

# Swing Contracts in Energy Markets

Presented as Part of MATH8630: Stochastic Analysis

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- 3 In the case where the asset is energy (either a fuel or electricity) lack of storeability and susceptibility to markets, weather etc. make the spot price extremely volatile.
- 4 Thus buyer would like more flexibility in amount to purchase, while seller would still like an amount of future income to be guaranteed.

# It's all about the swing

## Definition (Basei et al<sup>1</sup>)

A swing contract is an agreement whereby for any time  $s \in [0, T]$  the buyer may buy energy at a rate of  $u(s) \in [0, \bar{u}]$  at fixed price  $K$ . Total energy purchased,  $Z(T) = \int_0^T u(s)ds$  is constrained by either:

- 1 Penalized constraint: If  $Z(T) \notin [m, M]$  buyer pays fine of  $\Phi(P(T), Z(T))$ .
- 2 Strict constraint:  $Z(T) \in [m, M]$ .

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<sup>1</sup>Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

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We follow Basei et al. (*in. loc. cit*) in examining penalized case first, and then discussing how strict case can be relaxed to the penalized case.

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# Penalized Swing Contracts - The diffusion

Fix a filtered probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, \{\mathcal{F}_s\}_{s \in [t, T]}, \mathbb{P})$  with  $\{\mathcal{F}_s\}$ -adapted Brownian motion  $W_s$  Spot price given by<sup>2</sup>

$$dP^{t,p}(s) = f(s, P^{t,p}(s))ds + \sigma(s, P^{t,p}(s))dW(s) \quad s \in [t, T] \quad P^{t,p}(t) = p$$

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<sup>2</sup>Assume that  $f$ , and  $\sigma$  are 'nice enough' to guarantee a solution satisfying  $\mathbb{E}[\int_t^T P^{t,p}(s)ds] < \infty$  exists



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Let  $Z^{t,z;u}$  denote total energy purchased up to  $s$ . Model this using control variable  $u(s)$ :

$$dZ^{t,z;u}(s) = u(s) \quad s \in [t, T] \quad Z^{t,z;u}(t) = z$$

Then:

$$dX^{t,z,p;u}(s) = d \begin{bmatrix} P^{t,p} \\ Z^{t,z;u} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} f(s, P^{t,p}(s)) \\ u(s) \end{bmatrix} ds + \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(s, P^{t,p}(s)) \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

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## Penalized Swing Contracts - The Net Profit

Recall that buyer purchases at price  $K$ . This give instantaneous profit of  $(P(s) - K)u(s)$ . Let  $\tilde{\Phi}(P(T), Z(T))$  denote the penalty, where <sup>3</sup>

$$\tilde{\Phi}(p, z) = -Ap(z - M)^+ - Bp(m - z)^+ \quad (1)$$

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Net profit resulting from buying regime  $u$ :

$$\begin{aligned} J(t, p, z; u) &= \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-r(s-t)} (P^{t,p}(s) - K)u(s) ds \right. \\ &\quad \left. + e^{-r(T-t)} \tilde{\Phi}(P^{t,p}(T), Z^{t,z;u}(T)) \right] \\ &= e^{rt} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_t^T e^{rs} (P^{t,p}(s) - K)u(s) ds \right. \\ &\quad \left. + e^{-rT} \tilde{\Phi}(P^{t,p}(T), Z^{t,z;u}(T)) \right] = e^{rt} \tilde{J}(t, p, z; u) \end{aligned}$$

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# Penalized Swing Contracts - The Value Function

Let  $\mathcal{U}_t = \{u : [t, T] \times \Omega \rightarrow [0, \bar{u}] : u(s) \text{ } \{\mathcal{F}_s\} \text{ -- adapted}\}$  denote the set of all admissible controls.

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$$V(t, p, z) = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_t} J(t, p, z; u) = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_t} e^{rt} \tilde{J}(t, p, z; u) \quad (2)$$

$$= e^{rt} \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_t} \tilde{J}(t, p, z; u) =: e^{rt} \tilde{V}(t, p, z; u) \quad (3)$$

Clearly our goal is to find the control  $u(s) = u(X(s), s)$  maximising  $V$ . Will suffice to maximise  $\tilde{V}$ .

# Setting up the HJB equation

Theorem 1 (See Chpt. 4 and 5 of Fleming and Soner 2006)

If  $\tilde{J} = \mathbb{E}[\int_t^T \tilde{L}(u, s, X) ds + \tilde{\Phi}(X(T))]$  and  $V = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_t} J(t, p, z; u)$   
 Then  $V$  is the unique viscosity solution to

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} V + \sup_{w \in \mathcal{U}} [\mathcal{A}^w V + L(w, t, x)] = 0 \quad V(T, x) = \Phi(x) \quad (4)$$

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$$X(s) = (P(s), Z(s))^T \text{ and } \tilde{\Phi}(X) = e^{-rT} \Phi(P, Z) \quad (5)$$

$$\tilde{L}(t, p, z; w) = e^{-rt} (p - K)w \quad (6)$$

$$\mathcal{A}^w \tilde{V} = f \frac{\partial}{\partial p} \tilde{V} + w \frac{\partial}{\partial z} \tilde{V} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \frac{\partial^2}{\partial p^2} \tilde{V} \quad (7)$$

# Penalized Swing Contract - HJB cont.

The HJB equation:

$$\tilde{V}_t + \sup_{w \in \mathcal{U}_t} \left[ f \tilde{V}_p + w \tilde{V}_z + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \tilde{V}_{pp} + e^{-rt} (p - K) w \right] = 0 \quad (8)$$

$$\tilde{V}(T, p, z) = e^{-rT} \Phi(p, z) \quad (9)$$

Can simplify a little bit by switching from  $\tilde{V}$  to  $V = e^{-rt} \tilde{V}$ :

$$(\tilde{V})_t = -r e^{-rt} V + e^{-rt} V_t \quad \mathcal{A}^w \tilde{V} = e^{-rt} \mathcal{A}^w V \quad (10)$$

and removing terms not depending on  $w$  from the sup:

$$-rV + V_t + fV_p + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} V_{pp} + \sup_{w \in \mathcal{U}_t} [wV_z + (p - K)w] = 0 \quad (11)$$

$$V(T, p, z) = \Phi(p, z) \quad (12)$$



# Penalized Swing Contracts - Solutions and Regularity

'Standard Theory'<sup>4</sup> tells us that there is a unique viscosity solution to (11) satisfying  $|V(t, p, z)| \leq C(1 + |p|^2 + |z|^2)$ . Moreover Basei et al provide additional regularity:

- 1  $V(t, \cdot, z)$  is Lipschitz continuous and  $V_p(t, p, z)$  exists a.e.<sup>5</sup>.
- 2  $V(t, p, \cdot)$  is Lipschitz continuous, concave and a.e. twice differentiable (wrt  $z$ )<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup>For example, that of Chpt. 4 and 5 of Fleming and Soner 2006.

<sup>5</sup>Prop. 2.2 of Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

<sup>6</sup>Prop. 2.3 of Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

# Penalized Swing Contracts - an optimal buying policy

Recall that if

$$\mathcal{A}^{u^*} V + L(u^*, t, x) = \sup_{w \in \mathcal{U}_t} [\mathcal{A}^w V + L(w, t, x)]$$

Then  $u^*$  is an optimal control.

# Penalized Swing Contracts - an optimal buying policy

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In this case only need:

$$u^* V_z + (p - K)u^* = \sup_w [wV_z + (p - K)w]$$

and so an optimal policy is:

$$u^*(t, p, z) = \begin{cases} \bar{u} & \text{if } V_z(t, p, z) \geq -(p - K) \\ 0 & \text{if } V_z(t, p, z) < -(p - K) \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

## Strict Swing Contracts - The Problem

Will now focus on strict swing contracts, i.e. we add the integral constraint  $Z(T) = z + \int_t^T u(s)ds \in [m, M]$ . Note that the diffusion is still the same!

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The problem: our admissible control set is now more complicated:

$$\mathcal{U}_{tz}^{adm} = \{u \in \mathcal{U}_t : \mathbb{P}_{tz} \left[ z + \int_t^T u(s)ds \in [m, M] \right] = 1\} \quad (14)$$

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Thus we cannot naïvely apply standard results from Optimal Control to:

$$J(t, p, z; u) = \mathbb{E}_{tpz} \left[ \int_t^T e^{-r(s-t)} (P^{t,p} - K)u(s)ds \right] \quad (15)$$

$$V(t, p, z) = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_{tz}^{adm}} J(t, p, z; u) \quad (16)$$

# Strict Swing Contracts - A solution

Roughly: Approximate with Penalized contracts.

$$I^c = \left[ m + \frac{1}{\sqrt{c}}, M - \frac{1}{\sqrt{c}} \right] \quad (17)$$

$$\Phi^c(z) = -c \left[ \left( \left( m + \frac{1}{\sqrt{c}} \right) - z \right)^+ + \left( z - \left( M - \frac{1}{\sqrt{c}} \right) \right)^+ \right] \quad (18)$$

$$J^c = J + \mathbb{E}_{tpz} \left[ e^{-r(T-t)} \Phi^c(Z(T)) \right] \quad (19)$$

$$V^c(t, p, z) = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_t} J^c(t, p, z; u) \quad (20)$$

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The diffusion is still:

$$dX^{t,z,p;u}(s) = d \begin{bmatrix} P^{t,p} \\ Z^{t,z;u} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} f(s, P^{t,p}(s)) \\ u(s) \end{bmatrix} ds + \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(s, P^{t,p}(s)) \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$



# Strict Swing Contracts - Characterization and Regularity of $V^c$

Because  $\mathcal{U}_t$  is 'nice',  $V^c$  is unique viscosity solution to the HJB equation:

$$V_t^c + rV^c + \inf_{w \in \mathcal{U}_t} [(p - K)w + wV_z^c + fV_{pp}^c] = 0 \quad (21)$$

$$V^c(T, p, z) = \Phi^c(z) \quad (22)$$

And have regularity properties much as in the penalized case ( $V^c$  is continuous, Lipschitz in  $z$  and  $p$  etc.)

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And have regularity properties much as in the penalized case ( $V^c$  is continuous, Lipschitz in  $z$  and  $p$  etc.)

Note that all  $V^c$  are solutions to same equation (21), but with different boundary conditions, and:

$$\lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} \Phi^c(z) = \mathcal{I}_{[m, M]}(z) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } z \in [m, M] \\ -\infty & \text{if } z \notin [m, M] \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

# Strict Swing Contracts - The Approximation Result

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$$\begin{aligned}
 & \mathbb{E}_{tpz} \left[ \left| \int_t^T e^{-r(s-t)} (P^{t,p} - K) u(s) ds \right| \right] \\
 & \leq e^{rt} \mathbb{E}_{tpz} \left[ \bar{u} \int_t^T |P^{t,p}(s)| \right] + e^{rt} K \bar{u} (T - t) \\
 & \leq C
 \end{aligned}$$

Where the bound on  $\mathbb{E}_{tpz} \left[ \int_t^T |P^{t,p}(s)| \right]$  comes from standard existence and uniqueness results for diffusions (assume  $f, \sigma$  have sublinear growth)

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Hence  $V(t, p, z) = \sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}_{tz}^{adm}} J(t, p, z; u) \leq C$  is well defined, assuming  $\mathcal{U}_{tz}^{adm} \neq \emptyset$

## Strict Swing Contracts - The Approximation Result cont.

Say  $[m, M]$  is *reachable* from  $(t, z)$  if exists a Borel measurable function  $u : [t, T] \rightarrow [0, \bar{u}]$  such that  $z + \int_t^T u(s)ds \in [m, M]$ .

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<sup>7</sup>Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

# Strict Swing Contracts - The Approximation Result cont.

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$$\mathcal{D} = \{(t, p, z) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} : [m, M] \text{ reachable from } (t, z)\}$$

$$\mathcal{D}^\rho = \{(t, p, z) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} : [m + \rho, M - \rho] \text{ reachable from } (t, z)\}$$

$$\tilde{\mathcal{D}} = \cup_\rho \mathcal{D}^\rho$$

## Theorem 2 ( Lemma 3.3 and §4.1 in<sup>7</sup>)

- 1  $\mathcal{D}^\rho = \mathcal{D}_{tz}^\rho \times \mathbb{R}_p$  is non-empty for all  $0 < \rho < (M - m)/2$ .
- 2 Hence  $\mathcal{D}^\rho \subset \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_{tz} \times \mathbb{R}_p$  is nonempty.
- 3 Thus  $\mathcal{U}_{tz}$  is non-empty for all  $(t, z) \in \mathcal{D}_{tz}$ .
- 4 So  $V(t, p, z)$  is well defined on  $\mathcal{D}$ .

<sup>7</sup>Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

# Strict Swing Contracts - Picture of feasible region




Figure:  $\mathcal{D}_{tz}$ ,  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{tz}$  and  $\mathcal{D}_{tz}^\rho$  for typical  $\rho$ .<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014, Figure 2 in.



# Strict Swing Contracts - The Approximation Theorem cont.

## Theorem 3 (Theorem 3.5 in<sup>9</sup>)

*With notation as above, as  $c \rightarrow \infty$  the  $V^c$  converge uniformly on compact sets of  $\mathcal{D}^\rho$  to  $V$ , for  $0 < \rho < (M - m)/2$ .*

Proof.



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<sup>9</sup>Basei, Cesaroni, and Vargiolu 2014.

# Strict Swing Contracts - Consequences of Approx. Theorem

- 1  $V$  is continuous on  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$  (Corollary 3.6).
- 2  $V$  is a viscosity solution to HJB equation (21), with boundary conditions TBD. (follows from stability of viscosity solutions, Corollary 3.7)
- 3 Explicit boundary conditions for  $V(t, p, z)$  can be determined (See Theorem 4.4).
- 4  $V(t, \cdot, z)$  is Lipschitz, and a.e. twice differentiable (wrt  $p$ ) (Prop. 4.5)
- 5  $V(t, p, \cdot)$  is Lipschitz, concave and a.e. twice differentiable (wrt  $z$ ) (Prop 4.6)

# Strict Swing Contracts - Optimal Buying Policy

Again,  $u^*(s)$  is optimal if it achieves the inf:

$$\mathcal{A}^{u^*} V + L(u^*, t, x) = \inf_{w \in \mathcal{U}_t^{adm}} [\mathcal{A}^w V + L(w, t, x)]$$

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Observe that optimal control for penalized case:

$$u^*(t, p, z) = \begin{cases} \bar{u} & \text{if } V_z(t, p, z) \geq -(p - K) \\ 0 & \text{if } V_z(t, p, z) < -(p - K) \end{cases} \quad (24)$$

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Moreover if  $z \in [m, M - (T - t)\bar{u}]$  (and  $M - (T - t)\bar{u} \geq m$ ) then:

$$m \leq Z(T) = z + \int_t^T u(s) ds \leq z + \bar{u}(T - t) \leq M \quad \text{for all } u \in \mathcal{U}_t$$

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Hence  $\mathcal{U}_{tz}^{adm} = \mathcal{U}_t$  and so  $u^*(s)$  above is also an optimal buying policy for Strict Swing Contract.

Thanks for listening!

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