

DTU Course 02156 Logical Systems and Logic Programming (2021)

Week	Date	Main Topics (Prolog Programming in All Lessons)
35 #01	31/8	Course Prerequisites & Tutorial on Logical Systems and Logic Programming
36 #02	7/9	Chapter 1 - Introduction (Prolog Note)
37 #03	14/9	Chapter 2 - Propositional Logic: Formulas, Models, Tableaux
38 #04	21/9	Chapter 3 - Propositional Logic: Deductive Systems
39 #05	28/9	"Isabelle" - Propositional Logic: Sequent Calculus Verifier (SeCaV)
40 #06	5/10	Chapter 4 - Propositional Logic: Resolution
41 #07	12/10	Chapter 7 - First-Order Logic: Formulas, Models, Tableaux
42		(Autumn Vacation)
43 #08	26/10	Chapter 8 - First-Order Logic: Deductive Systems
44 #09	2/11	"Isabelle" - First-Order Logic: Sequent Calculus Verifier (SeCaV)
45 #10	9/11	Chapter 9 - First-Order Logic: Terms and Normal Forms
46 #11	16/11	Chapter 10 - First-Order Logic: Resolution
47 #12	23/11	Chapter 11 - First-Order Logic: Logic Programming
48 #13	30/11	Chapter 12 - First-Order Logic: Undecidability and Model Theory & Course Evaluation

Responsible: Associate Professor Jørgen Villadsen <jovi@dtu.dk>

Assignments & Exam

MUST BE SOLVED INDIVIDUALLY

Assignment-1 Deadline Sunday 26/9 (Available Wednesday 15/9)

Assignment-2 Deadline Sunday 10/10 (Available Wednesday 29/9)

Assignment-3 Deadline Sunday 31/10 (Available Wednesday 13/10)

Assignment-4 Deadline Sunday 14/11 (Available Wednesday 3/11)

Assignment-5 Deadline Thursday 2/12 (Available Wednesday 17/11)

Written Exam Tuesday 14/12 (2 Hours / No Computer / All Notes Allowed)

The mandatory assignments and the written exam are evaluated as a whole – even if you do well in the mandatory assignments then you still must do decent in the written exam in order to pass the course!

A TEACHER MUST IMMEDIATELY REPORT ANY SUSPICION OF CHEATING TO THE STUDY ADMINISTRATION FOR FURTHER ACTIONS



THE KEPLER CONJECTURE

The Kepler conjecture, named after the 17th-century mathematician and astronomer Johannes Kepler, is a mathematical theorem about sphere packing in three-dimensional Euclidean space. It says that no arrangement of equally sized spheres filling space has a greater average density than that of the cubic close packing (face-centered cubic) and hexagonal close packing arrangements. The density of these arrangements is around 74.05%.

In 1998 Thomas Hales, following an approach suggested by Fejes Tóth (1953), announced that he had a proof of the Kepler conjecture. Hales' proof is a proof by exhaustion involving the checking of many individual cases using complex computer calculations. Referees said that they were "99% certain" of the correctness of Hales' proof, and the Kepler conjecture was accepted as a theorem. In 2014, the Flyspeck project team, headed by Hales, announced the completion of a formal proof of the Kepler conjecture using a combination of the Isabelle and HOL Light proof assistants. In 2017, the formal proof was accepted into the Forum of Mathematics journal.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kepler_conjecture

METAMATH

Metamath is a language for developing strictly formalized mathematical definitions and proofs accompanied by a proof checker for this language and a growing database of thousands of proved theorems covering conventional results in logic, set theory, number theory, group theory, algebra, analysis, and topology...

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamath>

Agenda — Week #7

How are you doing?

Tableaux & Resolution...

First-Order Logic (FOL)

How are you doing?

Write a Prolog program `same_length(+List1,+List2)` that succeeds if and only if the two lists have the same number of elements.

Write two variants: one using only the predicate `length` and another not using any other predicate except possibly `same_length` (hence it can be recursive).

Sample queries:

`?- same_length([], []).`

Yes

`?- same_length([], [a]).`

No

`?- same_length([a,b], [b,a]).`

Yes

`?- same_length([a,b], [a]).`

No

Tableaux...

You must master it for propositional logic by now!

$\sim((p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) \Rightarrow ((\sim q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow ((\sim p \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow r)))$
 $(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)), \sim((\sim q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow ((\sim p \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow r))$
 $(\sim q \Rightarrow r), \sim((\sim p \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow r), (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $(\sim p \Rightarrow r), \sim r, (\sim q \Rightarrow r), (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $\sim\sim p, \sim r, (\sim q \Rightarrow r), (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $p, \sim r, (\sim q \Rightarrow r), (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $\sim\sim q, p, \sim r, (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $q, p, \sim r, (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$
 $\sim p, q, p, \sim r$ Closed
 $(q \Rightarrow r), q, p, \sim r$
 $\sim q, q, p, \sim r$ Closed
 $r, q, p, \sim r$ Closed
 $r, p, \sim r, (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$ Closed
 $r, \sim r, (\sim q \Rightarrow r), (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$ Closed

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In the textbook it is shown how to transform a closed tableau for the negation of a formula into a proof in the Gentzen system — and any proof in the Gentzen system into a proof in the Hilbert system

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$$\vdash A \rightarrow A \vee B$$

$$\vdash A \vee B \rightarrow B \vee A$$

$$\vdash (B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow (A \vee B \rightarrow A \vee C)$$

CNF / Resolution — Last Week — Exercise 1

$$(p \Rightarrow q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow (\sim q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow (\sim p \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow r$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\sim((p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) \Rightarrow ((\sim q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow ((\sim p \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow r))) \\ &\sim(\sim(\sim p \setminus (\sim q \setminus r)) \setminus (\sim(\sim\sim q \setminus r) \setminus (\sim(\sim\sim p \setminus r) \setminus r))) \\ &((\sim p \setminus (\sim q \setminus r)) \& ((q \setminus r) \& ((p \setminus r) \& \sim r))) \end{aligned}$$

$$1. \quad \bar{p}\bar{q}r$$

$$2. \quad pr$$

$$3. \quad qr$$

$$4. \quad \bar{r}$$

$$5. \quad \bar{q}r \quad 1,2$$

$$6. \quad r \quad 5,3$$

$$7. \quad \square \quad 6,4$$

Resolution...

?- resolution(p).

~p

~p

[[neg p]]

No

...

?- resolution(p<=>p).

~ (p<=>p)

(~p\ ~p)& (p\p)

[[neg p],[p]]

[],[neg p],[p]]

Yes

?- resolution(p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p).

~ (p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p<=>p)

ERROR: Out of global stack

Much more interesting for First-Order Logic...

Hilbert's Thesis

“Many logicians would contend that there is no logic beyond first-order logic, in the sense that when one is forced to make all one's mathematical (extra-logical) assumptions explicit, these axioms can always be expressed in first-order logic...

... we refer to this view as *Hilbert's Thesis*.”

Jon Barwise (editor): Handbook of Mathematical Logic - Page 41

books.google.dk/books?isbn=0444863885

A Formal Proof of $2 + 2 = 4$ in Metamath

The complete proof of a theorem all the way back to axioms can be thought of as a tree of subtheorems, with the steps in each proof branching back to earlier subtheorems, until axioms are ultimately reached at the tips of the branches.

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One of the reasons that the proof of $2 + 2 = 4$ is so long is that 2 and 4 are complex numbers...

Proof Systems

The textbook describes 3 variants of formal proofs:

- “Gentzen System” — Tableaux
- “Hilbert System” — Axiomatics
- Resolution

They yield the same theorems, that is, formulas with formal proofs, $\{A \mid \vdash A\}$, although the proof systems are very different.

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Hence in principle `qed` can produce a formal proof of the famous Kepler Conjecture — in 2014 it was proved using a combination of the Isabelle and HOL Light proof assistants.

Predicate Formulas

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A few valid formulas:

$$(\forall x A(x) \vee \forall x B(x)) \rightarrow \forall x (A(x) \vee B(x))$$

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The implications cannot be reversed.

Interpretations & Assignments

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An *interpretation* \mathcal{I} is a triple

$$(D, \{R_1, \dots, R_m\}, \{d_1, \dots, d_k\})$$

where D is a *non-empty* domain, R_i is an assignment of an n_i -ary relation on D to the n_i -ary predicate p_i , and d_i is an assignment of an element of D to the constant a_i .

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$\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}[x_i \leftarrow d_i]$ is an assignment that is the same as $\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}$ except that the variable x_i is mapped to d_i .

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$v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}}(A) = T$ iff $(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in R_k$

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$$v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}}(\forall x A_1) = T \text{ iff } v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}[x \leftarrow d]}(A_1) = T \text{ for all } d \in D$$

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$$v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}}(\forall x A_1) = T \text{ iff } v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}[x \leftarrow d]}(A_1) = T \text{ for all } d \in D$$

$$v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}}(\exists x A_1) = T \text{ iff } v_{\sigma_{\mathcal{I}}[x \leftarrow d]}(A_1) = T \text{ for some } d \in D$$

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Proved by Gödel and later improved by others.

Main Rules for Tableaux — Alpha & Beta — Summary

α	α_1	α_2
$\neg\neg A_1$	A_1	
$A_1 \wedge A_2$	A_1	A_2
$\neg(A_1 \vee A_2)$	$\neg A_1$	$\neg A_2$
$\neg(A_1 \rightarrow A_2)$	A_1	$\neg A_2$
$A_1 \leftrightarrow A_2$	$A_1 \rightarrow A_2$	$A_2 \rightarrow A_1$
$\neg(A_1 \oplus A_2)$	$A_1 \rightarrow A_2$	$A_2 \rightarrow A_1$

β	β_1	β_2
$\neg(B_1 \wedge B_2)$	$\neg B_1$	$\neg B_2$
$B_1 \vee B_2$	B_1	B_2
$B_1 \rightarrow B_2$	$\neg B_1$	B_2
$\neg(B_1 \leftrightarrow B_2)$	$\neg(B_1 \rightarrow B_2)$	$\neg(B_2 \rightarrow B_1)$
$B_1 \oplus B_2$	$\neg(B_1 \rightarrow B_2)$	$\neg(B_2 \rightarrow B_1)$

Main Rules for Tableaux — Gamma & Delta — Summary

γ	$\gamma(a)$
$\forall x A(x)$	$A(a)$
$\neg \exists x A(x)$	$\neg A(a)$

Only use if no α -, β - or δ -formula

Use all constants and all γ -formulas — and keep the γ -formulas

Just add a new constant a if there are no constants

δ	$\delta(a)$
$\exists x A(x)$	$A(a)$
$\neg \forall x A(x)$	$\neg A(a)$

Constant a must be new in δ -formula

Tableaux — A Systematic Search for a Counterexample

$$(\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x)) \rightarrow \forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$$

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$$\neg((\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x)) \rightarrow \forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)))$$

$$\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x), \neg \forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$$

$$\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x), \neg(p(a) \rightarrow q(a))$$

$$\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x), p(a), \neg q(a)$$

$$\overline{\text{L} \quad \text{R}}$$

$$\neg \exists x p(x), p(a), \neg q(a)$$

$$\neg \exists x p(x), p(a), \neg q(a), \neg p(a)$$

×

R

$$\exists x q(x), p(a), \neg q(a)$$

$$q(b), p(a), \neg q(a)$$

⊙

Tableaux — A Well-Known Valid Formula

Prove the validity of a formula by showing that a tableau for its negation closes

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)) \rightarrow (\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x))$$

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$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)) \rightarrow (\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x))$$

$$\neg(\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)) \rightarrow (\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x)))$$

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \neg(\exists x p(x) \rightarrow \exists x q(x))$$

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \exists x p(x), \neg \exists x q(x)$$

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), p(a), \neg \exists x q(x)$$

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), p(a) \rightarrow q(a), p(a), \neg \exists x q(x), \neg q(a)$$

$$\overline{\text{L}} \quad \text{R}$$

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \neg p(a), p(a), \neg \exists x q(x), \neg q(a)$$

×

R

$$\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), q(a), p(a), \neg \exists x q(x), \neg q(a)$$

×

Example Cont.

The available program considers only one γ -formula in each step...

```
?- tableau(~ ( all(X, p(X) => q(X)) =>
              (ex(X, p(X)) => ex(X, q(X))) )).
```

```
~(Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1)) => (Ex1p(x1) => Ex1q(x1)))
  Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1)),~(Ex1p(x1) => Ex1q(x1))
    Ex1p(x1),~Ex1q(x1),Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1))
      p(a1),~Ex1q(x1),Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1))
        ~q(a1),p(a1),Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1)),~Ex1q(x1)
          (p(a1) => q(a1)),~q(a1),p(a1),
            ~Ex1q(x1),Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1))
              ~p(a1),~q(a1),p(a1),~Ex1q(x1),
                Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1)) Closed
                q(a1),~q(a1),p(a1),~Ex1q(x1),
                  Ax1(p(x1) => q(x1)) Closed
```

Yes