Budget Balance

Fall semester, 2024
Public Finance




Today's talk

- Statistics on budget deficits and public debt
 - GDP ratios, international comparison
- Budget constraint of government
 - Intertemporal budget constraint, transitional equation
 - How to "repay" public debt
- Fiscal sustainability
 - After debt accumulation
- Simulation analysis on Japan's fiscal situation
 - Accounting, macro-econometric, general equilibrium



Gross financial liabilities

Japanese government accumulating debt




Source: OECD Economic Outlook 112. https://stats.oecd.org/ General government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP.




Net financial liabilities

- Japanese government accumulating debt
 - Also has social security funds. BOJ holds JGB.



Source: OECD Economic Outlook 112. https://stats.oecd.org/ General government net financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP.






Japanese Public Finance Fact Sheet (April, 2024)



Definitions of public debt

- Public debt in National Accounts (right-hand side)
 - Includes treasury-discount bills, bonds of local public enterprises
 - Excludes FILP bonds




(出所)日本の財政関係資料(令和5年4月)



Central govt balance sheet

- □ National balance sheet (2022)
 - Liabilities: 1411 tri. JPY
 - Assets: 724 tri JPY
- Liabilities
 - Public debts
- Assets
 - Financial
 - Securities: FX intervent
 - Loans: FILP
 - Nonfinancial
 - Roads, rivers
- Therefore
 - Not much to sell



Gap between

assets and liabilities

-687


Financing bills (foreign exchange fund financing bills) 88 Deposits received for public pensions 122 Money on deposit 10 FILP bonds 105 **Construction bonds** 294 Special deficit-financing bonds 702 Others (reconstruction bonds, etc.) 14 Borrowings (special accounts for Local Allocation Tax and Local Transfer Tax, etc.) 34 Others (accounts payable, etc.) 42



(cf) IMF fiscal monitor 2018

■ IMF Fiscal Monitor 2018

- Net assets of Japanese government is large
 - Huge nonfinancial assets, including roads and bridges





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Govt budget constraint (nominal)

- Government's intertemporal budget constraint
 - Considering money, price level
 - Expenditures (excl. debt service) G_t , Tax revenues T_t , interest rate of period t: i_t , price level P_t
 - At the end of t (beginning of t+1): Nominal debt (bond) outstanding B_t , nominal money outstanding M_t
 - Consolidate government: General govt + Central bank
 - Both debt and money are debt to government: BoJ FAQ

t-1 All 1-year debt

t

t+1

Debt B_{t-1} Money M_{t-1}

Stock at the end of t-1

Govt spending G_t Tax revenues T_t Interest rate i_t Price level P_t

Flow at period t

Debt B_t Money M_t

Stock at the end of t



Govt budget constraint (nominal)

Transition equation of debt: govt budget constraint

$$B_t + M_t = (1 + i_t)B_{t-1} + M_{t-1} + G_t - T_t$$

Primary balance (Primary budget deficit)

 $lue{}$ Divide both side by price level P_t to get real terms

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} = (1 + i_t) \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_t} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{P_t}$$

Real debt outstanding

Real money outstanding

Inflation rate (increase in price level)

$$1 + \pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$$

Fisher equation

$$1 + i_t = (1 + r_t)(1 + \pi_t)$$
Real interest rate





(cf) Budget balance

Current Situation

New Debt

Redemption of the debt [Decline in existing debts]

orrowing money for government services

= PB is deficit)

Tax revenue, etc.

Policy Expenditures

Not all expenses for government services can not be covered by tax revenues, etc. and gross government debt will increase.

Primary Balance ± 0

New Debt Redemption of the debt All expenses for [Decline in government services existing debts] are covered by tax Interest revenues, etc. (=PB is balanced) **Payments** Tax revenue. Policy Expenditures etc.

Interest payment is not covered by tax revenues, etc. and gross government debt will increase.

Fiscal Balance ± 0

New Debt

Redemption of the debt [Decline in existing debts]

Tax revenue, etc.

Interest payment will also be covered by tax revenues, etc.
(=Fiscal balance is balanced)

Redemption of the debt [Decline in existing debts]

Policy Exenditures

Gross government debt outstanding will remain.



Govt budget constraint (real)

Using Fisher equation,

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} = (1 + i_t) \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_t} \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{P_t}$$

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t} \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{1}{1 + \pi_t} \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{P_t}$$

- Inflation decrease the debt outstanding in real term
 - If nominal interest rate i_t is fixed
- $lue{}$ If interest and inflation rates are small, $i_t = r_t + \pi_t$
- □ Decrease in real term = $\pi_t \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}$

Approxi.
$$r_t \pi_t = 0$$

Inflation tax

Transfer of purchasing power from bond holder to government



Govt budget constraint (expansion)

Rearranging the budget constraint

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \frac{M_t}{P_t} = (1 + r_t) \left(\frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} \right) + \frac{G_t - T_t}{P_t} - \frac{r_t + \pi_t}{1 + \pi_t} \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}$$

Seigniorage

Seigniorage

- Government's economic gain from issuing currency
- $lue{}$ Money M_t does not require interest payments
- Inflation decreases government's debt (increase govt's gain)
- Inflation tax is from B_t , seigniorage is from M_t

(cf) FTPL (Fiscal Theory of the Price Level)

Nominal values and inflation do **not** determine real bond outstanding, nominal values (B_t, M_t) determine inflation



Govt budget constraint (expansion)

- Expand the budget constraint to the future
 - Denote seigniorage as S_t

$$\begin{split} &\frac{B_{t-1} + M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} = \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \frac{T_t - G_t}{P_t} + \frac{S_t}{1 + r_t} + \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \frac{B_t + M_t}{P_t} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \frac{T_t - G_t}{P_t} + \frac{S_t}{1 + r_t} + \frac{1}{1 + r_t} \frac{1}{1 + r_{t+1}} \left(\frac{T_{t+1} - G_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} + S_{t+1} + \frac{B_{t+1} + M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) \end{split}$$

Sum of discounted prevent value of primary surplus at t and t+1

Sum of discounted prevent value of seigniorage at t and t+1

$$= \frac{1}{1+r_{t}} \frac{T_{t}-G_{t}}{P_{t}} + \frac{1}{(1+r_{t})(1+r_{t+1})} \frac{T_{t+1}-G_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} + \frac{S_{t}}{1+r_{t}} + \frac{1}{(1+r_{t})(1+r_{t+1})} \frac{S_{t}}{1+r_{t+1}} + \frac{S_{t}}{(1+r_{t})(1+r_{t+1})} \frac{S_{t}}{1+r_{t}} + \frac{S_{t}}{(1+r_{t})(1+r_{t})} \frac{S_$$

Debt outstanding at the end of t+1

$$+\frac{S_t}{1+r_t} + \frac{1}{(1+r_t)(1+r_{t+1})} \frac{S_t}{1+r_{t+1}}$$



Govt budget constraint

=

Repeat the expansion further to the future


No Ponzi Game condition

If the present value of debt outstanding far in the remote future is zero,

Current sum of debt and money outstanding

Sum of discounted present value of primary surplus in the future

Sum of discounted present value of seigniorage in the future





How to repay public debt

Primary surplus

- Increase in tax or decrease in expenditure
- Tax increase: Bad effects on those who pay taxes
- Expenditure decrease: Bad effects of decrease in public services / transfers

Inflation tax, seigniorage

 Depreciation of the currency: Burden on currency / public debt holders

Default

- Burden on public debt holders (100% tax on debt)
- Debt restructuring: revision of terms

All have side effects


Economic downturn, high inflation, decline in public credit

Hyperinflation

- Hyperinflation
 - One definition: monthly rate 50%+ (yearly 130x)
- Interwar period
 - Hungary (1922-24), Austria (1922-23), Poland (1921-24)
 - Germany (1922-23)
- 1988-92: Argentina
- 2007-09: Zimbabwe
 - Annual rate in Jan 2009 was 6.5×10^{108} %
- 2018-19: Venezuela

https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20180918-the-people-

making-bags-out-of-worthless-money





100 trillion Zimbabwe dollar (wikipedia)





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Fiscal sustainability

- What if government rely only on primary surplus?
 - If seigniorage is small and default is not an option
- Budget constraint ignoring money:

$$B_t = (1 + i_t)B_{t-1} + G_t - T_t$$

■ Divide both side by output Y_t to obtain GDP ratio

$$\frac{B_t}{Y_t} = (1 + i_t) \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_t} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{Y_t}$$

■ Denote the growth rate as $1 + g_t = Y_t/Y_{t-1}$

$$\frac{B_t}{Y_t} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + g_t} \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{Y_t}$$

■ If primary balance is zero, $G_t - T_t$,

Interest rate > growth rate, $i_t > g_t$, bond/GDP increase

Interest rate < growth rate, $i_t < g_t$, bond/GDP decrease

Fiscal sustainability

Domer Condition

- If primary balance = 0,
 - $\Box i_t > g_t$, bond/GDP increase
 - $\mathbf{I}_t < g_t$, bond/GDP decrease = sustainable
- Usually, r > g (Thomas Piketty)
 - □ In 2010s, r < g: Blanchard (2019, AER)

Test of fiscal sustainability: Time-series analysis

- Testr>g
- Bohn test: when debt increase, primary surplus increase?
- and etc.
- Negative results for Japan





Debt accumulation, then...?

- Reinhart and Rogoff "This Time Is Different"
 - Fiscal collapse is not so rare
- After debt accumulate...
 - (Economic growth)
 - (Primary surplus)
 - Default or debt restructuring
 - Sudden inflation
 - Financial depression: Govt forces private sectors to buy govt bond by low interest rates
- □ When gross debt of central govt exceeds 60% of GDP,
 - 63 cases (35 countries) in Reinhart's database
 - 37 cases went financial collapse





Public debt in Japan

- How has Japan's govt coped with public debt?
 - Decomposition: economic growth, primary balance, inflation
 - https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/columns/a01_0379.html
 - Only after Japan-Rosso war, primary surplus worked

表1 債務GDP比率の変動の要因分解

表の数値はサンブル期間内の平均値である。プライマリー収支の数値についてはプラスが赤字を,マイナスが黒字を表す。

	Total	Fiscal balance			Nominal growth		
	[2]+[5]	[3]+[4]	Primary	Interest	[6]+[7]	Real	Inflation
期間	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
1886-1905	1.1%	2.6%	1.7%	0.9%	-1.5%	-0.6%	-0.8%
1906-1916	-4.1%	-1.2%	-3.2%	2.0%	-2.9%	-1.3%	-1.7%
1917-1944	4.5%	8.5%	6.8%	1.8%	-4.0%	-0.9%	-3.1%
1945-1948	-46 . 3%	2.7%	2.0%	0.7%	-49.1%	6.2%	-55.2%
1949-1986	0.6%	2.1%	1.0%	1.1%	-1.5%	-0.9%	-0.6%
1987-1990	-2.0%	1.0%	-2.2%	3.2%	-3.0%	-2.4%	-0.5%
1991-2005	6.0%	6.3%	3.8%	2.5%	-0.3%	-0.9%	0.6%
2006	-0.1%	0.8%	-1.0%	1.8%	-0.9%	-2.1%	1.2%
2007-2011	7.6%	5.7%	3.7%	2.0%	2.0%	0.0%	1.9%



(cf) History of government debt

- Eichengreen et al. "In Defense of Public Debt"
 - Ancient Greek city-state
 - Monarch borrowing restarted in 10th century
 - King Edward III borrowed from Italian bankers during the Hundred Years War (1337-1453)
 - 1-2 years, double-digit interest rates
 - Defaulted as early as 1345
 - Sometimes granted authority of tax collection as collateral
 - Difficult under absolute monarchy
 - King Felipe II of Spain defaulted four times
 - The Glorious Revolution: Parliamentary control lowered interest rates
 - King William III established the Bank of England
 - Money demand during the Nine Years War (1688-1697)
 - Loans in exchange for currency issuance rights



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- Accounting method, Partial equilibrium analysis
 - Exogenously given economic growth, interest rate, population size
 - Govt expenditures and revenues are functions of these variables
 - No feedback from economy to fiscal situation
 - Mid- and long-term forecast by Cabinet Office of Japan
 - European Commission: Debt Sustainability Monitor (2023)
 - Not applicable to Japan
 - Broda and Weinstein (2005) https://www.nber.org/papers/w10988
 - To keep net public debt-GDP ratio as 60%, govt revenue-GDP ratio had to increase to 35%, same as in 1990
 - Not so different with European countries at that time
 - "Happy news from dismal science"
 - Replication: <u>Doi, Hoshi and Okimoto (2011, JJIE)</u>



Macro-econometric model

- System of equation of macroeconomic variables
- Change fiscal variables (exogenously given) to see the effects
- Feedbacks from economy to fiscal situation
 - Large system can incorporate detailed fiscal institution
 - Mid-term analysis in government
- Not sufficient microeconomic foundation



- General equilibrium model: Representative agents / OLG
 - Setting "deep" parameters of utility and production functions
 - "Calibration"
 - Microeconomic foundation
 - Macroeconomic variables (e.g., consumption, saving) are determined as solutions of optimization problem of households and firms
 - Computer intensive. Not very detailed
 - Hard to incorporate the details of institutions
 - Assume a steady state in the long-run: Govt budget constraint is assumed to be satisfied
 - Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2017), Kitao (2018, JER), Kitao and Mikoshiba (2020, JJIE)
 - Higher than 30% VAT is necessary



- OLG general equilibrium model: Hybrid
 - Not solve the households' optimization problem
 - Estimate functions of consumption, labor supply, ...
 - Exogenous interest and wage rates
 - Instead...
 - Household heterogeneity: ability, gender, ...
 - Institutional details: tax, social security, ...
 - Calculate the effects of policy changes

Examples:

- Storesletten (2003, Scand. J.E)
- Imrohoroglu, Kitao, Yamada (2016, IER)
- Imrohoroglu, Kitao, Yamada (2019, J E Ageing), VoxEU
 - Policy combinations improve the fiscal situation: increase pensionable age, cut down pension benefit, increase copayments, raise VAT rate, promote female labor participation...