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openETCS@ITEA Work Package 4.2: “Verification & Validation of the Formal Model”

**OETCS/WP4/D4.2.1
January 2014**

D.4.2.1 1st interim V&V report on the applicability of the V&V approach to the formal abstract model

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Introduction

To ensure the correctness and consistency of a model and its implementation, the validation and verification has to be performed alongside with the modeling process. Thus this task will be performed repeatedly during WP3 and will provide feedback to it. This document presents the interim results of the first iteration of verification and validation of formal model. However as the actual formal model of the ETCS system, provided by WP3, has not yet been initiated, no “real” input is currently applied.

The following sections present the contributions of the partners: Institut Mines-Télécom, TWT GmbH Science & Innovation, University of Bremen, University of Rostock, and Systerel.

1 Institut Mines-Télécom

1.1 Introduction

Over the past century, Europe's railways have been developed within national boundaries, resulting in a variety of different signaling and train control systems, which hampers cross-border traffic. To increase interoperability for the railway sector, the European Union has decided to adopt and standardize the European Train Control System (ETCS) new methods and tools to verify the reliability of such system need to be elaborated. We focus on applying model-based formal methods on validation and verification (V&V) of the ETCS system. This allows to model the system rigorously and to analyze it to ensure that the models is consistent and reasonably complete, and that any system that meets the models is certain to satisfy the required properties. An overview of our approach is depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Overview of Our Approach

In the openETCS project, the system requirement specifications are represented by using SysML models. We validate and verify the models on two aspects, model-level and execution-level, by using two model-based techniques: model-checking and model-based testing. At the model-level, V&V is done through model-checking, by using IFx tool, of IF formal models which are representations of the SysML models. As model-checking techniques check exhaustively models, hence it may be expensive in some special cases where we intend to check some properties of models in some explicit conditions. In such a case, model-based testing is a low-cost alternative. At the execution-level, we encode the SysML models by Java simulators that are then used to execute some tests. Model-checking can also be done at this level by using Java Pathfinder through assertions. We also illustrate the consistency of two aspects by applying test cases, that are generated by TestGen-IF tool at the model-level, on our Java simulators, i.e., all tests must give *pass* verdict

The automatic translations from SysML models to IF models to Java simulators are being studied. Furthermore, as the actual models provided by WP3 have not yet been initiated, we started with a formal model that is a finite state machine augmented with continuous variables and guards. This model can be considered as an abstract version of ETCS model and it can be refined in our future steps, e.g., the **Moving** function mode of the TRAIN can be refined to SHUNTING, TRIP function modes of OBU in Subset-026.4.4. It is presented in Section 1.2. In this section, we illustrate also how to deliver a formal model for a system requirement specification. Section 1.3 introduces our representations of our formal model by using IF language, XML and Java. The V&V of the model by using model-checking is represented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 is devoted to model-based testing of the model. We end with conclusions and future works.

1.2 Modeling the European Train Control System

1.2.1 System Requirements

The specification of the ETCS system requirements describes the system behavior as well as a number of functional requirements. As the significance and complexity of these requirements grow rapidly, formal techniques for producing reliable control software become of importance. Such formal methods and model-based verification and testing are among the most promising approaches for increasing software confidence.

To formally describe these requirements, one needs a formalism that takes into account continuous variables (variables related to the train position, speed and acceleration) and also different roles of different actors in the specifications: a) the Radio Block Center (RBC), the train (TRAIN), and the environment itself (ENV). The devised formal model must represent critical situations such as a) alarm signals from the RBC; b) external inputs to RBC and trains; c) critical distance between two trains; d) the loss of some messages from/to a TRAIN or from/to a RBC.

The following requirements for the TRAIN system are considered in our approach.

Requirement R_1 : *For each train, there is the safety distance SD .*

Requirement R_2 : *If $TRAIN_{id}$ is controlled by the RBC, then it reports its current position (p), speed (v), and acceleration (a) and the next internal state where the output parameters p , v , a are updated according to the train sensors.*

Requirement R_3 : *The input parameter SD represents the safety distance between two trains and is a constant in the model.*

Requirement R_4 : *Messages between the train and the RBC may be lost. However, the train continues moving and it should automatically decide if it is in a safe position or not.*

Those four system requirements are taken into account when deriving a formal train system specification which is represented as a extended timed finite state machine.

1.2.2 Modeling Decisions

There exist several formal models related to ETCS [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Most approaches describe the system behavior using logic formulas and then verify whether these formulae satisfy some safety requirements, such as the safe distance between trains, alarm messages (fire, accidents, etc.) which can come from outside a train and RBC as well as from inside the train. In order to

develop a formal model in the ETCS context it is necessary to consider the actors in Figure 3 and discuss the behavioral aspects of an RBC and a train under control and which safety aspects should be taken into account. This figure also shows messages exchanged between the different actors, with the rep message being a report that the train sends to the RBC and the messages move, neg and stopRBC being messages sent from the RBC to the train to inform what state it should go to (moving, negotiation or stop state, explained below). The control message is used to inform the train of who it needs to communicate with. The other messages were not considered on our first version of the model.

The TRAIN, RBC, and ENV actors communicate in a distributed scenario that is characterized by the absence of a global time, thus, each player has its own clock. Moreover, there are two main safety issues related to time constraints. First, how often the train should report to RBC (position, speed, etc.) and how often the RBC has to send control messages to the train. We do not discuss this issue in the deliverable, since this decision is usually made when verifying the safety of a corresponding logic formula. In our approach, this is modeled by discrete time instances when messages may be received/sent. The second aspect is related to the situation when, for some reason, exchange messages are lost. In order to deal with this situation we augment our model with a timeout function. If there is no input before the timeout expires then the actors (RBC, a TRAIN under control, and/or ENV) has to make their own decision, e.g., for the safety issues usually it is the decision to stop the train. Therefore, in our model we synchronize the RBC and TRAIN by sending messages with relevant parameters such as the position, the maximum speed, the velocity, or the security point.

Another portion of safety issues is related to situations when a TRAIN under control moves in an autonomous way: when the TRAIN should negotiate with RBC about the safety distance, when it should be stopped, i.e., we have to check the functional aspects of the system. Some core points can be defined where an actor has different behaviors, and those points can be considered as states in the model. The conditions when an actor moves from one point (state) to another are usually related to some safety distances between TRAINs, respecting alarm messages, etc. Transitions significantly depend on the values of continuous variables such as train position, speed, acceleration, etc.

To solve these issues, we consider an ETFSM (Extended Timed Finite State Machine) as a formal model from which test cases for verifying the safety aspects of the developed implementations can be automatically generated. Formally, an ETFSM is a tuple $(S, s_0, E, T, \Delta, v_0)$ where: S is a non-empty finite set of states with $s_0 \in S$ as the initial state, E is a finite set of events, T is a set of transitions, $\Delta \subset S \rightarrow S \times (\mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\})$ is timeout function, and v_0 is the vector of initial values of the context variables. The timeout function Δ limits an interval by which a trigger of transition must occur (thus the transition will be fired). When the interval ends, the transition will be automatically fired in spite of its trigger has not yet occurred.

A TRAIN under control has four states where it has different behavior. These states are depicted in Figure 2.

Start. The initial state is where the TRAIN gets a notification message informing that it is controlled by the given RBC. When getting this message the train reports the corresponding data to RBC and moves to another state (moving/stopping).

Moving. At this state, the TRAIN can get different messages from RBC but almost any message should contain the safety distance according to the position of the previous TRAIN or possibly some obstacles reported to the RBC by the environment. If the TRAIN is in a safe position it




Figure 2. States and Transitions of the Train and RBC models.

continues moving in an autonomic way. However, if its position is closer to some dangerous point then the train should come to another state and start the negotiation with RBC.

Negotiation. If the TRAIN crosses the critical point then it should be immediately stopped. The safety point can be calculated by the RBC based on the data got from the previous TRAIN or on some data got from ENV.

Stop. The TRAIN waits for an input of RBC in order to start moving again. In our model, we have such an actor as the ENV and as far as we know, the idea of modeling the ETCS environment never has been presented. The ENV can send alarm messages to the RBC if something happens outside. We also model the train “red button” (accident, fire etc.) inside the train also by the environment and in this case, the train has to immediately report the situation to the RBC. The RBC states are almost the same as for the train but the RBC can get/send messages to/from the environment that usually is some automatic control (another RBC) or some manager in charge. Moreover, based on the collected information (from other RBC, from trains this RBC is in charge of, etc.) the RBC calculates the safety position for a given train and reports this position to the train. Below we present formula of how this safety position is calculated based on the ETCS requirements.

1.2.3 Modeling Requirements

We briefly describe the main requirements of the ETCS Level 3. In application Level 3 replaces the line-side signals as well as the trackside occupancy checking devices. The location of the train is determined by the trainside optometry and reported to the trackside radio block centre via the GSM-R radio transmission. In this configuration, train spacing is no longer controlled by the interlocking. However, the latter has to exchange information about the route setting with the RBC. In this level, the trains follow the moving block principle [6], i.e., the current speed and acceleration of a train are dynamically determined by a RBC tracking the train. Trains are only allowed to move when the RBC grants them permission to do so. According to the set of requirements, in this model, we have the first the *requirement R1* which is the critical point of $Train_{id}$ of interest (with respect to the previous train). This point is calculated by the RBC that controls the $Train_{id}$ to avoid collisions.

Figure 3 depicts the exchange messages among the actors. The environment ENV actor represents external inputs which may occur in the system, such as an alarm event or a call of an administrator that can interact with the RBC. Thus, the *requirement R2* is also considered in the model.

The RBC analyzes the information obtained from the previous train and returns the critical distance d to the train. According to the rules, the safety distance *requirement R3* is used in the model.

We say that a train at position p and with the critical point d is:

- In a *safe* position if $(d - p) \geq 4SD$;
- In a *negotiation* position if $2SD \leq (d - p) \leq 4SD$;
- In a *stop* position if $(d - p) < 2SD$.

The developed model takes the above expressions into consideration: If a TRAIN is at the **Moving** state and it is in a *safe* position then it can remain at this state having the speed and acceleration recommended by the RBC that controls the TRAIN. However, if the train progresses and the critical distance is not increased with the same speed, then the train will move to a negotiation position and enter the **Negotiation** state. Finally, if the train is at the **Negotiation** state and the critical distance does not increase then the train moves to a stop position and enters the **Stop** state where the train has zero speed.

This model satisfies the *requirement R4*. To model this behavior the timeouts $TAB = 4 * SD/Vmax$ and $TBC = 2 * SD/Vmax$ are introduced in our model (where $Vmax$ is the maximum speed allowed for the train). If the train is at the **Moving** state and the train does not receive any message from the RBC then after TAB time units it automatically moves to the **Negotiation** state, while if the train is at the **Negotiation** state and does not receive any input message from the RBC during TBC then the train moves to the **Stop** state.

1.2.4 Formal Model

We use the following functions when describing the set of transitions of the TRAIN and RBC models:

- The function $g(RBC)$ returns the critical point d to the $Train_{id}$;
- The function $rep(Train_{id})$ returns the current position (p), speed (v) and acceleration (a) values and the next internal state of the $Train_{id}$ according to the values of the train sensors.

The train. An ETFSM that describes the internal behavior of the TRAIN has the following states. State **Start** is the initial state of the train. Any train at this state is not controlled by the RBC of our interest. Once the train is controlled it moves to the **Moving** state.

The RBC checks the position of the train at appropriate time units which usually are very close to each other. If the train crosses the Negotiation point then the train and the RBC start negotiating and the train moves to **Negotiation** state. The dot line TAB denotes a timeout. If the train does not receive any input from the RBC during an appropriate time period (this is discussed above), then the train automatically moves to the **Negotiation** state. The train is at this state if the train has crossed the Negotiation point but did not reach stop position yet; the RBC calculates a new critical position (point d). If the train reaches Stop position then the train automatically should stop (moves to the **Stop** state). Otherwise, it continues moving and will go to the **Moving** state




Figure 3. Communications among the Actors: TRAIN, RBC and ENV

or stay at the **Negotiation** state depending on the value of d and its current position. At the **Stop** state the train has the null speed. The train can come to this state if timeouts are triggered or the current position of the train is very close to the critical point, or the train has received an alarm message from inside the train (modeled as a part of the environment) or a *stopRBC* message from the RBC.

The RBC. At the initial state **IDLE**, the RBC collects the information of all the trains which are controlled by this RBC and is waiting for the message *take_care* to control a train of interest.

When the message *take_care* is confirmed by the train then the RBC moves to the **Info** state. The **Info** is the state where the RBC waits for a message from the train that contains its position, speed and acceleration and its current internal state.

The RBC sends the message *control(k)* to the train in the **IDLE** state and when $k = j$ the train *Train_j* is controlled by the RBC. Once getting the message *control(j)* at the **Start** state the train replies with the message *rep(p; v; a; state)* to the RBC. In fact, once controlled by RBC the train replies with this message to any input from the RBC. The message *move(d; V_{max}; a_{max})* sent to the train contains the critical point d (with respect to the previous train or with respect to the next station etc.), the maximum speed V_{max} and the maximum acceleration a_{max} that the train can have.

Depending on the position of the previous train and possibly other conditions, the critical point d is calculated and according to its value the RBC moves to the **Stop** state, to the **Negotiation** state, or to the **Move** state. The **Stop** is a state where the RBC finds out that the train is stopped.

It could happen because the position of the train is close to the point d (the train is in a Stop position) or if any external input alarm occurs. The **Negotiation** is a state that denotes an active

exchange of messages between the train and the RBC since the train is not in a *safe* position but did not reach a *stop* position, i.e., the train is in a *negotiation* position. The **Move** state denotes that the train is moving as autonomous as possible.

The RBC sends the message *stopRBC* in order to stop the train. If the train receives this message at any state then the train moves to the **Stop** state.

The message $neg(d; V_{max}; a_{max})$ is sent to the train when the RBC knows that the train is at the **Negotiation** state. The environment can send the *alarm* message to the RBC indicating that something is going wrong outside.

Finally if the RBC gets this message then RBC sends the message *stopRBC* in order to stop this train and enters the **Stop** state. There is a timeout TAB from state **Moving** to the **Negotiation** state, where $TAB = 4 * SD$ (four times exceeding the safety distance):

*If the train is in the **Moving** state and the train does not receive any input during TAB time units, then the train automatically moves to **Negotiation** state.*

There also is a timeout TBC from the **Negotiation** state to the **Stop** state, where $TBC = 3 * SD$ (three times exceeding the safety distance) that means:

*If the train is in the **Negotiation** state and the train does not receive any input after TBC time units, then it automatically moves to the **Stop** state.*

1.3 Using Specification Languages to Describe the Model

1.3.1 SysML

SysML (Systems Modeling Language) is a general-purpose graphical modeling language for systems engineering applications. It supports the specification, analysis, design, verification and validation of a broad range of systems and systems-of-systems. It is defined as an open source specification of a subset extension of the UML, i.e., SysML reuses seven of fourteen diagrams of UML and add two diagrams: requirement and parametric diagrams. It seeks to generalize UML for specifying complex systems that include non-software components such as information, processes, hardware, personnel and facilities.

1.3.2 Intermediate Format Language

IF is a language based on temporized machines, allowing the description of existing concepts into specification formalisms. A real-time system described using IF language is composed of processes running in parallel and interacting asynchronously through shared variables and message exchanges via communication channels. The description of a system in IF consists in the definition of: data types, constants, shared variables, communication signals and processes. In Figure 4 we represent a short code of our model in this language.

1.3.3 XML and Java

In order to assess the possibilities of the model to represent safety properties, we have been implemented a prototype in XML-based language that then automatically generates Java simulator. The simulator can reproduce a sequence of outputs corresponding a given timed parameterized input sequence.

```

system ETCS;

/* Constant definition */
const SD = 300;
...

/* Data type definition */
type states = enum
    start, moving, _stop, negotiation
endenum;
...

/* Signal definitions */
signal ETCS_no_controlled(pid);
signal ETCS_report(pid, integer, integer, integer, states);
signal ETCS_control();
signal ETCS_move(dType, VmaxType, AmaxType);
...

/*Signal route definitions*/
signalroute train_to_RBEnv(1)
    from Train to env
    with ETCS_no_controlled, ETCS_report;
...

```

Figure 4. A Sample Code of the ETCS Specification in IF.

Currently, each actor is described by a XML file, in which the main component is state and inside each state all its characteristics are presented. Among the possible things, there are transitions that start at this state, internal variables for each state, update functions for these variables and timeouts. Once the XML file is properly defined, it is parsed, using JDOM - a Java library for XML parsing - in order to create an internal representation of the ETFSM. During this phase, all the components are created internally to be used later for the simulation. After this phase is completed, the model is ready to be executed. The simulator itself is implemented in Java, with a different thread in charge of keeping time (issuing an alarm when a timeout has occurred). Also, each component is represented internally by a different object, for example transitions and timeouts are different object types with very distinct characteristics.

1.4 Model Verification

We verify the proposed formal model by using two different model checking approaches, one at model level and another at execution level.

1.4.1 Deriving Safety Properties

When performing the verification of the TEFSM model we considered the following safety properties.

Property 1. The train is in the **Moving** state, running at 100km per hour, with an acceleration of 10km per h² on a distance of 100km. Due to some external unexpected reasons, the train must stop as soon as possible. Therefore, an alarm from the environment is sent to the train. Automatically, the train should stop and provide a reporting message with its current parameters (state, position, etc.) to the RBC.

Property 2. In this case, the property is the capability of the ETCS system of taking over control if the driver appears to be going too fast.¹ We consider the train in the **Start** state, receiving the message move with a certain speed and acceleration.

¹This property represents the situation that caused the Spain train accident

Property 3. A train is in the **Moving** state, running with a speed of 100 km per hour, with an acceleration of 10 km per h², situated somewhere at 10 km from the reference point. The safety distance (SD) between two ETCS trains is of 300 km. The train receives the signal move with the maximum speed of 105 km per hour and with an acceleration of 15 km per h² for the next 900 km.

Property 4. The property is related to transitions with time-outs. We consider a train in the **Moving** state, moving with a speed of 100 km per hour, with an acceleration of 10 km per h². The safety distance is of 300 km and the maximum speed allowed is $V_{max} = 105$ km per hour. The communication between the train and the RBC is lost, so the train should take an appropriate decision on the next state, after an appropriate period of time.

1.4.2 Model Checking using IFx

Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state reactive systems. Using such techniques one could automatically check if the model specifies most of the requirements of the system, such as the important safety properties described in Task 4.4. Similar to proof techniques, in order to use model checking to verify if the SFM (Semi-formal model) and FFM (fully formal model) comply with the safety and function requirements (cf. RWP2 /D2.6-02-058), the properties to be proven have to be identified and described. To implement the use model checking, it is mandatory to specify the model using finite-state reactive systems, and they should also provide an intuitive way to express the properties to be model checked. The language for describing a formal model for which corresponding model checkers exist should be selected and the set of critical requirements to be verified need to be clearly identified. The proposed model checking techniques should be supported in the selected tool chain. As mentioned above, we are using XML-based and IF-based specification to perform the model checking of train safety properties.

1.4.3 Model Checking using Java Pathfinder

When using model checkers the criteria for the model to be safe is that all the safety properties should be checked. This is impossible, since the number of safety properties could be infinite and thus, only some of them can be checked through the above step. For this reason, as a complementary approach, testing is commonly used. If the corresponding model respects some requirements, i.e., only expected outputs are produced to applied input sequences, to some extent, there is a confidence that the models is safe. In order to derive 'good' tests a formal model should be involved. It is known that only the FSM model where each input is followed by a corresponding output allows automatic deriving finite tests with the guaranteed fault coverage where the races between inputs and outputs can be easily avoided. Many authors for deriving finite tests with the guaranteed fault coverage turn their model to some kind of an FSM (see, e.g., [7, 8, 9]).

As for simulation, the artifacts should provide means to execute the model. The simulator must be automatically generated, so that, when run against test scenarios (inputs/outputs for the model), we may conclude whether the model follows the specification or not. In particular, it is important to define test scenarios for the safety critical properties. Since, the development within openETCS has to the goal to reach the CENELEC EN 50128 SIL 4 standard, it is highly recommended (cf. SIL 4) that the simulation needs to cover all states, transitions, data-flow, and paths in the model. It would also be desirable to include graphical representation of the simulation/model and also provide a report of the visited components as specified by CENELEC EN 50128 SIL 4. CENELEC EN 50128 SIL4 also advocates to perform tracing. Being able

to trace the requirements that are met during a simulation is also advisable to allow simple requirement coverage.

Java Pathfinder [10] (JPF) is a system to verify executable Java bytecode programs. The core of JPF is a Java Virtual Machine that is also implemented in Java. JPF executes normal Java bytecode programs and can store, match and restore program states. Its primary application has been Model checking of concurrent programs, to find defects such as data races and deadlocks.

As in this project, the XML-specification of the proposed model is automatically converted into Java code. The safety properties will be then specified as Java assertions and will be added to the corresponding Java implementation.

1.5 Testing European Train Control System

1.5.1 Adaptive scenario


In this section, we present the notion of testing and discuss a testing scenario for our model. We assume that the RBC and the train are tested separately, i.e., when testing the train software the RBC is replaced by a tester that sends inputs to the train and checks whether the produced outputs are expected. Moreover, we consider adaptive testing, i.e., a test case is represented as an acyclic ETFSM [11, 12] where only one timed input is defined at each intermediate state. We start at the initial state and apply an input defined at the state to an IUT. Based on the produced output the FSM R that represents a test case will move to another prescribed state where another input can be specified and exactly this input will be applied at the next step. If the observed trace is a trace of the specification ETFSM then we say that the IUT passed a test case. Otherwise, the IUT fails the test case, i.e., the IUT does not conform to the given specification. We illustrate our approach using the following testing scenario (Figure 5):

If there is no signal from RBC for an appropriate period of time then a train must stop itself.

In Figure 5 are represented the following five steps:

1. The tester (simulating the RBC functioning) starts with sending the message control to the train. The 0 value in the initial state means that the RBC does not wait anything to send this message.
2. Depending on the internal state of the train, the tester moves to different states. In order to simplify the example let us consider that the train always answers this message.
3. At these states the tester waits for the appropriate number of time units $TAB + TBC$ or TBC when there are no messages sent to the train.
4. Then the tester checks the state of the train by sending the control message again. If the train is in the **Stop** state then the tester returns *Pass*, otherwise it returns *Fail*. Finally, having the train at the **Stop** state the tester forces it to move with the maximal permissible speed and acceleration and returns the critical distance d .

In the same way, other testing scenarios for checking safety properties may be considered. For example, we can derive a test case that checks whether a train stops when being close to the critical point d , a test case that checks whether a train changes the Moving state when crossing the critical point d , a test case that checks whether a train speed (acceleration) does not exceed



the permissible maximum, etc. Finally, it is worth mentioning that when we are testing whether a train stops when reaching a critical point or whether the train respects RBC requirements about its speed and acceleration we must use continuous variables.

1.5.2 Test Cases Generation based on IF Model

In this Section we present how to automatically extract a set of test cases from the formal model described in the IF language. We have identified a set of basic requirements and we can describe them as IF properties. Based on these properties, the TestGen-IF tool automatically generates a set of test cases.

We present a short overview of the result of applying this tool in a requirement related to Property 1 as described in Figure 6.

```

1 #Test-case for the train in the Moving state
2 ?ETCS_control{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,100,10,start }
3 ?ETCS_alarm_to_train{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,100,10,moving }
4 ?ETCS_control{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,0,0,_stop }
5 #Test-case for the train in the Negotiation state
6 ?ETCS_control{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,100,10,start }
7 ?ETCS_move{900,105,15} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,100,10,moving }
8 ?ETCS_alarm_to_train{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,100,10,negotiation }
9 ?ETCS_control{} !ETCS_report{{ Train }0,10,0,0,_stop }

```

Figure 6. An Example of Test Case generated by TestGen-IF tool.

Different test scenarios are performed with respect to safety properties discussed in Section 1.4.1. As a future work we plan to verify the fault coverage of these tests by executing Java simulator against corresponding traces.

1.6 Conclusions

In this deliverable, we have provided a method to formally model the requirements of the European Train Control System using finite state machines augmented with continuous variables (train position, speed, acceleration) and time constraints. Currently, the obtained model can be considered as an abstract representation of the system specification provided by the standard, i.e., the **Moving** function mode of the TRAIN can be refined to SHUNTING, TRIP function modes of OBU in Subset-026.4.4.

We have also presented different model checking techniques to verify the proposed formal model. To efficiently perform such model checking we use different specification languages, namely, XML and IF languages. We have proposed a technique of the ETCS adaptive testing w.r.t. test scenarios written as train safety properties.

As a future work, on the one hand, we refine our formal model. In the other hand, we complete the automatic translations from the SysML specification to the IF specification or to our Java simulator.

2 TWT GmbH Science & Innovation

2.0.1 Verification of Procedures of Subset 026-5

This section reports on the modeling of the procedures described in Subset 026, Chapter 5—that is, the behavioral part of the ETCS. The goal of the activity is to validate the specification and to support the modeling using SCADE and the verification of SCADE models on a higher² level of abstraction.

The activity is described in the Verification and Validation Plan (see Sect. 6.1.2.5). In short, we provide feedback regarding ambiguities, inconsistencies and errors in the current ETCS standard based on our formalization of the specification using mathematical modeling languages.

Object of verification

The object of verification is Subset 026-5 of the specification. We formally model parts of the specification and use the resulting model to validate the specification. This design step has been described in D2.3 (see Sect. 4.4).

Available specification

The specification is described in Subset 026-5. It describes procedures of ETCS entities (i.e., required reactions on events and received messages), thereby focusing on required change in status and mode of entities considered.

Detailed verification plan

Goals The goal is to model the procedures described in Subset 026-5, thereby focusing on modeling the *system behavior*—that is, the control flow of the on-board unit and the interplay with its environment (e.g., the driver and the RBC). The model is then used to validate the specification.

Method/Approach As a formal model, we use *colored Petri nets* (CPNs) [13], an extension of classical Petri nets [14] with data, time, and hierarchy. CPNs are well-established and have been proven successful in numerous industrial projects. They have a formal semantics and with CPN Tools [15], there exists an open source tool for modeling CPNs. Moreover, CPN Tools also comes with a simulation tool and a model checker, thereby enabling formal analysis of CPN models.

We focus on modeling the *system behavior*—that is, the control flow of the on-board unit and the interplay with its environment (e.g., the driver and the RBC). Figure 7 depicts the CPN representing the highest level of abstraction. It shows the decomposition of the overall system into the on-board unit and its environment: the driver, the RBC, the RIU, the STM, and the GSM module. Each component is modeled as a subpage (i.e., a component). Graphically, a subpage is depicted as a rectangle with a double-lined frame. Furthermore, the model shows through which message channels and shared variables the on-board unit is connected to its environment. A channel or shared variable is modeled by a place which is graphically represented as an ellipse. As an example, the driver (i.e., subpage `Driver`) may send a message to the on-board unit (i.e.,

²in comparison to SCADE models




Figure 7. Top level model

subpage On-board Unit) via the place `msg from driver`, and receives messages sent by the on-board unit via the place `msg to driver`.

Zooming in subpage On-board Unit yields the CPN model in Fig. 8. This CPN model has two subpages: Subpage `Start` models the states `S0` and `S1` of the specification (i.e., Subset 026-5.4) and subpage `Rest` the remaining states. At this level of abstraction, we see on the left hand side seven places (green frame). Each such place models (a part) of the state of the on-board unit, for example, the mode and the train running number. The current model has 689 places, 173 transitions and 1,227 arcs.

Having a more detailed look at Fig. 8, we observe that our model does not represent all variables of the on-board unit as given in the specification and also partially abstracts from data. We abstract from those details, because the model is tailored to formalize the *control flow* of the on-board unit and, in particular, the *communication behavior* with its environment. As a benefit, this abstraction reduces the complexity of the model and improves its understandability. Additional details, such as data and precise message values, can be added in a refinement step.

The modeled procedures have been manually modeled using CPN Tools. Thereby, each element in the model has been reviewed against the respective requirement, as given in the specification. To improve the confidence in the model, in a second step, a person other than the modeler checked the model against the specification. In addition, we used the simulator to check whether the modeled behavior of the CPN matched the intended behavior.




Figure 8. CPN model of the on-board unit

So far, the primary goal of modeling has been to validate the specification. During the modeling we discovered 36 inconsistencies, ambiguities and gaps in the specification which we reported in [16].

Means The input for our approach is the specification described in Subset 026-5. Our output is a CPN model and a report describing inconsistencies, ambiguities and gaps in the Subset 026-5.

Results

Summary We have modeled the following five procedures of Subset 026-5 as CPN:

- Start of Mission (Subset 026-5.4)
- End of Mission (Subset 026-5.5)
- Shunting Initiated by Driver (Subset 026-5.6)
- Override (Subset 026-5.8)
- Train Trip (Subset 026-5.11)

During the modeling we discovered 36 inconsistencies, ambiguities and gaps in the specification which we reported in [16]. Our CPN models the system behavior—that is, the interplay between the different entities of the ETCS—and partially abstract from data. Therefore, we complement

the work on SysML modeling, where the focus is on the connectivity of components and the data types.

Conclusions/Lessons learned The numerous specification findings illustrate the need for validating the specification. CPNs are well-suited to model the behavioral aspects described in Subset 026-5. The size of the model clearly indicates the complexity of the procedures, even at the current level of abstraction. Therefore, we expect that applying formal verification on the resulting CPNs will not be feasible due to state-space explosion.

Future Activities

We shall continue our work by completing the model, contributing to the modeling of (parts of) Subset 026-5 using SCADE, and verifying the SCADE model. In addition, we are planning to exploit synergies by collaborating with the project partner LAAS who advocate the Petri net model checker TINA [17]. In addition, we are working with the project partners from Braunschweig University of Technology on generating test cases from the CPN model.

Modeling the Subset 026-5

We plan to model the remaining parts of Subset 026-5, thereby reporting possible additional findings in the specification. The goal is to have a CPN modeling all procedures that are described in Subset 026-5. We also want to compare our model with the (corresponding part of the) ERTMSFormalSpec model [18].

SCADE Modeling

As the ETCS will be modeled using SCADE, we shall contribute to this modeling process. To use the experience that we gained from modeling Subset 026-05 with CPN Tools, we want to contribute to the SCADE modeling of (parts of) the Subset 026-5. The SCADE design flow starts with modeling all components and their interplay using SysML block diagrams (with the tool SCADE Designer). The resulting SysML diagrams provide a functional and an architectural view. They are similar to the CPN model in Fig. 7. In a second step, the behavior of each block has to be fully modeled on the system level using SCADE Suite. Currently, SCADE does not support state machine models on the level of SysML. Our CPN model provides this level of abstraction and will, therefore, be useful for the SCADE modeling.

Verification of the SCADE Model Another task concerns the verification of the resulting SCADE model. Recently, researchers reported on complexity problems already for medium-sized SCADE models that restrict the verification using the SCADE prover [19, 20]. Given the complexity of the ETCS, we assume that we will face similar challenges. To alleviate those complexity problems, we aim to apply the following three techniques:

Abstraction: We will apply abstraction techniques on the SCADE model to prove safety properties on a higher level of abstraction whenever possible. On the one hand, we can apply SCADE contracts to restrict the domain of the input values. This technique is known as environment abstraction. On the other hand, we can transform the SCADE model into a model of higher abstraction, thereby using different formalisms such as timed automata, transition systems and Petri nets. (As SCADE has a formal semantics such transformations

are possible, but may take considerable effort.) We can then use verification tools that are dedicated to the properties of interest and the chosen formalism. We see the chance that our CPN model can be used for this task, too. For example, Uppaal [21] can analyze timed automata, the Spin model checker [22] and NuSMV [23] can analyze transition systems, and TINA [17], LoLA [24], and CPN Tools [15] are tools for analyzing (different variants of) Petri nets.

Compositional Reasoning: Another approach is to prove properties for individual components and deduce from it the correctness of a property concerning the entire ETCS. Here we think that we can, in particular, combine our model with the MoRC model [25] and apply compositional reasoning.

Correctness by Design: The two previous approaches support *correctness by verification*; that is, first the model is designed and in the next step it is verified. A different methodology is *correctness by design*. The idea is to model on a higher level of abstraction and to prove that certain safety properties hold. Then the model is iteratively refined. Each refinement step has to guarantee that all properties that hold for the more abstract level also hold in the refined model. The challenge is to find property-preserving refinement rules or a refinement relation between an abstract model and a refined model that preserves the desired properties and to verify that this relation holds. The results can be applied to validate the SCADE model and the specification.

3 University of Bremen

3.1 Verification of the Management of the Radio Communication

This section reports the verification activity of SCADE-MoRC. The goal of this activity is, first, to establish the compliance of the SCADE model to the SRS description via testing. Secondly, we want to track the ambiguities within the specification. Finally we want to demonstrate the efficiency of model based testing using the RT-tester tool for system integration testing.

The activity is described in the Verification and Validation Plan section 6.1.2.7 *System Integration Testing (Uni Bremen/DLR)* [26] In short, we develop a test model from the specification, generate tests and use the code generated from SCADE to perform software-in-loop testing. The test model and the SCADE model used to generate code have been done independently to each other.

Object of verification

Management of radio communication (MoRC) ERTMS function baseline 3.

The system under test (e.g. the verification object) is the C code generated from a SCADE model and described here https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/tree/master/model/SCADE_Siemens/Subset_026_Chapt_3.5_ManagementOfRadioCommunication/Generated_C_Code. It describes the Management of the radio communication at the software phase.

Available specification

The specification is described in the SUBSET-026[27] chap 3.5 [28]. It describes the communication protocol between the EVC and the RBC or balises. In particular, how the EVC initiates and terminates a communication.

Detailed verification plan

Goals To achieve what has been defined previously a test model in SysML has been developed. The description of this verification artifact may be found here https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/blob/master/model/EA-SysML/new_version/doc/ea_sysml_report.pdf

Our main goal is to verify the SCADE model by test simulation. The tests are produced by a model of the subset-026 chap 3.5 described as a state machine.

Method/Approach Figure 9 depicts our methodology. From the SRS specification, two models are designed: one SCADE model that will be then used to produce C code and one SysML model for generating tests.

Our test model contains the behavioral representation of the MoRC, the set of requirements of the chap 3.5, and the link between the behavior and the requirement. Most of the requirements may be represented as single transition or state in the test model state machine. Nevertheless, some of the requirements may be only modeled as a path of the state machine, we choose to represent those as LTL formula, added as constraints of the test model. For example the REQ-3.5.10




Figure 9. SCADE/RT-Tester methodology

describes the steps needed for the establishment of the radio communication order by the RBC. This requirement explicits a particular path of the test model, thus this path should exists in our test model. To ensure that this particular test will be generated a LTL formula has been added (See [25] for more details).

REQ-3.5.3.10 "If the establishment of a communication session is initiated by the RBC, it shall be performed according to the following steps ..."

```
Finally (MessageIn == INIT_SESSION_TRACK && setUp == 1 ->
Next (MessageOut == SESSION_ESTABLISHED && radioComSession == ESTABLISHED)
```

We need then to link the system under test and the test model. Since the two models are elaborated independently, we need to ensure that the tests generated may be handled by the code generated by SCADE and conversely we need to read the output of the C code back to the test generator to compare the values with our oracles. This is achieve by defining a common interface that the two models should respect. The inputs drive the tests and the outputs are the observational points to state if a test pass or fail. Hence, the two models should respect the same interface.

After the modeling phase, starts the test generation phase. Two strategies have been used for the tests generation. First, we generate a set of test following the common behavioral coverage strategies ensuring the following coverage :

- Basic control state coverage (BCS): All state locations are covered.
- Transition coverage (TC): All transition of the statecharts are covered.
- Modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC): Modified condtion/decision coverage.
- Hierarchic transition coverage (HITR): High-level transition of nested statecharts are covered.
- Basic Control states Pair coverage(BCPAIRS): For concurrent state machines pair states of two different state machines.

More detaillled explanation on the coverage may be found here [29].

We then apply a requirement coverage strategy that consists of generating tests that covers all the requirements. As each requirement are linked to an artifact of the test model, part of the test cases are generated as subset of the coverage mention above. In addition, test cases from the LTL are also provided.

Finally the test engines run the SUT with the stimuli from the test model. In parallel, it runs the test oracles that states if the test pass or fail.

Means The Artifacts are produced as follow:

- C code comes from SCADE model.
- Test model is a SysML model designed with Enterprise Architect.
- Test cases, tests data and test oracles are generated with RT-tester.

- Executable code compile with gcc.
- Code run within the RT-Tester engine.

SCADE is EN 50128 certified at SIL 3/4, RT-tester is also certifiable SIL3 as shown in [30].

3.2 Results

Coverage strategies	# tests generated
BCS	14
TC	40
MC/DC	79
BCPAIRS	33
HITR	12
LTL	2
Total Tests	180

Total Requirements cover 40

Table 1. Test cases generation summary

Table 1 resumes the set of automatically generated tests. The set of tests cover 40 of the requirements from the chap3.5.

The simulation result of the C code is not yet finished and for the moment, all test failed. The main reason was that the two models did not share the same starting condition. Hence, we need to refined our test model to be able to handle SCADE modeling style correctly and be able to have interesting result.

Summary

What we have done:

1. Created a test model in SysML.
2. Generated test cases.
3. Ran SCADE model against test procedure produces by RT-tester.

The next step:

1. Refined test model
2. Analyze the result of the test procedure.
3. Coordinate DLR/SIEMENS/Uni Bremen interfaces.
4. Run the test on the DLR lab.

Conclusions/Lessons learned

Our first attempt to simulate the tests was not a success. All tests except the one covering the initial states failed. Our two models have, at least, the same initial state. From our first investigation, we could see that one chapter of the specification is not self-contained. This leads to different interpretation in the modeling and thus some non equivalent behaviors.

Moreover some missing information in the specification leads to a under constraints test model. It affects the test generation by providing some non realistic test cases. Some variable behavior that were not mentioned in the spec are considered as free and may have any possible value in their definition range.

Future Activities

We will also provide the ceiling speed monitoring function to enrich the test model and apply new model based testing approach.

4 University of Rostock

4.1 Verification of the Speed and Distance Monitoring

This section reports the verification activities of the *Speed and Distance Monitoring* with model based simulation and virtual prototyping. The first activity pursues the goal of formalizing the specification in the form of an executable model. This model provides a performance estimation at an early stage of system level design and adduces evidence what hardware resources (hardware platform) will be needed for the future OBU. Secondly, finding and reporting of unclarities, inconsistencies, incompleteness and errors while implementing the specification by using tools of the openETCS toolchain (Papyrus/SysML, Scade Suite). Furthermore, we are developing a method of SystemC code generation from abstract and domain specific SysML models. Finally we want to demonstrate the efficiency of model based simulation after transformation from SysML to SystemC models.

The activity is described in the Verification and Validation Plan section 5.3.10 *Verification with Model-Based Simulation* [26]. To sum up, we develop application models from the specification of the *Speed and Distance Monitoring*, generate test scenarios and use the inherent simulation environment of SystemC to do performance and scheduling analysis.

Object of verification

Speed and Distance Monitoring ERTMS function baseline 3. The system under test is the implemented SystemC code which is described here: https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/tree/master/model/SystemC_TWT_UR0/3.13_Speed_and_distance_monitoring. It describes the Speed and Distance Monitoring at the Software phase.

Available specification

The specification is described in the SUBSET-026 Chapter 3.13 [27]. It describes the realization of both Train Interface (TI) and Driver Machine Interface (DMI) commands by calculating several modules with inputs from train side, track side and odometry. The University of Rostock focuses on the calculation of parts, which are used for safety critical cases using emergency brakes. This especially includes the EBD (emergency brake deceleration) curves.

Detailed verification plan

Goals On the one hand we are testing extra-functional aspects such as performance and scheduling analyses to give evidence which hardware system is sufficient to meet the system requirements. We want to discover which hardware resources (e.g. number of processors) will be needed for the OBU. This is important to avoid excessive delays to ensure adequate response times in critical situations. Therefore the University of Rostock will do model based simulation using the inherent simulation environment of SystemC.

On the other hand we use the existing SystemC model to check against a reference model, such as EFS braking curve model. Furthermore we use different tools and means to build additional system models for comparison and verifying behavior.




Figure 10. University of Rostock VnV Approach

Method/Approach Figure 10 depicts our methodology. Three models will be created from the specification (SRS): one SystemC model that is directly implemented (hand written) into executable code (finished), one SysML model that will be used to produce (automatically) SystemC code to be executable (not finished) and one Scade Suite model that will be used to produce C code (not finished). For model verification we use test cases and data provided by WP4 and use the ERA excel datasheet as reference implementation. The created test models will contain behavioral representation of the *Speed and Distance Monitoring* such as state machines, activity diagrams and sequence diagrams. There will be a link to the specification requirements to meet the needs of traceability in terms of verification activities.

Means The Artifacts are produced as follow:

- SystemC code which is directly implemented (hand written source code).
- One test model is the generated SystemC model. It's code will be generated/transformed by Acceleo from abstract SysML models designed with Enterprise Architect and/or Papyrus.

- C code is produced by Scade using Scade Suite.
- Executable code is compiled with GNU-C-Compiler gcc.
- Reference model (for now because no other is available) delivered by ERTMS Formal Specs.
- Testdata and testcases are provided in corporation with ERTMS Formal Specs using the ERA excel data sheet.

4.2 Results

Verification of extra-functional aspects is successfully done for the first iteration of application models. The provided results consist of recommendations on how hardware resources shall be allocated to the future OBU. The modeling activities are still in progress.

Summary What we have done:

1. Created an executable model in SystemC.
2. Ran simulations on single, dual and multi core virtual prototypes.
3. Architecture SysML model of the *Speed and Distance Monitoring*.
4. Architecture Scade model of the *Speed and Distance Monitoring*.
5. Defined a reduced set of parameters for calculating braking Curves especially EBD curves.

The next step:

1. Finishing model activities on SysML and Scade.
2. Developing a model transformation/code generation from SysML models.
3. Defining an exchanges interfaces between different model approaches.
4. Run the tests.

Conclusions/Lessons learned From the first results, we see that SysML is a very powerful graphical modeling language but to perform code generation it is necessary to have restrictions to it. We will have a domain specific SysML profile to get reliable results from code generation.

Future Activities

Simulink as a modeling tool is in our interest because there is a bridge to Scade. Simulink provides code generation for hardware description languages such as VHDL. That enables new hardware test scenarios.

5 Systemel

Three approaches of VnV on formal models have been experimented and are presented in this section:

1. VnV on classical B model that cover software design level, in the objective to provide an open-source approach;
2. VnV on Event-B model that cover system level and support safety analysis;
3. VnV on Scade model that cover software design level.

Classical B and Scade model specify the same example of Subset 026 "§5.9 Procedure on-Sight", Event-B model specifies the "Mangement of Radio communication" function.

5.1 Verification and Validation on Classical B model

The first section 5.1.1 describes usual verification and validation activities applied during the design of industrial critical software using the B method. Second section 5.1.2 gives a description of tools available.

Last section 5.1.3 describes the results on an example.

5.1.1 Verification processes applicable to a B model

A B model is a textual and formal specification covering the functional behaviour of a safety critical software. It is usually written based on a high-level specification (informal or formal specification, for example SysML or a natural language). It is gradually refined, starting at the top with an abstract notation and ending at the bottom with sequential instructions — which are then automatically translated in a target language such as C or Ada.

Thus, we define three objects of verification and validation: the specification, the B model and the generated source code.

Validation consists of:

- guaranteeing the functional adequacy between the specification and the model (this can be achieved, for example, through review and proofreading),
- building a test environment around the generated source code and test it.

Hence, this section will mainly focus on verification, i.e. the methods and tools required to assure that B method is a consistent way of producing critical software.

In this section, we demonstrate the suitability of the B method towards the problematics encountered in the openETCS project by introducing the different verification processes applicable to a B model.

Each of the verification process is presented and its contributions to the system security and consistency are discussed.

Type checking

Static type checking (TC) is a basic form of program verification that ensures type safety of the model. It is the first verification — after lexical and syntactic analysis — to be performed on a B model, thus allowing an early detection of problems. It is also a pre-requisite for the higher-level verifications.

Strong typing ensures a consistent use of data and is essential to writing correct formulae (predicates or expressions).

The type checking process consists of two main activities: data typing and type verification.

Data typing is the activity of assigning a type to newly-encountered data in a predicate or a substitution³. It is based on an inference mechanism, which is able to deduce the type of a newly-encountered variable from the type of the other variables intervening in the predicate or the substitution, and specific inference rules.

On the other hand, *type verification* is the activity of verifying typing rules between already-typed variables. These rules are specific to their applying predicates, expressions or substitutions.

B0-check

The B0 verification has the specific purpose of checking the respect of the rules that the B model has to conform to in order to generate the translation to C or ADA. These rules are called implementability rules and must be respected in order for the translation to process properly. They also ensure that the resulting code is executable and respects a set of properties.

Well-definedness

An expression is well-defined (WD) if its associated value or interpretation exists and is unique, thus avoiding ambiguity.

Examples of ill-defined formulae include division by zero, function application to an argument out of the domain, function application of a relation etc.

Well-definedness checking is thus an extra verification that helps strengthen the model.

Model checking

Model checking is a static semantic check that searches for invariant or assertion violations and deadlock states. It exhaustively explores the whole state space, i.e., is in general limited to finite systems.

This type of verification animates the model, modifying the current state of the machine, starting from the initialization. Operation calls are simulated and modify the internal state which is then checked for various properties. Most of the time, an invariant or assertion violation is looked for. This verification process, as opposed to the ones previously introduced, considers the semantics of the model and aims at verifying properties dynamically. However, it has its limitations:

- inability to run through all of the states and transitions for models with infinitely many states
- difficulty to deal with very large models or large domains (e.g. 32 bit integers) often leading to state-space explosion because of exponential growth of the state space size.

³In B, a substitution is comparable to a set of instructions that modify variables. For more information, see [31].

This means that potential erroneous states can be missed, and that this verification process is not sufficient to ensure *correctness*, though satisfying as an additional verification tool.

Constraint-based checking

Constraint-based checking (CBC) is the process of finding a given valid state, for which an operation call leads to an erroneous state. This is done by constraint solving instead of — as seen for model checking — running through states from the initialization.

This technique will usually provide more counter-examples than model-checking, because it ignores the initialization constraints and can thus reach a wider range of states.

Formal proof

A proof obligation is a mathematical lemma generated by the proof obligation generator (POG). It corresponds to a consistency property of the model, that has to be demonstrated. These properties are either generated to ensure correctness of the model, e.g., refinement, variable typing, well-definedness or they are specified manually as invariants of the system, e.g., dependent typing, safety invariants. A fully-proved model is said to be *correct*, in the sense that every property (invariant, assertion) expressed is proved to hold for every state of the program. If a proof obligation is not provable, it means that the B model is inconsistent and must be corrected. In fact, the goal of any B development is to obtain a proved model.

In contrast to model-checking, formal proof does not require to make assumptions about the size of the system (number of transitions). It is reliable and powerful, but it needs to be taken into account that:

- some proofs can be very difficult to solve,
- the model needs to be written as to make it the simplest to prove, which demands experience and skill.

A proved model will always meet the formalized safety and security qualifications ; however that does not mean it will behave in regards to the informal specification! It must be validated that the formalized specification (and in consequence the formalized model) correctly implements the informal specification, in particular that the intended functioning is possible. This is the domain of validation, as discussed in the introduction.

5.1.2 Tools for verification

In this section, we present the existing tools suitable for the verification processes defined in Section 5.1.1.

Atelier B

Atelier B⁴ is the main development tool associated with the B method and is produced and distributed by ClearSy. It provides most of the needed tools.

B compiler

⁴See <http://www.atelierb.eu/en>

The B compiler performs syntax analysis, type checking, identifier scope resolution and B0-checking. It is part of Atelier B as an open source tool.

Proof obligation generator

Atelier B's POG is currently the only known fully operational POG for B, and is free of charge — although proprietary software, which means closed-source. ClearSy is currently working on a new proof obligation generator ; whether it will be open source or not is to be determined.

Prover, proof assistant, user-defined rules

Atelier B provides a free of charge — although not open source — prover which discharges proof obligations. Depending on the complexity of the model, a varying proportion of the proof obligations is discharged automatically.

For the remaining proof obligations, Atelier B provides an interactive proof assistant allowing the user to guide the prover in discharging the PO. The user may define theories (or rules) which have in turn to be proved. The user-defined rules are organized in a database and can be automatically verified and validated with the Rule Verifier of Atelier B.

Atelier B translators

Translators are an essential component of the industrial success of B. The translators take the B0 implementations as input and produce a target source code, typically Ada or C/C++, ready to be compiled or integrated in an environment.

ClearSy provides an open source translator, but it does not reach the T3 level of qualification⁵.

ProB

ProB is an animator and model checker for B models distributed under the EPL license (open source) and mainly developed by Formal Mind⁶.

It performs model checking as well as constraint-based checking and searches for a range of errors, with customizable search options and various graphical views. ProB also handles automatic coverage reports generation.

ProB is a mature tool and is being used by several industrials such as Siemens and Alstom. This makes it a precious tool for the verification processes described above.

Tool qualification

Atelier B has been used for many years to develop railway critical software. It is, for this exact reason, *qualified* by the main actors of the railway domain: SNCF, RATP, Alstom, Siemens etc.

The CENELEC norm defines qualification levels for verification tools. Annex A 5 of the norm specifies several verification techniques and for each of them, a recommendation level (mandatory, highly recommended, recommended). Below are listed the different techniques

⁵For additional information on qualification, see subsection 5.1.2.7 or the CENELEC norm.

⁶See <http://www.formalmind.com>

and measures along with their recommendation levels for SIL4 developments : Recommended, Highly Recommended or Mandatory.

Table 2 shows, for each of the verification processes presented in 5.1.1 (specification and source code were added as artifacts which support the activity), the corresponding item in the CENELEC norm annex table.

		level	spec	TC	B0C	MC	CBC	proof	source code
A 5.1	Formal Proof	HR						✓	
A 5.2	Static Analysis	HR		✓	✓		✓		
A 5.3	Dynamic Analysis and Testing	HR				✓			
A 5.4	Metrics	R							
A 5.5	Traceability	M	✓					✓	
A 5.6	Software Error Effect Analysis	HR							
A 5.7	Test Coverage for code	HR							
A 5.8	Functional/ Black-box Testing	M							✓
A 5.9	Performance testing	HR							
A 5.10	Interface testing	HR							

Table 2. Correspondence between CENELEC norm recommendations and the presented verification processes

A B model proof provides a formal proof in the form of a proof tree that can be inspected by humans and is machine-checkable, i.e., an automated program can replay the proof steps and verify the correct application of the proof rules.

Static type checking, B0 compliance for programming language translation and constraint based checking do not require any dynamic, i.e., state-space information to detect problems. Therefore these representing static analysis approaches of B model.

Model checking analyzes the dynamic behavior of the model by generating and exploring the state-space. Very often, model checkers can generate counter-examples for violated properties and can therefore be applied as a testing method.

The specification in the B model represents a formalized version of the specification, the proof trees use formalized properties as proof steps. These can be traced in the informal specification. Finally the translated source code can be compiled and tested using various testing methods, including functional tests and black-box testing.

Conclusion on tools

Table 3 summarizes the presentation of the tools in subsections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.6.

Atelier B and ProB are both mature tools that have proved their worth. They are the core tools for validation processes of B models. However, key components of Atelier B are not open source and this issue is not completely compensated by ProB's model checking and CBC.

An ongoing research project named BWare⁷ and conducted by ClearSy, Inria, LRI and others aims at providing a framework from proof obligation generation to proof discharge by the means of SMT solvers. This promising project started in September 2012 and is funded for a period of four years. It opens perspectives for the near future in terms of open source B model verification.

⁷See http://bware.lri.fr/index.php/BWare_project

	TC	B0	model check.	CBC	proof
B Compiler	✓	✓			
POG and provers					✓
ProB			✓	✓	

Table 3. Comparison of the tools available for B verification processes

5.1.3 Application: Procedure On-Sight

The Procedure On-Sight, as described in *System Requirements Specification, Chapter 5*, has been modelled in B⁸ to show the feasibility of the task and the credibility of the method. This appendix briefly presents the model, then applies the verification processes to this example.

Presentation of the B model

As shown in figure 11, the model is split into three main processing modules, one of which corresponds to the actual on-sight procedure, and the two others being used as data conditioning:

- `os_mode_level`: determines the ETCS level and the mode. Contains the on-sight procedure algorithm,
- `os_consist`: checks data consistency, provides adaptation to the current ETCS level (BTM or radio),
- `os_train_info`: elaborates the location and the speed of the train.




Figure 11. Architecture of the B model for the Procedure On-Sight example

These three modules are imported by the main sequencer, `os_main_1`, which calls their respective operations. The main sequencer also imports the input module `os_in`, and the output module `os_out`.

The typing machine, `os_typ`, and the constant machine, `os_cte_conf_bs`, are both imported by `os_main`, the entry point of the software, which also imports `os_main_1`.

⁸The model is available at github.com/openETCS/validation/tree/master/VnVUserStories/VnVUserStorySystemerel/02-DAS2V/c-ClassicalBModel/ProcedureOnSight.

This “IMPORTS”-based vertical layout is complemented by a horizontal aspect: the “SEES” clause, which enables a component to access another component’s data. It is possible for a component to see the components to its left, but not to its right. Thus, a cycle-free graph is maintained.

Model checking results

ProB has been used on the example model and has shown through model checking that no invariant was violated, and no deadlock state was found. However, for some machines, only a minority of states and nodes have been visited (because of infinite sets in particular) and thus no formal conclusion can be drawn.

Additionally, constraint-based checking has also been run and stated, for every operation of every abstract machine, the non-violation of the invariant.

Formal proof results

Project status Project status illustrated in figure 12 shows the fully-proved model in Atelier B.

Composant ▼	Typage vérifié	OPs générées	Obligations de Preuve	Prouvé	Non-prouvé	B0 Vérifié
elop_bs	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_consist	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_consist_1	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK
os_consist_1_i	OK	OK	15	15	0	OK
os_consist_2	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK
os_consist_2_i	OK	OK	18	18	0	OK
os_consist_i	OK	OK	39	39	0	OK
os_consist_r	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK
os_cte_conf_bs	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_in	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_in_bs	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK
os_in_i	OK	OK	3	3	0	OK
os_main	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_main_1	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_main_1_i	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_main_i	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_mode_level	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_mode_level_1	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_mode_level_1_i	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_mode_level_2	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_mode_level_2_i	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_mode_level_i	OK	OK	247	247	0	OK
os_mode_level_r	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK
os_out	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_out_bs	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_out_i	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_out_r	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_train_info	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_train_info_1	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_train_info_1_i	OK	OK	9	9	0	OK
os_train_info_2	OK	OK	1	1	0	OK
os_train_info_2_i	OK	OK	15	15	0	OK
os_train_info_i	OK	OK	46	46	0	OK
os_train_info_r	OK	OK	5	5	0	OK
os_typ	OK	OK	0	0	0	OK
os_typ_i	OK	OK	4	4	0	OK

Figure 12. Overview of the B model in Atelier B, showing type check, B0 check and proof status

This model was proved almost entirely automatically, using the provers with force 0 and force 1 (on 427 proof obligation generated, only 3 need the interactive prover to define cases). Proving the model results in the certainty of its correctness wrt. the formal specification. In this case, only typing invariants and constraints were expressed, because more complex safety properties have not been identified to be specified as invariant. However, for each function, its behaviour is specified and the implementation is verified according this specification.

User-defined theories When automatic proof fails, the user must provide a manual proof and uses theories for this purpose. Theories are rules that are used to discharge specific goals. In this example, the only module for which interactive proof was required is `os_consist_i`. Below is presented a very simple theory (among several others) used for the proof of this component:

$$a < 0 \wedge 0 \leq b \wedge 0 < c \Rightarrow a \leq \frac{b}{c} \quad \text{(User theory 1)}$$

This theory is automatically verified by Atelier B and therefore ensures full consistency of the proof.

5.1.4 Conclusion

The B method, along with its verification processes and tools, meets the goals and activities of the openETCS project in terms of quality, rigor, safety and credibility.

There is yet to develop open-source POG and build a framework for proving, but this is compensated by the fact that work on the subject is ongoing, and ProB is an effective tool for verification.

5.2 Verification and Validation on Event-B models

The Event-B method share the same language than the classical B method. Besides both approaches are based on a pre/post-condition mechanism to describe the evolution of the system. Thus similar verification mechanisms can be defined.

5.2.1 Verification Processes Applicable to Event-B

An Event-B model is a formal specification that describes the functional behavior of a system from a global point of view. In general, an Event-B model comprises a set of state variables, parametrized events that can modify these state variables and invariants that describe logical properties thereof. The invariants are in first-order predicate logic and can be discharged using different proof engines, e.g., automatic modern open source SMT solvers and manual predicate provers.

In general, one starts with a rather abstract description of the model which is iteratively refined until the desired level of detail is reached. Event-B supports this refinement by creating the necessary proof obligations that ensure correct refinement in each step, both for behavioral refinement of events as well as for data refinement of state variables.

Thanks to the integration into the Eclipse platform, there are many plug-ins available as extensions. There is a plug-in to use graphical modeling in UML state machines to describe Event-B models. There is a tight connection to the ProR requirements engineering plug-in. To facilitate modeling, there are plug-ins to decompose a model into several sub-models and to facilitate proving by supporting external formal theories.

Together with the Rodin tool, the Event-B approach was developed in the European research projects RODIN (2004–2007) and DEPLOY (2008–2012). Since 2011 it is further developed in the European project ADVANCE.

Verification of Type Safety

Static type checking is a technique that allows the verification of correct typing for variables at compile / modeling time. It is performed after lexical and syntactic correctness of the Event-B model have been verified. Static type checking prevents all type errors at run-time, which eliminates many possible sources of program errors.

The type system of Event-B is much more expressive than the one of most other languages, as Event-B also allows the usage of dependent types for variables. In this case, the type of a variable is dependent of its value, e.g., one can define the type of all even integers. Event-B can define such types and verify that events respect the correct dependent typing of variables

In Event-B, every new variable gets a type assigned via a typing invariant. Such an invariant is either an explicit type assignment or an implicit one, e.g., by specifying a dependence to another variable which is typed. The integrated type inference can then deduce the static type of the new variable.

Every event that changes the value of a variable via substitution must also respect the variable typing. For each event that modifies a variable, proof obligations are created that ensure this in a rigorous formal way.

In almost all cases, the proof obligations for type verification are discharged automatically by the Rodin provers.

Verification of Well-Definedness

After type checking, one or more well-definedness (WD) proof obligations are created. This ensures that the expression has a unique meaning and prevents the usage of expressions that make no sense or are ambiguous.

One prominent example for WD proof obligations in Event-B is the cardinality of sets. The set of natural numbers \mathbb{N} has countable infinitely many elements, exactly as many as the set of all even natural numbers $\mathbb{N}_2 := \{2 \cdot n \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\}$. This means that both sets have the same cardinality, although \mathbb{N}_2 is a strict subset of \mathbb{N} .


Therefore, while sets of countable infinite cardinality can be used without any problem in Event-B models, the usage of cardinality of a set requires the set to be of finite size which gets verified by an appropriate WD proof obligation.

In almost all cases, the proof obligations for well-definedness are discharged automatically by the Rodin provers.

Model Simulation

A correctly typed Event-B model can be simulated or animated using different plug-ins like AnimB or ProB. At each step, one of the activated events can be executed and if applicable parameters for that event can be defined. This allows for stepping through the formal model, observing the state variables and the invariants. Using model animation, it is possible to validate the correct functioning of the model.

Figure 13 shows a ProB simulation session. The activated events are marked green, clicking on them allows for selection of parameters and to execute the events with the chosen parameters.



Event	Parameter(s)
▶ receive_information_incompatible	entities4
▶ receive_contact_order_accept	entities3
▶ receive_contact_order_non_accept	entities3
▶ initiate_session_after_contact	entities2
▶ initiate_session_no_contact_accept	entities3
▶ initiate_session_no_contact_non_accept	entities3
▶ drop_contact	entities4

Figure 13. ProB Model Animation

Model-Checking of Predicates

Model-checking is a static analysis of the semantics of a model. In general, a model-checker will create a representation of the whole possible state space of a model and verify logic properties on this state space. There are many different possibilities for properties that are verified by model-checkers, some are listed here:

- **Equivalence Checking** The equivalence between two models is verified given a certain equivalence relation. Often, a specification is compared to its (distributed) implementation using bisimulation modulo some reduction techniques, e.g., only the externally observable behavior is compared and the internal details of the different systems are ignored.
- **Deadlock Freeness** A deadlock represents a state where the system that the system cannot leave as no event is enabled. For a reactive system this is always an unwanted state that must be avoided.
- **Temporal Properties** The evolution of the system over time is analyzed, i.e., the admissible event sequences that can lead to different states. Roughly, temporal properties comprise *safety properties* which describe a set of states that should never be reached and *liveness properties* which describe states that should always be reachable. There are different temporal logic languages, like LTL and CTL, which allow to describe temporal properties of systems.

In general, model-checkers suffer from the state space explosion problem. This means that creating the whole state space becomes often infeasible due to memory limitations. In general it is also not possible to model-check systems with infinite state space, like many Event-B models.

In practice, tools like ProB which allow for model-checking of Event-B models, limit the size of the possible values for variables to a finite subset. While this means that a complete proof is not possible, it allows for fully automatic error detection in the model. For any violated property or a deadlock, ProB provides a counterexample that can be analyzed and therefore allows for correction of the associated modeling problem.




Figure 14. Model-Checking for Deadlocks

Figure 14 shows the model checking dialog of the Rodin plug-in for ProB. The currently selected options would check for deadlocks, i.e., a sequence of events that leads to a situation where no event can be selected anymore.

Formal Proof of Predicates

Formal proof techniques provide a much more powerful way to verify predicates than model-checking. Instead of the creation of the full state-space, they use a proof calculus to iteratively simplify predicates and to reduce them onto known lemmas or axioms, thus discharging them.

In contrast to model-checking, formal proof is applicable to models of infinite size and can cope with undecidable problems. Although this means that there sometimes will be a manual step in a proof, there are many automated tools that support formal proofs and can often discharge proof obligations without any manual intervention.

The Rodin platform natively supports manual construction of formal proofs by allowing easy access and manipulation of the proof tree and predicate hypotheses. It also provides access to different automated provers, i.e., the free of charge AtelierB provers, an open source SMT plug-in that supports several solvers⁹ as well as an open source plug-in that connects Rodin to the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant.

Figure 15 shows a part of a Rodin proof tree for an invariant. Its green color signals that the proof is finished, at each node in the tree, the applied proof rule is shown. This allows for easy inspection of the proofs and allows both for humans and for machines to verify the correctness of the proof steps.

Verification of Refinement Correctness

Rodin provides extensive support for a top-down development approach and allows for an iterative refinement of models. The model is developed using different levels of detail, starting from a rather abstract view, refining the details where necessary or desired. This refinement process can either be applied to the events or the variables.

Data Refinement In general, a data refinement replaces a variable with another one, or multiple other ones. For example a Boolean variable in the abstract model is replaced by an enumeration

⁹supported open source SMT solvers include: veriT, Alt-Ergo, CVC3, Z3




Figure 15. Rodin Proof Tree

with different possible values. To ensure a correct refinement, one has to manually supply a “gluing” invariant that describes the connection of the refined and the abstract variable. For example one subset of the possible values for the enumeration in the refined model would correspond to a value of “True” in the abstract model, the remaining values of the enumeration to a value “False”. The abstract variable is then deleted from the refined model, and the necessary proof obligations are created automatically by Rodin.

Code Refinement For event (or code) refinement, Rodin automatically creates the necessary proof obligations that ensure that the abstract system is correctly refined by the more detailed model. This includes the verification that each refining event only modifies variables that are also modified by the abstract event and that the modification is equivalent. It also includes verification of guard strengthening, i.e., the guards of a refining event must be at least as constraining as of the refined abstract event. A common code refinement is to split an event in several more specialized ones, where the additional guards ensure mutual exclusion of the activation conditions.

```

• initiate_session_after_contact_accept: internal extended ordinary ›(cf. 3.5.3.4 b) / (cf. 3.5.3.5.2)
  REFINES
  • initiate_session_after_contact
  ANY
  • l_partner ›
  WHERE
  • grd2: l_partner ∈ contacted_by not theorem ›
  • grd3: l_partner ∈ terminated_ER_connections not theorem ›
  THEN
  • act1: contacted = contacted u {l_partner} ›
  • act2: contacted_by = contacted_by \ {l_partner} ›
  • act3: establish_ER_connection = establish_ER_connection u {l_partner} ›
  END

```

Figure 16. Event Refinement

Figure 16 shows a refining event with guard strengthening and an additional variable that is modified. The pale blue colored guards and actions are derived from the refined event, the darker colored guard and action are the additional ones for the refining event.

Verification of Design Step Requirements

This section reports on the verification activities of the correct implementation of the design step requirements. The goal of the activity is to establish a correct formal representation of the design step requirements.


The activity is described in the Verification and Validation Plan [32]. In short, it consists of formalizing and proving the identified requirements of a preceding phase, to ensure their correct implementation of the requirements. To achieve this, we use the direct connection of the Event-B model with the ProR based on an EMF model of the Event-B model.

Verification of Safety Requirements

A safety analysis identifies additional requirements which guarantee the safety of a system. It must be verified that the system model correctly implements these non-functional requirements. Not every safety requirement is applicable on the system development level. Many are on the implementation level, e.g., they demand that certain safety-critical functions are done in a redundant way to reduce the risk of malfunctioning or loss of that function.

In the safety analysis [33], a list of safety requirements was identified using an FMEA analysis of the communication system. A ReqIf file captures all these safety requirements within ProR, the concerned functional requirements are traced in the ReqIf file for SS 026 section 3.5.

Each of the safety requirements is examined for applicability in the system level model, the identified ones are formalized. Most often, the safety requirements are represented as one or more additional invariants in the system model. These invariants are linked to the ReqIf file that describes the safety requirements, ensuring traceability in the model.



Name	Description	Source	Target	Link
1 REQ_FMEA_ID_001	The Mobile Terminal shall be safely registered to a Radio Network. Link to general function.		0 ▷ 6	3.5.6 3.5.6.1 3.5.6.3 3.5.6.5 3.5.6.6 3.5.6.7
2 REQ_FMEA_ID_002	The driver shall be safely informed of the state of the radio communication (resulting of the different steps: registration of the Mobile Terminal to the Radio Network, establishment of the communication, end of communication). Link to general function.		0 ▷ 4	3.5.7.2 3.5.7.1 3.5.7 b) If none of its ...
3 REQ_FMEA_ID_003	If a communication through a Radio Network is active, registration to another Radio Network mustn't be performed.		0 ▷ 1	3.5.5.6
4 REQ_FMEA_ID_004	A safety protocol shall be used to performed communication between the Mobile Terminal and the Radio Network.		0 ▷ 2	3.5.1.1 3.5.2.2
5 REQ_FMEA_ID_005	If a communication with trackside equipment is active, set-up of safe radio connection with another trackside equipment mustn't beformed. Exception in case of handover with RBC.		0 ▷ 4	3.5.3.5.2 inv6 (m6_hand_over_RBC) inv7 (m6_hand_over_RBC) inv8 (m6_hand_over_RBC)
6 REQ_FMEA_ID_006	Communication session with trackside equipment shall be safely established.		0 ▷ 6	3.5.3.8 3.5.3.7 3.5.3.5

Figure 17. Safety Requirements

Figure 17 shows a ReqIf document in Rodin (via the ProR plug-in) which holds the safety requirements defined by the safety analysis. For each requirement, there are references to the concerned

elements of SS 026 and to Event-B elements where applicable, e.g., REQ_FMEA_ID_005 which is linked to the invariants, inv6, inv7 and inv8.

Verification of Requirements Coverage

This section reports on the verification activities of the coverage of the design step requirements. The goal of the activity is to establish the coverage degree of the formal representation of the design step requirements.

The activity is described in the Verification and Validation Plan [32]. In short, it consists of analyzing the coverage of the identified requirements of a preceding phase, to ensure their completeness of implementation of the requirements wrt. the refinement level of the model. To achieve this, we use the direct connection of the Event-B model with the ProR based on an EMF model of the Event-B model.

5.2.2 Object of Verification

The object of verification is the Event-B model for the communication establishing¹⁰. It is from the strictly formal modeling phase and represents the communication session management of the OBU.

Available Specification

The model implements the requirements for the communication session management as described in SS 026, section 3.5[34].

This section describes the establishing, maintaining and termination of a communication session of the OBU with on-track systems.

Goals

One goal is the development of a strictly formal, fully proven model of the communication session management and to provide evidence of covering the necessary requirements of SS 026 as well as proving correctness of the model wrt. the requirements and attaining a good coverage of the model wrt. the requirements.

The second goal is to correctly implement the applicable safety requirements identified by the safety analysis. Both functional and safety requirements should be traced in the model and a requirement document in a standardized format.

The formal model will represent the described functionality on the system level, the correct functioning can be validated by step-wise simulation and model-checking of deadlock-freeness.

Method/Approach

At first, the basic functionality described in the section 3.5 that are identified. These serve as basis for a first abstract model, which is refined iteratively, adding the desired level of detail. The elements of SS 026 are traced using links from Event-B to the ProR file in ReqIf format. Requirements are formalized as invariants and proven where applicable.

¹⁰https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/tree/master/model/Event_B_Systemrel/Subset_026_comm_session

Means

The means used are:

- open source Rodin tool (<http://www.event-b.org/>), including plug-ins (for details see https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/blob/master/model/Event_B_Systemrel/Subset_026_comm_session/latex/subset_3_5.pdf)
- ProR requirements modeling tool <http://www.pror.org>
- open source ProB model checker and B model simulator http://www.stups.uni-duesseldorf.de/ProB/index.php5/Main_Page
- open source CVC3 (<http://www.cs.nyu.edu/acsys/cvc3/>), veriT (www.verit-solver.org) and Alt-Ergo (<http://alt-ergo.lri.fr>) SMT solvers

Results

- The result is a fully formal model of the communication session management as described in section 3.5 of SS 026.
- Each implemented element of this section is linked to the ProR requirements file, both specification elements that describe how something has to be done, as well as requirements that describe what must be achieved.
- The model can be simulated / animated, either with the AnimB or the ProB plug-in, validating the functional capabilities.
- The safety requirements are formalized as invariants in predicate logic, their proofs are for the most part fully automatic.
- It was found that while the SS 026 communication management explicitly allows multiple communication partners (see RBC handover), there is no explicit limit of established communication connections given in section 3.5.
- A complete covering of the elements of SS 026 was not realized, e.g., there is a representation of the contents of a message, but its explicit format is not implemented. This is considered an implementation detail without influence for a system level analysis. In general, Event-B models will not be refined up to the implementation level.

Summary

The created fully formal functional model allows for formalization and proof of SS 026 requirements. The integration of Rodin into Eclipse provides easy access to extensions like the ProR requirements tool which allows for validation of coverage of requirements.

The integration of various provers, in particular the SMT plug-in automates a large part of the formal verification. For the model of the communication management, from 382 non-trivial¹¹ proof obligations, only 12, i.e., 3.2% require any manual intervention.

¹¹many WD proof obligations are so trivial that they will not be shown in Rodin

Evidence produced

The formal Event-B model, including a ReqIf document for section 3.5 of SS 026 and a pdf documentation of the model can be found at https://github.com/openETCS/model-evaluation/tree/master/model/Event_B_Systemrel/Subset_026_comm_session

5.2.3 Conclusions/Lessons learned

Having an abstract formal model of the implemented functionality which can be simulated, allows for interesting insights into the overall functioning of a system. Formalized requirements are very helpful in both the identification of ambiguous requirements and in their clarification.

The elements of SS 026 are of very different nature. Some describe rather low-level specification details, other describe “real” requirements. Without an analysis as done with this Event-B model, it can be difficult to decide which elements must be considered on a system level analysis and which on the lower implementation level.

5.2.4 Future Activities

For other sections of SS 026, that describe a functionality in a way that can be captured in an iteratively refined model and which has interesting requirements on a rather high level, creating an Event-B model can provide insight into the functioning, identify ambiguous or erroneous elements in the specification and can provide the basis for logical pre- and post conditions of the later implementation.

5.3 Verification processes applicable to a SCADE model

The verifier shall be independent and shall neither be Requirements Manager, Designer nor Implementer as defined in the safety standards EN 50128 v2011.

The input documents needed are all the necessary System and Software Documentation used for the SCADE design activity and all the documentation produced during this phase, such as the SCADE Design Description, the SCADE Design Test Specification and the SCADE Design Test Report.

5.3.1 Respect of modelling rules

Syntactic rules of SCADE language are verified with the Quick Check tool available in the publisher. If an error is detected it must be corrected or justified in the SCADE Design Description document by the designer. The verifier shall ensure that no error remains or the justification associated is correct.

For specific modelling rules the verification has to be made manually by the verifier and described in the Verification Report. A grid of verification may be created in order to prove the compliance of the model with the rules. On some cases, dedicated tools can be developed.

Some modelling rules and constraints on Scade language can be defined and justified according CENELEC standard. Then these rules can be verified.

5.3.2 Specification traceability check

The verification of the compliance of the SCADE model with each requirement has to be made manually, by the verifier.

The Scade model shall be correct according to the informal requirements and the informal specification shall be completely covered : each specification requirement must be traced in the SCADE model. The specification requirements which are not covered by the SCADE model must be listed and justified in the SCADE Design Description document by the designer.

5.3.3 Testing and Validation of the model

The verifier shall control the activity of software testing performed by the tester.

The software testing uses the Model Test Coverage (MTC) and the Generic Qualified Testing Environment (QTE) tools from SCADE. Five steps are performed.

- Establish the Test Specification document.
- Writing scenarios in order to test the different functions independently.
- Running scenarios on the SCADE model.
- Extraction and analysis of results and the associated coverage (nodes, branches, branch conditions,...).
- Establish the Test Report.

5.3.4 Results

All these different verifications activities shall be described in the Verification and Validation Plan, and their results shall be record in a Verification Report. Each disparity must be corrected or justified.

Verification report content

The verifier shall produce a Verification Report containing the proof of the compliance of the SCADE model. It shall include the following points:

- the identity, version and configuration of SCADE model;
- the verifier name;
- the goal of the Verification Report;
- the result of each verification process with:
 - items which do not conform to the specifications;
 - components, data, structures and algorithms poorly adapted to the problem;
 - detected errors or deficiencies.
- the fulfilment of, or deviation from, the Software Verification Plan;
- assumptions if any;
- a summary of the verification results.

5.3.5 Conclusion

The use of SCADE with its verification processes is compliant with the CENELEC norm but as it is not developed as open-source it is not compliant with the goal of openETCS project.

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