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MASTER'S THESIS

Quest for Ambitious Climate Policy: Can Citizens' Assemblies Make a Difference?

A Case Study of National Climate Citizens' Assemblies in Germany and the UK

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abstract

In response to national governments' failure to address the climate crisis adequately, advocates propose using deliberative mini-publics as a potential solution to find politically viable and broadly legitimate measures commensurate with the challenge. Citizens' Assemblies (CAs), as one form of mini-public, have garnered widespread attention in this discourse, with a notable rise in occurrence across various levels from local to international. Yet, the critical question of whether Citizens' Assemblies (CAs) propose more ambitious measures than national governments and if these recommendations influence policymaking remains largely unanswered. This master's thesis addresses these questions by examining two national Climate Citizens' Assemblies (CCAs): the German "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) and the "Climate Assembly UK" (CAUK). For both cases the study assesses: 1) the ambition level of recommendations compared to existing policies, 2) the influence on policymaking of individual recommendations and 3) the mechanisms ensuring or hindering their impact. Results indicate that 56,3% of the BRK's recommendations and 78,3% of the CAUK's recommendations are more ambitious than existing policies. However, within the scope of this analysis, no influence of individual recommendations from the two cases could be proved. The main factors explaining this lack of influence can be categorised as follows: No.1) the entity commissioning the (C)CA, No. 2) timing issues, No. 3) multiple influencing factors at stake, No. 4) political pressure, No. 5) perceived added value of recommendations, No.6) the assembly's design and scope and No. 7) the existing amount of experience with (C)CAs. Employing mixed-methods, the study utilized a congruency approach to identify overlaps between recommendations and policy content. This was validated through surveys and interviews to ascertain whether these overlaps could be attributed to the influence of each respective CCA. The study provides valuable insights into the potential of (C)CAs and the factors shaping their impact on policymaking.

1. Introduction

> „The last three decades has left us with a politics no longer fit for purpose, not, at least, fit to drive the search for long-term strategies or to deliver on the practice and implementation of those and other long-term strategies. A politics bent towards short-terminism that does not engage most citizens and where politicians and the democratic processes are widely distrusted hardly seems to be in a robust condition to deliver policy goals, such as tackling global warming (…) For some, in this light, the argument is that only by abandoning the practice of contemporary democracy can the big issues or long-term concerns be tackled" (Stoker 2017, p. 68).

To prevent an irreversible climate catastrophe, each successive IPCC[1] report emphasizes the shrinking window of opportunity to implement sufficient climate protection measures. The acknowledgment that climate protection is a paramount societal challenge of our era and that existing responses are inadequate has permeated even the courtrooms of Europe: For instance, the national climate protection endeavours of the German and British governments were declared unconstitutional in 2021[2] and 2022[3] and the processes of revision remain ongoing[4][5]. Alongside court reactions, climate justice movements in the respective countries, such as "Letzte Generation"[6] in Germany and "Just Stop Oil"[7] in the UK, resort to civil disobedience, emphasizing that the call for more comprehensive climate protection also emanates from segments of civil society.

In scientific discourse, the lack of political action on the climate crisis is attributed to factors such as lobbying (Beder 2014; Lamb and Minx 2020; Streeck 2014), policitcal competition (Yang et al. 2023; Carter and Little 2021) as well as a cronicle preference for short term over long-term solution within contemporary policymaking (Stoker 2017; Cseh 2019). In regard to the latter, Stoker (2017) identifies politicians' fear of potential electoral consequences from exceeding current public support for climate measures. While studies suggest that public backing for enhanced climate mitigation measures may surpass politicians' assumptions (e.g. Dabla-Norris et al. 2023; Timmons and Lunn 2022; Tyson and Kennedy 2020), political feasibility and support for specific measures depend significantly on how and by whom they are proposed, emphasizing the crucial role of government trustworthiness (OECD 2017;

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[1] Reports — IPCC
[2] See: Bundesverfassungsgericht
[3] See: Judiciary UK
[4] Germany's government was recently ordered by a Higher Administrative Court to implement immediate programs in building and transportation; (see press release of November 30, 2023)
[5] A high court legal challenge was recently filed against the UK government's decision to weaken key climate policies (see The Guardian article of December 4, 2023)
[6] See https://letztegeneration.org/
[7] See https://juststopoil.org/

Davidovic and Harring 2020; Fleuß 2021; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021). The unfavorable outlook for political decision-makers in this context, marked by a drastic decline in public trust (Stoker 2017; Matasick 2017), underscores the need for enhanced transparency and public co-creation in policymaking to foster greater support for climate policies and governance (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2019).

To find these kinds of political measures commensurate with the scale of the challenge, various actors, activists, and politicians advocate for the use of deliberative mini-publics (Boswell et al. 2023; Wells et al. 2021; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023; Elstub et al. 2021). One of the most well-known forms of these mini-publics is the Citizens' Assembly (CA) in which individuals selected by lot, aided by expert inputs and professional moderation, develop recommendations for decision-makers (Kübler et al. 2020, e.g.; Elstub et al. 2021; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023). In recent years, CAs have gained popularity, with thirteen national Climate Citizens' Assemblies (CCAs) alone in Europe held throughout the last six years, as listed on the website of the "Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies" (KNOCA)[8].

The frequently stated objective of mini-publics is to furnish policymakers with recommendations, serving as a foundational framework for decision-making (Ryan and Smith 2014). As argued by Dryzek (2012), deliberative mini-publics, such as CAs, can serve as "transmission mechanisms", conveying citizens' ideas to formal politics and enhancing legitimacy as well as public acceptance when decision-makers incorporate their recommendations. In the context of climate mitigation, CCAs are credited with formulating more ambitious measures than current policies (Muradova et al. 2020; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021). It is argued that both the quality and climate policy could improve through the implementation of CCAs (Capstick et al. 2020).

To date, (C)CAs, with some exceptions, have not been inherently integrated into the political system and usually function in a consultative way (Geissel 2019). Consequently, their impact on policy depends, among other factors, on the decisions of policymakers concerning whether to adopt their recommendations or not (Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023).

While many studies have focused on the design factors of CAs, the critical questions that remain underexplored in the literature are whether the outcomes of CCAs are indeed more

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[8] See website (last retrieved: 18.12.2023)

ambitious than prevailing policies, whether they are used or shelved by decision-makers and which mechanisms ensure CAs recommendation's impact or lack thereof on policy.

Addressing these questions, constitutes the focus of this research, employing two national CCAs in Germany and the UK as case studies. This study is part of a research project at Leuphana University Lüneburg, systematically examining and comparing the policy impacts of eight national CCAs that have taken place in Europe. The goal is to derive insights for the future design and integration of Citizens' Assemblies into political structures. The research questions (RQs) are stated as follows:

1) To what extent did the "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) and the "Climate Assembly UK" (CAUK) generate proposals that demonstrated greater ambition than pre-existing government policy?
2) What impact did the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK have on national policy decisions?
3) What are the underlying factors which contributed to the influence or lack of influence of the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK?

In analyzing a total of 133 recommendations with a focus on causality by combining a pre-post approach with mixed methods of documents, interviews, and surveys, the study investigates whether these recommendations were more ambitious than previous policies and explores the extent and manner in which they influenced policy. The rationale for influence or the lack thereof is also examined within the framework of this approach. This study focuses on CA impacts on collective policy decisions. Expert interviews, however, also suggest other impacts. These potential impacts will be presented briefly in the results but are not based on systematic inquiry.

To this end, the thesis is structured into seven parts. Following the introduction, CCAs are defined, providing a brief overview of their relevance through application examples, expectations associated with CAs in general and the current state of research. Subsequently, the analytical framework underlying this study is elucidated. The methodology is outlined in Section 4, followed by the presentation of results in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the quantitative and qualitative findings concerning implications for future design and political integration of Citizens' Assemblies. Moreover, proposals for further research are put forth. In the concluding section, the study's findings will be summarized and potential implications of the discussed results for the overall role and application of (C)CAs will be explored.

2. Theoretical Framework

This section establishes the theoretical foundations for the research, provides a more detailed definition of CAs and outlines associated expectations. It delves into the diverse impact areas of CAs, particularly exploring their potential role in climate policymaking. Through a review of previous studies on the policy impact of (C)CAs, research gaps will be identified to justify and explain the research questions of this study. The theoretical framework situates the investigation within the broader research landscape on CAs, paving the way for the subsequent introduction of the analytical framework employed in this study.

2.1. Citizens' Assemblies as a Social Mandate for Climate Change

A Citizens' Assembly represents a type of mini-public which is tasked to advise on a specific issue on behalf of the broader public (Kübler et al. 2020)[9] For this purpose, a CA is constituted through stratified random selection ensuring that participants depict the population as closely as possible regarding various characteristics (Elstub et al. 2021; Ryan and Smith 2014). Alongside random selection, several measures, including compensation, accommodation provision, and childcare, are employed to minimize participation barriers, fostering greater diversity (Elstub et al. 2021). As a basis for consultation, experts from various disciplines are consulted, shedding light on the subject under consideration from different perspectives (Ryan and Smith 2014). To facilitate a fair discussion on an equal footing within the diverse group, participants are assisted by independent moderators during the deliberations (Kübler et al. 2020). The guiding principle of CA's deliberations is to ensure conditions that are as free, inclusive, and solution-oriented as possible (ibid.). It is crucial to note that there is no singular form of CAs. Mini-publics in general manifest in diverse forms, varying in purpose, subject matter, participation selection, meeting frequency, modes of deliberation, stakes, and monitoring (Fung 2003).

Well-recognized examples of CAs designed to contribute to decision-making processes encompass the 2004 CA in British Columbia (Warren and Pearse 2008) as well as the Irish CA and Convention on the Constitution (Courant 2021). Since then, a number of CAs have emerged in diverse states and contexts, spanning local, regional and national levels as well as

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[9] The number of participants in Citizens' Assemblies (CAs) varies; according to the OECD (2020, p. 35), the average number of participants per panel is 90.

a global assembly preceding COP26 (Kübler et al. 2020; Boswell et al. 2023)[10]. In recent years, CAs focussing on climate-related topics have gained popularity, marking a noteworthy development after more than a decade of sporadic interest in this approach (Boswell et al. 2023). According to Sandover et al. (2021, p. 81) the recent popularity and emergence of some CCAs is, amongst other factors, attributable to a shift in public perception regarding the climate crisis: „Mass climate change protests in 2019 were seen to have changed public perceptions of climate change and created a need for political action at all levels".

The focus of this study is on the impact on policy making as this is one of the major interests for scholars and practitioners of CCAs (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2019; Howarth et al. 2020; Kübler et al. 2020; Cherry et al. 2021; Elstub et al. 2021; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021; Wells et al. 2021; Capstick, Demski 2022; Boswell et al. 2023; Ejsing et al. 2023). However, it should be noted that the rationales for the implementation of CAs are manifold. One of the key arguments is that CAs have the potential to significantly broaden democratic processes by incorporating a more diverse range of voices, aiming to address representation deficiencies in the democratic system (Ehs 2019; Michels and Binnema 2019; Sandover et al. 2021). They are but one part of the call for democratic innovations aimed at reimagining and enhancing citizens' roles in governance processes by expanding opportunities for participation, deliberation, and influence (Elstub and Escobar 2019). CAs, beyond their common intent to influence policy, can also serve various purposes, including informing and fostering societal discussion, ensuring political accountability, promoting justice in politics, as well as fostering civic virtues and political skills (Fung 2003).

In the context of addressing the complexity of climate issues, CCAs are proposed, among other reasons, due to the belief that they can navigate through various courses of action through an interplay of scientific knowledge and societal value discussions (Capstick et al. 2020). Howarth et al. (2020, p. 1107) attribute to CCAs the ability to "create a social mandate for climate action". A social mandate, akin to a social contract or license for action, represents societal support for an actor (here the government) to take legitimate action for collective welfare (ibid.). In this instance, CCAs are hoped to generate more ambitious climate policy proposals than governments, but the evidence for this is only anecdotal (Böker and Elstub 2015; Devaney et al. 2020; Muradova et al. 2020; OECD 2020; Ejsing et al. 2023). An often-cited exemplary

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[10] It is noteworthy that the adoption of the lottery method in political procedures is not a recent occurrence but has deep roots in the egalitarian principles of early democracies (Manin 1997) Argued by Ehs (2019), the resurgence of the lottery method, although originally confined to lay jurisdiction, is evident in response to the widely recognized crisis of democracy and the emergence of novel social challenges.

recommendation in this context is the proposal from the French CCA to institutionalize ecocide as a criminal offense under French law[11]. Yet, to date no systematic analysis on the ambitiousness of CCAs recommendations could be identified. Consequently, the first research question (RQ1) is formulated as follows:

1) To what extent did the "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) and the "Climate Assembly UK" (CAUK) generate proposals that demonstrated greater ambition than pre-existing government policy?

2.2. Previous Research on Impacts of (C)CAs

While in recent years, there has been an increase in interest in and the application of CAs for climate and other topics (OECD 2020; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023; Michels and Binnema 2019; Boswell et al. 2023), certain subdomains to better understand and evaluate CAs are currently underexplored. What do CAs and especially CCAs actually achieve in light of the promises associated with them? This question arises not least from the criticism surrounding CAs, coexisting with the myriad hopes placed upon them. Critics of CAs articulate concerns about their potential limitations in fostering meaningful deliberation, the perceived failure of CAs to challenge power dynamics, susceptibility to manipulation, limited policy impact, and insufficient promotion of minority voices (see for details Elstub and Khoban 2023). Ejsing (2023, p. 16) argues that CAs "should not be seen as a silver bullet that can solve the dual crisis of climate and democracy". Hence, Citizens' Assemblies (CAs) are not undisputed. This is also a reason why this study aims to closely examine what CAs actually accomplish and specifically focuses on the aforementioned criticism that CAs are supposed to have limited policy impact. The following section provides an overview of different approaches and previous research to assess the impact of (C)CAs, followed by a more in-depth exploration of policy impacts.

General Research Landscape on Impact of CAs
While there are numerous empirical findings on the effects of direct democratic procedures on citizens, the citizenry, and policies, the same cannot be said for dialogue-oriented ones (Geissel 2019). Prior research on the impact areas of CAs has focused on establishing frameworks for impact analysis (Vrydagh 2022; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023; Capstick, Demski 2022; Michels and Binnema 2019), analysing the drivers of impact or the lack thereof (Michels and Binnema 2019; Geissel 2019; Lafont 2015; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023), examining the

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[11] See the voting result, in which 99% of participants voted in favor of these recommendations

effects on participants (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2018; Boswell 2021; Fung 2003), investigating the media coverage of CAs and exploring the perception of different actors regarding CAs (Sandover et al. 2021; Courant 2021; Elstub et al. 2022; Pilet et al. 2023). Furthermore there has been research on the local level, in which the fate of proposals of participatory proceses were traced, for instance, from Spain (Font et al. 2016) and Belgium (Vrydagh 2022; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023).

Research Landscape on Policy Impact of (C)CAs

Whereas many different impact areas of CAs have been explored so far, the overall macro-effects of deliberative processes on politics, such as public policies, have so far remained underexplored and the absence of a systematic evaluation approach hinders drawing conclusions and comparing outcomes across diverse deliberative forums (Pogrebinschi and Ryan 2018; Michels and Binnema 2019). Critics of the format argue that CAs have so far had little impact on policy (see for discussion Elstub and Khoban 2023). However examples exist demonstrating that CAs can indeed have an impact on macro-politics under certain conditions (see for examples Goodin and Dryzek 2006). Elstub et al. (2021, p. 1) contend that there is "little empirical research on how the scope of citizens assemblies affetcs (…) its impact on external policy actors". The limited research on macro-level effects, such as policy impacts, is surprising, given that Vrydagh and Caluwaerts (2023) contend that deliberative practices are frequently employed to shape public policy. Concerning the focus of this analysis, Climate Citizens' Assemblies, the research landscape is also limited to date (Elstub et al. 2021; Capstick, Demski 2022). Similarly to the overall impact research on CAs, previous studies on CCAs, primarily assessed deliberation processes, providing best practice guidelines but lacking a comprehensive evaluation of the assembly's overall value in addressing climate change (Capstick, Demski 2022).

Research Lanscape on the BRK and the CAUK

In the context of the cases examined in this thesis, for instance, scholarly investigations have assessed the CAUK concerning its design, participants' perceptions, and deliberations (Cherry et al. 2021; Elstub et al. 2021b; Elstub et al. 2021a). Additionally, Elstub et al. (2021b; 2021a) conducted interviews with committee clerks, chairs, and civil servants from the UK government to evaluate the general impact of the CAUK, albeit without systematically tracing individual recommendations. There is also research on drawing lessons for climate lawmaking from three national assemblies, including the CAUK (Duvic-Paoli 2022). Boswell et. al. (2023) furthermore described the differences between internal and integrative design characteristics

of six national climate assemblies, including the CAUK and the BRK, but without analyzing effects. Machin (2023) included both respective CCAs in a critical analysis of the internal deliberations of the two processes.

Regarding the BRK, the research landscape is relatively limited. Blome and Hartlapp (2023) examined the potential of national CCAs in France and Germany to address issues of underrepresentation. In investigating dilemmas within policy pilots, deliberation fora, and policy labs, Zeigermann (2023) utilizes the BRK as an exemplar of a policy deliberation forum, noting its limited policy impact. However, there has been no systematic evaluation of its impact.

While the state of research on both the policy impacts of CAs and on CCAs appears rather limited, the research undertaking in this study is to address both endeavors. Therefore, the second research question (RQ2) is:

2)   What impact did the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK have on national policy decisions?

While CCAs can have diverse types and realms of impact, for instance on public attitudes, discourse and capacity-building across policy, social and systemtic dimensions (see Capstick, Demski 2022), this study focuses on "instrumental impact", specifically pertaining to public policy and political decision-making (Capstick, Demski 2022). The actors under consideration for this area usually include policymakers, politicians, parliamentarians, civil servants, and advisory bodies. The effects can influence various steps along the policy cycle, from agenda setting through positions and strategies to the implementation of policy (ibid.). While influences on political debate also fall within this category, this research primarily concentrates on the positions of relevant political actors in the form of collective decisions. The definitions for this research will be presented more precisely in the analytical framework.

2.3. Factors Influencing Policy Impact

Gaining understanding of the underlying factors that contribute to either influence or lack of influence is crucial for discerning the conditions under which CCAs exert impact, thereby offering valuable perspectives for the future of CCAs. This section incorporates various hypotheses from the literature for this purpose, paving the way for the third research question.

As most CAs have produced non-binding recommendations so far, an important factor influencing the impact of recommendations include the linkage of a participatory process with representative democracy (Geissel 2019) as well as decision-makers' attitudes toward the process and the subsequent manner in which they handle the recommendations (Lafont 2015; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023; Michels and Binnema 2019). According to Bua (2019, p. 289) "[c]onsultative innovations have a relatively undefined link to binding decisions, which provides minimal guarantees for action based on recommendations". Several authors argue that the degree of institutionalization and the degree of power-sharing between deliberative formats and representative institutions can play a pivotal role in terms of impact (Geissel 2019; Pogrebinschi and Ross 2019; Bua 2019). Furthermore, scholars argue that CAs linked to other efforts and forms of participation, such as referendums and applied at different levels, have the potential to foster impact and transformative changes on a broader scale (Ejsing et al. 2023; Boswell et al. 2023). Moreover Michels and Binnema (2019) argue that an open deliberation agenda neglecting specific political needs can lead to reduced impact, producing abstract proposals that align with existing policies, making it easier for politicians to dismiss them. Likewise, Pogrebinschi and Ryan (2018) conclude that the topic of deliberation plays a role in explaining the impact of the recommendations. It is also argued that the uptake of recommendations depends on the agreements made in advance, specifying how responses to the recommendations should be addressed (Lowndes et al. 2001; Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Elstub et al. 2021). Kuntze and Fesenfeld (2021) argue that the legitimacy and support of CCAs are, to some extent, attributable to design characteristics, further dependent on the CCA's ability to withstand lobbying influences and additionally contingent on public awareness of the process. Regarding the latter, Chwalisz (2020) equally asserts that effective public communication is crucial for legitimizing deliberative processes. According to Jacquet and van der Does (2021a, p. 481), media can be a key actor in the transmission and reframing of a minipublic's recommendations, thereby exerting influence on policy-making.

In considering these different assumptions, the third research question (RQ3) is formulated as follows:

3) What are the underlying factors which contributed to the influence or lack of influence of the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK?

3. Analytical Framework

The following section outlines the units of analysis considered in this study and provides definitions crucial for understanding the approach. Subsequently, the approach for assessing the ambition level and impact of the CA will be examined.

3.1. Unit of Analysis and Concept Definitions

The unit of analysis in this study is a single CA recommendation. Recommendations vary in scope and level of detail. Typically, each recommendation focuses on solving a specific problem in a particular area of action, as identified by the CA. A recommendation suggests general goals and/or detailed steps for addressing an issue. Sometimes, timelines and/or required resources are outlined, offering guidance on how to address the problem or achieve the goal. Notably, one recommendation may involve multiple sub-recommendations; for instance, a recommendation titled "Avoidance of Air Travel" may include the sub-recommendations "Shift of domestic air traffic to rail by 2030" "Abstention of politicians from short-haul flights" and "Control of holiday advertising" amongst others[12]. The scrutiny of sub-recommendations is crucial for assessing the complete recommendation and aligning with political content, to be outlined. However, for this research, recommendations are treated as a unified entity to manage information volume effectively and ensure comparability across cases.

Collective decisions comprise the main dependent variable for the purpose of this research. They refer to agreements or choices reached by a group of relevant political actors within the political sphere, often involving negotiations, compromises, and consensus-building processes.

A *relevant political actor* is defined here as someone directly influencing the (non-)formation of collective political decisions at the national level, including entities such as parliament and government, as well as individuals like party leaders, cabinet members, and party spokespersons.

Relevant political actors can each have distinctive *positions* which can manifest in in various media (e.g., legislative texts or drafts, party programs, interviews, other actions, etc.) and vary in terms of specificity (from informal statements of intent to proposed legislation). However, these different positions will not be looked at individually here, but assessed in the form of a

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[12] This example represents recommendation No. 19 from the action field "Mobility" of the BRK (see report, p. 51)

collective decision such as formal parliamentary votes or informal collective statements of intent.

The type of collective decision under consideration depends on the *political arena* in which the CA occurrs and the objectives set forth by the CA. A *political arena* for collective decisions is the context in which policymaking unfolds. This context may involve critical moments in the formation of collective decisions, such as the establishment of a new government coalition. It can also encompass the contextualization of the party landscape, determining the decision-making power of different parties within the government.

In the respective sections dedicated to each case in the methodology part, these concepts will be outlined for each case. The next section operationalizes the assessment of the impact of the independent variable, recommendations, on the dependent variable, collective decisions, and details the approach for comparing levels of ambition.

3.2. The Congruence Approach

Jacquet and van der Does (2021a) identify three categories in the literature to classify the policy impact of CAs: consideration in the policy-making process, congruence with decisions and structural change. While the first questions actors' consideration of the CA in the public sphere and institutions and the latter examines if a CA induces policy practice changes, the congruence-dimension, focused in this study, examines whether CA recommendations translate into policies. Although these dimensions are interconnected, Jacquet and van der Does (ibid.) recommend making analytical distinctions.

According to Vrydagh (2022) assessments of consultative participatory mechanisms typically utilize a congruency approach when evaluating their impact. Examining congruency basically means to assess whether recommendations translate into policies (Jacquet and van der Does 2021a). This can be done by textually comparing a CA recommendation with public policy documents that detail the policy output, e.g., strategy papers or legislation (Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023). It is crucial to bear in mind for the congruency approach that "a citizen proposal could correspond either literally in the text or more subjectively in intent" (Vrydagh 2022, p. 72).

My analytical approach is adapted from the pioneering work of Vrydagh (2022) and Vrydagh and Caluwaerts (2023).

In contrast to a binary approach, which categorizes only whether there is a textual overlap between a recommendation and a policy document, Vrydagh (2022) suggests a plural approach as it recognizes different nuances of congruency. For the purpose of this study, the category "congruent" indicates that a recommendation entirely aligns with collective decisions. Conversely, "not congruent" applies when the recommendation and collective decisions exhibit strong divergence, contradiction, and/or negativity. Additionally, "partially congruent" occurs when the recommendation and collective decisions differ in a) the level of concretization, b) the overlap of subsets, and c) the level of ambition[13]. Another category labelled "congruent in goal only" outlines instances in which the objectives between a recommendation and collective decisions coincide, albeit with divergent proposed measures. Furthermore, the category "conflicting positions", indicates the existence of divergent viewpoints among relevant political actors with respect to a recommendation. Lastly, the category "absence of idea" applies to instances where no positions from relevant political actors during the compared period can be identified, indicating a deliberate or unconscious decision to refrain from taking a position. In Table 1, the variable "congruence of positions" which summarises all of these categories, is presented[14].

Table 1:Congruence of Positions Between Citizens' Assembly Recommendations and Political Actors' Positions

Type of congruence	Definition
A: congruent	The recommendation and the positions of relevant political actors overlap completely
a: partially congruent	The recommendation and the positions of relevant political actors overlap partially but not completely. This concerns the level of concretization (a|a) and/or the overlap of subsets (a|b) and/or the level of ambition (a|c).
x: congruent in goal only	The recommendation and the positions of relevant political actors overlap in their objective, but not in their implementation strategy, with the period to be compared.
B: not congruent	The recommendation and the positions of relevant political actors do not overlap. The positions are strongly divergent, contradictory and/or negative.
C: conflicting positions	In relation to the recommendation there are conflicting positions between relevant political actors.
ø: absence of idea / no stance	There are no positions at all from relevant political actors in the period under comparison. Relevant political actors consciously or unconsciously refrain from taking a position.

[13] It is crucial to emphasize that the category "partially congruent" combines various manifestations of partial overlaps, potentially resulting in lost data for the congruence analysis. While not a significant issue for this analysis, it is important for future work to distinguish and delve deeper into these variations in the data.
[14] More detailed explanations and definitions for the variable "congruence of positions", including examples, can be found in Section I.1. in Annex I

The congruence approach is challenged by the fact that CAs produce varying forms and degrees of precision in their recommendations (Jacquet and van der Does 2021a). Some CAs generate abstract guidelines, while others provide voting outcomes for different options. This variability makes it challenging for researchers to analyse their translation into concrete policy content (ibid.). One way to approach this limitation is to differentiate between different types of recommendations (see Section I.2. in Annex I). The research team decided on using four different categories: *Guidelines* contain formulations on political principles that do not include specific measures or goals. *Goals* contain target formulations, such as specifications like years or percentage reductions, while under *measures*, concrete actions are understood. In addition, the category „*mixed*" was introduced for all recommendations that include both specific measures and target formulations[15]. It is noteworthy that the congruency approach was not applied to guidelines for this research due to their broad and interpretative nature. All other types of recommendations were included, mindful of the limitations for analysis posed by the variation in recommendation types as formulated by Jacquet and Van der Does (2021a).

A second challenge is that the observation of congruence between recommendations and policy decisions does not necessarily imply that the minipublic played a decisive role in the policy-making process which led to the uptake (Jacquet and van der Does 2021a). One should therefore not solely rely on textual correspondence between CA's recommendations. Merely looking at policy papers published after the assembly is considered insufficient, as the adoption of specific decisions may be influenced by factors other than the assembly. (Jacquet and van der Does 2021a; Vrydagh 2022; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023).

Consequently, Vrydagh (2022) suggests enhancing the congruency approach by integrating an analysis of decision-makers' preferences prior to the assembly. The objective is to evaluate whether assembly recommendations align with or diverge from decision-makers' pre-existing positions. This is particularly important for assessing whether decision-makers selectively included recommendations that already matched their agenda, a phenomenon known as "cherry-picking" or whether they also embraced ideas that did not align with their preferences (ibid.). Initial preferences can be discerned by analysing policy agendas, party programs, and media interviews (Vrydagh 2022). To assess the initial preferences of relevant political actors,

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[15]While this differentiation is not central to this research, it could be of interest for future studies. For instance, examining whether policymakers are more likely to adopt broader goals within recommendations compared to specific measures, or vice versa. Such an analysis could have implications for the required formulation and concretization of Citizens' Assemblies recommendations to achieve policy impact or to observe whether "cherry-picking" (Vrydagh 2022) occurs more frequently for goals or means.

Vrydagh and Caluwarts (2023) advocate for a sequential model which will be explained in the following paragraph.

3.3. The Sequential Impact Matrix (SIM)

Performing the congruence analysis before and after the assembly is the basis for answering the first two research questions. The aim of the second research question is to assess whether a recommendation had and influence on policy or not and if so, which type of influence it was.

For this purpose, a *sequential impact matrix* (SIM) can be used as a tool for the systematic documentation and comparison of the findings (Vrydagh 2022). In the SIM, three data collection points are identified. Time 1 (T1) denotes the point at which the recommendations of the CA were released (Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023). The positions of relevant political actors after the CA took place are captured at time 2 (T2), and at time 0 (T0), the initial preferences of the actors are recorded (ibid.). This distinction derives from March's (1955, p. 438) conceptualization of influence as "that which induces behaviour on the part of the individual at time T1 different from that which might be predicted on the basis of the knowledge of the individual organism at time T0". If a recommendation (T1) has induced a shift in the positions of pertinent political actors between T0 and T2, it constitutes an influence (Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023). To examine influence, a temporally sequential perspective is necessary, as Vrydagh and Caluwaerts (2023, p. 8) argue that "decision-makers' preferences act as the connecting mechanism between the mini-public and the subsequent public policy". For the purpose of this research, eight categories were derived and adapted from Vrydagh and Caluwaerts (2023): "no uptake", "anyways", "enriching", "shifting", "innovating", "inhibiting", "political" and "fortifying". The first two signify "no influence", while the remaining six indicate "influence"[16]. For the analysis, the various types of influence are individual dummy variables, each encoded with "yes" or "no". This accounts for the fact that different types of influence may occur simultaneously. The various types of influence are presented in Table 2[17].

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[16] Comparatively, the introduction of the category "anyways" adopts a more conservative approach than Vrydagh and Caluwaerts (2023) category "continuous". Thus, the "anyways" cases are classified under "no influence" for the purpose of this study, rather than being assessed as a separate influence, as is the case for the "continuous" category.

[17] Fur further definition, explanation and examples regarding the different types of influence see I.3. in Annex I

Table 2: Types of Influence of a Citizens' Assembly Recommendation on Political Actors' Position

Type of influence	Definition
no uptake (no influence)	The recommendation (T1) had no influence on the collective decisions of the political unit in question because no uptake took place.
anyways (no influence)	The recommendation (T1) had no influence on the collective decisions of the political unit in question, because the identical decision would have been taken at that time even without the CA.
fortifying influence	The recommendation (T1) influenced collective decisions of the political unit in question (T0 → T2) by reinforcing the political actors in their existing positions and/or initiating new processes for the further development of existing positions. Without T1, the decision would not have been made at this point in time.
political influence	The recommendation (T1) had an influence on the fact that the conflicting positions of relevant political actors at time T0 changed to such an extent that a collective decision in line with T1 was made possible in T2.
shifting influence	The recommendation (T1) caused a shift in the positions of relevant political actors and consequently led to collective decisions in line with T1 that would not have occurred in this form and/or at this time without T1.
inhibiting influence	The recommendation (T1) prompted the political actors to abandon their political agenda from time T0 to time T2.
innovating influence	The recommendation (T1) has resulted in the adoption of a new idea in T2 - even if the recommendation has only been partially integrated. This only applies if the entire recommendation is innovative and not just individual aspects of it.
enriching influence	The recommendation (T1) has concretized and enriched the previously existing positions of relevant political actors (T0) with regard to T2.

Additionally, since RQ1 1 investigates the recommendations' level of ambitiousness compared to previous policy decisions, the variable "ambition" is introduced. This variable assesses whether the recommendation (T1) is "more ambitious", "less ambitious" or "neither" compared to the collective decisions made prior to the assembly (T0). A recommendation is considered "more ambitious" if it 1) results in greater CO_2 emissions reduction, 2) achieves a specific goal earlier than planned, or 3) impacts more sectors than intended at T0. An illustration of this is when, at T0, the objective is to phase out diesel cars by 2040, while the CA recommendation (T1) suggests banning the sale of new petrol, diesel, and hybrid cars by 2035-30. This example perfectly demonstrates all three potential expressions of "more ambitious". Firstly, the target year is earlier (2030/35 instead of 2040). Secondly, T1 encompasses a broader range of vehicles, which, in turn, likely leads to a more substantial reduction in CO_2 emissions[18].

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[18] This is a real example referring to the first recommendation of the CAUK in the action field "how we travel on land" compared to T0 in the form of a strategy paper. For further details see SIMs fot the BRK and the CAUK in Supplement 1

Certainly, there are instances where the level of ambition can be analysed based on only one or two of these expressions of "more ambitious". For instance, a recommendation such as "rules for large retailers and supermarkets" to reduce food waste and packaging can be compared to T0, where the government only states to be "working with retailers (...) to explore introducing plastic-free supermarket aisles". In T0, only packaging is addressed, whereas T1 additionally focuses on reducing food waste and aims for the establishment of a "rule"[19]. A recommendation is also considered "more ambitious" if, at T0, there is an "absence of idea" signifying that no content pertaining to the recommendation could be found. This automatically enhances the ambition of the recommendation because there were no prior efforts in T0 regarding the respective field. [20].

4. Methodology

The analysis was based on multiple types and sources of data. A document analysis was followed by the conduction of semi-structured interviews as well as surveys. Mixed methods are especially well-suited to engage with the complexities of deliberation as they enable the researcher to get a better understanding of the CA and its context as well as the actors involved (Talpin 2019; Escobar 2022; Vrydagh 2022).

The cases addressed in this study concern two national-level CCAs, the German "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) and the "Climate Assembly UK" (CAUK). Case studies are essential for evaluating dialogue-oriented processes like CAs as they provide insights into how deliberative approaches integrate into policymaking and ways to enhance deliberation more broadly (Geissel 2019; Elstub and Pomatto 2022).

In the case of the BRK, 107 actors were contacted, including people involved in the process of the BRK, Members of Parliament (MPs), differenct fractions of the Bundestag and climate-related committees at federal level. Four interviews could be conducted from July to November 2023, meeting a low-range standard concerning the optimal quantity of interviews in comparative studies (Vrydagh 2022). In addition, two phone calls were made, four written responses were received, and information from ten people was collected through surveys.

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[19] This example refers to the fourth recommendation of the CAUK in the action field "what we eat and how we use the land" and a comparison to a strategy paper in T0. For further details see Supplement 1.
[20] For further details regarding the variable "ambition" see section I.4. in Annex I

In the case of the CAUK, 146 people were contacted with an interview request, comprising of government MPs, committees, permanent secretaries, and individuals involved in process of the CAUK. Seven interviews could be conducted from September to November 2023. This meets a middle-range standard for the number of interviews in comparative studies (Vrydagh 2022). The interviews were complemented by three written responses and information from two actors through surveys.

Given the substantial differences in the two cases, the precise steps of analysis will be divided at that juncture for each case. Each part begins with a description of the case and its contextualization. This is because the selection of relevant data sources, for instance documents and experts, depends on case contexts.

4.1. The "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) in Germany

4.1.1. Case Description BRK

From April to June 2021, 160 randomly selected individuals from across Germany convened in 12 sessions to deliberate on the question: "How can Germany achieve the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement - with due consideration to social, economic, and environmental factors?" (Bürgerbegehren Klimaschutz e.V. 2021). These people comprised the first national CCA in Germany, the "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK). The selection of participants considered regional distribution factors, age, gender, educational and migrational background, as well as the self-reported level of concern regarding climate protection. The outcome of the deliberations, presented in the form of a „Citizens' Climate Report", comprised 80 recommendations spanning the action fields of „energy," „mobility," „buildings and heating," as well as „food and agriculture", along with seven recommendations addressing „instruments of transformation" (Bürgerbegehren Klimaschutz e.V. 2021). To inform their deliberations, participants received input from 25 leading researchers in climate and social science. The BRK was commissioned and financed by the non-profit association "BürgerBegehren Klimaschutz e.V." (BBK)[21]. The final report was published on September 7, 2021, just before the German federal elections took place. This timing aligns with the expressed objective of the sponsoring association BBK to leverage the recommendations of the BRK to shape the stances of political leaders and representatives during the prelude to the 2021 Federal Election and the subsequent

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[21] See website; furthermore three independent organizing institutes nexus, ifok, and the "Institut für Partizipatives Gestalten" (IPG) were responsible for the design, concept, and process.

negotiation process for the coalition agreement[22]. Unlike other CCAs, the BRK was solely organized by civil society organizations and had no formal ties to the political parties it sought to influence (Boswell et al. 2023). Boswell et al. (2023, p. 190) therefore call the BRK a "hybrid form of civil society-party political connection".

A non-probabilistic quota sample survey conducted by "Pha²se"[23] examines the societal acceptance of the BRK. Furthermore, a recently published representative online panel study of forsa[24] commissioned by BBK indicates that 79% of Germans express the desire for the federal government to use the recommendations of the Bürgerrat Klima as guidance.

Political context

Public opinion in Germany is characterised by a strong support for pro-climate views (Zwar et al. 2023). The current government coalition consists of Greens, Liberal Democrats (FDP) and Social Democrats (SPD)[25]. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) plays a crucial role in Germany's climate policies, overseeing legislative matters through the Committee on Climate Protection and Energy (Zwar et al. 2023). Other ministries, such as transportation, agriculture, and buildings, house additional committees related to climate (ibid.). Furthermore, there are collaborative efforts, including party-level working groups on climate protection and energy within the Bundestag, the German parliament (ibid.). Following the legal challenge to Germany's national climate law in 2021[26], the government coalition presented a revision in March 2023[27], leading to the removal of legally binding sectoral targets. However, a Higher Administrative Court recently mandated the government to implement immediate programs in the building and transportation sectors[28].

4.1.2. Data Collection and Analysis BRK

Document Collection and Analysis

As the BRK was intended to influence the coalition negotiations of 2021, the chosen political arena is „coalition negotiations" and collective decisions in this arena manifest in the „coalition agreement". Therefore, the initial step of analysis involved comparing the 2021 coalition agreement (T2) with the BRK recommendations (T1) and verifying overlaps. The sequential

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[22] See coalition agreement
[23] See „Erste Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen"
[24] See „Bürgerrat Klima. Ergebnisse einer bevölkerungsrepräsentativen Befragung"
[25] The greens have reentered government in 2021 after a 16-year absence from government participation;
[26] See: Bundesverfassungsgericht
[27] „Modernisierungspaket für Klimaschutz und Planunsgbeschleunigung"
[28] „Klagen der DUH und des BUND auf Sofortprogramm für die Sektoren Gebäude und Verkehr erfolgreich"

impact matrix for the BRK, documenting intersections between recommendations and relevant passages within the coalition agreement, can be found in Supplement 1[29].

For the document analysis, in accordance with the congruence approach, key policy documents post the release of the CA recommendations (T2) and immediately before the release of the recommendations (T0) are scrutinized. The objective is to comprehend how reality without a CA compares to a world with a CA. It is important to note that RQ1 was answered after it had already been established that the BRK recommendations had no influence in regard to RQ2. This makes the coalition agreement (T2) a better comparison document in regard to the variable ambition than other potential documents for T0, such as party manifestos. Therefore, T2 was used as a comparison to assess ambition and answer RQ1.

Expert Interviews

In the case of the BRK, the sponsoring organisation BürgerBegehren Klimaschutz e.V. was considered a relevant actor, with the assumption that they had a consolidated overview of the BRK's follow-up. Relevant political actors in the context of the BRK are the Members of Parliament (MPs) who participated in the coalition negotiations in 2021. Through document analysis and a comparison between the recommendations and passages from the coalition agreement, it became evident which working groups precisely addressed the topics covered in the BRK. The focal individuals were MPs from the working groups "Environmental and Nature Conservation", "Agriculture and Nutrition", "Climate, Energy, Transformation", "Construction and Housing", and "Economy". Additionally, seven different committees and advisory bodies in the German Bundestag were considered relevant as they coordinate various aspects of climate protection, and the coalition agreement serves as the foundation for their work[30]. It was presumed that they would possess information about whether the BRK was mentioned beyond the coalition negotiations. Individual factions in the Bundestag were also viewed as relevant actors, as it was suspected that they might have insights into whether the BRK played a role in the preparation and follow-up of coalition negotiations for their respective parties and to what extent.

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[29] Only after the completion of the congruence analysis, I received a response from one of the institutions that conducted the BRK. It included a table documenting the overlap between recommendations and the coalition agreement. While this comparison yielded similar results, it was not integrated into the analysis.

[30] These were: Committees (1. Transport; 2. Climate Protection and Energy; 3. Nutrition and Agriculture; 4. Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection; 5. Housing, Urban Development, Construction, and Municipalities), 6. the Sub-Committee on International Climate and Energy Policy of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 7. the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Sustainable Development.

Each one of the aforementioned contacted 107 actors received three emails: The first one included the interview request, the second contained the survey, and the third served as a reminder to complete the survey. The requests resulted in four interviews (I), two phone calls (C) and four written responses via e-mail (W). The initial interview (I1) was conducted with a project team member of BBK. Three interviews were conducted with MPs who were part of the coalition negotiations within the aforementioned working groups (I2, I3, I4). One phone call took place with the Chief of Staff Working Group on Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection SPD-Parliamentary Group[31] (C1) and one with an employee of a member of one of the committees (C2). Additionally, there were three written responses from MPs who were part of the coalitions negotiations (W1, W2, W3) and one written response from the employee of a negotiator within the coalitions negotiations (W4)[32]. A total of ten people completed the survey. While Vrydagh (2022) mentions various standards regarding the appropriate number of interviews for data triangulation[33], in the case of the BRK, an exhaustive approach was chosen to identify suitable interview partners, given the difficulty in persuading actors to participate in interviews.

Three interviews were conducted through the video conference platform Zoom[34] and one over the phone. In Supplement 2, an example of a semi-structured interview guide for the BRK is provided. Adhering to Leech's (2002) methodology for semi-structured interviews, the interview partners were initially presented with open-ended questions concerning their overall assessment of the BRK and its perceived influence on policy. Following this, more focused questions aimed to understand the specific impact of certain recommendations, especially those aligning with passages in the coalition agreement. In the interviews with the MPs, the relevant passages were tailored to the working group they belonged to during the coalition negotiations. The concluding questions focused on soliciting their arguments for the (lack of) impact of the BRK, suggestions for improvement and whether they could recommend others with expertise on this particular subject. For the purpose of this research, interviewees were anonymized to an abstract role description prefered by them, in order to allow participants to express their views without bias. The participants were requested to sign a consent form (see Supplement 3), which detailed the objectives of the thesis and the conditions of participation.

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[31] This interviewee explicitly gave their consent to use this role description.
[32] The table of respondents for the BRK and the CAUK are found Annex II
[33] Data triangulation means using different methods, in this case, to cross-verify causal conclusions drawn from the results of the congruence analysis (see Bennett and Checkel 2012.
[34] See website

<u>Surveys</u>

Given that those best positioned to evaluate the impact of the BRK are holding decision-making roles at the federal level, it was not reasonable to expect that a significant number of them would be available for an interview. Therefore, surveys were developed for the MPs who had already been contacted, with the hope that the reduced time commitment would increase the likelihood of a response[35]. A survey for each working group was created using the survey tool *Lamapoll[36]*. As I was the first among the research group to create a survey, this step involved a considerable amount of time and consultation. Some recommendations are not only present in one but several of the six surveys because multiple working groups address them. In the end, 10 MPs who were part of the coalition negotiations completed the respective surveys sent to them.

4.2. The "Climate Assembly UK (CAUK)"

4.2.1. Case Description CAUK

The "Citizens' Assembly UK" (CAUK), commissioned by six select commitees of the House of Commons[37], took place on six weekends from January to May 2020 (Climate Assembly UK 2020). 108 participants were randomly selected from the general population to achieve a composition that reflects the UK population across various criteria, including age, gender, ethnicity, educational level, location in the UK, urban or rural residence, and their level of concern about climate change. The CAUK is the first national CCA in the UK and represents one of the first CCAs addressing the climate emergency at large (Elstub et al. 2021). It was tasked by the six select committees with exploring the question: "How can the UK achieve its goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050?" The assembly developed a total of 46 recommendations across the action fields of land and air travel, heat and energy use in homes, food consumption and land use, consumer behavior, electricity sources, greenhouse gas removals, the impact and handling of Covid-19 and offered some additional recommendations. The participants of the CAUK were primarily engaged in policy appraisal[38], evaluating scenarios and policies proposed by experts (Boswell et al. 2023). Thus, the assembly adopted

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[35] Example surveys can be found in Supplement 4.
[36] See website
[37] The six select committees were: Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; Environmental Audit; Housing, Communities and Local Government; Science and Technology; Transport; and Treasury (see announcement)
[38] "Involve", a public participation organization, was commissioned by Parliament to organise CAUK and received a list of prioritised action fields, agenda-setting questions in line with the interests of the six select committees focusing on climate change and the net-zero target (Elstub et al. 2021)

a predominantly top-down approach regarding the topics and contents for discussion (Cherry et al. 2021). On September 10, 2020, CAUK published its findings in a 556-page report (Climate Assembly UK 2020). In November 2020, CAUK was praised and deliberated among multiple Members of Parliament (MPs)[39], and another oral evidence session occurred in the House of Commons in June 2021[40].

Boswell et al. (2023, p. 190) suggest that the CAUK is the only existing example of "parliamentary-scrutiny connection, operating through parliamentary oversight committees, rather than speaking directly to government".

After the publication of the report, 60% of the assembly members indicated that they suspected the recommendations had at least a fair amount of influence on the work of the committees, while only half suspected that this would be the case for the work of the government (Cherry et al. 2021, p. 41). However, as far as the researcher is aware, there is no assessment of the general public perception regarding the CAUK's recommendations.

Political context

In the UK, the majoritarian electoral system and the presence of devolved administrations significantly shape climate policy (Zwar et al. 2023). According to Zwar et al. (2023) the voting system makes it difficult for a strong green party to appear which can be seen in the Green Party of England and Wales having only one seat out of 650 in the House of Commons. Whereas both major parties recognise climate change as challenging, "a relatively small number of Members of Parliament (MPs) champion ambitious climate policy and those that do are not organised in a political party, raising the costs of coordination" (Zwar et al. 2023, p. 21). The pivotal Climate Change Act of 2008, now known as the Climate Law following revisions in 2019, serves as the cornerstone for climate change efforts in the UK (Zwar et al. 2023). It established the carbon budgets system, the UK Climate Change Committee (CCC), and mandates the government to formally respond to the CCCs annual progress reports, solidifying its role as the foremost climate institution and advisor on climate policy matters (ibid.).

The UK's Department for Energy Security and Net Zero oversees the nation's climate action mandate, playing a crucial role in formulating policies for achieving net-zero emissions (ibid).

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[39] See transcript of debate
[40] See transcript of oral evidence

In the United Kingdom, each government department corresponds to a parliamentary select committee[41]. These committees scrutinize the actions and inquiries of government departments, producing reports with recommendations. The government is obligated to respond within a designated timeframe[42]. According to Zwar et al. (ibid.) these committees are integral in shaping legislative measures and ensuring accountability on the governments climate policy.

4.2.2. Data Collection and Analysis CAUK

Document Collection and Analysis

Since the CAUK was not explicitly targeted to influence a particular political event, the political arena for analyzing collective decisions was not entirely clear. Therefore, the initial step involved thorough research for documents where the recommendations could potentially have been incorporated.

Following an inquiry from July 2021 by the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2021a), one of the commissioning select committees, regarding expectations on the handling with the CAUK's recommendations, a government response (BEIS Committee 2021b) was published two months later in September 2021. Despite government ministers promising a "comprehensive and point-by-point response" (BEIS Committee 2021b, p. 4), the government's actual response only comprised replies organized under the headings of CAUK's action fields, stating what the government was implementing at that time or plans to undertake in each respective area (Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2021). The response stated that the recommendations were incorporated into diverse strategy documents, such as the Net Zero Strategy, Heat and Buildings Strategy, and the Transport Decarbonisation Plan and referenced additional strategy papers (ibid.). For data collection, these mentioned strategy papers were identified and used for the congruence analysis. Additionally, further research was conducted to identify more documents relevant to the action fields. The documents used for the analysis of T2 and T0 are located in Supplement 5. The additional documents considered for the document analysis were identified through two search engines provided by the UK government for „policy papers and consultations"[43], as well as „official documents"[44]. These platforms allow for specific searches for papers from individual

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[41] See for the division of tasks and roles between the government and parliament
[42] See for more information on select committees
[43] See policy papers and consultations
[44] See official documents

departments, as well as the use of keywords. I specifically employed the keyword „climate assembly", "CAUK" and keywords from the action fields of the CAUK's recommendations for the search.

As for there were more than twenty documents to analyse for T2 and T0 each, the software *humata*[45] was used for the document analysis. *Humata* is capable of consolidating, linking, and drawing conclusions from various points across different documents. The software displays the page numbers within the documents where the question posed in the chat can potentially be answered. However, it is not uncommon for incorrect page references to be provided, or for inaccurate statements to be made by *humata*. While the tool serves as a supplementary aid for obtaining an initial overview within documents, one should not unquestionably rely on it. Therefore it is important to review the original document to confirm the precise content on the relevant page.

<u>Expert Interviews</u>
As potential interview partners in the CAUK case, individuals involved in the organization and commissioning, such as parliamentary officials from the six select committees, were considered suitable. Given that the committee system reflects the government's structure, all departments subject to scrutiny by the corresponding select committees were also seen as appropriate contacts.

The first mails were sent to individuals involved in the process of the CAUK. Since sending emails to the previous official email address of the CAUK, as listed on the official website, was unsuccessful, I then reached out to all individuals from the Academic and Advisory Panels of CAUK, as well as the four expert leads[46] and the implementing organization, Involve. An email to the House of Commons revealed changes in both the responsibilities of the select committees and the departments since the CAUK took place. Subsequently, all select committees that emerged from the original committees that commissioned CAUK were contacted as well as the corresponding departments. Despite attempts to reach out via the official email addresses of the departments, there was no response even after two follow-up inquiries, or it was indicated that they did not have the time to participate. Subsequently, during one of the interviews with a person involved in the process of the CAUK, it was suggested to contact MPs who held responsibilities in the respective departments at the time CAUK's

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[45] See webpage
[46] Expert leads made sure that the information provided to the assembly is accurate, balanced and easy to understand (for more information see CAUK's website)

recommendations were published. Finding these actors from the time when the CAUK recommendations were released proved challenging due to two changes in Prime Ministers and subsequent alterations in the composition of the Cabinet and government departments. Hence, in alignment with Vrydagh's (2022) contention that identifying the actors responsible for the uptake may pose challenges, this limitation was very evident in the context of the CAUK. Utilizing the *Wayback Machine[47]*, which enables users to view past versions of websites, all MPs in departments potentially associated with the CAUK were identified from the time its recommendations were published. E-mails were sent to all former ministers of these departments who still held their respective positions until at least the end of 2021. Furthermore, former permanent secretaries[48] were contacted, but without receiving responses[49].

In the end, the seven interview partners (I) included three parliamentary officials (I5, I6, I7), three academic advisors of CAUK (I8, I9, I10) and one of the four expert leads of CAUK (I11). Each interview lasted for approximately 30 minutes. Just as for the BRK semi-structured interviews were used for the CAUK following Leech's (2002) approach[50]. Furthermore, three written responses (W) could be obtained, one from the Climate Change Committee (W5), one from a shadow minister[51] (W6) and another one from a civil servant working at the BEIS committee at the time CAUK's recommendations were published (W7).

As the political arena and the relevant political actors were not as evident in the case of the CAUK as for the BRK, a snowball sampling method was repeatedly utilized to identify potential participants (Diaz-Bone 2015; Babbie 2004). Thus, the advantage of expert interviews was utilized, increasing the likelihood to gain access to an extended circle of experts (Bogner et al. 2009).

Surveys

While the prospect of securing interviews with MPs was seen as unlikely, there was a somewhat higher perceived likelihood of survey participation. Out of the 146 people who were contacted in the CAUK case, 85 were government civil servants or MPs. In total, six surveys were tailored for these people, including only the recommendations related to their specific areas of

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[47] see webpage

[48] A permanent secretary functions as the most senior civil servant in a department and assists the government minister in leading the department

[49] Furthermore, efforts were made to find email addresses for 10-15 management personnel per department visible on the former website. However, this was challenging due to limited public access. Many had left their positions, and given the uncertainty about their involvement with the CAUK, exploring their current roles for contact information deemed disproportionately high for the anticipated outcome.

[50] An example for an interview guide for the CAUK can be found in Supplement 2

[51] See for definition: https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/shadow-cabinet/

responsibility[52]. The first and second emails to each of the 85 individuals were designed to secure an interview. The third email included the link to the survey tailored for their department, along with a deadline to fill out the survey. The final reminder reiterated the request to complete the survey.

4.3. Data Analysis

As the final step in conducting case studies, data analysis aims to construct a coherent interpretation, addressing specific risks of producing overly detailed but descriptive chronicles or subjective interpretations (Elstub and Pomatto 2022). The results of the congruency approach addressing RQ1 and RQ2 were captured in Sequential Impact Matrices (SIMs), addressing each individual action field sequentially in the rows and divided according to the analysed categories from the analytical framework in the columns[53].

In order to address RQ3, the reasons for influence of lack theoreof, a qualitative content analysis based on Mayring's techniques (2015) was applied after transcribing the interviews in MS Word. In addition, written feedback from emails and notes from calls were utilized for the content analysis. Following Mayring's Analytical Procedure Model (Mayring 2015, pp. 61–64), categories were dynamically formed and continually revised through the interplay between the research questions and the data. The pivotal defining criterion for incorporating elements from the transcripts initially was „reasons for the impact or lack thereof" as this addresses research question number 3. After initially forming numerous subcategories, subsequent revisions summarized these subcategories into four main categories: „Factors for (Lack of) Influence", „Challenges in Impact Assessment", „Additional Potential Impacts" as well as „General Assessments" for both the CAUK and the BRK. Concerning the CAUK, an additional category, namely „Potential Influence of Individual Recommendations", was derived from the material. The results were documented in spreadsheets (see Supplement 6).

4.4. Validity and Reliability

As explained in the analytical framework, to enhance the validity and reliability of the findings in this research, a triangulation of methods - document analysis, expert interviews, and surveys - was employed. Each step served a distinct yet complementary role in addressing the research

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[52] An example survey for the CAUK can be found in Supplement 4.
[53] The SIMs are found in Supplement 1. The data results of the surveys are found in Supplement 7.

questions and providing sufficient evidence[54]. Finding sufficient evidence posed challenging in this research, partly due to a low response rate to interview requests and survey inquiries.

Furthermore, it is imperative to note that coding was conducted in a single iteration. Instances of ambiguity concerning congruence, type of influence, and ambitiousness were deliberated during meetings among the research team, leading to a consensus to categorize them as one or the other case.

Moreover, the category "level of uncertainty"[55] indicates the coder's confidence in the classification of the type of influence for the recommendation (T1). Here, a distinction is made between low, average and high uncertainty. "Low uncertainty" applies when the data allows for a clear classification of the influence, meaning a definite answer is found in relevant documents or in the statements of experts. There must be high confidence that the statements refer to collective decisions and not to individual positions or beliefs to ensure validity. The source must have the necessary information, which is, for example, the case when the person was involved or closely connected to the decision, and must have the willingness to respond truthfully. "Average uncertainty" is used when the influence classification is not entirely reliable due to the inability to find fully dependable data. This is the case, for example, when an expert says that without the respective recommendation, it *probably* would not have come to this or that decision. This indicates that the expert is not certain that the CA was the influence. "Average uncertainty" can also apply if there are indications that the expert has a bias in communicating influence. Additionally, the classification "high uncertainty" is employed in cases where the influence classification is either not possible or barely feasible due to the absence or scarcity of reliable data and/or conflicting collected data. This applies when the classification of the influence type is hardly possible because either no reliable data can be found and/or the collected data contradict each other.

All cases with "high uncertainty" were excluded for the analysis. In the end, a robustness check can be conducted to determine whether there are significant differences with and without "high uncertainty" cases. To address intercoder reliability for subsequent data processing, a review of the results is planned to ensure reliability and make any necessary adjustments.

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[54] In terms of *sufficient evidence*, the researcher starts with the null hypothesis (H0) that suggests no relationship between the variables (Babbie 2004, G7). This hypothesis needs to be disproven with ample evidence, ensuring a low error probability. For instance, $T0{\neq}T1{=}T2$, solely based on document analysis and without additional is not sufficient proof of a recommendation's influence. Adequate evidence can be a single piece of high-validity and high-reliability evidence or multiple weak indicators that collectively demonstrated logical consistency and plausibility.

[55] A more detailed definition of the variable "uncertainty" can be found in Section I.7. of Annex I

For the analysis of the interviews, it is also important to acknowledge that the interviewees' biases and agendas may have influenced their depictions of the impact or portrayal of the assembly in a more positive or negative light (Capstick, Demski 2022). To address these limitations, efforts were made to conduct interviews with diverse participants involved in the assemblies, including those involved in the design or advisory capacities, along with political decision-makers from parliamentary and governmental spheres. However, as already mentioned, acquiring access to all crucial stakeholders posed challenging. Therefore, it cannot be entirely ruled out that different results might have emerged if the interviews had been conducted with different or additional individuals.

5. Findings

5.1. Quantitative Findings

In the following quantitative results section, the first two research questions are addressed. Each research question is initially addressed for the BRK, followed by the CAUK.

Initially, the first question, "To what extent did the 'Bürgerrat Klima' (BRK) and the 'Climate Assembly UK' (CAUK) generate proposals that demonstrated greater ambition than pre-existing government policy?" is answered.

5.1.1 Ambition of Climate Assembly Recommendations (RQ1)

BRK

Regarding the BRK, Figure 1 illustrates that 49 recommendations (56,3%) out of a total of 87 were more ambitious than the positions outlined in the coalition agreement. One recommendation (1,1%) was less ambitious. For 26 recommendations (29,9%), no significant difference in terms of ambition level could be discerned.

Figure 1:BRK Overall Ambition Level of Recommendations

It is also intriguing to examine the distribution of the level of ambition per action field of the assembly to conclude in which action field the assembly members are most willing to support ambitious measures. This is depicted in Figure 2. It can be observed, for instance, that in the field of nutrition, on the whole, 78,9% of all recommendations were more ambitious than the coalition agreement, whereas in the field of buildings and heating, only 38,9% of the recommendations were more ambitious. The latter action field also includes one single case (recommendation GW-7) that was less ambitious.

Figure 2:BRK: Percentage Distribution of Ambition Levels by Action Field

Note: „E" stands for the action field "energy" and comprises recommendations, "M" for "mobility" (20 recommendations), "GW" for "buildings and heating (18 recommendations), "ER" for "nutrition" (19 recommendations) and "IT" for "instruments of transformation" (10 recommendations)

CAUK

Figure 3 illustrates the overall ambition levels regarding the CAUK recommendations in comparison to T0. In total, 36 out of the 46 recommendations (78,3 %) were more ambitious than collective decisions previous to the assembly, zero recommendations (0,0%) were less ambitions, 9 recommendations (19,6%) were neither more nor less ambitious and for one recommendation (2,2%), the level of ambition was difficult to assess.

Figure 3:CAUK: Overall Ambition Level of Recommendations

The percentage distribution of ambition levels by action field is shown in figure 4. There is a particularly strong difference, for example, in the level of ambition between the action field "travel on land" (TL), where 100,0% of the recommendations are more ambitious than T0, and "greenhouse gas removals", where 50,0% are more ambitious and 50,0% are neither more nor less ambitious than T0. In the energy sector, there were the most overlaps regarding the level of ambition between T0 and T2. For five out of nine action fields, between 71,4% and 100,0% of the recommendations in T2 were more ambitious than the positions in T0.

Figure 4: CAUK: Percentage Distribution of Level of Ambition by Action Field

Note: TL stands for action field"how we travel on land" (3 recommendations), TA = "how we travel by air" (7 recommendations), H = "in the home" (4 recommendations), ELU = "what we eat and how we use the land" (10 recommendations), B = "what we buy" (5 recommendations), E= "where our electricity comes from" (3 recommendations), GGR = "greenhouse gas removals" (2 recommendations), C = "covid-19, recovery and the path to net zero" (6 recommendations), AR = "additional recommendations" (10 recommendations)

5.1.2. Influence of Recommendations on Policy Decisions (RQ2)

<u>BRK</u>

No evidence could be found for the influence of individual recommendations of the BRK on collective decisions in the coalition agreement. Figure 5 illustrates that 24 out 84[56] recommendations (28,6%) are not reflected in the coalition agreement (no uptake). For 60 recommendations (71,4%), there are overlaps with the coalition agreement. However, based on the analysis, the presence of these overlaps could not be attributed to the BRK as an influencing factor. Therefore, they were categorized as "anyways", meaning that the recommendation (T1) had no influence on collective decisions in T2 because the identical decision would have been taken without the CA.

Figure 5:BRK: Types of Influence

None of the 93 contacted coalition negotiators provided any specific recommendations where an influence could be identified. Additionally, 28 individuals claimed unavailability, and 40 negotiators did not respond at all. The fact that, thus, 73% of all the negotiators contacted either did not respond or claimed to be unavailable could also be interpreted as indicative of a lack of significant interest in the topic. One may assume policymakers have an incentive to report influence because there is a social desirability and political pressure that mini-public recommendations are taken seriously[57]. Furthermore, twelve negotiators or their employees

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[56] Three out of the total 87 recommendations were identified with "high uncertainty" and consequently excluded from the interpreted data for a robustness check. The omission of these recommendations did not yield a substantial impact on the interpretation of the results.

[57] This incentive may be higher when parliament or government commission a participatory process as opposed to civil society.

directly stated via email that the BRK played no role at all and information obtained through more detailed written responses, interviews, and phone calls substantiated this qualitatively. Overall, there is thus a low level of uncertainty, i.e., a low error probability of having missed one or more recommendations with a clearly identifiable influence.

In sum, RQ2 "what impact did the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK have on national policy decisions?" can be answered regarding the BRK by stating that, with low uncertainty, individual recommendations had no influence on decisions of the coalition agreement.

<u>CAUK</u>

No evidence could be found for the influence of individual recommendations of the CAUK on collective decisions. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of influence types regarding the recommendations of the CAUK. It can be observed that 12 recommendations (26,1%) do not align with T2 ("no uptake"), while 34 recommendations (73,9%) are reflected in T2, albeit influenced by other factors ("anyways") [58].

Figure 6: CAUK: Types of Influence

Regarding one recommendation (TL-1) on "a ban on the sale of new petrol, diesel, and hybrid cars by 2030-35", two interview partners noted a strong similarity to a statement by Boris Johnson with the exact same aim, announcing a ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars from 2030, shortly after the CAUK's recommendations were published. However, no evidence was found indicating that this can be attributed to CAUK.

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[58] Additional graphs illustrating influence types, congruency in T0/T2, ambition, and transformativeness are located in Annex III

Out of the 85 contacted government civil servants or MPs, 21 responded, stating that they were not available. One MP mentioned never having heard of the CAUK and only one MP and one former civil servant completed the survey. The low response rate or indication of unavailability is presented here because it leads to the interpretation, similar to the BRK case, that the interest in the topic was not particularly high. Among individuals within the government, whether as advisors, civil servants, or MPs, there was no indication that a recommendation could have had an influence.

In sum, RQ2 „what impact did the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK have on national policy decisions?" can be answered regarding the CAUK by stating that, with low uncertainty, the recommendations had no influence on decisions in T2.

5.2. Qualitative Findings

The following section addresses the third research question (RQ3): "What are the underlying factors which contributed to the influence or lack of influence of the recommendations of the BRK and the CAUK?". As the experts also suggest other impacts of the respective assemblies, these potential impacts will be presented briefly in this section as well.

For each factor, the BRK results will be presented first, followed by the CAUK. Note that "I" stands for interview, "W" for written response, and "C" for phone call. Together with the numbers this denotes the respondents (refer to Annex II for more details about respondents).

5.2.1. Reasons for the Lack of Influence of the BRK

Table 3 illustrates the various factors mentioned in determining the limited influence of the CAUK and the BRK. In the following section, these factors will be explained sequentially for both CAs, starting with the BRK and followed by the CAUK, along with examples

Table 3: Factors affecting the lack of influence

Influence Factor	BRK	CAUK
Commissioner	Civil society commissioning reduces impact compared to government	Parliament commissioning reduces impact compared to government;
Timing	Late appearance of recommendations in the targeted policy process/event reduces impact	Personnel change within commissioning body throughout the process reduces impact (e.g. due to unexpected events such as snap elections in 2019 in this case)
Multiple Factors	The more other potential impact factors exist (e.g. actors), the less impact can be expected from a CA	The more actors involved, the less likely a novel idea, the less added epistemic value

Political Pressure	Limited media coverage / limited public pressure reduces impact ; Limited utilization of assembly results by interest and activist groups	Limited media coverage / limited public pressure reduces impact; Political events (e.g. covid-19) can diminish attention for a CA and thus reduce the impact
Added Value of Recommendations	Perceived lack of depth in recommendations can result in less engagement with them	Low novelty / Uniqueness of recommendations reduces likelihood or size of impact
Assembly's Design and Scope		Large number of recommendations overwhelm decision-makers and can limit the impact; Dividing CA participants into small thematic groups can create misperception of overall agreement/disagreement with recommendations, reducing impact
Experience with CAs	Lack of experience in handling CAs diminishes impact	Lack of experience in handling CAs diminishes impact

Commissioner

Many interviewees attribute the limited impact of the BRK to its commissioning by civil society, and hence a lack of commitment and formalized feedback loops into politics or coalition negotiations (I1, I4, W1, W2). W1 stated:

> "In principle, it should be considered that the Citizens' Assembly was not an official institution of the federal government but was initiated by an association. Accordingly, while we thoroughly engaged with the results, we did not discuss them in detail during the coalition negotiations" (translated from German).

Interviewees perceived the BRK as another lobby organizations or „one of many studies" attempting to influence the coalition agreement, that was considered along with other sources but did not play a role in negotiations (I4, W2). The absence of a formalized connection, prior political commitments, and hence lack of influential follow-up processes were mentioned as further impact factors connected to civil society being the initiator (I1). I4 suggests better integration of assemblies into the political system, for example through public hearings and discussions in parliamentary committees or by directly involving parliamentarians in assemblies, similar to a parliamentary inquiry commission (in German: "Enquete-Kommission"[59]). I1 furthermore suggests obtaining written commitments from parliamentarians or ministers before the assembly process, specifying how they will engage with the recommendations.

Several respondents (I5, I8, I10, I11, W7) emphasize that the CAUK being commissioned by parliament rather than government was the primary factor contributing to the limited impact of

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[59] see for a definition: Deutscher Bundestag - Enquete-Kommission

CAUK's recommendations. Due to this "missing mandate" (I11), the CAUK "never really had the governments support or buy-in" (I5) and received less attention "than if government itself would have commissioned it" (W7). Consequently "there was no way it [CAUK] was feeding directly into the political process" (I8), the assembly therefore being "supposed to just sort of be informative" (I11). I10 concludes that parliamentary committees could, at best, use CAUK to scrutinize the government's climate protection efforts. In order to increase the feedback mechanism into politics, I9 advocates for integrating agreed-upon engagement processes from the start or, minimally, hosting events in parliament to enhance interaction. However, the argument of committee commissioning being the major factor limiting influence is somewhat weakened by the fact that committee recommendations are often adopted by government[60].

Timing

C2, W4, and I4 emphasize that the timing of the release of the BRK's recommendations was unfavorable as they were published after the creation of the respective election programs, thus having no impact on the formulation of these essential documents for the subsequent negotiations. According to W3, election programs resulting from internal party debates form the basis for coalition negotiations, and the coalition agreement represents a compromise reached after extensive deliberations among coalition partners. C2 suggests that the ideal timing for the CA report would have been before the development of election programs or just at the beginning of coalition negotiations, as the latter would have required the coalition as a whole to take a stance.

Unexpected electoral shifts in November 2019 shuffled responsible actors for the process of the CAUK, reducing its impact. The election caused turnovers in composition within the six parliamentary committees that initially commissioned CAUK in spring 2019. This disrupted the possibility of continued committee engagement and interest in the Assembly's outcomes (I5, I7, I10). While the initial MPs engaged in commissioning actively contributed to the assembly's design, the subsequent group of MPs, inheriting the project post-elections, displayed a diminished level of commitment (I9, I10).

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[60] I6 referenced a University College London study from 2011, revealing a 40% adoption rate for Select Committee recommendations by the government. Despite the study's age, it underscores the importance of examining the assembly and its rationale in the context of its inception. In the case of CAUK, the assembly emerged as a project of committees, but 0% of the recommendations had an impact which is very low compared to the usual adoption rate of 40%.

Multiple factors

In the BRK's case, various factors affected coalition negotiations, reducing the impact of its recommendations as one of many influences. I4 highlights the complexity of coalition negotiations, emphasizing various influential factors like election programs, the overall background debate, fundamental party stances, studies presented for preparation and the person leading the negotiations for each party. According to W4, further factors influencing the negotiations are previous and thematically more in-depth resolutions, as well as position papers of the faction, and input from specialized politicians in the state parliaments. Furthermore, I2 notes that a longstanding network of experts in the background shape negotiators' positions.

In the case of the CAUK, W7 notes the difficulty to tell what influence the CAUK recommendations had on every area, as many of the teams in the BEIS department had run their own consultations with members of the public, which provided similar views and recommendations. From this, it can be concluded that the more actors are involved in shaping policies, the less likely a novel a CA idea might be, and the less epistemic value is added.

Poltical Pressure

Participants I1, I2, C2 highlight the restricted media coverage of the BRK contributing to the limited impact of the recommendations. I2 emphasizes that more active and "louder" groups gained more attention, noting a perceived lack of lobbying. I1 stresses public pressure's importance for BRK relevance, underscoring the need for additional efforts in ensuring civil society recognizes a CA report's value and utilizes its recommendations for climate advocacy.

Insufficient media engagement, budget allocation and strategic planning for communication efforts were named as factors limiting the impact of the CAUK's recommendations (I5, I9, I10, I11). I9 suggests that sustained media engagement could have compelled the government to take CAUK's recommendations more seriously. I11 points out the missed opportunity in leveraging participants of the CA as ambassadors for the dissemination of the recommendations.

The public pressure to act relies not only on media coverage and public relations efforts but can also be diminished by the emergence of other events perceived as more politically relevant than the Citizens' Assembly. In this context, I9 observes that the emergence of COVID-19 further diminished environmental concerns in news coverage and policy discussions, adversely affecting CAUK's prominence and the potential impact of the recommendations. Furthermore,

I9 suggests that, compared to the local level, the influence of initiatives like CAs on the national level can easily be overshadowed by the prevailing national issues of the day.

Added Value of Recommendations

I2 sees no significant knowledge gain from the recommendations and considers implementation issues rather than lack of knowledge as a problem in climate protection. He criticizes the recommendations for lacking in-depth detail (I2).

Regarding the transport recommendations, W6 indicates that CAUK did not influence their party's policy, as their party already had clear ideas based on evidence from similar sources before the assembly's report was published. W7 states that various department teams working in areas that the CAUK's report covered, had run their own consultations with members of the public, which provided similar views and recommendations.

Assembly's Design and Scope

According to I10, dividing the CAUK's participants into small thematic groups created a misperception of the overall agreement or disagreement with recommendations. The division led to the fact that not all participants engaged in discussions and voting on every recommendation. In some cases, the presentation of results to MPs subsequently indicated preferences from, for instance, 20 out of 30 individuals, resulting in disinterest from MPs who were primarily interested in the majority perspective within the assembly. I10 also expressed concerns about the extensive list of CAUK's recommendations, proposing a more focused scope to facilitate specific recommendations for simplified policy implementation.

Experience with CAs

I4 attributes the limited influence to the fact that CAs are a relatively new format and not yet well-integrated into political processes. I5 highlights that CAs are still a novel concept in the UK, lacking a formulated government policy. As it was a new format, I7 emphasizes that some MPs perceived their jobs in engaging with citizens as threatened by the CA, stressing the early need to clarify that it would not encroach on their parliamentary responsibilities.

5.2.2. Additional Potential Impacts

In the following section, potential impacts of the two assemblies will be outlined. These were not part of the research questions and thus are not based on systematic inquiry.

BRK

Elevating Climate Priority and Calling for more Citizens' Assemblies

According to I3, the BRK, in conjunction with movements like Fridays for Future (FfF)[61] and German Zero[62], played a crucial role in emphasizing the importance of the climate issue as well as providing new momentum to the concept of a climate protection law. Together these actors have demonstrated that not only students advocate for increased climate protection, but also broader segments of society (I3). According to C1 and I4, the BRK alongside FfF contributed to a positive shift in the perception and prioritization of climate action. C1 further states that that the BRK generally made the demand for CAs louder. According to I3, CAs such as the BRK can provide an alternative reference point, compelling decision-makers to justify their climate policies in response to societal pressure. While W4 states that negotiators from his party did not directly use specific results from the BRK for their own policy proposals, he confirms that faction negotiators felt affirmed by the BRK results to actively take positions in favour of climate protection.

Influence at the Local Level

Despite being a national assembly, impact at the local level was observed by I1. According to I1, participants of the BRK often presented the CA report to their local mayors and community leaders and explained the necessary actions to address climate change, citing the BRK's recommendations.

CAUK

Demonstrating CAs functionality and the Importance of Participation in Climate Action

Several interviewees emphasize the CAUK's effective demonstration of Citizens' Assemblies' viability (I5, I8, I10). I5 suggests that the CAUK got politicians more involved in considering CAs as a useful policymaking tool, fostering enthusiasm especially among those who witnessed the process. Furthermore, I6 believes that the CAUK made politicians recognize the crucial need for public support in impactful climate action, emphasizing the importance of actively listening to people's perspectives. It is hoped by I5 that the CAUK has given the politicians a confidence to engage in some of the trade-offs in order to tackle climate change.

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[61] See for more information: https://fridaysforfuture.de/
[62] See for more information: https://germanzero.de/

Influence on Government Departments

Even though a one-to-one influence of the CAUK's recommendations on policy could not be verified, the contents of the CAUK were communicated to government officials. In the government response to the recommendations, it is stated:

> "Government invited the Climate Assembly UK's expert leads to present the recommendations via seven briefings for officials from across government, covering all the policy areas discussed in the report and attended by over 400 HMG[63] officials" (BEIS Committee 2021b, p. 5).

I5, I11, and W7 confirm this, with W7 even mentioning briefings for 450 officials. These officials from various departments, expressed significant appreciation for the information, particularly in understanding the policy's impact on public opinion (I5). W7 outlines the BEIS department's active response in organizing workshops, discussions, and circulating specific recommendations to relevant government teams. Overall, this indicates that there was a comprehensive engagement with the CAUK's recommendations at departmental levels. Furthermore, it was noted in the government response that the recommendations form a vital part of the evidence base, guiding the development of policies for achieving Net Zero Strategy in a feasible and equitable way (BEIS Committee 2021b). In the analytical framework of this thesis, it was specified that only the influence of recommendations containing measures or goals, such as specific dates, was examined. Guidelines were excluded from the analysis because they only include broad principles and were considered too general to be included in the analysis. Yet, in one of the documents used to analyse collective decisions in T2, the Energy White Paper (HM Government 2020), a reference was made to CAUK's principle of fairness. It stated:

> „The members of the Climate Assembly UK identified 'fairness within the UK, including for the most vulnerable' as one of the top two principles that should guide decisions around net zero. We agree."

I10 classified this as "previously plans being reinforced". This indicates that the CAUK played a role in emphasizing a specific value that should be considered in climate policy.

Influence on Committees

Concerning the impact of the CAUK on committees, I6 highlights that, in his department, nearly all of CAUK's recommendations were used as the foundation for inquiries to the government. I10 highlights the BEIS Committee's inquiry on what the government should do about the CAUK recommendations[64]. Further five inquiries of select committees have evolved

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[63] HMG stands for "His Majesty's Government"
[64] See inquiry and subsequent government response

out of CAUK using its recommendations[65]. While the government departments did not explicitly reference the CAUK in their responses, it remains plausible that they considered the recommendations in their work through these inquiries. Additionally, I11 noted the House of Lords' recent inquiry[66], which integrated insights from CAUK members on climate and environmental behavior change goals.

Influence on the CCC

I5, I10, and I11 emphasize the substantial impact of the Climate Assembly UK (CAUK) on the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), the independent advisory body appointed by the government to evaluate progress toward net-zero targets and formulate carbon budgets. I9 specifically mentions that the chair from the CCC, who also served as an expert lead for CAUK, likely integrated insights from the CAUK into the CCC's advice to the government. W5 (the CCC itself) confirms the documented utilization of the CAUK's recommendation in their 2021 and 2022 Progress Reports to Parliament, advocating for the integration of participatory and deliberative methods in the Net Zero policy-making process. Notably, the CAUK's recommendations were also incorporated into the CCC's 6th Carbon Budget[67]. The CCC's current head of Net Zero stated in a UK Parliament session that the Citizens' Assembly provided clear evidence on public acceptance, prompting a shift from a previously more cautious and conservative stance of the CCC on potential changes[68].

Influence on other Assemblies

I11 has been involved in local CCAs and juries, noting that some of these have considered adopting the approach used by the CAUK as a valuable resource and template. Furthermore, I10 asserts that the CAUK directly influenced the design of the Scottish Climate Assembly, suggesting that the latter might not have occurred without the precedent of the CCA in the UK. I10 further states that the CAUK played a pioneering role in inspiring national assemblies across Europe.

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[65] Transport Committee's inquiry on Road Pricing and Zero Emission Vehicles; Treasury Committee's Decarbonisation of the UK economy and Green finance inquiry; Environmental Audit Committee's inquiry into Energy efficiency of existing homes; BEIS Committee's inquiry into De-Carbonising Heating in the Home ; Science and Technology Committee's inquiry on the Role of Hydrogen in Achieving Net Zero
[66] See inquiry
[67] See report
[68] See evidence

6. Discussion

This pioneering research provides the basis for identifying and understanding design and context factors that shape the ambition and influence of CCA results.

By addressing RQ1, knowledge has been generated regarding what an informed, moderated, randomly selected body like a CA, ideally representing a cross-section of the population, is willing to support in climate protection. The analysis indicates that the previously somewhat anecdotal assumption that CCAs would develop more ambitious recommendations than politics can be confirmed for the two cases under investigation.

By addressing RQ2, a first step has been taken to fill the existing research gap on data regarding the influence of (C)CAs on policy. Both the result, indicating that no influence of individual recommendations could be demonstrated for the two cases, as well as the testing of such a systematic analytical approach itself, are important for enabling further conclusions and comparisons across outcomes from CCAs.

The responses to RQ3 provide an explanation for the observed absence of influence from recommendations of the two cases on policy, thereby contributing significantly to an enhanced understanding of factors influencing the impact of CCAs on policy. This insight can be used to enhance the design of CCAs and, in particular, their integration into their respective political contexts.

The following section discusses the findings in more detail.

6.1. Discussing the Level of Ambition

Regarding RQ1, it was found that 56,3% of the BRK's recommendations were more ambitious than the 2021 coalition agreement, and 78,3% of the CAUK's recommendations were more ambitious than pre-existing collective decisions. This confirms the theoretical assumption that recommendations from CA are often more ambitious than government policies (Capstick et al. 2020; Boswell et al. 2023; Howarth et al. 2020; Muradova et al. 2020).

The analytical framework of this study does not pursue a comparative approach between the two cases or an explicit analysis of factors influencing the level of ambition. However, since the level of ambition of the recommendations in comparison to the existing policies differs significantly between the BRK and the CAUK, it is worth exploring this further, as outlined in the following paragraphs.

Possible Explanations for the Ambition Differences between BRK and CAUK

Temporal Gap Between Analysed Documents and the CA

Firstly, it is necessary to consider that the analysis deals with documents from different time periods. In the case of the CAUK, the level of ambition in the recommendations from 2020 was compared to the previous collective decisions documented from 2016 to early 2020. In contrast, for the BRK, the recommendations presented in June 2021 were compared to the coalition agreement from November 2021. As a result, the points of comparison are closer together for the BRK than for the CAUK. This could potentially explain why, in the case of the BRK, fewer recommendations were considered as more ambitious compared to the coalition agreement than in the case of the CAUK.

Timeframes Regarding Political Pressure for Ambitious Measures

Moreover, some of the documents utilized for the CAUK comparison can be dated back to a period preceding the international mass protests for increased climate protection in 2019, which exerted political pressure at various levels, as highlighted by Devaney et al. (2020). At the time the BRK recommendations were published, actors like Fridays for Future were already very prominent in Germany, potentially exerting political pressure leading to more ambitious measures.

Political Contexts

Another factor that could explain the difference in ambition levels of the two cases is the degree to which green political actors and ideas are already established in the political system. As stated above, Germany demonstrates a robust institutionalization of pro-climate public opinion and consolidation of an influential green party which negotiated the coalition agreement the BRK was compared to. In the UK, no green party has emerged (Zwar et al. 2023). While the presence of a green party is not the sole indicator explaining the smaller difference in ambition between BRK recommendations and the coalition agreement compared to CAUK recommendations and pre-assembly UK policy documents, a more in-depth exploration of this contextual factor would be intriguing in future analyses of CCAs.

Ambition Variances within Different Action Fields

Within the results section, distinctions in ambition levels were delineated across specific action fields. For instance, in the case of the CAUK, participants exhibited hesitancy in areas like

greenhouse gas removals, prompting a cautious stance in advocating for ambitious measures[69]. Subsequent in-depth analysis could delve into understanding the underlying reasons for this hesitancy and potentially formulate strategies to enhance awareness or stimulate broader discourse. This, in turn, could facilitate public engagement in fields where ambitious measures are deemed necessary.

Future studies could aim to systematically explain the differences in ambition between action fields. Insights would likely have crucial implications for mini-public legitimacy and effectiveness in addressing challenges like the climate crisis.

6.2. Discussing the Lack of Influence

The answer to RQ2 that no individual recommendation had an impact on policy from neither case can be interpreted as confirming the assumption made by critics who have previously noted the limited policy impact of CAs (see for discussion Elstub and Khoban 2023).

If this result for RQ2 is viewed in isolation, one might conclude arguing against the utility of Citizens' Assemblies. However, it is crucial to note that valuable insights can be gleaned from such cases to inform the design and integration of future assemblies, enhancing their impact.

Spada and Ryan (2017) underscore the importance of examining cases where anticipated impacts fell short. While most research on democratic innovations has concentrated on "best practices", they argue for a broader study of cases in which expected impact did not materialize to derive lessons for future cases. Therefore, cases with minimal apparent influence or clear indications of potential impact on policymaking can offer valuable insights for designing, implementing, and embedding future CAs. Through an iterative process of research and practical application, the format can continually evolve and be tailored to the specific context.

To explain the lack of influence of the recommendations, several factors have been presented in the results, adressing RQ3. These will be discussed in the following.

Commissioner

The commissioning body of a CA was identified as one of the key factors explaining the lack of influence in the two cases. In neither of the two cases were government officials part of the

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[69] Interestingly, CAUK was addressed in an <u>oral evidence session of the House of Commons in 2022</u> in which concerns raised by CAUK regarding greenhouse gas emissions were discussed. Thus, the CAUK still plays a role in dicsussions. See an example statement out of the evidence: "What we learned from the Climate Assembly is that people are intuitively very wary of greenhouse gas removals, especially if that is in place of other solutions rather than as an add-on. I think there needs to be a strategy from the Government to ensure that people understand that strategy and that is what they are delivering".

commissioning body; thus, the effectiveness of the recommendations depended on the engagement of political decision-makers[70][71]. This not only substantiates the hypotheses that the linkage of participatory processes with representative democracy can explain the influence on policy (Geissel 2019; Pogrebinschi and Ross 2019; Bua 2019), but also which kind of linkage was deemed as needed in the two cases: a commissioning of the CA by the *government*. The results suggest that commissioning by government leads to higher impact compared to parliament and civil society. If a government linkage is not in place, this research shows that impact is dependent on decision-makers' will to engage with the recommendations, as mentioned in previous studies (Lafont 2015; Vrydagh and Caluwaerts 2023; Michels and Binnema 2019).

This study furthermore underscores the theory that the influence of recommendations on policy also depends on the existence of pre-established agreements specifying how to respond to recommendations (Lowndes et al. 2001; Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Elstub et al. 2021). In this context, commissioners, participants of the CA, political decision-makers and administrative authorities should be involved[72]. Publishing these agreements on the follow-up process is advisable as it enhances transparency and fosters responsiveness by transforming decisions into public records (Bua 2019). Moreover, these agreements can be more effectively contested by civil society actors, potentially increasing political pressure to address the recommendations (ibid.). Thus, concluding the process of a CA with the completion of the subsequent report alone is insufficient. In the case of the CAUK, the BEIS Committee (2021b, p. 5)[73] issued a directive specifying the manner and timeframe for a response to the recommendations, but this was disregarded by the government.

In summary, the results highlight a causal connection between the commissioning body and the presence of a follow-up process plan. The study suggests that if the government commissions an assembly, there is a greater likelihood of decision-makers engaging with the

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[70] Another factor mentioned in a Learning Call from KNOCA by one of the actors organising the process, concept and design of the BRK is that a CA initiated by the government can address specific challenges the government is facing; regarding the CAUK, an actor in designing and implemented the CA furthermore emphasizes that better feedback loops to politics should be established throughout the process, e.g. through more interactions between decision-makers and citizens
[72] See also: A recently published report by KNOCA on embedding CAs recommendations within public administration as well as a learning Call "Landing assemblies within public administrations"
[73] It stated: "This point-by-point response to Climate Assembly UK's recommendations should provide a full assessment of which recommendations will be accepted in full or in part and which will be rejected, along with an explanation for why the recommendation is being rejected. We expect this response to be published before the Assembly's one year anniversary in September and as part of the Government's response to this report" (BEIS Committee 2021b, p. 5)

assembly's recommendations, an increased probability of feedback loops and a pre-determined agreement on handling the recommendations. All these factors can ultimately enhance impact.

Timing

As noted in the results, timing was named as a pivotal role in determining the potential impact of the respective CAs on decision-making processes. The factor of timing could not be identified in the literature on factors influencing impact. However, a takeaway for future (C)CAs should be that the timing of implementing a process and publishing results can be crucial for influencing political decisions with the recommendations. Especially in the commissioning and implementation phases, attention should be paid to the timing concerning elections, as their occurrence might impact the effectiveness. It is also crucial to identify the mechanisms determining at which point in time recommendations need to be available to influence political decisions or events.

Multiple Factors

The study provides the insight, that impact of a CA on policy can be affected by the presence of multiple factors influencing the political process. In the case of the BRK, several influencing factors for coalition negotiations were cited, contributing to the BRK's report being perceived as "one of many studies". Therefore, it can be concluded that the more other factors (e.g., actors, parties and their stances, background studies) are involved in shaping policy, the less impact can be expected from a CA.

Additionally, it can be concluded that the more actors and factors are involved in shaping policy, the less likely a novel idea, and thus, the less added epistemic value will be brought by CA recommendations. This is exemplified by an interviewee mentioning that, alongside the CAUK, there were other consultation processes on specific topics in the BEIS Department whose results resembled CAUK's recommendations.

Public Pressure

In both cases, insufficient media coverage of the CA has been criticized, according to respondents, resulting in a lack of public support and pressure and thus reducing the likelihood for politicians to engage with the recommendations. The need for additional efforts in ensuring civil society recognizes a CA report's value and utilizes its recommendations for climate advocacy was deemed important in order to increase media coverage, leading to more public pressure to make use of the recommendations. The findings substantiate the assumption that effective public communication is crucial for legitimizing deliberative processes and increasing

public support (Chwalisz 2020; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021). These results are in accordance with Jacquet and van der Does (2021a) who emphasize the need to pay more attention to the role of the media as conveyors and framers of CA's recommendations, thereby exerting a factor for CA recommendations' influence.

Assuming that media coverage is a crucial factor that can lead to more public pressure to act, it is particularly important to examine under what circumstances media report on CAs. For instance, Boswell et al. (2023) note that the Irish CA on Climate and the Irish CA on Abortion underwent very similar processes, but the latter garnered substantial media coverage and popularity, unlike the former. Boswell et al. (ibid., pp. 191) argue that "the salient difference is that the latter issue was put to a referendum". Because decision-makers had to deal with the outcome of the referendum, the media was interested in it. As mentioned, factors such as global events (e.g. I9 mentioned Covid-19 in the case of the CAUK), perceived as more significant, can also lead to less attention for a CA.

An additional factor influencing limited media attention is highlighted in a KNOCA Learning Call[74], where it was noted that journalists are primarily interested in processes with political impact, and politicians are more responsive to recommendations when there is high public awareness, potentially leading to a "deadlock". Therefore, it can be argued that public relations and impact are interdependent and may have led to such a deadlock in both cases.

Thus, as important as it is to have the means and personnel for public relations efforts for a CA, not everything depends on the public relations efforts by commissioners, designers, or implementers of the CAs. On the one hand, the public pressure and thus potentially the impact of CA recommendations can be increased when other associations, activists, and groups adopt the recommendations and engage in lobbying. On the other hand, the pressure to address the recommendations can be heightened through binding procedures, such as referendums. According to Boswell et al. (2023), it is crucial to contextualize CAs and consider them alongside other forms of participation, such as referendums. However, there are also factors that are somewhat less controllable, such as global events that can divert attention away from CAs.

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[74] Learning Call: German Citizens' Assembly on Climate | KNOCA - YouTube

It was found that whether (C)CAs generate added political value depends partly on whether parallel processes yield similar outcomes. The observation holds that, as more actors are involved in the political decision-making process, the likelihood of individual processes introducing innovations increases.

Furthermore, this research substantiates previous assumptions that the topics discussed in the (C)CA, as well as the scope, play a particularly significant role in being able to derive new and politically relevant insights (Pogrebinschi and Ryan 2018; Michels and Binnema 2019; Kuntze and Fesenfeld 2021). Some actors criticized the lack of depth in the recommendations, one interviewee mentioned that the number of recommendations might have overwhelmed politicians[75]. It was further mentioned that political interest in recommendations can depend on whether the participants work and vote on recommendations in small groups or whether the entire plenary is involved in voting on all recommendations and in how this is presented. Less attention has been paid to these and other factors related to the design and scope of CAs in this study. However, they should not be forgotten in the course of analyzing policy impact in further research.

6.3. Discussing Uncertainties and Methodology

The data collection approach used in this thesis aligns with researchers' demands for utilizing a systematic method in the analysis of the effects of CA recommendations, enabling conclusions and comparisons across outcomes from various deliberative forums (Pogrebinschi and Ryan 2018; Michels and Binnema 2019).

Nevertheless, there are several factors that complicated the tracking of the impact of individual recommendations on policy, as elucidated below.

The Complexity of the Political System

One factor accounting for the difficulty in precisely determining the impact of individual recommendations is the complex network of influences on policymaking. According to many respondents, this makes the operationalizability in measuring the impact of individual recommendations extremely difficult (I1, I3, I6, I7, I8, I11, C2, W7). Especially if overlapping proposals from various sources exist, it becomes challenging to attribute impact sizes to each

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[75] For instance, the ongoing national CA on Nutrition in Germany, commissioned by the German Bundestag, is specifically tasked with formulating only nine recommendations to provide policymakers with clear priorities (see concept, p. 7)

source. These findings underscore the assumption of many scholars that a major challenge lies in establishing a direct causal link between the recommendations of a CA and policy outcomes (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Stoker 2017; Geissel 2019; Jacquet and van der Does 2021a; Capstick, Demski 2022; Vrydagh 2022). In the case of the CAUK, for example, it will be nearly impossible to trace whether and in what manner the 400-450 civil servants from various government departments, who received briefings on the CAUK's recommendations, incorporated them into their work, not only due to the fact that many of these civil servants have possibly changed offices since. Additionally, the Committee on Climate Change, showcasing significant agenda-setting and seeding power in regard to UKs climate policy, as noted by Zwar et al. (2023), utilized CAUK's recommendations in various reports. However, tracing this influence is also likely to be very challenging.

Another factor that makes it difficult to ascertain that the respective CAs had impact is that "policy outcomes might be explained by unseen factors, such as decisions that are already taken - even when they are similar to the process inputs" (Bua 2019, p. 289).

Furthermore, Geissel (2012) highlights the general challenge of measuring the impact of dialogue-oriented procedures, comparing it to calculating cyclists' speed by considering toddlers to racers.

Reluctance to Credit CA Recommendations

Moreover, the factor that the CAUK was commissioned by committees rather than government may attribute to the government's hesitancy to cite or credit the recommendations, even if the government had adopted some of them (I7). According to I7, the government might hesitate to acknowledge the CAs contributions "because it wasn't it's project". I6 and I11 emphasize the government's general lack of clarity regarding the origin and influences behind policies, with I6 suggesting that ministers often present decisions as solely their own. This result provides the insight that political decision-makers might more likely credit adopting a CA's recommendation if it has political utility for them.

Information Acquisation

The low response rate, with none of the 107 contacted individuals and institutions in the case of the BRK and 146 in the case of the CAUK reporting influence, could be indicative of minimal or non-existent impact, possibly linked to a reluctance to respond. However, the limited information from decision-makers affects the analysis. If it is possible at another time, seizing the opportunity to speak with additional representatives should be considered.

6.4. Further Implications for Future Research

Assessing Long-term Impacts

In the case of the BRK, it is plausible that the recommendations arrived too late to influence coalition negotiations, as party programs were already finalized. However, it would be compelling to investigate the potential long-term impact of the recommendations, considering that the respective CA reports are now publicly available, allowing decision-makers the opportunity for review. According to Jacquet an van der Does (2021b), research a couple years after the assembly has taken place could also show whether CAs have led to structural transformations in the policy-making process.

With MPs potentially in different roles in the future, there may be an opportunity for increased participation in such surveys and potentially more candid responses, no longer constrained by the political dynamics of their office. Correspondingly, Talpin (2019) suggests evaluating the long-term impact of democratic innovations on public policies, emphasizing the need for mixed methods approaches, including historical, observational, and quantitative methodologies, which has yet to be explored.

Systematic Research on Further Impact Types

It is important to note that the analysis in this study has specifically concentrated on discerning impacts on the national level. Exploring whether, similar to the CAUK, where an indication exists that it influenced the development and implementation of the Scottish CCA(I10), there were also systemic[76] impacts in the case of the BRK, would be intriguing. Firstly, it was mentioned by I1, that effects of CA recommendations might have occurred at the local level, given that participants presented them to mayors of their municipalities. Secondly, in Germany there was a notable simultaneous occurrence of local CAs and initiatives promoting CAs on climate issues around the time of the BRK's emergence[77] Likewise, for the CAUK, numerous local and regional initiatives addressing the climate and ecological crisis have occurred (Cherry et al. 2021; Wells et al. 2021).

In 2019, two-thirds of local councils in the UK declared a climate emergency, with many complementing their declarations by establishing CAs or Citizens' Juries (Howarth et al. 2020). Thus, it remains possible that local CAs might have been influenced in their structure and

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[76] The influence on other Citizens' Assemblies could be categorized under what Capstick and Demski (2022) term as „instrumental systemic impact" of Citizens' Assemblies.

[77] There is no comparative analysis on this, however on this webpage all the local CAs and CA initiatives are listed, many occuring at a similar time to the BRK

establishment by the BRK or the CAUK. Deeper investigation in this context would be valuable.

Examining the Impact of Institutionalized Citizen's Assemblies

Another research area concerns the question of the impact that CCAs could achieve if institutionalized at the national level, accompanying politics not as short-term phenomena but as a permanent part. Both the CAUK and the BRK were one-time events. However, what would happen regarding the policy impact of Citizens' Assemblies if they were more effectively and regularly integrated into representative democracy, as suggested by various scholars (Bua 2019; Geissel 2019; Pogrebinschi and Ross 2019)? At the national level, currently no institutionalized CA exists. However, there is a notable example in East Belgium, where the first permanent CA has been operational for a few years, bringing valuable insights (see e.g. Macq and Jacquet 2023) This year, the world's first permanent local CCA started its work in Brussels[78]. Another permanent local CCA was also established in Milan[79].

While, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, currently there seems to be no further nationwide Citizens' Assembly planned in the UK, the German Bundestag is experimenting with three consecutive national Citizens' Assemblies, with the first one currently addressing the topic of nutrition. Will the subsequent ones focus on climate-related topics? Will the recommendations have more impact on policy than the BRK? What comes after the three Citizens' Assemblies? Is there potential for Citizens' Assemblies to evolve into a permanent form of participatory decision-making in Germany? These question cannot be conclusively answered at this point. However, they pose many interesting fields and questions for further observation and research.

In conclusion of this section of the discussion, it remains to be emphasized that additional practical examples and scientific analyses are imperative for a more thorough understanding of the current and potential role of (C)CAs in democratic processes, as well as to comprehend the mechanisms that lead to either impact or non-impact. Interestingly, one interviewee posited that the endurance of CCAs in Europe, as a lasting element in climate governance or a temporary trend, hinges on their future achievements and contributions to meaningful changes in climate policy and action.

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[78] See website
[79] See website

7. Conclusion

The quote from Stoker in the beginning of the introduction underscores the urgent need to find more inclusive ways of politics, devising long-term strategies to address global crises, such as the climate crisis. In the quest for ambitious climate policy, various actors propose the utilization of Citizens' Assemblies, often attributed with the capacity to identify comprehensive societal solutions for complex issues which are frequently more far-reaching than what conventional politics may envisage.

This project represents the first systematic effort to compare the ambition level of recommendations from Climate Citizens' Assemblies with existing policies and evaluate individual recommendations' impact on policymaking. The data used to address the research questions were generated through a mixed methods approach, including document analysis, interviews, and surveys.

In answering RQ1, it was found that 56,3% of the recommendations of the German "Bürgerrat Klima" (BRK) were more ambitious than the 2021 coalition agreement, and 78,3% of the recommendations of the "Climate Assembly UK" (CAUK) were more ambitious than pre-existing collective policy decisions. The analysis thus indicates that the previously somewhat anecdotal assumption that CCAs would develop more ambitious recommendations than politics can be confirmed for the two cases under investigation.

In regard to RQ2, no impact of individual recommendations from either the BRK or the CAUK on policy could be verified. Several factors were identified to explain the lack of influence to answer RQ3, including who commissioned the respective CA, predefined procedural rules in handling the recommendations, timing, multiple influencing factors at stake, political pressure, perceived added value of recommendations, the assembly's design and scope, as well as the existing amount of experience with CAs.

Impacts may be underestimated due to various factors. Firstly, the complexity of the political system renders it challenging to trace the influence of individual recommendations. Furthermore, there could be a reluctance of some decision-makers to credit the utilization of individual recommendations. Adittionally, there were methodological difficulties in acquiring enough information. All these factors make it difficult to trace the impact of individual recommendations "one-on-one".

The results suggest additional impacts, such as the BRK's influence alongside other actors in elevating climate priority in politics, advocating for more Citizens' Assemblies, and the potential influence of individual recommendations at the local level. The CAUK was credited with showcasing the functionality of Citizens' Assemblies and emphasizing the importance of participation in climate action, exerting influence on government departments, committees, and the Climate Change Committee. Notably, it was also mentioned that the CAUK influenced the establishment and design of the Scottish Citizens' Climate Assembly.

Future studies could aim to systematically explain the differences in ambition between action fields found for the two analyzed cases. Additionally, the role of media and other factors that can exert political pressure for the implementation of recommendations should be investigated. Moreover, long-term impacts could be explored, along with the potential influences of nationwide CCAs on the local level. Furthermore, subsequent research could systematically examine the extent to which recommendations from Citizens' Assemblies, followed by a referendum or institutionalized ones, have more impact than one-time CAs. Additionally, other impact types and areas of CCAs should be systematically investigated.

All in all, if one would only look at the outcome of this study, which states that individual recommendations from the CAUK and the BRK had no impact on policy decisions, one might argue that this does not necessarily roll out the red carpet for Citizens' Assemblies. However this study's result may aswell be a call to persist in experimenting with deliberative formats to explore the circumstances under which they prove effective or ineffective, along with all the nuances in between.

In any examination and conclusion regarding democratic innovations, whether impact is found or not, it is furthermore important to pose the following question: What are the consequences if we abstain from experiments and perpetuate the status quo?

Will the current system automatically adopt more ambitious measures as extreme weather events intensify, causing increasing numbers of people to lose their livelihoods and flee? Will there be more substantial political measures if a significant portion of the population takes to the streets to protest when food shortages prevail and inequalities have drastically increased? These questions cannot be conclusively answered, but formats like Citizens' Assemblies demonstrate that waiting until the answer becomes clear is not an option.

Citizens' Assemblies provide insights into the preferences of a randomly selected, well-informed, and moderated mini-public, elucidating their predispositions concerning political measures following intensive deliberations. Thereby, CAs can offer a profound understanding of public sentiment which is crucial for political decision-makers to implement necessary measures with widespread public support.

While the quote from Stoker presented in the beginning portrays a rather undesirable current state of democracy, a couple of pages later he also provides a proposal for what should be done: „[p]olitics as problem solving involves a complex process of testing, learning and adjusting" (Stoker 2017, p. 81). Accordingly, this study emphasizes that further analytical and practical efforts are required to understand under what circumstances recommendations from CAs can influence political decisions and which mechanisms prevent this. All these insights can contribute to fulfilling the hopes associated with (C)CAs – namely, leading to more ambitious climate policies and enhancing democratic practices.

The author David van Reybrouck (2016) argues that the historical experimentation with democracy spans almost three thousand years, with a shift to exclusive reliance on elections occuring only in the last two centuries. Accordingly, the currently emerging forms and colours of Citizens' Assemblies may mark just the beginning of a revival in democratic experimentation.

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Annexes

Annex I: Code Book

I.1. Congruence of Positions

Die Variable „Congruence of positions" gibt an, inwiefern die Positionen der relevanten politischen Akteure mit den Empfehlungen der Climate Assembly übereinstimmen, sowohl pre- (T0 vs. T1) als auch post-assembly (T2 vs. T1).

Table 4: Congruence of Positions

type of congruence	definition	explanation	example
A: congruent	Die Empfehlung (T1) und die Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure *überschneiden sich vollständig* zum Zeitpunkt t (T0 oder T2).		Der KBR in UK empfiehlt ein Verkaufsverbot für neue Benzin- und Diesel-Hybridautos bis 2030 bzw. maximal 2035. Auch die Regierung hat dieses Ziel M-4 (Berlin) empfiehlt Vorrang von Bussen und Fahrrädern gegenüber Autos & separate Busspuren – T0: Grüner Pfeil für Radverkehr, Vorrangschaltung für Busse, separate Fahrrad- + Busspuren
a: partially congruent	Die Empfehlung (T1) und die Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure *überschneiden sich teilweise, aber nicht vollständig* zum Zeitpunkt t (T0 oder T2). Dies betrifft das Ambitionsniveau und/oder den Grad der Konkretisierung und/oder die Überschneidung einer Teilmenge.	Die Kongruenz wird mit "partially congruent" bewertet wenn: a) der Grad der *Konkretisierung* zwischen T0/T2 und T1 weicht voneinander ab; b) UND/ODER nur eine *Teilmenge* von T0/T2 und T1 stimmen überein; c) UND/ODER Die Zielrichtung und Art der Maßnahmen zwischen T0/T2 und T1 stimmen überein, doch das *Ambitionsniveau* nicht Die zutreffende(n) Dimension(en) bitte in der Impact Matrix angeben.	- fünf von zehn Unterempfehlungen einer Empfehlung von T1 stimmen mit T2 überein für G-12 (Berlin): in T0 werden nur manche der Forderungen erfüllt, andere werden gar nicht adressiert, d.h. T0 = a Konkretisierung: politische Akteure vertreten formal dieselbe Sichtweise wie der Klimarat, schlagen aber keine konkreten Maßnahmen vor zu T0, in T2 schlagen sie dann konkretere Maßnahmen vor Teilmenge: Der Klimarat macht mit einer Empfehlungen defacto 5 Vorschläge (T1), von

			denen aber nur 2 übernommen wurden (T2)
x: congruent in goal only	Die Empfehlung (T1) und die Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure *überschneiden sich in ihrem Ziel, aber nicht in ihrer Umsetzungsstrate gie* mit dem zu vergleichenden Zeitraum (T0 oder T2).	Die Zielsetzung zwischen T0 / T2 und T1 ist dieselbe, jedoch unterscheiden sich die Maßnahmen, die zum Ziel führen sollen. Das Ambitionsniveau zwischen T1/T2 und T0 stimmt grob überein. Bei deutlicher Abweichung des Ambitionsniveaus wird der Fall als partially congruent codiert.	En-10 (Berlin): Ziel in T0 stimmt überein, aber unkonkrete oder andere Maßnahmen M-10 (Berlin): Mobilitätswende fördern u.a. durch autofreie Tage + kostenlosem ÖPNV – T0: Ziel (Mobilitätswende fördern) stimmt überein, aber nichts zu autofreien Tagen oder kostenlosem ÖPNV, d.h. T0 = x
B: not congruent	Die Empfehlung (T1) und die Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure *überschneiden sich nicht* zum Zeitpunkt t (T0 oder T2). Die Positionen (T1 vs. T0/2) sind *stark abweichend, gegensätzlich und/oder ablehnend.*	a) T0/T2 sind *stark abweichend* von T1, weil ein anderes Ziel präferiert wird oder eine grundsätzlich andere Herangehensweise bei Maßnahmen präferiert wird (d.h., die zugrundeliegenden Ideologien, Problem- und Lösungsverständnisse sind verschieden.) b) UND/ODER T0/T2 sind gegensätzlich zu T1 c) UND/ODER in T0/T2 wurde sich gegen den Inhalt entschieden, den T1 vorschlägt. (ablehnend)	*stark abweichend:* Politische Akteure legen starke Priorität auf Dekarbonisierung des individualisierten Autoverkehrs, Klimarat hingegen eine grundlegende Mobilitätswende mit explizit weniger Autoverkehr (fiktiv) *gegensätzlich:* politische Akteure wollen die Anzahl 30er-Zonen reduzieren obwohl der Klimarat empfiehlt die Anzahl auszuweiten (fiktiv) *ablehnend:* M-9 (Berlin) (T1): Autofahren unattraktiver machen – T2: ÖPNV attraktiver machen, aber nicht

			Autos unattraktiver, d.h. T2 = B
			Bsp für gegensätzlich: T1= Autobahnausbau stark zurückfahren, T2= Autobahnausbau vorantreiben
			Bsp. ablehnend: explizites Statement "wir fahren den Autobahnausbau nicht zurück"
			<u>Abgrenzung zu ø</u> M-15 (Berlin) (T1): u.a. Aufklärung zu Auswirkungen von E-Autos – in T0 keine explizite Aussage zu Aufklärung zu Auswirkungen von E-Autos, d.h. T0 = ø – in T2 explizite Aussage dass dies nicht aktiv getan werden soll, d.h. T0 = B
C: conflicting positions	Bezogen auf die Empfehlung (T1) existieren zwischen relevanten politischen Akteuren konfligierende Positionen zum Zeitpunkt t (T0 oder T2).	Diese Variable ist nötig, wenn die Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure nicht homogen sind, sondern voneinander abweichen. In einem solchen Fall könnten jeweils A, a oder B gleichzeitig bei unterschiedlichen Akteuren auftreten. Treten unter relevanten politischen Akteuren abweichende Positionen hinsichtlich T1 auf, wird C codiert. Gleichzeitig werden die Positionen der einzelnen relevanten politischen Akteuren hinsichtlich T1 in der Impact Matrix im Feld t0_explanation/t2_explanation festgehalten.	fiktiv: Grüne sind pro Tempo 30 (T0 = A), FDP ist contra (T0 = B) M-11 (Berlin) (T1): City-Maut – T0: Grüne pro (A), SPD contra (B), d.h. T0 = C
ø: absence of idea / no stance	Es sind überhaupt keine Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure im zu vergleichenden Zeitraum zu finden (T0 oder T2). Relevante politische Akteuren verzichten *bewusst* oder	a) No stance: politische Akteure positionieren sich *BEWUSST* nicht zu der Lösungsidee T1, obwohl diese zum Zeitpunkt T0 als ernsthafte Option im Policy-System existierte und den politischen Akteuren bekannt war. (Beispielhafte Gründe: Positionierung schwächt Verhandlungsmacht, ist bei Wähler*innen unbeliebt, schränkt Flexibilität ein…)	Der KBR empfiehlt Tempo 100 auf Autobahnen, die Regierung äußert sich dazu nirgends. – Es gibt keine Hinweise darauf, ob dies bewusst oder unbewusst geschieht. G-6 (Berlin) (T1): Nutzung von Leerstand für Wohnraum + sozialer Infrastruktur – T0: in policy documents steht nichts zu diesem Thema oder

unbewusst auf eine Positionierung.	b) Absence of idea: politische Akteure positionieren sich UNBEWUSST nicht zu der Lösungsidee T1, weil diese zum Zeitpunkt T0 nicht als ernsthafte Option im Policy-System existierte oder den politischen Akteuren nicht bekannt war. Eine Unterscheidung von "no stance" und "absence of idea" wäre wünschenswert, weil relevant, um die politischen Einflüsse von Empfehlungen zu verstehen. Leider ist eine reliable Unterscheidung zwischen bewussten und unbewussten Handlungen politischer Akteure in der Praxis oft schwierig und mit erheblichem Mehraufwand verbunden. Daher werden beide Kategorien zusammengefasst. Sollten Hinweise existieren, die eine Zuordnung ermöglichen, werden diese in t0_explanation/t2_explanation und, wenn relevant, in type_of_influence_explanation aufgeführt. Coding-Anweisung: Explizit suchen, ob sich jemand aus der Regierung vorher schon zu dem Vorschlag geäußert hat. Erst wenn wirklich nichts zu finden ist, als absence of idea codieren	das andeuten könnte dass dieses Ziel existiert

I.2. Type of Recommendation

Die Variable „Type of recommendation" gibt an, wie abstrakt (goal/guidelines) oder konkret (means) die Forderungen aus den Empfehlungen (T1) sind.

Table 5: Type of Recommendation

type of recommendation	definition	explanation	example
means	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist eine *konkrete Maßnahme*.		Fiktiv: Ab 2025 werden die Kosten für das Parken jährlich um 10% gesteigert.
goals	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist eine *Zielformulierung*.	Die Ziele umfassen Vorgaben wie Jahre oder prozentuale Kürzungen	Fiktiv: Berlin soll bis 2045 klimaneutral werden

guidelines	Eine Formulierung zu *politischen Prinzipien/Leitlinen*, die keine konkreten Maßnahmen oder Ziele enthalten.	Leitlinien bieten lediglich eine allgemeine normative Orientierung, z. B. in Form von Präferenzaussagen oder Prinzipien.	"social justice is more important than economic efficiency", or less stringent formulations like "social justice must be regarded"
mixed	Die Empfehlung (T1) beinhaltet *eine konkrete Maßnahme und eine Zielformulierung*.	a) Wenn die Empfehlung (T1) in manchen Teilen einem Ziel, in anderen einer konkreten Maßnahme entspricht b) Wenn die Empfehlung (T1) in manchen Teilen einer guideline entspricht, in anderen einem Ziel Empfehlung entspricht v.a. einer Leitlinie, aber es gibt Unterpunkt mit Ziel -> als Ziel kodieren	

I.3. Types of influence

Die Variable „Types of Influences" gibt an, welche Art des Einflusses die Empfehlung (T1) auf die *kollektiven Entscheidungen der betrachteten politischen Einheit* hatte (z.B. Parlament, Regierung, Koalitionsvertragschließende) (T0 → T2). Die kollektiven Entscheidungen resultieren aus den einzelnen *Positionen relevanter* politischer Akteure sowie deren *Interaktionen* zur Herstellung kollektiver Beschlüsse. Die Variable "Type of Influence" ist blind hinsichtlich Effekten auf Überzeugungen (beliefs) und Einstellungen (Attitudes) und Positionen auf einzelne Akteure, und Effekten auf kollektive Interaktionen, die NICHT zu Veränderungen kollektiver Entscheidungen führten.

- Beispiel 1 – Individuelle Überzeugungs- und Einstellungseffekte ohne Positionseffekte (No influence): Ein relevanter politischer Akteur E1 wird in ihren T0 Überzeugungen gestärkt, dass eine Mehrheit für T1 ist und ihre Einstellung zu T1 verfestigt sich (höhere Sicherheit). Gleichzeitig verändert sich jedoch die Position (T0 → T2) nicht, weil diese bereits zu T0 "Zustimmung zu der Idee T1" war (d.h., congruence). Die hinzugewonnene Sicherheit in E1s Position zu T1 führt nicht dazu, dass sich die kollektive Entscheidung der Regierung verändert.
- Beispiel 2 – Individuelle Positionseffekte und Interaktionseffekte ohne kollektive Entscheidungseffekte (No Influence): Ein relevanter politischer Akteur E1 verändert ihre Position (T0 → T2) von Ablehnung zu Zustimmung aufgrund von T1. E1 ändert ihr Verhalten und damit die Interaktionen zwischen allen Es (E1…En), d.h. beispielsweise, dass Diskussionen anders verlaufen, als dies ohne T1 der Fall gewesen wäre. Es ist möglich, dass die veränderten Interaktionen sogar zu weiteren individuellen Effekten führen. Die veränderten Interaktionen führen jedoch nicht zu einer Veränderung der kollektiven Entscheidung, beispielsweise weil sich andere durchsetzen oder E1 überzeugt wird, ihre Position erneut zu ändern. Die Regierungsposition zu T0 bleibt die Regierungsposition zu T2.

Die unterschiedlichen types of influence sind einzelne **Dummyvariablen**, die jeweils mit yes oder no codiert werden. Damit wird dem Umstand Rechnung getragen, dass unterschiedliche Einflusstypen

gleichzeitig auftreten können. Dies tritt meist (aber nicht ausschließlich) deshalb auf, weil Empfehlungen oft mehrere Ideen kombinieren oder sogar explizit Unterempfehlungen enthalten. Jedoch können auch einzelne Ideen mehrere Einflüsse gleichzeitig haben. Dies kann von besonderem Interesse sein und sollte in type_explanation erläutert werden.

- Beispiel: Enriching + shifting/political/fortifying influence einer einzelnen Idee – Die CA erweitert bestehende Vorschläge um inhaltliche Aspekte oder entwickelt diese weiter. Diese inhaltliche Entwicklung verändert Positionen relevanter politischer Akteure, d.h. *wegen dieser inhaltlichen Neuerung* sind sie nun nicht mehr gegen, sondern für den Vorschlag.

Table 6: Types of Influence

type of influence	definition	explanation (subcategories of mechanisms)	example
no uptake (no influence)	Die Empfehlung (T1) hatte *keinen Einfluss* auf die kollektiven Entscheidungen der betrachteten politischen Einheit, weil kein Uptake stattgefunden hat.	a) *Kein uptake*: die Empfehlung wurde nicht in die kollektiven Entscheidungen der betrachteten politischen Einheit integriert (T2 = B|ø), weil sie bspw. ignoriert oder explizit abgelehnt wurde (z.B. in einem Antwortschreiben). UND b) für diese Empfehlung wurde kein anderer Typ of Influence als vorhanden identifiziert. eine Empfehlung hat mehrere Unterempfehlungen. Einige Unterempfehlungen haben fortifying influence andere keinen Influence → hier wird NICHT No Influence codiert, weil dies voraussetzt, dass eine Empfehlung in ihrer Gänze absolut keinen Einfluss hatte.	Der KBR empfiehlt eine City-Maut, diese kommt aber nicht Der KBR empfiehlt den Austausch von alten Gasheizungen, das wäre aber ohnehin so gekommen M-9 (Berlin): Autofahren unattraktiver machen – Parkraumbewirtschaftung soll sowohl in T0 als auch in T2 ausgeweitet werden; das Ziel, Autofahren insgesamt unattraktiver zu machen (z.B. durch Reduzierung von Parkplätzen), wird offiziell weder in T0 noch in T2 verfolgt M-15 (Berlin): City-Maut –> in T0 = C, in T2 = B
anyways (no influence)	Die Empfehlung (T1) hatte *keinen Einfluss* auf die kollektiven Entscheidungen der betrachteten politischen Einheit, weil die identische Entscheidung zu diesem Zeitpunkt auch ohne die CA getroffen worden wäre.	- *Anyways:* Daten/Forschung + Interviews zeigen das Fehlen von Einfluss, selbst wenn T1=T2, z. B. eine Empfehlung wurde umgesetzt, aber die politischen Akteuren ohnehin vor, sie vor der Versammlung umzusetzen (T0=T1=T2) - Unterscheidung "no uptake" und "anyways" i) Kein anderer Impact & T2=A | a | x, dann anyways="yes"; no uptake="no"	Hypothetischer Einfluss: Bei einer Empfehlung traf *Sowieso* zu. Expert*innen gaben jedoch an, dass eine gegensätzliche Empfehlung mit hoher Sicherheit *inhibiting influence* gehabt hätte. → No Influence *Hinreichende Evidenz?:* K-5: u.a. Erweiterung von Pfandsystemen -> Experte: evtl. wäre es auch ohne KBR umgesetzt worden, aber

		ii) Kein andere Impact & T2=B | ø, dann anyways="no"; no uptake="yes" ● *Nullhypothese H0:* Die betrachtete Empfehlung hatte KEINEN Einfluss. Diese Hypothese muss mit *hinreichender Evidenz* (geringer Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit) widerlegt werden. T0≠T1=T2 alleine aus einer Dokumentenanalyse und ohne weitere Evidenzen ist in der Regel keine hinreichende Evidenz für Impact. UND ● für diese Empfehlung wurde kein anderer Type of Influence als vorhanden identifiziert. *hypothetischer Einfluss*: a) trifft auch zu, wenn es einen Einfluss nur im hypothetischen Fall gegeben hätte, in dem die Empfehlung T1 eine andere gewesen wäre (s. Bsp). eine Empfehlung hat mehrere Unterempfehlungen. Einige Unterempfehlungen haben fortifying influence andere keinen Influence → hier wird NICHT No Influence codiert, weil dies voraussetzt, dass eine Empfehlung in ihrer Gänze absolut keinen Einfluss hatte.	wichtig, dass KBR die Regierung darin bestärkt hat, dass sie das richtige tun → Diese Evidenz ist für sich alleine ein Grenzfall, aber noch NICHT hinreichend. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die CD auf ohne T1 gekommen wäre erscheint zu hoch. Außerdem hat der Experte einen Anreiz, Impact zu demonstrieren. Schließlich kann die Validität der Aussage in Frage gestellt werden: Meint er wirklich CD oder nicht eher Positionen oder sogar nur Überzeugungen und Einstellungen, wenn er sagt, dass Bestärkung wichtig war.
fortifying influence	Die Empfehlung (T1) beeinflusste kollektive Entscheidungen der betrachteten politischen Einheit (T0 → T2), indem sie die politischen *Akteure* in ihren bereits vorhandenen Positionen bestärkte und/oder neue Prozesse zur Weiterentwicklung vorhandener Positionen in Gang setzte. Ohne T1 wäre die Entscheidung zu	a) die Empfehlung (T1) wurde in die politische Entscheidungsfindung integriert, war aber zuvor bereits Teil der politischen Agenda (T0 = A & T2 = A; oder T0 = a & T2 = a, wenn T0 = T2); UND b) es gibt hinreichende Evidenz dafür, dass die kollektive Entscheidung T2 ohne T1 zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht getroffen worden wäre. Mögliche Mechanismen: c) T1 beeinflusst Überzeugungen und/oder Einstellungen und/oder	Der KBR empfiehlt eine Emissionsminderung in der Tierhaltung um 50 % bis 2030. Das war vorher schon diskutiert worden, aber der KBR verstärkte Politiker:innen darin, dieses Ziel umzusetzen. M-8 (Berlin): Abstellen von E-Scootern – in T0 wird nur Vorhaben formuliert das Abstellen von Sharing-Angeboten generell zu adressieren, in T2 wird spezifisch auf E-Scooter eingegangen und rechtliche

	diesem Zeitpunkt nicht getroffen worden.	Positionen und dadurch kollektive Entscheidungen. d) T1 führt zu "Momentum" (d.h. Prioritätssteigerungen) und setzt Prozesse der Konkretisierung und/oder Abstimmung o.Ä. in Gang, die schließlich kollektive Entscheidungen führen, die ohne T1 nicht oder zumindest erst später getroffen worden wären. e) Prozesse der Konkretisierung gehen häufig mit inhaltlicher Weiterentwicklung von Politikmaßnahmen einher. Ist diese inhaltliche Weiterentwicklung im Sinne der Inhalte von T1, dann wird auch(!) enriching influence als vorhanden codiert. In diesem Fall kann, wenn möglich, untersucht werden, ob die fortifying influence (nur) *wegen der inhaltlichen Weiterentwicklung* aufgetreten ist.	Konsequenzen werden in Erwägung gezogen M-13 (Berlin): Emissionsfreie Innenstadt bis 2030 – in T0 grobes Ziel, in T2 konkrete Maßnahmen und Zeitplan
political influence	Die Empfehlung T1 hatte einen Einfluss darauf, dass zum Zeitpunkt T0 *konfligierenden Positionen* der relevanten politischen Akteure sich soweit veränderten, dass eine kollektive Entscheidung im Sinne von T1 in T2 ermöglicht wurde.	T0 = C & T2 = A|a	x Es liegt zum Zeitpunkt T0 ein politischer Konflikt vor (T0 = C). Durch die Empfehlung (T1) können sich die konfligierenden Positionen einigen und auf eine gemeinsame, oder zumindest teilweise überschneidende Position in T2 einigen (T2= A|a|x) Mindestens eine relevante politische Einheit ihre Vetoposition und dadurch kommt es zur CD. Dies kann aus unterschiedlichen Gründen und nach unterschiedlichen Mechanismen passieren. Falls political influence existiert, ergibt es Sinn diese Mechanismen, d.h. die Motivationen hinter der Positionsveränderung genauer herauszuarbeiten. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von *false negatives* für political influence ist vermutlich höher als für andere Kategorien. 1. Es ist zu t0 schwierig herauszufinden ob die betrachteten Informationen einen Konsens widerspiegeln oder nicht. 2. Aus	Die verschiedenen Parteien waren sich nicht sicher, ob man generell Tempo 30 in Innenstädten einführen soll. Es gab unterschiedliche Haltungen. Die Empfehlung des KBR für ein Tempo 30 in Innenstädten führte zu einer Entscheidung, dies einzuführen. M-12 (Berlin): Einsatz auf Bundesebene dafür dass A100 nicht ausgebaut wird – Laut Experte war diese Frage besonders kontrovers in T0 und wurde nur aufgrund der Empfehlung im BEK aufgenommen

		Kapazitätsgründen kann man nicht endlos nach möglichen Konflikten bzw. Vetos suchen 3. Politische Akteure haben manchmal Anreiz Konflikt nicht zu kommunizieren (z.B. Position unbeliebt, Konflikt zeigen kommt nicht gut bei Wähler*innen an, politische Norm, man Will nicht zeigen, dass man verloren hat bei CA). Diese Ausführungen könnten teilweise auch für shifting und inhibiting influence gelten.	
shifting influence	Die Empfehlung (T1) bewirkte eine Änderung in den Positionen der relevanten politischen Akteure und führte deshalb zu kollektiven Entscheidungen im Sinne von T1, die in dieser Form und/oder zu diesem Zeitpunkt ohne T1 nicht zustande gekommen wären.	$T0 = B \ \& \ T2 = A\|a \mid x$ Wenn das auftritt, dann wäre es sehr interessant, die Mechanismen zu beschreiben, wenn möglich. Wer genau hat die Position geändert (alle oder nur ein Teil relevanter politischer Akteure)? Warum haben Sie ihre Position geändert? Hatte das einen Einfluss auf die Interaktionen zwischen relevanten politischen Akteuren?	
inhibiting influence	Die Empfehlung (T1) veranlasste die politischen Akteure dazu, ihre *politische Agenda* vom Zeitpunkt T0 zum Zeitpunkt T2 *aufzugeben*.	$T0 = B \ \& \ T2 = \emptyset\|C$ Zum Zeitpunkt T0 haben die relevanten politischen Akteure eine Intention eine CD zu einer politischen Maßnahme herbeizuführen. Die CA spricht sich in T1 dagegen aus. Wegen T1 geben die politischen Akteuren ihre Intention zur CD auf.	fiktiv: haben sie sich vor Beginn des Klimarats deutlich für die Abschaffung von E-Scootern ausgesprochen und positionieren sich danach nicht mehr eindeutig zu dem Thema
innovating	Die Empfehlung T1 hat die Übernahme einer neuen Idee in T2 bewirkt - auch wenn die Empfehlung nur teilweise integriert wurde. Dies gilt nur, wenn die gesamte Empfehlung innovativ ist und nicht nur einzelne Aspekte davon.	$T0 = \emptyset \ \& \ T2 = A\|a\|x$	
enriching influence	Die Empfehlung T1 hat die zuvor	$T0 = a \ \& \ T2 = A;$ or $T0 = a \ \& \ T2 = a$ if $T0 \neq T2;$	fiktiv: the Council proposes concrete measures and steps

| | bestehenden Positionen von relevanten politischen Akteuren (T0) hinsichtlich T2 inhaltlich weiterentwickelt, beispielsweise durch Konkretisierung oder Erweiterung. | or T0=x and T2=a

Konkretisierung: Bestehende abstrakte Pläne oder Absichtserklärungen werden werden durch T1 inhaltlich so weiterentwickelt, dass eine Umsetzung erleichtert wird

Erweiterung: Bestehende abstrakte Pläne oder Absichtserklärungen werden durch T1 inhaltlich um weitere Dimensionen erweitert, z.B. Maßnahmen zur Berücksichtigung weiterer Ziele oder Nebenwirkungen (wie soziale Gerechtigkeit, oder Betroffenheit bestimmter Gruppen) | to reduce ticket prices for public transport - decision-makers have already shown a willingness to make public transport more accessible for people with lower incomes before the publication of the recommendations (i.e. T0 = a) - and after the conclusion of the Climate Council they promise to reduce ticket prices, but without concrete measures (i.e. T2 = a, but already somewhat closer to the recommendation than T0) |

I.4. Ambition

Die Variable "Ambition" gibt an, inwieweit die Empfehlung (T1) gar nicht, mehr oder weniger ehrgeizig ist als Positionen und Handlungen der politischen Akteure (Policymaking) zum Zeitpunkt T0.

level of ambition	definition	explanation
More ambitious	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist *ehrgeiziger* als Positionen und Handlungen der politischen Akteure (Policymaking) zum Zeitpunkt T0.	Eine Empfehlung gilt als ehrgeizig wenn: a) z.B. werden mehr CO_2 Emissionen eingespart / ein bestimmtes Ziel zeitlich früher erreicht wird / mehr Sektoren von einer Empfehlung betroffen sind als geplant
Less ambitious	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist *weniger ehrgeizig* als die Positionen und Handlungen der politischen Akteure (Policymaking) zum Zeitpunkt T0.	Eine Empfehlung gilt als weniger ehrgeizig wenn: b) Siehe Gegenteil von a)
Neither	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist *weder mehr noch weniger ehrgeiziger* als die Positionen und Handlungen der politischen Akteure (Policymaking) zum Zeitpunkt T0.	Eine Empfehlung ist weder mehr noch weniger ehrgeiziger wenn: a) "More ambitious" und "Less ambitious" Faktoren abwesend sind

I.5. Transformativeness

Die Variable „Transformativeness" gibt an, wie transformativ die Empfehlung (T1) nach der subjektiven Einschätzung der Codierenden ist.

transformative	definition	explanation	example

Yes	Die Empfehlung (T1) *sorgt für eine grundlegende qualitative Veränderung* in der Politik? In der Gesellschaft? The recommendation (T1) *provides a fundamental qualitative change* in policy? In society?	Grundlegende Veränderungen durch die Empfehlung (T1) könnten sein/werden charakterisiert durch: a) Sie sorgt für konkrete Treibhausgas (THG) Einsparungen b) AND/OR sie schafft institutionelle Grundlagen für künftige THG-Einsparungen c) AND/OR sie sorgt für grundlegende Änderungen der politischen Entscheidungsgrundlagen zugunsten künftiger THG-Einsparungen	Bsp. UK (TL-1): T1 "A reduction in the amount we use cars by an average of 2–5% per decade" - sehr transformativ, da bis dato nicht über eine Reduktion gesprochen wurde, insofern: THG Einsparungen möglich plus Suffizienzthema eingebracht
No	Die Empfehlung (T1) sorgt für *keine grundlegende qualitative Veränderung* in X.	Die Empfehlung (T1) ist nicht transformativ wenn: a) "yes" transformative Faktoren abwesend sind b) AND/OR die Empfehlung eher symbolisch ist	Fiktiv: Berlin soll bis 2045 klimaneutral werden
No idea	Es ist *keine verlässliche Einschätzung* der Transformativität *möglich*. *No reliable estimate* of the transformativeness is *possible*.	Die Transformativität wird mit "No idea" bewertet wenn: a) "Yes" und "No" transformative Faktoren abwesend sind b) AND/OR generell keine belastbaren Daten vorliegen um eine subjektiv informierte Einschätzung abgeben zu können	

I.6. Stringency

Die Variable „Stringency" gibt an, wie wahrscheinlich die effektive Implementierung der Beschlüsse zum Zeitpunkt T2 ist.

Type of stringency	definition	explanation	example
High	Die *Wahrscheinlichkeit einer effektiven Umsetzung* der Beschlüsse zum Zeitpunkt T2 ist *hoch*.	Die Umsetzungswahrscheinlichkeit wird mit "High" bewertet wenn: a) Ressourcen (z.B. Geld) zur Umsetzung bereitgestellt werden,	Ist ein Umsetzungsplan mit dabei?

		b) AND/OR „muss" in der Formulierung des Regulierung auftaucht,	
		c) UND/ODER Sanktionen mit dem nicht-Einhalten der Regulierung verknüpft sind,	
		d) UND/ODER Grenzwerte mit der Regulierung verknüpft sind,	
		e) UND/ODER die Subjektive Einschätzung einer hohen Umsetzungswahrscheinlichkeit vorliegt	
Low	Die *Wahrscheinlichkeit einer effektiven Umsetzung* der Beschlüsse zum Zeitpunkt T2 ist *gering*.	Die Umsetzungswahrscheinlichkeit wird mit "low" bewertet wenn: a) "kann"/"soll" in der Formulierung des Beschlusses auftaucht, b) UND/ODER der Beschluss eher symbolisch ist, c) UND/ODER high stringency Faktoren abwesend sind d) UND/ODER die Subjektive Einschätzung einer geringen Umsetzungswahrscheinlichkeit vorliegt	Ist es eher nur symbolisch ohne Umsetzungsplan? bspw beheizte pools werden verboten - das kann niemand konsequent überprüfen, also low stringency

I.7. Uncertainty

Die Variable "Uncertainty" gibt an, wie sicher sich der/die Coder:in bei der Einstufung des Einflusses für die Empfehlung (T1) ist.

Uncertainty	definition	explanation	example
High	Die Einfluss-Einstufung ist *nicht oder nur kaum möglich*, da *keine oder kaum verlässliche Daten* gefunden werden können und/oder erhobene Daten sich widersprechen.	Es gibt eine hohe Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit Bei Influence False positive (type I error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich einen Einfluss angebe, der eigentlich gar nicht existiert, ist höher als $\alpha = 10\%$. ODER Bei No Influence	For example: there is no information about T0 X false pos.: kann laut Kategoriendefinition nicht auftreten false neg.: T0=T1=T2 in Dokumentenanalyse UND [es wurde keine oder nur eine Interview-/surveyanfrage an eine Person gestellt die es wissen müsste ODER die Personen die es wissen müssten, haben

		False negative (type II error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich KEINEN Einfluss angebe, obwohl eigentlich einer existiert, ist höher als β = 25%.	einen Anreiz keinen Einfluss zu kommunizieren]
		Durch unsere Definitionen der Kategorien und die Berücksichtigung von *hinreichender Evidenz*, sollten wir eigentlich keine false positives mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit als 10% drin haben.	
		Dadurch, dass unsere Expert*innen und "die Politik" in den meisten Kontexten einen Anreiz hat, Einflüsse zu kommunizieren, sollten false negatives mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit als 10% selten auftreten.	
Average	Die Einfluss-Einstufung ist *nicht vollständig verlässlich* möglich, da *nicht vollständig verlässliche Daten* gefunden werden können.	Es gibt geringe Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit Bei Influence False positive (type I error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich einen Einfluss angebe, der eigentlich gar nicht existiert, ist kleiner als α = 10% aber nicht kleiner als α = 5%. ODER Bei No Influence False negative (type II error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich KEINEN Einfluss angebe, obwohl eigentlich einer existiert, ist kleiner als β = 25% aber nicht kleiner als β = 20%.	For example: change in line with the recommendation between T0 and T2 can be perceived, but it isn't certain whether this change can be directly attributed to the assembly False pos.: Expert*innenaussage: "Ich würde sagen, dass es ohne die CA vermutlich nicht zu dieser Entscheidung gekommen wäre." UND ["aber ganz sicher sein kann man sich da natürlich nicht" ODER "aber die selbe Position haben natürlich auch noch andere wichtige Interessengruppen vertreten" ODER Hinweise, dass die Expert*in einen Bias hat Einfluss zu kommunizieren *Schwierige Fälle, wenn Dok-Analyse ungleich Survey-Ergebnis:* Wenn Dok-Analyse "agree" bei „anyways" ergeben hat (T2=A|a|x), aber jmd im survey bei allen types of influence (auch „no uptake" und „anyways") „disagree" angibt, dann nachfragen und falls keine Antwort trotzdem „anyways" angekreuzt lassen, weil die Regel ja besagt T2=A	a	x,

			then "anyways"="yes" & "no uptake"="no". Wichtig: hier für „uncertainty" dann „average" angeben und bei uncertainty explanation angeben.
Low	Die Einfluss-Einstufung ist *sehr verlässlich* möglich. Die *Daten ermöglichen eine fundierte/klare Einstufung* des Einflusses.	Es gibt sehr geringe Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit False positive (type I error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich einen Einfluss angebe, der eigentlich gar nicht existiert, ist kleiner als $\alpha = 5\%$. False negative (type II error): Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ich KEINEN Einfluss angebe, obwohl eigentlich einer existiert, ist kleiner als $\beta = 15\%$.	false pos: Eine klare Antwort findet sich in den einschlägigen Dokumenten oder in den Aussagen der Experten. Die Aussage bezieht sich mit hoher Sicherheit auf CD und nicht etwa auf Positionen oder Überzeugungen/Einstellungen (Validität) und die Quelle hat die nötigen Informationen (war an der Entscheidung beteiligt oder sehr nah dran) und den Willen wahrheitsgemäß zu antworten.

Annex II: Tables of Respondents

Table 7: BRK: Overview of Interview Participants (I), Phone Calls (C), and Written Responses (W) with Anonymized Role Descriptions

No	Abbreviation in Thesis	Anonymised role description
1	I1	Project Team Member BürgerBegehren Klimaschutz e.V.
2	I2	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
3	I3	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
4	I4	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
5	W1	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
6	W2	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
7	W3	Negotiator within the Coalition Negotiations
8	W4	Employee of a Negotiator withing the Coalition Negotiations
9	C1	Chief of Staff; Working Group on Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection; SPD-Parliamentary Group
10	C2	Employee of a committee member

Table 8: CAUK: Overview of Interview Participants (I), Phone Calls (C), and Written Responses (W) with Anonymized Role Descriptions

No	Abbreviation in Thesis	Anonymised role description
11	I4	Parliamentary Official
12	I5	Parliamentary Official
13	I6	Parliamentary Official
14	I7	Academic Advisor for CAUK
15	I8	Academic Advisor for CAUK
16	I9	Academic Advisor for CAUK
17	I10	Expert Lead for CAUK
18	W5	Climate Change Committee (CCC)
19	W6	Shadow Minister
20	W7	Civil Servant at BEIS Department at the time CAUK's recommendations were published

Annex III: Graphs Visualising the SIM

VIII.1.1. BRK - Influence Types

Figure 7: Types of Influence, "high uncertainty" excluded

Figure 8: BRK: Types of Influence, divided by "no uptake" and "anyways"

VIII.1.2. BRK - Congruency in T0/T2

Figure 9: BRK: Congruency in T0/T2, "high uncertainty" excluded

Figure 10: BRK: Congruency in T0/T2, "high uncertainty" included

VIII.1.3. BRK – Ambition

Figure 11: BRK: Overall Ambition Level of Recommendations

Figure 12: BRK: Level of Ambition for "no uptake"


Figure 13: BRK: Level of Ambition for "anyways"

Figure 14: BRK: Ambition Levels Segregated by "no uptake" and "anyways"

Figure 15: BRK: Level of Ambition for "no uptake" and "anyways" in percentages


Figure 16: BRK: Level of Ambition per Action Field (totals per action field)

*Figure 17: BRK: Level of Ambition per Action Field (totals per level of ambition)*

VIII.1.4. BRK – Transformativeness

VIII.2.1. CAUK – Influence Types

Figure 21: CAUK: Influence Type Frequencies, "high uncertainty" excluded

Figure 22: CAUK: Types of Influence

Figure 23: CAUK: Influence Types "no uptake" & "anyways" per action field

VIII.2.2. CAUK – Congruency in T0/T2

Figure 24: CAUK: Congruency in T0

Figure 25: CAUK: Congruency in T2

VIII.2.3. CAUK – Ambition

Figure 26: CAUK: Overall Ambition Level of Recommendations

Figure 27: CAUK: Level of Ambition for "no uptake"

Figure 28: CAUK: Level of Ambition for "anyways"

Figure 29: CAUK: Level of Ambition per Action Field (totals per action field)

*Figure 30: CAUK: Level of Ambition per Action Field (totals per level of ambition)*

Figure 31: CAUK: Percentage Distribution of Ambition Levels by Action Field

VIII.2.4. CAUK – Transformativeness

Figure 32: CAUK: Transformativeness

Figure 33: CAUK: Transformativeness for "no uptake" & "anyways"

Statutory Declaration

Kira Hoffmann

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Name of the Student

Herewith I confirm

that the submitted master thesis is my own independent work and that I only used sources and resources listed therein and I have not made use of any inadmissible help from any other third party. In particular, I have clearly identified matter from other works, cited verbatim or paraphrased, as such.

The submitted thesis of parts thereof have not been presented at any institution or higher education for the examination procedure.

21.12.2023, Freiburg im Breisgau

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Date, Place   Signatur