

SIRS - 2024/2025

# MessagIST


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
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# Build Infrastructure



<fig.1>

# Protecting Communications


Communications are made through SSL/TLS over TCP:

- No messages can be lost in transit (TCP)
- Messages are **encrypted** (TLS)
- Each component maintains its own dedicated **KeyStore** and **TrustStore**.
- **One-way authentication** (server is authenticated, client is not - same in web browsers)

# Secure Document Library

Provides these operations:

- Protect document
- Check integrity of document
- Unprotect document




# Secure Document Library

```
{  
  "message": {  
    "sender": "ist1123123",  
    "receiver": "ist1321564",  
    "timestamp": "2022-01-01T12:00:00Z",  
    "content": "Hi! do you know the solution for the SIRS exercise?"  
  }  
}
```

<fig.3>

# Secure Document Library



# Secure Document Library

```
{  
  "message": {  
    "sender": "ist1123123",  
    "receiver": "ist1321564",  
    "timestamp": "2022-01-01T12:00:00Z",  
    "content": "MIQfb5dLFkroJnfeP2lMrp80hegs...",  
    "keyForReceiver": "eQr+qAtLjZcdusC2Qd3Y/...",  
    "keyForSender": "ldtZhtjVpwReY351mffAav/...",  
    "signature": "YRsoxCAS9Rr1SFcYJAu/..."  
  }  
}
```


<fig.4>




# Database

Database is trusted by the Server and:

- Is an **in-memory** database
- Should be replicated to ensure availability and reliability
- Scheduled Backup Service is executed every 14 days.
- Only responds to server-side requests, never accessed directly by the client.
- Sanitization of user input is done through the use of **PreparedStatement**



# DuckDB



# Security Challenge A

## Security challenge A

Basic encryption is enough to comply with GDPR but it is not enough to convince the security experts from IST. As such, in this security challenge you are invited to implement a point to point encryption mechanism. Ensure the following security requirements are met:

- [SRA1: Confidentiality] Only sender and receiver can see the content of the messages.
- [SRA2: Confidentiality] There must be a protocol that allows two students to exchange a key (in a secure way). You can assume the existence of a side channel for this.
- [SRA3: Availability] If a user loses their phone, they must be able to recover the message history.

<fig.6>


# Security Challenge A

[SRA1: Confidentiality]: Solved by using the Secure Document Library 

[SRA2: Confidentiality]: E2E System - Token Service 

[SRA3: Availability]: PasswordDerivationService - Partial Implementation

# E2E - End-to-End Communication



<fig.7>

# E2E - End-to-End Communication

```
return Jwts.builder()  
    .setSubject("E2E-connection")  
    .claim("sender", sender)  
    .claim("receiver", receiver)  
    .setIssuedAt(new Date())  
    .setExpiration(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 60000)) // 1 min expiry  
    .signWith(config.getJWT_KEY())  
    .compact();
```

<fig.8>

Can only be validate by the server.  
Expiry date secures against replay attacks

# Password Derivation Service

masterPassword + salt



SecretKey

1. symmetric key


2. public key (generated  
keyPair)

Recovery of the Messages:

- The service regenerates the secret AES key
- Use private or symmetric key to decrypt messages

# Demo

# Link to video



15.

# Conclusion

Possible Enhancements:

- Local Persistent Storage for all message instances
- Change how token + message is sent to receiver

This project allowed us to develop our critical analysis of systems regarding how secure they are, and broaden our knowledge of the different possibilities to make a system secure.



# Questions

# Attacker Model

## Assumptions:

### What attacker **can** do:

- Setup virtual machine with own IP on the network to:
  - Use Wireshark and try to sniff packets
  - Connect to the Server and try to send malicious payload

### What attacker **cannot** do:

- Have knowledge of Runtime information of any of the Server machines, hence not being able to check the data stored by the Database.