Linear Quadratic Control Additional Material and Examples

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January 17, 2018

This material is intended to supplement https://lectures.quantecon.org/jl/lqcontrol.html

1 Quadratic Objective Functions

- (a) 2nd order approximation of more complicated non-linear functions, e.g. cost of inflation on output gap.
- (b) Quadratic adjustment costs
- (c) Toy models to illustrate concepts.

These were used for much of early macroeconomics: R.E. examples, due to tractability; permanent income model, etc. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, Chapter 5)

2 General Setup: Infinite Horizon Optimal Linear Regulator

The value of the planner with control u_t and state x_t , with the following:

- $x_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$, x_0 given
- $w_{t+1} \in \mathbb{R}^j$: shocks with $w_{t+1} \sim \mathrm{N}\left(0, \mathbf{I}\right)$
- $u_t \in \mathbb{R}^k$: decision rule
- $R \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}, Q \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$: capture objective function (can add another $H \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times n}$ for cross terms)

- $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}, B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times k}$: capture state evolution
- $C \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times j}$: Cholesky of covariance matrix

3 Problem

We choose u in the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{\{u_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[-\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[x_t^T R x_t + u_t^T Q u_t \right] \right]$$
 (1)

s.t.
$$x_{t+1} = A \cdot x_t + B \cdot u_t + C \cdot w_{t+1}$$
 (2)

$$x_0$$
 given (3)

$$w_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0,\mathbf{I}\right) \tag{4}$$

This is a quadratic objective function, with linear evolution. Note that the canonical form often has the observation equation built into R.

Recursive Formulation:

$$V(x) = \max_{u(\cdot)} \left[-x^T R x - u^T Q u + \beta \mathbb{E} \left[V(x') \right] \right]$$
 (5)

s.t.
$$\underbrace{x'}_{\substack{\text{state}\\ \text{next}\\ \text{period}}} = Ax + Bu + Cw$$
 (6)

Solution: See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), or notes on linear equations.

Given that V(x) is quadratic in the state, we have:

$$V(x) = -x^T P x - d (7)$$

$$u(x) = -Fx (8)$$

for a matrix $P \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$; scalar $d; F \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times n}$: linear control, where P solves:

$$P = R + \beta A^T P A - \beta^2 A^T P B (Q + \beta B^T P B)^{-1} B^T P A$$

$$\tag{9}$$

Equation (9) is an algebraic matrix Ricatti equation; use numerical methods for n > 2:

$$F = \beta (Q + \beta B^T P B)^{-1} B^T P A \tag{10}$$

$$d = \beta (1 - \beta)^{-1} \cdot \operatorname{trace}(PCC^{T}) \tag{11}$$

Shocks do not affect the choice, but it affects $v(\cdot)$ through d, and $u(\cdot)$ through x_{t+1} .

4 Certainty Equivalence

Key:

- Value depends on shocks through C
- Policy independent of shock distribution
- We can solve the deterministic version with C = [0] to get policy.
- This is the key tractability result of L-Q control.

See (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, Chapter 5, Appendix B) for examples of L-Q approximations of standard models.

Substituting equation (8) into the LQM:

$$x_{t+1} = Ax_t + Bu_t + Cw_{t+1} (12)$$

$$= Ax_t - B \cdot Fx_t + Cw_{t+1} \tag{13}$$

$$= (A - BF) \cdot x_t + Cw_{t+1} \tag{14}$$

This is a canonical linear Gaussian state space:

$$\boxed{\mathbb{E}_t \left[x_{t+j} \right] = (A - BF)^j x_t} \quad \text{(forecast)}$$

The forecast of value is different than previous linear asset pricing examples due to Quadratic utility.

5 Example: Exercise 5.12 from Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012)

5.0.1 Problem

Demand:

A firm believes market wide output, Y_t , for a product follows (large number of firms):

$$Y_{t+1} = H_0 + H_1 Y_t + H_2 \nu_t, \ Y_0 \text{ given}$$
 (16)

where the demand shock is also AR(1)

$$\nu_{t+1} = \rho \nu_t + \sigma_{\nu} w_{t+1} \text{ for } w_{t+1} \sim N(0,1), |\rho| < 1$$
 (17)

The price, p_t lies on the demand curve:¹

$$p_t = A_0 - A_1 Y_t + \nu_t \tag{18}$$

Adjustment Costs:

The firm chooses y_t , the output, to maximize profits. It is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost:

$$\max_{y_{t+1}(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\underbrace{p_t y_t}_{\text{revenue}} - \frac{1}{2} \delta(\underbrace{y_{t+1} - y_t}_{\text{adjustment}})^2 \right) \right]$$
(19)

where $\delta > 0$ is the cost, with discount rate $\beta \in (0, 1)$.

Information: sees Y_t , p_t , y_t at time t. The competitive equilibrium is seen through the law of motion for Y_t , which is independent of y_t .

5.0.2 Recursive Setup

We want to maximize the following recursive problem:

$$V(x) = \max_{u(\cdot)} \{-x^T R x - u^T Q u + \beta \mathbb{E} \left[V(x')\right]\}$$
(20)

$$s.t. x' = Ax + Bu + Cw (21)$$

Converting to a linear-Gaussian state space: Find a state x_t , u_t and error w_{t+1} :

$$x_{t} = \begin{bmatrix} y_{t} \\ Y_{t} \\ \nu_{t} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}, \ u_{t} = y_{t+1} - y_{t} \equiv \triangle y_{t}, \ w_{t+1} = w_{t+1}.$$

¹The ν_t in (18) isn't strictly necessary for this sort of problem, but may help in aggregation to ensure that a large number of symmetric firms choose the same y_{t+1} , which allows us to let $Y_{t+1} = y_{t+1}$ after finding the optimal policy. This is a general equilibrium approach not fully implemented here.

Evolution:

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_{t+1} \\ Y_{t+1} \\ v_{t+1} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & H_1 & H_2 & H_0 \\ 0 & 0 & \rho & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{A} \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} y_t \\ Y_t \\ v_t \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{x} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{B} \underbrace{\triangle y_t}_{u} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \sigma_{\nu} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{C} \underbrace{w_{t+1}}_{w} \tag{22}$$

Revenue:

$$P_t y_t = (A_0 - A_1 Y_t + \nu_t) \cdot y_t \tag{23}$$

Now, take the sequential equation and plug in the expression for p_t :

$$\max_{y_{t+1}(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\underbrace{\left(A_0 - A_1 Y_t + \nu_t \right) y_t}_{x^T R x} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \delta \triangle y_t^2}_{u^T Q u} \right) \right]$$
(24)

Note that Q is scalar here, so:

$$-u^T Q u = -\frac{1}{2} \delta \triangle y_t^2 \tag{25}$$

Since $u \equiv \triangle y$:

$$Q \equiv \frac{1}{2}\delta \tag{26}$$

2nd term in the objective function:

$$\triangle y \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right) \triangle y \leftrightarrow u^T Q u \tag{27}$$

Now, take $x^T R x$:

$$-x^T R x = (A_0 - A_1 Y_t + \nu_t) y_t \tag{28}$$

$$-x^{T}Rx = \begin{bmatrix} y & Y & \nu & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -\frac{A_{1}}{2} & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{A_{0}}{2} \\ -\frac{A_{1}}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{1}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{A_{0}}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y \\ Y \\ \nu \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(29)$$

$$R = -\begin{bmatrix} 0 & -\frac{A_1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{A_0}{2} \\ -\frac{A_1}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{1}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{A_0}{2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$(30)$$

How to get used to drawing up states spaces? Practice!

- (a) Quadratic forms are symmetric
- (b) No squared terms, or all 0's on diagonal
- (c) Divide cross terms by 2 since added twice.

Note: We had to be careful on the signs of Q and R to match the signs in the canonical setup.

5.0.3 Summary of Solution

In our model, if A, B, C, Q, R are all defined, then we can use the formulas for certainty equivalence, i.e:

$$V(x) = -x'Px - d (31)$$

$$u(x) = -F \cdot x \tag{32}$$

for $P \in \mathbb{R}^{4\times 4}$, $F \in \mathbb{R}^4$, where P, F solve the algebraic matrix Ricatti equation (9) defined before.

5.0.4 Simulating

- 1. Choose $x_0 = \begin{bmatrix} y_0 & Y_0 & \nu_0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ for initial conditions you are interested in.
- 2. Iterate:
 - (a) Solve for $u(x) = -F \cdot x$ (can calculate value as well)
 - (b) Draw w for shock

- (c) Use evolution with $x, u, w \to x'$
- (d) Repeat
- 3. Stationary solution for x?
 - \rightarrow Could find stationary Y, u_{∞} (for large T), then iterate forward for w = 0 until $\triangle y = 0$? Or, better yet: use the approach from the VAR notes with the discrete Lyapunov equation to solve for the stationary distribution.

References

LJUNGQVIST, L., AND T. J. SARGENT (2012): Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, Third Edition, vol. 1 of MIT Press Books. The MIT Press.