


The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction

Monika Fludernik



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The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction

‘Monika Fludernik’s *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* is a landmark contribution to the poetics of narrative... It is hard to say whether Fludernik is more to be admired for her mastery of theory and scholarship on both sides of the literature/linguistics divide—which thanks to her, looks less than ever like a divide, and more like an opportunity—or for the calibre and richness of her fine-grained analyses.... She has spoken, not the last word, but the *first word* of a fresh reconceptualization of her subject.’

Brian McHale
Tel Aviv University

Monika Fludernik presents a detailed analysis of free indirect discourse and the crucial problematic of how speech and thought are represented in fiction. She deals with the use of linguistic methodology in the study of literature, and subsumes earlier insights into the forms and functions of quotation by aligning them with discourse strategies observable in the oral language. Building on Ann Banfield’s *Unspeakable Sentences*, the author radically extends Banfield’s model to accommodate evidence from conversational narrative, non-fictional prose and literary works from Chaucer to the present day. Drawing on a vast range of literature, she provides an invaluable resource for researchers in the field, and introduces English readers to extensive work on the subject in German, as well as comparing the free indirect discourse features of German, French and English. This important state-of-the-art study effectively repositions the whole area between literature and linguistics, opening up a new set of questions in narrative theory.

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The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction

The linguistic representation of speech and
consciousness

Monika Fludernik



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My father is exchanging forbidden words with Klein-Anna. I do not need to leave my room to know. *We*, he is saying to her, *we two* ; and the word reverberates in the air between them. *Now: come with me now*, he is saying to her. There are few enough words true, rock-hard enough to build a life on, and these he is destroying. He believes that he and she can choose their words and make a private language, with an *I* and *you* and *here* and *now* of their own. But there can be no private language. Their intimate *you* is my *you* too. Whatever they may say to each other, even in the closest dead of night, they say in common words, unless they gibber like apes. How can I speak to Hendrik as before when they corrupt my speech? How do I speak to them?

J.M.Coetzee, *In the Heart of the Country*, §74

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Preface

The present volume grew out of a long-standing interest in narrative theory and in the central problematic of speech and thought representation in fiction. Initially I was planning to re-analyse the bases of Ann Banfield's speakerless sentence theory as presented most fully in her 1982 classic study *Unspeakable Sentences. Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction*, and, possibly, to refute it. Despite its very obvious advance over competing theories, Banfield's model at the same time involved itself in some insoluble contradictions when applied to pre-late-nineteenth-century texts, particularly those of the classic omniscient narrator tradition. Banfield's linguistically based theses directly undermined the theoretical model of communicative levels and instances that is generally accepted by narratologists from Genette to Stanzel, Bal, Chatman or Rimmon-Kenan. It therefore became an imperative task to take Banfield's linguistics very seriously indeed in order to ascertain the validity of her model as a basis for restructuring narratology. Alternatively, if Banfield's propositions could be demonstrated to have more limited applicability—as has indeed turned out to be the case—the question would still remain of how far narrative modes of speech and thought representation could actually be accounted for within a consistent narrative paradigm.

In the course of my research into these initial questions I have come to use a variety of linguistic approaches beyond the standard Chomskyan paradigm on which Banfield's study is predicated. In particular I have profited from more recent pragmatic analyses of syntactic phenomena. In addition to pragmatics, discourse analysis has provided a crucial reorientation of the original perspectives of the project, allowing me to deal with speech and thought representation in *language* rather than in (merely) narrative, and literary fiction at that. In the wake of these linguistic influences the more purely narratological perspectives receded into the background and gave way to some searching questions about the place of oral or naturally occurring narrative in the discipline called narratology, which has so far been almost exclusively concerned with the literary canon and popular *writing*. In spite of numerous attempts to deal with narrative as a cognitive structure, oral storytelling has largely been ignored in the rush towards locating a narrative deep structure in painting, theatre or film. To posit the question of what the specific characteristics of *written* narrative consist in and to determine what remains at the core of narrativity once the written medium is replaced by an *oral* one consequently became an important research project in its own right and developed into a second separate study.

The present *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* therefore concentrates on the more linguistic questions of speech and thought representation, although I have never lost sight of the framing narrative issues. The narratological implications of my conclusions in this volume will then be treated separately in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*, where I will directly address the issue of orality in narratology, as well as considering (postmodernist) experimental writing.

The present study was originally designed mainly for literary scholars, particularly narratologists, but it should also be of interest to the pragmatically oriented linguist. Indeed, the book centrally attempts to mediate between literature and linguistics, in the belief that neither discipline can do without the other. In speech and thought representation, in the choice of narrative tense and in much that concerns the substance of literature, the medium language is demonstrably affected by the meaning effects and generic uses to which it has been put, and it in turn crucially structures and determines the substance of literature. If former linguistic approaches to literature have exposed themselves to ridicule, such early failings have recently been compensated for by the new stylistics and by the successful pragmatic approach to literature. My own work develops this line of inquiry, positing semiotically relevant textual frame categories within which linguistically definable phenomena can be demonstrated to operate in a significant manner. One such textual category is narrative, and one significant phenomenon speech and thought representation. More prosaically, *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* is conceived as a kind of handbook on free indirect discourse and related phenomena. There is a need in the English market for an update on this topic that incorporates German contributions to the issue. I have attempted to provide a thoroughgoing description of free indirect discourse, and particularly a discussion of the theoretical problem areas which this device has revealed within the standard paradigms in linguistics and narratology. Additionally, a comprehensive bibliography is supplied that may prove useful to enthusiasts who want to delve more deeply still. Nevertheless the present volume cannot claim to be a definitive study of free indirect discourse or speech and thought representation because the theoretical analyses presented in it have not, as their most important effect, closed the issue but have *opened up* new lines of inquiry, which can now be pursued by scholars in a number of different disciplines. I hope that *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* may succeed in bringing together at one table the comparatist, the literary critic, the linguist and the literary philologist in their shared concern for the makings of that elusive complex of meaning effects that we are used to name, vaguely, *narrative aesthetics*.

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This book owes its existence both to the extensive financial support that I have received and to the encouragement and help of several of my colleagues and friends.

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Of the many scholars who have accompanied me through the difficulties of a complex and ever-extending project I would like to single out, above all, my long-time 'narratological mother', Dorrit Cohn. Her continuing interest in my research and her comments on work in progress together with her personal friendship have perhaps helped me most to see this study through to its successful completion. I also owe deep gratitude to Susumu Kuno, who has been extremely helpful, kind and patient, and at several crucial junctures reassured me that I could indeed 'do' linguistics even though I have had no professional training in that field.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and thanks to all those who over the years have helped me most by their teaching, encouragement, friendship and respect. I will always be in debt to Professor F.K. Stanzel, my doctoral thesis supervisor, for the living example of an excellent scholar, teacher and employer. Professor Hermann Mittelberger has taught me invaluable lessons in the true concern for one's students'

welfare besides strengthening my fascination with Proto-Indo-European. I also fondly remember the friendship and kindness of the late Richard Ellmann whose interest in my work and stimulating feedback sustained me during a year at Oxford while I was working on my dissertation. I would also like to thank Professor Anna Davies for her lasting friendship and for her hospitality during my repeated sojourns at Oxford. My gratitude extends, furthermore, to Francis Warner, whose lectures in Oxford in 1977–78 first introduced me to some of my favourite authors and became an unforgettable model of superb teaching. Barbara Johnson's lectures and seminars have likewise left a deep impression on me, and her example of a lucid, sophisticated and uniquely feminine teaching style has provided me with an invaluable role model.

Among those on whom I have for many years relied for personal and academic and support, I would like to single out Dr Ferdinand and Dr Eva Richter, as well as my scholar colleagues Sonja Basic, Howard Caygill, Wallace Chafe, Marcel Cornis-Pope, Willie van Peer, Marie-Laure Ryan and Haruhiko Yamaguchi. They have provided stimulating critical response to work in progress. I am also indebted to my friends Maria Ascher and Susanne Klingenstein who have given me much emotional support and kept me supplied with books and photocopies from across the Atlantic. This is the opportunity, moreover, to voice my general appreciation for the help and encouragement that I have received from my academic supervisors and colleagues in Vienna and from the official referees of my work in the habilitation committee, Professors Robert-Alain de Beaugrande, Brian McHale and Waldemar Zacharasiewicz. My particular thanks go to Herbert Schendl and Franz Wöhrer and to my women colleagues in the department, notably to Grete Rubik and Brigitte Tranker, for their unceasing kindness and solidarity. My greatest debt of all, however, is to my mother without whose continuing love, trust and encouragement as well as financial support this book might never have been completed. It is to her that I dedicate this volume.

Finally, I would like to tender a grateful thank-you to Katrin Križ and Ulrike Beck who offered me invaluable typing assistance when I was suffering from tendinitis. Help with the manuscript and index has also come from Claus Inanger, Beatrix Gnan and Brigitte Wöhrer.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to Mrs Laura Huxley and Chatto & Windus for permission to quote from Aldous Huxley's *After Many a Summer*, and to Mr Bruce C. Bolinger for the permission to reproduce as [Figure 2](#) (p. 425) Dwight Bolinger's diagram 'A hypothetical continuum of propositional and automatic speech modes and their properties' (Bolinger 1976).

Abbreviations and symbols

AP	Adverbial phrase
AUX	‘Auxiliary’: syntactic category in the deep structure of Chomsky’s (1965) phrase structure rules, can be realized as an auxiliary verb or, in simple finite verb phrases, by the tense, person and mood markings
COMP	Complementizer (node)
CP	Complementizer phrase
DD	Direct discourse, i.e. direct speech
E	Expression (node) (Banfield 1982)
EST	Extended Standard Theory (Chomsky 1965)
EXCLAM	Exclamation constituent
FID	Free indirect discourse
ID	Indirect discourse
iM	interior monologue
I-movement	Subject-verb inversion, treated as a separate transformation
IP	Inflectional phrase
NEG-transformation	Transformation transforming affirmative deep structure sentences into negated surface structures
NOW	Deictics relating to the deictic centre
NP	Noun phrase
NYRB	<i>New York Review of Books</i>
PP	Participial phrase
PsN	Psycho-narration
R-expressions	Referring expressions are non-pronominal, non-anaphorical referential noun phrases such as proper names and full NPs (Chomsky 1986b: 101; Kuno 1987: 59)
RST	Represented Speech and Thought (Banfield)
S	Sentence; S-node
S’	S-bar (node)

S''	S-double-bar (node)
SELF	(Banfield's) Deictic centre of consciousness
SoT	Sequence of tenses
TG	Transformational Grammar
VP	Verb phrase
WH-movement	Transformation that moves interrogative pronominals (which, in English, typically start with /wh/) to clause-initial position (defined differently by various versions of TG); WH-movement applies cyclically
*	Asterisk marks unacceptability of subsequent word, phrase or sentence; the unacceptability is mostly syntactic, but sometimes pragmatic or semantic
?	Question mark <i>before</i> certain words, phrases or sentences designates weak acceptability rather than outright unacceptability (which would be marked by *)

Typographical conventions

The following quotational and typographical conventions are observed in this book.

In all quotations of both literary and non-literary sources, free indirect discourse passages (unless ambiguous) are printed in italics. Emphasis in the original text is rendered as underlining, and my own emphases are given in bold italics. Documentation in quotations from literary sources includes, first, the title of the work cited, followed by the volume, part or book number in capital Roman numerals and the relevant chapter in small Roman numerals. Volume and chapter numbers have been included to facilitate tracing these passages in different editions.

In quotations from the *Survey of English Usage* corpus full stops indicate quarter-second pauses and dashes half-second pauses. Text inside double brackets has been reconstructed from barely audible material. I have not reproduced the *Survey's* complicated notation which is of no relevance to the present discussion. The *Corpus of English Conversation* (Svartvik/Quirk, 1979) employs capital letters to mark intonational emphasis.

Introduction

Almost thirty years have passed since the *anni mirabiles* of 1966 and 1967—the years that saw the publication of many critical studies now counted among the modern classics of the literary discipline: Gérard Genette's *Figures I* (1966), A.J. Greimas's *Sémantique structurale* (1966), Roland Barthes's 'Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits' and his *Critique et vérité* (both 1966), Tzvetan Todorov's 'Les catégories du récit littéraire' (1966) and his *Littérature et signification* (1967), as well as Jacques Derrida's first triplet *De la grammatologie*, *La Voix et le phénomène* and *L'Écriture et la différence* (all 1967).

In 1966 also appeared the critical study to which the title of this book pays homage: David Lodge's *Language of Fiction*—a volume that introduced into British academia an orientation of research anticipated by Stephen Ullmann and, in the United States, by Leo Spitzer. At a time when syntacticians were already modifying Chomsky's Extended Standard Theory of 1965, views about the role of language in literature that had developed in the climate of Russian Formalism, and had been transplanted into the West by Roman Jakobson and by the seminal presentation of them in Wellek and Warren's *Theory of Literature* (1949), were for the first time being applied to English fiction. The emphasis is here on fiction, rather than poetry, since most (but not all) Formalist research had concentrated on poetry, and the shift towards fiction indeed followed the trend already initiated by Spitzer and Ullmann, both of whom were in fact forerunners of the literature and linguistics analysis of literary narrative practised in the present study. I will not provide a detailed discussion of David Lodge's book in these pages. Much of what he had to say in 1966 has since then become the unquestioned orthodoxy in the literary study of prose narrative. Suffice it to note that Lodge initiated an approach to literary fiction which has since developed into an entire methodology of the linguistic analysis of literary texts and, most recently, into the 'New Stylistics'. Among the foremost practitioners of this theoretical orientation can be found Donald C. Freeman (1970, 1981), Roger Fowler (1975, 1977, 1986a, 1986b), Geoffrey N. Leech (1969, 1985), Michael H. Short (1973a, 1973b, 1988), Leech/Short (1981) and Michael H. Toolan (1985, 1988, 1990).

Lodge was shrewd enough to entitle his book *Language of Fiction* rather than **The Language of Fiction**—a manoeuvre that decidedly counters any presuppositions about a unified system of language for the purpose of literary narrative. Nevertheless Lodge, much like his followers, consistently relates specific devices to specific meaning effects—a simplified methodology that can no longer be tolerated (Mair 1985). At the current stage

of research a plurality of linguistic devices and their ‘meanings’ in sometimes bewildering cross-fertilization have been discovered, and my use in the title of a plural, *The Languages of Fiction*, in part alludes to that state of affairs. More importantly, however, my full title is designed to exceed both the purposes and the application of Lodge’s original propositions. For one, I contend that there are several languages of fiction. This does not merely note the obvious existence of separate national literatures in a variety of different languages. Indeed, French and German are being considered in this study alongside a number of English literatures, written in British, US American, Canadian, Australian, South African, Caribbean and various other African and Asian variants of English. Nor does the plural *The Languages of Fiction* simply reflect the stylistic proliferation between different authors, periods and genres. Although all of these kinds of linguistic diversity (synchronic, diachronic, individual, generic) are important, the wording *Languages of Fiction* is primarily meant to capture the multiplicity of languages among different fictional speakers. These different languages, it will be argued, can in effect be identified as one of the standard meaning effects produced by *the fictions* which language *as a system* (i.e. the language of any national, historical or individual variant or even register) *projects* in the course of narrative signification. The languages of fiction are the fictions of language, and the fictions of language produce, *entre autres*, the evocation of different languages within the fictional text.

The title therefore relates to what I present in [Chapter 8](#) as the theory of schematic language representation, a model with decidedly anti-mimetic tendencies. According to the schematic language paradigm, instances of speech and thought representation even in oral discourse (natural narrative, everyday conversation) are invented according to strategies of typicality and formulaicity. So-called verbatim representations of utterances do of course exist, not as the most mimetic, natural, unmarked form of speech report, but as the most highly artificial, marked and formulaic type of reported discourse. Free indirect discourse, indirect discourse, speech report and the numerous intermediary forms between these canonical types of speech and thought representation all display various degrees of formulaicity and these signals of typical discourse are *marked* in relation to the narrative’s unmarked discourse. Dialogue in fiction therefore produces what Barthes called an ‘*effet de réel*’ (Barthes 1968)—a fiction of mimesis even in the realm of the most purely mimetic substance, that of linguistic expression iconically represented by itself.

The present study locates itself squarely between a literary and a linguistic point of view. It will indeed be contended that in the matter at hand—speech and thought representation—no distinction between a literary and a linguistic subject matter or perspective can be drawn. The forms and functions of the various kinds of represented discourse can, however, only be discussed within a framework that considers the narrative text as—primarily—narrative, literary and mimetic. Although it will be beyond the scope of this study to engage deeply with the nature of narrative mimesis—a question that has recently received some superlatively penetrating criticism¹—narrative mimetics provides the very framework within which one has to locate even a predominantly linguistic discussion of speech and thought representation. Linguistic methods can contribute cardinally to the *description* of textual givens; the functional *explanation* of these, however,

can only be performed by a narrative model that provides for the integration of the generic, narratological, mimetic and semiotic aspects of the reading process. Whereas linguistics supplies the terminological apparatus for the definition of textual phenomena, the reading process and its resultant meaning effects, on the other hand, are characterized by the interplay of textual features (linguistically defined) and the semiotic framework of the reading process which determines how textual givens become integrated into macro-structural narrative frames in which they then come to function as semiotic signals of textual interpretation. Again, these larger perspectives, although of central importance to the project, exceed the possible scope of this study, and I will therefore provide only a brief characterization of the kind of semiotic model that I have in mind. Both this issue and the question of narrative mimetics will receive much fuller coverage in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*.

0.1

WHY ANOTHER STUDY OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE?

Free indirect discourse has been a topic discussed at great length for the past twenty years and some sort of consensus on its form and meanings has been reached. Why, then, another study of free indirect discourse?

Speech and thought representation in (fictional) narrative is clearly a crucial issue in narrative poetics and for a variety of reasons. Classic narrative theories see speech and thought representation as central to narratology because it is the locus of interaction between the narrative discourse (*récit*, Genette's *discours*, the narrator's utterance) on the one hand and the story material (*histoire*) on the other, with characters' speech and thought acts considered part of the plot, part of what the narrative is *about*. The overlap between characters' and narrator's language in free indirect discourse, where standard narratological accounts posit the site of a dual voice effect, therefore acquires supreme theoretical relevance as a transgression of an otherwise neat separation line between the words of the text in the narrating process and the plot level of the fictional world, which is linguistic in a merely derivative, incidental and partial manner. Beyond these theoretical concerns, speech and thought representation touches on important stylistic questions, and on the empirical status of narrative categories such as 'the narrator', 'voice', or 'linguistic subjectivity'. Interpretative narrative analyses necessarily rely on such categories, and a discussion of irony or unreliability would be entirely impossible without them.

In spite of its theoretical centrality, however, few books on narratology provide an adequately balanced account of the linguistic properties of free indirect discourse or of the environments in which the device occurs. Nor are the theoretical implications and significance of speech and thought representation within narrative theory given much prominence. This may partly be due to the set-up of narratological studies: most of these are either introductions or present a new theoretical framework. In both cases metatheoretical discussion has to be reduced to a minimum. As regards specific studies of free indirect discourse, there has so far been no major book-length treatment of the phenomenon which fully responds to Ann Banfield's revolutionary linguistic theory in

Unspeaking Sentences (1982), weighing the textual evidence for and against her account as well as analysing its radical implications for narrative theory. Of the books on free indirect discourse that appeared after 1982, von Roncador (1988)—a published dissertation—is more interested in the linguistic comparison to logophoric phenomena, and Ehrlich (1990a) merely extends Banfield's theory beyond sentence level without openly questioning her paradigm. There are, however, a number of quite excellent articles and reviews that critically evaluate Banfield's theory. For reasons of space such treatments have necessarily been unable to fully confront the relevant implications of Banfield's model.

A new study of free indirect discourse has become desirable for other reasons, too. Banfield, like most free indirect discourse studies in English, is blithely unaware of the findings presented by nearly a century of German criticism. The bias towards studying free indirect discourse in terms of English and French textual evidence has had serious theoretical repercussions and can be held responsible for some incorrect (particularly syntactic) analyses of the phenomenon. It will therefore be one of my aims to introduce English readers to some of the central characteristics of *erlebte Rede* that—although commonplaces in German criticism—have so far been largely ignored or misrepresented in English work on free indirect discourse. Besides this glance across the German linguistic and critical border the present study will additionally provide supplementary accounts of free indirect discourse in medieval and pre-nineteenth-century English texts as well as discussing the occurrence of the device in the everyday oral language. German research on the topic has always insisted on the popular origins of free indirect discourse, and recent work in discourse analysis now makes it possible to check such programmatic theses against newly available evidence. The comparison of literary and non-literary instances of free indirect discourse additionally helps to shift the emphasis of my analysis from the more 'fictional' or novelistic characteristics of free indirect discourse to its basic linguistic and functional, i.e. pragmatic, aspects.

The subject of free indirect discourse additionally serves here as a kind of testing ground for the linguistic method in its application to narrative texts, whether literary or not. An issue that becomes particularly prominent in relation to the study of free indirect discourse is the question how useful linguistic methodology can really be in the analysis of speech and thought representation. The study of free indirect discourse cannot fruitfully be divorced from the examination of other forms of speech and thought representation. *Qua* renderings of characters' language in fiction, indirect and free indirect discourse passages contrast with the seemingly verbatim 'quotation' of figural discourse on the one hand and with pure narrative on the other. More specifically, one can translate this into the question whether free indirect discourse, indirect speech or any of the other forms of speech and thought representation allow themselves to be defined in purely linguistic terms. Although some accounts of free indirect discourse have already noted that many instances of the device are linguistically ambiguous and have treated the commonly noted linguistic signals indicating the presence of free indirect discourse as mere *indices* rather than as reliable criteria affording sufficient proof for the presence of the device (Verschoor 1959), the syntactic and lexical delimitations between free indirect report and other forms of represented discourse have received all too little analysis. Nor have the various

criteria on which the distinctions between the individual forms are based have been subjected to critical examination.

Among the issues that need to be confronted here, the patent differences in function between the representation of speech and the representation of consciousness require serious attention. The imbalance between form and function—observable, for instance, in the prevalence of indirect discourse (besides direct discourse) for the representation of characters' speech acts and the near-non-occurrence of the form for the rendering of consciousness—has been observed before, signally by Cohn (1978) and Leech/Short (1981). However, some of the consequences of this imbalance between form and application still need to be discussed, and the schematic bases of this imbalance will need to be analysed more fully. Most importantly, however, the present study attempts to point to general parameters or contextual frames that decisively influence the determination of free indirect discourse passages as well as accounting for the uses and meaning effects of the technique. With few exceptions (but see McHale 1978, 1983) the contextual flavour of speech and thought representation has so far been awarded insufficient critical attention. The delimitation of free indirect discourse as a linguistic rather than contextual phenomenon was already a question very much at issue between Charles Bally and the Vossler School at the beginning of this century. Bally claimed that free indirect discourse was an objective rendering of a character's speech act, and he interpreted ironic free indirect discourse as *antiphrase* and neutral or empathetic uses as *figure de pensée*.² The debate about the qualities of empathy versus irony versus objectivity in free indirect discourse is very much with us still, and it clearly has to be related to macro-structural frame phenomena that decisively influence the choice of linguistic form as well as subsequent interpretations and ultimate uses or functions of such speech and thought representations whatever their linguistic form or category. Moreover, this general problematic significantly bears on considerations of context: empathetic thought representations in free indirect discourse are quantitatively more prominent than ironic ones, whereas free indirect discourse renderings of speech acts typically tend to be either ironic or neutral (objective): one usually does not talk about empathy in this case.

Besides the more specifically syntactic features of free indirect discourse and other forms of discourse representation, the 'borrowing' by the narrative of characters' idiom and lexis constitutes a crucial factor in the recognition of a 'voice' in the text. In particular, Banfield's theory of narratorless or speakerless sentences, which she proposed in development of, and on the inspiration from, Benveniste's *histoire* category³ and Barthes's concept of *écriture*, invites a reassessment of the linguistic and narratological foundations of textual subjectivity and suggests a critical evaluation of the standard communication model in narrative theory. As the newest theories of free indirect discourse have suggested, one can discuss the narrative's infiltration with characters' idiom in terms of a 'deictic centre'. Many of the lexemes attributable to a character's 'point of view' can indeed be related to that character's deictic *hic et nunc*, corresponding to Bühler's *origo* (Bühler 1934), reintroduced into the language of the mediating narrative. Other stylistic and particularly syntactic features, however, seem to require the positing of an 'underlying' direct discourse act of the character (frequently identified as the character's 'voice'), whose sociolect, ideological preoccupations and philosophical orientation 'show

through' the mediating language. On account of this close relation to deixis, free indirect discourse is now seen to be crucial to the discussion about narrative point of view and the linguistic representation of subjectivity.

The intermingling of characters' and narrator's lexis, besides its purely narratological significance, is of course of additional concern for stylistic analysis. In particular, the echoing of characters' idiom in the narrative has become the focus of some interesting methodological considerations. Characters' vocabulary finds its way into the narrative not only in passages of free indirect discourse (whence the 'dual voice' hypothesis); it can occur *throughout* the narrative text, even outside passages of speech and thought representation. This 'contamination' (Stanzel 1984b) of narratorial idiom by the language of the characters has been little noted in Anglo-American criticism—Hugh Kenner's 1978 'Uncle Charles Principle' constitutes a tantalizingly *leger demain* treatment of the issue. More importantly, the *distinction* between characters' and narrator's language—a conspicuous conundrum not only in the discussions of free indirect discourse—requires ample methodological analysis beyond Riffaterre's micro-contextual speculations in the 1970s. One needs to acknowledge, for instance, that his concept of *deviation from context*, like the earlier deviation from the norm, relies on a fundamental binary opposition between similarity and dissimilarity, a dichotomy that on a theoretical level directly involves the notions of difference, alterity and *différance*. No present-day analysis of stylistic 'contamination' can fail to take these issues into account. Likewise, stylistic interaction between the narrative and the reported discourse can no longer be discussed without reference to Bakhtin's dialogic principle, a concept that has suffered much critical sleight of hand. Finally, the linguistic interaction of narrator's and characters' language needs to be related to the question of linguistic and stylistic *norms*, which are always already societal norms, too. The problematic of deviation pure and simple has now been replaced by the (equally intractable) theoretical complex of marking and linguistic foregrounding, where the bases of marking or foregrounding repose on the same normative and contextual data hitherto adduced to account for formal deviation.

Beyond the more linguistic problems outlined above, free indirect discourse and speech and thought representation in general need to be related to a number of macro-textual and interpretative aspects of the reading process in general. Some of the contexts involved are more restrictedly literary, as for example the question of point of view, the narrative situation, mood or voice; others are of a more conceptual nature, involving, for instance, the reading conventions that trigger an interpretation in terms of speech or thought representation. Even 'simple' grammatical features, such as the use of tense in narrative, can be of great significance for more general narratological issues. Examples are, for instance, the question of the fictional quality of past tense narrative (known as the discussion about the so-called epic preterite) or the cognitive and schematic framework for the reading of narrative fiction. Some of these issues naturally need to be discussed in relation to the presumed fictionality of literary narrative—most recently a subject of renewed fascination with the old guard of narratologists. (See Cohn 1989, 1991; Riffaterre 1990; Genette 1990, 1991.) I will try to redress this overemphasis on fictionality by my emphasis on natural (or conversational) narrative.

A new examination of free indirect discourse can therefore be claimed to contribute significantly to the linguistic understanding of speech and thought representation, but should additionally help to clarify a number of narratological and stylistic issues which will be of interest to the literary critic in general.

0.2

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The following account of free indirect discourse and related phenomena starts with some general frame considerations, which attempt to place the reporting of others' utterances within a typological perspective of research in philosophy, literary criticism and linguistics. [Chapter 1](#) provides a basic introduction to the diegesis/mimesis distinction, to speech act theory and its applications for speech and thought representation, to the linguistic analyses of deixis and to the communication model in narrative theory. These issues will be taken up again at relevant points during the discussion of the evidence, and conclusions about the function of narrative mimesis can be stated only in the wake of the schematic language model and the semiotic framework presented in [Chapter 8](#).

[Chapter 2](#) provides a general introduction to free indirect discourse, particularly for those readers who are new to the subject. In addition to this general preliminary characterization, more specific issues are also broached: the historical origins of free indirect discourse, the non-exclusive literariness of the device, the occurrence of free indirect discourse in past tense and present tense narratives, in narrative of all persons and all modes and in languages other than German, French or English.

In [Chapters 3 and 4](#), I will then provide an exhaustive description of (free) indirect discourse, noting its possible variants in oral and written texts, plus analysing the most distinctive signals of the device whether syntactic, lexical or contextual. [Chapter 3](#) concentrates on the 'shifted', narratorial features of (free) indirect discourse—person, tense and syntactic subordination. [Chapter 4](#) covers the unshifted characteristics of expressivity and subjectivity: adverbial deixis as well as lexical and syntactic features relating to the reported speaker's deictic centre.

In [Chapter 5](#) I then turn to the scale model of the forms of speech and thought representation and discuss the (definitional) problems that this approach entails. [Chapter 6](#) continues with a presentation and evaluation of the dual voice hypothesis and considers the problematic character of the poetics of deviation. [Chapter 7](#) presents a synopsis of Banfield's account of free indirect discourse and discusses the achievements, failures and limitations of Banfield's theory. The chapter concludes with a proposal for radicalizing Banfield's tenets.

[Chapter 8](#) considers the fallacies of the direct discourse approach underlying all previous treatments of speech and thought representation, and presents the schematic model of language representation. [Chapter 9](#) complements this with a contextually determined, reader-oriented approach to the narrative representation of characters' discourse and consciousness. I will conclude with some consideration of the ulterior consequences of the new model in the linguistic, narratological and stylistic domains.

0.3

METHODS AND AIMS

Since this book is centrally concerned with methodological questions, I have decided to dispense with a more extended methodological essay at this initial stage. The following remarks are therefore meant to convey, in a rather more practical spirit, what kind of book this is and how it came into being.

It needs to be clarified at the outset, *ex negativo*, that there are a number of alternative approaches that decisively differ from my own. These should be regarded as complementary extensions of the present project, not competing theories against which I write. Moreover, within the current limitations of time, expertise and—above all—space, paths that could profitably have been pursued in a longer study, or in an entirely different one, have had to be ignored or surveyed in a preliminary fashion rather than incorporated into the subject matter of this book.

These caveats apply specifically to the more historical questions raised in this volume. Since the study was conceived as a structural, linguistic and narratological analysis, I did not have sufficient space and time to then apply all theoretical conclusions to the extensive historical evidence. Where possible, a rough estimate of the situation is provided, and noticeable lacunae or recurrences are pointed out. As an example of this state of affairs one can mention the use of parentheticals in free indirect discourse. These apparently occur much more frequently in English and French than in German, and in English seem to be distinctly dependent on the personal taste or stylistic inclination of an individual author. Since this is not a statistical corpus study, nor a study of a specific literary period, definitive conclusions about the pervasiveness of narrative parentheticals in English, German and French literature will have to wait until such a study has been undertaken.

Neither is this book a corpus study in the linguistic sense of the term. There has been no effort to collect statistical data, largely because of the theoretical orientation of the research. The literary texts listed in the bibliography have been analysed primarily with a view towards finding rare or supposedly impossible collocations of linguistic features, for example occurrences of expressive elements outside direct or free indirect speech in the domains of indirect speech, psycho-narration, speech report or in the narrative discourse itself. In this framework the one exception to the rule acquires more than proportional importance over the recurrence of expected features. A pre-dominantly statistical analysis of forms of speech and thought representation would have resulted in a restriction of the number of analysed texts and would therefore have required a limitation, say, to *one* national literature's major canonical works, or to texts of one or two historical periods exclusively. Moreover, such a statistical project would have encountered serious methodological problems in view of the practical necessity to institute arbitrary definitions for the relevant categories. Such arbitrariness would necessarily have resulted in an erosion of the actual usefulness of the statistical data, since one would have had either to decide on larger categories that include marginal and ambiguous phenomena, or to indulge in a proliferation of subcategories and intermediary categories which would have rendered the statistics next to useless for interpretation. From previous experience with statistical research (Fludernik 1982) I have also acquired a profound distrust of the

methodological relevance of statistical data. Statistics typically take individual occurrences of certain phenomena out of context. Since the present study attempts to document the crucial importance of context for the purpose of the even preliminary establishment of basic categories, a statistical approach would from the outset have vitiated one of the major aims of the project. These remarks are, however, not meant to discredit statistical research in itself. On the contrary, I would welcome a series of statistical analyses that might help to corroborate, modify or refute some of the theses I am here proposing. Such studies would have to choose very specific historical and typological corpora rather than aiming at the comprehensiveness that I have attempted in these pages.

A second point that requires elucidation concerns my choice of texts. In principle, no premeditated choice of a specific canon has been made. The literary texts on which I draw basically cover the novels which I have read over the past eight or ten years. Fiction that I have read and found to contain little free indirect discourse, or only very typical and unremarkable instances of it, has not been included. On the other hand, as the project developed and specific historical questions arose, texts were chosen more deliberately to cover the pre-nineteenth-century period, fiction in the second person, fiction written entirely in the present tense or neutral narrative. I have included works of popular literature alongside a few novels outside the British and American canons, and there has been a serious attempt to concentrate on authors that have so far received little attention in the debate on free indirect discourse. The work of Dickens, which has not been examined in any detail for its (free) indirect discourse, was therefore analysed more fully than D.H. Lawrence or Thomas Hardy, whose uses of free indirect discourse are fairly standard, and I have not included any Dos Passos because this has been the favourite example text of McHale's. I have also excluded all consideration of Joyce on account of my previous work (Fludernik 1986a, 1986b). In this respect as in others, the present volume seeks to be complementary to previous research whose results need not be replicated unnecessarily. The attempt has been to cover as much variety as possible from a generic, historical, narratological, ethnic and gendered point of view, filling, if possible, lacunae left by previous research.

Besides works belonging more strictly to the literary canon (if one can still call my choice canonical) I have additionally supplemented the source material by including both oral narrative (in conversation) and journalistic or critical prose. Alongside various material from discourse analytical studies, the examples in this category here mainly derive from the *Survey of English Usage* (University of London, Gower Street). As for historical, critical and journalistic prose, I rely on random evidence sampled from my own reading, especially from the *New York Review of Books*.

The linguistic scope of this study also requires some specification. I have mainly concentrated on the English language in its British and US American variants. Surprisingly little difference has been noted between these two regional dialects of English, at least as far as the handling of speech and thought representation is concerned. Of course there are numerous lexical differences, but they only affect the number of available lexemes of certain open modifier categories. Syntactic differences, such as the acceptability of multiple negation in various English regional dialects, again do not considerably change the situation except for making available a larger number of expressive syntactic features.

Even work written entirely in non-standard English (for instance Alice Walker's *The Color Purple*) in no way changes the essential features of free indirect discourse. The situation is, rather, comparable to the effect of, say, present tense narrative in which the formal marking of sequence of tense seems to disappear. Categories are collapsed (for example when ambiguous tense forms are used), but no new categories or new structural elements can be observed. The same seems to apply with regard to Canadian, Australian and South African literature, at least judging from the few novels that I have looked at.

Besides dealing with an English corpus in the defined sense, this volume also awards a major emphasis to the comparison with the situation in German and French. Here and there I have also appended a note on speech and thought representation in Russian or Japanese, but have had to leave any extensive account pending until more fully qualified research is undertaken. For reasons of space and because this book was written to fulfil Austrian habilitation (tenure) requirements for an English Department, German and French examples have been kept to a minimum. For easy reference translations of non-English quotations have been provided, and I have revised the wording or provided my own versions where available published translations proved to be too imprecise to illustrate the 'point' under discussion.

I now come to the argumentative shape of this volume. It has been noted above that the book is of a predominantly theoretical cast. This bias has repercussions with regard to what I emphasize, the style of argumentation and the choice of an emphatically linguistic rather than purely literary vantage point.

For structural and theoretical reasons this study concentrates on marginal features of free indirect discourse and on those problematic areas in the current paradigm where standard explanations have so far failed. Such an orientation has been motivated primarily by the exigencies of the present state of the critical debate. In particular, the necessity to respond to Ann Banfield's linguistic theses and therefore to adopt her empirical framework has decisively shifted the argumentational structure from pure description to the documentation of possible variants (and an implied claim for the non-occurrence of certain other combinations or collocations). Thus, I have provided extensive examples for passages of indirect discourse that incorporate expressive features, complementing analyses and examples by McHale (1983) and Sternberg (1991). Since most of the crucial issues have been raised from the linguistic camp, this has also meant a decisive shift towards a more linguistic analysis of the subject. However, as will be obvious from a comparison with von Roncador's (1988) dissertation, my linguistic analysis is integrated into a larger textual and narratological framework.

Literary critics may note the complete absence of a discussion of the function of free indirect discourse or of its meaning. This lacuna is quite deliberate. As I will argue in the course of my attack on the poetics of stylistic deviation in [Chapter 6](#), free indirect discourse—unlike a past tense morpheme—is not a linguistic form that could be aligned with a specific function or meaning. On the contrary, as has variously been documented in a number of perceptive critical studies (Pascal 1977, Page 1988, Kühn 1988), free indirect discourse can be employed in very different contexts and for a variety of functions. Interpretatively fruitful discussions of the significance of free indirect discourse in a particular paragraph, or even in a whole work, necessarily deal with the *effects* of the

supposed 'double voice' of free indirect discourse. A lack of delimitation between the narrator's and the characters' language, or a very pronounced citation of characters' linguistic peculiarities, may serve a large variety of idiosyncratic effects that depend on the situational, narratological and ideological (macro-) context. The uses of free indirect discourse in George Eliot (D.A. Miller 1988), in Zora Neale Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Watching God* (Gates 1989) or in *Madame Bovary* (LaCapra 1982) cannot be reduced to a grammatical shape and might conceivably be produced by entirely different means (authorial commentary, narrative discontinuities, etc.). Free indirect discourse indeed frequently *contributes* to, rather than directly *causing*, certain macro-structural situations, for instance the prevalence of figural narrative, or the evocation of dead-pan irony (Fludernik 1992b). If the question of *function* is therefore dismissed in the present study, this has been done in the interests of the theoretical purposes of this volume alone; in the interpretation of individual works of narrative that question will remain of prime importance.

A second lacuna concerns the much-discussed question of point of view or (figural) perspective. Narratologists have treated this problem primarily in typological terms, establishing focalization either as perceptual and ideological viewpoint anchored in narratological instances (the narrator or a character), or as camera-like focussing on external and internal sense data and controlling the accessibility of such sense data (Bal 1985). Stanzel (1984b) combines enunciational (teller versus reflector character), existential (realms of existence) and purely perspectival choices to establish his three narrative situations, and other critics (Füger 1972, Lanser 1981, Bonheim 1982a) dissect narrational constellations into an entire substructure of collocational elements. In all of these systems point of view closely correlates with either perception or access to internal consciousness, and the basis for textual analysis in each and every case can be located in the presence and quality of deictic (i.e. potentially perspectival, subjective) elements in the text, and in the schematic situational naturalizations to which they give rise. In this book I will therefore return to basics and work my way up towards some of the constellations that are standardly described in terms of point of view.

The present volume squarely situates itself between a linguistic and a literary analysis of narrative prose. Indeed, the distinction between a purely literary and an exclusively linguistic approach loses its meaning in the kind of criticism here undertaken. I therefore believe that the present project exceeds a characterization in terms of a 'literature and linguistics' frame, for instance under the title of 'the Newest Stylistics'. What I am attempting to do in these pages is not an *application* of linguistic methodology to narrative prose, doing literary criticism with a toolbox of linguistic methods and categories. Nor is this, precisely, a linguistic study of phenomena best documented in literary texts—a study, that is, in which the literary effects of the proposed *langue* become secondary and negligible. My main inspiration, by contrast, comes from literary stylistics, narratology and discourse analysis or text linguistics, and the methodology here envisaged can perhaps be described best as a text linguistics of narrative language. The effort to discover how language 'means'—a basically semiotic and linguistic starting point—has here been subjected to a generic frame, foregrounding how specific seemingly linguistic phenomena function in literary and non-literary texts. Nevertheless, a decisive linguistic emphasis—

surprising in somebody with a decidedly literary background—has to be acknowledged. What this book is doing can certainly be appreciated best as a present-day update and—it is hoped—development, of Charles Bally's stylistics. It is therefore entirely appropriate for me to concentrate, among the various types of speech and thought representations, on the very phenomenon that Bally himself helped to discover and popularize.

How, precisely, does the methodology embraced in these pages relate to current models? What is the place of linguistic methods and of grammar in the present inquiry? This can be illustrated best by distinguishing between three levels of analysis. There is a basic level of textual analysis on which the linguistic properties of various kinds of speech and thought representation are being described by means of standard (mainly) transformationalist linguistic categories. On this level, the work of generations of linguists in this century which has resulted in a fairly consistent description of syntactic phenomena is adopted as a common ground of a descriptive methodology. I am of course aware that Chomskyan syntax has come under attack from several directions, most damagingly from pragmatics and analyses of the syntax of oral language (Mulder 1989, Halford/Pilch 1990). However, in the present study, what is adopted is not the entire apparatus of the Chomskyan model but the terminology for designating some specific syntactic features. It is to be expected that different syntactic models will explain these features differently but will nevertheless incorporate them as distinct phenomena of English syntax, as is indeed the case in McCawley (1988). Since most syntactic features dealt with in these pages are generally noticeable properties of the language or observable deviations from the expected, neutral word order, it ultimately does not really make much difference whether, say, fronting is described as a type of CP (complementizer phrase) adjunction or a movement operation into CP specifier position. The name given to some of these phenomena naturally implies a specific syntactic model, but since the preposing itself is a self-evident empirical fact of observation, one can, I believe, use the terminology simply to identify phenomena without at the same time necessarily espousing the entire syntactic model which has produced the terminology. A mildly Chomskyan approach, as already noted, became indeed necessary on account of Banfield's work on free indirect discourse. I have, however, used transformationalist terminology only where absolutely necessary and have even employed such reactionary descriptors as *direct object* in a major bid for general comprehensibility. Whatever the linguistic terminology applied on the basic level, readers unfamiliar with modern linguistics should be able to follow the argument by observing the example passages which have been added.

Whereas, on the basic level of linguistic description, the sentence was a major unit on which most definitions were based, the second level of analysis in this book concerns textual or discourse units. This is the level on which a possible linguistic definition of free indirect discourse is discussed, and on which most contextual phenomena occur that are treated in these pages. On this level, the linguistic method has already lost much ground. Whereas the existence of a *langue* was implicitly presupposed on level one as a system allowing definition of linguistic phenomena, the textual phenomena treated on a discourse level, even if lexicalized or definable in syntactic terms (e.g. discourse modifiers or addressee-oriented adverbial phrases), relate to a plane of pragmatic interaction and rhetoric strategy which has been described so far in a much less exhaustive manner than

'purely' syntactic phenomena. (But see, for instance, the excellent work of Longacre 1983.) Since I was dealing with a body of previous research mostly discussing literary prose, I have here relied on basic tenets from the current narratological paradigm. Besides the work of Gérard Genette, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan and Michael H. Toolan, this standard model has been presented most forcefully and competently by F.K. Stanzel (1984b), whose major categories have here been adopted for the analysis. In the interests of easy comprehensibility, particularly for non-narratologists, great care has been taken to indicate equivalent Genettean terminology, where available, and to provide non-technical explanations (which may perhaps strike narrative theorists as simplistic). Stanzel's typology has been used throughout because his proposals are surprisingly compatible with the results of Banfield's analysis and help to illuminate the importance of her major insights while, at the same time, providing some explanation for the drawbacks of her approach. Stanzel's typology has, however, not been adopted in wholesale fashion. Nor do I want to turn this book into an appreciation and argued revision of the Stanzelian paradigm. I will indicate in the text where I try to go beyond the frame of *A Theory of Narrative* (Stanzel 1984b).⁴

On a final, third level, linguistics as such plays even less of a role than on the second, discourse-oriented level. Whereas even Stanzel relied on linguistic textual aspects for his definition of narratological categories, the phenomena discussed on level three concern interpretative and cognitive principles which extend the analysis of linguistic and textual givens into the realm of cognitive science. This is the direction in which much linguistic theory, inspired by frame theory, has recently moved, not only in the analysis of metaphor but also within discourse analysis (G. Lakoff 1987, Lakoff/Johnson 1980, Lakoff/ Turner 1989, Turner 1987, de Beaugrande 1980). Cognitive linguistics attempts to uncover the cognitive bases which enable language production and language reception, and it therefore deals with the constitutive factors of human cognition rather than with any specific linguistic issues.

To summarize, the present study does not rely on linguistics as a ruling methodology, but utilizes linguistics as one basic, contributive level of analysis which is then complemented by more textual and interpretative methodologies. In this I transcend the more purely linguistic approach of both Banfield (1982) and Kuno (1987) in moving beyond linguistic principles of interpretation that are said to operate in Chomskyan Logical Form or on the syntactic surface structure. The general interpretative and cognitive frame brought in on level three, in contrast to 'interpretative principles', locates such reading strategies within a comprehensive frame of discourse production and reception (Grice's conversational maxims, Sperber/Wilson's relevance theory) and subsumes these more linguistic phenomena under a general inquiry into the properties and orientations of the human mind. These cognitive factors therefore function as a kind of ultimate horizon to my account of linguistic and textual phenomena.

I would like to conclude this section by noting the extent and limitations of the bibliography. For obvious reasons this bibliography cannot claim comprehensiveness for all aspects treated in the book. References are most comprehensive for work on free indirect discourse; I have, however, on the whole excluded studies on the use of free indirect discourse in individual authors, work in languages which I do not speak (unless

they seemed to be especially relevant) and brief minor essays. For the general problems of speech and thought representation I have attempted to be as comprehensive as possible, but have had to choose what seemed to me to be the more important studies. No comprehensiveness can be claimed concerning more specific issues such as speech act theory, the philosophical problems of the *de dicto* / *de re* distinction and very specific linguistic problems. Such are the drawbacks of a wide scope and they need to be accepted together with the advantages of the new insights afforded by connecting data from widely disparate disciplines. I will be grateful for any advice, modifications and refutations from scholars at home in the areas that I have here covered from the limitations of an outsider's perspective.

0.4

TERMINOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES: REPRESENTATION AND BEYOND

In the title of this study I have combined two apparently incompatible views of the representation of language in and by language. In the paradoxical first part I speak of the *fictions* of language, referring to the creative illusions, to the effects of mimetic representation that language is able to evoke by means of rhetorical strategy. In the subtitle, on the other hand, I resort to the technical term *representation*, which is the standard literary concept applied to contexts of direct and indirect quotation, to the 'rendering' of others' discourse in (un)mediated form. As may be objected, *representation* is a singularly unfortunate terminological choice. Nevertheless, besides being the standard, generally accepted technical term for the subject matter of this book, *representation* additionally cannot be replaced with a *single* more appropriate concept. The rendering of (others') speech and consciousness in the medium of language includes a variety of phenomena on very different levels of discourse production and a critical analysis of *representation* needs to distinguish between these levels and their various aspects of linguistic (re)production. The phrasing *fictions of language* characterizes the prominent creative and antimimetic element of speech and thought representation, if mimesis is here taken to signify mirroring or self-identity. The fictional element in *oratio recta* and in the numerous forms of *oratio obliqua*, which has been marginalized in the standard literature, will receive incisive emphasis in this book because it provides direct access to the question of rhetorical strategy. Whereas the concept of *representation* foregrounds a metaphor of copying 'original' text in more or less adequate fashion, a discourse-oriented approach is able to subsume the plethora of observable functions and forms under the heading of rhetorical strategies. Representation can be replaced by a number of rhetorical strategies, mimetic strategies, fictionality strategies, typification strategies or condensation strategies. I will present a functional model of this discourse dimension and document its relevance in the discussion of typification and condensation features of ((free) (in)direct) discourse in [Chapter 8](#). If I have refused to adopt this model as a consistent terminological pattern for the book, this has been in the interests of lucid presentation. I will clarify in

the text where the functional approach affords new vistas and requires crucial departures from the traditional representational model. However, since [Chapters 2](#) to [7](#) present, if critically, the empirical evidence adduced by previous scholarship, to work from within the representational model has proved to be a necessary tactic for practical reasons. The representational model will be exploded only in [Chapter 8](#) after its deficiencies have been amply illustrated from the inside.

What happens in and to language when we quote other people's utterances directly or indirectly? The traditional answer would be that we attempt to *render* as *correctly* as possible what was 'actually' ('originally') said. In direct quotation this kind of rendering is taken to be synonymous with reproduction, i.e. verbatim repetition; in (free) indirect 'quotation', typically termed *representation*, the rendering can only be mediate, warped, through a syntactic and rhetorical filter which inherently distorts the self-identity of the original. Yet even for the indirect the potential dangers of *misrepresentation* are curbed by 'co-operative' rules of discourse representation that stipulate at least a certain measure of *reliability*. Indirect discourse is therefore frequently seen in terms of indirect *paraphrase* rather than as (essentially) incommensurable (*re*)creation.

The stipulation of *correct* reproduction and *reliable* paraphrase is a kind of quotational co-operative maxim. Not only can direct and indirect quotation be regarded as a kind of illocutionary act which, in order to be felicitous, needs to observe a number of internal and external frame conditions; such illocutionary conditions are in fact openly thematized in legal and journalistic discourse where a clear separation between the words of the original speech act and the words of the reporter is taken for granted. Even if one concentrates on the rendering of *speech* rather than *thought* acts, however, neither reproduction nor content paraphrase in fact can be said to unproblematically 'represent' prior utterances. Not only can one observe a truly hair-raising sloppiness and disregard for reliable representation in the everyday oral language, which would be unthinkable for written genres. A more than cursory reflection on the bases of speech and thought representation in the complex processes underlying so-called representation indeed points up serious incompatibilities between the *doxa* of reproduction and reliable rephrasing and the *praxis* in the most dogmatically restricted areas of legal and journalistic discourse (Slembrouck 1992a).

We will do well not to introduce the notion of *mimesis* just yet, since this term, in its long history in Western culture, has undergone quite extensive revisions and would tend to complicate and further confuse the issues at this point.⁵ Let me concentrate first on the notion of linguistic *reproduction* and on the crucial *type/token* distinction. Reproduction of language in the medium of language is never an *actual*, *complete* reproduction but only the reproduction of an *ideal type*. Iterability, the possibility of repetition, intrinsically demands a correlation with the ideality of reproducible *form* in contrast to the individual not entirely reproducible substance of expression. The apperception of linguistic units operates in terms of ideal types, to which utterance tokens in speakers' active and passive linguistic performance are cognitively reduced. Linguistic reproduction of language in direct discourse should therefore not be characterized as mimicry or imitation, although the enunciation process of the reproduction may include elements of deliberate mimicry;

on the contrary, reproduction is a process of evocation, in which the ideal type signified by the 'original' utterance token is aimed at as the signified of the 'reproductive' token. The reproductive token therefore is identical *neither* to the original token (with which it shares only an ideal type/token identity), *nor* to the ideal type itself since types and tokens are situated on different theoretical levels and cannot ever be identical.

The entire issue of reproduction illustrates what Derrida has been teaching us since *Of Grammatology*: for two objects to be identical they need not be the same, since identity in the type implies a necessary difference in the tokens. If two tokens are identical as tokens they are the *same*, and the constitutive difference of identity has been erased. Functional or typological identity is in fact a feature of the *system* of language *per se*; it may be more obvious in the written language where identity is signalled by standardized printed letter shapes rather than by elusive phonological or semic identities. Indeed, written language illustrates the ideality of representation with particular force, especially in non-phonemic writing systems such as the Japanese combinatory syllabic and ideographic scripts. What is being represented in writing can only be characterized as an ideality of form in a new medium. What applies to writing applies perforce to translation and to the less august practice of paraphrase. Even in the most innocuous and banal uses of direct discourse in everyday colloquial narrative—reproduction at its most mimetic—the reproduction process unrolls by means of a constitutive typological *écart*, and this constitutive feature of typification, of a necessary derouting via the signifié, prepares the way for far-reaching linguistic experiments with saying the same differently and in one's own terms.

That reproductive direct discourse is in fact an idealization has been variously noted in the failure of direct discourse to reproduce 'incidental' phonetic or paralinguistic features of enunciation such as peculiar pronunciations, hesitations, slips of the tongue, etc. Nevertheless the ghost of verbatim reproduction has haunted the minds of linguists and literary scholars alike, if only as an idealized requirement in legal and journalistic contexts. The term representation is in fact less infelicitous than one might at first conceive once one excludes its *mimetic*, i.e. imitative, and *reproductive* overtones. If representation is seen entirely in terms of cross-medial *evocation* of material objects or objects of language—a statue representing a person or a painting representing nature—then representations of *linguistic* tokens in the *medium* of language short-circuit the definition because the same medium would seem merely to *reproduce* and not *represent*. However, as we have seen, this constitutes a superficial account of the workings of reproduction, which in fact displays the very same representational structure as painterly representation. In both cases the medium is exercised to create an impression of the original *idea*, and in both cases our realistic commonsensical notions identify that idea with the original *object* or *utterance*.

Represented discourse, just like graphic or sculptural representation, therefore depicts a semblance of identity or at least similarity by means of a by-route over the ideal signifié, with the result that typification—adequation to the *type*—becomes more important than mimetic *imitation*. Imitation iconically reposes on external resemblances, representation or signification of the same by means of a strategic recreation of signifying effect. Whereas imitation is constituted on the inherent difference of the same (the *imitans* must not become identical to the *imitatum*) and the sameness of the different (imitation has to be

recognizable as a copy of the original), representation, by contrast, involves a relation between signifier and signified, not between two signifiers (as in imitation). However, in so far as the process of signification is aided metonymically by external incidental resemblance, imitation serves an important enhancing effect in facilitating the evocation of the representational signifié. Typicality and mimetic resemblance are therefore complementary—or should I say *supplementary*?—aspects of discourse representation that cannot be intrinsically identified or necessarily conjoined, nor can one oppose them in a dichotomy or locate them at different ends of one scale. They are indeed situated on entirely different levels, yet can be conjoined as well as disjoined in textual practice. Most notably, a representational effect can be achieved *both* by an entirely new expression that shares only its signified with the original utterances *and* by a quasi-verbatim recreation of the original which banks on a maximum of ‘authenticity’.

Whereas mimetic resemblance can relate to the form of an utterance alone, typicality—it should moreover be noted—additionally and in fact primarily refers to the content. One therefore has to distinguish between a *formal typification* in speech representation which bares authentic utterance of its incidental marginal features (e.g. standardizing pronunciation) and a more radical kind of typicality that affects the content or signified, lifting the represented utterance out of its specific context of enunciation and transforming it into an icon, a situational vignette of ‘proper’ typicality.

Mimetic and typical qualities of represented discourse, however, are not inherent aspects of the linguistic material; they acquire their mimeticism or typicality from the relevant context, the generic and linguistic norms that are in force both in the represented discourse as well as in the representing quotational text. Even more radically, mimeticism and typification need to be recognized as rhetorical *strategies* of quotation and linguistic representation. In contrast to mimetic imitation, where mimeticism is a desideratum in its own right, representational art can be monitored and manipulated by the reporter for a variety of subsidiary effects and in correspondence with a number of discourse maxims and requirements. Since mimeticism in representation is an *effect*, a fiction of authenticity, its grounding in actual resemblances can be minimal.⁶ Indeed, an illusion of mimeticism can be generated by typically mimetic features of discourse, engineering an effect of typical authenticity that is the logical outcome of the reproductive paradoxon: since language cannot reproduce language in completely authentic fashion, representation has to recreate the known features of expressive utterance and when wishing to enhance the mimetic status of the represented discourse, this mimetic effect increasingly comes to rely on the deployment of typicalized ‘mimetic’ features and on their density and pervasiveness.

Not only can typicality therefore accommodate mimetic substance, mimeticism itself cannot be divorced from typicality. All reproduction is inherently typicalized, and its mimeticism has to be created by means of a fictional effect. Mimetic representation is always a semblance of imitation, a strategic creation of mimetic effect by means of typicalized mimetic material. This mimetic material can be said to consist in the well-known ‘expressive features’ that have been noted in free indirect discourse and uncovered as direct discourse by Banfield (1982). These lexical and grammatical aspects—which will receive ample discussion in [Chapter 4](#)—are ‘typical of’ direct discourse and therefore

lend themselves to being used as markers or signals of mimetic representation. Their typicality stems from their well-known frequency of occurrence in direct speech and from their adaptability to various contexts. They enable reporters not only to fabricate typical direct discourse but to signal mimetic verisimilitude in (free) (in)direct discourse. Reporters make use of expressive features in order to pretend to authenticity, to create an original utterance where there was none or to evoke a 'voice' effect in the discourse. And they do so in the interests of the conventional requirements of speech representation: authenticity, verisimilitude, verbatim faithfulness. Typification strategies that are openly *anti-mimetic*, on the other hand, either overdo the expressivity by a kind of overkill, self-reflexively drawing attention to the typicality of the mimetic element; or they stylistically complicate and discursively undermine what would be in principle acceptable as a verisimilar direct discourse representation.

We will have to sharpen our tools once more to understand the process of typification and its rhetorical purpose in the context of discourse representation. Typification, as we have seen, can relate to form *and* to content. It can also relate to an erasure of individuality—transforming what one person said in his or her own way into what just anybody might (typically) have said. Moreover, typicality can eventually come to erase differentiation itself, providing the common denominator between manifestations of the 'same'. Expressivity features are 'typical' in the sense that they obliterate the individuality of linguistic expression by condensing it into a standard (and hence undifferentiated) form. Yet in terms of their mimetic *effect* expressive features reinstitute a semblance of individuality (a figural 'voice'), which correlates with a scale of implied emotional intensity: the more expressive features there are, the more individualized the utterance and the more 'emotional' it appears to be. In its signalling function of emotionality, expressive language therefore contrasts with the neutrality, objectivity and coherence of the surrounding discursive presentation.

Typification and mimeticism, we have said, are rhetorical strategies and they become strategies only in their discourse contexts. Whereas legal texts require absolute verity in regard to the propositional content of reported utterances as well as inviting, if possible, verbatim reproduction, fictional texts on the contrary cannot stipulate a basic requirement of authenticity since they patently *invent* rather than *report* figural discourse and they are therefore free to *evoke* mimetic speech *effects* as a realistic discourse strategy. Telling a story allows the speaker to invent and fictionalize talk *ad libitum* and s/he is empowered to do so by the basic paradox of representation, its anti-mimetic typicality and typified mimeticism.

Figure 1 illustrates the major aspects and components of representation and of its correlation with typicality and fictionality. In it the linguistic system has a direct influence only on the formal linguistic types. Other representational features are determined by the pragmatics of discourse strategy, which is in turn dependent on its specific generic frame (a legal discourse strategy is decisively different from a narrational one). The generic frame also determines the speaker's commitment to cooperative maxims and the latitude for flouting these, and it directly determines the discourse effects which the text type envisages. Discourse strategies are rhetorical moves to implement or *evoke* the appropriate discourse effects, and these are then interpreted by the textual addressee as the 'meaning




Figure 1: Signification, discourse processes, generic frames

effects' of the representative tokens of the representation.⁷ As such they cannot be divorced from their generic frame, even if that frame touches them only in an indirect, mediated manner.

In contrast to the standard approach to speech and thought representation, my orientation is therefore radically anti-mimetic, i.e. anti-originary and antiimitative, foregrounding the invented quality of all representational processes and insisting on their consequent fictionalization. The title of the book has therefore been chosen with deliberation—reported discourse constitutes a fiction that language fabricates in accordance with discourse strategic requirements, whether these are brevity, poignancy, pithiness, verisimilitude, exaggeration, ironic over-characterization or, simply, truthful representation. Representation inherently includes fictionalization, and fictionalization, like all rhetoric, has its own interests, its strategies, its tendencies. One traditional way of saying this has been to consider all discourse representation as either mediated or 'framed', but mediation and framing are formal concepts and they need to be complemented with more specific stylistic, rhetorical and historical analyses of the precise functions of quotation, of the different purposes of typicality or pretended reproductiveness in represented speech and thought.

The outlines of this argument will appear with greater clarity in the chapters that follow where the more traditional aspects of *representational* discourse production will be screened and eventually discarded in their conventional frames. Chapters 8 and 9 will attempt to clarify how represented speech and thought can be incorporated in a model of discourse production that transcends the purely mimetic and originary conceptions of the linguistic system in the direction of the fictions created by language in the various languages which are at the disposal of literary fiction and naturally occurring conversational discourse.

NOTES

- 1 Besides Derrida's very interesting analyses of mimesis in *Dissemination* (Derrida 1972/1981) and the discussion to which this has given rise, one may also want to note the recent essay collections by Spariosu (1984) and Bogue (1991).
- 2 Bally's examples of the *figure de pensée* are usually ambiguous between narration and free indirect discourse. (Compare Bally 1914a, 1914b, 1930.) Empathy here refers to what Cohn (1978) has called the *consonant* presentation of figural perspective, in which the narrative espouses the figural attitude rather than ironically (*dissonantly*) distancing itself from it.
- 3 Compare below under (1.3).
- 4 The reader will find a more extensive debate with Stanzel's model and an attempt to radicalize its tenets in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*.
- 5 For two excellent discussions of representation that squarely address the issue of mimesis see Bal (1984) and Pavel (1985).
- 6 According to Goodman (1968) resemblance does not constitute a sufficient condition of representation (Pavel 1985:33–4).
- 7 In contrast to Thibault (1984:111) or various models by Dressler/de Beaugrande (1981) or de Beaugrande (1980) I refrain from specifying this schema too precisely because I believe

that one need not necessarily have a rigorous hierarchy between interacting levels and frames.

Contexts: the reporting of speech and thought acts

This is a chapter of contexts philosophical, linguistic, literary and narratological. Speech and thought representation has been an issue of central concern for a variety of very different disciplines, and an issue that was discussed under a number of titles specific to the concerns of those disciplines. The survey presented here is designed to locate phenomena of quoting and reporting in their multiple interdisciplinary perspectives and to demonstrate why they became such a problem within so many separate paradigms. The following presentation additionally aims at providing a frame of reference for the chapters that follow. On the one hand, the philosophical discussion constitutes a kind of *cas limite* of the problems of reported discourse—it, for instance, helps to explain some of the preoccupations of studies on indirect discourse by linguists such as Barbara Hall Partee (1973b, 1984) and other contributors of *Linguistics and Philosophy* (Dowty 1982, 1986; F. Heny 1981a, 1982; B. Richards 1981, 1982; P. Peterson 1982; Wreen 1989). Like deixis, the topics of speech representation and intensional logics have acquired a central, potentially disruptive relevance as truth-semantically marginal issues that are threatening to undermine the general applicability of truth semantics. For the present book, this philosophical perspective constitutes a horizon of my own inquiry, which centres on more linguistic and literary concerns. The philosophical perspective is so important because of its influence on several more narrowly relevant philosophical and linguistic studies which grew out of questions originally conceived within philosophy. Thus Castañeda's seminal work on consciousness and the self (Castañeda 1966, 1967a, 1967b, 1968) needs to be situated within a debate between philosophers of truth semantics.¹ Likewise, speech act theory, a philosophical discipline in its origins, developed directly from the insufficiencies of the truth-value analysis of what Austin then called 'performative' utterances. Even more specifically, the linguistic issue of deixis poses some crucial philosophical problems, and it is interesting to observe how, for instance, Jakobson departs from Peirce's remarks on Russell's ego-centric particulars (Jakobson 1956/1971). The philosophical debate about deixis and naming between Frege, Russell, Peirce, Strawson, Kripke, Quine, Putnam and others is regularly invoked by standard linguistic studies of deixis, as already by Bühler or Benveniste.

That quotation and report should thus be issues which challenge the concept of truth values and therefore of analyticity transfers the discussion about reporting others' discourse

on a meta-disciplinary plane, where inductive (linguistic) and deductive (truth-semantic) methodologies redefine each other's proceedings. Ultimately, linguistics then starts to restructure the philosophical discourse about language, and linguistic discourse in turn becomes aware of its methodological inadequacies. After all, the claim to describe language empirically entails the ability to step outside language. If one departs from the presupposition that our thought is structured by the very system of language that one seeks to analyse, then the observer's intrinsic relatedness to the object of observation is nowhere more apparent than in the linguistic attempt at an objective description of language. If linguistic empirical observation becomes feasible at all, it does so on the basis of users' concepts of (functional) difference and structural meaningfulness. Chomsky's reliance on informants' intuitions thus constitutes an ultimate baring of the devices of linguistic research—linguistic units have always been discovered empirically because users intuited their existence, and they did so because they felt that those units 'made a difference'.

Pragmatic research and discourse analysis have recently demonstrated the limits of prescriptive systematicity in linguistics, but even their apparently so unassailable empiricity (supported by computerized analyses of oral discourse) does not escape the snare of the observer's entanglement with the object of analysis. No linguistic analysis, not even the most scientific, can eschew the requirements of relevance (cp., for instance, Ducrot 1989, chs 5–6); description may be infinite, but the parameters of a truly valid characterization of oral discourse eventually reduce themselves to the very same dependency on what human ears and minds pick out as relevant. As in other disciplines (Einsteinian physics, post-Heisenbergian quantum mechanics, or medicine), empiricity here encounters both its limits and its ultimate self-determinacy. Models of language, like models of the universe, cannot but remain provisional theories that may help to explain, or help to direct, but can no more lay claim to an ulterior truth than can the theoretical systems of mathematics or medicine or astronomy. Language, like everything else, needs to be studied in its linguistic and human context. Recent developments in cognitive linguistics have in fact taken cognizance of this boundedness of language within cognitive parameters, proposing a 'natural' perspective from which language and cognition are structured in existentially relevant terms. Although such a model (see, for instance, Dressler 1989, 1990; G. Lakoff 1990; Langacker 1990) does not escape the 'binding' of subjectivity, it does account for human situatedness in language on the theoretical plane—certainly a major advance over non-pragmatic linguistics, which generates an illusion of empirical objectivity.

This is a book in which method and methodology are everywhere centrally at issue, and nowhere does this perhaps appear more clearly than in the approaches characterized in this chapter. Reported speech and the representation of consciousness are crucially central marginal issues which constitute a challenge for the respective disciplinary paradigms. Before considering the central side issue of free indirect discourse—a test case within the paradigm of speech and thought representation—we will therefore place the reporting of others' discourse within the frames that have hitherto been used to contain it and which it has reframed in turn.

1.1

DIEGESIS AND MIMESIS—LITERARY APPLICATIONS IN
THE GUISE OF GRAMMAR

I am starting my survey of contexts with the Platonic distinction between *diegesis* and *mimesis* (*Republic* III, 392D–394E), which closely correlates with the pre-linguistic analysis of direct and indirect discourse, *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua*. If I say *pre-linguistic*, I mean to suggest that no formal (linguistic) analysis of the direct and the indirect is provided in *The Republic*; this distinction is simply presupposed as intuitively present to Plato's audience. In fact Plato does not offer any grammatical definition of the direct and indirect; his terminology is entirely in terms of narration versus speeches, with 'impersonation' contrasted disfavouredly with the narrator's 'speaking in his own voice'. Plato's formulations have given rise to numerous conflicting interpretations, and the results of these can be observed today in narrative theory, in philosophy and even in basic linguistic analysis. If Plato's text did not in fact suggest any linguistic distinctions, the 'natural', intuitive linguistic interpretation of the classic passage helped to confer upon his statements the status of fundamental observation. As a consequence, later scholars have frequently been blinded as to the specificity and decidedly literary quality of Plato's remarks.

The narratological analogy between direct and indirect speech representation on the one hand and mimetic unmediated representation versus mediated summary by the narrator on the other derives directly from Plato's example text and has helped to confuse the issue of speech and thought rendering with the question of narrative representation and mediation in general. There are then—at least factually—two quite different areas that have become irretrievably bound up with each other: grammar, i.e. the different *linguistic* ways of representing speech; and the status of direct and indirect discourse in *narrative texts*, and their relation to the narrative instances involved (narrator, characters).

The confusion between these two levels or areas of application is entirely due to Plato's original example, the plea by Chryses to Agamemnon to release his daughter (*Iliad* I, 15–21). In the *Iliad* this plea is rendered in direct speech, whereas Plato transforms it into indirect discourse (393E ff.). The example is noteworthy on several counts. Although the attack against *mimesis* in *The Republic* is directed against the impersonation on stage of lower-class characters, Plato's illustration of *mimesis* is taken from the *Iliad*, a *narrative text* in which the notion of *mimesis* can ostensibly be argued to have shifted in signification. Secondly, in the example provided, the seer *addresses* Agamemnon, and the narratorial description of the utterance is therefore in terms of the illocutionary speech act of imploration: 'he prayed that'. Rather than a neutral 'He said that' the narrator's indirect representation of Chryses' plea utilizes a descriptive and semantically loaded paraphrase doubly removed from the original utterance.

The *Iliad* introduces this plea with an inquit phrase 'he made prayer' (*hísseto*) followed by direct speech. Plato's (Socrates') indirect discourse rendering, on the other hand, has *êúxeto* ('he wished') followed by an Acl (accusative with infinitive) construction that includes both Chryses' good wishes for the Greeks' speedy defeat of Troy, their safe

return home, and his wish that they would exchange his daughter for the ransom he has brought. Note that the Greek employs *one* verb ('to wish') both for the polite formality and the actual plea. Plato's rewriting of the passage then continues with Agamemnon's threat to Chryses (also given in direct speech in *Iliad* I, 26–32). This has two Acl constructions, one for Agamemnon's command to Chryses to leave immediately and the other for his refusal to release Chryses' daughter. True to the direct speech in the *Iliad*, the indirect representation mentions the sceptre and fillet of Apollo, who protects Chryses—that is to say, it mentions the metonymical symbols of his authority—and it also renders Agamemnon's chilling threat that Chryses' daughter will grow old as Agamemnon's concubine. However, in the indirect, the order of these two discourse elements is reversed. Moreover, except for the words *geráo* ('to grow old') and the sceptre and fillet of the god (*skêptron*, *stémma*), the vocabulary of the indirect rendering is changed as much as the syntax (from imperative to Acl and optative). Plato's example therefore fully conforms to the results of speech act analyses of indirect discourse (e.g. Ryan 1981b), according to which the indirect need only represent the illocutionary force of an utterance but not necessarily its propositional content, much less its lexical or syntactic material. In indirect discourse the reporter must not distort the import of the original utterance, but s/he can easily substitute his or her own language and linguistic structure for the original, if there was one. Beyond the slippage from dramatic to narrative mimesis, Plato's example therefore also explicitly touches on the issue of narrative mediation, of the narrator's position as source and guarantor for the story-universe.

Book Three of the same dialogue [*Republic*] does not reduce all literature to such a degrading function of representation (*mimesis*). Here Socrates distinguishes the poet's monologue, the characters' dialogue, and the alteration between authorial and figural speech as three styles of presentation (*diegesis*): the commendably pure, the dangerously mimetic, and their rather acceptable combination. The apparent contradiction points, I believe, to the dual nature of poetic discourse. Literature as an art is representation (*mimesis*) even though it can assume the style of straightforward, non-imitative presentation; literature as verbal discourse is presentation (*diegesis*) even though it can assume the style of mimetic representation. Attempting to grasp ideas as timeless, universal substances, the thinker in Socrates and Plato had to prefer the abstractive power of verbal presentation to the impersonating representation of particular events. Yet Socrates liked to convey his philosophical vision through imaginative parables, and Plato embedded those parables into the mimetic medium of dialogue. Their poetic method of philosophizing implies that verbal art, by representing action, also presents the verbal approximation of vision.

(Hernadi 1971b:18)

In the standard formulation of *diegesis* versus *mimesis*, *mimesis* is aligned with the imitation not only of speech but also of action. Both Genette and Chatman, for instance, regard an objective description of action as equivalent to a 'mimesis of events' (Genette

1980:164; Chatman 1978:33). Diegesis, on the model of indirect speech, is then aligned with narrative *mediation* (and, implicitly, *distortion*) of the primary events (including speech acts), and it highlights the narrator's subjective style and his or her (ideological, evaluative) point of view. Diegesis therefore potentially draws attention to itself *qua* narration. Although Genette and Chatman then go on to discuss speech and thought representation in greater detail, the dichotomy of diegesis vs mimesis tends to conflate not merely the grammatical issue of indirect vs direct discourse with the epic vs dramatic generic distinction à la Plato; on account of the privileged position which mimesis occupies, the diegesis/ mimesis opposition additionally suggests an equation of indirect speech with mediation *tout court*, and (since everything that is not mimetic is by definition adulterated) it ends up viewing narrative report of dialogue as intrinsically unreliable—a necessary evil.

There are two major confusions at work in this development. When Plato opposes narration (diegesis) to mimesis (imitation), he does so within a generic contrast of drama (all imitation) versus the dithyramb (all diegesis) and the epic (mixed), and the diegesis is here not simply 'narrative', but very explicitly the author's direct voice. For Plato, of course, does not distinguish between a narrator and the author, which is the only way that the narrator of the epic would become identified with the speaker of elegiac verse. In narrative theory Plato's distinctions have been forgotten, with the result that diegesis has come to signify narration, *per se*, that is to say the *narrator's* rendering of the story in everything except clearly defined discourse not attributable to this enunciator, i.e. the characters' directly quoted speech and thought acts. This schema makes it very difficult to conceptualize action (or, for that matter, description). Genette, in his discussion, concentrates on the *medium* of imitation as his primary concern, and he therefore excludes action from the realm of pure mimesis since only characters' discourse can be mimetically represented (by a quotation in direct speech):

In contrast to dramatic representation, no narrative can 'show' or 'imitate' the story it tells. All it can do is tell it in a manner which is detailed, precise, 'alive,' and in that way give more or less the illusion of mimesis—which is the only narrative mimesis, for this single and sufficient reason: that narration, oral or written, is a fact of language, and language signifies without imitating.

Unless, of course, the object signified (narrated) be itself language. [...] The truth is that mimesis in words can only be mimesis of words. Other than that, all we have and can have is degrees of diegesis. So we must distinguish here between narrative of events and 'narrative of words.'

(Genette 1980:164 [1972:185])

Chatman (1978:33), on the other hand, insists on the concept of a mimetic action report. He therefore counts 'objective' or 'un-narrated' renderings of events as belonging to the mimetic (non-diegetic) realm.² The consequence of this move is likewise to emphasize narration's quality of *mediation*, hence the term 'non-narrated' for direct speech

quotations. Both Genette and Chatman underline that original direct discourse becomes 'adulterated' in narrated transcriptions.

This is the position also shared by Stanzel in his *A Theory of Narrative* (1979/1984b) and by Cohn (1981) in her appreciation of it. Stanzel develops the genre distinctions to their last systematic consequence. All fiction is said to be *mediated*, whether it pretends to be unmediated or not. From this perspective scenic presentation ('showing') becomes a type of narrative mediation that *backgrounds* its diegetic quality, whereas 'telling' foregrounds the mediating role of the narrator. All is diegesis (and mediation) except embedded direct discourse, with the result that mimesis becomes both a more comprehensive and a more restricted issue. In fiction, mimesis of the fictional world is achieved *by means of* diegesis, but dramatic (properly mimetic) elements survive in the embedded (lower-level) quotation of figural utterances and thoughts. The emphasis is therefore reversed. Whereas Genette departs from the lamentable inability to represent action by means of language (and therefore limits mimesis to direct speech and thought report), Stanzel privileges the diegetic pole and restricts mimesis to a semblance of unmediated narration. This position is fully compatible with the specious authenticity of direct speech so masterfully outlined by Sternberg (1982a, 1982b) and indirectly corroborated by Tannen (1987a, 1987b, 1989).³

One will therefore have to position diegesis and mimesis on different levels. Diegesis as invention or projection of a fictional world (mimesis in the Auerbachian sense) spans all 'narrative' genres, all genres that tell a story: drama, fiction, film, epic, jokes... On the other hand, the specifically narrative, i.e. narrational, genres, in short those genres in which mimesis relies on the *medium* of language, have to be distinguished from drama and film, where the medium by means of which mimesis is achieved is not narration, i.e. a uniformly linguistic act, but a re-enactment of the plot in which the visual presentation dominates. In drama or film, mimesis of the fictional world is therefore achieved by means of the *medium* 'mimesis' (or re-enactment). (I here reiterate the standard narratological perspective, in contrast to Chatman 1990a.) From that perspective, the question of mimesis versus diegesis with regard to speech and thought representation can then be reduced to the various grammatical, stylistic and interpretational issues as relating to the mediating narrative. A central issue of this sort is the textual evocation of a narrator persona, whose strategies to reflect figural idiom in an idiosyncratic or slanted manner can then be noted. Most of the conundrums of speech and thought representation relate to precisely this question of narratorial mediation and distortion, also known as the issue of 'voice'. We will return to these questions below under (1.5), when the general communicational structure of narrative will be discussed, and in more detail later in [Chapter 6](#).

The origins of the misreadings of Plato's diegesis/mimesis distinction have been illustrated with great acuity by Irene de Jong (1989) in her analysis of the Greek text.⁴ According to her reading, Plato's critical terms can be diagrammed as follows, with indirect speech as part of the diegesis:

	<i>diegesis haplè</i>	<i>mimesis</i>
the poet speaks as	himself	one of the characters
in the	parts between the speeches	speeches

Narrative is here considered ‘pure’ or ‘simple’ (*haplè*), i.e. ‘single-voiced’ speaking, whereas in mimetic narration the narrator impersonates one of the characters, and the discourse therefore becomes double-voiced, dual or double-levelled. (This constitutes an interesting parallel to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of novelistic polyphony—Bakhtin 1984.)

In Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1448a and 1460a), on the contrary, the term *mimesis* does not refer to impersonation by means of direct speech, but already signifies the representation of fictional reality—much on the lines of Genette and other narratologists. In fact, de Jong even credits Aristotle with the anticipation of the technical narrator/author distinction (1989:7–8).

It should be noted in particular that the narratological tradition, in fact even the grammatical tradition on which it relies, terminologically and substantively tends to privilege direct discourse over its (free) indirect (also called *oblique*) equivalents. Plato’s original distinction, however, although it does not deny the possible mimetic adequacy of direct speech, privileges the narrator’s rendering of speech events. The narrator’s presentation is in a single voice; *mimesis* is characterized by a duality of discourse. Unlike the later sticklers for verbatim truth and those beholden to naïve literary concepts of imitation, Plato foregrounds a narratorial double-voiced strategy of quotation. One may want to note that in the mimetic passages it is the imitation of the characters *by means of* direct discourse rather than the imitation of their words which Socrates underlines to Adeimantus; Plato was very explicit about the entirely literary, fictional (and hence fictitious) nature of such discourse. If direct discourse imitates anything, it is the (raw) manner of expression which one expects from real speech—there is certainly no implication of an imitation of *actual* words or sentences.

It is precisely regarding this aspect that the linguistic reading of Plato has skewed the issue, and his term *mimesis* or imitation has consequently been taken much too literally. Meir Sternberg’s extensive rethinking of what one might perhaps call the politics and conventions of *mimesis* provides an important corrective to this naïve imitational approach. In Sternberg (1982b) the author elegantly and very perspicaciously presents five interpretative ‘package deals’ between the reader and the implied author. Thus the choice of direct speech in its capacity of mimetic discourse comes to signify (or imply) empathy, specificity, realism, stylistic distinctness or reproductiveness, and only the last of these actually allows a verbatim interpretation. Diegetic discourse, by contrast, tends to be read as distant, non-specific, non-realistic, stylized and paraphrased (Sternberg 1982b:111 *et passim*). Sternberg’s model provides a very clear indication of the complex interplay of cultural norms and reading conventions which influence the reader’s macro-structural integration of direct discourse within the textual interpretation. In a later paper (1983b) Sternberg extends his insights on the basis of an analysis of the Russian Formalist concept of *motivation*, integrating speech and thought representation with the general problematic of the mimetic-referential illusion of narrative in its entire spectrum from the realist to

the *vraisemblable* and the fantastic, and from the culturally and generically conventional to the ironically and parodically excessive.

In conversational discourse and legal-historical-journalistic argumentation the distinction between *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua* forms of reported speech is functionally crucial because such discourse puts a premium on truth, reliability and responsibility. Such frame conditions do not apply in narrative, at least as far as the narrator's speech act (s) is (are) concerned, and only the characters in their conversation among each other interact in full illocutionary responsibility. The narrator's reporting discourse, on the other hand, as part of a narrative text cannot be made to obey the same constraints as actual discourse. Not only is one here confronted with the question whether the narrator's tale *in toto* consists of *pretended speech* acts (Ohmann 1972, Searle 1974–75, B.H.Smith 1978) since they have no reference to the 'real' world. Even more importantly, one needs to ask whether the narrator's reporting acts are illocutionarily equivalent, on the one hand, to reporting acts by characters within the fictional world and, on the other, to such acts as practised by real speakers in everyday utterances whether oral or written (newspapers). Does fictionality, or lack of reference, influence the *function* of reportive speech acts?⁵ If this were in fact the case, any formal or purely linguistic analysis of speech and thought report would indeed become quite pointless. On the other hand, one can utilize the distinction between narrative and non-narrative texts, concentrating not on fictionality but on narrativity: the function of reportative forms of discourse could then be aligned with their narrative mode of existence. In this book no elementary dividing line is drawn between fictional and non-fictional texts, and the phenomenon of quotation and reporting clearly spans both oral and literary, fictional and non-fictional, narrative and non-narrative discourse. We will return to the specifically illocutionary issues in the following section under (1.2).

This is not the place to engage in a discussion of mimesis *qua* imitation and representation. Mimesis, as a literary concept, has recently attracted intensive re-evaluation by literary theorists (Bogue 1991). In particular, Derrida's profound meditations on the subject in the second part of *Dissemination* (Derrida 1972/1981) deserve emphatic mention. These deliberations go far beyond the now current recognition of mimesis as essentially falling short of a perfect representation of its original (since perfect reproduction would make the representation identical with its mimetic object). Derrida patiently probes the intricacies of this indispensable difference of the *imitans* from its origin (*imitatum* and *signifié*), and he creatively manipulates and stages the interplay between the notions of semblance, similarity, simulacrum, mirror and mime. (See also Gasché 1986:226 ff., 256 ff.) Derrida's choice of texts—Mallarmé's *Mimique* and Philippe Sollers's *Numbers (Nombres)*—is telling. More recent studies of mimesis have likewise turned to postmodernist texts for an illustration of the inherent paradoxes of the concept. In the present book, I will join the camp of those who emphasize the artificial and illusionary nature of textual representation, but my criticism will proceed from a more specifically linguistic perspective and eschew the treacherous depths and heights sounded by the Derridean critique.

1.2

INTENSIONALITY AND OPACITY: FROM TRUTH VALUES TO ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

Since Frege's (1892/1970) 'puzzle' (Salmon 1986) about the morning star and the evening star,⁶ philosophy has been concerned with the question of opacity vs transparency—or with intensional contexts, which are potentially opaque.⁷ The problem originally started out as an issue about the truth value of certain sentences within a framework of Russell's theory of descriptions. In a truth-semantic framework extensional (referential) equivalents such as *Tim Ruthers* and *Janet's father* should be substitutable.⁸ In actual contexts of use, however, referentially identical terms are not freely substitutable (in contrast to contexts of definition or other philosophical discourse). Transparency (the substitutability of extensionally equivalent terms) is threatened, particularly, in contexts of knowing, belief or intention—and this is precisely the kind of context that has been dubbed *intensional*.

(1) John believes that Ted Carroway is the manager of IBM.

In the transparent reading of this sentence John knows, and is therefore able to name correctly, Ted Carroway, but may be mistaken about his job. (1) therefore correctly renders a statement of belief on the part of John, and it does so because the sentence successfully refers to the same individual X about whom John has a certain belief y, namely that X is the manager of IBM. There are no truth-semantic problems with this sentence: it can be true or false, depending on whether the individual referred to, Ted Carroway, is or is not the manager of IBM. Both states of affairs (i.e. Ted's existence and the ascertainability of who is the manager of IBM, which of course include the presupposition that there is a company called IBM and that it has a manager) appear to pose no problems.

If this sentence, however, were opaque, then this referential correspondence would fail to materialize. If the reporter of John's belief characterizes the object of John's belief by naming him (for his listener) as Ted Carroway, but John holds his belief about a person whom he cannot identify by name or even takes to be somebody else, then the truth conditions of (1) become dangerously insecure. Whereas, in the transparent reading, the truth value of the subsidiary clause immediately determines the truth value of the reporting sentence (1), in the opaque reading that is no longer permissible. If John has his belief y about a certain person X, but this person happens to be Ted Carroway and *not*, say, Jeffrey Ridley (as John believes), then (1) is an incorrect rendering of John's beliefs and must be assigned a truth value of 'false'.

If, on the other hand, John's belief is that the man in the blue suit who has just been pointed out to him is the manager of IBM, and if this person (unbeknownst to John) is called Ted Carroway, then (1) is of course a correct rendering of John's belief because—as in the transparent reading of (1)—the propositional object of John's belief coincides with the referential subject of the subsidiary clause in (1), whose reference is determined

by the utterer of (1): it is the speaker of (1) who names or designates Ted Carroway referentially. The near-omnipotence of the speaker can be noted also in the possibility of contradiction between the speaker's evaluative reference to a designated object and the reported speaker's predication about that object, as in:

(2) Joan insisted that that genius was a fool.

in which Joan believes that X is a fool, but the speaker is responsible for characterizing X as a genius. Banfield (1982:54) has made use of this kind of example to argue for the univocality of indirect discourse.⁹ Note, however, that in *Harry said that his stupid brother is coming to town* the conventional reading is to attribute the characterization *stupid* to Harry and not to the reporter of Harry's dictum (McKay 1980:291).

So far, as in (1), the definite description (*the manager of IBM*) has been used within the predicate as a quality attributed to an individual named previously. However, the case can be complicated by placing in the position of X, John's object of belief, not a person who is deictically referred to by means of a proper name or by means of a pointed finger (*the man in the blue suit*) but a definite description of an individual whose identity may not be known or may even be indeterminate. This is called the *attributive* (rather than *referential*) use of the definite description (Donnellan 1966/1971, Cole 1978b, Hellan 1981).

(3) John believes that the manager of IBM is an agent of the KGB.

(This example correlates with Donnellan's famous example sentence *Tom thinks that the murderer of Smith is insane*.) Now in (3) John's belief may be *de re*, i.e. about the actual manager of IBM—and this is irrespective of whether he has talked about Ted Carroway' or 'the manager of IBM' as a definite description of Ted Carroway to his (John's) addressee. Another way of saying this would be to attribute to John a *de re* belief about Ted Carroway—ignoring what he actually *said* and what the speaker of (3) therefore renders by way of a belief *report*. On the other hand, John's belief may have been in the *de dicto* modality, i.e. he may have made a statement about the manager of IBM irrespective of who (referentially) this person actually is. *The manager of IBM* then ascribes a property to an indefinite entity X about whom it is propositioned that he is an agent of the KGB.

The problem here, then, is one of *scope* rather than truth value as such. In the one case, John holds a belief *concerning Ted Carroway*, in the other a belief *concerning the manager of IBM*, whoever that might be.

Besides the question of scope (transparency versus opacity)¹⁰ the philosophical literature on the topic has concentrated on *modality*, among which one distinguishes between *de re* and *de dicto* modality.¹¹ As Platinga (1969) demonstrates, the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* readings originally goes back to a philosophical problem not at all related to direct or indirect discourse but to the establishment of *essential* properties of objects. Platinga, who argues for the existence of essential (*de re*) properties of objects, discusses the origins of this question with Aristotle and Aquinas, and then proposes a logical formula that derives essential (*de re*) properties from accidental (*de dicto*)

properties. The link between these essentialist origins and the problems of indirect discourse can be established via the theory of descriptions and the problem of reference. If one starts referring to certain entities by descriptive terms rather than by other names (as is the case in much narrative literature and in much ordinary conversation), then the problem arises how the descriptors restrict reference to those—one wants to claim essential properties that belong necessarily to the object or person referred to. Thus if, in reference to Socrates, one used the descriptor *The man who drained the cup of hemlock to the dregs, or the husband of Xanthippe, or the snub-nosed one*, the problem of whether or not these attributes necessarily define Socrates becomes an urgent one.

Quine illustrates the pitfalls of this analysis (from a philosophic perspective) with his anecdote of Paul J. Swiers, who happens to be both a mathematician and a cyclist (Quine 1960:199).¹² As a cyclist Swiers is necessarily bipedal, but accidentally rational, whereas as a mathematician he needs to be essentially rational and only accidentally bipedal. From a logical perspective Swiers, *qua* human being, necessarily and essentially is both rational and bipedal, since these are common semantic features constituting the sememe 'human'.¹³ However, Quine is quite correct to voice his puzzlement at this state of affairs since in actual linguistic practice, when speaking or writing, reading or listening, we actually delimit the range of accidental properties in such a way as to enable identification of the correct referent. This is as much as to say that, given a context in which the interlocutors share an acquaintance of *two* Xanthippes, to refer to Socrates as the husband of Xanthippe will be imprecise and misleading. It will in fact constitute a violation of the maxim of manner ('avoid ambiguity') in the Gricean scheme (Grice 1975). Pragmatic considerations thus allow an easy resolution of the referential quandary into which logicians have brought themselves.¹⁴

So far the problems of referentiality and essentiality. There remains the meta-linguistic feature discovered in Quine's (and Platinga's) musings on the *de dicto* versions of various sentences. Now the *de dicto* concept is apparently meta-linguistic. In the first place, the *de dicto* 'the snub-nosed man' (in reference to Socrates) is *de dicto* since, *qua* descriptive term, it requires a speaker to enunciate this description with the function of making reference to the individual commonly referred to as Socrates. Such reference reflects the irreducible essentiality of the proper name as the designator of individuality. In spite of the discussion about essential properties, this concedes the underlying realization that individuals are most properly (and essentially) referred to by their proper names. Hence all other reference in descriptive terms is essentially accidental and opaque.¹⁵ For the purposes of our own concerns it need not puzzle us too much how propositions about propositions tie in with descriptors of the 'the snub-nosed man' type. What is essential for our purposes, however, is that both descriptors and the meta-linguistic level touch on the problematics of indirect discourse renderings.

The *de dicto/de re* distinction has been rejected by Searle (1979) in a move that builds on Donnellan's (1966/1971) article. Searle distinguishes between a primary and a secondary aspect of a proposition (which basically pattern with Donnellan's referential and attributive use of description). The primary aspect touches on the topic of the sentence (*About Jones, the sheriff believes he is insane*); the secondary aspect describes the predication. As Searle correctly points out, both the attributive and the referential beliefs

can be *de dicto* or *de re* (1979:160). Searle's most important contribution is to stress the independence of truth value from the *report* provided of it:

This is even more obvious in the case of statements. Consider the statements made by Ralph in utterances of 'The man I saw in the brown hat is a spy' and 'About the man I saw in the brown hat, he is a spy.' The truth conditions are exactly the same in each case. The reason the reporter can make a distinction that Ralph cannot make is that the reporter can decide how much of Ralph's belief he is going merely to report and how much he is going to commit himself to. In a *de facto* report he reports the entire content of the belief and does not commit himself to the existence of an object the belief is ostensibly about. In the *de re* report, of the sort we gave above, he reports only a fragment of the belief, expressed by 'is a spy', and commits himself to the existence of an object that the belief was ostensibly about, though not necessarily under the same aspect as Ralph. But Ralph is committed to the whole thing under his own aspects; that is what makes it his belief or his statement.

(Searle 1979:158–9)

I will here break off rehearsing the technicalities of the matter. Similar definite descriptions have haunted the literature on the *de dicto* and *de re* modalities. Besides Donnellan's *The murderer of Smith is insane* there is the famous *The next president of the United States will be a Republican*, and sentences that predicate desired qualities of objects one wishes for, is in search of or imagines to exist: *I am looking for a secretary who is able to type letters in Arabic; In the town which I imagine there is a physician who collects butterflies*.¹⁶ Such examples bear an unmistakable resemblance to anaphoric problem sentences on the lines of the famous 'donkey' pattern: *Everybody who owns a donkey beats it* (B.Richards 1981).¹⁷ Strawson's *The present king of France is bald* (Strawson 1971), like *the next president*, shares some of the imaginary reference with literature and other language games.

In the examples outlined so far one can observe a few striking qualities that have immediate relevance for the analysis of reported discourse, particularly of a literary kind. It will be noted that almost all the examples are—syntactically—instances of subsidiary clauses, most commonly of indirect speech or thought (belief) report. The transparency/opacity or *de re* vs *de dicto* reading has important repercussions only if framed within a superordinate clause. That most discussions about *de dicto* and *de re* readings concern indirect speech is never really addressed by the philosophic literature, although the term indirect speech surfaces at times (Davidson 1968–69:134). A rare exception is Searle (1979), who recognizes that in a report one is more likely to rely on a primary aspect reference by means of a *de dicto* modality, because the *de dicto* locution is pragmatically relevant, whereas one would tend to paraphrase a secondary aspect (*de re*) description into primary aspect. Yet even Searle appears to be blind to the fact that he keeps presupposing an actual original utterance, whereas the whole point of the *de dicto/de re* quandary is the *inaccessibility* of that original utterance which therefore *gives rise to incompatible readings and interpretations* of the report. Secondly, there is an obvious interference between pragmatic

adequacy of a specific speech report (what I have earlier called a 'correct' rendering of the original utterance) and the truth value analysis: the communicational context which philosophers of truth value so strenuously exclude can no longer be relegated to the irrelevancies of language use—it centrally determines the truth value of indirect complement clauses. (The situation is then comparable to the philosophical analysis of deictics, where the context of utterance likewise cannot be excluded from consideration.)

Moreover, the direct parallel between fictionality and some of the examples so extensively analysed in the literature does not receive adequate attention. Castañeda (1966, 1967) is the only one who has insisted on the importance of distinguishing between people's beliefs within their own mental frame and the statements *about* such beliefs which are the staple of standard philosophical example sentences. We will return to this crucial insight below under (1.4). The parallel with fictionality is even more striking in the sentences predicating properties of desiderata—in these the object so described frequently has no immediate existence except as in the mind of the predicating speaker. It is, one can argue in a linguistic strain, no coincidence that such sentences should employ a subjunctive in the Romance languages (*Il cherche un appartement quit ait une belle vue sur la Seine*) and that they frequently entail the use of a desiderative formula in others (for instance in Germanic *sollen/should* expressions or in Japanese *deshoo/daroo* constructions). This complex state of affairs is partly, but not entirely, reflected by the distinction between *extension* (i.e. reference, equivalent to Frege's *Bedeutung* or denotation) and *intension* (that is to say Frege's *Sinn* or 'sense'—the intended meaning of an expression).

What is most lacking from the classic studies of opacity is a philosophical discussion about the status of referential expressions within actual contexts of utterance. As has recently been observed with great acuity, propositions have truth values only within contexts of conventional pre-understandings about functional adequacies of the discourse—adequacies that may be described in terms of a theory of relevance (Sperber/Wilson 1986). For example, in an everyday 'definition' of a whale, the formula *the biggest fish* would be biologically 'false' but contextually felicitous if uttered to persons unacquainted with the concept *mammal*. Thus, where it is already acknowledged that a certain level of mutual knowledge and speaker's interest significantly determine the choice of propositions including, specifically, the choice of definite descriptive terms, indirect discourse becomes an important example of the shaping forces of communicational parameters in their determination of the production and processing of *utterances*.

- (4) We shook hands, and October said, smiling, 'You may like to know that Inskip thinks you ride extraordinarily well for a stable lad. His exact words were that he didn't really trust men with your sort of looks, but that you'd the hands of an angel.'

(Dick Francis, *For Kicks* [1973]; quoted Sternberg 1982b: 151)

- (5) S2 [the reporter] kann auch den Inhalt einer Äußerung von S1 [the reported speaker] so wiedergeben, daß ihn A1 [*sic!*]¹⁸ in seinen Verstehenshorizont einordnen kann. Wenn S1 gesagt hat 'Karl hat einen Ödipuskomplex, kann S2 einem Achtjährigen den Inhalt dieser Äußerung so wiedergeben 'S1 sagte, Karl habe seine Mutter sehr lieb.'

(Bähr 1986:203)¹⁹

Bähr claims that one can posit intersubjectively valid rules regulating the use of singular terms, i.e. proper names and definite descriptions in the relevant contexts.²⁰ He relates the choice of singular terms by the reporting speaker to that speaker's intentions and aims and to his or her responsibilities towards the addressee (1986:200–8).

The pragmatic inadequacies of the truth semantical approach have already been recognized even within philosophy and have helped to introduce some considerations of actual language use. This development can be associated with the name of John Austin, the inventor of speech act theory. Within its philosophical frame speech act theory constitutes a development of the theory of ordinary language. Whereas Russell and the school of ordinary language philosophy in general have attempted to analyse the logics of actual language use, operating on the kind of propositions that we have encountered above, Austin recognized the crippling effect of looking at utterances *qua* propositions and suggested instead that some (and, later, all) utterances be regarded as speech *acts* that do not merely assert ideas but also *effect* changes in the world. According to Austin (1955/1980) one currently distinguishes between three types of speech act—the locutionary act, i.e. the utterance as such; the illocutionary act, which correlates with illocutionary force; and the perlocutionary act, which relates to the *effect* of the illocutionary act. The illocutionary act constitutes the centrepiece of speech act theory, since it derives from Austin's discovery of the *performative*. An illocutionary act, such as promising, commanding, threatening, asking, legally marrying, naming a ship, etc., consists in somebody *saying* something and thereby performing an act, *doing* something. The perlocutionary effect then pertains to the situation achieved in the addressee by means of the illocutionary act. The perlocutionary act does not necessarily refer to the locutionary act (Austin 1980:102–28). By threatening Y, X *intimidates* Y; by insulting Y, X *offends* (or *mortifies*) Y.²¹ Austin makes two important observations about the differences between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts: illocutionary acts are conventional, but the effect of perlocution is not conventional. Secondly, illocutionary speech acts take their effect through their very utterance: 'in saying B' one achieves an illocutionary effect. Perlocutionary effects, on the other hand, are achieved '*by* saying B' (Austin 1980:103, 107–8, 121).

Now it has been recognized for quite some time that indirect speech preserves not the original wording of an original (direct) utterance but merely its propositional and illocutionary content. (See, for instance, Ryan 1981b.) Thus, *He said 'I'll be there tomorrow'* can become *He said he would meet X the next day*, and *He said 'I'll smash your nose'* may be reported as *He threatened to smash X's nose*. In the literature on speech acts illocutionary acts are commonly identified with indirect discourse clauses (*He promised to—/He commanded him to—*); the propositional content of the original utterance then becomes of secondary importance. Linguistic scholars such as Ducrot (1984) and Ninio (1986) have criticized Searle's easy transition from *I promise to do X* to *Y promised to do X*.²² In their view this constitutes an unreflected and unwarranted transferral of a term from the everyday language to the linguistic metalanguage of speech acts. As Ninio remarks,

To say that the term *promise*, for example, describes such and such an act (or the force of such and such an act) is to be engaged in a type of description which consists of sense giving: Here a certain type of phenomena is matched to a name. To say that a certain utterance is a promise (or has the force of a promise) is to engage in a different kind of description, namely name giving. In the latter, a certain phenomenon is fitted with a name. We owe the distinction to Austin himself (1961).²³

(Ninio 1986:130)

What is even more noteworthy here is the incongruity between the indirect discourse (which is fairly uniformly a statement of the illocutionary nature of the original utterance) and the many possible underlying locutionary acts. Not only can a promise be conveyed by numerous utterances (*I will be there tomorrow; I promise to do X; I'll come, don't worry; How could I not show u the party of the year?*), but the same utterance can have different illocutionary forces—*I'll be there tomorrow* can also be a threat.²⁴

Ninio deals with such examples by distinguishing between illocutionary acts on the one hand and meta-meaning components on the other. The meta-meaning component of an utterance would then be 'the sum total of the illocutionary points of the acts *S* [the speaker] can be said to have performed in making that utterance' (145). Illocutionary *verbs* then become a category of lexemes that can be employed to score very different illocutionary points. For instance, a person's reply to a question about her name may be described as *Sarah replied to my question* or *Sarah told me her name* (Ninio 1986:144), and these renderings 'refer to two different meta-meaning components of the same utterance'.

The distinction between the propositional and the illocutionary in terms of indirect discourse rendering can indeed be revised to stipulate that indirect discourse adheres to the propositional content of the locutionary speech act only as long as this does not endanger the transmission of the illocutionary meaning of the utterance. If one rendered *I wonder would you be kind enough to close the window* by *She wondered whether he would be kind enough to close the window*, then this is, strictly speaking, an unreliable rendering in indirect speech, since *She wondered whether* refers to a thought act, and there is no rumination involved in the original.²⁵ A similar slip of Austin's is shown up by Searle (1979:9), where he argues that *to intend cannot* be considered a speech act; only *to express an intention*. In indirect discourse, the illocutionary force of an utterance therefore takes precedence over its propositional content. Literary texts frequently play with this expectation of illocutionary faithfulness, for instance by echoing a propositionally verbatim formulaic utterance where a brief illocutionary statement would have been more appropriate:

- (6) Paul, looking at it [the invitation], found, in copper-plate print, with the exception of his own name and the date, which were in Mr Feeder's penmanship, that Doctor and Mrs Blimber requested the pleasure of Mr P.Dombey's company at an early party on Wednesday Evening the Seventeenth Instant; and that the hour was half-past seven o'clock; and that the object was Quadrilles. Mr Foots also showed him, by holding up a companion sheet of paper, that Doctor and Mrs Blimber

requested the pleasure of Mr Toots's company at an early party on Wednesday Evening the Seventeenth Instant, when the hour was half-past seven o'clock, and when the object was Quadrilles.

(*Dombey and Son*, xiv; Dickens 1985:257–8)

As regards perlocutionary acts, these constitute even more of a puzzle. Very few of Austin's illocutionary acts have a perlocutionary effect, as Searle already remarked (Searle 1969:46; 1979:3). What, for example, could be the perlocutionary effect relating to commands, promises or questions? Of course one can always find some sort of description 'By commanding X to do Y, Z *made* X do Y'; 'By asking X a question, I *elicited* an answer from X'; 'By promising to be at the wharf, X made an appointment/engaged his honour/made Y happy.' Austin in fact distinguishes between contexts where one can speak of a perlocutionary *object* (*convince*, *persuade*) and those where the concept of a perlocutionary *sequel* seems more appropriate (*command*, *ask*). The examples Austin uses to illustrate perlocution are linguistically equivalent to what is usually called *speech report* (see under (5.4.2)), yet this equation does not work fully on either linguistic or structural grounds.²⁶ Whereas the illocutionary act is defined in terms of an act that the speaker *performs*, the perlocutionary act is defined in terms of an *effect* on the *addressee*. This is particularly odd since even *indirect* speech acts (*It is hot in here* for 'Please open the window') still relate to *the meaning* of the speech act (although this meaning is determined by the addressee on the basis of conversational implicature—Grice 1971) and by no means to *its effect* whether incidental or predetermined. The second inconsistency lies in the kind of effect achieved by various speech acts. Thus an argument (the illocutionary force of a constative speech act) may elicit a counter-argument, as an order will usually (if felicitous) elicit the obeying of the command. Such effects are (speech) *acts*. *Intimidation*, on the other hand, is a purely psychological effect, and it is not a *logical* or *necessary* consequence of the threat supposed to trigger this feeling: the addressee can react by a counter-threat, shrug her shoulders (thus refusing to be intimidated) or accept the threat as a challenge: *I dare you*. Austin therefore rightly insists on the non-conventional nature of perlocutionary effects. Although most of these reactions are verisimilar and even in some measure predictable, the reason for this expectation should, however, be related to a script notion of events (Schank/Abelson 1977) and has nothing to do with either the original utterance or its illocutionary force. If an utterance has an illocutionary force it will necessarily elicit a reaction on the part of the addressee, but the addressee can refuse a demand, disobey an order and challenge a proposition, and s/he can react to the perlocutionary effect instead of the illocutionary speech act: *Can you make any more mistakes than that?! (criticism/accusation)*; *Look, I'm sorry, I did not get a chance to study for this exam (excuse/defence)*.

Two consequences can be drawn from this. Perlocutionary acts are not defensible terminological entities. Secondly, Ducrot's and Ninio's arguments need to be embraced not only for direct but also for indirect speech acts, and they should certainly include all non-constative speech acts as well as their indirect equivalents.²⁷ One would also need to pay more attention to speech acts that are not addressed to people or do not allow a

reaction of any sort: *I here with name this ship 'The Leaf-Bearer'; I herewith declare the exhibition opened; I herewith declare you to be man and wife.* As has been noted repeatedly such speech acts are felicitous only when performed by the right kind of functionary under the correct circumstances. They moreover achieve a *result* (the ship is named, the exhibition open to the public, the couple married) which, being institutional, is as much beyond the ken of an individual agent as its original source.²⁸ In such cases a distinction between enunciatory, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts breaks down entirely, as do the formal distinctions between indirect speech and speech report: *He declared the exhibition opened/He opened the exhibition; He declared them man and wife/He married them.*

What conclusions can one draw from these philosophical and speech act discussions of indirect discourse? Both parties are overly preoccupied with the original utterance, and understandably so since their examples are from non-fiction. Both camps concentrate on the truth-preserving qualities of indirect discourse. The earlier *de dicto/de re* distinction (with its intensional variety) registers the existence of ambiguity. Speech act theory, on the other hand, is able to resolve this dichotomy by aligning the *de re* reading with a rendering of the utterance's illocutionary force: Ralph, the original speaker, pointed out the man in the brown hat as the person to whom he ascribed certain properties, and this man in the brown hat, in the knowledge or belief system of the reporter and his addressee, can be identified as Mr. Orcutt. The *de dicto* reading, on the other hand, preserves merely the propositional content of the original utterance. However, to be a reliable reporter, this propositional content must not contradict the knowledge and belief of the reporter because, in reporting the utterance, s/he is constrained to provide the maximally relevant information. As one knows from jokes and all kinds of subterfuge, the reporting of utterances in their *de dicto* shape, withholding personal information that would throw an entirely different light on the proceedings, is a frequent ploy that allows one to be literally truthful while at the same time managing to avoid telling the complete truth.

The conclusions that have been drawn from the results in the philosophical arena are one-sided in interesting ways. Although illocutionary verity is conventionally expected from indirect discourse, this requirement can be undermined, by ignorance if by nothing else. In certain contexts the illocutionary force has indeed to be distinguished from after-the-fact information. Thus, in the famous *Oedipus said that his mother was beautiful*—in which *his mother* needs to be the reporter's remodelling of *Iocasta*—the report misrepresents the original illocutionary force since Oedipus was of course as yet unaware of Iocasta's identity. This example is particularly relevant to the narrative concerns of this book because in narrative, too, one frequently encounters a narratorial retrospective evaluation and reinterpretation. In this way 'Oedipus married his mother' is a perfectly sound after-the-fact summary but one that collapses the crucial story-internal coordinates with the retrospective identifications. What we have here, then, is a context in which the intensional reading needs to be preserved in a *de dicto* manner in order to allow for the preservation of story-meaning. This kind of temporal dichotomy, and the problems of truth value that it introduces, have been neglected by philosophers because they were interested in timeless and non-contextual propositions. Indirect report, of course, has a responsibility to be relevant to the concerns of the situation of utterance, yet it is also free

to (and sometimes, as in narrative, constrained to) introduce opacity in the form of *de dicto* locutions. Rather than *uniformly* echoing the reporter's metalanguage, indirect discourse—and not only in fiction—sometimes provides us with more than a flavour of the reported utterance, shifting from extension to intension.

1.3

THE LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORK OF DEIXIS: BÜHLER, BENVENISTE, WEINRICH, LANGACKER

Besides the more conventional philological background to the accounts of the direct/indirect speech dichotomy another important backdrop to the present discussion is deixis, an area of both linguistic and philosophical concern.²⁹ In this section I want to point out some of the basic ways in which deixis impinges on the linguistic properties of narrative—whence its importance for the study of free indirect discourse. I will also briefly outline how deixis connects with the linguistic expression (or, should one say, evocation) of subjectivity, a topic that will centrally concern us in the discussion of free indirect discourse in Chapters 4 and 7.

Deixis concerns those elements of linguistic expression which 'point' to referents, speech participants, temporal or spatial givens as well as to other linguistic expressions. Typical deictics are the personal pronouns *I* and *you*, the (morphologically defined) class of demonstratives (*this*, *that*), a certain class of adverbs of time and space (*here*, *now*, *last week*), all of which directly refer to extra-textual entities, locations, or points of time (Halliday/Hasan's *exophoric* reference). Deictics are also used to refer to *discourse-internal* entities (with *discourse* comprising utterances as well as written texts), and, in this function, one variously speaks of 'textual deixis' (Ehlich 1982, 1983; Sennholz 1985 [*Textdeixis*]), 'endophoric' (anaphoric or cataphoric) reference (Brecht 1974, Halliday/Hasan 1976) or 'discourse deixis' (Fillmore 1971): *the former*, *the latter*, *in the next paragraph*, etc. There is some terminological overlap between the concept of deixis and the concept of anaphora. Some theorists have decided to include anaphora with deixis (as, e.g., textual deixis); others distinguish between deictic and 'phoric' processes (Harweg 1968). Deixis can also be separated from the referential function *per se* (Fludernik 1991b), which is not intrinsically deictic, not directly anchored in the *here* and *now* of the current speaker.

Anaphora will play an important part in our discussion of sequence of tense and the referential properties of free indirect discourse. (See below, in Chapter 3.) For the purposes of this study a very clear distinction is being made between deixis on the one hand, and demonstrative morphology (deictics) or phoricity (anaphora and cataphora) on the other. In spite of this initial distinction, some interesting blurring of that dichotomy will be discovered in the use of the basically anaphoric personal pronoun and in the 'shifted' preterite, which—in specific contexts—can become a signal of subjectivity, in correlation with a *deictic centre*. (Compare below under (1.4) and (3.5).)

The basic distinction between deictic and (ana)phoric processes can be illustrated by the following pairs of sentences:

- (7) a. Don't go over **there**. The bull might attack you.
 b. Have you been to London yet?
 No, I haven't yet been **there**.
- (8) a. **This man** came into my office.
 b. John told me about an old acquaintance of his. **This man** apparently has a lot of problems with his boss.

In the (a) sentences above *there* and *this man* indicate a place and person from the speaker's perspective. This perspective has been analysed by K. Bühler (1934) as the centre of the I-originary of the speaker, his or her *ego-hic-et- nunc*. It is in reference to the enunciator's *hic* that the place is *over there* (and not *over here*), and that s/he uses *this man* (rather than *that man*). In the anaphoric (b) examples, on the other hand, the perspective of the speaker has been neutralized. Like the anaphoric pronoun *he* in

- (9) I happened upon Ralph. *He* was just tinkering about in the kitchen.

there in (7b) establishes co-reference with the location introduced in the previous sentence and merely fills a position within the valency structure of the verb. In the same manner, *this man* in (8b) fulfils an invaluable cohesive function in the context, establishing co-reference with the new topic introduced in the previous sentence. The anaphor *he*, on the other hand, would have co-indexed with the subject of the previous sentence, *John*, and would therefore have continued the topic of John's activities.³⁰

Deixis in its establishment of a subjective deictic centre includes not merely demonstrative pronouns, spatial adverbs (*left, right, behind (me/X), in front of*) and a huge number of temporal adverbs (ten years *ago, last Friday, tomorrow*), but also verbal categories (*come/go, bring/take*), honorifics and humble expressions. The last two categories are infrequent in the languages on which I concentrate in this study but very common in others, as for instance in Japanese. Among deictic phenomena also need to be included relational designations (*the enemy* for one's own enemy, father, *boss*) and various kinds of intimate address (*daddy*).

Since properly deictic elements are linked to a deictic centre, i.e. a *hic et nunc* of a SELF (speaker or consciousness), the need arises to have non-deictic equivalents for non-subjective circumstances. As a consequence, most languages have two parallel sets of expressions (deictic versus non-deictic or anaphoric):³¹

today	aujourd'hui	heute	that day	ce jour-là	an diesem/jenem Tage
yesterday	hier	gestern	the day before	la veille	am vorhergehenden Tage
tomorrow	demain	morgen	the next day	le lendemain	am darauffolgenden Tage
next week	la semaine	nächste	the following	la semaine	in der darauffolgenden
	prochaine	Woche	week	suivante	Woche

The deictic expressions establish an 'absolute' chronology in reference to the enunciatory deictic subject; the anaphoric expressions relate to an earlier reference point in the discourse. That earlier reference point was of course originally defined by the speaker's *hic et nunc*. Besides such anaphoric relational references, one can also distinguish absolute

calendar reference (*on August 5, 1874*), in which the reference is only mediately or implicitly deictic, as well as the vaguer indefinite referential expressions such as *one day*, *on a spring day*, etc., which Harweg (1975a) has called ‘adeictic’.

Two kinds of deixis which straddle the distinction between the relative and the absolute (the anaphoric and the deictic) need to be noted here briefly. One is ‘displaced’ deixis (Brown/Yule 1983:53) or ‘analogic’ deixis (Sennholz 1985), as in *here on this map*. Displaced deixis can be integrated with the second deictic phenomenon, Bühler’s *Deixis am Phantasma* (‘deixis relating to an imaginary origo’). Bühler distinguished between three uses of an imaginary deictic centre (1934:133–9). In the first, one imaginatively transfers an object into an imaginary or imagined space and attempts to see how it fits into this realm. The speaker acts as an observer who tries to imagine the object in relation to other objects of the space realm into which it is transferred. In the second case, the speaker transfers his or her own origo to a different locality, as in a guidebook description where one is told what is to one’s left or right. The speaker reads the imaginary space in terms of his or her own deictic body position. Case two, which Bühler metaphorically names ‘Muhammad coming to the mountain’, is the standard case for ‘literary’ empathy, or for imaginative reliving of the past:

- (10) Jacob *looked about himself* and saw the old men swaying slowly to and fro in prayer. For a moment it seemed to him as if his father were standing by his side. He could see him clearly—the long, black caftan, the grizzly beard, the little bluish-black skull-cap. *And there he was himself*, a small boy in short trousers, a bit restless, his thoughts wandering away from the prayers.

(*The Rich Man*; Kreisel 1985:104)

In his vision of himself at prayer when he was still a boy Jacob transfers himself into the synagogue and perceives the men from his transferred body position. In Bühler’s third case of *Deixis am Phantasma* two deictic positions are related to one another (rather than conflated as in cases one and two): the speaker remains at his original position, but at the same time imaginatively points towards the position of the object. In the above quotation, Jacob distances himself from the scene to observe his former self ‘over there’. Bühler’s classic example was his question to his students in the lecture hall in Vienna where in relation to their position in the lecture room they would locate St Stephen’s Cathedral. This third case of *Deixis am Phantasma* is close to analogic deixis because the students would have to transfer themselves imaginatively onto a map of Vienna (case two) and then locate St Stephen’s from the direction of the university building. Sennholz treats cases two and three of *Deixis am Phantasma* as special types of analogic positional deixis (‘analogische Körperstellendeixis’—1985:86).

All the above relates to deixis in its primordial, central shape—pointing out textual or extra-textual referents. In a seminal paper on *then* and *now* Bronzwaer (1975) has contributed greatly to our understanding of the complex *textual* functions of deictics by illustrating a variety of discourse uses of deictics. These include the foregrounding or propelling of narrative action (close to a discourse marker function—Schiffrin 1987), the

shifting from the enunciation level (*now*) to the story level (*then*), and marking story-time as such in deictic and anaphoric terms. Bronzwaer's findings crucially demonstrate the failure of 'pure' linguistic analysis which does not consider the interaction of several discourse levels (the enunciatory level, the story level, the argumentative process, the evocation of subjectivity in the text). A good example of such a discourse function has been noted by Costa (1972:42):

- (11) Since public protest had been so slight, the CIA concluded that there was now no need for them to find a legal cover for the coup.

Now (which is preserved in the indirect version) cannot be replaced by *then*, but only by *at that point* or similar expressions relating to a causal or developmental sequence unrelated to plot. (*Then*, as Bronzwaer demonstrates, has a high correlation with the movement of time on the plot line, and it is frequently used in the function of anaphoric backgrounded *at that time*.) The dichotomy of deictic and anaphoric uses of deictic phenomena can therefore at best serve as a general guideline; their uses and functions are determined by contextual factors, and particularly by discourse level considerations.

Deixis has received extensive analysis since Brugmann's (1904) and Bühler's (1934) original formulations, and it is therefore impossible to provide a thorough introduction to the topic in this place.³² For the purposes of the present discussion the central importance of deixis within the temporal system requires attention, and I will now turn to the contributions of Benveniste and Weinrich, who have critically influenced the analysis of narrative tense. This brief overview has to ignore the very extensive literature on the (English) temporal system.³³ The connection between deixis and morphology is made most emphatically in the three authors I have named, and they additionally adumbrate a discussion of tense in terms of *parole* (or pragmatics) rather than pure *langue*, which is of immediate relevance to the concerns of this book. In particular these studies belong to the camp of the functionalist approach to (morphological) tense, rejecting an inherent 'present' meaning of the present, or 'past' meaning of the preterite.³⁴

Émile Benveniste's discussion of pronouns and tenses in his *Problems in General Linguistics* (1966/1971) centres on the French temporal system and on its Latinate and Romance equivalents. Benveniste clearly distinguishes between, on the one hand, the first and second persons (designating the speaker and addressee) and, on the other, the third person, which is 'impersonal'. In third person contexts the designated process or event rather than its enunciator are emphasized: *volat avis*, according to Benveniste, is equivalent to 'it flies (the bird)', foregrounding the perception of flight and not the agent (1966:231; 1971:200). Benveniste regards the second person as a mirror image of the first in a symmetrical reversible relationship of verbal interaction. This distinction between the deictics *I* and *you* and the third person becomes functional in the area of texts and their temporal make-up. In his nineteenth chapter Benveniste proposes to discuss the French temporal system as a set of two separate realms, those of *discours* and *histoire*. *Discours* implies the presence of a speaker and an addressee and employs the present tense system: the default tense is the present tense, with anteriority designated by the *passé composé*,

posteriority by the future tense. This system prohibits the introduction of an aorist, the *passé simple*. The second temporal system, that of *histoire*, on the other hand, is centred on the aorist as its basic tense, and employs the conditional for posteriority and the *passé antérieur* (instead of the *plusqueparfait*) for anteriority. The *discours* system can compensate for the lack of the aorist by creating the *sur composé* forms. On the basis of this paradigm Benveniste separates everyday conversation from *writing*, particularly historical writing (and the traditional third person novel).

This schematic split has been of seminal importance for both Weinrich (1964/1985) and Banfield (1982). It should therefore be pointed out immediately that Benveniste's influential dichotomy—enlightening as it is for the linguistic structure of the French *langue*—fails to take account of various aspects of language and runs into some serious problems when applied to actual texts.³⁵ In addition, since Benveniste's discussion centres entirely on French with little regard for the temporal system in other languages, the model's applicability and general validity can be doubted. Weinrich, although a Romance scholar, is more circumspect in this regard. He also discusses some German and English examples, even if his theory as such is based on Benveniste's model and concentrates on the Romance languages. The failures of Benveniste's dichotomy, which I can only briefly rehearse here, touch on the practical consequence of positing an absolute dichotomy. Thus, the person/ non-person opposition, although it helps to illuminate some (historical) linguistic factors, devotes too little attention to the gradational deictic effect of personal pronouns vs third person reference on the scale of proximal, medial, and distal deixis (Frei 1944, Fillmore 1974; see also Fludernik 1991b). Even more importantly, Benveniste's theory is quite unable to deal with the occurrence of a first (or second) person pronoun in narrative, whether in reference to a personalized hetero-diegetic (third person) narrator (as in Fielding's *Tom Jones*), or a fictional homo-diegetic (first person) narrator, who likewise narrates in the *passé simple*.³⁶ Benveniste's *histoire* category is an idealist concept and not consistently relevant in terms of the empirical data.³⁷

Benveniste's conception of the aorist as a 'historical' *tempus* somewhat overlaps with Hamburger's proposition that the past tense in *fiction* signals fictionality rather than (deictic) anteriority (Hamburger 1953, 1957/1968/ 1973).³⁸ Hamburger's theory of the 'epic' preterite is, interestingly, based on *German* texts and therefore free of the *passé simple* generalizations indulged in by Benveniste. Like Benveniste, Hamburger is unable to deal with homo-diegetic narrative except as a 'figured reality statement'. Hamburger's fictionality argument depends on linguistic evidence—the collocation of the (epic) preterite with deictic adverbials such as *morgen* or *gestern* ('tomorrow', 'yesterday'). Most of Hamburger's examples are actually passages of free indirect discourse. This makes a comparison with Benveniste's *histoire* difficult for linguistic reasons: in French the tense of free indirect discourse is always the *imparfait* and not the 'fictional' *passé simple*. However, the deictics which Hamburger analyses can in fact be found to occur both inside and also outside passages of free indirect discourse. One can therefore not fully endorse Stanzel's refutation of Hamburger's thesis (Stanzel 1959). In a famous exchange, Stanzel had criticized Hamburger, arguing that the loss of deictic pastness in the epic preterite as signalled by its collocation with deictics such as *here* or *now* became possible only within free indirect discourse, or within a *figural narrative situation* in which a character's deictic

centre is assumed as the dominant perspective. In authorial and first person narrative, on the other hand, the narrator *qua* narrator looks back on the story time, and the pastness of the preterite would therefore remain in full force.³⁹ Since deictic adverbs also occur outside free indirect discourse in the narrative itself (cp. below under (6.2)), Hamburger's thesis cannot be convincingly refuted on that score alone. However, as Rasch (1961) already notes, the epic preterite seems to foreground the *Erzählsubjekt*, i.e. the experience of the character- a thesis that anticipates two conclusions of the present study: it can indeed be observed that figural perspective correlates with an extensive use of deictic adverbs even in the narrative proper; and there are some indications that the preterite in narrative evokes an experiencing, particularly perceiving SELF (cp. (3.5)). Both conclusions, however, require very careful qualification and contextualization.

From a linguistic perspective it is also very unsatisfactory to speak of an epic preterite in free indirect discourse because the preterite there can be identified as temporal anaphora within the well-known sequence of tenses rule. It would actually be much more convincing to posit the existence of an epic preterite in the narrative itself, in the narrator's assumption of story-time; as when the narrative introduces a *heute, hier* or *gestern* within the narrative proper, i.e. within the narrator's discourse on the fictional world. Such deictic usage correlates with what Bühler called *Deixis am Phantasma*, case two, where 'Muhammad goes to the mountain' (Bühler 1934:135). The narrator-speaker imaginatively transfers his or her deictic field to the fictional location so that it becomes his or her 'here'.⁴⁰ Such alignments are fairly common in homo- and hetero-diegetic fiction, or in history. In oral discourse, on the other hand, they are much rarer on account of the possible interference with the speaker-deictic positions. Bühler's famous example '*Hier* [in Rom] stapfte er den ganzen Tag am Forum umher' (1934:138)⁴¹ occurs within an 'authorial' narrative with a prominent narrator-figure—at least that is what Bühler's introductory remarks suggest. The only requirement for such a deictic borrowing or appropriation of the figural *hier* ('here') is therefore a (temporary) bracketing of the communicative situation. Such bracketing does not necessarily imply the atemporality of the fictional past tense because, in a homo-diegetic narrative, the preterite *always* registers anteriority to the time of enunciation. According to Stanzel, the deictic pastness of the past is preserved also in hetero-diegetic narrative of the authorial type; only reflectorial narrative erases the present tense/preterite opposition which constitutes the 'pastness' value of the preterite.

The situation is perhaps even more complex than that. Although the existence of a teller figure allows a deictic *now* vs *then* opposition, even within the oral pattern this opposition is functional mainly as a framing device. Within the narrative itself, the preterite can become the unmarked basic narrative tense, and as a consequence one encounters a foregrounded historical present (Chvany 1984; Hopper 1979a, 1979b; Fleischman 1990; Fludernik 1991a). However, because the basic deictic dichotomy in oral narrative is ever present on the horizon and the status of markedness can be reversed, neither Hamburger's theory nor Stanzel's main counter-argument fully capture the value of this preterite. Both theorists concentrate on literary narrative, and in fact Hamburger explicitly excludes oral narration from the realm of the epic preterite. Yet even within the purely literary domain, more recent insights by linguists suggest that Hamburger's

empathetic transposal of the author into the fictional world (1953:342) need not necessarily be aligned with the reader's imaginative empathy with a character's psychology or consciousness (*ibid.*, 346). Hamburger's example is a passage from Thomas Mann's *Buddenbrooks* in which one gets a detailed description of Senator Buddenbrook's house including deictics such as *linker Hand* ('to the left') and *hinaus* ('out into'). This is the original passage—emphases all mine:

- (12) Man saß im »Landschaftszimmer«, im ersten Stock des weitläufigen alten Hauses in der Mengstraße [...].

Im Verhältnis zu der Größe des Zimmers waren die Möbel nicht zahlreich. **Der** runde Tisch mit den dünnen, geraden und leicht mit Gold ornamentierten Beinen stand nicht vor dem Sofa, sondern an der **entgegengesetzten** Wand, dem kleinen Harmonium gegenüber, auf dessen Deckel ein Flötenbehälter lag. Außer den regelmäßig an den Wänden verteilten, steifen Armstühlen gab es nur noch einen kleinen Nähtisch am Fenster und, dem Sofa gegenüber, einen zerbrechlichen Luxus-Sekretär, bedeckt mit Nippes.

Durch eine Glastür, den Fenstern **gegenüber**, blickte man in das Halbdunkel einer Säulenhalle **hinaus**, während sich linker Hand **vom Eintretenden** die hohe, weiße Flügeltür zum Speisesaale befand. An der **anderen** Wand aber knisterte, in einer halbkreisförmigen Nische und hinter einer kunstvoll durchbrochenen Tür aus blankem Schmiedeeisen, der Ofen.

(*Buddenbrooks* I, i; Mann 1991:1011)

They were sitting in the 'landscape-room' on the first floor of the rambling old house in Meng Street [...].

For the size of the room, the furniture was rather scant. A round table, its slender legs decorated with fine lines of gilding, stood, not in front of the sofa, but by the wall **opposite** the little harmonium, on which lay a flute-case; some stiff arm-chairs were ranged in a row round the walls; there was a sewing-table by the window, and a flimsy ornamental writing-desk laden with knick-knacks.

On the other side of the room from the windows was a glass door, through which **one** looked into the semi-darkness of a pillared hall; and on the *left* were the lofty white folding doors that led to the dining-room. A semi-circular niche in the **remaining** wall was occupied by the stove, which crackled away behind a polished wrought-iron screen.

(Mann 1984:5)

The deictics in the last paragraph of this passage are all related to the deictic centre or perspective of someone entering through the front door. Hamburger is correct in noting that the reader is asked to supply his or her own body orientation to determine where *left* is. However, all this is explicitly related to the standpoint of a person entering the hallway

(the English translation only implies this by using a general *one*), and entering it by the canonical route. The phenomenon therefore cannot be justified as a purely literary one, much less as a phenomenon of direct correlation with the epic preterite. In fact such a transferral of human body orientation is a common deictic phenomenon in language, and indeed one of the major foundation stones of a linguistic theory of 'naturalness' (Haiman 1985, Dressler 1990, G.Lakoff 1990). As Fillmore already noted, there are canonical orientations⁴² for various objects, and in some languages these are structured differently. In English the front of a car or of a house is typically related to the pragmatic criteria of use (direction of driving, place of entry), and in the linguistic positioning of objects the human body is frequently used as a conceptual 'prop'. Thus, in English, *behind the tree* signals an orientation of visual directionality (first you get to the tree, then to the object behind it);⁴³ in Hausa, on the other hand, *behind* describes a position *before* the tree, since the speaker transfers her-/himself into the tree's position, facing in the same direction (Hill 1982). Hamburger's example is also inadequate as evidence for the epic preterite because the same kind of orientational deixis occurs regularly in guidebook texts: *When you get to St Peter's, you turn right for the Vatican Museum.*

Even more seriously, the German original really employs very non-deictic expressions for the local description. The use of *linker Hand* and *hinaus* is in fact explicitly related to somebody leaving the 'landscape-room' to look at the hallway, and since this apostrophized sightseer in the Buddenbrook mansion is not a fictional character but a ploy by the narrator, one cannot really identify this with deixis that is internal to the fiction, but should more properly relate it to *transferred deixis* in terms of Bühler's *Deixis am Phantasma*. Even more importantly, the adjective *gegenüberliegend* ('on the other side') is a relational expression and not a deictic one. The translator's *remaining* in the final paragraph is a pure invention, although it is quite in line with the general diffuse localization of the passage. Contrary to Hamburger's claim, the description given by Mann is in fact very typical of what Stanzel has termed 'authorial aperspectivism' (1984b:117–25). One knows that the sofa and the harmonium are on opposite sides of the room, but one could not hope to actually draw a map of the furniture. The only deictic signal in the passage is the definite article for the round table, which has been replaced by an indefinite one in the translation. The definite article here has a decisively 'familiarizing' function; its existence is taken for granted, and that can only be explained from the perspective of the Buddenbrook family. After this initial clue of a text-internal deictic centre, the description loses this deictic quality, but later revives it with the continuation of the narrative just after the quoted descriptive paragraphs, where one reads: 'For cold weather had set in early.' ('Denn es war schon frühzeitig kalt geworden.') This causal link (*for*), motivating the lit fireplace, gives away a story-internal interest focus, and so does the use of the pluperfect, which takes the family scene as its reference point.

The situation in French, which should throw some light on Hamburger's thesis and its general validity, has unaccountably received very little attention in the critical discussion. The crucial collocation in terms of Hamburger's thesis would be that of *the passé simple* with an *ici*, *hier*, *demain* or *maintenant*. In contrast to the English and German situation, in French only *ici* and *maintenant* seem to be able to collocate with the *passé simple* in a

heterodiegetic context, but *hier* is perfectly acceptable in homo-diegetic statements in the *passé simple*.⁴⁴ The solution to this problem can be found only in a reanalysis of the examples. *Here* and *now* typically function in an anaphoric manner, and are used as such in the contexts provided. Once the location has been set in Rome, *here* and *there* both relate to the already established location. Once a time frame has been chosen, *now* in the narrator's description signals the simultaneity with that temporal frame or temporal interval. *Today*, *yesterday* or *tomorrow*, on the other hand, cannot be used anaphorically, and therefore *always* have to be read as story-internal temporal deixis. They therefore occur predominantly in free indirect discourse or other forms of speech and thought representation, and only very rarely in passages of imaginative authorial shifting to the story-time. This conclusion seems to dispose of the linguistic argument for the epic preterite in the formulation of Hamburger. Such a refutation of Hamburger's thesis, however, does not rule out one's possible concurrence in a modified version which—on the basis of the noted reversals of temporal marking—concedes to the preterite an attenuated temporal (deictic) quality within the discourse type 'narrative.'

Weinrich's theory of tense improves upon Benveniste by considering the *textual* function of the temporal system as well as the *contextual* implications of choice of tense. Weinrich starts out from the temporal feature of *obstination*—tenses are repeated cross-textually in order to signal a continuation of the current 'set' (*Einstellung*). A change in tense marks a change in set. This outlook allows Weinrich to incorporate the differential meaning effect (the past has past value only in relation to a juxtaposition with the present tense) in a larger reader-oriented cognitive framework. Weinrich distinguishes three levels or kinds of sets which can change:

- (A) *Sprechhaltung* ('speaker's positioning': discussing vs narrating) (attention vs relaxation: the present tense system vs the past tense system)
- (B) *Reliefgebung* ('relieving') (foreground vs background; *passé simple* vs *imparfait*)
- (C) *Sprechperspektive* ('temporal perspective') (anteriority, posteriority, simultaneity)

Category (A) corresponds to Benveniste's *discours/histoire* distinction and analyses the function of the speaker-addressee relationship. Since the present tense is schematically linked to this communicative function, it implies 'relevance' and attracts the reader's 'attention' even in a narrative context. The discussing vs narrating dichotomy is clearly motivated by the French and Southern German distinction between a colloquial *passé composé* or *Perfekt* and a literary (narrative) *passé simple* and preterite. Category (B) incorporates the well-known 'schema of incidence' pattern (Pollak 1960/1988), i.e. the juxtaposition between a *passé simple* and an *imparfait*, or a simple and a progressive past tense form in English, which represents the irruption of (unexpected) events on a stative background situation or into an ongoing activity. Category (C), finally, takes care of all 'shifted' tenses and generally of tense in subsidiary clauses.

Weinrich's system extends Benveniste's most importantly by considering his categories as *pragmatic* rather than morphological entities (one can use the present tense in reference to a past event and the past tense when speaking of a present event). Secondly, Weinrich

provides an algorithm for calculating temporal discontinuity (*Tempusübergänge*), the crucial criterion being the speaker's conceptualization (the *Sprechhaltung*) of the events to be either narrated or discussed. If more than one category is involved in a change of tense, for instance in a transition between the present and the past progressive, Weinrich considers this to be a clearly 'marked' environment which lends itself to metaphoric interpretation (*Tempusmetaphor*). Weinrich already notes the significance of deictic adverbs, which within his temporal system can fully signal reference time in the absence of temporal marking. (See also Crystal 1966.) Since free indirect discourse involves a temporal shift plus an 'incompatible' use of deictics, it therefore figures as one of Weinrich's temporal metaphors.

Like Benveniste, Weinrich has some problems with homo-diegetic narrative, this time with Camus's *L'Étranger* which uses the colloquial *passé composé* for narration. The same problem would presumably surface regarding the now frequent use of the narrative present tense for entire novels, where a typically narrating attitude persists.⁴⁵

In all the previous remarks on deixis a connection has been implied between the deictic centre and the speaker's (or experiencer's) subjectivity. I will conclude this section by discussing Ronald W. Langacker's two recent contributions on deictic subjectivity (1985, 1990). His framework provides some independent corroboration of the phenomenological starting point of Ann Banfield's analyses and that of her followers (Galbraith, Wiebe).

Langacker distinguishes two kinds of deixis, one in which the ground (the speaker's situatedness) serves merely as a reference point for the deictic expression, e.g. *I saw him on Tuesday*. Here *Tuesday* refers to a *Tuesday* just previous to the time of utterance. By contrast, if one of the elements of the ground itself is highlighted, then a so-called egocentric viewing arrangement comes into force: *I don't like fish* or *It's right here* centre on the very subjectivity of the ground. Langacker draws a crucial distinction between the explicit specification of a relation to the subjective ground, and its implication: *the house across from me* vs *the house across*.

Langacker then appends some penetrating remarks on the limitations of the speaker's perspective. *The speaker*, as highlighted referential reference ground in utterances such as *there were trees all around*, cannot get to have an optimal inside-outside viewing arrangement because—in contrast to the time or location of the speech event—the 'relational predication cannot specifically profile a ground element as a major participant and at the same time leave this element offstage to view the relation objectively' (1985: 135). Langacker goes on to argue that epistemics, demonstrative *this* or the morphological past tense constitute ways of objectifying the ground, and that this is why they allow for an anaphoric use. Unlike the egocentric viewing arrangement (*near me*), the optimal viewing arrangement excludes the relevant ground element from the objective scene. Although the ground is definitely implied as a reference point, as in the deictic *Tuesday* example, it is not centred on outside the profiled entity.⁴⁶

By a kind of paradox, the egocentric viewing arrangement is actually more 'objective' than the optimal viewing arrangement. The reason for this can be found in the correlation of explicit mention and conceptual objectification: a ground element is 'more likely to be construed subjectively [...] when left implicit than when it is overtly mentioned' (1985:

137). There are thus two kinds of deictic elements, those that more explicitly name the reference to the ground (*around me*) and those, like *all around*, which are more immediately subjective. This subjectivity is highlighted quite prominently in third person contexts, where,

(13) Dmitri was trudging through the woods.

(a) There was a clearing ahead of him.

(b) There was a clearing ahead. (Langacker 1985:140 [= (29)])

can be construed to differentiate between the narrative's report in (a) and Dmitri's own perception in (b). In Langacker (1990) this analysis of relationals is crucially extended. Langacker proposes the metaphors of a *trajectory* and a *landmark*. The focussed entity (or trajectory) is perceived in relation to the landmark.

Langacker's analysis therefore supports the view that explicit relational expressions are a first step towards the objectification of a SELF. These deliberations allow Langacker to dissociate the hitherto parallel scales of proximity and objectivity. On the standard account proximal deictics (the definite pronoun, human rather than merely animate objects) imply subjectivity. However, with humans the difficulties of objective self-observation and of getting too close to the object indicate that a maximally objective view of oneself can be attained only by others, whereas a maximally objective view of a non-subjective item can be obtained only at a certain distance from the observing subject.

1.4

THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME IN NARRATIVE RECOLLECTION: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

What Langacker elucidates from a linguistic point of view has received close attention from the philosophical perspective, too. I cannot hope to provide an adequate introduction to the philosophical deliberations on human temporal experience in this place and will therefore restrict myself to a few general points that are meant to establish the major areas of convergence between these philosophical speculations and the linguistic and literary concerns of the present study.

The philosophical tradition has concentrated specifically on the question of (human) time (consciousness) and on its dependence on (narrative) experience and memory. Paul Ricoeur's monumental study *Time and Narrative* traces this history and provides some answers to the question of how narrative interrelates with human time consciousness. Ricoeur starts with the Augustinian subsumption of human retention (recollection) and protention (expectation of the future) under the basically atemporal temporality of God. Phenomenological reflection builds on an analysis of the human experience of time, departing from the insights of Saint Augustine, according to whom we experience the past as the just-present and the future as the expected present-to-be, with the actual present of

experience eluding the experiencing subject. Temporality in fact cannot be experienced *per se* because the past is constituted by our remembrance of earlier experience, and the future of course becomes experienceable only in so far as it has in turn become present and past. Current experience cannot be experienced objectively while one is experiencing it, and the present *qua* present therefore eludes the conceptual grasp of the experiencer. As a result, none of the three temporal states (past, present, future) can be comprehended separately but only in a dynamic or dialectic process of ongoing experience and temporal (uni-directional) flux.

From this perspective, sensation becomes the basic unit of experience, as in Husserl's famous example of an ongoing melody which is perceived and progressively merged into retentive (primary) memory until this retention fades and disappears. Husserl (1966:35–6 [=§ 14]; 1964:55–7) illustrates this view of the human experience of temporality in the following manner:

When a temporal Object has expired, when its actual duration is over, the consciousness of the Object, now past, by no means fades away, although it no longer functions as perceptual consciousness, or better, perhaps, as impressional consciousness. (As before, we have in mind immanent Objects, which are not really constituted in a 'perception'.) To the 'impression,' 'primary remembrance' [primäre Erinnerung], or, as we say, retention, is joined. (Husserl 1964:51 [=§ 12])⁴⁷

In the case of the perception of a temporal Object (it makes no difference to the present observation whether we take an immanent or transcendent Object), the perception always terminates in a now-apprehension, in a perception in the sense of a positing-as-now. During the perception of motion there takes place, moment by moment, a 'comprehension-as-now'; constituted therein is the now actual phase of the motion itself. But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the nucleus of a comet's tail of retentions referring to the earlier now-points of the motion. If perception no longer occurs, however, we no longer see motion, or—if it is a question of a melody—the melody is over and silence begins. Thus no new phase is joined to the last phase; rather, we have a mere phase of fresh memory, to this is again joined another such, and so on. There continually takes place, thereby, a shoving back into the past. The same complex [process] continuously undergoes a modification until it disappears, for hand in hand with the modification goes a diminution which finally ends in imperceptibility. The originary temporal field is obviously circumscribed exactly like a perceptual one. Indeed, generally speaking, one might well venture the assertion that the temporal field always has the same extension. It is displaced, as it were, with regard to the perceived and freshly remembered motion and its Object time in a manner similar to the way in which the visual field is displaced with regard to Objective space.

(Ibid., 52 [=§12])⁴⁸

Present experience is then centred on a zero point of the experiencer's ego (which Husserl calls the *Zeithof*), from which the progress of time becomes measurable. Husserl is very explicit about the subjective nature of this experience in which one is emerged and which cannot be objectively constituted outside of the experience itself. Husserl's experiential description of time phenomena therefore prefigures Merleau-Ponty's critique of the concept of sense-data in his *Phenomenology of Perception*. The figure-ground relationship, which enables the apperception of a sense-datum, becomes the basic experiential unit, with the sense-datum itself a derivatively conceptual entity constructed by the experiencer in a process of objectification:

The sensation is supposed to be the basic unit or building block of experience. But if we consult our experience and attempt to describe it, the simplest thing we can discover is the figure-background scheme; a 'patch' of colour, for example, standing out from a field which seems to extend behind it. The supposedly punctual, distinct, and in themselves 'meaningless' units of sensation, far from being elements of experience, are in fact the products of a highly abstract analysis which forms part of a causal explanation (not a description) of our experience. Sensations, then, are theoretical entities or constructs.

(Carr 1986:24)

As Husserl recognizes, too, one does not experience one's own experience, one simply *has* it. Only an external observer or a later recollection by the experiencer can objectify the initial experience in its elusiveness.

Husserl therefore posits a category of secondary memory or reproduction, in which the original retentive memory is *represented* in a quasi-experience:

Every temporal point which has been shoved back can, by means of reproductive memory, be made the null-point of an intuition of time and be repeated. The earlier temporal field, in which what is presently shoved back was a now, is reproduced, and the reproduced now is identified with the temporal point still vivid in recent memory. The individual intention is the same.

(Husserl 1964:94–5 [=§ 32])⁴⁹

In the recollected and represented past the imagination provides an orientation point, the quasi-source-present that makes it the 'centre of perspective for its own retentions and protentions' (Ricoeur 1985b: 32). Husserl, who is interested in the constitution and apperception of temporality, here touches ground with the theory of deixis as presented by Karl Bühler. Bühler suggested that in what he called *Deixis am Phantasma* we project our deictic centre of *ego-hic-nunc* onto a different point in space and/or time, reconstituting a perspectual relation away from our original bearings (1934: 135). Like Husserl, Bühler is therefore concerned with the shifting of one's deictic orientation point to a different locality—and, by implication, to a different time.

It is only within a recollective experience that narrative as such can properly develop. Narrative reconstitutes the primary experience, reproducing it and, at the same time, enabling an objective perception of the experience in its inception, development and conclusion. Ricoeur's mimesis I, which corresponds to this human conception of experience, therefore becomes the indispensable precondition for the properly narrative restructuring that is achieved by narrative plotting or narrative configuration, as Ricoeur (1984b) calls it, on the level of mimesis II.

On account of the centrality that it accords to experiential subjectivity in narrative, such a model of the narrational recuperation of past experience affords a number of interesting perspectives on the status of experiential consciousness in narrative fiction and, more specifically, on the use of tenses and deictics in the narrative text. We will come back to this in [Chapter 7](#). Earlier, I noted the consequences of Bühler's model—so close to the insights of the phenomenologists—for Käte Hamburger's thesis of the 'epic preterite', and one can observe even closer connections between the phenomenological representation of past experience and Ann Banfield's definition of a deictic centre of consciousness in represented speech and thought.

Before concluding this section, another important philosophical contribution needs to be briefly mentioned. This concerns the subjective experience of oneself as one's own self, an experience linguistically represented by the use of /in reference to oneself. Hector Neri Castañeda, in a series of articles published in the 1960s, discovered that self-reference to one's own self can be transposed into a third person *he* or *she* which is non-replaceable and constitutes what he calls a 'quasi-indicator'. Castañeda departs from the recognition that in *oratio obliqua*, when one attributes a 'cognitive or linguistic propositional act' to a person, one also attributes to that person 'purely indexical references'.

We shall say that attributing a cognitive disposition to a person is to attribute to him *implicit* uses of sentences or words of certain types (without this implying a reduction of cognitive acts to linguistic acts).

(Castañeda 1967a:89)

Castañeda then goes on to discuss what happens to these virtual indicators, i.e. deictics, in indirect discourse and discovers the existence of quasiindicators:

Quasi-indicators do not make demonstrative references. They may even fail to make reference to single entities, for they can play the role of variables of quantification. For instance, in 'Always everywhere a boy tells a girl that he* will love her* from then* on' the quasi-indicators 'he*', 'her*', and 'then*' are (also) variables bound, respectively, by the quantifiers 'a boy,' 'a girl,' and 'always.'

[...] Quasi-indicators have necessarily an antecedent to which they refer back, but they are not replaceable by their antecedents.

(Ibid., 93)

Castañeda also posits that quasi-indexical uses of *he* are ‘quite different from the other uses of the third-person pronoun’ and that they ‘constitute the employment of a *unique logical category*, which is not analysable in terms of any other type of referring mechanism (i.e. the other uses of ‘he,’ other personal pronouns, proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions)’ (Castañeda 1966:131). Castañeda additionally maintains that—in parallel to first and subsequent occurrences of the deictic I—the quasi-indicator *he*, on its first occurrence, is an unanalysable category (like the first person pronoun), but subsequent manifestations of *he* are analysable, since they are anaphorically related to the original *he*.

Castañeda evolves the properties of the quasi-indicator (which we will identify with the linguistic concept of the logophoric under (3.2.2)) from the privileged position of the deictic first person pronoun *I*. *I*, according to Castañeda, has a ‘referential priority over all names and descriptions and objects’ as well as an ‘ontological priority’: *I* cannot fail to refer correctly. *I* also shares an epistemological priority with descriptions and names over ‘other demonstratively used pronouns’ (Castañeda 1966:144–5).

In order to keep knowledge or belief, or in order merely to rethink, of the objects originally apprehended by means of demonstratives one must reformulate one’s knowledge or belief, or thought, of those objects. One must replace each purely demonstrative reference by a reference in terms of descriptions or names, or in terms of the demonstrative ‘I.’ If Privatus asserts This is blue,’ perhaps with a pointing, he seems both to single out an object in his experience and to attribute to it nothing but blueness. Let this be as it may. The crucial thing, however, is that later on, when the object is no longer in his presence, the pronoun ‘this’ has to yield to a name or description of the object Privatus called ‘this.’ Demonstratives are necessarily eliminable for their users. The only exception is the demonstrative ‘I.’ Nobody can at all keep knowledge or belief of whatever information about himself he receives, unless he manages to replace every single reference to himself in terms of descriptions or names, or in terms of other demonstratives (like ‘you,’ ‘he,’ ‘this’) by a reference in terms of ‘I (me, my, mine, myself).’ This does not mean, of course that whenever, e.g. Privatus hears ‘Privatus is ,’ he is to perform a physically, or psychologically, distinguishable act of translation: That is, I am .’ The point is a logical one. Privatus cannot remember, or merely consider later on, that he* is , unless he remembers, or considers, what he would formulate by saying ‘I am ’ or ‘Privatus is and I am Privatus.’ At least the statements of identity ‘I am Privatus’ or ‘I am the one who...’ must include an ineliminable use of ‘I’ for Privatus.

(Castañeda 1966:145)

Although Castañeda’s philosophical and logical analyses do not consider more linguistic aspects of the use of *he*, such as the syntactic and pragmatic factors regulating the distribution of anaphors, descriptions (i.e. R-expressions), and reflexives (cp. below under

(3.2.2)), his findings are nevertheless of crucial importance as a corroboration of the phenomenological privileging of subjective experience, and they even support Bühler's linguistic insights on the deictic centre of the *ego-hic-nunc* originarity. This complex of questions also gives rise to further related issues. One of these will haunt us throughout the present study. It concerns the distinction between the I and the *he* of Castañeda, between the speaker as speaker in actual self-reference and the mediated reflection of that self-reference. What is so different and so unique about the I, about utterance? How does consciousness relate to utterance, or—as it is generally called—communication?

1.5

COMMUNICATION IN NARRATIVE: NARRATOLOGY AND BEYOND

This section is meant to highlight the conceptual bases of narrative's communicative structure as projected in narratology and recent speech act theory accounts. For linguists this will provide a preliminary introduction to, and explain some of the relevant background for, narratology's concern with speech and thought representation and, particularly, free indirect discourse. For literary scholars, I hope to clarify the frequently implicit presuppositions about the communicative function of narrative at its various structural levels.

Although speech and thought representation is an issue of general relevance, it has been discussed in greatest detail by literary critics. Ever since the discovery of free indirect discourse at the end of the previous century even the majority of linguistically conceived work has turned to narrative fiction for inspiration and for its inexhaustible data base. Not only have most theories of speech and thought representation (with the exception of the purely philosophical ones) therefore used examples from literary narrative; as a consequence the importance of literary critics' view on the matter (in their putative capacity of experts on literature) has had a decisive influence on the development of the discussion. The reasons for this heavy literary emphasis are perhaps banal: literary texts provide an extensive corpus that lends itself to synchronic and diachronic analysis. Literary texts are also available in large number and easily accessible, whereas oral instances of speech and thought representation require separate data sampling and time-consuming transcriptions and may involve (possibly distracting) issues about the forms and functions of oral discourse in general. Whereas literary language is felt to observe, and indeed to embody, the rules of syntax, of *langue*, oral discourse, as has become apparent, needs to be described within an entirely different syntax, within a *langue* of the *parole* (Halford/Pilch 1990). On the other hand, linguistic research has paradoxically persisted in taking face-to-face conversation as the default communicative setting, and this despite the standard syntactic emphasis on well-formulated sentences which resulted mostly in the analysis of written discourse.⁵⁰ It is therefore no coincidence that linguists have generally assumed a communicative structure for narrative which directly echoes their conception of oral discourse, and although this conception has been critiqued by literary scholars as overtly naïve and as inapplicable to the multi-layered structure of literary narrative,

narratologists themselves have in fact espoused a more complex schema of narrative communication levels that is perhaps not so very different from the basic linguistic model to which they take exception. Despite some important modifications and some acknowledged exceptions (such as figural narrative in Stanzel's typology, or the putative lack of communication in free indirect discourse in Banfield's work) narratological statements about communication bear an uncanny resemblance to linguistic pronouncements on the topic. In fact, one of the reasons why it has become necessary for me to add this section is the development of a mystique about communication in literary studies (a mystique which is not unrelated to an inspiration of literary criticism by the linguistic work of Emile Benveniste).

I will start by a brief survey of the major conceptual fault lines of the debate. In spite of several cautionary contributions (probably most notably by Roman Jakobson 1958/1987), communication in philosophy, linguistics and literary studies has been conceived of as, basically, homologous to the elementary (technical) information structure utilized by various media:

sender—[channel—message]—receiver

or

encoding—[encoded message]—decoding

Despite quite numerous warnings that language use cannot be explained in this manner, the traditional patterning of language as *form versus content* continues to support the view that the phonological, morphological and syntactic codings of the *langue* constitute a code, on the basis of which the addressee retrieves the 'meaning' of linguistic utterances from the linguistic performance. This originally rather simplistic pattern—simplistic because minimizing the differences between the complexity of actual linguistic structure and language's semiotic 'equivalents' (e.g. codes such as flag language, the Morse code or intelligence coding)—has in the meantime been superseded by pragmatically sensitive models such as speech act theory, Grice's co-operative maxims and conventions, or Sperber/Wilson's theory of relevance. Yet the basic linguistic question remains *how language means*. Whereas formerly it used to be taken for granted that encoders proceeded in a competent and efficient manner, it has now been recognized not merely that 'noise' interferes within the channel of code transmission but that the coding process itself can be deliberately imprecise, implicative or ambiguous. The question of how meaning actually 'gets across' has therefore shifted from the optimistic expectation of finding an eventually complete inventory of encodation (a model that had few qualms about seeing the message as transparent both to the analyst and to the receiver) to a renewed puzzling over how actual encoding could possibly have the meaning effects that are empirically observable, seeing that literal decoding frequently falsifies and distorts what—as a native speaker—one perceives to be the observable meaning effect(s). Indeed, already within linguistics, the earlier emphasis on the encoding process, and hence on the formal linguistic system (the

code), has given way to a radical shift in perspective. Instead of the speaker it is now the listener, decoder, reader who occupies the central position within current debates whether in pragmatics, semiotics or literary studies. Most linguists would currently agree that meaning is produced by the listener, who from the available information input computes the most likely meaning that conforms to the generic and situational conventions of the ongoing linguistic exchange and to its topical, contextual relevancy.

Recent developments in linguistics therefore make available to us a methodology that is able to deal with an entire spectrum of non-literal linguistic use: indirect speech acts (such as *It is cold in here* for *Please close the window*), the withholding of information or the flouting of Gricean maxims in general, as well as the pervasive use of metaphor, deliberate obscurity and imprecision. It will be noted that the corpus on which such insights have necessarily been based is the oral language. It is there that utterances are typically imprecise, indirect, incomplete and context-dependent. However, some kinds of written communication, particularly those closest to oral discourse structure, allow analysis along similar lines. As with the earlier encodation model, literary research has enthusiastically espoused such linguistic models and insights, again extending their applications to areas of writing in which one can no longer posit the existence of an oral communication structure except in a modified and frequently metaphorical form. Whereas discourse-analytical studies of letters and dramatic dialogue profit from a close structural resemblance between conversational exchanges and their delayed written equivalents and dramatic representations, the attempt to use speech act theoretical models in the analysis of poetry and fiction flounders on a lack of agreement about 'who' 'speaks to' 'whom'.

Narratologists have for some time tried to answer that very question and—on the whole—have arrived at a consistent model of narrative communication. This model has been updated to include the reception aspect of narrative, incorporating narratees, implied readers and actual readers on the way. It may be one of the fine ironies of fate that what has largely been ignored in the rush towards an up-to-date appropriation of linguistic insights is the very spirit and function of the linguistic paradigm, which—as is fairly obvious once one stops to think about it—is alien to the structure and function of literary texts (cp. also Hutchison 1984). Indeed, speech act theorists and literary scholars have very unsuccessfully puzzled over the possible communicative quality of literature, and their proposals (literature as pretended speech acts, literature as an instruction to visualize fictional worlds) have met with deserved scepticism. Where narratology has been successful, it has incorporated communicative structure into the fictional world, where it falls under the general realistic or mimetic constraints of non-fiction. It is precisely on the issues of the implied author, author-reader communication and the question of the narrator in novels lacking a personalized narrator-figure that narratologists cannot agree, and these are the narrative levels on which communication cannot be conceived of literally in terms of the paradigm of face-to-face communication.

In the space available here I cannot hope to present a survey of narratological communication paradigms.⁵¹ The standard approach (endorsed as early as Lotman 1977) is to visualize the (real) author as the transmitter of a literary message (in the form of the work of art, the text) to the (real) reader. This level, however, is usually bracketed

entirely from the classic narratologies of Prince, Genette, Bal, Chatman, Stanzel or Lanser because these critics all agree that the text does not vouchsafe any direct conclusions about the real author (the intentionalist fallacy) or about its actual reception. Instead literary analysis focusses on the narratological distinction between *histoire* and *discours* (or *récit*) (Genette 1972/1980), that is to say on the story and its linguistic representation in the text (the *discours*). Although the 'deep structure' level of the story is conceived differently in the various paradigms and in fact allows for further subdivision and stratification (Korte 1985),⁵² the *discours* level is more or less unanimously identified with a communicative structure between the narrator and the narratee (both of whom are usually regarded as latent speech instances, allowing explicit or overt thematization). Genette additionally separates the *discours* from its enunciation, which he entitles *narration*, thus distinguishing between a textual level and the implied enunciatory structure. *Narration* in Genette's formulation constitutes an invaluable theoretical asset, since it allows a formal description of the implicit nature of narrative's communicative process. In Table 1 I attempt an overview of some of the major paradigms, which also illustrates how they relate to one another. Only Genette and Stanzel provide for a separate (sub-) category of enunciation, but all models depart from a communicative narrator-narratee structure irrespective of whether this communication is taken to be part of the textual story level or considered an additional superimposed (textual or merely implied) stratum.⁵³

The question is, however, a crucial one, not least for the communicative quality of (fictional) narrative. Since in texts with a personalized narrator figure (*David Copperfield*, *Tom Jones*) the narrator is either part of the fictional world (its central protagonist or at least a participant, as in *Moby Dick*) or personalized to the extent of projecting a fictionalized identity clearly different from the (historical) author, the narrator as a fictional persona of course seems to belong to the fiction, to the alternative world described in the text. It is for this reason that narratological models have consistently aligned narration with an intra-fictional or extra-fictional narratee:

(real) reader—implied author [narrator → (story) → narratee] implied reader—
(real) reader

This is the schema in Genette (1980), Lanser (1981), Prince (1982), Rimmon-Kenan (1983), Stanzel (1984b), Bal (1985), Jackson (1987) and Coste (1989), as well as in Chatman (1978) and in his revision (Chatman 1990a), which concerns only the stratification beyond the implied author and implied reader level. In all of these models one factor remains constant—that of communication. However, as can already be seen from the direction of the arrows, this standard paradigm is predicated on the old informational cliché of the sender-message-receiver pattern, operating at several interacting levels. The example of internal communication *between* characters within the story—a representative of everyday communication in extra-fictional reality—has therefore been projected onto all the other framing levels, stipulating the existence of theoretical communicators, listeners and their communicative interaction. Even Coste

(1989), who acknowledges that the narrator is always ‘a construction of the receiver, not the grammatical subject of the utterance’,⁵⁴ nevertheless defines narration in terms of enunciation (if not communication):

A narrator is the subject of enunciation of one or more utterances that either contain a narrateme or are involved in the production of a narrateme by the reader.

Narrating is a particular actantial role at the level of enunciation; at this level the same actor-unciator can also play other roles such as those of describer, or giver of orders, as does Mentor when he says to Telemachus: The sea is blue. Ulysses is returning to Ithaca. Let us find him and go with him.’

(Coste 1989:166; Coste’s emphases)

Table 1: Narrative levels

	Events in chronological order	Events causally connected	Events ordered artistically	Text on page	Narration as enunciation
Genette	<i>histoire</i>		<i>discours</i> (<i>récit</i>)		narration (voice + focalization)
Chatman	story	discourse			
Bal	<i>fabula</i>	story and focalization		narration (plus language, plus voice)	
Rimmon -Kenan	story		text		narration
Prince	narrated			narrating	
Stanzel	— story			mediation by teller or reflector + enunciation if teller figure	

The problems of this paradigm have been generally recognized in narratology. However, most of the relevant discussion has centred on the *existence* of, and evidence for, the various narrative ‘instances’, rather than on their properly communicative function or quality.⁵⁵ Two recent contributors deserve attention for finally broaching that question. One is Chatman’s *Coming to Terms* (1990a), in which the author attempts to answer the frequently unanswered puzzle of the narrative speech act. I take that proposal to touch on both the narrator-narratee level and on the real author-real-reader level (which is the level Chatman mainly aims at). The second proposal comes from a German dissertation by Ansgar Nünning (1989), who denies the relevance of the communicational metaphor for the implied-author-implied-reader level. In what follows I will briefly characterize

Chatman's position and then turn to my own presentation. Nünning's schema, which requires more detailed presentation, has been discussed in Fludernik (1993).

Chatman (1990a) tries to incorporate narratology within a genre-specific typology of text types of which one is narrative; the other two are description and argument. Narrative, in accordance with his own earlier proposals, is built on the *story/discourse* distinction. In contrast to argumentative prose, narrative *suades* (rather than *persuades*) and it is based on the tension between the two constitutive levels—story and discourse. Chatman's formulations can be compared to Pratt's (1977) analysis of the narrative (speech) act in which an entire narrative—on the basis of the situation in oral discourse—is identified with a narrative 'turn'. Chatman's questions are perhaps closer to actual literary examples.⁵⁶ Suasion clearly implies an addressee, and indeed Chatman's model is communicative on all levels: characters communicate among themselves, narrators with narratees, implied authors with implied readers, the career author⁵⁷ presumably with his expected readership, and of course the historical author with his readers.⁵⁸

Recent studies in oral narrative suggest that tellability or reportability as well as evaluation are key factors of the narrational act, and many stories (particularly of people's own experience) serve to project specific attitudes, or to support or invalidate current argumentation (Quasthoff 1980; Wodak *et al.* 1990, especially their ch. 5). Such short-term strategies of narration are operative in fiction exclusively on the story level, i.e. in the depicted interaction between characters. Although communication in the 'transfer of information' sense is inapplicable even to oral storytelling—but then speech act theory has justly reduced the importance of assertive speech acts in general—its inapplicability on the other narrative levels is even more obvious.

How then, and precisely where, can one still talk of narrative communication? One answer to this question has come from linguistically oriented critics, and especially from Ann Banfield. Banfield attempts to define Benvenistean discourse as addressee-oriented (see under (7.1) below) and proposes a speaker function which also becomes operative in narrative texts with a personalized narrator. The term speaker is employed advisedly because narration or *histoire*, by contrast, is defined as *speakerless*, as writing (*écriture*). In spite of the radicality of these proposals, which seem to draw a wedge between the oral and the written language (and we will of course have to return to this problematic in great detail below), Banfield's definition of the speaker function, although more linguistically precise, basically reiterates conventional descriptions of the narrator function, one of whose implicit forms is that of narratorial address. Nünning (1989) provides the probably most complete description of these (traditional) author functions. The list is, however, very similar to those given in Genette, Rimmon-Kenan or Stanzel. Stanzel's typology constitutes a particularly interesting case because he anticipates Banfield's linguistic distinctions between the speaker text and narration in his teller/reflector mode opposition. Since Stanzel bases his theory on the central importance of the linguistic mediation of (mostly non-linguistic) story, he comes close to allowing reflector narrative (in which the events are filtered through characters' consciousness) to be speakerless, i.e. narratorless, even though in practice he recognizes the impurities of actual novels which tend to mix and modify both modes. It is no coincidence that Banfield's represented

speech and thought (i.e. free indirect discourse) needs to be located in mostly reflectoral narrative (see [Chapter 7](#)).

This brings me to the crucial narrator question which has sparked so much controversy between Banfield and her critics (and even followers). If one wants to limit narrative's communicative quality to the existence of an observable speaker function in the text, then the linguistic (deictic and lexically subjective) elements which Banfield has so studiously presented are prime empirical evidence. The question is then a linguistic one, that is to say it revolves upon textual properties and not upon the existence or non-existence of narrative instances. Indeed, the question of *existence* is entirely misleading: if there is a speaker function, a speaker figure is projected from the text.⁵⁹ Texts without a personalized narrator therefore do not 'have' a narrator in the strict sense of the term even if readers continually project a vague narrator or implied author figure as the source of the text and its inconsistencies. Such a non-essentialist view of narrative 'communication'—and the inverted commas are here deliberate—in fact allows the recuperation of nineteenth-century reading experience where the author/narrator distinction was tenuous at best, and addresses to the narratee were frequently meant (and taken to be) invocations to the actual reader.

The radically pragmatic reader response attitude that I have here outlined exceeds the more closely defined concerns of this study. In particular, the dynamics of the reading process can be tested best in comparisons of oral narrative and experimental writing (e.g. texts using the second or third person impersonal pronouns). Nevertheless the basic framework, which will be presented in full in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*, is relevant to speech and thought representation to the extent that the reader's interpretation of subjective language is motivated by a mimetic creative reconstitution of the fictional world. The reader then relies on a mediational mimeticism, on the basis of which narrative is conceived of as *told* unless this default value has been superseded by clear indications of a reflectoral consciousness.

In the following it will therefore be taken for granted that the image of a narrator *qua* producer of the narrative ever hovers on the horizon of the reader's consciousness, but that a clear instantiation of a narrator persona has to be marked linguistically; in the same manner that figural consciousness cannot be projected without sufficient textual (i.e. linguistic) evidence. Narrative 'instances' (narrators, narratees, etc.) can therefore be regarded as a product of the reader's interpretative strategies which are in turn determined by general frames and schemata of human agency (for the plot level) and communication scripts (for the narratorial discourse). I will return to these issues in [Chapter 9](#).

NOTES

- 1 See, for instance, Davidson's classic 'On Saying *That*' (Davidson 1968–9), which takes issue with Castañeda's position.

- 2 In Chatman (1990a) this earlier schema is radically modified, and Chatman now counts even 'objective' description as mediated by the narrator. Mimesis then becomes a subcategory of narrating.
- 3 We will deal with the consequences of this speciousness in [Chapter 8](#).
- 4 See also Bal (1982).
- 5 This would be a radicalization of Ducrot's argument that assertive speech acts always serve to promote an argument rather than simply (propositionally) attributing properties to thematic entities. (See Ducrot 1984:111–12 *et passim*.)
- 6 See Frege (1967:144). The extension of the lexemes *evening star* and *morning star* is, identically, the planet Venus, but the intensions of the two speakers using them are dramatically different—they refer to two entirely incompatible phenomena. *Intension* in particular describes a subject's set of beliefs and intended meanings, as in the famous *Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy* (Quine 1966:186 ff.). Kaplan (1977/1989) provides the following explanation of *intension*: 'we can represent a content by a function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension. Carnap called such functions *intensions*' (1989:501–2)
- 7 The interested reader is referred to the excellent introductory essays by Cole (1978b) and Hellan (1981). For more extensive reading see Quine (1953, 1960, 1966), Kripke (1972), Kaplan (1977/1989), Cole (1978a), de Fornel (1980), Heny (1981a) and Bähr (1986).
- 8 'For each proposition containing a reference we can substitute an existential proposition which has the same truth conditions as the original. This, it seems to me, is the real discovery behind the theory of descriptions. [...] [This is] only to say that the circumstances in which the one is true are identical with the circumstances in which the other is true.' (Searle 1969:94)
- 9 Her example is *John said that that idiot of a doctor was a genius*, and the apparent contradiction is resolved by treating *that idiot of a doctor* as the speaker's evaluation, while *was a genius* counts as a non-evaluative proposition. David Kaplan (1977/1989) regards such sentences as *pseudo de re*: 'A typical example is, 'John says that the lying S.O.B. who took my car is honest.' It is clear that John does not say, 'The lying S.O.B. who took your car is honest.' Does John say $\ulcorner \delta \urcorner$ is \neg honest for some directly referential term δ [i.e. an indexical] which the reporter believes to refer to the lying S.O.B. who took his car? Not necessarily, John may say something as simple as, 'The man I sent to you yesterday is honest.' The reporter has simply substituted his description for John's.' (p. 555, fn. 71) Kaplan's views derive from his conviction that indexicals have no *de dicto* occurrences because they are devices of direct reference. Hence the necessity of the term '*pseudo de re*'.
- 10 The technical definition of scope relies on the scope of the verb, for instance *believe*, that is to say whether the noun phrase in question does or does not come under the scope of *believe*. Cole (1978b) attempts to disprove the scope hypothesis in favour of an attributive and quotational analysis.
- 11 See also the literature quoted in Bähr (1986:55, fn. 21). Bähr rejects the *de re/de dicto* analysis because it does not explain under what circumstances *de dicto* NPs are replaceable, or they are replaceable in some contexts and not in others. He points out that the literature is really caught in a circular argument, namely the reasoning that there is non-substitutability because this is a *de dicto* context and that this is a *de dicto* context because there is non-substitutability. He compares this state of affairs to the absurdity of trying to determine which houses threaten to collapse by looking for notices 'Don't enter' in front of houses rather than by analysing the architectural structure of houses in order to decide which houses have to have a sign 'Don't enter' installed on their premises (1986:56).

- 12 Platinga quotes and discusses this at length (1969:245–6).
- 13 In Greimassian terms ‘human’ is of course a categorical seme belonging to the semantic rather than semiological level, and rationality as well as the property of having two feet may come in as *virtuallèmes* on the connotative level (Greimas/ Courtès 1979: s.v. isotopie).
- 14 Thus Kaplan (1977/1989), for example, distinguishes the contexts (or, one might say, speech acts) of ‘fixing the reference’ and ‘supplying a synonym’, using the terminology of Kripke (1972). See also the interesting analysis of Austin (1961: 189–91), where he splits identificational propositions into ‘cap-fitting’, ‘b-identifying or bill-fitting’, ‘stating’ and ‘instancing’.
- 15 However, there is a second aspect in which a more properly meta-linguistic level of *de dicto* locutions comes to the fore. This is voiced already early in Platinga’s article when he quotes Aristotle’s distinction between (a) and (b):

- (a) Every animal in this room is necessarily rational.
- (b) It is necessarily true that every animal in this room is rational.

Whereas in (a) *necessarily* refers to an essential property of ‘every animal’, in (b) the ‘proposition’ (i.e. every animal in this room is rational) is declared to be true. Thus the object of the modal proposition (*necessarily*) in (a) is *animal*, predicating ‘of an object the necessary or essential possession of a property’ (Platinga 1969:236), whereas in (b), which is in *de dicto* modality, it ‘predicate[s] a modality of another statement’ (ibid.). This second, *de dicto*, modality is clearly meta-linguistic. Compare also Heny (1981b: xvi).

- 16 Sentences of this kind have been analysed by Quine in his famous ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ (1955/1966), and in Donnellan (1966/1971), Saarinen (1981) and Lavric (1989).
- 17 See also Roberts (1989) on related examples.
- 18 This needs to be A2, not the addressee of the reported speech act but the addressee of the reporting speech act.
- 19 The reporter can render the content of the original speaker’s utterance in such a way that it becomes interpretable within the mental frame of the addressee (of the reporting speech act). For instance, if the original speaker said “Karl has an Oedipus complex,” then the content of this utterance can be represented to an eight-year-old by saying something like “S1 said that Karl loves his mother very much.”
- 20 The term *singular term* goes back to Vendler (1971). See also van Fraassen (1966).
- 21 Typical perlocutionary acts are *convincing, persuading, deterring*.
- 22 ‘[L]a notion de *performatif* tient a une confusion commise par les linguistes entre les mots qu’ils étudient et les mots dont ils se servent, confusion préfigurée d’ailleurs dans la langue elle-même en tant qu’elle est le lieu d’une dérivation délocutive conceptualisant les mots qu’elle met a la disposition du sujet parlant’ (Ducrot 1984:119)
- 23 Searle (1969:159) also describes the fault of the theory of descriptions as its tendency to present the *propositional* act of definite reference as *equivalent* to the *illocutionary* act of *asserting* a uniquely existential proposition.
- 24 Searle’s example that *one* utterance may perform *several* speech acts (Searle 1969: 70) really departs from the locutionary act and its various illocutionary, perlocutionary and indirect effects. *It’s late* can be a statement, an *objection* (what Ducrot would analyse as part of the ongoing argument), a *request* to go home or a *warning* (both of the latter are not illocutionary or perlocutionary in Austin’s terms).

- 25 The sentence *She wondered would he be kind enough to open the window*, however, is perfectly acceptable as free indirect discourse.
- 26 I will have to say more about the linguistic aspects of speech report or the 'narrative report of speech acts' (Leech/Short 1981) under (5.4.2).
- 27 Searle already extends the pragmatic frame to a distinction between *meaning* and *use*, critiquing the tradition of identifying *illocutionary force* with *meaning*. *Good* does not 'perform' the speech act of commending, to *call* something 'good' is equivalent to commending, and this is entirely different from the *meaning* of 'good' as inferable from its *use* in commendation. Searle dubs this the 'speech act fallacy' (1969:137–41).
- 28 Austin's taxonomy of verdictives, exercitives, commissives, expositives and behabitives (1980:151 ff.) is little improved by Searle's five-part schema of assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations (1979:12–16), although Searle's model manages to integrate the constitutional, status-dependent and pragmatic factors involved in illocutionary speech acts. Ninio has a yet more complex schema.
- 29 For the philosophical background, which I am not discussing, the main problem has been deictic instability of reference. Since, for example, *I* designates the current speaker, deixis can only be treated in a pragmatic framework and not within a purely logico-mathematical frame. Deictics in fact advance to a central semiotic category in Charles Peirce's writings, where *symbolic* signs are contrasted with *indexical* and *iconic* signs. *Indices*, or deictic elements, also play a central role in Castañeda's work (1967a, 1967b, 1968)—see under (1.4) below. Reichenbach called deictics 'token-reflexive' words. See also Bar-Hillel (1954), Partee (1973a) and Kaplan (1977/1989).
- 30 The problem of *this* and *that* is rather complex. Thus, one has to distinguish between the basic deictic opposition as in example (7a), as well as the emotive *this* and *that*. 'Well, I got to the counter and this guy comes up and pushes me.' In the last sentence *this* is used to introduce new topics, signalling emotional involvement. *That* emotionalizes 'old' referents: 'So then that guy with the blue shirt started to make some grotesque remarks.'

That/those can be used only for 'old' items; or it is pretended that these items are already in the addressee's current frame of reference: 'familiarizing *that*'. *That/those* are frequently used pejoratively to convey disapproval or emotional distancing. Both of these oppositions, in *anaphoric* contexts, are subjected to the first mention > anaphoric mention sequence which corresponds to the sequence indefinite > definite article:

I saw *a woman* on the bus today. *She* was at least six feet tall. [Topic continues, i.e. speaker's experience.]

I saw *a woman* on the bus today. *This* woman was at least six feet tall, and she was wearing one of *those* slitted skirts... And you know, when I finally got a good look at *that* woman,... [change of topic. *Those* slitted skirts is meant to express emotional involvement and presumes the addressee's knowledge about the article and his connivance with the intended implications.]

There is therefore a series *a(n)>the, this>that, here>there* which seems to be anaphoric as a default value but overlaps with topic constraints and the emotional, 'familiarizing' use of the demonstrative pronoun. I have only found very brief hints towards a discussion of emotional *this/that* in Lakoff (1974), and have presented a first discussion of the phenomenon myself (Fludernik 1990). I am not aware of any extended analysis even of the topic-focus related

- use *this* and *that*. The term 'familiarizing' has been coined here in analogy with Bronzwaer's *familiarizing article* (Bronzwaer 1970:90). The emotional demonstrative is one of the categories of subjective designation listed in [Chapter 3 \(3.2.3\)](#).
- 31 Bally (1969) calls these the *absolute* and *relative* categories. According to Markus (1977:20) the distinction was first made by McTaggart (1927/1968).
 - 32 For important studies of deixis see Fillmore's numerous contributions, the essays in Rauh (1983a), Jarvella/Klein (1982), Weissenborn/Klein (1982), as well as Frei (1944), Kurylowicz (1972), R.Winkler (1976), Hill (1982), Lyons (1982), Greenberg (1985), Sennholz (1985) and Klein (1990).
 - 33 The following are a sampling of standard discussions of tense (and aspect) in the English *langue*: Kruisinga (1911), Poutsma (1922), Curme (1931), Jespersen (1931), Zandvoort (1957), Diver (1963), Ota (1963), Bull (1963), Joos (1964), Palmer (1965), Allen (1966/1982), Crystal (1966), Huddleston (1969), Wunderlich (1970), Vanek (1971), Vasudeva (1971), McCawley (1971), Brecht (1974), Comrie (1976, 1985), Markus (1977), Tedeschi/Zaenen (1981), Hopper (1982a), Ö. Dahl (1985), Bache (1985), Lo Cascio/Vet (1986), Schopf (1984, 1987a, 1989a) and Declerck (1989, 1991). For further bibliographical information see Schulze (1985). Rauh (1984, 1985b) provides an excellent discussion of earlier treatments. For an overview on the different proposals of the constitution of temporality, e.g. by means of a deep structure temporal or adverbial marker, verbal morphology, AUX, etc., see Markus (1977).
 - 34 Compare Declerck (1991:74) for a brief survey of the major proponents of this stance.
 - 35 Benveniste cannot really deal with oral narrative, or with the first person novel in the *passé simple*. In languages that do not have a morphological aorist, Benveniste's model seems entirely inappropriate, although it can partly be recuperated by very careful analysis and argument.
 - 36 One need only look at the French translation of *Tom Jones* (Fielding 1990), or at equivalent French novels such as Diderot's *Jacques le fataliste* (for the heterodiegetic with an active narrator-persona) or Gide's *La Porte étroite* (for a homodiegetic narrative).
 - 37 See, for instance, Ducrot's dictum '[I]l devient impossible d'admettre l'existence d'une histoire au sens de Benveniste, sinon comme l'horizon mythique de certains discours.' (Ducrot 1972:99; quoted Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980:169)
 - 38 On the epic preterite see Rasch (1961), Pascal (1962) and Rauh (1982; 1983b, esp. 39–40). Note also the debate in the journal *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift* (Hamburger 1953 and 1955; Seidler 1955).
 - 39 It seems likely that Stanzel's present views on the subject would tend towards extending the use of such deictics into the entire realm of reflectorial narration, that is to say narrative mediated by a reflector character (a figural consciousness), as well as to all free indirect discourse contexts even outside reflectorial narration. In this Stanzel's position is almost identical with Banfield's, as we will see in [Chapter 7](#).
 - 40 For examples see Seidler (1955:409). Rauh (1985b) uses this second kind of *Deixis am Phantasma* to explain the effect of the historical present tense. According to her, the use of the historical present tense is another means for the narrator to transfer his referential centre into the fictional world. This is a view of the historic present tense which I strongly oppose (Fludernik 1991a, 1992c).
 - 41 Scil. 'Here/There [in Rome] he wandered about the forum all day.'
 - 42 Klein (1990:21) calls such canonic orientations 'gefrorene Deixis' ('frozen deixis').
 - 43 It is often claimed that the speaker imagines her-/himself in the tree's position such that s/he undergoes a 180 degree turn and has the object behind her-/himself. This is true, I

- believe, *only* if the relational object is human, not for objects such as trees. In fact, the English use of the reflexive pronoun *herself* or *himself* in such examples argues for a transferred body image only when objects are described as being behind humans.
- 44 For an excellent analysis of this question see Kamp/Rohrer (1983:262–5). The basis for this argument derives from the information of French native speakers. In contradiction to Banfield's claim that the *passé simple* cannot collocate with NOW deictics, they accept sentences such as *Nous arrivèrent à 11 heures hier*. According to Kamp/Rohrer *maintenant* never collocates with the *passé simple* in their date. But see the numerous Italian examples of *passato remoto* and *adesso* or *ora* in Bertinetto (1991).
- 45 See the recent discussion of this issue by Wright (1987), A. Neumann (1990, 1991), Cohn (1983, 1989, 1991 and forthcoming). Stanzel (1981b) calls this use of the present tense the 'epic' present tense (in imitation of the 'epic preterite').
- 46 The profile of *this* is consequently a thing, specifically the thing that is identified to the speaker and hearer and situated in the vicinity of the speaker. The speech act participants remain offstage as points of reference, and the relations of proximity and identification are necessarily unprofiled, important though they are to the semantic value of the expression. By the same token, the past tense morpheme resembles the deictic sense of *before* in specifying the location of a process prior to the time of speaking. *Before* is a stative relation in the manner of 8(a) [refers to Langacker's earlier diagram], but the past tense predication is epistemic; thus it has the structure of 8(c)—with both G[round element] and the relation of temporal anteriority to G offstage and unprofiled—except that the profiled entity is a process rather than a thing.' (Langacker 1985:135)
- 47 'Wenn ein Zeitobjekt abgelaufen, wenn die aktuelle Dauer vorüber ist, so erstirbt damit keineswegs das Bewußtsein von dem nun vergangenen Objekt, obschon es jetzt nicht mehr als Wahrnehmungsbewußtsein oder besser vielleicht impressionales Bewußtsein fungiert. (Wir behalten dabei wie bisher immanente Objekte im Auge, die sich nicht eigentlich in einer "Wahrnehmung" konstituieren). An die "Impression" schließt sich kontinuierlich die primäre Erinnerung oder, wie wir sagten, die Retention an.' (Husserl 1966:30)
- 48 'Im Falle der Wahrnehmung eines Zeitobjektes (es spielt für die jetzige Betrachtung keine Rolle, ob wir ein immanentes oder transzendentes nehmen) terminiert sie jederzeit in einer Jetztauffassung, in einer Wahrnehmung im Sinne einer Als-Jetzt-Setzung. Während eine Bewegung wahrgenommen wird, findet Moment für Moment ein Als-Jetzt-Erfassen statt, darin konstituiert sich die jetzt aktuelle Phase der Bewegung selbst. Aber diese Jetztauffassung ist gleichsam der Kern zu einem Kometenschweif von Retentionen, auf die früheren Jetztpunkte der Bewegung bezogen. Findet aber keine Wahrnehmung mehr statt, sehen wir keine Bewegung mehr, oder—wenn es sich um eine Melodie handelt—ist die Melodie abgespielt und Stille eingetreten, so schließt sich an die letzte Phase keine neue Phase der Wahrnehmung an, sondern eine bloße Phase frischer Erinnerung, an diese aber wiederum eine solche usf. Dabei findet fortgesetzt eine Zurückschiebung in die Vergangenheit statt, die gleiche kontinuierliche Komplexion erfährt fortgesetzt eine Modifikation, bis zum Verschwinden; denn mit der Modifikation geht eine Schwächung Hand in Hand, die schließlich in Unmerklichkeit endet. Das originäre Zeitfeld ist offenbar begrenzt, genau wie bei der Wahrnehmung. Ja, im großen und ganzen wird man wohl die Behauptung wagen dürfen, daß das Zeitfeld immer dieselbe Extension hat. Es verschiebt sich gleichsam über die wahrgenommene und frisch erinnerte Bewegung und ihre objektive Zeit, ähnlich wie das Gesichtsfeld über den objektiven Raum.' (Husserl 1966:30)
- 49 'Jeder zurückgeschobene Zeitpunkt kann vermöge einer reproduktiven Erinnerung zum Nullpunkt einer Zeitanschauung gemacht werden, und wiederholt gemacht werden. Das

- frühere Zeitfeld, in dem das gegenwärtig Zurückgeschobene ein Jetzt war, wird reproduziert und das reproduzierte Jetzt mit dem noch in frischer Erinnerung lebendigen Zeitpunkt identifiziert: die individuelle Intention ist dieselbe.' (Husserl 1966:69–70)
- 50 This is not to belittle the Chomskyan revolution or to deny that it has not relaxed the prescriptive tendencies of earlier grammatical models. One has to acknowledge, however, that the Chomskyan emphasis on the *sentence* and on speakers' *competence* fails to do full justice to the processual nature of observable (oral) discourse.
 - 51 See also the following work on narration and focalization: Adam (1984), Baur (1981), Berendsen (1981, 1984), Briosi (1986), Chatman (1986, 1990a), Cohan (1986), Diengott (1986, 1987), Edmiston (1989), Friedemann (1965), Friedman (1955), Gnutzmann (1977), Haubrichs (1976, 1977), Hönninghausen (1980), de Jong (1989), Lotman (1975b), Kablitz (1988), Klopfer/Janetzke-Diller (1981), Kummer (1972), Lämmert (1955, 1982), Ludwig/Faulstich (1985), McKay (1980), Markus (1985), Nelles (1987), Petersen (1977, 1980), Weimann (1962).
 - 52 In particular, there is the Russian Formalist distinction between the *fabula* (the story material) and the *siuzhet* (plot), where the plot orders the events of the story artistically. (The distinction derives from the Opoiaz group—Erlch 1981:240–2.) See also the excellent paper by Volek (1977). Another famous dichotomy goes back to E.M. Forster (1927). He defines plot as the story plus causal connections. All these layers are already subsumed in Genette's *histoire* category.
 - 53 The work of Doležel (1973a) and Kummer (1972), which departs from textual, linguistic aspects of communication, here deserves mention. Interestingly, both authors come to conclusions that are comparable to Stanzel's typology, and even corroborate it.
 - 54 This formulation is in fact rather obscure. Coste goes on to say: This is true even of performative utterances such as: "I swear that x happens"; the subject of enunciation here is not "I," subject of the enunciated verb "swear," but "he who says 'I swear,'" subject of the verb "say" in the receiver-formulated, extratextual utterance "He says that he swears." (Coste 1989:167)
 - 55 A commendable exception is Diengott (1986, 1987).
 - 56 But see Pratt (1986) for a revised formulation which decisively critiques literary 'adaptations' of speech act theory: 'Representative discourses, fictional or nonfictional, must be treated as simultaneously world-creating, world-describing, and world-changing undertakings' (1986:71). See also: 'In his own writing, Grice is careful to point out another limitation on his maxims, namely that they are formulated only to apply to language used for the 'maximally efficient exchange of information,' and that they would have to be modified to apply to other situations. Such an elaboration has never taken place, however, and Grice's formulations now function widely in literature on the subject as the norm for non-literary verbal interaction [...] This despite the fact that people are surrounded all the time by speech events that are [in?] principled ways, not cooperative, not exchanges, not efficient, and where truthfulness, proportion, relevance, and informativeness are systematically absent or mitigated.' (Ibid., 65)
 - 57 The career author is Chatman's term for the personality of 'the author' constructed from the implied authors of the works of one writer, for instance 'Dickens' as gleaned from his novels.
 - 58 Lanser (1981) has a similarly full interactional model, including the character-actors, focalizers and spectators, private narrators and public narratees, public narrators and private narratees, extra-fictional voices and extra-fictional readers as well as the historical author and the historical audience. These relate to the text constituents of action (focalizer/

spectator), scene (public narratee, private narrator), story (narrator/narratee), fiction (extra-fictional voice and reader) and the text (historical author and audience). (See Lanser's diagram on p. 144.)

- 59 Compare the very shrewd discussion in Diengott (1987).

2

Establishing the object of analysis: an introduction to the free indirect

In this and the following chapters I will attempt to discuss all major aspects of free indirect discourse that have come to my notice. In particular I wish to introduce readers to occurrences of free indirect discourse *outside* literary third person past tense writing, since such contexts have frequently been ignored or even actively ‘repressed’. A third aim will be to present an exhaustive list of the features and characteristics of free indirect discourse, specifically of those that have so far received little attention or have been discussed in a one-sided manner. No present-day study of free indirect discourse could hope to tackle the subject single-handedly in the manner of Bally, Lerch, Lorck, Lips, Verschoor or Günter Steinberg. I acknowledge a debt to the many studies that have preceded my own inquiry and whose efforts, much as they have led me to attempt a fuller and (I believe) more adequate treatment of the issue, will be recorded in these pages with respect and genuine appreciation. This book relies on much German and French criticism of free indirect discourse, and I hope to introduce English readers to these sometimes less accessible studies. On account of the language barrier German contributions to the topic, in particular, have frequently been ignored in English criticism. In spite of three book-length treatments of free indirect discourse in English (Pascal 1977, Banfield 1982, Ehrlich 1990a),¹ no really complete list of free indirect discourse characteristics has so far been provided, particularly one that clearly evaluates similarities and dissimilarities between different languages.² There are, however, numerous articles on free indirect discourse which provide excellent contributions to the subject, and these will receive ample discussion throughout.³

2.1

INTRODUCING FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

And they cantered off, leaving him very flushed, trying to be quite normal with the girl. But presently he had gone back to the hotel and given his horse into the charge of an ostler and had gone off with the girl into the woods, not quite knowing what he was doing. His heart thumped and he thought it the most glorious adventure, and was mad with desire for the girl.

Afterwards he glowed with pleasure. *By Jove, but that was something like!* He stayed the afternoon with the girl, and wanted to stay the night. She, however, told him this was impossible: *her own man would be back by dark, and she must be with him. He, Brangwen, must not let on that there had been anything between them.*

(*The Rainbow*, i, (ii); Lawrence 1988:23)

The italicized parts of this quotation correspond to what is generally entitled free indirect discourse, *erlebte Rede*, narrated speech or *discours indirect libre*.⁴ We move from report to the rendering of consciousness and to the implied speech of the girl, effortlessly, without any noticeable shifting of gears ('and then he thought', 'but he said'), smoothly turning from the external situation to internalized perceptions of it and to the mental interaction between characters. The passage is narrated from Tom Brangwen's point of view, yet a mere one and a half pages earlier we have been granted a brief glimpse of the woman's perspective, too, following the omniscient narrator's characterization of her:

The Miss who made up to Tom Brangwen, then twenty-four years old, was a handsome, reckless girl neglected for an afternoon by the man who had brought her out. She saw Brangwen and liked him, as all women did, for his warmth and his generous nature, and for the innate delicacy in him. But she saw he was one who would have to be brought to the scratch. However, she was roused and unsatisfied and made mischievous, so that she dared anything. *It would be an easy interlude, restoring her pride.*

(*Ibid.*, 22)

The last sentence is again free indirect discourse, this time from the girl's perspective. What we have here is a fairly standard, almost typical case of free indirect discourse—we shift from external to internal perspective, from one mind to another, from thought to speech and perception. The example is standard in other respects, too. This is a passage from a Modernist novel by an author famous for his portrayal of the agonies of passion and self-questioning. The example is typical of the text type that has figured almost exclusively in studies of free indirect discourse: late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century fiction, third person form, past tense narrative (omniscient to figural), portraying (mostly) characters' consciousness. Free indirect discourse then becomes a 'literary' 'device', whose purposes prominently include automatic gear shifting between narration and characters' minds, usually in the interests of empathy and narratorial inconspicuousness.

In the present study the standard case will receive not much more than complimentary attention. In particular, we will insist on the pervasiveness of 'non-standard' free indirect discourse, whether in non-literary, non-third person, non-past tense or non-Modernist texts, and will emphasize the existence of free indirect discourse in the oral language. This concentration on what have so far been considered merely marginal cases will naturally

have a decisive impact on the explanation provided for speech and thought representation in [Chapter 8](#) of this study.

From a more narrowly linguistic perspective, the standard definition of the properties of free indirect discourse is by means of a comparison with direct and indirect discourse, in purely formal terms. Thus, whereas direct discourse consists of grammatically independent sentences which are deictically grounded in the *hic et nunc* of the enunciator,

- (1) (Tom said:) *Gosh, I* am tired.

free indirect discourse preserves some of the expressive elements of direct discourse as well as its syntactic independence, but shares with indirect discourse the temporal and referential consonance with the quoting instance. The indirect,

- (2) Tom said *that he was* tired.

becomes, in free indirect discourse,

- (3) *Gosh, he was* tired (Tom said).

As is so frequently reiterated in studies on discourse representation, indirect speech characteristically consists of an introductory verbal phrase and a subordinate speech representation clause. Indirect discourse is also typically described in terms of a rendering of propositional or illocutionary content (compare under (1.2)). In our example, (2) primarily relates the content or propositional meaning of Tom's words, and the mimetic evocation of the original utterance is a secondary feature. Indirect discourse, in this standard definition, is intrinsically opposed to direct discourse, which is then regarded as unproblematically mimetic. This well-worn opposition never critiques the notion of the direct, failing to establish that quoted speech cannot be identified with the utterance *per se* (Strauch 1984:166-7, fn.; Viohi 1986:368); nor allow for the existence of non-mimetic direct speech. The definitions of indirect discourse, in so far as they postulate an underlying direct discourse pattern that is 'shifted' into the referential and temporal coordinates of the reporting speaker's discourse, are in fact self-contradictory because they claim to explain both mimetic and non-mimetic indirect speech: abstraction and illocutionary distortion is referred to the reporter's deictic superiority, mimetic closeness to the 'mere superficial shifting' into the reporter's referential coordinates. On this pattern of explanation, which—for the pragmatic purposes of demonstration—is acceptable enough, free indirect discourse comes to stand between indirect and direct speech: with regard to grammatical form (subject to the concordance of tense and to the referential shift) it is closer to the indirect; with regard to syntax and mimetic truthfulness (syntactic independence, preserving a large set of expressive elements), closer to the direct.

Although the comparison with direct and indirect speech is therefore clearly a useful entry into the formal problematic of free indirect discourse, it also needs to be noted that the device has to be contrasted with other means of speech and thought representation, especially with speech and thought report (see under (5.4.2)) as well as with narrative sentences as such. It has frequently been assumed that indirect speech can be explained as a transformation from direct speech, and that this would equally apply to free indirect discourse (Ohmann 1964, Lee 1970), but Banfield (1982) has conclusively refuted this account. Not only are indirect discourse sentences ambiguous with regard to the original wording—(2) can translate not only (1) but also (4) or (5):

- (4) (Tom said:) How tired I am!
- (5) (Tom said:) Look, I can't even lift my finger any more.

Also, certain expressive utterances cannot be transformed into indirect speech at all:⁵

- (6) a. Wow! What a life!
- b. *Sheila exclaimed what a life.
- c. Sheila exclaimed what a life this was.⁶

Free indirect discourse, on the other hand, allows apparent transformations from direct speech:

- (7) What a life (this was)!

(7) is a perfectly well-formed English sentence. It does not, however, allow one to reconstruct any original discourse because, like indirect speech, free indirect discourse passages tend to typify the tenor of the original discourse (Steube 1985:391). This factor will be treated in depth in [Chapter 8](#). Thought representation, of course, is not reconstructible at all, nor can one presuppose an 'original', unless the person whose consciousness is being depicted happens to be the narrator's former self. Unfortunately the transformational approach, presupposing an original direct discourse that gets shifted into indirect or free indirect speech, is still presupposed even among linguists in spite of Banfield's rather conclusive evidence against it.⁷

The definition of free indirect discourse constitutes a problem in itself. Although it is clear that free indirect discourse obligatorily shifts referential expressions to the reporter's stance—and this is a criterion which makes it possible to recognize free indirect discourse in present tense contexts of conversation or present tense narrative—there are even some exceptions to this rule (cp. under (3.2.1) and (3.2.4) below). The difficulty of formally delimiting free indirect discourse will follow us throughout this study, but I will here note that direct discourse and indirect discourse are not as easily definable either. For instance, so-called verbatim direct discourse does not reproduce phonetic or articulatory peculiarities of the speech act (Kurz 1970: 23), unless of course the reporter wants to foreground these idiosyncrasies, usually for parodic effect.⁸ Most

direct discourse therefore seems to be modelled not on the observable soundwaves (the token) but on the formal level of linguistic *types*. Lyons (1977:751) in fact concludes that the type-token identity between observable discourse and its verbatim report in direct speech remains elusive, with the requirement of sharing the identical word forms as a necessary but not sufficient prior condition. The situation becomes even more complex when one recognizes the validity of translated direct discourse (and indirect discourse) reports (Kurz 1970:12). Direct speech has also been characterized in terms of its typical double intonational structure (Authier 1979:218), with a definite pause and gear-shift in intonational contour.

Indirect discourse, if it poses fewer problems of identifying *types*, instead produces some even more complex difficulties in relation to the choice between propositional and illocutionary meaning in the indirect report. The standard definition—besides the stipulation of complement clause subordination and complementary syntactic rules for questions and imperatives (cp. under (3.3.1) below)—holds that indirect discourse typically reproduces both the propositional and the illocutionary act of the original speaker (Ryan 1981b: 133; Steube 1986:348–9). As we will see, this does not apply to each and every indirect report, and within certain pragmatic constraints either the one or the other may win out. Besides this general consensus, there are a number of different evaluations of other factors of indirect discourse. Thus by some scholars the German *subjunctive* in indirect speech is taken to be an indicator of a required ‘verbatim’ reading (‘wörtlich’—Steube 1986:360–1), whereas Lips (1926:34–5), E. Winkler (1930:441–2), Verschoor (1959),⁹ Herrmann (1973:84) and Wierzbicka (1974:296) foreground the abstracting and content-oriented nature of indirect discourse—an attitude that is more closely compatible with the propositional and illocutionary nature of the indirect report. Similar disagreements attach to the characterizations of free indirect discourse.

It needs to be emphasized additionally at the very beginning that this tripartite formal schema of *direct discourse vs indirect discourse vs free indirect discourse* distorts the differences in function and context that exist between the three forms as a representation of speech events and the entirely different functions and uses of the three forms in the presentation of consciousness and thought acts. As Leech/Short (1981)¹⁰ have so admirably illustrated, the primary device in the representation of speech acts is direct discourse, followed by indirect discourse. Although free indirect speech occurs with some generality in written texts, it is frequently employed for purposes of exaggeration and irony, where the flavour of indirect speech would most consistently be that of an objective report. For free indirect speech as a distancing device compare, for instance, the many ironic examples in Dickens, Meredith, or Thomas Mann, especially in Dickens:

(8) ‘Ah!’ said Mr Podsnap. ‘Easy to say somewhere [...]. Centralization. No. Never with my consent. Not English [...].’

He was not aware (the meek man submitted of himself) that he was driving at any ization. He had no favourite ization that he knew of. But he certainly was more staggered by

these terrible occurrences than he was by names, of howsoever so many syllables. Might he ask, was dying of destitution and neglect necessarily English?

(Our Mutual Friend I, xi; Dickens 1979:187)

Indirect discourse, on the other hand, can equally well operate in the distancing mode if the narrator reports certain speech acts with obvious disagreement or sarcasm, or if his reformulations are patently distortive—so that the irony then redounds on the reporter.

- (9) Here Mr Venus interposed, and remarked that he conceived Mr Boffin to have taken the description literally; the rather, forasmuch as he, Mr Venus, had himself supposed the menial to have contracted an affliction or a habit of the nose, involving a serious drawback on the pleasures of social intercourse, until he had discovered that Mr Wegg's description of him was to be accepted as merely figurative.

(Our Mutual Friend IV, iii; Dickens 1979:720)

None of these effects can be determined without a consideration of the context of reporting, either factually or textually. The whole issue of 'the function' of free indirect discourse, even if mitigated by an acknowledgement of several potential functions, has really been a dead end for precisely this reason—the contextual and interpretative framework can make the device into an inconspicuous formal reflective variant as well as into a striking technique that attracts the potential for multi-level significance. The conclusions that one draws from skilful uses of free indirect discourse are, however, all predicated on the same grammatical and illocutionary features: a greater closeness to the original utterance, a lack of reporter's assertions regarding the original speech act, and the ability to signify metaphorically because the standard way of reporting is in direct or indirect speech (according to the linguistic register and the textual genre at hand).

The situation is entirely different for the representation of consciousness. (For an excellent book-length account see Cohn 1978.) The standard way of 'reporting' consciousness is by means of thought report or psycho-narration which is not even part of the three-term scale. Indirect discourse, although it does occur infrequently, can practically be ignored, and free indirect discourse—next to psycho-narration—owns pride of place. In the twentieth-century novel one also encounters much interior monologue, frequently in the form not of fully articulated direct discourse (i.e. including finite verb forms) but of a rambling, disjointed stream of consciousness.¹¹ Interior monologue spans a wide spectrum of linguistic forms and can evoke different layers of verbal and pre-verbal states of mind. Not only is the extensive presentation of consciousness practically restricted to fictional narratives;¹² the unknowability of others' minds makes any 'direct transcription' suspect and initiates a rhetoric of speculation in the reporting instance. Even omniscient narrators and texts that present the fictional world through characters' consciousness shy away from articulate direct speech monologue because thought need not necessarily be purely verbal. Joyce has shown in a masterful fashion how interior monologue can evoke a character's mute perceptions (as well as verbal

mentality), and *Ulysses* is a happy hunting ground also for passages of psychonarration that attempt to evoke deeper pre-verbal or non-verbal levels of the mind. Although the presence of free indirect discourse is frequently recognized on the basis of a character's 'voice' or idiom, even grammatically impeccable instances of free indirect discourse, when rendering a character's consciousness, come to signify more than just an internal speech act of that person.

- (10) She [Lily] started up and looked forth on the passing streets. Gerty!—they were nearing Gerty's corner. *If only she could reach there before this laboring anguish burst from her breast to her lips—if only she could feel the hold of Gerty's arms while she shook in the aque-fit of fear that was coming upon her!*

(*The House of Mirth* I, xiii; Wharton 1962:173)

Lily's overwhelming desire for comfort and consolation is an irresistible wave of emotion that articulates itself in her wish to be near Gerty. Lily's mental turbulence is hinted syntactically and lexically but no 'transcription' of a thought act is implied. The choice of free indirect discourse rather than psycho-narration or indirect discourse in the representation of consciousness is thus, primarily, related to a choice of the appropriate level of consciousness between verbality and non-verbality, reflectivity or non-reflectivity¹³—a choice that obviously does not apply to the representation of speech acts. These, by definition, are verbal and mostly reflective (if one utters a certain phrase, one is necessarily aware of doing so), although exclamations may be argued to be non-reflective.¹⁴

The formal scales that coincide so neatly in the three-term model are therefore radically undermined in any analysis that takes into consideration the full variety of forms as well as their conventional functions. The tripartite model breaks down entirely in relation to thought representation, where the parameters for the reporting of speech events are no longer operative. It is for this reason that I have dispensed with an initial definition of (free) indirect discourse in this book. Most of the study will indeed patiently trace the attempt to portray the formal elusiveness of the device and demonstrate the pragmatic nature of speech and thought representation.

As I have already outlined in the Introduction, this book was conceived as a reaction to Ann Banfield's theory of represented speech and thought. Banfield presents a definition of free indirect discourse that cuts across traditional linguistic and literary distinctions. In her framework free indirect discourse is predicated on consciousness and—formally—on the collocation of PAST and NOW, i.e. the collocation of the fictional past tense with proximal deictics relatable to the deictic centre of a represented consciousness. Additional expressive elements can be referred to this centre of consciousness by means of interpretative principles. (Compare under (7.1) below.)¹⁵ This definition, too, has its drawbacks, as we shall see, particularly on account of its insistence on a fictional past tense of narration.

It may, however, be doubted whether the form of free indirect discourse is all that important, or whether the attempt to distinguish it from other forms of speech and thought representation deserves the efforts that have been spent on establishing what is,

or is not, free indirect discourse. What one might instead consider to be of primary importance is of course the *functions* or the *purposes* of free indirect discourse in a specific text or in a specific passage. Many scholars have discussed a variety of such functions of the device, ranging from the illusion of an immediate presentation of characters' consciousness without too much loss of the narrative's superior powers (a narratological account) to the frequently mentioned ironic uses of free indirect discourse, and including more metaphorical statements such as:

The free indirect mode therefore inscribes its reversible pretense of empathy within an overarching metairony [*sic*] of narration and reading. The hierarchy of reflector and narrator, subjective and objective, necessarily subsists at the level of corrective irony. But in foregrounding both a uniformity of registers and a disparity of ideologies, the disembodied voice of the free indirect mode also gives rise to textual self-consciousness, or romantic irony. [...]

Thus, it is in the free indirect mode that romantic irony best objectifies the dissonance between meaning and experience. [...] Ultimately, Flaubert's response to this fall into language will be to fully embrace the alienating materiality of words—not to lower poetry, but to raise positivity of speech to its highest power. The poetic qualities of Flaubert's overdetermined style are potentially most perceptible when irony in the free indirect mode dramatizes the autonomy of the signifier. Reading becomes a dialectic between radically agonistic readings, an esthetic pantheism alternating between mimesis and metaphoricity, culture and nature, self and self-destruction.

(Ramazani 1988:115, 130–1)

A number of excellent observations regarding the functions of free indirect discourse have been made by Ingrid Kühn (1988:185–7). As is well known, free indirect discourse can be utilized to great effect in the detailed portrayal of characters' sentiments and feelings and thoughts. Besides rendering the propositional tenor of characters' thoughts, free indirect discourse additionally allows their representation in the mode of thinking and speaking most appropriate to those characters. In particular, free indirect discourse can effectually outline a character's mental situation, his or her emotional upheaval, and follow the train of thoughts and emotions through their turmoil to a possible resolution. Lips (1926:98) confirms this impression. She argues that free indirect discourse—in contrast to direct speech which marks the highlights—prepares the development of the subject.¹⁶ As Funke (1929:459 *et passim*) demonstrates with rare sensitivity, the contrast between a character's thoughts in free indirect discourse and a following direct discourse utterance can be utilized to portray the turmoil of indecision and its resolution in eventual decision making. Kühn additionally notes that free indirect discourse frequently occurs distributed all over the text in short passages rather than in larger blocks of text, monopolizing the narrative. This insight clearly characterizes texts where free indirect discourse is used to shift the perspective between events and characters' speech and thought acts, and it is of course highly untypical of novels such as Virginia Woolf's. Besides providing a relief for

the events by contrasting them with characters' mental reactions, mental counter-moves or emotional predicament, such a use of interspersed free indirect discourse can additionally add to the dramatic or scenic effect of the text, particularly if the thoughts of characters interacting in dialogue are accompanied by internal conflict and dialectic.

Kühn further remarks on a high incidence of free indirect discourse passages at the end of chapters, especially at the point of thematic highlights, recapitulating recollections or the like. In the realm of speech representation free indirect discourse is frequently employed in alternation with direct discourse, with one character always quoted directly, the other 'free-indirectly' (Bally 1912b:598–9). This allows the narrative to highlight important material against stereotypical answers, but can additionally be exploited to ironize the FID utterances of the character, or metaphorically to reflect the relation between the characters: power vs cringing subservience; outspokenness vs diplomacy or dishonesty; plain speech vs fastidiousness, euphemism or stylistic preciousness; simplicity vs sophistication, density, abstraction or profundity. Besides the more structural and empathetic uses of free indirect discourse, the caricaturing and parodic elements of FID presentation have received much notice (as early as Bally 1912a, 1912b, 1914a, 1914b, and treated at length in Pascal 1977). Müller (1985:220–1) and Beyerle (1972:361) emphasize the facility with which caricaturing FID can condense and exaggerate a character's utterance or attitudes with the intention of implicitly criticizing those speech acts and beliefs.

The very best analyses of free indirect discourse, however, are always too specific to allow generalization, and metaphorical interpretations of free indirect discourse in particular seem to depend on the thematic and formal setup of the individual text. The characteristic merging of the narrator's and the characters' perspectives which lies at the heart of the 'dual voice' approach to free indirect discourse (cp. below in [Chapter 6](#)) departs from the very same linguistic patterns of expressivity and pronominal or temporal shifting which constitute the characteristic 'mediary' quality of free indirect discourse. Whether one can interpret the ambiguities of form and 'voice' as a means of blurring the narrating structure of the text or as a means of ironically undermining characters' attitudes depends on the individual text, on its style, its characters, its themes and its situations (Meyer 1957).¹⁷ Extensive over-generalization beyond the individual novel or story can result in metaphorical blanket condemnations or celebrations that are of little practical value. Developments of this kind are unfortunately observable in recent criticism, for instance in D.A. Miller's *The Novel and the Police* and in LaCapra's *Madame Bovary on Trial*, where the narratorial syntactic government of free indirect discourse comes to be equated with an authoritarian poetics (Miller 1988, LaCapra 1982). Free indirect discourse will always have to rely on a reader's active interpretative strategy—as we will see in [Chapters 8](#) and [9](#)—whether in establishing a 'voice', or even a figural perspective in which the character's consciousness is foregrounded against a backgrounded inconspicuous narrating instance. It is for this reason that free indirect discourse becomes so eminently useful as a means of *deliberate ambiguity* (McKenzie 1987),¹⁸ but can likewise be treacherous because it fails to clearly separate the speaker's and the reportee's attitudes.¹⁹

That formal considerations above a general recognition of free indirect discourse as ‘mixing’ characteristics of indirect discourse and direct discourse need to be taken seriously, however, appears from the very common critical inattention to what exactly is free indirect discourse or psycho-narration, an inattention that has resulted in illustrations of the function of free indirect discourse in passages where there is no free indirect discourse in the text.

But, more important to my analysis of Walker’s revisions of *Their Eyes Were Watching God*[in Walker’s *The Color Purple*], Celie’s written voice to God, her Reader, tropes **the written-yet-never-uttered voice of free indirect discourse** which is the predominant vehicle of narrative commentary in Hurston’s novel.

Specifically, Hurston **draws upon free indirect discourse as a written voice masked as a speakerly voice** — as, in Hurston’s phrase, ‘an oral hieroglyphic.’ The **double voice** of *Their Eyes*, which conveys the illusion of a (writing) narrative presence that records the actual words of a (speaking) subject, is best exemplified in passages such as this one, where both voices speak/write at once:

They sat there in the fresh young darkness close together. Phoeby eager to feel and do through Janie, but hating to show her zest for fear it might be thought mere curiosity. Janie full of that oldest human longing—self-revelation. Phoeby held her tongue for a long time, but she couldn’t help moving her feet. So Janie spoke.

They don’t need to worry about me and my overalls as long as Ah still got nine hundred dollars in de bank. Tea Cake got me into wearing ‘em—following behind him. Tea Cake ain’t wasted up no money of mine, and he ain’t left me for no young gal, neither. He give me every consolation in de world. He’d tell ‘em so, if he was here. If he wasn’t gone.’

Phoeby dilated over all with eagerness, Tea Cake gone?’

‘Yeah Phoeby, Tea Cake is gone. And dat’s de only reason you see me back here—cause Ah ain’t got nothing to make me happy no more where Ah was at. Down in the Everglades there, down on the muck.’ [...] ²⁰

Here, where it is bordered by the prosaic voice of the narrator, ‘speech’ appears as spoken (black) dialect *within* the framework of formal writing or ‘official discourse.’ Phoeby and Janie are speaking about talking and understanding, but this speech must be modified by the voice of the narrator who formulates a written commentary upon the nature of the intimacy their speech represents. Thus their voices are ‘written over,’ or, rather, Janie (re)writes, as she represents, her own speech.

(Gates 1989:148–9, quoting Hurston 1978:18; my emphases)

Not only are the descriptions of free indirect discourse in this passage imprecise, derivative and metaphorical; the passage quoted from Hurston’s novel does not contain a single sentence of free indirect discourse, and the irony that Gates apostrophizes needs to be located between the dialogue (which is represented in direct speech—as he himself recognizes) and the narrative’s description of Phoeby’s curiosity, between the story as we

get it and the interpretation we construct on the basis of oddities and inconsistencies in the presentation. Lapses such as these are more than regrettable in a critic of Gates's stature, and the example illustrates how little actual attention has been bestowed on the formal properties of free indirect discourse outside narratology. It also shows how grossly narratological discussions of free indirect discourse can be misread in the interests of metaphor and thematic speculation. A study as linguistically oriented as this one may perhaps not reverse the trend, but it could help to provide a guidebook on free indirect discourse in its fullest spectrum, which should clarify some aspects of the phenomenon even for the general critic.

2.2

FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE IN FOCUS: ON THE MARGINS OF DISCOURSE

Following the discovery of free indirect discourse in French and German by Swiss and German Romance philologists around 1900,²¹ a lively debate about the terminology²² ensued which was mainly triggered by the syntactic differences between German and French and by the questions of 'voice' and irony. The history of this early period has been documented extensively in Lethcoe (1969:12–53) and G.Steinberg (1971), as well as Pascal (1977, chs 2–4). Whereas the Swiss (and by extension French) school persisted in using the term 'free indirect style', foregrounding the non-subordinate status of the device, the German school insisted on the narrator's responsibility for the form, noting that free indirect discourse (in German) came in the *indicative*, not the subjunctive mandatory for *indirect* discourse. Free indirect discourse undergoes a shift in personal pronouns and tense, similar to indirect discourse, and early studies documented and discussed many passages where this shift did not seem to take place in the expected manner (see below under (3.2.1)). Definitions of free indirect discourse were thus prevailingly syntactic—an orientation that persists even in Banfield's revolutionary approach. By quoting extensively from the nineteenth-century novel (mostly from the work of Zola), these early studies additionally illustrated a large number of other key characteristics of free indirect discourse, especially in the area of what has come to be subsumed under the so-called 'deictic centre' of the characters (cp. under (1.4) above and Chapter 7). Besides characters' evaluative lexemes (*pretty rough, gorgeous, lousy*), the occurrence of epistemic modals (*probably, certainly, must, ought to*), designations of others only referable to the characters' perspective (*papa, Madame, Sir*), as well as idiomatic expressions were established as *signals (indices)*²³ of free indirect discourse early on. Since then this list has been complemented by items such as the (logophoric) use of reflexives (Banfield 1982, Kuno 1987; cp. below under (3.2.2)), the perceptual nature of the English progressive (Banfield 1982; Toolan 1983, 1990; cp. below under (3.5)), causal subsidiary clauses (Spitzer 1948, Toolan 1990), the occurrence of so-called 'root transformations', i.e. syntactic indications of subjectivity (Banfield 1982, N.McCawley 1977, Ogle 1981; cp. below under (4.3.2)), and macrostructural aspects such as

paragraph boundaries and other narrative signals of subjective point of view (Fox 1987, 1988; Wiebe 1990).

Although several important studies on free indirect discourse appeared after Bally's classic and masterly presentation of the device (see especially Verschoor, Lips, Steinberg, Pascal), the discussion of free indirect discourse became more of an in-depth matter, adding new subcategories to the original definitions, and—most laudably—analysing the textual uses of the technique (Pascal 1977). Banfield's transformational approach therefore marks a true turning point. Banfield's paradigm derives from the syntactic model of transformational grammar and her description of free indirect discourse in terms of a deictic centre created many new *indices* of the device, establishing new areas of research for the occurrence of free indirect discourse in, say, the oral language or earlier historical periods.

Most discussions of free indirect discourse until today have concentrated on *literary* free indirect discourse. The existence of the construction in the spoken language was, however, already noted by E. Lerch (1914), Lorck (1921), Thibaudet (1922), Jespersen (1924), Karpf (1928, 1933) and Günther (1928), whereas Bally and Lips (1926:81) emphatically denied the oral origin of the device.²⁴ Karpf, for instance, adduced ample evidence from dialect narrative. More recently, Eisner (1975) has posited the existence of free indirect discourse in the oral language, although she then quoted passages that are not actually free indirect discourse.²⁵ Banfield—and with her a large number of scholars (Plank 1986, von Roncador 1988)—even now deny the existence of free indirect discourse in the oral language, but the *Survey of English Usage*—a collection of the present-day English language—devotes an entire classificatory category to the phenomenon. In fact, free indirect discourse occurs pervasively in the oral language; once one starts listening for it, one encounters numerous examples.

- (11) [the speaker is offered a job] *this was a Wednesday ((was it right)) so would I start the next day- and perhaps put in for that Friday as well- m and that that would be my first week's pay*

(*Survey of English Usage* S.2.12.91)

- (12) followed me—followed me—yes followed me into [unreadable] *yes he was on the dole brought out his dole card and showed it to me and and — (did)) I know what it was like to be on the dole and so on*

(*Ibid.*, S.2.7.87)²⁶

- (13) —the one who's supposed to have saved it [the computer?] *he'd heard rumours that Peel might Join the brain drain on this account —. as far as he was concerned any old drain was good enough for Peel. all Peel had to do was to specify the drain and he would gladly help him down it any time*

(*Ibid.*, S.1.6.133)

There is much corresponding evidence from American English.

- (14) And w—

so, the car stalled
 but we didn't ca—
 COULDn't call
 because we were supposed t'be out t'lunch
 and why were we *HERE*?

(Schiffrin 1981:47)

- (15) And my mother had just sat down to have a cup of coffee. And I told him to cut it out.

'Course kids, you know—he *don't hafta listen to me*. So that's when I grabbed him by the arm.

(Labov 1972:239)

- (16) He wanted to know right then and there: *Were we gonna comply and go along or was he gonna have to call his boys to work us over?*

(*The Good War*, 'John H. Abbot'; Terkel 1990:168)

Whenever available I will quote examples from such sources in the following chapters. In regard to the origins of free indirect discourse, these examples already demonstrate the crucial importance of intonation and context—most of the free indirect discourse in conversation tends to be ironical and therefore relies on a triangular model of the reception process.²⁷ Even with the artful inclusion of expressive syntax and other expressive elements, free indirect discourse is therefore bound to remain an elusive, potentially ambiguous phenomenon that cannot be defined in exclusively linguistic terms. Early instances of free indirect discourse are, moreover, different in form from present-day free indirect discourse because they tend to adhere to now superseded normative conventions of narrative discourse and style.

On similar lines, most examples of free indirect discourse that have been discussed have concentrated on third person narrative, but the device equally exists in first person texts. This was first noted by Lorck (1921:38), Lips (1926: 149–50) and Karpf (1933). Dickens's 'My dream was out; my wild fancy was surpassed by sober reality; *Miss Havisham was going to make my fortune on a grand scale*' (*Great Expectations*, xviii; Dickens 1974:165) has acquired some notoriety as an example of free indirect discourse in a first person narrative.²⁸ In first person narrative the character through whose consciousness one perceives things in free indirect discourse is the 'experiencing self', the narrator's self as character in the tale (Lips 1926:149–59; Spitzer 1928a; Lämmert 1955; Stanzel 1971; Banfield 1982), to be distinguished from the 'narrating self'. Stanzel, in particular, noted the generally more empathetic character of first person free indirect discourse, since distancing from one's former beliefs tends to take the shape of commentary rather than strong irony (1984b: 224).

Besides first person narrative, free indirect discourse can now be discovered in more experimental kinds of writing, too. G. Steinberg (1971, 1972) was the first (and, to my knowledge, only) scholar to note early the existence of free indirect discourse in second-person narrative.²⁹ I can entirely confirm his results and add examples from texts with other 'odd' pronominal forms. Here is an example of free indirect discourse (*speech*

representation) in a second-person narrative, followed by an example of the (more common) representation of a reflector's consciousness:

- (17) Amanda had to look after herself; you gathered her mother didn't much care about her. *She left home when she was sixteen and moved in with a boyfriend, who lasted until a few months before she met you. He left a note explaining that he was moving to California.*

(*Bright Lights, Big City*; McInerney 1984:71)

- (18) Sunlight. A morning. *Where the hell are your sunglasses?* You hate mornings—anger rises in you, bubbling like something sour in your throat—but you grin into the morning because somebody is approaching you, shouting a magic word. Your name.

('You'; Oates 1970:362)

- (19) You thought about the road [...] and you hoped the snow wouldn't melt too soon into mud. *It would be all right; it wasn't like the long hard rains. It would be all right if you didn't stay out too long with the sheep.*

(*House Made of Dawn, The Night Chanter*'; Momaday 1977:142)³⁰

Besides second person narrative, there are stories written in the first person plural we (*nous*) or its equivalent *on*, such as Pierre Silvain's *Les Éoliennes* (1971):

- (20) Nous étions sur le devant de la porte depuis un moment, plongés dans nos réflexions, lorsque nous nous sommes avisés que l'ombre de la roue s'était déplacée vers la gauche. *Il était grand temps de commencer l'inspection. On devrait peut-être y aller*, a dit Gaubert, mais Mathis a fait celui qui n'avait pas entendu. [...] Brazier avait encore sa main fermée dressée au-dessus de sa tête, quand, tout à coup, la roue s'est mise à tourner. Le premier grincement s'est fait entendre. Il ne ressemble pas à ceux qui vont le suivre. C'est une plainte assourdie, venue du silence, qui jamais ne cessera de monter vers le ciel vide. *Mais si cette plainte était la nôtre? Et si la roue ne tournait que dans notre tête? Peut-être qu'elle n'existe pas, il n'y a rien au-dehors, tout est noir et immobile depuis le commencement, arrêté pour le reste de l'éternité, c'est dans notre tête que tourne et grince sans fin la roue géante.*

(*Les Éoliennes*; Silvain 1971:42–3)³¹

Another famous text is Monique Wittig's *L'Opoponax*, where the impersonal *on* ambiguously shifts between a 'we', 'one' and 'I' reading.

- (21) On regarde par la fenêtre les nuages qui ballottent dans le ciel. *On va être obligé d'allumer les lampes on n'y voit rien.* On a envie d'être dans le jardin pour le premier coup de tonnerre pour voir l'éclair entre les troncs de marronnier pour attendre qu'il frappe l'un d'eux.

(*L'Opoponax*; Wittig 1964:171)³²

Christopher Isherwood's *A Single Man* (1964:9–10) provides a (brief) near-equivalent in English. The novel starts with a description of the protagonist using the pronoun *it*, and has a few snatches of free indirect discourse in the *it* form. Perhaps the most curious pronominal usage I know of is June Arnold's replacement of the gendered pronouns *he* or *she* by *na* in *The Cook and the Carpenter* (1973). Even here one can observe characteristic cases of free indirect discourse:

- (22) The boards lay. The carpenter felt that Saturday morning—alone and unrequired by family, job or movement—erotic. Na thought na would write the article after taking a walk with one of the dogs, doing morning things, getting the day in order. Na could structure the article as na went.

(*The Cook and the Carpenter*; Arnold 1973:69)

To stay with more narratological concerns, it has long been acknowledged that free indirect discourse can occur *in all types of narrative* (excluding the pure interior monologue novel), even if pervasive use of free indirect discourse seems to argue for a connection between free indirect discourse and internal focalization (Genette; i.e. Stanzel's reflector mode)—which is what Banfield proposes.

Free indirect discourse, for instance, can be found with great pervasiveness in the nineteenth-century '**omniscient**' novel, although, especially with Dickens, it is used prominently for the rendering of *speech events* and very commonly for *ironic purposes*:

- (23) He [Mr Dorrit] received them in his poor room (he disliked an introduction in the mere yard, as informal—a thing that might happen to anybody), with a kind of bowed-down beneficence. *They were welcome to the Marshalsea, he would tell them. Yes, he was the Father of the place. So the world was kind enough to call him; and so he was, if more than twenty years of residence gave him a claim to the title. It looked small at first, but there was very good company there — among a mixture—necessarily a mixture — and very good air.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, vi; Dickens 1978:105–6)

Free indirect discourse, however, also occurs in many near-neutral renderings of utterances:

- (24) *And did he deserve to be acquitted? Yes, upon the whole he did;—to be acquitted of that special sin.*

(*Doctor Thorne*, xviii; Trollope 1990:240)

There are, however, also many passages rendering characters' *consciousness*:

- (25) The blood rushed to Dorothea's face and neck painfully. But Celia was administering what she thought a sobering dose of fact. *It was taking up notions that had done Dodo's health so much harm.*

(*Middlemarch*, 1; G.Eliot 1986:532)

- (26) The father understood it all. He saw that it was now much beyond his faded powers to touch the heart or conscience of such a youth as his son had become. *What now could he do for his boy except die? What else, what other benefit, did his son require of him but to die; to die so that his means of dissipation might be unbounded?*

(*Doctor Thorne*, xxv; Trollope 1990:327)

Free indirect discourse strongly correlates with **internal focalization**, whether in the early Jane Austen or the late Virginia Woolf and beyond, with standard applications in recent, more popular fiction.

- (27) Anne saw the misery of such feelings. *The husband had not been what he ought, and the wife had been led among that part of mankind which made her think worse of the world, than she hoped it deserved.*

(*Persuasion*, xvii; Austen 1987:168–9)

- (28) Cadfael thought about it every step of the way, as he went up through the woods that afternoon to Rhisiart's hall. *A man could count on Prior Robert to be impressive, but that little miracle had been a master-stroke.* The breathless hush, the rippling outbreak of comment and wonder and awe among the men of Gwytherin were with him still. *No question but the remotest villein hut and the poorest free holding in the parish would be buzzing with the news by now. The monks of Shrewsbury were vindicated. The saint had taken their prior by the hand and led him to her grave.*

(*A Morbid Taste For Bones*, vi; Peters 1988:99–100)

It has been argued by Banfield that (in such works—since she only analyses novels of internal focalization) representations of speech events occur only as filtered through the character's consciousness, as they well may be:

- (29) The first speaker was her Uncle Tom. She knew the naïve candour covering the girding and savage misery of his soul. *Who was the other speaker? Whose voice ran on so easy, yet with an inflamed pulse?* It seemed to hasten and urge her forward, that other voice. 'I remember you,' the young man's voice **was saying**. [...] Mrs Brangwen laughed, shy and pleased.

(*The Rainbow*, xi; Lawrence 1988:289)

However, the pervasiveness of free indirect discourse for the rendering of speech acts in nineteenth-century fiction suggests that this radical explanation can be valid only for the most uncompromisingly rigorous application of narrative perspective (a rigour not fully observed even in Virginia Woolf).³³

Within the **first person realm** free indirect discourse of course occurs in the traditional, more balanced retrospective tales on the pattern of *David Copperfield* and *Moby Dick*, and here again both for speech and thought representation, as one can see already in early-eighteenth-century examples:

- (30) *This was very pertly said, she was pleased to tell me; but bid me reflect, that the forfeiture of that estate, through my opposition, would be attended with the total loss of my papa 's favour; and then how destitute I must be; how unable to support myself; and how many benevolent designs and good actions must I give up!*

(*Clarissa*, Letter 20; Richardson 1985:107)

- (31) Then he began to parly with me, said he would make me any reasonable Satisfaction, and would fain have had me told him [*sic*] what it was I expected; I told him I should not be my own Judge, *the Law should decide it for me, and as I was to be carried before a Magistrate, I should let him hear there what I had to say.*

(*Moll Flanders*; Defoe 1989:315)

Free indirect discourse is found, likewise, for the representation of consciousness and also in first person narrative with **internal focalization** (first person figural narrative) where it usually occurs in a present tense context and is then formally indistinguishable from direct speech:

- (32) I go round the house and go back to the toilet. The grass is dry like hay. There ain't no leaves on the trees. I see some birds in the tree. The wind's moving the birds's [*sic*] feathers. *I bet you them little birds's some cold. I'm glad I'm not a bird. No daddy, no mama — I'm glad I'm not a bird.*

(‘A Long Day in November’; Gaines 1976:38)

Neutral or objective narrative, on the other hand, by definition rules out a rendering of characters’ consciousness and therefore of free indirect discourse portraying such consciousness. However, there are sometimes infractions of this rule:³⁴

- (33) ‘Il piove,’ the wife said. She liked the hotel-keeper. [...] Liking him she opened the door and looked out. It was raining harder. A man in a rubber cape was crossing the empty square to the café. *The cat would be around to the right. Perhaps she could go along under the eaves.* As she stood in the doorway an umbrella opened behind her. *It was the maid who looked after their room.*

(‘Cat in the Rain’; Hemingway 1987:130)

Even in the representation of speech events one only rarely encounters a free indirect discourse passage. Hemingway, like Chandler, relies almost completely on direct speech.

To stay with such more specifically narratological distinctions, one can observe additionally that free indirect discourse occurs not only in narratives using the narrative past tense or preterite—the ‘standard’ case, so to speak, which is assumed to be the only one in most studies of free indirect discourse—but also in texts written entirely **in the present tense**, a fact that has been little noted in work on free indirect discourse,³⁵ although studies of present tense texts have frequently noted the existence of free indirect discourse.

- (34) There are open grates in every room. This is in defiance of the Clean Air Act, *it is true, but it is clear to Oliver that industry pollutes the air and not the private domestic fire. And as for cars (Oliver has two, a Peugeot estate and a Mustang) they contribute only six percent to total air pollution and the attack against the private car, as is well known, is diversionary tactics backed by big business interests.*

(*Female Friends*; Weldon 1988:101)

- (35) I sit down on the bed. *They might have asked me first, it's my house. Though maybe they're waiting till I come out, they'll ask then. If I say I don't want to they can't very well stay; but what reason can I give? I can't tell them about my father, betray him; anyway they might think I was making it up. There's my work, but they know I have it with me. I could leave by myself with Evans but I'd only get as far as the village: it's David's car. I'd have to steal the keys, and also, I remind myself, I never learned to drive.*

(*Surfacing I*, viii; Atwood 1973:75)

Most comments that I have found on present tense free indirect discourse have called this free indirect discourse within the *historical* present tense, but one needs to note that the present tense in these novels is frequently a *narrative* present tense, because these texts are narrated entirely in the present.³⁶ The situation is much more complex in brief passages of present tense within a past tense context, where there is little occasion to use free indirect discourse. Note, however, that most passages in Dickens's novels for instance belong to the typical nineteenth-century manifestation of the so-called historical present tense,³⁷ that is to say the present tense here also serves to report the 'action', and the tense of the free indirect discourse sentences is embedded within this present tense inset in the narrative.

- (36) He *fought* his way over and under the bodies blocking the corridor to the only first-class carriage, *sat* down in it, *mopped* his brow, *looked* out of the window. *His porter. Oh, where is his porter? His porter! He looks* out up and down, down and up. Out through, over and under the bodies he *fights* his way once more! *Where is his porter? Where his bags? He runs* up and down, here, there, everywhere. *No porter anywhere. Good heavens! The train is going! A whistle blows! Someone shouts! The train is going! The train is moving. The train is gone.*

(Hugh Walpole, *The Silver Thorn*; quoted Steinberg 1971:259)

There are similar shifts into the present tense also in more recent fiction, for instance in Proust (see the passages quoted by Fleischman 1990:235–44, 249–53), where free indirect discourse is similarly embedded but the use of the present tense no longer appears to be a striking deviation from context on account of the predominant internal focalization.

These cases have to be carefully distinguished from free indirect discourse passages in which the narrative frame is in the preterite but the free indirect discourse itself fails to 'shift' the tense—presupposing that one has an underlying 'original' direct discourse

which should be shifted into the past *tense/imparfait*. On a non-mimetic reading, the present tense would mark the reportative nature of the inset by a ‘temporal metaphor’ (or ‘tense metaphor’—Weinrich), i.e. by a temporal deviation from the expected preterital norm.³⁸ Such cases are fairly rare in modern English, except in the context of gnomic utterances, and would perhaps deserve to be treated as cases of ‘slipping’ (Schuelke 1958).³⁹ In early English texts and particularly in medieval English narrative, however, present tense free indirect discourse in preterital contexts exists in large quantity. For a more extensive discussion of this issue see under (3.4.3) below.

Such cases of present tense (free) indirect discourse need not actually be regarded as the problem they appear to be from a twentieth-century perspective. As can be observed in medieval and early modern English, indirect discourse very frequently comes in the present tense, too, so that the tense shift certainly does not seem to be the rule and one may speculate about free stylistic variation. In French the sequence of tenses rule was apparently non-obligatory until Flaubert, who was the first to apply it consistently (Lips 1926:186 ff.). Particularly in medieval free indirect discourse and as late as La Fontaine the present tense is the almost exclusive FID tense, that is to say one has an unshifted deictic orientation (cp. Fabricius-Hansen 1989 and her Principle I as presented under (3.4.1)).

Although I cannot here offer any thorough-going comparisons with the medieval French or German situation, one needs to note that there are other languages without tense shifts for indirect discourse (Japanese) or with alternative shift/non-shift patterns (Russian). I will return to the point below when briefly considering the attestation of free indirect discourse outside German, French and English. In oral English narrative free indirect discourse in the present tense can be observed quite regularly (and this is true of German also), but the situation requires careful evaluation because it is invariably bound up with the oral historical present tense pattern, and one may here (although, I would say, still metaphorically) speak of a free indirect discourse in the historical present tense.

- (37) Right, yeah, well Jo and Ewen and a girlfriend of mine, Jo and Ewen and Rob and I went to the Victoria Station for supper once and [...]. So we were all ready to go eh and Joanne and me and Ewen **are** still waiting for Rob who is in the washroom. We’re waiting and waiting an‘next thing we know here **comes** Rob just streaking out of the can with somethin’ huge under his arm ‘okay, let’s go.’ [...] and just **goes** bombing right through the door. *And what the hell has he got?*

(Spielman/Gardner 1979:303)

Besides fictional texts (novels, short stories), free indirect discourse can also be found in **drama**, that is to say in the dramatic representation of oral free indirect discourse, and of course in the fictional dialogue of characters in the novel.

- (38) [Sara speaking] She [Mrs Harford] started talking the second she got in the door. *She had only a few minutes because she has to be home before dinner so her husband won’t suspect she came here.* He’s forbidden her to see Simon ever since Simon came out here to live. [FID or Sara’s report]

(*A Touch of the Poet* II; O’Neill 1957:61)

- (39) [Mr Meagles speaking] Then it all burst out. *She [Tattycoram] detested us, she was miserable with us, she couldn't bear it, she wouldn't bear it, she was determined to go away. [...] What did we think she, Tattycoram, might have been if she had been caressed and cared for in her childhood, like her young mistress? [...] There was Mrs Tickit, only yesterday, when her little grandchild was with her, had been amused by the child's trying to call her (Tattycoram) by the wretched name we gave her; and had laughed at the name.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xxvii; Dickens 1978:371–2)

- (40) But she smiled a private kind of smile. 'Cora Manson told me about it, she read all about it in the papers and of course she was shocked and disgusted. *She didn't know we had such things around here, she said, she thought we were civilized here. And shouldn't someone do something to stop them?*'

(*The Invention of the World*, 'Wade'; Hodgins 1977:167)

Additionally, free indirect discourse can even be located in verse narrative, as Karpf was the first (and practically only) person to point out:

- (41) And while he pray'd, the master of that ship
 Enoch had served in, hearing his mischance,
 Came, for he knew the man and valued him,
 Reporting of his vessel China-bound
 And wanting yet a boatswain. *Would he go?*
There yet were many weeks before she sailed,
Sail'd from this port. Would Enoch have the place?
 And Enoch all at once assented to it.

(*Enoch Arden*; Tennyson 1968:118; quoted Karpf 1933:273)

All of the above examples have been either from the oral language or from more or less literary texts. However, as has lately been noted with increasing urgency, free indirect discourse also occurs widely in **non-literary texts**. Pride of place is here probably due to Hansard, the official transcription of the British parliamentary debates.⁴⁰

- (42) *Reform of the Lords was a long-pursued mirage*, Mr Powell told a House which started to fill up as news that he was on his feet spread. *If it was found that the Lords really curbed the Commons, MPs would not stand for it for long.*

(*Survey of English Usage* W.12.4.4)

As has additionally been pointed out with increasing frequency, free indirect discourse is used extensively in newspaper articles, scientific prose, historical writing and all kinds of journalism.⁴¹ Many of my own examples are from the *New York Review of Books*:

- (43) He [Montagu] suffered agonies from her sexual rejection, which was known to their intimate friends; and when his political career was finished, *what was there to*

live for? And yet some cynics might have said that he had achieved his ambition. *The daughter of a famous aristocratic family had accepted him. Did not this prove that he was on equal terms with the rulers of the land?*

(NYRB 38.19 [1991]:25)

- (44) Within a matter of weeks, according to a *Newsweek* poll, 77 percent of the American public had become aware of George Holliday's Rodney King video, had counted the kicks and the baton strikes and identified on the grainy, badly lit tape which officers were which, *here was the indefatigable Wind, over there the stomper Briseno.*

(NYRB 38.15 [1991]:24)

I have recently even heard examples on the BBC News and in news presentations on Austrian television. Although, in scholarly historical writing, free indirect discourse is generally discountenanced as a stylistic device unless supplemented by quotable sources, more popular historical literature—and of course the historical novel—make extensive use of free indirect discourse (cp. Cohn 1989). The *New York Review of Books's* historical and biographical articles—produced by the foremost senior historians in their field—indicate the acceptance of the device under more relaxed circumstances:

- (45) In August 1989, the historian Andranic Migranian had published an article in *Novy Mir* advocating an authoritarian system as a 'transitional stage from totalitarianism to democracy.' *Democracy was a luxury the Soviet state could not yet afford*, Migranian argued; *for an unspecified time a strong hand was needed to guide it through the deepening crisis.*

(NYRB 37.11 [1990]:53)

I now shift back to more linguistic, particularly **diachronic issues**. The origins of free indirect discourse have remained a topic of heated dispute over the decades. One group of scholars has claimed that free indirect discourse is a purely literary device, and that its origins in the eighteenth-century novel are unrelated to similar syntactic and expressive phenomena in earlier narrative texts. Banfield (1982) is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the literary quality and origin of free indirect discourse. She particularly rejects early French and English examples adduced by various scholars,⁴² as do also Stempel (1972a) and Fleischman (1990: ch. 7).

The second camp, among which I count myself, maintains that free indirect discourse is an oral phenomenon and that its rarity in pre-eighteenth-century texts is accounted for by its original reliance on intonation to indicate a 'voice'. Scholars in this tradition recognize numerous instances of proto-free indirect discourse in medieval texts (precisely the ones rejected by Fleischman and others), and they point to the currency of free indirect discourse in present-day conversation. Here is a random example from Chaucer to document the existence of the device in Middle English. Note that this is a passage with full temporal shift. (More generally, as we have noted earlier, the present tense prevails in

FID clauses, or there is considerable inconsistency in the application of the shift even within one single sentence.)

- (46) Daun John hym maketh feeste and murye cheere,
 And he hym tolde agayn, ful specially,
 How he hadde wel ybought and graciously,
Thanked be God, al hool his marchandise;
*Save that he **moste**, in alle maner wise,*
Maken a chevysaunce, as for his beste,
*And thanne he **sholde** been in joye and reste.*
 (*Canterbury Tales*, The Shipman's Tale'; B² 342–8)

Note that with very few exceptions Chaucer's free indirect discourse renders characters' *speech acts* rather than consciousness. (For further examples see under (3.4.3).)

The existence of free indirect discourse in medieval narrative has been denied by Banfield on the grounds that proposed instances of free indirect discourse lack the subjectivity markers which she considers to be a requirement for establishing the subjective context of free indirect discourse. However, as one can note from the above, Chaucer does integrate some exclamations such as *Thanked be God* in (46) with his (free) indirect passages, although the full scale of expressive elements common to present-day free indirect discourse is clearly absent.

In order to evaluate this scarcity of expressive elements one here needs to consider two things. Chaucer's style, although quite demonstrably colloquial, is still a *written* text,⁴³ and the constraints against all too colloquial elements in the written language extend until well into the literature of the nineteenth century. Many of the expressive free indirect discourse devices which Banfield fails to locate in medieval narratives also cannot be found in other contemporary medieval texts. They do not enter the English language before the Renaissance period, when they can indeed be traced first in the imitation of 'vulgar' speech in the Renaissance drama of the sixteenth century and beyond. It is therefore no coincidence that in narrative texts the expressive elements in free indirect discourse begin to prevail only in late-sixteenth-century prose and in literary imitations of colloquial discourse, for example that of diaries and letter writing (as, for instance, in Aphra Behn's and Richardson's works):⁴⁴ the privacy of the written composition allows a certain freedom from linguistic etiquette. It comes therefore as no surprise to find expressive elements in *The Unfortunate Traveller* (1594), a text which has a garrulous narrator on *skaz*⁴⁵ lines, whereas in Sidney's *Arcadia* (1590) or in *Euphues* (1578/1580) such 'colloquiality' is apparently discountenanced.

- (47) He very subtly consented to her stratagem at the first motion: *kill me he would, that heavens [sic] could not withstand [root transformation], and a pistol was the predestinate engine which must deliver the parting blow.*
 (*The Unfortunate Traveller*; Nashe 1985:301)

- (48) Yea, he was more inflamed and ravished with it ['this silver-sounding tale'] than a young man called Taurimontanus was with the Phrygian melody [...]. *No remedy there was but I must help to furnish him with money.*

(Ibid., 267)

- (49) He swore, *as he was a gentleman and a soldier, he would be revenged on him; and let but the King of France follow his counsel, he would drive him from Turwin walls yet ere three days to an end.*

(Ibid., 267)

Expressive instances of free indirect discourse can, for instance, be found in Francis Kirkman's *The Counterfeit Lady Unveiled* (1673) and in the anonymous *Don Tomazo* (1680):

- (50) At length he calls for the people of the house and asks them if they knew not the men that were with him. They replied, 'No.' *What not know my lady's men Thomas and Ralph that were there with him?* 'We know none of them,' Replied they, 'Nor know not what lady you mean.'

(*The Counterfeit Lady Unveiled*; Kirkman in Peterson 1961:69)

- (51) When Father Worsley came to discourse [with] Don Tomazo in English, *heavens, what a refreshing it was to him!* For he had not spoken to any person whatever in ten weeks before.

(*Don Tomazo*; Anon. in Peterson 1961:282)

Even more surprisingly, there are even some examples of indirect speech that accommodate characters' subjective language:

- (52) In the meanwhile the old man rises, who finding both his son and Don Tomazo absent, could not conjecture *what the De'll should be become of them.*

(Ibid., 196)

Such examples are, however, rare in Elizabethan prose. Most free indirect discourse passages are fairly unobtrusive continuations of indirect discourse:

- (53) At length, riding in a lane, suspecting nothing in the least, he turns his little hobby upon me and seizing my bridle before I was aware, claps to my breast a little ugly, brass-barreled pistol, and swore as bloodily as if he had been one of the trade above twenty years: *if I would not instantly dismount, he would send a bullet to my heart.*

(*Jacksons Recantation*; Head in Peterson 1961:161)

- (54) and so reaching at his arm would needs drag him [Robin Caley] unto the bishop. The gentleman gently requested again and again that refraining his hold he would suffer him to go of his own free will: *he should not need to fear him; for he would not start from him.*

(*Foxe's Book of Martyrs*, 'Mary; The Cruelty of Boner and his Complices'; 1965:405)⁴⁶

- (55) Well then (said the duke of Excester) this that I doo and shall say is true, that the late king, the duke of Norfolk, and thou being at Woodstoke, made me to go with you into the chappell, and there the doore being shut, ye made me to sweare upon the altar, to keepe counsell in that ye had to say to me, and then ye rehearsed that we should never have our purpose, so long as the duke of Lancaster lived, and therefore ye purposed to have counsell at Lichfield, *and there you would arrest the duke of Lancaster*, in such sort as by colour of his disobeieng the arrest, he should be dispatched out of life.

(*Holinshed's Chronicles*, 'Henry the Fourth'; 1978:9)

Definitive answers to the origins of free indirect discourse can only be expected from an exhaustive analysis of precisely those texts that are usually⁴⁷ considered below the attention of literary scholars, and will therefore have to wait until such analyses have been completed. No such extensive study on early free indirect discourse has yet been made. From the evidence that I have seen, one can, however, note a number of interesting facts.

It has, for instance, been variously suggested that free indirect discourse only occurs for the representation of consciousness (Banfield, Wiebe), and that speech in the form of free indirect discourse can be 'explained away' as the perception, i.e. hearing, of that speech as reflected in a character's consciousness (who then functions as a reflector). As we have seen from the early free indirect discourse examples, they are almost without exception examples of *speech* representation. However, in **German** the emergence of free indirect discourse in the eighteenth century is linked, almost exclusively, to the representation of *thought*, from which the subjunctive, also in indirect discourse, is barred,⁴⁸ and the device seems to have then been generalized to cover speech environments, too. My source for these statements is Neuse (1990), who quotes extensively from eighteenth-century novels. It would of course now be extremely interesting to compare Neuse's results to earlier German occurrences of free indirect discourse, but there is very little documentation for free indirect discourse or its avatars in medieval German and in pre-eighteenth-century German prose.⁴⁹ Whereas Lorck (1921), Günther (1928), Verschoor (1959), Stempel (1972a) and Bruña-Cuevas (1988) present a wide array of medieval French examples, I have not encountered more than two or three putative free indirect discourse cases for medieval German including one passage from the *Nibelungen* epic, v. 1101.⁵⁰ An analysis of early modern German texts, too, would be highly recommendable in view of the comparison with the late-eighteenth-century situation in the English language. Although free indirect discourse for the rendering of speech acts continues to be common in nineteenth-century English novels, there is of course a dramatic increase in its use for the representation of consciousness starting with Jane Austen and Sir Walter Scott, with some earlier examples in Walpole, Radcliffe or Charles Brockden Brown (W. Bühler 1937).

Neuse's book additionally allows us an insight into the comparative importance of Banfield's subjectivity markers. As will be noted (see [Chapter 3](#)), even in English there are many passages of free indirect discourse without such explicit signals (Wiebe and Ehrlich, although they adopt Banfield's paradigm, here fully concur). In fact, the predominance of such signals seems to be restricted to a number of writers who literally

wallow in them (Aldous Huxley is a case in point), whereas others rarely indulge in colloquialisms or syntactic free indirect discourse markers, and there is of course a complete range of intermediary cases from George Eliot to D.H. Lawrence or Donald Barthelme. In fact, the question seems to be very much something of a stylistic order and inextricably linked to what kind of ulterior uses of free indirect discourse are envisaged by the respective authors. Thus, a lack of distance to the characters' emotionality or a parodic intent may further the extensive use of subjectivity markers, whereas distance or critical evaluation may encourage a cautious use of such signals. The German comparison, here, too, opens up interesting perspectives. From Neuse's numerous example quotations one can—in principle—observe the presence of roughly the same subjectivity markers in German as in English. However, the frequency of their use in German seems to be largely restricted, but by way of compensation German employs a whole battery of sentential or verbal modifiers that constitute an evaluative, colloquial or subjective modification of the propositional values in the remainder of the phrase or sentence in which they occur. Examples of such modifiers are:

- (56) Die Amme zögerte. *Sie wußte wohl, wie Säuglinge rochen, sie wußte es ganz genau, sie hatte doch schon Dutzende genährt, gepflegt, geschaukelt, geküßt...sie konnte sie nachts mit der Nase finden, sie trug den Säuglingsgeruch selbst jetzt deutlich in der Nase. Aber sie hatte ihn noch nie mit Worten bezeichnet.*

(*Das Parfüm* I, ii; Süskind 1985:16)⁵¹

A historically sensitive analysis of non-literary prose before and into the eighteenth century would additionally throw some light on the syntactic properties of early free indirect discourse in relation to the general syntactic handling of reported speech. In English and French, for instance, the emergence of free indirect discourse would seem to be easily explainable in the dropping of subordinating complementizers *that* or *que* in long passages of reported discourse, with the question form (I-movement) a subsequent analogical development once free indirect discourse has become established. However, in German, this explanation does not work at all because of the near-obligatory use of the subjunctive in indirect discourse. This tallies with the fact that free indirect discourse first emerged in German in passages representing (characters') *thought* processes; for *speech* representation 'free' **indirect** discourse (signalled by the subjunctive) was already available. The English medieval protoforms also suggest a development from ambiguous narratorial sentences in which the narrator's account can be regarded as both *de re* and *de dicto*. The concentration on direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse—to the exclusion of intermediary forms—has unfortunately meant that so far the wrong kind of linguistic evidence for free indirect discourse in early texts has been at issue. In any case the absence of certain expressive elements in pre-eighteenth-century free indirect discourse does not entirely rule out earlier non-expressive forms of the device, as is so persistently argued in some parts. Free indirect discourse is *not* a morphological form that either exists or does not exist in, say, fifteenth-century English—a formulation of the question appropriate to lexemes and forms of the plural or the past tense of certain verbs.

When one attempts to grasp free indirect discourse linguistically, it will not do to discover *its formal origins*, but one also needs to analyse previous ways of evoking the same effect, that of ‘voice’ and mimetic immediacy. Within the stylistic context of a past literature, ‘voice’ can be suggested by tense metaphor as well as by left dislocation in a ‘shifted’ context. Of course, eventually one may want to decide that earlier forms anticipating free indirect discourse need to be regarded as, after all, different and would merit a separate name. However, at the present time there is a lack of evidence for such a move, and it will be well to wait for a series of philological studies in the various literatures that patiently trace the story of forms and meaning-effects in early instances of reported discourse.

This takes me to the situation in **French**. I believe there is ample evidence for free indirect discourse in medieval French if one does not insist on the presence of too many of Banfield’s expressive elements. I quote two fairly self-explanatory examples from Günther and Stempel:⁵²

(57) Tristan l’oï, mult s’en haita.

Ele n’i purra mie aler

qu’il ne la veie trespasser.

(Marie de France, *Chievrefoil*, 44–6; quoted Günther 1928:95)

‘Tristan heard it, he was very pleased about it.

She won’t at all be able to go there

without him seeing her [i.e. so that he not see (present subjunctive) her] *pass by.*’⁵³

(58) Guigemar est en piez levez;

Ne s’est de nient effreez:

Une grosse perche de sap,

U suleient pendre li drap,

Prist en ses mains e sis atent.

Il en ferat aukun dolent;

Ainz ke il d’eus seit aprimiez

Les avrat il tuz maïniez.

(Marie de France, *Guigemar*, 593–600; quoted Stempel 1972a:319)

‘Guigemar got up on his feet;

He was not frightened by anything:

A large wooden pole,

Upon which clothing was usually hung,

He seized in his hands and so did he [or does he] await them.

He will hurt some of them with it;

Before he be [subjunctive] *approached by any of them,*

He will have maimed them all.’⁵⁴

Stempel also quotes an example of free indirect discourse within a first person context (1972a:323) and an indirect speech sentence with the interjection *pour Dieu* (325).

For modern French, an example from La Fontaine has excited much comment:

- (59) Tout le jour il avoit l'oeil au guet; et la nuit,
 Si quelque chat faisoit du bruit,
Le chat prenoit l'argent.
 (*Fables* VIII, ii 'Le savetier et le financier'; La Fontaine n.d.: 212)⁵⁵

Free indirect discourse can definitely be found in Madame de La Fayette's *La Princesse de Clèves* (1695),⁵⁶ and in the classic dramatists:

- (60) Mais bientôt rappelant sa cruelle industrie,
 Il me représenta l'honneur et la patrie,
 Tout ce peuple, ces rois a mes ordre soumis,
 Et l'empire d'Asie a la Grèce promis:
De quel front immolant tout l'Etat a ma fille,
Roi sans gloire, j'irais vieillir dans ma famille!
 (*Iphigénie* I, i; Racine 1950:677)⁵⁷

There are also instances in the eighteenth-century novel, for example in Diderot's *Jacques le fataliste* (1778–80):

- (61) Au bout de quelques années, le marquis commença a trouver la vie de La Pommeraye trop unie. [...] Peu a peu il passa un jour, deux jours sans la voir; [...] peu a peu il abrégéa ses visites; *il avait des affaires qui l'appelaient*; lorsqu'il arrivait, il disait un mot, s'étalait dans un fauteuil, prenait une brochure, la jetait, parlait a son chien ou s'endormait. Le soir, *sa santé qui devenait miserable voulait qu'il se retirât de bonne heure, c'était l'avis de Tronchin.*
 (Diderot 1983:127)⁵⁸

The extensive use of expressive elements seems to be characteristic of Zola, where the device becomes obtrusive and was therefore first discovered by Tobler, Kalepky, Bally and Lerch; other novelists, including the master Flaubert, seem to have exercised caution.⁵⁹

It may be appropriate to close this chapter with a brief consideration of free indirect discourse in other languages. To my knowledge free indirect discourse has so far been attested in all the Romance and Germanic languages, in the Slavic languages (see below), in Lithuanian, Japanese, Chinese (N.Li 1991; Hagenaar, forthcoming) and Korean, Hungarian, Finnish, Turkish, Hindi and Yoruba.⁶⁰ There has also been a heated discussion about the possible occurrence of free indirect discourse in the classic languages, where the indirect accusative with infinitive construction competes with complementizer clause subordination.⁶¹ Since I know none of these languages well enough to discuss literary

passages, I will concentrate very briefly on some well-known facts about Russian free indirect discourse and provide some information about the situation in Japanese as far as I can summarize it from the literature. The main reason for this exercise lies in the different temporal (and syntactic) situation in Russian and Japanese which sheds, I believe, a very interesting light on the comparable English, French and German aspects of free indirect discourse. My excursion to the East is motivated by the necessary realization that many things that we take for granted in relation to speech and thought representation can be handled quite differently in other Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages.

In **Russian** indirect discourse tense does not automatically ‘shift’—in the majority of cases the tense of the reported discourse is preserved. Sometimes, however, a shift in tense does occur, and Comrie (1986b) provides some examples of this. The precise environments of such shifting seem to be fairly puzzling.⁶² Comrie’s example,

(62) Zina skazala, chto Yzot poet [present]

‘Zina said that Yzot was singing’

(63) Zina slyshala, kak Yzot pel/poët [past or present]

‘Zina heard Yzot singing /heard how Yzot was singing’

(294, fn. 3)

suggests that the how-clause is really part of the narrative and not taken to be part of speech report. Brecht (1974) has argued that preterites occur with specific semantic classes, those of verbs of saying, verbs of perception and factive verbs; and his examples support an analysis of preterite usage to indicate reported consciousness—a factor very germane to deictic centre research. However, Brecht’s examples have been criticized independently by two Russian scholars whose opinion I invited, and I will therefore refrain from using Brecht’s material as evidence for the ‘consciousness’ features of the preterite in [Chapter 3 \(3.5\)](#).

Free indirect discourse definitely exists in Russian.⁶³ Since tense does not necessarily shift in indirect discourse, one can find many passages of free indirect discourse employing the present or future tenses:

(64) Thus she spent all day and the next morning, again took the blanket and the pillow and the little volume of Stevenson, and went into the garden. *So will she now live, in the garden under the Akazen, no matter what happened in the world.*

(Fadeev, *The Young Guard*; quoted Kovtunova 1953:21)⁶⁴

On the other hand, extensive passages of free indirect discourse such as in the portrayal of consciousness in novels like *Anna Karenina* seem to employ a regular shifting of the tense. In contrast to French, however, such shifted past tenses do not obligatorily have the imperfective aspect (the French *imparfait* so to speak)—a requirement also in Italian, for example—but they can choose the aspect on the basis of the verb semantics: unlike English, Russian frequently distinguishes between processes, achievements and accomplishments (Vendler 1967) by the morphologically marked (explicit) aspect form.

In other cases, however, a perfective aspect may signal anteriority (because the action has been completed).

¹Never before had occurred [impf.] to them a day of dissent, this was [perf.] the first time. ²And this was [impf.] no (mere) disagreement; it was [impf.] an obvious admission of complete cooling off. ³After all, (how) was it possible [impf.] (for him) to look [perf.] at her in such a way, the way he gave her a look [perf.] when he came [impf.] into the room to pick up the certificate? ⁴To look/be looking [impf.] at her, to see [impf.], that her heart was being rent [impf.] by misery, and to walk [perf.] past her quietly with that indifferent, calm face? ⁵It wasn't that he had grown tired of her [lit. 'cooled off'; perf.], he hated her [impf.] because he loved/was loving [impf.] another woman, that was [impf.] obvious.

(*Anna Karenina*, xxvi; my translation)⁶⁵

The aspectual distinctions in fact reflect the general (narrative) distribution between those events that occur punctually, on the plot-line, so to speak, and states of some temporal extension, processes as well as evaluations, feelings, perceptions. In the above example the tenses shift. Anteriority remains unexpressed in the first sentence, where *prokhodilo* [impf.] in the preterite sums up Anna's past experience; anteriority is reflected, if one wants to interpret it this way, in the fifth sentence, where the perfective *okhladel* marks an accomplished and therefore anterior event (although Anna is in fact denying the accomplishment of this process). Simultaneous events, correspondingly, do not necessarily require an imperfective aspect. Anna's misery at Vronsky's indifference is rendered by a description of his actions (he walks past her and he looks at her)—in the perfective because these are significant singular looks and a walking past that is of enormous emotional significance to her; Anna's perceptions of what he *is doing* to her, on the other hand, require an imperfective aspect (*posmotret'*), and so do her inferences about the state of affairs reached in their relationship (*liubil*—he was loving).⁶⁶ The passage additionally demonstrates that—unlike French, English or German—Russian does not employ as clearly defined temporal morphology in subsidiary clauses.

Despite these temporal ambiguities Russian, however, has all the other characteristics of free indirect discourse which help the reader to trace a 'voice' in the text. (I am here departing from the literary examples discussed in Schmid and Kovtunova—I do not know whether free indirect discourse also exists in the spoken Russian language.) Kovtunova's article illustrates the use of (pet) names peculiar to individual characters, the use of modifiers and colloquial evaluative adverbs and adjectives, of epistemic modals (*perhaps*) and—simply—the contextual interpretative signals of the text where a passage makes sense only from the benighted, innocent, shrewd or enthusiastic frame of mind of the character on hand and could not be understood from the narrator's omniscient perspective. (This is certainly the case in the previous example, where only Anna, and not the omniscient narrator, could speculate about Vronsky's having fallen in love with another woman.)

The situation in **Japanese** is even more complex, again on account of the different forms of indirect discourse and indeed even of direct discourse. In Japanese there is no clear syntactic difference between direct and indirect discourse. Both can be formed by means of a quotational clause that has the quotational suffix- *o*. Indirectness in fact appears only where the *to*-clause contains pronouns, names, lexemes or expressions that *cannot* be read as direct quotation. Thus the italicized phrases ruled by *to* quotative in the following passages,

- (65) Sono hanashi no oshimai ni wa daredemo, *maa ichido Ottugi-san o mite-oinaae, sore wa uttui ohito yae* to itte musubu no ga tune de-ari.

‘Whoever discussed the couple always concluded, “You must see Otsugi. She’s incredibly beautiful.”’

(Maynard 1984:3–4)

- (66) Otoko wa kenmeini kirishitan nanka ja nai-n-da to kyoochooshiteiru.

The man insists strongly (by saying) not (be) something like a Christian.’

(Ibid., 8)

are definitely direct discourse because they include the colloquial *maa* (‘well’) and *nanka* (‘sort of’, ‘something on the lines of’), the dialectal *yae* and the colloquial suffix *n(o)*, whereas

- (67) Otoko wa kenmeini jibun wa kirishitan de wa nai to kyoochooshiteiru.

(Ibid., 8)

can only be indirect discourse on account of the reflexive *jibun* in logophoric reference to the reported speaker⁶⁷ and on account of the formal *de wa* negation which is unidiomatic for direct speech (where it is standardly replaced by *ja* or *nai*). A clear indication of indirect discourse is also provided by reference to the current speaker in terms of *I* or *you*, since in the original speech act (unless addressed to the current addressee) different forms of address must have been employed.⁶⁸ Indirect discourse is also clearly marked in a second construction of speech and thought representation, where *to* is replaced by *koto-o*. The resulting sentences can only represent propositional content (not, for instance, verbatim transcriptions of enunciations peculiarities), and they usually correspond to speech or thought report, most closely resembling ‘the fact that’ constructions. Colloquial items are typically barred from *koto-o* clauses, including the topicalization particle *wa*, which needs to be replaced by the subject suffix *ga* (Maynard 1984:8).

There is, additionally, a curious intermediary form which Kuno (1986) has called ‘quasi-direct’ discourse. In such constructions the *to*-clause has, for instance, an imperative (the *to*-clause usually has a non-finite verb form),⁶⁹ and this imperative is of course a clear indication of direct presentation, but the imperative form used is not the expected one (i.e. the conventionally polite imperative) but the basic (impolite or familiar) imperative form. In the original speech act this impolite imperative could not have been employed.

- (68) Hanako ga [kanojo no ie ni 'sugu koi'] to denwa o kakete kita.
 'Hanako called me up and said that (lit.) "Come right now" to her house.'
 (Kuno 1986:14 [= (4.1)])

A more realistic verbatim transcription of Hanako's words would have been something like 'watakushi no ie ni wa sumimasen ga moo konaide kudasai'—with the apology (*sumimasen ga*) and the polite request form *konaide kudasai*.⁷⁰ In Chapter 8 I will argue that direct discourse is always typical and that the non-standard imperative in such Japanese sentences therefore has no evidential relevance for deciding against a direct discourse reading.

Japanese not only frequently lacks pronominal reference but also has no tense shift because there are only two tenses in Japanese, the present (or non-past), and the past tense. The finite and non-finite verbal forms in the *-to* or *koto-o* clauses can only be either in the present or in the past tense and can therefore only mark simultaneity or anteriority.⁷¹

Under the circumstances it is surprising that free indirect discourse should exist at all. In the following passage, several clauses can be recognized as free indirect discourse because the speculations here described can only be attributed to the character and not to the narrator. The speculative nature is morphologically determined by the *daroo* suffix. Note also the subjective modifier *moshi*.

- (69) ¹Yaharu-sensei-wa [kono shunzoo-to-iu-kodomo wa koegawari no shikakete-iru-tokoro-daroo] to omotta. [...] ²*moshi* hahaoya-ni yooboo-ga nite-iru nara, ³me-hana-dachi-mo totonotte-iru *daroo*. ⁴semo surarito shite-iru *daroo*. ⁵Moo atama-no-ke-mo nobashite, ⁶tekateka hikarashite-iru-daroo. [...] ⁷sensei-wa uketorishoo no hizuke-o, juu-roku-nen-mae no sangatsu nijuu-shichi-nichi-no hizuke-ni kaki-naoshita. ⁸Kono sangatsu ni-juu-shichi-nichi-to-iu hi-wa Yaharu-sensei ni-totte wa inshoobukai hi de atta kara, hizuke-ni machigainai. ⁹Seinsei-ga daigaku-byoo-in no kinmu-o yoshite, jibun de byoo-in-o motte kaigyoo dai-ichi-nichi-me-no sono hi de aru. ¹⁰Asa gumori de ato wa yoku haretai hi de atta. ¹¹O-hiru sugi ni natte mo, kanja-ga hitori mo konakatta.

¹The boy's [Shunzoo] voice **would** be changing, thought Dr. Yaharu. [...] ²*Maybe* he looked like his mother. ³If so, he **would** have good, regular features. ⁴He would be slim and erect. ⁵Too old for the cropped head of the school boy he **would** be letting his hair grow, ⁶and would be shining it with brilliantine. [...] ⁷The doctor predated the receipt: March 27, sixteen years before. ⁸This 27 of March was an important day for Dr. Yaharu, so there could be no doubt about the date. ⁹It was the first day after he resigned from the university hospital and opened a hospital of his own. ¹⁰The morning was cloudy, but later the sky cleared. ¹¹Noon passed, and not a patient came.'

(Quoted Hosaka 1981:96–7)⁷²

Another signal of free indirect discourse in Japanese as in Chinese is the reflexive pronoun *self* (*jibun*). A later passage quoted by Hosaka from a film review has additional

'expressive' features very much on the lines of what I will describe for English in [Chapter 4](#): *tabun* ('perhaps'), *kanarazu* ('surely') and the colloquial constructions typical of Japanese oral discourse: *mite mo, ii-de wa nai-ka* ('is good, isn't it') (Hosaka 1981:101).

This concludes my introductory survey of free indirect discourse. We will now analyse the deictic signals aligning (free) indirect discourse with the reporter's and with the reportee's language.

NOTES

- 1 By way of comparison, there are quite a number of books and dissertations on free indirect discourse in German: Lorck (1921), Günther (1928), Bühler (1937), Glauser (1948), Meyer (1957), Neubert (1957), Hoffmeister (1965), Steinberg (1971), von Roncador (1988), Neuse (1990). In English, the dissertations by Lethcoe (1969), Ginsburg (1970), Wiebe (1990) and Caenepeel (1989) deserve special mention. In French, to my knowledge, there are only the two truly classic studies of free indirect discourse by Lips (1926) and Verschoor (1959).
- 2 Banfield's book provides the longest abstract list, but neglects crucial evidence. A much more detailed study is Wiebe (1990), who concentrates on lexical aspects. Wiebe's study is, however, less accessible because it is a dissertation and difficult to read on account of her computer-science background.
- 3 Particularly important and insightful contributions to free indirect discourse include Bally (1912, 1914), Beyerle (1972), Cohn (1966), Dillon/Kirchhoff (1976), Doležel (1973a), Fehr (1938), Fillmore (1974), Ginsburg (1982), Guiraud (1971), Hamburger (1968/1973), Herdin (1905), Hernadi (1971a), van den Heuvel (1978), Jefferson (1980), Kalik-Teljatnicova (1965, 1966), Karpf (1928, 1933), Kovtunova (1953), Kuno (1986), Kuroda (1973), Leech/Short (1981), E.Lerch (1914, 1922), G. Lerch (1922), Lorck (1914, 1921), McHale (1978, 1983), McKay (1980), N.Miller (1958), Müller (1985), Page (1973/1988), Ron (1981), Ryan (1981b), W.Schmid (1973), Spitzer (1921, 1923a, 1923b, 1928a, 1928b), Stanzel (1959), Sternberg (1982b, 1991), Strauch (1974, 1984), Tamir (1976), Tobler (1887), Uspensky (1973), Vološinov (1929/1973/1986), Walzel (1926) and Weinrich (1964/1985:177–83).
- 4 For an extensive list of the diverse terminology that has been invented for the device see G.Steinberg (1971:111–12).
- 5 I here follow Banfield's argument (1973, 1982). It is quite true that a great number of expressive elements can be integrated into indirect discourse (McHale 1978, 1983; Sternberg 1991), but there seem to be categories such as exclamatory NPs, e.g. (6b), for which syntactic subordination is grammatically ruled out except as a 'quotation' within ongoing indirect discourse.
- 6 The possibility of adding *this was* or *this is* to exclamations which consist in an evaluative noun phrase has been noted also by W.Bennett (1989:316–17) in relation to tags: *What a life, isn't it*
- 7 A recent example is the remarks of Comrie (1986b: 267) in connection with sequence of tenses in indirect discourse.
- 8 By contrast, indirect discourse disallows phonetic mimeticism except in the literary language (Pütz 1989:186–7).
- 9 'C'est l'idée seule qui compte.' (Verschoor 1959:13)

- 10 See as early as Cohn (1978) in the literary camp.
- 11 On definitions of the stream of consciousness technique see also the classic studies by E. Steinberg (1958/1973) and Humphrey (1954).
- 12 See Cohn (1991) as well as Fludernik (in preparation). Brief glances into the minds of others, on the other hand, are a staple of conversational narrative (Stempel 1983, Tannen 1989).
- 13 This term was first introduced by Ann Banfield (1981). See below under (7.1).
- 14 We will come back to this point in [Chapter 8](#).
- 15 Banfield's findings were anticipated in Lethcoe's excellent work (1969).
- 16 See also Kalik-Teljatnicova (1966:135).
- 17 McHale very perceptively distinguishes between first order and second order 'naturalizations' of free indirect discourse (McHale 1978:274). Among first order 'explanations' of FID passages he mentions the distinction between irony or empathy, the effect of polyvocality and the incorporation of free indirect discourse into a stream of consciousness. Second order effects include, for instance, a metaphysics of multiple authority, analyses of the discontinuous self or theories of determinism. Such second order naturalizations are really interpretations on a metaphorical plane, whereas McHale's first order naturalizations link the occurrence of free indirect discourse to the plot level of the narrative and to its characters, explaining free indirect discourse in terms of the text's realist illusion.
- 18 McKenzie's point—on the example of South African political rhetoric—is well taken, even though most of the ambiguous free indirect discourse sentences he quotes are in fact instances of indirect speech.
- 19 Besides the famous law suits brought against *Madame Bovary* and *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, where the argument centrally hinges on the 'corrupting' nature of the fictional protagonists and their sentiments as portrayed in free indirect discourse, there has more recently been the more purely political scandal sparked off by Philipp Jenninger's commemorative address on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the notorious German pogrom of November 9, 1938. (For the text of Jenninger's speech see *Die Zeit*, November 18, 1988.) Jenninger had included a long free indirect discourse passage in his speech, in which he portrayed the typical attitudes of Germans at the time of the atrocities. Jenninger failed to clearly mark his distance from the represented frame of mind, both in the text and in his oral presentation (where intonational emphasis and a marked ironic tone might have disambiguated the passage). (See Suzuki 1991 for a discussion of the issue.)
- 20 My ellipsis. Gates continues his quotation for a few more paragraphs.
- 21 The earliest treatments of free indirect discourse were provided by Tobler (1887), Kalepky (1899, 1913), Herdin (1905) and Bally (1912a, 1912b, 1914a, 1914b). The centres of the debate were located in Geneva (Bally's followers) and Munich (the Vossler School, including the Lerchs and Lorck) respectively.
- 22 In Strauch (1974) this debate was still raging as one can observe from his dismissive remarks about practically all recent German FID criticism as well as the 'pro-German' articles by Cohn (1966) and Kalik-Teljatnicova (1965, 1966). On the debate compare, for instance, Lips (1926:204) and Verschoor (1959:52–6).
- 23 Lips (1926) and Verschoor (1959).
- 24 Oral free indirect discourse has also been noted by Verschoor (1959:101), Pascal (1977:34), Authier (1979:225), Strauch (1984:166), Steube (1985:392, 'rarely') and Violi (1986:368).

- 25 Polanyi (1982) unfortunately also fails to grasp the actual properties of free indirect discourse. However, a prominent discourse analyst, Wallace Chafe, has recently turned to the analysis of free indirect discourse in oral communication (Chafe 1992).
- 26 Full stops indicate quarter-minute pauses, dashes half-minute pauses. Text in double round brackets indicates a reconstruction from barely audible material.
- 27 See, for instance, Chambers (1989a), or Stempel (1976).
- 28 The existence of free indirect discourse in the homo-diegetic novel has been discussed also by Bronzwaer (1970:53–63), G.Steinberg (1971), Cohn (1978:166 ff., 302, fn. 47) and Stanzel (1984b: 218–24). The Dickens passage has, for instance, been commented on by Ron (1981:33).
- 29 See also Yamaguchi (1989:591). Curiously, Spitzer (1962) only briefly discusses Butor's use of the second person form, and fails to note the prevalence of free indirect discourse, although he correctly describes the text as a rendering of Léon's musings and self-questionings—an insight sadly missing from much later criticism of *La Modification* (*A Change of Heart*).
- 30 For second-person narrative see also Morrisette (1965), Vauthier (1973), Passias (1976), Nieraad (1978), Hopkins/Perkins (1981), Bonheim (1983), Korte (1987), Hantzis (1988), Kacandes (1990), Margolin (in print) and Fludernik (under review; in preparation).
- 31 'We had been standing just outside the door for a brief moment, absorbed in our meditation, when we suddenly became aware that the shadow of the wheel had moved to the left. *It was high time that we started the inspection. Perhaps we should walk there*, said Gaubert, but Mathis pretended he hadn't heard. [...] Brazier was still holding his closed fist on top of his head when, all of a sudden, the wheel started to turn. We heard a first creaking noise. It doesn't sound like those which will follow it. This is a low wailing, emerging from silence, which will not cease to mount to the empty sky. *But if this wail was ours? And if the wheel didn't actually turn but was turning only in our heads? Perhaps it doesn't even exist, there isn't anything outside, everything is black and unmovable and has been so from the start, frozen for all eternity, it 's in our head that the immense wheel is turning and creaking unabated.*' (My translation)
- 32 'You look out the window at the clouds scudding across the sky. *You will have to light the lights you can't see a thing.* You wish you were in the garden for the first clap of thunder to see the lightning between the trunks of the chestnut trees to wait for it to strike.' (Wittig 1966: 114)
- 33 This is illustrated already in Ehrlich's (1990a) book on free indirect discourse in two of Woolf's novels. In contrast to her mentor Banfield, Ehrlich has to propose a narrator's voice in the text.
- 34 One can, however, also consider the very occurrence of free indirect discourse and narrated perception in this passage as a break in the neutral quality of the story.
- 35 See Lethcoe (1969:170–5) for an excellent early discussion of present tense FID, as well as Pascal (1962:10). FID examples in the present tense are quoted in Lerch (1914:485) and Lips (1926:65).
- 36 For this type of narration see Frey (1946), Pascal (1962), Wright (1987), Neumann (1990, 1991), Cohn (1989,1991, forthcoming).
- 37 On the distinction between the historical present tense in nineteenth-century fictional and historical narrative on the one hand and in oral and quasi-oral narrative on the other see Wolfson (1982), Schiffrin (1981), Fleischman (1990) and Fludernik (1991a, 1992c).
- 38 But note that in contemporary Russian the situation is much like in medieval French and English texts, and that in Russian even pronominal reference may remain unshifted. For examples see Vološinov (1986:126, fn. 2) as well as Schmid (1973). Sequence of tenses has

- recently again become a heavily debated issue (Comrie 1986b, Huddleston 1989, Declerck 1990a)—compare below under (3.4.1)
- 39 Compare under (3.2.1) below.
- 40 Dickens's extensive use of free indirect discourse to render the speeches of Mr Merdle, Mr Veneering and the like may even have been directly influenced by his work as a court stenographer.
- 41 This was noted as early as Onions (1905:83–4) *re* parliamentary debates, and for newspaper writing in Curme (1931:420)—both quoted in McHale (1978:282). See also Lips (1926:101–2), Pascal (1977:136), Carlota Smith (1980:364) and Suzuki (1988a).
- 42 See Günther (1928), Karpf (1928, 1933), Verschoor (1959:89–98, 110 ff.), Lips (1926:119–20), Lorck (1921:22) and Kalik-Teljatnicova (1966).
- 43 Compare the discussion about the written versus the oral in Chaucer, for instance in the excellent article by Fisher (1985), as well as the general deliberations on the remnants of oral composition in medieval texts (Foley 1985a, Fleischman 1990).
- 44 See W.Bühler (1937). Interestingly, there is no free indirect discourse in the diaries of Pepys, Evelyn and Dorothy Osborae (Karpf 1933:275).
- 45 *Skaz* is a form of storytelling that imitates, parodies and stylizes oral storytelling. It can be used to narrate in both a first and a third person mode. The term was coined by Boris Eichenbaum and is now a standard critical term in Russian and Formalist literary criticism. Examples of *skaz* in literature in the English language are, for instance, the 'Cyclops' episode narrative by the unnamed first person narrator in *Ulysses*, or several of the short stories by Mark Twain, Ring Lardner or James Thurber ('Haircut', *Huckleberry Finn*). See Eichenbaum (1971a, 1971b), Titunik (1977) and Vinogradov (1972).
- 46 Further examples in the same text are:

Which done, they asked whether he [James Bainham] would persist in that which he had said or would return to the Catholic Church; adding many fair and alluring words, that he should reconcile himself, saying the time was yet that he might be received; *the bosom of his Mother was open for him: otherwise there was no remedy.* (Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, 'Henry VIII; Luther, Tindall, and Their Disciples'; 1965:95)

But God saw that was not the best for Tindall's purpose nor for the profit of his Church, and therefore gave him to find little favour in the bishop's sight; the answer of whom was this: *his house was full; he had more than he could well find;* and advised him to seek in London abroad. (Ibid., 'Henry VIII; The Break with Rome,' 122)

Barnes was commanded at the end of the sermon to declare that he was more charitably handled than he deserved; *his heresies were so horrible.* (Ibid., 147)

- 47 That is to say before the advent of the New Historicism.
- 48 Compare under (3.5.3) below.
- 49 I have recently come across Emberson (1986), whose examples are not very convincing. Only two passages are conceivably free indirect discourse (in continuation of indirect discourse), but she also quotes some indirect discourse with expressive elements (1986:105, 109).
- 50 According to Lorck (1921:22), the earliest French free indirect discourse passage dates back to the ninth century.

- 51 The wet nurse hesitated. *She knew **very well how** babies smell, she knew **precisely**- after all she had fed, tended, cradled and kissed dozens of them... She could find them at night with her nose. **Why, right at** that moment she bore that baby smell clearly in her nose.* But never until now had she described it in words.' (Süskind 1986:9)
- 52 See also the authors cited above in note 42 as well as Vološinov (1986:149–51), Kullman (1992), Lips (1926:117–26), Pollak (1988:181), Ullmann (1964:99–101). Fleischman (1990:231–2) rejects free indirect discourse readings for passages that, to me, are clearly cases of free indirect discourse in the present tense.
- 53 I would like to express my thanks to Professor Fritz-Peter Kirsch (Univ. of Vienna) for helping me with the translation of the passages quoted in Günther.
- 54 Translations from Stempel are by Professor Edward Montgomery (Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
- 55 'All day he was on the look-out, and at night, if there was some noise from a cat, *the cat was taking his money*' (My translation) For the use of free indirect discourse in La Fontaine see Goebel (1966), Kranz (1971) and Kullmann (1992).
- 56 Von Roncador quotes an article by Delhez-Sarlet (1964) on free indirect discourse in *La Princesse de Clèves*, and refers to Verschoor (1959:124–26) for some further seventeenth-century examples from private memoirs.
- 57 '[B]ut soon, /With all his [Ulysses'] cruel and cunning eloquence, /He talked to me of honour and of country, /The peoples and the Kings at my command, /The rule of Asia in the grasp of Greece—/Could I betray a nation for a daughter, /Go back, grow old among my family, /A King without his glory?' (Racine 1982:58)
- 58 '[A]fter a few years the Marquis began to find Mme de La Pommeraye's life too uneventful. [...] Little by little he went one day, two days, without seeing her. Gradually he shortened his visits. *He had other business which needed seeing to.* When he arrived he would say one word, stretch himself out in an armchair, pick up a pamphlet, and throw it down again, talk to her dog, or go to sleep. In the evenings *his health, which was becoming wretched*, apparently [not in the original] *required that he retire early. This was the advice of Tronchin*' (Diderot 1986:109)
- 59 On the use of free indirect discourse in Flaubert see Culler (1985), Ginsberg (1970), Brooks (1985) and Ramazani (1988), as well as the articles by Warning (1981–82) and Weinberg (1978, 1981).
- 60 For relevant literature see von Roncador (1988:137–8, fnn. 12–14).
- 61 On Latin (free) indirect discourse see Ammann (1940), Bayet (1931, 1932), Hahn (1952), Hyart (1954), Juret (1925, 1938), Schlicher (1905) and Wiethaler (1956). See also the remarks in the two standard grammars Schwyzler (1950:638) and Leumann *et al.* (1965:362).
- 62 Timberlake (1982:318–22) connects the use of the preterite with the presence of definite time linkage.
- 63 For a survey of early research, including first observations in 1890, see Schmid (1973:52–6). Schmid proposes a sliding scale between direct and (free) indirect discourse, according to whether pronouns, tense, deictics, lexical features, typography, syntactic features (subordination or coordination) and appellative function are correlated with the reporter's perspective (*Erzählersprache*) or the characters' perspective (*Personensprache*). This pattern closely resembles the less complex schemas proposed by Jakobson (1971) and Doležel (1967/1973a). A much-quoted article by Holthusen (1968) also deserves mention.
- 64 'Tak provela ona [Valia Borts] ves' den' i na drugoe utro snova vziala pled i podushku i tomik Stivenzona i ushla v sad. *Tak ona i budet zhit' teper', v sadu pod akatsiei, chto by tam ni*

proiskhodilo na svete.' (Fadeev, *Molodaia gvardiia*) Thanks are due to Peter Barta for his help with the translation, and to Helena Goscilo for help with the transcription.

- 65 '1Nikogda eshche ne prokshodilo dnia v ssore. Nynche eto bylo v pervyi raz. 2I eto bylo ne ssora. Eto bylo ochevidnoe priznanie v sovershenom okhlazhdenii. 3Razve možno bylo vzglianut' na nee tak, kak on vzglianul, kogda vkhodil v komnatu za attestatom? 4Posmotret' na nee, videt', chto serdtse ee razryvaetcia ot otchaianiia, i proiti molcha s etim ravnodushno-spokoinym litsom? 5On ne to chto okhladel k nei, no on nenavidel ee, potomu chto liubil druguiu zhenshchinu,—eto bylo yasno.' (*Anna Karenina*; quoted *sic* Kovtunova 1953:22)

The Penguin edition has the following translation: 'Never before had a whole day gone by without bringing a reconciliation. To-day was the first time. And this was not a quarrel. It was an obvious admission of complete estrangement. How could he look at her as he had done when he came into the room for the pedigree? Look at her, see that her heart was torn with despair, and then walk out without a word, with that face of callous indifference? Not only had he cooled towards her—he hated her because he loved another woman: that was clear.' (Tolstoy 1978:783)

- 66 The use of the imperfective for this summing up reflects an interesting correspondence with English and French 'evaluative' past progressives and *imparfaits* (cp. below under (3.5)).
- 67 On logophoricity compare below under (3.2.2).
- 68 This test, too, is very frequently inapplicable because the speaker very rarely refers to her-/himself as /, or to the addressee as *you*. (Japanese very generally replaces direct address by implied address—using no explicit forms of address at all—or by honorific expressions.)
- 69 Maynard (1984:5) also allows polite *-masu* and *desu* forms in direct discourse, but these are actually untypical of colloquial speech which prefers the *-ru* and *da* 'infinitives'.
- 70 Inoue (1979:153 [= (8), (9)]) has some comparable cases where a deictic verb of giving is 'preserved' in indirect discourse, but in an inappropriate morphological form.
- 71 There is no morphological future tense in Japanese. Prospective events are referred to by means of the present tense, or by means of various epistemic modals, hearsay constructions and idiomatic phrases which evoke future relevance.
- 72 Translation slightly changed. I would like to express my thanks to my Japanese teacher, Mag. Megumi Maderdonner, for her help with this translation.

Indirect and free indirect discourse: aspects of anaphoricity and shifting

Part A:

Deictic and anaphoric reference

3.1

INTRODUCTION

The standard description of indirect discourse posits that in indirect discourse the speaker's (reporter's) deictic point of view is asserted over and against any deictic orientation within the presupposed reported discourse. A radical version of this view can be observed in Banfield's absolute denial of any character (reportee)-oriented deixis in indirect speech. The most obvious sign of the well-known alignment of (free) indirect discourse with the reporter's deixis consists in the referential reorientation, which is obligatory for both indirect and free indirect discourse and can easily be observed in the referential shift of pronominals and R-expressions.¹ We will discuss this phenomenon under (3.2) below. Not all designations in indirect discourse, however, necessarily derive from the speaker's perspective. As we already noted under (1.2), there would be no problem with the *de re* and *de dicto* readings of indirect discourse sentences if the speaker's deictic perspective was not in fact susceptible to the reportee's intensional meanings and designations. Referential reorientations by the reporter towards the reportee's deictic centre are therefore treated in a separate section under (3.4.) below. They constitute one category of the many 'expressive' elements attributable to the reported speech act.

Likewise, it is usually taken for granted that the reporter will locate places and events within the deictic frame obtaining between her-/himself and the addressee. Any *tomorrow*, *here*, *next week*, *over there*, etc. are obligatorily referred to the reporter's temporal and spatial position, which may or may not coincide with the addressee's. However, in an excellent paper Plank (1986) has demonstrated that even in *indirect* discourse occurrences of *morgen* ('tomorrow') or *hier* ('here') can be interpreted from the reportee's perspective. Plank's informants in fact in some cases by a majority preferred the non-speaker-related interpretation. Additionally a considerable number even interpreted

gestern ('yesterday') in a *direct* quotation as coming from the *reporter's* perspective. A translation of Plank's example sentences into English surprisingly yields similar results.

- (1) a. Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil: 'Ich singe am Samstag hier.'
 'Vico sent me a cable from Uzwil to Oberuzwil saying: "I am singing here on Saturday."
 b. Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß er am Samstag hier singt.
 'Vico sent me a cable from Uzwil to Oberuzwil saying that he was singing here on Saturday.'
 c. Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß ich am Samstag dort singe.
 'Vico sent me a cable from Uzwil to Oberuzwil saying that I was singing there on Saturday.'
 d. Vico telegraphierte mir aus Uzwil nach Oberuzwil, daß er am Samstag dort singe.
 'Vico sent me a cable from Uzwil to Oberuzwil saying that he was singing there on Saturday.'

(Plank 1986:289 [= (8)])

According to Plank's eleven informants 40 per cent read (1a) as saying that Vico is singing in *Oberuzwil* rather than *Uzwil*, i.e. they were attributing *here* to the reporter's location in *Oberuzwil*. In the (b) through (d) variants opinion was decidedly divided. Only 20 per cent accepted *here* in (1b) as necessarily referring to *Oberuzwil*, and some further 20 per cent thought that the *here* could refer equally to *Uzwil* or *Oberuzwil*. A majority, however, maintained that *here* for the speaker's location (*Oberuzwil*) was the better or more likely interpretation. For sentence (c), 50 per cent of the informants insisted that *there* could only refer to *Uzwil* (the reported speaker's location), but for the (d) sentence only 40 per cent held this to be the exclusive interpretation.

The English sentences are less ambiguous than the German sentences, it seems to me, the main reason being that the English adverb *here* can *only* be read deictically and *not* anaphorically (*there* alone functions as an anaphor for locations). In German, by contrast, both *hier* and *dort* can have an anaphorical as well as the deictic speaker-oriented reading² with the result that intonation (emphasis) alone (not ascertainable from Plank's written test) disambiguates between deictic and anaphoric readings. In English, too, only a proper emphasis on *there* would convert the reading into a deictic one. The problem therefore—contrary to Plank's approach—seems to lie less in the competition between the speaker's and the reportee's (i.e. Vico's) deictic positions but in the confusion caused by having, for one, two antecedent locations *both of which* might have *dort* or *hier* as their anaphors and, secondly, a competing speaker who may impose his or her deictic *hier* (for *Oberuzwil*) and his *dort* (for *Uzwil*) over the anaphoric readings. The German case is even more complex because German has an additional anaphoric locative *da*³, use of which would prove to be especially disorienting in Plank's example sentences. (Since Plank concentrates on deixis without considering anaphoricity *per se*, he fails to mention *da*.)

Another example of Plank's deserves special mention because it conforms to English patterns:

- (2) a. Vico telegraphierte mir am vorgestrigen Montag: 'Ich werde morgen singen.'
 'Vico sent me a cable on Monday, that is to say the day before yesterday, saying
 "I will sing tomorrow."
 b. Vico telegraphierte mir am vorgestrigen Montag, daß er gestern singen werde.
 'Vico sent me a cable on Monday, that is to say the day before yesterday, saying
 that he would sing yesterday.'
 c. Vico telegraphierte mir am vorgestrigen Montag, daß er morgen gesungen habe.
 'Vico sent me a cable on Monday, that is to say the day before yesterday, saying
 that he had sung tomorrow.'
 d. Vico telegraphierte mir am vorgestrigen Montag, daß er gestern gesungen habe.
 'Vico sent me a cable on Monday, that is to say the day before yesterday, saying
 that he had sung yesterday.'

(Plank 1986:293[=(15)])

In these sentences it is impossible to 'shift' into indirect discourse by way of speaker-deictic rewriting. Nor, it should be noted, can one use any of the anaphoric equivalents like *the following day*, or *the day before*. Most surprising of all, in (2a) even in English there will be a strong tendency to read *tomorrow* as *Thursday*, i.e. as the *reporter's* 'tomorrow', rather than as 'Tuesday'. In fact both German and English here need to resort to supplementary hints and explanations:

- (3) Vico telegraphierte mir am vorgestrigen Montag, daß er so wie gestern singen würde.
 'Vico sent me a cable on Monday, that is to say the day before yesterday, saying
 that he would sing the next day, that is to say yesterday.'

As Plank himself notes, the future tense of an original utterance, very interestingly, has to be preserved in the indirect even if that future, from the reporter's perspective, is present or past:

- (4) a. Frederick accused Joan that she would desert him today.
 b. * Frederick accused Joan that she deserted him today.
 c. Frederick accused Joan that she was deserting him today.

(4c) is acceptable presumably on account of the standard 'future' reading of the present progressive. On the other hand,

- (5) Frederick accused Joan that she (had) deserted him yesterday.

can only be read as 'the day before Frederick uttered the accusation,' and it will be especially felicitous if Frederick has uttered his accusation *today*, i.e. on the day the report is enunciated by the speaker. Note also the obverse constellation,

a. epistemische Distanz	a. Raum	a. Sprechakt-Rollen	Sprecher-Indexikalität
b. Zeit (Tempus)	b. Zeit (Adverb)	b. soziale Distanz	
		c. Relationierung	

(Plank 1986:296)

In Plank's second category (column 3) indirect discourse (but not free indirect discourse) usually relies on the reporter's deixis. In this category there are (a) *Sprechaktrollen*; (b) *soziale Distanz* and (c) *Relationierung*. These refer to, for (b), the polite versus informal pronouns of address, i.e. German *Du* vs *Sie*, or French *tu* vs *vous* (1986: 287); and, for (c), designations of people who stand in a certain relationship to the designator, e.g. the reporter's *father* versus the reportee's *uncle*. (Plank here also includes titles such as *comrade*- 1986:288.) What subcategory (a) might refer to I am at a loss to guess precisely because Plank's earlier examples on pp. 186–7 are not entirely clear. Apparently speech act roles include the speaker position and addressee position within the reported speech act.⁶ These can be recuperated from the pronominal usage. If one had naturally aligned *Sprecher-Indexikalität* (column 4) with pronominal use, this seems to create a problem. Plank's examples of *Sprecher-Indexikalität*, on the other hand, concern the phonetic level of the speech act: even in most direct discourse renderings the standard of the reporting speaker takes over (rendering even direct discourse bare of its original dialect, lisping or stuttering). The third category (column 2) includes local and temporal adverbs. In the final fourth slot (column 1) one finds two terms: (a) tenses (only the future is always preserved and never shifts)⁷ and (b) epistemic modals:

(7) a. Heinz sagt mir: 'Peter soll krank sein.'

b. Heinz sagt mir, daß Peter krank sein soll.⁸

In the second sentence *soll* is obligatorily read as Heinz's speculation—even if Heinz knows that Peter is not ill, the report has to preserve the epistemic orientation of the original speech act.

Plank then suggests that the hierarchy of his four deictic positions is always preserved, i.e. if the temporal adverb is read from the reportee's perspective so must the tense; or if the adverb is to be interpreted from the reporter's deictic position then so must all the categories to its right (pronouns, relationals, titles, choice of formal *Sie* or informal *Du*). In the narrative contexts that have been relevant for the bulk of the free indirect discourse discussion, however, tense almost *always* shifts and Plank's hierarchy is therefore of little real use. Moreover, as Chapter 4 will demonstrate, the possibilities of taking over the reportee's deictic orientation are vastly greater than Plank allows for, and since his hierarchy does not include the many lexical and syntactic categories which we illustrate there, its predictions cannot be generalized without incisive caveats. Plank's deictic theory has come under attack from Fabricius-Hansen (1989), who not only notes its inadequacy for dealing with free indirect discourse, but additionally presents a system for the deictic and non-deictic use of tense in subsidiary clauses. (Compare my discussion of Fabricius-

Hansen under (3.4.1).) Whereas Plank departs from the standard account of shifting, in which the ‘original’ direct discourse shifts its deictic positions into deictic expressions aligned with the reporting instance, von Roncador (1988) presents *Referenzverschiebung* (‘shifting of reference’) as determined by the deictic centre of the current text. From that perspective direct discourse undergoes the most extensive referential shifting (1988:57). Von Roncador also observes that adverbs of place and time can easily adopt the reported speaker’s referential orientation as in free indirect discourse or in cases of *Deixis am Phantasma*, but that the shift of personal reference *necessarily* requires corresponding temporal and adverbial shifting (1988:78). There is then a deictic hierarchy, but it has to be grounded in the framing text and departures therefrom, rather than in the mimetic reproduction of embedded textual material. Von Roncador’s model corroborates my own more literary and theoretical findings that attempt to assimilate quoted and reported discourse to the reporting text, identifying it as the same discourse in the cloak of adopted alterity.

The main problem with the referential shift and the temporal problems in indirect and free indirect discourse concerns the interplay of three categories—characters’ deixis (which we will deal with in [Chapter 4](#)), the reporter’s (narrator’s) deixis and the unmarked anaphoric substitution of deictic categories which are understood to relate to the *reporter’s* perspective. As we will see under (3.4) in the discussion of tense, what is usually called shifting consists in anaphoric alignment—it is unmarked. Deictic positions, on the other hand, are *marked* and overlay anaphoric substitutions by deictic reorientations. Another way of saying this would be to explain that the reporter’s deixis foregrounds the reporting act, and that it therefore establishes a connection between the reported speech act and the situation of reporting it. This connection can be informative—substituting *tomorrow* for the reportee’s *on Friday* in order to mark current relevance (a move easily alignable with Grice’s co-operative maxims); it can be propositional—noting the continued relevance of the reported proposition (*Sonya is **still** ill* from *Sasha called to say that Sonya is ill*); or it can be evaluative—as when the persons, objects and actions or events of the reportee’s speech act are characterized by evaluative lexemes and names meant to transmit to the addressee the reporter’s perspective and attitudes.

To define indirect and free indirect discourse in terms of one sole deictic position is therefore misleading. One would have to distinguish between a minimal and a maximal alignment, an ‘effacement’ or foregrounding of the speaker’s (reporter’s) perspective. In free indirect discourse, then, the reporter’s deixis is regularly backgrounded (unless it coincides with the reportee’s deictic position—a case common in oral free indirect discourse), whereas in indirect discourse a separate reporting deixis helps to evoke the reporter as a reporting instance. Such an explanation obviously has an important bearing on the dual voice question which will be taken up in [Chapter 6](#).

In the present chapter I will concentrate on all those features of indirect and free indirect discourse that are generally regarded as reporter-bound. I will start with the referential problems, where I will include a discussion also of the English reflexive, although the results of this inquiry suggest that it largely reflects a deictic position of the reportee. Secondly, I will deal with the syntactic factors of subordination, including the question of narrative parentheticals, and discuss the positioning of free indirect discourse in relation to

the echo question. A few more specific syntactic problems of free indirect discourse are dealt with in [Chapter 4](#). The final part of [Chapter 3](#) will consider several aspects of verbal morphology: sequence of tenses, mood and related questions.

3.2

THE REFERENTIAL SHIFT IN FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

3.2.1

Personal pronouns⁹

As Comrie (1986b) puts it with admirable lucidity, the reference of referring expressions in indirect (and free indirect) discourse has to be interpreted from the point of view of the reporting instance and not from the original speaker's deictic designations. This rule is on the whole rigorously observed in indirect discourse, which does, however, allow the quotation of evaluative expressions evoking a seemingly 'underlying' direct discourse:

- (8) The trader was not shocked nor amazed [...]. He had seen Death many times [...]; and so he only *swore that **the gal was** a baggage, and that he was **devilish unlucky**, and that, if things went on in this way, he should not make a cent on the trip.*
(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xii; Stowe 1981:130)

In free indirect discourse, the rule is relaxed even further to allow incorporation of a wide range of deictic designations such as *papa*, *Aunt Helen* or *the boss*.¹⁰ (See under (3.2.4) below for extensive examples.) As we shall see, this clear-cut distinction between indirect and free indirect discourse is not warranted by the textual evidence, from which it appears that indirect discourse passages, too, can frequently designate the reportee's objects of discourse by his or her (the reportee's) referential vocabulary:

- (9) Just then a negro boy entered, and announced that ***Mas'r's*** room was ready.
(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xi; Stowe 1981:106)

The most extensive amount of shifting, however, can be observed in the bulk of personal pronouns. The distribution of *I*, *you* and *he/she* changes dramatically between a situation of immediate utterance and the context of its reporting. The reporting situation is potentially complex and multifunctional. In it the perspective may be that of the original addressee or of a third party addressing somebody who in the direct speech act occupied the position of the speaker, the addressee or even yet another party. The greatest amount of shifting in indirect discourse therefore takes place in conversations and letters because the addressee is more likely to have been involved in the original utterance as either a participant or the topic of conversation. In literature, on the other hand, unless an intra-fictional narratee¹¹ is addressed by the narrator (as, for instance, in many second-person

novels),¹² pronominal reference is fairly constant. In hetero-diegetic narrative (where the narrator 'exists' only in an alternative world divorced from the story-world of the characters), all referential positions (*I*, *she*, *he*, *it*, *you*) need to be shifted into the third person. (In hetero-diegetic second person fiction, the protagonist and referential designations of him or her are of course 'shifted' into the second person.) In homo-diegetic narrative, where the narrator shares the story-world with the characters (*David Copperfield*), the referential shift is more complex, with references to the narrator *qua* protagonist (which may have been an *I*, *you*, *he* or a noun phrase originally) shifting into the first person, but references to others shifted into the third person. Homo-diegetic second person fiction is even more complex since two characters have to be consistently shifted into *I* (for the narrator) and *you* (for the second person protagonist). An example of such a constellation is Edmund White's *Nocturnes for the King of Naples*, where the narrator writes to his dead lover recalling, on the story level, their common experiences.

Here are examples of all the main constellations of pronominal shifting:

(I) Reference to the original speaker

[I → I]

- (10) 'Who does Andromeda think she is?'

I'd hear no more such criticism. 'My question to Athene,' I said, 'was *Who was I*?'
(*Chimera*, 'Perseid'; Barth 1983:95)

[I → you]

- (11) You have felt like this before, less acutely, that day for instance you ate dinner at the club with your son. [...] *What if the men around you, friends and acquaintances some of them, had known?*

(*How Like a God*; Stout 1947:84)

- (12) (Mrs Zero:) I was a fool for marryin' you. If I'd 'a' had any sense, I'd 'a' known what you were from the start. I wish I had it to do over again, I hope to tell you. **You** was goin' to do wonders, **you** was! **You** wasn't goin' to be a bookkeeper long — oh no, not **you**. Wait till **you** got started — **you** was goin' to show 'em. There wasn't no job in the store that was too big for **you**. Well, I've been waitin' — waitin' for you to get started — see? It's been a good long wait too. Twenty-five years! An' I ain't seen nothin' happen. Twenty-five years in the same job.

(*The Adding Machine*; Rice 1965:5)

[we → you]

- (13) You [the narrator's parents] taught me that, no matter what I thought, it was probably wrong. *The world is fundamentally deceptive. The better something looks, the more rotten it probably is deep down. Some people were fooled but not you. You could always see the underlying truth, and the truth was ugly. Roosevelt was a drunk, and that was that. New*

Deal? What New Deal? A sham, from beginning to end. There was no Depression, a person could get work if they really tried.

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'News'; Keillor 1987:325, n. 57)

[I → third person]

- (14) Meanwhile he thought: Father Todd? Bring in Father Todd? The T-shirt priest? *The last time he got talked into Father Todd was for an Easter sunrise vigil for Catholic youth, which the man presided over in a T-shirt. With a picture of Our Lord on waterskis that said 'He's up!'* What would the man do on St Francis's Feast Day? Probably wear antlers and talk about Our Brother the Buffalo.

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'Fall'; Keillor 1987:236)

[we → they]

- (15) Down at the Georgia Fidelity, they told me, *Yes, back in 1920. Who was president of the Seaboard then? Why, just a minute, and they'd [we → they] find out. Mr Percy Poindexter had been. Was he in Savannah? Well, they couldn't say for sure, times changed so fast. But Mr Pettis would know, Mr Charles Pettis, who was his son-in-law. Oh, you are welcome, sir. Quite welcome.*

(*All the King's Men*, v; Warren 1982:217–18)

These examples correspond precisely to changes in indirect discourse. Here is a French example:

- (16) —Ma chère dame, disait madame Couture a madame Vauquer, figurez-vous qu'il n'a pas même fait asseoir Victorine, qu'est restée constamment debout. A moi, *il m' 'a dit*, sans se mettre en colère, tout froidement, *de nous* [vous → nous] *épargner la peine de venir chez lui* [moi → lui]; *que mademoiselle*, sans dire sa fille, *se nuisait dans son esprit en l' [moi → lui] important* (une fois par an, le monstre!); que la mère de Victorine ayant été épousée sans fortune, elle n'avait rien a prétendre; enfin les choses les plus dures, qui ont fait fondre en larmes cette pauvre petite.

(*Le Père Goriot*; Balzac 1966:63)¹³

(II) Reference to the addressee

[you → I]

- (17) 'How will you mark the anniversary?' I [Timothy Garton Ash] asked Václav Havel earlier this year. No need to say which anniversary.

'We shall hold a symposium,' he said. *It would discuss the significance, not just of the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion, but of all those 'years of eight' which have been turning points for Czechoslovakia and the whole of Europe in the twentieth century: 1918,*

1938, 1948, 1968. Interested Western scholars, intellectuals, and writers would be cordially invited. Perhaps I would be kind enough to prepare a paper? They would try to hold the meeting quite openly. They would inform the authorities.

(NYRB 35.20 [1988]: 36)

[you → you]

- (18) You swung round in the judo clutch of the professor of Japanese, who drew you a few steps further along, and warned you that the Army Island Commander was dangerously pro-Chinese [...]. *Did you know that Sun Yat-sen had received his early training right here in Honolulu and did you know that his wife was a Communist? You [I → you] did not.*

(*The Mountain and the Feather*; Ashmead 1961:53)

[you → third person]

- (19) Oh yes though! said Bella; *she might as well mention one other thing; Lizzie was very desirous to thank her unknown friend who had sent her the written retractation. Was she, indeed?* observed the Secretary. *Ah! Bella asked him, had he [you → he] any notion who that unknown friend might be? He [I → he] had no notion whatever.*

(*Our Mutual Friend III*, ix; Dickens 1979:593)

In pre-twentieth-century texts the addressee is frequently referred to by a proper name or descriptive noun phrase in free indirect discourse, frequently for ironical or stylistic effect. (Compare also below under (3.2.3).) In other languages such noun phrases may be honorifics. In Japanese, for example, it is common in direct speech to address people formally by their names, avoiding a second person pronoun that is indeed very rarely used and usually elided.

(III) *Reference to third parties*

[third person → I]

- (20) They [the town people] had no way of knowing that I spoke at all these past few months, since I spoke only to Sylvie. So they had reason to feel that my social graces were eroding away, and that soon I would feel ill at ease in a cleanly house with glass in its windows—I *would be lost to ordinary society. I would be a ghost, and their food would not answer to my hunger, and my hands could pass through their [our → their] down quilts and tatted pillow covers and never feel them or find comfort in them. Like a soul released, I would find here only the images and simulacra of things needed to sustain me.*

(*Housekeeping*, ix; M.Robinson 1987:158)

[third person → you]

- (21) but she was saying *she wanted something. personal from me she didn't want **you** to do all the buying or— **you** to send the card-- she wanted me to send something. not solely from me from us but. that was. typically from me*

(*Survey of English Usage* S.4.36.)

[third person → third person]

- (22) [Tannen is summarizing the situation.] A similar conflict exists between Louise and Howie, another couple, about spending money. *Louise [I → Louise] would never buy anything costing more than a hundred dollars without discussing it with Howie, but he goes out and buys whatever he wants and feels **they** [we → they] can afford, like a table saw or a new power mower.*

(Tannen 1990:27)

For extensive German and French examples see G.Steinberg (1971), who also analyses them in their narrative context (first, third, and second person narrative).

(IV) *Narrative oddities: the impersonal and non-gendered pronouns*

In twentieth-century experimental fiction first, second and third person (he, she, they) are no longer the exclusive pronominals used in reference to fictional protagonists. At least two other possibilities are worth noting briefly, and they result in parallel shifting into these 'odd' referential frames.

The first of these is French *on*—'one' and/or 'we'. This pronoun is used as (one of) the central referential expressions in Monique Wittig's *L'Opoponax* (1964) where it has usually been taken to cover up for the gendered *elles*. However, a closer inspection of the text shows that the *on* in fact functions as a camouflage for Catherine Legrand's *I*, since the novel is written in the reflector mode. The *on* then stands in both for an 'I' and for a 'we' (the girls). As a consequence, Catherine Legrand's experiences can be rendered in free indirect discourse, duly shifted into *on*.

- (23) Catherine Legrand dit, et les enfants qui sont morts on les met aussi dans un trou?
On ne sait pas.

(*L'Opoponax*; Wittig 1964:20)¹⁴

La grande petite fille qui s'appelle Inès emmène après la classe les enfants près de la maison. *Peut-être qu'on pourra voir quelque chose.*

(*Ibid.*, 19)¹⁵

In *Entre la vie et la mort* (1968) Nathalie Sarraute, too, uses *on*, but this time in reference to a third party within a text that has a homo-diegetic narrator and addresses intra-diegetic narratees. The captive here designated by *on* is later referred to by an *il* (1968:25).

- (24) Regardez-le. Je l'ai ramené. [...] Maintenant on a peur, on tremble, on voudrait retourner chez soi... *Comment a-t-on pu se laisser aveugler au point de se mettre à la merci de ces bruts barbares?*

(*Entre la vie et la mort*; Sarraute 1968; 23–4)¹⁶

Finally, there is another very interesting case, June Arnold's *The Cook and the Carpenter* (1973), a novel that until almost the end of the text (p. 139) uses the non-gender-specific pronouns *na* and the possessive *nan*. It does so even for free indirect discourse.¹⁷

Besides these very logical shifts, a number of interesting exceptions to the rule need to be noted that allow an unshifted pronominal in free indirect discourse (and sometimes even in indirect discourse).

‘Unshifted’ pronominals

(A) Unshifted pronominals persist in **idiomatic expressions**, which—one could argue—are referentless:

- (25) Roses, she [Mrs Dempster] thought sardonically. All trash, m'dear. *For really, what with eating, drinking, and mating, the bad days and good, life had been no mere matter of roses, and what was more, let me tell you, Carrie Dempster had no wish to change her lot with any woman's in Kentish Town!*

(*Mrs Dalloway*; Woolf 1976:31)

- (26) And huddling and crouching were hardly postures for a woman like Maggie Kyle. *She would walk upright, thank you, as long as she was able. And she would stay close to trees that permitted it.*

(*The Invention of the World*, ‘Pilgrimage’, i; Hodgins 1977:294)

On the other hand, some first and second person pronominals occurring in idioms do get shifted, but with decidedly odd effect: *Jeannie said, listen to her husband* (Karpf 1933:252); *if Miss Murdstone pleased* (from *if you please*; *ibid.*, 254); *O her beloved Clary* (*ibid.*, 247).

(B) The pronoun is not shifted if it is a **generalizing** *you* or *one*. This also applies to generalized *I* and *we*, and to the possessive pronouns of all these. Examples can be found even in indirect discourse.

- (27) Yet somehow they [Giles and Mrs Manresa] felt—how could one put it—a little not quite here or there. As if the play had jerked the ball out of the cup; as *if what I call myself* was still floating unattached, and didn't settle. Not quite themselves, they felt. Or was it simply that they felt clothes conscious?

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:110)

- (28) The night before he was executed he wrote a letter in his prison cell [...] but the jailor, who saw no point in sending off a letter written by a dead man, tossed it in his fire that night in his home without bothering to open it first or even to read the name and address on the envelope. There was a good deal of executing going on that week, *and though it never hurts a man to humour the condemned a bit, you couldn't spend your whole life doing favours.*

(*The Invention of the World*, 'The Eden Swindle'; Hodgins 1977:104–5)

- (29) To such questions, the Major, waxing very purple, would reply that it was a bad world, Sir, altogether; that Joey [I → Joey] knew a thing or two, but had been done, Sir, done like an infant; that if **you** had foretold this, Sir, to J. Bagstock [me → J.B.], when he went abroad with Dombey and was chasing that vagabond up and down France, J. Bagstock would have pooh-pooh'd **7011**—would have pooh-pooh'd **you**, Sir, by the Lord!

(*Dombey and Son*, lviii; Dickens 1985:910)

- (30) *N'importe! elle n'était pas heureuse. [...] Rien, d'ailleurs, ne valait la peine d'une recherche; tout mentait! Chaque sourire cachait un bâillement d'ennui, chaque joie une malediction, tout plaisir son dégoût, et les meilleurs baisers ne vous laissaient sur la lèvre qu'une irréalisable envie d'une volupté plus haute.*

(*Madame Bovary* III, vi; Flaubert 1972:335; quoted Steinberg 1971:275)¹⁸

One:

- (31) **One** could hardly blame people for classing all university women as frumps, thought Prudence, looking down the table at the odd garments and odder wearers of them, the eager, unpainted faces, the wispy hair, the dowdy clothes; *and yet most of them had married—that was the strange and disconcerting thing.*

(*Jane and Prudence*, i; Pym 1987:9)

- (32) Cependant, la Maheude restait debout, sans se décider à partir. [...] *Evidemment, ils avaient renvoyé la vieille et enfermé la petite, pour bâfrer leur lapin. Ah! on avait beau dire, quand une femme se conduisait mal, ça portait bonheur à sa maison!*

(*Germinal* IV, v; Zola 1978:316; quoted Steinberg 1971:275)¹⁹

- (33) Mamsell Jungmann und das Folgmädchen hatten die weiße Flügeltür zum Speisesaal geöffnet, und langsam, in zuversichtlicher Gemächlichkeit, bewegte sich die Gesellschaft hinüber; **man** konnte eines nahrhaften Bissens gewärtig sein bei den Buddenbrooks.

(*Buddenbrooks* I, ii; Mann 1991:18)²⁰

Our:

- (34) *Now it was God's turn: and He was not to be hoodwinked or deceived. Every sin would then come forth from its lurking-place, the most rebellious against the divine will and the most degrading to our poor corrupt nature, the tiniest imperfection and the most heinous atrocity.*

(*Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, iii; Joyce 1974:113; quoted Steinberg 1971:310)

Some of the early debates between Kalepky on the German and Bally on the French side centre on similar uses of the first person plural pronoun and possessives. Thus *nous* for *nous hommes* in (36):

- (35) Pierre sentit des larmes lui monter aux yeux, et d'un geste inconscient [...] il ouvrit les bras, il les tendit vers la Rome réelle, [...] qui s'étendait a ses pieds. *Serait-elle douce a son rêve? Allait-il, comme il l'avait dit, trouver chez elle le remède a nos impatiences et a nos inquiétudes?*

(*Rome*, i; Zola 1896:38–9; quoted Kalepky 1899:500)²¹

- (36) Et ils [M. et Mme Vignerot] y [namely about money to be inherited through the death of a rich relative] avaient certainement pensé devant la Grotte, *mais la sainte Vierge n'était-elle pas la suprême sagesse, ne savait-elle pas mieux que nous-mêmes ce qu'elle devait faire pour le bonheur des vivants et des morts?*

(*Loures* V, i; Zola 1894:466; quoted Kalepky 1899:499)²²

For some equivalent German examples see Steinberg (1971:308–9). Steinberg calls this a 'gnomic' first person plural form.

In the following example the reference is not to a generalized *we*, but to *we British*, so that one could argue that the unshifted *our* is appropriate to the current situation of reporting: the reader, after all, is expected to be British.

- (37) The motto for 10, Downing Street, he [Mr Hamilton] proposed, was: 'Everywhere someone is waiting for a peerage from you.'

This widespread attack on patronage should be noted by those who attack our politicians. After all, a salaried lordship would make a nice retirement for an M.P.

(*Survey of English Usage* W. 12.4.11; 'Powell in centre of Commons row')

Steinberg also quotes a number of examples of a similar nature for German and French (1971:312–13).

(C) One, which in some British sociolects is used as an equivalent for *I*, can preserve this meaning in indirect discourse and free indirect discourse.

- (38) *How could one, in any case, understand other people's motives and feelings, when one's own remained mysterious? Why did one look forward with irritation to the receipt of a letter on April 1, and then feel alarmed and affronted when it did not arrive by the first post? Very likely the letter had been sent to Oxford. There was no possible urgency about it, since one knew what it would contain and how it had to be answered; but it was annoying to sit about, expecting it.*

(*Gaudy Night*, xi; Sayers 1968:178)

- (39) *Why on earth couldn't people live their lives in a rational, civilized way? Why couldn't they take things as they came? Breakfast at nine, lunch at one-thirty, tea at five. [...] And sometimes calls in the afternoon—the Rector, Lady Fredegond with her ear-trumpet, Mr. Veal. And political discussions — except that in these last months, since the Anschluss and Munich, **one** had found that political discussion was one of the unpleasant things it was wise to avoid. And the weekly journey to London, with lunch at the Reform, and always dinner with old Thrupp of the British Museum; and a chat with **one's** poor brother Tom at the Foreign Office (only that too was rapidly becoming one of the things to be avoided)*

(*After Many a Summer*, viii; Huxley 1950:106)

- (40) und Monseigneur, der Bischof, der, als sei ihm übel, mit dem Oberkörper vornüberklappte und die Stirn auf seine Knie schlug, bis ihm das grüne Hütchen vom Kopfe kollerte; und dabei war ihm gar nicht übel, sondern er schwelgte nur zum ersten Mal in seinem Leben in religiösem Entzücken, denn ein Wunder war geschehen vor aller Augen, der Herrgott höchstpersönlich war dem Henker in den Arm gefallen, indem er den als Engel offenbarte, der vor der Welt ein Mörder schien — o daß dergleichen noch geschah im 18. Jahrhundert. Wie groß war der Herr! und wie klein und windig war **man** selbst, der **man** einen Bannfluch gesprochen hatte, ohne daran zu glauben, bloß zur Beruhigung des Volkes!

(*Das Parfüm* III, xlix; Süskind 1985:302)²³

(D) There are also cases in which *you* is a *you* of **self-address**, and therefore also can remain unshifted:

- (41) Milkman smiled and let his shoulders slump a little. *It was a good feeling to come into a strange town and find a stranger who knew **your** people.*

(*Song of Solomon*; Morrison 1977:229)

- (42) Sometimes he felt what he believed the white folks were feeling. Or most of them. *Something you felt against **your** mind. Against all **you**knew. Against all you believed. Yet, there it was. [...] You'd always wanted to know a white girl. You knew their brothers, you'd played with them as kids, sometimes gone fishing. But you never knew a white girl. You'd have to be a house boy, or cook or gardener, to know a nice white girl in Maxwell. And even to know the whores in the hotels you'd better be a bellboy.*

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:216)

Lillian Smith's novel is one of the most prominent instances of the use of the second person in contexts of self-address modulating into 'one' readings.

(E) Very rarely special circumstances allow a direct address-*you* to be preserved if the addressee is an entity that the extradiegetic narratee (and the reader) might themselves address in these terms. Such cases have been the focus of heated debate in early discussions about free indirect discourse:

- (43) Resté seul dans l'embrasure, le cardinal s'y tint immobile, un instant encore. Par la fenêtre, les yeux obscurcis de ses larmes, il regardait le ciel. Et ses bras

frémissements se tendirent, en un geste d'imploration ardente. [...] *O Dieu! que ne faisiez-vous un miracle, pour montrer l'éclat de votre pouvoir sans bornes! Un miracle, un miracle!* Il le demandait du fond de son âme de croyant.

(*Rome*, xiii; Zola 1896:582; quoted Kalepky 1899: 500, and Bally 1914a:415)²⁴

In this passage the *vous* is an address to God such as the cardinal may voice in his prayer, but also such that the reader as well as the narrator, sympathizing with the cardinal's anguish, might possibly be led to echo.²⁵ However, since the reader/narratee, in an invocation to God, would use the same pronominal form, a coincidence between narratorial and figural usage occurs, similar to the *nous* in *nous hommes*. One last example, of a possibly even rarer sort, is provided by Vološinov in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*:

- (44) There, mountain peaks, each one alike, stretch out in line; a lonely track among them winds and fades in gloom... Oppressive thoughts beset the captive youth's tormented breast... [...] In people's hearts he found betrayal, in dreams of love, a mad illusion... ***Freedom*** ! For you alone he kept the quest in this sublunar world... It came to pass... Now he sees nothing in the world on which to set his hopes, and even you , his last fond dream, you , too, are gone from him. He is a slave.

(Pushkin, *The Captive of the Caucasus*; quoted Vološinov 1986:139; Vološinov's emphasis; my italics and bold italics)

Here the narrator apostrophizes Freedom in the name of the hero. The passage is indeed a curious one. A possible naturalization could be established along the lines of Stanzel's concept of reflectorization.²⁶ According to this, the narrator could conceivably be said to adopt provisionally the character's personality with respect to his attitudes and linguistic idiom. This would explain the free indirect discourse form as well as the direct address (apostrophe)—after all it is the narrator speaking. Vološinov significantly calls the phenomenon 'substituted direct discourse' (1986:138), but holds that most people would read the passage as unproblematic free indirect discourse. For the moment I would therefore prefer to consider this as a further phenomenon of the same kind as (43), which comes across as much less successful because the reader can less easily imagine her-/himself join in an address to freedom together with the narrator and character in what is after all a very specific moment in a specific history and not a generally employed rhetorical exclamation.

A passage that does not really fit the case of a generalized *you* is the following:

- (45) With that name ***you*** had no sure sense of property, as if it were in your blood and history not to possess, or if by some miracle to own something, to do so on the verge of loss. At the end ***you*** were sixty and had less than at thirty. It was, she thought, surely a talent.

(*The Assistant*; Malamud 1985:19)

Although the second *you* could be generalized as ‘one’, the first *you* echoes Helen’s words as if addressed to her father. Since there is no clear narratee in the text at this point, the ambiguous *you* is naturalized as Helen’s intra-textual address rather than the narrator’s (potentially extra-textual) reference to the narratee/reader. The passage, in fact, is free indirect discourse, as the parenthetical *she thought* in the final sentence suggests.

In the following example *us* (rather than shifted *them*) is preserved, but there is little ambiguity because the reader, too, wishes to know, or identifies as a contemporary:

- (46) Bar, handling his persuasive double eye-glass, was by no means clear but that it might be four [hundred thousand pounds]. *It was one of those happy strokes of calculation and combination, the result of which it was difficult to estimate. [...] But there was Brother Bellows, who had been in the great Bank case, and who could probably tell us more. What did Brother Bellows put this new success at?*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xxi; Dickens 1978:295)

- (47) The people moved uneasily in their seats as John rose to reply. He spoke slowly and methodically. *The age, he said, demanded new ideas; we were far different from those men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, — with broader ideas of human brotherhood and destiny.*

(*The Souls of Black Folk*, xiii; Du Bois 1989:195–6)

- (48) For, though they had reached the town now and were in the main street, with carts grinding past on the cobbles, still he [Charles Tansley] went on talking, about settlements, and teaching, and working men, and helping **our** own class, and lectures, till she [Mrs Ramsay] gathered that he had got back entire self-confidence [...].

(*To the Lighthouse* I, i; Woolf 1985:17)²⁷

Such cases are more frequent than one would expect.

At this point one may want to ask whether such examples are not, after all, cases of what Schuelke (1958) has called ‘slipping’. Schuelke of course regards the survival of direct discourse elements into indirect discourse as a kind of writerly ‘slip of the pen’.

- (49) The army will put ‘all **we’ve** got,’ as he put it, into the program.²⁸

(Quoted Schuelke 1958:96)

- (50) Dr. Loper said last night he wished ‘to express my gratitude to all the Stanford students for all the time spent’ in the search for his small son.

(Quoted *ibid.*, 90)²⁹

I have not found any comparable examples in the *Survey of English Usage*, except in cases where ‘typical utterances’ were proffered by the speakers:³⁰

- (51) on the other hand he may say **my dear fellow** of course **we** understand this problem and **we** would arrange it in this way

(*Survey of English Usage* S.3.4.72)

This can equally well be simply direct discourse. In literature, I have only come across a few examples of such slipping, although I am certain that there are more:³¹

- (52) but he [Caesar, i.e. Oroonoko] told us he could never pardon Byam; [...] but for Byam, who was their leader, their head—and shou'd, by his justice and honour, have been an example to 'em—for him he wished to live to take a dire revenge of him; and said, it had been well for him [Byam? Oroonoko?] if he [Byam] had sacrificed *me* [i.e. Oroonoko] instead of giving *me* the contemptible whip. He refused to talk much; but begging us to give him our hands, he took them, and protested never to lift up his, to do us any harm.

(*Oroonoko*; Behn 1986:90–1)

- (53) And thenne Parys maad hys ansuer sayeng that the beaulte of my lady vyenne was so grete that in al the world was none to hyr lyke/ that yf it pleased the Kyng *I* am redy for to [a vij"] furnysshe the Ioustes for hys loue ayenst the knyght yet another tyme/ and to Iuste tyl that geffroy shold be vaynquysshed/ & that was wythoute ony gaynsayeng/ & the heraulde retorned and tolde it to the kyng.

(*Paris and Vienne*; Caxton 1957:16)

- (54) Gertrude Stein was delighted when later she was told that Eliot had said in Cambridge that the work of Gertrude Stein was very fine but not for *us*.

(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, vii; Stein 1990:202)

- (55) I discovered that Ann Taylor had gone back to Australia, but six weeks before. No one had killed herself. *A girl the girl on the other end didn't know, but 'I think she's a friend of Ann's' had taken over the flat; she hadn't seen her 'for weeks'. Yes, she had blonde hair; actually she had only seen her twice; yes, she thought she was Australian. But who on earth...*

(*The Magus*, lxvii; Fowles 1983:565)

- (56) *About here*, she [Cam] thought, dabbling her fingers in the water, *a ship had sunk*, and she murmured, dreamily, half asleep, how we perished, each alone.

(*To the Lighthouse* III, x; Woolf 1985:176)

The last quotation alludes to Cam's earlier vision of drowning, and the *we* is thus quite properly a deictic expression relating to the character's deictic centre. Slipping also apparently occurs in Russian.³² Whether one regards it as a sign of inattention or as a 'quotation' from direct discourse, slipping certainly forges the link between the direct and the (free) indirect, emphasizing that the dichotomy is not as indestructible as is usually believed.

3.2.2

Logophoricity, the English reflexive, and the predominance of pronouns in free indirect discourse

Some uses of the English reflexive pronoun have recently been discussed in connection with free indirect discourse, and I will here briefly present the main facts of the case.³³ In some contexts, the specification of which we owe to Kuno (1987), one can encounter a reflexive pronoun (e.g. *himself*, *ourselves*) instead of the expected anaphoric pronoun *he*, *she* or *us*. The phenomenon is widely regarded as a *subjective* index or a consciousness (SELF) marker by proponents of deictic centre theory (Banfield, Wiebe, Rapaport). Banfield was one of the first to discuss sentences such as:

(57) This paper was written by Ann and himself.

(Cp. Banfield 1982:91; following Ross 1970)

(58) Physicists like himself do not lie.

(Cp. Kuno 1987:123–5)

Banfield came across such sentences in free indirect discourse. In similar idioms reflexive *myself/yourself* occurs also in indirect discourse. Examples of the reflexive in indirect discourse and free indirect discourse abound:

(59) Then Lesley was asking finally and once and for all if he wouldn't come to Paris because it would take him out of **himself**, and Glynis was asking in the same terms if he wouldn't come to Bournemouth. And he thanked them both for their charity and forbearance and said that he wouldn't; *he meant to spend Christmas by himself*.

(Susan Hill, 'Strange Meeting' [1984:33]; *Survey of English Usage* W. 16.7.39–1)

(60) Nevertheless, like all fervid writing, the task was done in less time than usual, *and if the spelling differed from Mrs. Glegg's—why, she belonged, like himself* [Mr Tulliver], *to a generation with whom spelling was a matter of private judgment*.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, xiii; G. Eliot 1986:130)

(61) There was yet another circumstance which went a long way to confirm Little Dorrit in her fears, though it was not a great circumstance in itself. *Mr Sparkler's demeanour towards herself changed. It became fraternal*.

(*Little Dorrit* II, xiv; Dickens 1978:652)

(62) Mr Sparkler said, or rather twitched out of himself in small pieces by the shirt-collar, that Mrs Merdle having completely used up her place in the country, and also her house at Brighton, and being, of course, unable, don't you see, to remain in London when there wasn't a soul there, and not feeling **herself** this year quite up to visiting about at people's places, had resolved to have a touch at Rome, where a woman like **herself**, with a proverbially fine appearance, and with no nonsense about her, couldn't fail to be a great acquisition.

(*Ibid.*, II, vi; 553)

(63) *Very good, so he [Jove] had, in Greece. For herself* [Ursula], *she was no Grecian woman. Not Jove nor Pan nor any of those gods, not even Bacchus nor Apollo, could come to her. But*

the Sons of God who took to wife the daughters of men, these were such as should take her to wife.

(*The Rainbow*, x; Lawrence 1988:276)

(64) But I could not make him see that. *Nothing must be in my life but himself.*

(B.Johnson 1987:169, quoted from Z.N.Hurston's autobiography)

There are also examples of this reflexive use in early English texts but since the reflexive was used much more widely then, their subjective value may be much doubted (Dry 1990).

(65) In sum, he left nothing unassayed which might disgrace *himself* to grace his friend, in sweet terms making me receive a most resolute refusal of *himself*. But when he found that his presence did far more persuade for *himself* than his speech could do for his friend, he left my court, hoping that forgetfulness [...] would make room for his friend.

(*Arcadia*, xi; Sidney 1977:124)

Note also the following passage of 'brogue', where the reflexive can be regarded as a dialect feature on the synchronic plane:

(66) Be Jaysus, if it ain't the mirror the auld loon was always admirin' his mug in while he spouted Byron to pretend *himself* was a lord wid a touch av the poet.

(*A Touch of the Poet* V; O'Neill 1957:133)

Radford (1988:318) also points out the grammatically obligatory use of a reflexive after verbs of cognition and speech in 'exceptional clauses': *The President believes / himself to be right*]. It is a moot point to determine whether the reflexive implies a consciousness factor since exceptional clauses can occur only after 'cognitive verbs' (ibid., 317).

The reflexive does not occur automatically, however, and contrastive stress may overrule the reflexive:

(67) why the Kurds are interested in signing the agreement and why the Shiites are worrying for *them* [i.e. the Shiites].

(BBC News, April 30, 1991)

In German and French the situation is more complex on account of the reflexives *sich* and *soi*, which seem to be restricted to the immediate binding category on the lines of Chomsky's Condition A for anaphors. Zribi-Hertz (1990), however, discusses a whole battery of French idiomatic expressions which utilize a non-reflexive pronominal and the *lui-même* construction, and these are very similar to idioms such as *out of oneself* in English. In German, the equivalent formal expression would be the adverb *selbst*, but it has no function equivalent to the English and French examples, as one can gauge from the infelicity of:

- (68) Er konnte alles hören. Sie sprachen über *sich/*ihn selbst/ihn. 'He could hear everything. They were talking about himself/him himself/him.'

Er selbst is exclusively contrastive and emphatic on the lines of Zribi-Hertz's emphatic English and French examples. A logophoric though not necessarily deictic element exists, however, in the adjective *eigen*—compare the English *own*:

- (69) Was sich beide Frauen in dem Drange ihrer Seelen möglich dachten, konnte er sich endlich auch möglich denken, gerührt wie er war, wenn er es recht fühlte, in dem glücklichen Momente! *War nicht sein **eigener** Wunsch erfüllt?* [...] *Ihm selbst war es gegeben, die Krone des Beifalls zu brechen, ihm war es aufgedrungen, das Schicksal seines **eigenen** Stückes und seiner Freunde zu entscheiden.*

(Goethe, *Urmeister*; quoted Neuse 1990:116)³⁴

- (70) *She did not want to be unkind to him; but she could see no reason for being kind to him. She was a virtuous business woman with a mother and two sisters and her **own** old age to be provided comfortably for. She did not expect more than a five years' further run. She was twenty-four and, as she said: 'We Spanish women are horrors at thirty.'*

(*The Good Soldier* III, iv; Ford 1983:160–1)

When Kuno came to look at the problem of the English reflexive, he was concerned mainly with the theory of pronominalization and anaphor binding³⁵ as presented by Chomsky in his *Government and Binding* lectures (1981/1986b, 1982/1985). In that frame, it became important to explain the use of the reflexive in the direct discourse examples—which is different from that of the ordinary reflexive in sentences such as *Bill preens himself in front of the mirror*. Whereas, in this last sentence, it is unacceptable to use the anaphor **him*, there are numerous patterns in which *both* the anaphor and the reflexive can occur, though—as Kuno claims—with a difference in *meaning*.

- (71) Mary found a snake behind her.
(72) Mary found a snake behind herself.

(Compare Kuno 1987:66–8)

The snake is much closer in (72), with the reflexive implying physical contact. Compare also Cantrall's example (Cantrall 1974):

- (73) a. The womeni were standing in the background, with the children behind themi.
b. The womeni were standing in the background, with the children behind themselvesj.

Cantrall asks us to imagine that these sentences describe a photograph in which the standing women have their backs turned to the camera. It then becomes clear that [73a] and [73b] do not have the same informative content: the children of [73b] are necessarily located 'behind the women' *FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE WOMEN*

—that is, behind the women's backs, and consequently in the foreground of the picture; by contrast, the children of [73a] may be located 'behind the women' *FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SPEAKER*, therefore in the background of the picture and actually in *FRONT* of the women.

(Zribi-Hertz 1989:704)

Kuno goes on to discuss so-called picture noun reflexives,³⁶ and reflexives in logophoric contexts (of saying or thinking):

- (74) John showed Mary a picture of herself. John showed Mary_i a picture of *her_i.
(Cp. Kuno 1987:168)

Kuno explains the occurrence of the reflexive (and its direct discourse equivalents) as the result of a series of *pragmatic* constraints. If one can posit an 'underlying' speech or thought act—with the result that the reporter's consciousness has access to that speech or thought act—then the reflexive pronoun will be triggered. What this comes down to in practice is that the enunciator's own thoughts and his or her own utterances as well as those of his or her original interlocutor constitute the precise environment for the occurrence of such reflexives in relation to the original partners of conversation. These uses of the reflexive need to be set against the 'unmarked' obligatory reflexive in sentences like *Jimmy wrote a letter to himself* (*him).

Occurrences of the obligatory reflexive are accounted for syntactically by the notion of command which establishes a governing category within which such anaphors are 'bound'. The same applies also to the reflexive *each other*³⁷ and the adjective *own*. Besides the *logophoric* reflexive *-self one* also needs to note the occurrence of reflexives in certain emphatic and contrastive positions:

- (75) John_i believes that the letter was sent both $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{to him}_i \text{ and Mary.} \\ \text{to Mary and himself}_i. \end{array} \right.$
(Quoted Zribi-Hertz 1989: 699)

There are also, it seems to me, some idiomatic expressions which *require* the use of a reflexive:

- (76) Similar odorous substances, called pheromones, are used as mating stimuli by many animals, even by species as highly evolved as *ourselves*.
(Quoted Zribi-Hertz 1989:708)

Another such idiom seems to be *despite oneself*, as in Zribi-Hertz's *John 's face turned red despite himself* (709). Here, too, *despite myself* is the only possible direct discourse equivalent.

Zribi-Hertz then quotes a number of very interesting counter-examples to the logophoric reading of the reflexive.

- (77) When Palmer's sister did at last appear I_i recognized her at once. The face came back to ME_i (*MYSELF_i) with a rush, as often happens when what one cannot picture appears unexpectedly as something well known.
 (A Severed Head, viii; Murdoch 1961:68; quoted Zribi-Hertz 1989: 712)
- (78) SHE_i [Kitty Lasswade] was not pretty; no, HER_i size was against HER_i (*HERSELF_i).
 (The Years, '1888'; Woolf 1979:64; quoted Zribi-Hertz 1989:713)

Zribi-Hertz concludes that in these examples a boundary between two 'domains of point of view' is crossed, and that the logophoric reflexive can only be used within a uniform domain of point of view. This conclusion of course echoes Banfield's definitions for free indirect discourse, and since Zribi-Hertz quotes Banfield elsewhere in the article, a direct influence cannot be dismissed. In particular, Zribi-Hertz's reference to 'narrative point of view' versus 'objective' sentences in her discussion of example sentences where the reflexive cannot be used suggests a direct reliance on Banfield's results. However, being a linguist, Zribi-Hertz is somewhat at a loss how to define objective and subjective sentences. Her attempts are clearly circular (714–15), and in fact one ends up with Banfield's conclusion that, *if* there is a reflexive, *then* one has a context of subjectivity. Zribi-Hertz's deliberations are circular also because she characterizes reflexives according to their environment, rather than proposing any watertight rules when or in what environments they will inevitably occur.

Take the following example from Zribi-Hertz:

- (79) Today I_j had, with each of them [Miss Hernshaw and Miss Seelhaft] separately, gone through the painful business of telling them about my divorce. So gleefully fast does bad news travel. They_j stood now by the door waiting without visible impatience [e_j to see the last of ME_i ('MYSELF_i)].
 (A Severed Head, ix; Murdoch 1961:76; quoted Zribi-Hertz 1989:712)

To see the last of somebody semantically implies distance and impenetrability of the other's ego. It clearly is not self-reflexive. One therefore reads this as the two women's thought reported by the retrospective first person narrator. However, one can easily transform the final sentence into an experiential account of the narrator's story experience by adding a consciousness signal such as the progressive tense. If one does so (*They were now standing by the door waiting without visible impatience to see the last of myself*), the narrator's realization of their standing there and of their pleasurable anticipation of getting rid of him can be signalled by means of a reflexive. Note also the *today* and *now* in the passage, both 'subjective' deictic elements.

The above seems to warrant the following conclusions. Reflexives that are not 'bound' in syntactic fashion may occur in certain idioms and in certain emphatic contexts. They can additionally help to signal or enhance immediate subjective experience, i.e. non-reflective experience of the self as self, both in contexts of speech and thought representation and in contexts of narrated perception (compare under (5.4)). In contexts where a consciousness reading is possible but not mandatory—and this applies to Zribi-Hertz's

examples listed under (55) and (56)³⁸—the reflexive may need other consciousness markers to create a viable reading.

The same pragmatic awareness criteria apply for some uses of the pronoun (rather than an R-expression), for instance in clefted that-clauses.

(80) * That the defendant_i did not know the victim was claimed by him_i in court yesterday.

(Kuno 1987:115)

(81) That he_i did not know the victim was claimed by the defendant_i in court yesterday.

In these cases there is a definite situation of a speech context, and the defendant is hence necessarily aware of the self-reference in the that-clause. Compare also,

(82) That the chairman was going to dismiss her_j; was overheard by Alice_j during lunch.

?That the chairman was going to dismiss Alice_i was overheard by her_i during lunch.

In the first case Alice herself overheard this, and the sentence reflects her *awareness*, her involvement. In the second sentence, the speaker notes that Alice overheard a remark about her dismissal during lunch. In this context the dismissal constitutes old, presupposed information, and the speaker's point is that Alice overheard a statement to this effect. Since the speaker cannot 'look into' Alice's mind, Alice's consciousness is not involved. In the first case, however, the cataphoric pronoun signals awareness, and can only be used if Alice's overhearing implies a submerged act of perception reflected in her consciousness. Kuno terms such occurrences of a personal pronoun (where a proper name or descriptive noun phrase is forbidden) *logophoric*.³⁹ The term *logophoric* is a technical term in linguistics, where it refers to morphological classes of pronouns in some African languages, and in Mandarin Chinese, or to the use of reflexive *jibun* in Japanese (von Roncador 1988, Sells 1987, N.Li 1991, Kameyama 1984). Logophoric pronouns are pronouns used anaphorically to designate speakers (and addressees) in contexts of speech or thought report. Interestingly, these same logophoric pronouns can also be found in free indirect discourse passages in Mandarin narrative:

(83) (a) With her eyes hanging, (b) Fan Danni walked quickly with a ghastly expression on her face. [...] (c) Now, when she really left Hu Zhengqiang's house, (d) she felt the real humiliation. [...] (e) Indeed a couple of hypocrites! (f) But, [their] hypocrisy made *self* a hypocrite too.

(N.Li 1991:4)⁴⁰

In English these logophoric and reflexive phenomena can be observed only in very specific syntactic environments in which pronominalization is suspended by the standard Chomskyan conditions of anaphor distribution (Conditions A through C, as revised by Kuno 1987). Thus,

(84) Alice overheard during lunch that the chairman was going to dismiss her.

according to Kuno's Condition B',⁴¹ is an example of obligatory forward pronominalization (triggered by the fact that the NP *Alice* does not k-command⁴² the object-NP of *dismiss*).

(85) *She_i overheard during lunch that the chairman was going to dismiss Alice_i.

on the other hand, is ruled out entirely in the co-indexed reading: although *Alice* is not k-commanded by *she*, *she* c-commands⁴³ *Alice*, and 'An R-expression is invariably marked for disjoint reference with an NP that precedes and c-commands it' according to Kuno's Anaphor Binding Rule C'. Pronominalization in clefted clauses such as (82) or in the reflexive uses outlined above cannot be explained by these Anaphor Binding Rules.⁴⁴

In so far as it represents somebody's utterance or consciousness, free indirect discourse therefore falls within the awareness criterion postulated by Kuno. On the reading of free indirect discourse incorporating the deictic centre of the consciousness which it evokes—and this is the reading that I endorse—one can therefore begin to explain the predominance in free indirect discourse of the pronouns referring to the corresponding ('underlying') centre of consciousness. It has been noted again and again that free indirect discourse, particularly when it renders thought processes, predominantly employs pronouns rather than R-expressions to designate the current reflector character or centre of consciousness. (This is true at least for the most common context, third person narrative.) Banfield even goes so far as to ban all R-expressions from free indirect discourse, allowing them only in what she calls non-reflective consciousness. (Compare below and Chapter 7.)

The predominance of the pronoun in free indirect discourse has naturally been noted by narratologists, too. Stanzel (1984a, 1984b) interprets the occurrence of third person pronouns at the beginning of narratives (otherwise referred to as 'referentless pronouns' or 'non-sequential sequence signals'—Backus 1965) as one of the major signals of figural narrative, i.e. narrative presented predominantly through the perspective of one (or several) character(s), who are then referred to as 'reflector' characters (i.e. in Jamesian terminology, centres of consciousness) (Stanzel 1984b). Using a third person pronoun for the protagonist or other characters whom he or she observes—with the text miming a perspective within the consciousness of the reflector figure—highlights the *medias in res* quality of a text beginning. Harweg (1968) has termed such narrative beginnings that use referentless pronouns and 'familiarizing' articles⁴⁵ *etic* text beginnings, and they correlate with Stanzel's reflector narrative (1984b:169–70).

At the beginning of narratives such pronouns of course do not necessarily belong to a character's (reflector's) consciousness as part of a *free indirect discourse* rendering of his or her thoughts—they do, however, require the positing of a character's *deictic centre* and can technically be subsumed under a description of the character's perceptions, or even only of his or her awareness. Text beginnings of this kind as such transcend Banfield's category of non-reflective consciousness in the direction of the narrative's assumption of figural

deixis *without* any very precise claims about linguistic origins within the psyche or consciousness of that character. Here narratology offers a richer terminology to deal with etic text beginnings and narrative sentences that, in the context, become as much a description of a character's subjective body feeling as a neutral statement about his or her actions:

- (86) Turning, he scanned the shore south, his feet sinking again slowly in new sockets.
(*Ulysses*, 'Proteus'; Joyce 1984:89)

His feet marched in sudden proud rhythm over the sand furrows, along by the boulders of the south wall.

(*Ibid.*, 87)

His pace slackened. Here. Am I going to Aunt Sara's or not?

(*Ibid.*, 77)

All of these sentences can be interpreted as narrated perception (cp. (5.5)), including 'His pace slackened', which one could read from Stephen Dedalus's perspective as his awareness that his pace is slackening. Narratology allows us to put such sentences into a macro-textual frame of the illusion of immediacy (Stanzel 1984b: 4–5), of the reader's illusion of direct access to a ruling figural consciousness that reflects or mediates the story-world to us.

It needs to be noted emphatically that this explanation is not generally extendable to the presentation of *utterances*, which—unless they are merely reflected through the consciousness of a reflector character—need to be considered objectively accessible items of the story world. Free indirect discourse representations of utterances therefore frequently employ a proper name, or even a descriptive NP to designate logophoric as well as other referents, and this is true *a fortiori* of the subject and indirect object positions in narrative parentheticals accompanying free indirect *speech*.⁴⁶ Consider, for example, the following exchange, quoted by Banfield to (mistakenly) illustrate non-reflective consciousness:

- (87) A conversation then ensued, not on unfamiliar lines. *Miss Bartlett was, after all, a wee bit tired, and thought they had better spend the morning settling in; unless Lucy would rather like to go out? Lucy would rather like to go out, as it was her first day in Florence, but, of course, she could go alone. Miss Bartlett could not allow this. Of course she would accompany Lucy everywhere. Oh, certainly not; Lucy would stop with her cousin. Oh no! that would never do! Oh yes!*

(*A Room with a View* I, ii; Forster 1977:15)

The proper names in this passage are used partly because the interlocutors are both female and the pronominal reference might therefore have been misleading, but, additionally, this is of course a spoken exchange, and therefore necessarily outside a character's

individual consciousness. I will have more to say on the use of R-expressions rather than pronouns in relation to thought report (psycho-narration), i.e. the narrative's (external) description of figural consciousness, particularly in the light of recent research into the effects of paragraph boundaries on shifts of deictic centre (Fox 1987, 1988; Wiebe 1990, 1991; Bruder 1991). It should, however, be noted at this point that no invariable rule can be postulated out of context, since the presence of other subjectivity markers, narratorial presence, competing referential candidates (other characters or other objects of thought), contrastive emphasis, parodic or ironic intent, the desire for obscuring distinctions or for deliberate ambiguity can all influence the stylistic choice between a pronoun or an R-expression, if such a choice is possible grammatically in the relevant context.

3.2.3

Designation by means of noun phrases

'Replacement' in indirect discourse of referential expressions in the original utterance by means of definite descriptions or proper names has been analysed in great depth by philosophers of the natural language approach—starting with Frege's example of the morning and evening stars denoting the planet Venus, but whose reference in terms of a speaker's intended meaning may be quite distinct (Frege 1970). As I have outlined under (1.2) in the wake of Frege the reference of so-called singular terms in indirect discourse and in belief contexts has been discussed under the headings of *intensionality* and the *de re/de dicto* distinction. What literary critics are mostly concerned with are those NPs that are stylistically significant, whether they 'deictically' evoke a reported character's language, or whether they hint at a narrator's deliberate language play. Deictic elements are usually treated as markers of 'sub-jectivity', as in Banfield's theory of deictic centre. Designation indicative of a character's 'voice' will be discussed in the following section (3.2.4).

Unaccountably, very little attention has been paid by literary scholars to the precise variations of NP reference in fiction.⁴⁷ Most narratologists briefly subsume designations such as *our hero* or *the sun-tanned Mexican* to the category 'authorial' style, treating it in terms of an attempt at stylistic variation (proper name versus pronoun), and note the sometimes facetious and ironical tone of such descriptive noun phrases, either as marking the narrator's attitude towards certain characters, or as typical of nineteenth-century fiction, where the narrator can refuse to name a character by her or his proper name, utilizing a definite description that frequently emphasizes non-essential properties: *the man with the red kerchief; the slim one with the moustache*. Indeed, such paraphrase can span the entire scale from simple description of the character's looks, habits and clothing to metonymic and metaphoric epithets—a tradition well grounded in the Western epic since Homer. Most really excellent analyses of characters' naming conventions have been conducted in the interpretation of a single work.

The linguistic side has not contributed greatly to the elucidation of this problematic (with two exceptions) because, as I take it, the large variety of such descriptive noun phrases would usually be regarded as a literary phenomenon. The first exception is Halliday/Hasan's classic *Cohesion in English* (1976). In this study the descriptive noun

phrase is treated under the title ‘lexical cohesion’ (Chapter 6), and several interesting relations are noted between antecedent names or descriptions and their anaphoric variants. Secondly, one should mention Roland Harweg’s classic study *Pronomina und Textkonstitution* (1968). Harweg departs from an analysis of textual *substitution*, a presupposition that I cannot share. Much of Harweg’s factual material corresponds with Halliday/Hasan’s, and this has been the reason for my choice of *Cohesion in English* for the structure of the following presentation. The difference between substitution and anaphora can be briefly captured in terms of textual (endophoric) versus extra-textual (exophoric) reference. Substitution appears to work more generally for *textual deixis*, since the anaphors would directly relate to earlier textual items. Most other anaphors, however, as indeed the variety of anaphoric alternatives suggests, cannot be reduced to a linguistic substitution of earlier signifiers, but need to include a referential and pragmatic aspect.⁴⁸

An anaphoric expression can utilize a general noun, i.e. a superordinate or super-superordinate of vague semantic content. Halliday/Hasan quote

the minister	the man
the Caterpillar	the creature
this crockery	the stuff
Geneva	the place (1976:274–5)

- (88) The question that you’re really asking is the result of almost sort of the Enlightenment that saw the cult of the Saint as an expression of popular culture. *How could an educated person believe in **the stuff**?*

(*Soundings* no. 536, January 1991)⁴⁹

as well as, even more interestingly, replacements of unexpressed, merely implied concepts:

- (89) We all kept quiet. That seemed the best *move*.

(Halliday/Hasan 1976:275 [=6.1d])

- (90) Henry seems convinced there’s money in dairy farming. I don’t know what gave him that *idea*.

(Ibid.[=6.1f])

Besides superordinates, i.e. hypernyms, synonyms and hyponyms can also be employed:

the ascent of the peak	the climb
the boy	the lad (Halliday/Hasan 1976:279–80)
a tree	the elm
a car	the Mazda

It needs to be noted that semantic restriction, i.e. the narrowing down of reference to a preciser hyponym, regularly correlates with the shift from introduction to specification

and is therefore equivalent to, or parallel to, the shift from indefinite to definite article in the 'new' versus 'given'⁵⁰ sequence of discourse.

- (91) a. When we turned the corner we saw a car approaching. The Mazda was coming at us, trying to run us over.
 b. We had been looking for a car for quite some time. The car we finally ended up with was *a* real Mazda.
 c. There's a car following us,' said Julie, frightened. I looked in the rear mirror. The car was still behind us. I had noticed the Mazda some time ago.
 d. The first car the dealer showed me was overpriced. *The red Mazdai was \$12,000—.

In (91a) and (91c) the car is introduced by an indefinite first-mention article, and further specification follows. Such specification can be related to the discourse strategy of providing more detail (and in fiction can be linked to the narrator's establishment of reliability, to the *effet du réel*—Barthes 1968); it can also trace characters' perceptions. Examples (91b) and (91d) document the relation of naming to topic-focus patterns. In (91b) definite reference requires the description to be indefinite as 'one of a category,' and in (91d) this is the expected continuation, which is why the definite description is then read as a reference to a *second* car.

Besides synonymy and hyponymy, Halliday/Hasan also note simple repetition (*the house...the house*) and, most significantly for fiction, NPs with a "connotation of attitude on the part of the speaker, usually one of familiarity (derogatory or intimate)" (1976:280). Mere repetition is very difficult to handle in terms of its function in discourse. Outside contrastive contexts and contexts in which the use of a pronoun might have resulted in ambiguous reference, the choice of repeating a lexeme rather than using the pronominal anaphor remains somewhat of a puzzle. In the move from introduction of the topic to its reiteration inside the 'theme', the use of a definite NP constitutes an unmarked choice, but outside that context speaker motivations or discourse rules have proved hard to pin down. Studies of repetition in conversation (Norrick 1987; Bublitz 1989; Tannen 1987a, 1987b) have understandably concentrated on interactional functions of lexical repetition, but it is not clear whether these functions can be simply adapted to the written language. Here a computerized approach may perhaps help find structural patterns that have so far remained impenetrable.

The most interesting category mentioned by Halliday/Hasan includes subjective, evaluative replacements such as the following:⁵¹

a boy/the boy...the idiot

I've been to see my great-aunt. *The poor old girl's* getting very forgetful these days.

(Halliday/Hasan 1976:276 [=6.2a])

Henry's thinking of rowing the Atlantic. Do go and talk to *the wretched fool*

(Ibid.[=6.2c])

We have noted above that such expressive idiom is generally assumed to be attributable to the speaker in indirect discourse and to the reported speaker in free indirect discourse, and we have also critiqued this assumption. Expressive NPs of the relevant kind can signal both a narrator's and a character's subjectivity and one therefore needs to consider this problem particularly in connection with the issue of 'voice' as one of the many expressive elements that signal a speaker or consciousness.⁵²

For the discussion of free indirect discourse, however, another kind of NP, namely that of the **proper name**—otherwise the typically unmarked term of standard reference⁵³—needs to be considered. It has frequently been claimed that in free indirect discourse only pronouns and no proper names could be used unless a narrator's interference needed to be postulated. Banfield (1982) in fact extends this claim to the point of creating a separate category of non-reflective consciousness in order to cover the use of NPs in what would otherwise seem to be free indirect discourse passages. Here are a few examples of NPs that 'replace' putative pronouns in the original utterance.

- (92) Sure of ardour being taken for granted, I [Vicomte de Valmont] assayed a more tender tone. *Evasion no longer disappointed me, it grieved me: did not my sympathetic friend owe me some consolation?*

(*Les Liaisons dangereuses*, Letter 99; Laclos 1987:232)⁵⁴

- (93) 'Unknown friend, my dear?' said Bella.

'Who caused the charge against poor father to be contradicted, and sent me the written paper.'

Bella had never heard of him. Had no notion who he was.

(*Our Mutual Friend* III, ix; Dickens 1979:587)

- (94) *Anna would surely yield if she would struggle, but struggling was too much work and too much worry for peaceful Miss Mary to endure. If Anna would do so she must.* Poor Miss Mary Wadsworth sighed, looked wistfully at Anna and then gave it up.

(*Three Lives*; Stein 1936:36)

For representations of consciousness the use of NPs within free indirect discourse is very rare indeed. Steinberg (1971:285–7) has some instructive examples with NP-appositions following the pronoun.

- (95) *But here came the conditional clause, and to this he entreated the special attention of his comrade, brother, and partner. It was not to be borne that the minion and worm should carry off any of that property which was now to be regarded as their own property. When he, Mr Wegg, had seen the minion surreptitiously making off with that bottle [...].*

(*Our Mutual Friend* III, vii; Dickens 1979:560–1)

- (96) This was a great stand-back to Ursula, who suffered agonies when she thought a person disliked her, no matter how much she despised that other person. *How could*

anyone dislike her , Ursula Brangwen? The question terrified her and was unanswerable.

(*The Rainbow*, xii; Lawrence 1988:335)

- (97) Esch stutzte, da er an Martin dachte, *allein der Teufel mochte wissen, was er, August Esch, heute hier in dieser Redaktion zu suchen hatte! daß es nicht wegen der Ringkämpfe geschah, das war klar.*

(*Die Schlafwandler* II, iii; Broch 1978:299; quoted Steinberg 1971:285)⁵⁵

In these cases heavy intonational emphasis, or even an underlying *I* , *August Esch* is usually implied, unless the proper name serves to avoid ambiguity.

Proper names in free indirect discourse have an odd effect mainly when used in the representation of consciousness, in reference to the SELF, that is to say in lieu of logophoric pronouns. In so far as Banfield's corpus included mostly texts of figural narrative and concentrated on the presentation of consciousness, she is correct in excluding proper name NPs from Represented Speech and Thought. However, not only is the use of the proper name, even in logophoric positions, entirely acceptable when the context is one of *speech* representation; a number of authors use NPs rather than pronouns also in passages of consciousness description, usually for ironic purposes (as does Gertrude Stein). Even in figural contexts proper names also occur to demarcate narrative units, in particular to mark shifts from one reflector character to the next—a remainder of narratorial manipulation.⁵⁶ There are, however, a sufficient number of counter-examples to a rule excluding R-expressions from the free indirect discourse of thought representation, even discounting all the possible contexts of paragraph boundaries, shifts between centres of consciousness or disambiguation between same-sex characters. For lack of a better explanation, such examples are usually 'naturalized' in terms of 'narrator's voice'.⁵⁷

3.2.4

Designation from the perspective of the reported consciousness

In our utterances and thoughts we refer to other people and objects in ways different from those around us, either because of a personal relationship with (or to) them or because we conceptualize them in a special, subjective way that has no objective justification. Such terms, which are typical of direct discourse, occur very frequently in free indirect discourse, although they can also be found in indirect discourse.

(A) There are **pet names** or **familiar names** such as *Pop*, *daddy*, *auntie*, *darling*, and the like. Many of these are "shifters" (Jespersen 1923/1959, Fludernik 1991b):

- (98) She's [Jessica] meant to go. [...] *He* [Roger Mexico] *can't move*, **poor dear** , *it won't let him go.*

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:629)

- (99) His [Mr Toots's] wife [i.e. Susan Nipper], with her old manner suddenly restored, so pathetically entreated him to take her to *her precious pet, her little mistress, her own darling*[all of these referring to Florence Dombey], and the like, that Mr Toots, whose sympathy and admiration were of the strongest kind, consented from his very heart of hearts; and they agreed to depart immediately, and present themselves in answer to the Captain's letter.

(*Dombey and Son*, lx; Dickens 1985:949)

- (100) Tippins, with a bewitching little scream, opines that we shall everyone of us be murdered in our beds. Eugene eyes her as if some of us would be enough for him. Mrs Veneering, W.M.P., remarks that these social mysteries make one afraid of leaving *Baby*.

(*Our Mutual Friend* II, xvi; Dickens 1979:472–4)

- (101) Mr Sparkler, finding himself stunned by the words thus heaped upon his inoffensive head, made a brief though pertinent rejoinder; the same being neither more nor less than that he had long perceived Miss Fanny to have no nonsense about her, and that he had no doubt of its being all right with *his Governor*.

(*Little Dorrit* II, xv; Dickens 1978:656)

(B) There are also relationships such as between master and servant, superior and inferior, that require specific addresses and designations such as titles:⁵⁸

- (102) Now Anne is to be beheaded and her body is to take the useful place of her brother's. *How can the judge* [he is the SELF involved] *even dare hint to the Führer that the intolerable young woman is secretly affianced to his son, that the latter is threatening mutiny if the sentence is carried out?*

(Steiner 1986:143)

- (103) *Monsieur*, as an English traveller, surrounded by all means of travelling pleasantly; doubtless possessing fortune, carriages, and servants-

'Perfectly, perfectly. Without doubt,' said the gentleman [Mr Dombey].

Monsieur could not so easily place himself in the position of a person who had not the power to choose, I will go here tomorrow, or there next day; I will pass these barriers, I will enlarge those bounds. Monsieur could not realize, perhaps, how the mind accommodated itself in such things to the force of necessity.

(*Little Dorrit* II, i; Dickens 1978:493–4)

- (104) — well, it *had* happened; and really she just couldn't believe it was as bad as Father O'Reilly said it was; and, anyhow, *Our Lady* would be a lot more understanding and forgiving than he was.

(*After Many a Summer* I, iv; Huxley 1950:50)

(C) In some cases, the reference to the addressee may be very personal or unconventional so that one would tend to regard the NP as a lexeme in the reported speaker's idiolect:

- (105) Jeremy listened with growing discomfort and a mounting irritation. *His fears had been justified, **the old boy** was launching out into the worst kind of theology.*
(*After Many a Summer* I, viii; Huxley 1950:106)
- (106) Celia thought privately, 'Dorothea quite despises Sir James Chettam; I believe she would not accept him.' [...] Sometimes, indeed, she had reflected that *Dodo* would perhaps not make a husband happy who had not her way of looking at things.
(*Middlemarch* I, ii; G.Eliot 1986:43)
- (107) They [the narrator's two feet] discussed what Mother and I should do during the day, what Santa Claus should give *a fellow* for Christmas, and what steps should be taken to brighten home.
(*'My Oedipus Complex'*; O'Connor 1952:4)

(D) As has been pointed out, in our thoughts we frequently do not think of people by their names. Joyce reflected this fact in Molly's ubiquitous *he* for a number of the men she muses about.

- (108) 'She [Ms Meagles] is very pretty,' she [Little Dorrit] said to herself. 'I never saw so beautiful a face. O how unlike me!' [...]
'I know I must be right. I know *he* [i.e. Arthur Clennam] spoke of her that evening.'
(*Little Dorrit* II, i; Dickens 1978:495)

In free indirect discourse of consciousness (and narrated perception) one can also encounter such indeterminate reference:

- (109) She [Kitty] smiled at his praise, and continued to look about the room over his shoulder. [...] In the left corner of the ballroom she saw the cream of society gathered together. There—incredibly naked—as the beauty Lidia, Korsunsky's wife; there was the lady of the house; there shone the bald head of Krivin [...]. There, too, she descried Stiva, and there she saw the exquisite figure and head of Anna in a black velvet gown. *And he was there.*
(*Anna Karenina* I, xxii; Tolstoy 1944:71)⁵⁹
- (110) *It was his father now.* The strain became acute. *For in one moment if there was no breeze, his father would slap the covers of his book together, and say: 'What's happening now? What are we dawdling about here for, eh?'* as, once before, he had brought his blade down among them on the terrace and she had gone stiff all over, and if there had been an axe handy, a knife, or anything with a sharp point he would have seized it and struck his father through the heart. ***His mother had*** gone stiff all over.
(*To the Lighthouse* III, viii; Woolf 1985:172)

Note that James's thoughts centre on his father, and on Cam and himself in the boat with his father, so that one would initially interpret the *she* to refer to his sister Cam rather than to dead Mrs Ramsay. That this is James's private reference to a scene the reader has

witnessed in Part I of the novel is not revealed until the belated explicatory *his mother*, which finally establishes the correct reference for the reader. I have not found any examples for this in indirect discourse, except in cases where the imprecision can be laid at the door of the narrator.

(E) Typically vague or imprecise references or locutions are also characteristic of a figural point of view:

- (111) 'Major and Mrs Mayhew,' Page the reporter noted, licking his pencil. *As for the play, he would collar Miss Whatshername and ask for a synopsis.* But Miss La Trobe had vanished.

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:110)

- (112) *It would be different from the accidents with Enid and Mary Lou, because, with a man, those things generally did matter a good deal, even when you didn't mean them to matter.*

(*After Many a Summer I*, iv; Huxley 1950:49)

- (113) The dogs were trying their best to get up into the tree, and the men were considering whether to shoot the bobcat down, shoot a limb and make him jump down and fight the dogs, **or what** They decided to try and kill the cat where he lay.

(*Song of Solomon*, xi; Morrison 1977:280)

- (114) *After the party was over, Henry was coming for her. [...] But he was bad. He sho was what Miz Harris would call bad, cause every time he was with her he tried to take her back of a palmetto clump or some'n.*

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:210)

In indirect discourse vagueness of reference tends to redound on the reporter:

- (115) said that of course in India they hadn't begun to distinguish between different categories of handicapped and that **this thing only** blew up for him because of **this wealthy woman** whose husband was in... **something in the newspaper world** I think and had a spastic child that's right I think I remember

(*Survey of English Usage* S.2.14.68–9)

Such vagueness of reference is frequently exploited for the ends of characterization, as in the following example, where Virginia hedges the mention of sex, euphemistically designating it as 'the other thing':

- (116) *and really she just couldn't believe it was as bad as Father O'Reilly said it was; [...] and wasn't gluttony just as bad as the other thing?*

(*After Many a Summer I*, iv; Huxley 1950:50)⁶⁰

(F) More frequently, objects are referred to by a **definite noun phrase**, because—from the perspective of the consciousness portrayed—they are definite, although an 'objective' narrative report would have needed to introduce them first. This type of NP when it occurs in the narrative proper has been discussed under the title of the 'familiarizing

article' as one of the signals of a figural narrative situation with internal focalization (Stanzel 1984b:161–2, 169–70).

- (117) She [Hannah] winced as she heard them crash to the platform. *The lovely little mirror that she had brought for Ellen, and the gifts for **the** baby!*
(Franchère, *Hannah Herself*; quoted Wiebe 1990:293)⁶¹

(G) There are numerous examples also of the **shifter use of *this* and *that*** (*these / those*) expressing emotional closeness or distance.⁶²

- (118) It was because of this dabbling in the occult that she had to pack up her bags at such short notice and leave for England with two small babies in tow; [...] and on account of this diabolism that she was stuck forever in **this** England and would never see her village again.

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:248)

- (119) Through the flowing water, the holes of the old Hohner Slothrop found are warped one by one, squares being bent like notes, a visual blues being played by the clear stream. There are harpmen and dulcimer players in all the rivers, wherever water moves. Like **that** *Rilke* prophesied.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*, Pynchon 1981:622)⁶³

(H) Besides such more neutral kinds of designation one frequently finds highly **evaluative designations**. These are very close to the epithets discussed below under lexical indications of subjectivity (4.5):

- (120) But Mr. Stoyte remembered with terror that he had had a stroke, that he was growing old. *Obispo had put him on his feet again when he was almost dying [...]. Or it might even be that **the loathsome little kike** would find some way of proving that Mrs. Eddy was right, after all.*

(*After Many a Summer I*, iv; Huxley 1950:51)

- (121) *Trouble was, nobody 'd be looking. And unless Harris or Cap 'n Rushton or some of them did something, they'd get **the damn fool**— though God knows he couldn't be all fool to have hidden himself so well—get him before night.*

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:333)

(I) In the free indirect discourse representation of speech acts one also frequently encounters designations that are very much from the *reporter's* perspective, sometimes even deliberately incongruous with the reported speaker's discourse. Dickens, by way of inversion, employs some of the character's references for a variety of (usually comic) effects in the narrative:

- (122) 'May one ask to be shown to bed, madame?'

Very willingly, monsieur. Hola, my husband! *My husband* would conduct him upstairs. [...] This the landlady of the Break of Day chirpingly explained, calling between whiles, 'Hola, my husband!' out at the side door.

My husband answered at length.

(*Little Dorrit* I, xi; Dickens 1978:170–1)

(123) 'Now, let us see *whether there's anything else the matter, and how **our ribs are?***'

There was nothing else the matter, and ***our ribs*** were sound.

(*Ibid.*, I, xiii, 205)

Other more stylistic expressions of subjectivity are dealt with below under (4.5).

In this section we have discussed the referential shift in (free) indirect discourse. Of all the shifting categories this shift is the most constant, yet it, too, can be suspended in the interests of expressive language. Expressions meant to evoke the reportee's perspective concern the reportee's designation of *others*, even if that other happens to be the addressee and the reporter. As a result, pronominal (logophoric) reference prevails in FID passages of reflectoral narrative for the designation of the centre of consciousness, but in the reporting of utterances the full range of referential expressions becomes available, from the reporter's foregrounded evaluative designation to the subjective self-reference of the reported speaker or the label given to the reportee by his or her interlocutor. The (subjective) logophoric pronoun is typically anaphoric, whereas the reporter's and the reportee's (or interlocutor's) designations are, by definition, deictic material. The deictics in referential expressions are always foregrounded and therefore elicit an effort at interpretation on the part of the reader, an interpretation of the attribution of the evaluation and subjectivity in the deictic elements.

We will now turn to the syntactic marking of the (free) indirect. In contrast to the crucial referential category, indirect and free indirect discourse here radically part ways.

Part B:

Syntactic patterns

3.3

THE SYNTACTIC FACTOR

3.3.1

The question of (non-) subordination

The standard description of indirect discourse is in terms of its syntactic structure, with a complementizer and a subordinate clause. The temporal and referential shifts are then interpretable as the logical consequence of subordination. Free indirect discourse, by contrast, is said to be syntactically 'free', lacking an obligatory introductory verbal clause. The temporal and pronominal (referential) anaphoric aspects of free indirect discourse cannot therefore be formalized in terms of subsidiary clause constraints, hence the

putative ‘sequence of tenses’ (3.4.1) rule and the attempt (by Banfield and, implicitly, Ehrlich) to institute parentheticals as triggers of temporal and referential linking. The pragmatic extension of linking to previous sentences serves as a means of anchoring free indirect discourse surface phenomena (see under (3.3.2)). In accordance with Chomsky’s Extended Standard Theory, indirect discourse can be described as subordinating reported statements by means of complementizers *that* (F.que, G.daß), whereas free indirect discourse is independent of a *ruling* verbal expression. Subordination of indirect discourse can be extended beyond a single sentence—a stylistic technique now only admissible in legalese:

- (1) Meanwhile Flora was murmuring in rapid snatches for his ear, **that** there was a time and **that** the past was a yawning gulf however and **that** a golden chain no longer bound him and **that** she revered the memory of the late Mr F. and **that** she should be at home tomorrow at half-past one and **that** the decrees of Fate were beyond recall and **that** she considered nothing so improbable as that he ever walked on the north-west side of Gray’s-Inn Gardens at exactly four o’clock in the afternoon.

(*Little Dorrit* I, xiii; Dickens 1978:201)

- (2) The other peculiarities I could gather from Miss Martinas were these: **That** he [the musician Metastasio] had contentedly lived half a century at Vienna, without ever even wishing to learn its language; **that** he had never given [...]; **that** he was grateful and beneficent to the friends who began by being his protectors, but ended much his debtors.

(*Observations and Reflections*; Piozzi 1789/1967:377)

- (3) The deweys [*sic*] came in 1921, but the year before Eva had given a small room off the kitchen to Tar Baby, a beautiful, slight, quiet man who never spoke above a whisper. Most people said he was half white, but Eva said he was all white. **That she knew blood when she saw it, and he didn’t have none.**

(*Sula*; Morrison 1982:39)

One can also find *how that* clauses of this type.¹

Nowadays, particularly in colloquial English, the complementizer *that* is commonly dropped:

- (4) I told him if he liked he could make use of one of the motor cycles for his week end and he **said yes he’d like to**

(*Survey of English Usage* W.13.1c.12)

- (5) our political correspondent **says all the amendments deal** with the procedure to be followed in gaining exemption for certain goods

(Ibid., 4.c.1b.3)

- (6) CREGAN. It’s like a miracle, me meeting him again. I came to these parts looking for work. It’s only by accident I heard talk of a Con Melody and come here to see **was it him.**

(*A Touch of the Poet* I; O'Neill 1957:9)

This is not possible in French, where *que* (or *si*) are obligatory. In fact the complementizer in French can even occur where it is absolutely forbidden in English, in the *He said *that yes* construction:

- (7) Catherine Legrand demande a Valerie Borge si on va entrer dans la grotte qu'on voit
 et où ma mère de saint Jules a défendu d'aller, Valerie Borge dit *que oui on y va*.
 (*L'Opoponax*; Wittig 1964:272)²

German, of course, has an additional signal besides subordination, the **subjunctive**, and can therefore dispense with obligatory subordination. As has been pointed out in the literature—e.g. by Weinrich (1964/1985) and as early as Behaghel (1877, 1899)—the signal of subordination in German was originally *either* the subjunctive *or* syntactic subordination. Besides these two alternatives, there also exists a statement type, here (8d):

- (8) a. Er sagte, er sei/wäre müde.³ [ID; subjunctive]
 b. Er sagte, daß er müde ist. [ID; indicative: still valid]
 c. Er sagte, daß er müde sei. [ID; hyper-characterization by means of both subordination and subjunctive; equivalent to (1)]
 d. Er sagte, er ist müde. [narratorial report]
 e. Er sagte, er war müde. [narratorial report, anteriority; or free indirect discourse]
 f. Er war müde. [FID, or narrator's report]

It has to be noted that (a) is only applicable to the report of utterances,⁴ and that (e) can only signal anteriority. This leaves (f)—without the initial *er sagte*—to function as *thought* report. (d) is fairly common and, it seems to me, a near-equivalent of the English *Tom says he's ill*.

Sentences following a first subordinate clause of indirect discourse, according to prescriptive grammar, require a new subordinating verb in order to continue indirect discourse. However, in actual fact, **continuations of indirect discourse** very frequently, remain unsubordinated, so much so that this '**free**' subjunctive form has recently acquired a name of its own.⁵ In English and French such continuations of indirect discourse which are no longer subordinated to the introductory verb clause of the previous sentence have in fact been equated with free indirect discourse, at least on a synchronic level: they observe the shift in tense and pronouns and are syntactically independent. Such easy continuation from indirect discourse to free indirect discourse, however, is applicable only to *statements*. Question formation (and the rendering of commands and other illocutionary acts) already sets apart free indirect discourse from indirect discourse proper:

- (9) Big Missy and Marse John had arranged to sell Aunt Sally. [...] Big Missy came out in the kitchen after breakfast and told Aunt Sally to get her things together; *there was a wagon in the backyard waiting to take her to Savannah.*

(*Jubilee*; M. Walker 1966:70–1)

- (10) Then, speaking carefully and avoiding his eyes, she asked how it happened that he was not in London. *What had brought him to the cabin? Had he known she was in Maryland?*

(*The Sot-Weed Factor* III, xvi; Barth 1984:688)

In (9) the indirect discourse continues seemingly unbroken, and one can then speculate whether the construction is, or is not, free indirect discourse. In (10), on the other hand, the question formation clearly rules out an indirect discourse reading. German, in contrast to English and French, on account of its ‘free’ *subjunctive* form for non-subordinated indirect discourse, clearly separates indirect discourse from free indirect discourse by morphological means.

- (11) Ich antwortete ihr, daß mein körperliches Befinden immer gleich wohl *geblieben sei*.
Man habe mich von Kindheit an zu einem einfachen Leben angeleitet, und dieses verbunden mit viel Aufenthalt im Freien habe mir eine dauernde und heitere Gesundheit gegeben.

(*Nachsommer* II, v; Stifter n.d.: 476–7)⁶

I will return to the fact that the German ‘free’ subjunctive form—like free indirect discourse in English and French—accommodates expressive elements including the question and imperative forms, inversions, root transformations and all the other characteristic free indirect discourse categories. From an English or French perspective independent sentences of free indirect discourse therefore can appear as continuations of indirect discourse, but from a *German* perspective—where the indicative has signal character—they seem more closely aligned to sentences of the narrative.

Ambiguous cases of free indirect discourse, which may be either the narrator’s statement of a fact or the character’s utterance or thought, have been noted frequently also for English and French:⁷

- (12) Dick scrawled the name in a notebook, excused himself, and hurried to a telephone booth.

It was convenient for Doctor Dangeu to see Doctor Diver at his house immediately.

(*Tender is the Night* III, ii; Fitzgerald 1984:267)

- (13) Napoleon with his suite rode up to the Shevárdino Redoubt where he dismounted.
The game had begun.

(*War and Peace* X, xxix; Tolstoy 1966:879)⁸

In the English and French literature on the topic such cases of ambiguity have not, however, been considered of really central importance to the definition of free indirect discourse, whereas German criticism has concentrated on this ambiguity as a central

feature of free indirect discourse. Compare the striking difference between the indicative in (14) and the subjunctive in (15):

- (14) 'Sie wollen keine Partie riskieren, Vater?'

Nein, Lebrecht Kröger blieb bei den Damen, aber Justus könne ja nach hinten gehen...
Auch Senator Langhals, Köppen, Grätjens und Doktor Grabow hielten zum
Konsul, während Jean Jacques Hoffstede nachkommen wollte: 'Später, später!
Johann Buddenbrook will Flöte blasen, das muß ich abwarten... Au revoir,
messieurs.'

(*Buddenbrooks* I, xiii; Mann 1991:36)⁹

- (15) Nach einer langen, stummen Pause, in der sich beide zu fassen suchen, erklärt er
ihr [Eduard talking to Ottilie] mit wenig Worten, warum und wie er hieher
gekommen. *Er habe den Major an Charlotten abgesendet, ihr gemeinsames Schicksal werde
vielleicht in diesem Augenblick entschieden. Nie habe er an ihrer Liebe gezweifelt, sie gewiß
auch nie an der seinigen. Er bitte sie um ihre Einwilligung.*

(*Wahlverwandtschaften* II, xiii; Goethe 1986:219)¹⁰

In the first case, only one's general interpretation of the scene allows one to surmise that Kröger actually *said* anything (and this interpretation is immediately corroborated by the subjunctive *könne*: this can only be a free indirect rendering of Kröger's suggestion uttered to his son Justus—for the free indirect command and proposal forms see below); in the Goethe passage, on the other hand, no doubt can arise—the subjunctive immediately characterizes these sentences as speech report, in the form of indirect discourse. Sometimes the ambiguity lies in the interpretation, whether one has to attribute the passage to the speculations of the character or the narrator.

- (16) Even the beggars gathered about the gatehouse had an air of holiday excitement
about them. *When the baron of an honour scattered overfour counties arrived to marry the
heiress to lands as great as his own, there must be lavish largesse to be hoped for in
celebration.*

(*The Leper of Saint Giles*; Peters 1986:9)

- (17) Tom felt rather disgusted with Maggie's knowingness, though beyond measure
cheerful at the thought that she was going to stay with him. *Her conceit would soon be
overawed by the actual inspection of his books.*

(*Mill on the Floss* II, i; G.Eliot 1986:147)

- (18) Devant la porte, nous en avons parlé avec Raymond, puis nous avons décidé de
prendre l'autobus. *La plage n'était pas très loin, mais nous irions plus vite ainsi.*
Raymond pensait que son ami serait content de nous voir arriver tôt.

(*L'Étranger*, vi; Camus 1955:69)¹¹

In (16) the epistemic *must* can be interpreted only from the beggars' perspective, and Tom's hope of Maggie's impending humiliation in (17), too, needs to be aligned with his perspective; it is in fact only partly realized in the subsequent episode. In the French example

the reasons for deciding to take the bus are given in what must correspond to Raymond's argument. In fact one may even want to include the final sentence as part of the FID passage.

As is well known, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse have some problems when dealing with sentences that are not constative. For the purposes of indirect discourse many of these illocutionary speech acts are, however, readily transformable by the use of an appropriate *verbum dicendi* and a matching complement clause. As already discussed under (1.2), such verbal transcriptions foreground the illocutionary nature of the utterance since they quite openly privilege the illocutionary force over the propositional content of the reported speech act. In free indirect discourse, questions preserve the structure (word order) of questions in direct discourse, but do observe the temporal and pronominal alignment with the reporting instance. Other illocutionary acts are less easily represented in free indirect discourse, and I give examples of some of the possibilities below. It is noticeable that free indirect discourse—since it evokes more of the properties of direct speech—frequently preserves propositional (i.e. phraseological) content over and above the illocutionary force of an utterance. Thus, *how do you do* can be transformed into indirect discourse only as *He asked how she was* but not *He asked *how she did*;¹² or by means of speech report, such as *He said hello*, or *He greeted her*. In free indirect discourse, however, one does—though this may strike one as odd—find *How did she do?* (*Ulysses*, x; Joyce 1984:473).

Questioning

The standard question type in indirect discourse is by means of an *if* or *whether* (G. *ob*, F. *si*) complement clause. This, however, applies exclusively to yes/no questions. In **direct** questions, of course, WH-terms are moved into CP-specifier position (WH-movement), and inversion (I-movement) is obligatory in both English and German.¹³

- (19) Asked **whether** the three officials had coordinated their hostage discussions with the Swiss Foreign Minister, who was also in Teheran today, Mr Poos said they had not, that the two visits were coincidental.

(*New York Times* April 4, 1991; A 7)

- (20) I asked you *if* you were not well, because you look so white.

(*Our Mutual Friend*, xiii; Dickens 1979:431)

- (21) mentioning a *NUMBER* of *WAYS* **in which** we are now going *AMERICAN*- in a way—in *DIRECTIONS* **which** were being reversed in *AMERICA* or **where** America was trying to go *BRITISH*

(Svartvik/Quirk 1979:78; S.1.2.b)

Particularly in oral discourse and colloquial speech, however, one finds much freer constructions, such as the following, in which I-movement occurs in spite of the 'normal' rules for indirect discourse. The word order, more noticeable still than the lack of a CP specifier, then has to be that of direct questions:

- (22) I asked him why since this if this was official medical treatment you know **why didn't he have a district nurse in**—and get a proper domestic in who really did know how to do look after antique furniture and so on you know why mix the two which probably don't mix awfully well

(*Survey of English Usage* S.2.12.95)

- (23) everything, as it lay in the clear, frosty starlight seemed to speak reproachfully to her, and ask her **whither could she go from a home like that?**

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, vii; Stowe 1981:48)

Complementizerless indirect questions are also in evidence for yes/no questions:¹⁴

- (24) She told him that was hardly a good enough reason for a proposal, and he said **would it help if** he told her he loved her, and she said that was a start at least.

(*The Invention of the World*, *The Eden Swindle*; Hodgins 1977:149)

This construction is particularly common for *requests* in question format (where the formally expected indirect phrasing would of course be by means of an infinitival construction *ask to*).

- (25) he first of all came up to my room and said **would I** ((please)) **come at four o'clock**

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.4.2)

- (26) Mortimer asked him, **would he be so good as look at those notes?** Handing him Eugene's.

(*Our Mutual Friend* I, xii; Dickens 1979:205)

- (27) well I introduced him and I asked Joseph **could Joseph fix up someone to do it**

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.4.66)

This same construction, so clearly located between 'proper' indirect discourse and free indirect discourse, can also be used in very rhetorical discourse, however—a fact that does not allow an exclusive 'colloquialism' reading.

- (28) And so he asked, how could he allow our children to suffer humiliation at the hands of the enemy?

The non-subordinated indirect question is thus a relatively common syntactic phenomenon.

In **French**, where the complement *que* cannot ever be dropped in constative indirect discourse, the question format is much looser than in English, since there are also many forms of the direct question:

- (29) Est-ce qu'il a telephone?

- (30) A-t-il telephone?

- (31) Il a téléphoné?¹⁵
 (32) Jacques, a-t-il telephone?
 (33) Son sac, elle l'a trouvé?
 * 'Her bag, has she found it?'
 (34) Dans la cave, il y est entré?
 * Into the fridge, has he put the bananas (there)?

The free indirect discourse forms echo the direct forms exactly (with the transpositions in tense and pronouns, if applicable):

- (35) Est-ce qu'il avait telephone?—cf. (29)
 (36) Avait-il telephone?—cf. (30)
 (37) Il avait téléphoné?—cf. (31)
 (38) Jacques, avait-il telephone?—cf. (32)
 (39) Son sac, elle l'avait trouvé?—cf. (33)
 (40) Dans la cave, il y était entré?—cf. (34)

Now observe the indirect and one kind of free indirect discourse which borrows the *si*-complementizer from the indirect:

- (41) Jacqueline demandait si son fiancé avait telephone.
 (42) *S'il connaissait la jeune comtesse?*

(Quoted Lips 1926:77)

As in the case of assertions, French here observes strict conformity to the syntactic pattern and disallows the *est-ce-que* WH-specifier or dislocation.¹⁶

- (43) * Manon demandait si est-ce que Jean était au travail.
 (44) * Jacqueline demandait si son sac il (l') avait trouvé?
 (45) * Jacqueline demandait: son sac, il l'avait trouvé?
 (45) requires a noticeable pause before *son sac* in order to be intelligible (otherwise Jacqueline would be addressing her handbag), and what follows is considered by French speakers to be free indirect discourse—if they are familiar with the concept. The sentence as a whole is taken to be deviant.¹⁷ Note that Gertraud Lerch considered this type of sentence one of the four basic types of represented discourse:

- (46) *Il protesta: son père, s'écria-t-il, la haïssait!* (= uneigentlich indirekt)
 Il protesta: Son père la haïssait! (=uneigentlich direkt)

(G.Lerch 1922:107 [= (3) and (4)])

Word order, however, is not as strictly handled in French as it is in English or German, and subject-auxiliary inversion frequently occurs in indirect discourse and is even considered by some educated speakers to be more 'literary' and 'refined'. Thus,

(47) Elle demandait où étaient ses frères.

is regarded as more generally acceptable and better style than (48):

(48) Elle demandait où ses frères étaient.

Compare, for instance, the non-foregrounded nature of the inversion in the following passage:

(49) Mais leur corps s'était révolté, refusant le mariage, et ils se demandaient avec terreur *où allaient les conduire l'épouvante et le dégoût.*

(*Thérèse Raquin*, xxviii; Zola 1979:252)¹⁸

Where the NP in the subsidiary clause is lengthy, I-movement even becomes mandatory:

(50) André demanda: Quel est le train pour Paris?

(a)

(aa) André demanda quel était le train pour Paris.

(ab) * André demanda quel le train pour Paris était.

(51) André demanda: Est-ce que c'est le train pour Paris?

(b)

(ba) André demanda si c'(ceci) était le train pour Paris.

(bb) André demanda si le train pour Paris était celui-ci.

Observe also that a relative noun phrase requires statement word order:

(52) Richard demanda a Pierre quel livre il avait lu.

(53) * Richard demanda a Pierre quel livre avait-il lu.

(53) elicits the same reactions as (45). A pause is required to follow 'Pierre' and the sentence is taken as either ungrammatical or as free indirect discourse with narratorial introduction. In older texts this pattern occurs more frequently, and the free indirect discourse part often appears within quotation marks (compare under (4.2.1)). If the verb is transitive, however, only 'statement' word order is allowed:

(54) Jean-Claude demanda: Jeanne, a-t-elle trouvé son mouchoir?

(55) Jean-Claude demanda si Jeanne avait trouvé son mouchoir.

(56) * Jean-Claude demanda avait Jeanne trouvé son mouchoir?

(57) * Jean-Claude demanda si Jeanne avait-elle trouvé son mouchoir?

In **German**, the subordinate and free variants of indirect discourse allow a more formal and a more immediate rendering of indirect questions. The 'free' form can occur both

with and without a complementizer, and the presence of the complementizer seems to be the more frequent case.

(58) Der Richter forderte ihn auf, ihm die Wahrheit zu sagen. [indirect discourse] *Sei er nun gestern um die besagte Zeit am Tatort gewesen oder nicht?* [free subjunctive indirect discourse]¹⁹

(59) *Ob das Motorboot der Gesellschaft am Bahnhof liege.* Der Mann beteuerte, es liege vor der Tür.

(‘Der Tod in Venedig’; Mann 1989:52)²⁰

(60) Diederich mußte ihm [dem Vater] viel von Göppels berichten. *Ob er die Fabrik gesehen habe.*

(Thomas Mann, ‘Der Untertan’; quoted Steinberg 1971:138)²¹

Since the present perfect (rather than the preterite) dominates the oral language, subjunctive forms of the auxiliaries *sein* and *haben* by themselves almost signal indirect discourse.

Like indirect statements, indirect questions in German can also be distinguished for truth value or credibility by the choice between the indicative and the subjunctive.²²

(61) Der General fragte den Schaffner, ob er in Bruck aussteigen **könne**. [subjunctive; possibility: The general asked the conductor whether he could get off the train in Bruck’]

(62) Er behauptete, daß der Zug nicht abgefahren **sei**. [claim; ‘He claimed that the train had not left/did not leave’]

(63) Ich weiß nicht, welcher König im Jahre 1015 an der Macht **war**. [factual reference: ‘I don’t know which king occupied the throne in 1015’]

(64) Er fragte, ob der Zug gestern abgefahren **ist** [factual question; ‘He asked, was it the case that the train left yesterday?’]

(65) Er fragte, ob der Zug gestern abgefahren **sei**. [report of the utterance; ‘He asked whether the train had left yesterday’]

The distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive in terms of credibility is valid also for the representation of thoughts in indirect discourse, if these are clearly verbalized thoughts rather than feelings:

(66) Er grübelte darüber nach, warum Mimi wohl um eine solche Zeit zum Bäcker gegangen sei und wo sie denn nun stecken **möge**.²³

(67) Er grübelte darüber nach, warum Mimi wohl um eine solche Zeit zum Bäcker gegangen **war** und wo sie denn nun stecken **mochte**.

In the first case, the emphasis is on the thought *act*, in the second on the cogitation. As in the contrast between free indirect discourse and the free subjunctive form, the preterite seems to signal reported *consciousness*. (Cp. under (3.5.3).)

The imperative: commands, requests

In English orders and commands are usually rendered in indirect discourse by means of verbs that take infinitival complements or that-clauses with modal auxiliaries:

- (68) John ordered Bill to open the window.
- (69) John told Bill that he should return by midnight.

However, there are imperative forms that signal other illocutionary acts, for instance *Let's go by taxi*.

- (70) Jane proposed to us that we should take a taxi rather than go by bus.
Janet proposed for us to go by taxi.
- (71) They **requested** that the British public **give** justice and fair play to fellow citizens, regardless of colour or race. About 300 Sikhs attended.
(*Survey of English Usage* W. 12.3f.2)
- (72) They all agree that she [Mrs Dombey] was too high, and Mr Towlinson's old flame, the housemaid (who is very virtuous), **entreats** that you **will** never **talk** to her any more about people who hold their heads up, as if the ground wasn't good enough for 'em.
(*Dombey and Son*, li; Dickens 1985:816)

In free indirect discourse, both complement clauses and imperative forms can occur as the equivalents of direct discourse imperatives:

- (73) Would he please stop!
- (74) Let me tell him.
- (75) If he would only stop!
- (76) That I hate him!
- (77) He should go and open the door.
- (78) Please to love him.

These devices range from the shifting of tenses (73) to the creation of nonsubordinate (in the sense of the French *non-régi*, grammatically independent) subsidiary clauses (75, 76), the *let*-paraphrase (74), the *should*-paraphrase (77) and infinitival constructions (78), and include even real imperatives, if these can be recognized as common clichés (as in the *let* construction).

- (79) one day my father told me to watch through the window of one of these chambers while he was doing a test inside—if I saw him actually keel over **I was to** undo the door. pull him out and do artificial respiration
(*Survey of English Usage* W. 1.3b. 17)

- (80) It had taken him the best part of his youth to get boots made as they should be made. **He would have her observe** (**he** lifted his right foot and then his left) *that she had never seen boots made quite that shape before.*

(*To the Lighthouse* III, ii; Woolf 1985:144)

- (81) But he did not receive it with unqualified assent; on the contrary, he said, No, gentlemen, no; **let them not misunderstand him**. His brother Frederick was much broken, no doubt, and it might be more comfortable to himself (the Father of the Marshalsea) to know that he was safe within the walls.

(*Little Dorrit* I, xix; Dickens 1978:269)

- (82) it is Eteocles who orders Creon to deny burial to Polyneices. *If the latter falls in battle, let him never find sepulchre in Theban earth.*

(Steiner 1986:178)

In **French**, command verbs take the *subjonctif* or a prepositional complement.

- (83) Le général commanda que les lignes **soient** retranchées.

Le général commanda que les lignes **fussent** retranchées.²⁴

Le général commanda **de refrancher** les lignes.

Although truly imperative forms can survive into free indirect discourse in standard phrases or idioms,

- (84) Elle [Sophie] dut encore, sur une question de madame de Jonquière, raconter l'histoire des bottines [...] que madame la comtesse lui avait données, et avec lesquelles, ravie, elle avait couru, sauté, dansé. **Songez-donc!** des bottines, elle qui, depuis trois ans, ne pouvait pas mettre une pantoufle!

(*Lourdes* I, iv; Zola 1894:70)²⁵

French requires a *que* complement plus subjunctive for free indirect discourse imperatives: *Qu'il lui rendât son mouchoir!*

- (85) Rose-Marie l'accueillit. Elle promit de l'aider de ses conseils et de sa modeste influence. *Qu'il revienne le lendemain, elle aura parlé au maître; ils verront ensemble ce qu'il convient.*

(Louis Artus, *La Maison du sage*; quoted Lips 1926:73)

This corresponds precisely with direct discourse (and in fact free indirect discourse) formulas for wishes:²⁶ *Qu'il devienne heureux! Qu'il soit ainsi.*

In **German**, the indirect discourse formations of the imperative, which has several direct discourse forms, are equally variable:

- (86) Halt! Es ist verboten, die Geleise zu betreten. (lit. 'Stop! It is prohibited to cross the tracks.')

Möge er lange leben! (lit. 'May he live long.')

Er bringe mir meinen Mantel!²⁷ (lit. 'He shall bring [subjunctive] me my coat.')

Anhalten! (lit. 'To stop'—cp. French: *Arrêter!*)

Man nehme drei Eier, 20 dkg Mehl und 10 dkg Staubzucker und vermenge diese Zutaten mit dem Mixer. (lit. 'One should take [subjunctive] three eggs, 200 grams of flour, 100 grams of castor sugar and mix [subj.] these ingredients.')

Indirect discourse forms:

(87) Er solle warten, bis jemand komme/käme.

(88) Sie bat ihn, er möge ihr den Ausgang zeigen.

(89) Der Vater herrschte ihn an, daß er sich doch zusammennehmen solle/ möge.

Der Vater herrschte ihn an, er *solle* sich doch zusammennehmen.

(90) Er sagte es Marie, daß er einen Gang (über Land im Sinn habe und wohl erst spät zurückkommen werde, *sie möge ihm ein tüchtiges Stück Brot mitgeben, und am Abend möge sie doch nicht seinetwegen warten.* [subjunctive free form of indirect discourse]

(*Narziß und Goldmund*, xvi; Hesse 1970:250)²⁸

Free indirect forms:

(91) Er sollte warten, bis jemand kam. [cf. (87)]

(92) Sie stand plötzlich vor ihm. *Er möchte ihr den Ausgang zeigen.* [cf. (88)]

(93) *Aber er sollte seine Lehre bekommen, der präpotente Bursche! Zusammenputzen würde er ihn am Ende dieser lächerlichen Aufführung, daß er davonschlich als das geduckte Häuflein Nichts, als welches er gekommen war.*

(*Das Parfum*, xv; Süskind 1985:106)²⁹

(94) *Man hatte nur einen Kopf. Wenn der einmal aufgestört war—der Bienenschwarm dadrinne—, da mochte der Teufel wieder Ruhe schaffen.*

(‘Der Apostel’; Hauptmann 1963:33)³⁰

Exclamations and phatic speech acts³¹

Exclamatory syntax can be reproduced with almost no problems in free indirect discourse, although in many cases indirect discourse renderings are problematic and frequently entirely impossible, at least with any mimetic observance of ‘original’ speech acts.

(A) **Exclamatory sentences** are one of the surest indications of free indirect discourse, particularly in the representation of figural consciousness.

(95) *Heaven could never be sufficiently praised!*

(*To the Lighthouse* III, ii; Woolf 1985:143)

- (96) While paying three guineas he caught sight of himself in the glass behind the counter. ***What a solid young citizen he looked*** — quiet, honourable, prosperous without vulgarity. On such does England rely.
(*Maurice*, xxx; Forster 1987:135)

In colloquial speech, such exclamatory syntax can also be incorporated into indirect discourse, especially after verbs of perception or cognition (Radford 1988:353):³²

- (97) Mr. Hamilton observed bitterly, to prolonged Labour cheers, ***how glad he was to see Mr. Po well speaking in the House for a change***
(*Survey of English Usage* W. 12.4.2)
- (98) it really is it's something. quite astounding .—the foreigners who do avail themselves of our Health Service go back to their respective countries . *saying **what a wonderful country this is what wonderful seientific achievements we have. what wonderful devotion we have from they've had from our nurses and our doctors and everyone has been so kind to them.*** they take back a glowing picture of this country
(*Ibid.*, S.5b.26.48)
- (99) *saying **how this is disgraceful and demonstrates degrees are*** [break in mid-sentence]
(*Ibid.*, S.5.11a.58)³³

However, other syntactic patterns in exclamatory sentences do not seem to be quite as common in free indirect discourse and I have found no examples for indirect discourse:

- (100) ***'I know, Jesus, do I ever know.'***
(*The Diviners*; Laurence 1985:212)

Note also the pattern: *Boy, were we happy!*:

- (101) A derisive smile appeared on his face. ***'Is he in love!***
(*After Many a Summer* I, v; Huxley 1950:60)
- (102) So it appears that the skipper was willing to sacrifice a win over a team we had never beaten before for a 'moral victory'. ***Golly was I mad!!***
(*Survey of English Usage* W.7.3–46)
- (103) He'd come in and sit down saying 'Mmm boy ***was this ever going to be the best turkey yet***' and rubbing his hands together and I'd push jars around in the cabinet.
(*Third and Oak*, Act I; Norman 1988:77)

Such exclamatory uses of inversion seem to exist also in French:

- (104) Cela suffit, avec le souvenir du grand jour, pour faire chanter ta vie, discrètement, comme il te plaît qu'elle chante. *Et qu'importe les brusqueries d'Yvette et la bile noire du*

père d'Amélie! Sont-ils assez grotesques, l'un accroché a ses os, l'autre a la barbe de bronze!

(*Le Joker*; Muno 1988:115)³⁴

Besides these exclamatory sentences which mark their exclamatory nature either by undergoing I-movement or by WH-fronting *without* I-movement (as in questions), there are also exclamations that contain a verb but are incomplete as sentences. Banfield, in the wake of the French linguist Jean-Claude Milner, has suggested a number of phrase structure rules for exclamations (1982:38–40), which basically allow any major constituent (NP, VP, PP, AP) to be used as an exclamation (cp. under (7.1.2)). However, this does not account for the fact that VP, at least in English, can be used as an exclamation only if it is an imperative, or non-finite, or part of a to-infinitive (see also Quirk *et al.* 1985: §§ 11.40–53):

- (105) A new degree of anger came over him. *What did it all matter? What did it matter if the mother talked Polish and cried in labour, if this child were stiff with resistance, and crying? Why take it to heart? Let the mother cry in labour, let the child cry in resistance, since they would do so. Why should he fight against it, why resist? Let it be, if it were so. Let them be as they were, if they insisted.*

(*The Rainbow*, ii; Lawrence 1988:77)

- (106) Three minutes to midnight. He closed his Wordsworth—**and to think**, he went on bitterly to remind himself, to think that he might have been refreshing his memory of Félícia!

(*After Many a Summer I*, xiii; Huxley 1950:170)

Compare the equivalent French and German construction with a Q-constituent and the bare infinitive:

- (107) La cour d'assises évitée, il respire. **Comment empêcher les adversaires d'entretenir la plaie?** Dès demain, il ira voir le préfet.

(*Thérèse Desqueyroux*; Mauriac 1979:22)³⁵

As in free indirect discourse and German 'free' subjunctive indirect discourse, exclamatory English clauses can have an initial complementizer:³⁶

- (108) That he should have left without asking me! Why, if it isn't Susan.

(Quirk *et al.* 1985: §11.41)

If only he'd come! Supposing we stole the ship.

- (109) She [Ursula] shrank from touch and question. She was very proud, but very new, and very sensitive. *Oh, that* no one should lay hands on her!

(*The Rainbow*, xi; Lawrence 1988:306)

- (110) Là-dessus, les trois femmes de se précipiter sur moi comme si elles voulaient m'arracher les yeux. *Que j'étais une brute, un sauvage, un assassin, et que c'était ma faute.*

(Verschoor 1959:18)³⁷

An equally frequent construction is that of the present participle, also a non-finite verb form:

- (111) *And besides, who was Uncle Jo to be prudish, she'd like to know? **Getting mad** with people only for telling you a funny story, when just look [real imperative!] what he himself was doing all the time — and then **expecting** you to talk like Louisa M. Alcott, and thinking you ought to be protected from hearing so much as a dirty word! [...] **Making** a build-up of her as somebody quite different from what she really was. Acting almost as though she were Daisy Mae in the comic strip and he a sort of Little Abner rescuing her in the nick of time.*

(After *Many a Summer* I, xii; Huxley 1950:168)

Thirdly, there are exclamatory sentences which have an imperative, as the 'look what he himself was doing all the time' sentence in the above quotation.

On the whole such imperatives are idioms, but I have also found one real imperative:

- (112) *Keep my dog off his garden*, he tells me.

(Sperber/Wilson 1986:250)

- (113) *Why, the tourists would come a thousand miles to see it. Because there was nothing people liked so much as caves. Look at those Carlsbad Caverns, for example; and all those caves in Virginia.*

(After *Many a Summer* II, iii; Huxley 1950:204)

(B) Free indirect discourse is also able to integrate **verbless exclamatives**, which—when they occur in indirect discourse—are usually interpreted as 'typical' quotations. These more fully correspond to Banfield's list of exclamatory syntactic types, and most of them are built around a noun phrase construction; either a WH-constituent³⁸ or a 'normal' NP:

- (114) ***What a day!** [...] **A house full of Rubenses and Grecos**—and your sheets were cotton! But that 'Crucifixion of St. Peter'— **what a really staggering machine!***

(After *Many a Summer* I, xiii; Huxley 1950:170)

- (115) Five minutes later, Charlie Habakkuk was letting off steam to his secretary. ***The ingratitude of people! The co-ordinated facts about the lusts, greeds and duties of people who happen to live in the country and speak in dialect!***

(Ibid., II, v; 225–6)

A typical construction (already noted in Banfield's phrase structure rules for expressive syntax) introduces exclamatory constituents with an initial *and*:³⁹

(116) Moishe married a Gentile—*and him a nice Jewish boy!*

(117) John ran off with Linda—*and after everything I've done for them!*

(R.Lakoff 1971:137)

Lakoff also mentions *or* introducing threats (ibid., 144). Sometimes the NP is followed by a present participle or gerundive construction:

(118) Across the street a white man was walking fast, as if in a great hurry. Mr. Tracy Deen... Lowd Gawd...*in the arbor last night... And him ajinin da church today. He'd better be gittin home and shavin and gittin cleaned up ef he was gwine live spectable atter today.*

(*Strange Fruit*, xiii; Smith 1944:214)

This corresponds to Quirk's 'verbless clauses with and' such as

(119) How could you be so spiteful *and he* your best friend.

(*Quirk et al.* 1985: §11.44)

(C) Free indirect discourse can furthermore integrate **incomplete sentences**, which indirect discourse cannot do without giving rise to a direct discourse reading. Quirk includes this with his 'subject-plus-complement' constructions.

(120) Not bad that salmon. Just our luck, she finding out. (*Quirk et al.* 1985: § 11.44)

(121) Very funny this little game. * He said (that) very funny this little game. (Banfield 1982:38)

I fail to see the difference between the above and Quirk's 'Non-Sentences' (§ 11.53), which he says are 'usually but not exclusively noun phrases'. Quirk's examples include:

(122) The clothes she wears!

The fuss they made!

You and your statistics!

Of all the stupid things to say!

Note that exclamatory sentences, even those that start with a noun phrase, possibly allow integration into indirect discourse:

(123) One more can of beer or I'll leave. (Banfield 1982:38)

He shouted (that) one more can of beer or he'd leave.

Although the second sentence is perhaps not quite standard English, with the deletion of *that* it becomes perfectly good (free) indirect discourse.

The discussion of the syntactic factors of free indirect discourse (as compared with those of direct discourse and indirect discourse) has demonstrated not only the oversimplification of the current explanations but also their incorrectness. Subordination, like the temporal shift, is no distinguishing feature of indirect discourse because the subjunctive can signal indirect discourse, at least in German.⁴⁰ Moreover, free complement clauses exist in English, German and French, although their distribution between direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse, and between the various illocutionary forces, is different for each language. This evidence has been largely ignored by Banfield, who attempts to exclude certain exclamatory speech acts such as *Hello* or *Wow* from indirect discourse on the ground that *He said *that hello* is unacceptable. In actual fact, however, one can notice various kinds of transcriptions:

(124) He greeted her.

(125) She exclaimed 'wow'.

She exclaimed how marvellous it all was!

She gave a shout of delight.

One needs to bear in mind that exclamations and other illocutionary speech acts do not necessarily have propositional meanings, but express the speaker's emotions, make phatic contact with the addressee or even directly address him or her:

(126) She called: Tom?

She called Tom.

She called for Tom to come.

She tried to attract Tom's attention.

Although spontaneous exclamations may perhaps be non-reflective (and therefore lack propositional force), this cannot be claimed for greetings and, even more so, for addresses to the interlocutor however standardized these might be. It is very imprecise to speak of propositional meaning even in relation to, say, wishes, commands or permissions:

(127a) A: May I go out into the garden?

B: OK.

(127b) Max allowed Jimmy to go out into the garden.

All Max *said* was 'OK', which concedes to the demand in a not really propositional way. This is why the philosophical distinctions between the illocutionary and propositional aspects of an utterance do not allow easy alignment with the more strictly linguistic factors. For some further arguments that rely on the choice of introductory or parenthetical verb see under (5.4.1). Recent developments in pragmatics and discourse analysis have additionally undermined the standard account of (non-) subordination. Besides attempts to query the transitive nature of *say* verbs (Munro 1982), Halliday

(1961, 1985) no longer regards indirect discourse clauses as embedded. Moreover Matthiessen/Thompson's (1988) recent redefinition of clause combination also strikes a blow against a traditional or standard Chomskyan treatment of indirect complement clauses. For the purposes of this study I have nevertheless abided by the traditional syntactic models because Matthiessen/Thompson's proposals have far-reaching and as yet incalculable repercussions on the very foundations of our syntactic model, undermining the descriptive adequacy of practically all the current syntactic terminology in so far as it regards clause structure and clause combination.

3.3.2

Parentheticals

Free indirect discourse can occur with and without parentheticals. This was already noted by early studies on free indirect discourse (Bally 1912b:598: 'le style indirect libre avec incidente'). Parentheticals have long been regarded as an impurity of free indirect discourse, as an intermediary form between indirect and free indirect discourse. The reason for this can be found in the very uneven distribution of parentheticals in various literary texts. Parentheticals very rarely occur in oral free indirect discourse. There are, however, examples of narrative parentheticals in Studs Terkel's interviews, which also display a number of other literary devices.

- (128) Two weeks before the British actually moved into Hamburg, the military blocked the street in front of the school and built a huge tank barricade. [...]

*Tomorrow, it **was announced**, the British would come into the city.*

(*'The Good War'*; Terkel 1990:503)

In Austen, Lawrence or Meredith, too, parentheticals are fairly infrequent. Even in Dickens parentheticals do not occur as pervasively as in V. Woolf, who probably over-uses the device, playing with juxtapositions of parentheticals and truncated free indirect discourse. Parentheticals of free indirect discourse (i.e. narrative parentheticals) establish temporal linking (concordance):

- (129) Among the people I have seen here, Mademoiselle Paradies, the blind performer on the harpsichord, interested me very much;—*and she **liked** England so, and the King and Queen **were** so kind to her, and she **was** so happy, **she said!***

(*Observations and Reflections*; Piozzi 1789/1967:381)

- (130) In August 1989, the historian Andranic Migranian had published an article in *Novy Mir* advocating an authoritarian system as a 'transitional stage from totalitarianism to democracy'. *Democracy was a luxury the Soviet state **could** not yet afford, **Migranian argued**; for on unspecified time a strong hand was needed to guide it through the deepening crisis.*

(*NYRB* 37.11 [1990]: 53)

So-called discourse parentheticals, on the other hand, are addressee-oriented (Reinhart 1975).⁴¹ Examples of discourse parentheticals are:

- (131) John will be late to Mary's party, *he told her*
(Reinhart 1975:139)
- (132) He'll come in then if needed—*so he says*
(*Survey of English Usage* 7.1.5)
- (133) there was a very nice letter in the OBSERVER on SUNDAY—I *don't know whether you NOTICED*
(Svartvik/Quirk 1979:78; S.1.2b)

Narrative parentheticals, in contrast to introductory sentences, disallow negations and questions. In discourse parentheticals, however, negations and questions are easily accommodated.

- (134) He's a bore, *don't you think?*
Jane's in Vermont, *she didn't say?*

There has been some discussion on the syntactic integration of parentheticals and inquit-tags (for direct discourse). In reference to Partee (1973b) and Emonds (1976), Banfield (1982) revises her earlier treatment of the syntactic integration of direct discourse.⁴² She first notes that some verbs can appear only *parenthetically* in *direct discourse* and NOT introduce it: *wonder, notice, remember, interrupt, insinuate, sneer, impart, oracle, rapped* or French *s'écria-t-il* (1982:46).⁴³ Consciousness verbs—with the exception of *think*—NEVER appear as an introduction to direct discourse. These findings correlate with the fact that initial communication verbs can all take *this* as their object-NP, whereas verbs barred from introducing direct discourse do not allow complementation by *this*:

- (135) she said this
the man answered this
* he recommended this
* the children giggled this* they agreed this

Some verbs take *thus*, or *so* as a proform adverbial, and these proforms need to be shifted to initial position:

- (136) 'What's up now?' Thus she interrupted.
'What's up now?' Thus interrupted she.
*'What's up now?' She interrupted thus.

Within Banfield's frame of Chomsky's Extended Standard Theory, this provides a good explanation why these verbs do not introduce direct discourse. It also explains why negation and question formation are blocked in the parenthetical, because the

complementizer position is already filled by the fronted proform, which blocks WH-movement. This model additionally explains subject-auxiliary inversion in parentheticals as occurring by way of analogy to inversion in interrogative formation. Once the complementizer position is filled, it can trigger inversion. I am not sure, however, how the latest version of Chomskyan grammar would perform here. The landing site for WH-phrases in CP-specifier position (which would be crucial for I-movement) no longer rules out negation or questions, and I-movement in fact can be argued to result in IP-adjunction rather than movement to CP positions (A. Weinberg 1990). It seems to me that semantic constraints could possibly handle the absence of questions and negation in direct discourse and free indirect discourse parentheticals. If one puts the utterance (or thought) first, then one posits it as being the topic and the parenthetical is a secondary element:

- (137) He's a bore, isn't he.⁴⁴
 The iceman's here, she shouted.
 The rain was coming down fast, she realized.

Discourse parentheticals, on the other hand, emphasize the tag part of the sentence, providing a second topic nucleus. Note, for example, that a tag question or a narrative parenthetical does not allow an answer or return question such as,

- (138) She had done it, she exclaimed.
 * Did she really [i.e. exclaim]
 * No, she didn't [i.e. exclaim]

whereas discourse parentheticals frequently call for an answer, and both the main clause and the parenthetical can give rise to queries:


- (139) A: there was a very nice letter in the *OBSERVER* on *SUNDA* Y—I don't know
 whether you noticed.
 B: I didn't SEE that-NO.

(Svartvik/Quirk 1979:78)


Syntactically, discourse parentheticals might therefore perhaps be treated like interjections and like non-restrictive relative clauses (see Fabb 1990), that is to say, as not linked syntactically to the sentence at all.

Banfield's final solution is to bar *this* and *that* deletion from tags and parentheticals and to institute as parenthetical only those constructions which include an initial *so* or *thus* in complementizer position, a proform that is *obligatorily* deleted when attached to direct discourse.

- (140) DEEP STRUCTURE:



(141) SURFACE STRUCTURE:



(Banfield 1982:51)

In the indirect discourse parenthetical the obligatory deletion of initial *so* (as for direct and free indirect discourse) is suspended, and final *this* is blocked from occurring (contrary to introductions of direct discourse):

(142) Mr. Kieran remarked that the time was ripe for action and that to wait any longer, he added, would ruin the plan.

(143) Mr. Kieran remarked that the time was ripe for action and that to wait any longer, so he added/* he added this, would ruin the plan.

A *so he added* intermediary parenthetical clearly constitutes a *discourse* parenthetical ('or that's what he said'). Banfield does not conclude that this structure explains discourse parentheticals—indeed she believes these to be outside the concerns of her study (1982: 51), but it seems to me that her frame can easily account for them, too, by leaving the discourse parenthetical in the position of exclamations or right dislocation—suitably both features of direct discourse and allowing for them all the deep and surface structures from which narrative parentheticals are barred: non-deletion of initial *so/this* and final *so/ thus*, non-blocking of negation and question formation.⁴⁵ Contrary to Banfield, discourse parentheticals actually *can* include 'real' questions:

(144) Did he really climb that mountain, what do you think?

The constraint for the parenthetical to be negated, or interrogative, in concordance with the preceding main clause—which Banfield says 'must be attributed to some context sensitive device' (1982:51)—does not seem to me to constitute a major difficulty since these parentheticals ordinarily *confirm* the preceding statement, or ask for confirmation, and to abide by the same illocutionary act would hence seem appropriate semantically.

Whereas the tag question constraint is a grammatical one, matching an affirmative sentence with a negative tag (and the other way round),⁴⁶

- (145) He's in Indonesia now, isn't he?
He isn't in the car, *is he?*

discourse parentheticals obey more pragmatic constraints:

- (146) He can't yet be in Kashmir, at least that's what he said.
He must have experienced a lot, don't you think.

By treating the tag question separately as a [(Neg) AUX+NEG+Subject NP] - note that tag questions are inapplicable to questions—one immediately produces affirmation through double negation. This would then leave discourse parentheticals free to do whatever seems semantically apposite under the specific circumstances of discourse.

Newer attempts to define syntactically the placing of parentheticals include, for instance, McCawley's proposal of discontinuous structures (1988: II, 40), and one can speculate on the similarity with other types of interpolated constituents, at least as far as *discourse* parentheticals are concerned. A good discussion of parentheticals in a more traditional mode is provided by G. Prince (1978), who notes free indirect discourse parentheticals that represent characters' perceptions, and the excellent article series by Michel (1966), which extensively covers possible placement alternatives of parentheticals.

Within the Banfieldian paradigm, narrative parentheticals in free indirect discourse work exactly the same way as for direct speech, with obligatory *so/ thus* deletion. However, the initial clause is a narrative statement (not reported discourse), and its tense therefore conforms to that of the narrative with the attendant backshifts. What perhaps deserves special mention in connection with free indirect discourse is the distribution of **inversion** in free indirect discourse (and direct discourse) parentheticals. Whereas German and French have obligatory inversion,

- (147) * So ist es, der Vater sagte.
So ist es, sagte der Vater
(148) * J'y suis, il dit.
* J'y suis, M.Jacques dit.
J'y suis, dit-il.
J'y suis, dit M.Jacques

English can choose between the two word orders. One can observe a distribution by register, with inversion common in the oral *says Jo* pattern in colloquial speech and natural narrative, and—lexically underlined, too—in extremely formal or literary language. Inversion is therefore a marked choice with overtones of (in)formality, or irony. Note also that, if a pronoun is used, inversion becomes very rare indeed; in fact it appears to be

ungrammatical in non-contrastive contexts and tolerated only under special circumstances:

- (149) 'Yes, sure!' *said she*, when the business was opened, 'Mrs Milvey...'
(*Our Mutual Friend* I, xvi; Dickens 1979:246)
- (150) A few minutes after Alfie came in there was a violent knock at the door and, dinner is ready, from Hélène. It's funny the Picassos have not come, *said they all*.
(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, ii; Stein 1990:11)
- (151) Janet came alongside. I think, *said she solemnly*, Gertrude Stein always called her The Doughboy, she always said there were only two perfectly solemn things on earth, the doughboy and Janet Scudder.
(*Ibid.*, vii: 207–8)

One may speculate whether the inversion in (149) is a signal of a structural incipit,⁴⁷ the onset of a narrative episode, rather than an 'ordinary' tag inversion.

Proper names and descriptive noun phrases (R-expressions) seem to be generally barred from FID parentheticals in predominantly figural or reflectorial contexts, although this rule is not as stringent as within the FID clauses themselves. However, in the FID representation of *utterances*, R-expressions occur with great frequency. Where such R-expressions appear in parentheticals, and of course when they occur in the body of free indirect discourse, one is usually justified in assuming narratorial irony, or an act of evaluation on the part of the narrator.

Although parentheticals in past tense contexts help to *attribute* free indirect discourse or thought, they alone cannot explain temporal shifts: not every free indirect discourse sentence has a parenthetical in tow. This is why Banfield's theory of free indirect discourse had to be extended by Ehrlich (1990a) to include what she called temporal and referential linking. Ehrlich presents a good case for third person past tense narrative, but already encounters some problems with present tense texts. The present tense makes it impossible to trace temporal linkage except in cases where a verb form is exclusively tied to a subjective expression, as in *I should say so*.⁴⁸ Even Ehrlich's revision of Banfield therefore does not entirely manage to link all free indirect discourse to a parenthetical. Ehrlich indeed comes very close to acknowledging the *interpretational* nature of free indirect discourse. Even though Banfield's theory that free indirect discourse is always (ultimately) linked to an obligatory parenthetical cannot be generally accepted, one has to agree that parentheticals in free indirect discourse passages do guide the reader's interpretations in significant ways. (Compare also under (5.1) below.) Free indirect discourse sentences all by themselves require more semantic and contextual signals to become recognizable instances of free indirect discourse.

3.3.3

The echo question versus free indirect discourse

I would like to conclude this section of the chapter with some remarks on the distinction between free indirect discourse and the echo question. A few years ago it would have been unthinkable to propose any connection between these two linguistic devices, particularly because free indirect discourse was usually conceived of in terms of a literary device, whereas the echo question has always been treated as a feature of the colloquial language. When Banfield briefly considered the echo question, she immediately dismissed it as irrelevant for represented speech and thought, and she also denied the existence of oral free indirect discourse. Since then Yamaguchi (1989, forthcoming), in a review essay on *Unspeakable Sentences* and in a separate manuscript, has proposed to consider more carefully a connection between free indirect discourse and the syntax of echo sentences (which include statements, exclamations and questions). The echo question has also recently received some attention in McCawley (1987), Wunderlich (1986) and Ueki (1989).

Echo sentences ‘echo’ previous discourse. As regards *echo QUESTIONS*, the most common type of echo sentences and the one most studied by linguists since it suspends I-movement, one needs to distinguish between a WH-echo question and an echo question that repeats the entire previous clause without specifying a particular constituent. Both again need to be distinguished from a mere echoing of the (not necessarily interrogative) direct discourse, and Yamaguchi calls this ‘echo-D[direct]S[peech]’ (Yamaguchi, forthcoming). In German, incidentally, that specific kind of repetition is called *Papageienfrage*, i.e. ‘parrot question’. The echo question of a question shifts the pronouns, if applicable, but otherwise repeats all the constituents:⁴⁹

(152) What did you buy?

WHAT did I buy?

(153) A: (laughs)—which way will you go out—

B: well I don’t know you tell me how do you mean ***which way will I go out***

(*Survey of English Usage* S.4.2.41)

WH-echo questions, on the other hand, can choose a variety of constituents to foreground. Here are some examples:

- | | | |
|-------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (154) | He has bought a dinosaur. | Er hat einen Dinosaurier gekauft. |
| | He has bought WHAT? | Er hat WAS gekauft? |
| | He did WHAT? | Er hat WAS getan? |

The WH-echo question applies to the surface structure of the sentence. This is especially clear from the German examples, where an object constituent that is being queried is replaced in the position it occupies on the surface after the application of auxiliary movement. German also allows

- (155) Er hat einen WAS gekauft? (lit. 'He has bought a WHAT?')
 Einen DINOSAURIER hat er gekauft? (lit. 'A DINOSAUR he has bought?')

The latter operates with topicalization (Wunderlich 1986:45–6). Like ordinary indirect questions in German, questions can be echoed by a construction with an initial complementizer *ob*:

- (156) Ob Peter das Huhn gefüttert hat? ('Whether Peter has fed the chicken?')
 Ob Peter WAS gefüttert hat? ('If Peter has fed WHAT?')
 (Wunderlich 1986:46)

Here German shifts the queried constituent into third clause position, with the interrogative *ob* replacing (on the superficial non-theoretic surface structure of course) the original verb or auxiliary fronted in question I-movement: *Hat Peter das Huhn gefüttert?* ('Did Peter feed the chicken?') Structurally, the espousal of subsidiary clause word order (compare *Er fragte, ob Peter das Huhn gefüttert habe*) allows an optimum echo of the triggering direct question. Note also that the German echo question implies an analysis in terms of an eliminated introductory clause on the lines of *You're asking [if Peter has fed the chicken]*.⁵⁰

German also shifts the WHAT into second position in sentences which already have a WH-constituent in order to mark the queried constituent (cp. Wunderlich).

- (157) Wer WANN das Auto benützt hat? (lit. 'Who WHEN has used the car?')
 Wann WER das Auto benützt hat? (lit. 'When WHO has used the car?')

In English this is not possible:

- (158) Who used the car on Monday?
 Who used the car WHEN?
 ? Who did WHEN use the car?
 When did Peter use the car?
 ? When did WHO use the car?

In addition—again quite comparable to indirect discourse and free indirect discourse in German—imperatives require a *should* or *sollen* paraphrase:

- (159) Ich soll WAS tun? (lit. 'I shall do WHAT?')

English alternatively has a separate semantic paraphrase of:

- (160) You want me to do WHAT?
 You want me to go WHERE?

This is in fact the standard French echo construction:

- (161) OU est-ce que tu veux que j'aille?
 Tu veux que j'aille OU?
 Qu'est-ce que tu veux que je fasse?
 Tu veux que je fasse QUOI?
 Qui est-ce que tu veux que j'invite?
 Tu veux que j'invite QUI?
 C'est QUI que tu veux que j'invite?
 A QUI veux-tu que je donne l'argent?
 Tu veux que je donne l'argent a QUI?
 POURQUOI voulez-vous que je parte?
 Vous voulez que je parte POURQUOI?

French also has alternative forms with a *conditionnel* (in the 'according to you' journalistic reading), and parrot questions (cp. as early as Lorck 1921:9; and Bally 1912a: 555, 1914a: 421).

- (162) [Cendrillon dit] Hélas! Mademoiselle Javotte, prêtez-moi votre habit jaune que vous mettez tous les jours.
 —Vraiment, dit Mademoiselle Javotte, je suis de cet avis! **Prêtez votre habit a un vilain Cucendron comme cela:** 11 faudrait que je fusse bien folle.
 (Contes, 'Cendrillon ou la petite pantoufle de verre'; Perrault 1967:162)⁵¹

Mere parrot questions do not require to be full sentences:

- (163) He went to the bank.
 He went to the BANK?
 To the BANK?

One can also find some abbreviated parrot questions: *WHERE?? WHAT??* Note also the possibility of

- (164) WHERE did he go??
 Where is it he went?

Whereas the echo question is used to comment on a matter of content, the parrot question mimics the form (i.e. diction) of the original (Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 40), and may be used to query a term in the 'original' (Wunderlich 1986:47).

What are the points of contact between the echo question and free indirect discourse? First of all, oral passages of free indirect discourse, particularly those imputing current

attitudes to the addressee, ‘ring’ like echoes. Banfield quotes such an example, by arguing that it represents the hearer’s reflection of discourse addressed to him:

(165) Every time I see him he ridicules me. *Oh, I could never repair the car myself. What was I doing lying in the middle of the road? No, that wasn’t the way to go about it. Here, he’d show me.*

(Banfield 1982:298–9, fn. 10)

This is indeed free indirect discourse since no answer or query to the first utterance is provided. Besides, the passage condenses a repeated harangue (‘every time’) into one representation, a feature which we will analyse more fully in [Chapter 8](#). One other interesting feature of the echo question is its typical ‘double voicing’. When a speaker echoes somebody else’s speech this is very frequently done with a markedly irritated or dissenting tone, very often with the intention of signalling that one’s own opinion is the very opposite of the echoed utterance. Compare Yamaguchi’s example (1989:587):

(166) Jim: What a peach of a girl you are!
Liz: What a peach of a girl I am?

According to Yamaguchi, ‘Liz is only mentioning what Jim has just said, and not using the phrase in order to express herself’ (587). As Yamaguchi goes on to demonstrate later in his review of Banfield’s book, free indirect discourse usually does exclude a real addressee except, precisely, in cases where a *you* is mentioned rather than used (as in the colloquial idioms I have noted earlier under (3.2.1)). This is so because, for Yamaguchi, free indirect discourse is defined as ‘echoic mention’. This thesis is a highly original contribution to the discussion of free indirect discourse since echoic mention is able to account for the ‘voice’ effect of free indirect discourse, for the possibility of ‘double voice’ (i.e. of a mention for purposes entirely different from the original speaker’s) and for the typicality features of free indirect discourse. As we will see in [Chapter 8](#), I consider all speech and thought representation a case of mention (in Yamaguchi’s terms), but go beyond this frame by denying the necessary existence of a previous token of actual use. Echoic mention, however, conflicts with free indirect discourse tokens in colloquial speech where *I* and *you* are NOT mentioned any longer but refer in the normal deictic manner.

Another feature that appreciatively moves the echo question closer to free indirect discourse is its ability to replace the precise wording of the original by adequate paraphrase (sometimes from the speaker’s perspective). The replacement words have to be roughly synonymous with the ‘original’, though how one is to delimit this formally so far remains a puzzle (Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 21–5).⁵²

(167) Wir haben gestern im *Dienst* Tarock gespielt. (lit. ‘Yesterday we played taroque at work.’)

Ihr habt gestern im **Büro** WAS gespielt? (lit. 'You yesterday played WHAT *in the office?*')
 Tanya's **mom and dad** have robbed a bank.
 Tanya's **parents** did WHAT?

I now turn to those features of the echo question that set it apart from free indirect discourse, and I believe that these factors are decisive for the eventual difference between the two devices. Prime among the distinctions between free indirect discourse and the echo question are two structural features. Free indirect discourse can 'report' all kinds of utterances and thoughts of a SELF other than the addressee *at the present moment of utterance*. (Yamaguchi says as much, since he is primarily interested in echoic mention.) Secondly, only free indirect discourse can be accompanied by a narrative parenthetical. Thirdly, the echo question obeys the referential shift constraint but, because it echoes previous discourse in a present communicative situation, there is *no temporal shift*. Indeed, echo questions can occur within free indirect discourse, which would additionally suggest that they are a more basic linguistic device.⁵³

- (168) 'Do you remember how you laughed at me that time on the roof,
 when I talked about my real self?' **Did I not remember!**

(*Eyeless in Gaza*, xxxviii; Huxley 1955:479)

- (169) So redeten die Leute, und ich hörte ihnen gierig zu, und hörte auch die Gegenrede: *Wie! Wegen einer Leidenschaft für den Apollonpriester Panthoos sollte Vetter Lampos die Befragung der Pythia über die allerwichtigsten Angelegenheiten Troias einfach vergessen haben?*

(*Kassandra*; Wolf 1989:40)⁵⁴

Tense in the echo can also easily be linked to the deixis of the speaker:

- (170) TED: Soon after that he confided to me he couldn't get along with you any more.
 'Liz is cheating me. I can't forgive her.' That's what he said.

LIZ: *I was cheating him?* It's him who was cheating.

(Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 51)

Finally, echoes have different intonational patterns and pragmatic contexts. Even oral free indirect discourse is a speech (or thought) report or imputes (attributes) discourse to the addressee or a third person. It never expresses irritation or surprise or asks for information or confirmation—the main pragmatic purposes of the echo question and of parrot sentences. Also, intonation patterns for oral free indirect discourse are either entirely mimetic of the represented discourse (like the parrot question) or markedly ironic; they never coincide with the typically irritated or surprised tone of the echo. This is a direct consequence of free indirect discourse's use as a *reporting* and not an *interactive*

device. Besides, there exists a flat tone form of what I would consider to be free indirect discourse, and which Yamaguchi (forthcoming) cites as the echo declarative:

(171) X: Do I look silly?

Y: Do you look silly? [echo question]

X: (Yes,) *Do I look silly.*

Y: Oh, yes.

(Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 8–9)

(172) X: Do I look silly?

Y: What?

Z: (To Y, in whisper) *Does he look silly.*

Y: (To Z) Oh, I see.

(Ibid., 9)

Not only does the flat intonation, in my view, identify this as report, i.e. narrative; these sentences additionally can be argued to have an underlying inquit-frame: *I was saying: Do I look silly?* and *He's asking: Does he look silly?*⁵⁵ Querying and reporting may thus employ a similar form but are distinct in their pragmatic use.

The most important distinctive feature of the echo question consists in its echo quality, in the fact of its being an immediate reply to a previous utterance, which is exactly the one use from which free indirect discourse is excluded. In free indirect discourse, since it is also a report, there has to be a reason for the report—one cannot, in an actual communicative situation, report to somebody what s/he has just said. I can impute something to somebody which s/he has, precisely, not uttered, remind somebody of what s/he said earlier (e.g. in the past) and of course report absent people's utterances and opinions. And, in present tense second person narrative, I can employ a FID sentence to report narratively the you-protagonist's current utterance or thought. Yet these alternatives do not echo anything—being a first mention, and having no substantive reality except the narrative's invention—nor are they 'mentioned' in the ordinary sense of the term: they are narrated. Even quite unemotional echoes can therefore be distinguished from free indirect discourse because they collocate with previous (i.e. to be echoed) discourse:

(173) A: I'm leaving for India tomorrow.

B: O, you're leaving for India. Do you think I might ask you to take a present for my good friend Rajman if that's not too inconvenient?

In spite of these distinctions there is, as I have said, a real similarity between oral free indirect discourse and the echo question in the way in which previous discourse, if there is one, can be usurped and framed for the current speaker's ulterior purposes. It is this superimposition of the current speaker's frame that evokes the narrator's own voice. Yet one should never forget that free indirect discourse *reports* or *narrates*, whereas the echo question is part of *interactive discourse*. Similarities between the echo question and oral free

indirect discourse can therefore be explained precisely by the fact that, in the spoken language, the narrative is carried on within a conversational frame of discourse, in which the addressee is a present participant.

A construction that is much closer to free indirect discourse than the echo question, although it has precisely the same syntactic pattern as the echo question, is the following:

- (174) Now let's see about this form. Today is the 9th of March. You are called Jill Rutgers. *You live where?* Ah, 17 Sesame Lane. That's 94275 right? OK. *You were born when?* OK. And where? Right. *You are now filing this application for public welfare because your husband has died and you have five children to support?*

In this text the speaker addresses his interlocutor in order to elicit information, part of which he already knows (hence no 'real' question but an 'echoic' statement). However, there is no actual echo involved because he merely attributes an answer to the addressee, namely what he fills in on the form. He thus reports to the addressee what he is saying *about* her on the form in her stead, in *her* first person, and is thereby (implicitly) asking for confirmation. Where he does not have the precise answer ready he asks a direct question, but one without I-movement, which—except for its intonation and pragmatic purpose—is identical to an echo question: *You live where?* If there is a syntactic and pragmatic form that is difficult to separate from free indirect discourse, it is this constative echo report. The *You were born where?* construction, which formally coincides with an echo question, is common in court-room testimonials but cannot readily be found in ordinary conversation since it requires an official questioner who is certain of receiving the answer without having to ask formally or politely for it. Hence this, too, really does not interfere with free indirect discourse environments although it comes closer to the reportative and attributive nature of free indirect discourse than does the 'real' echo question.

Although I do not think the evidence proposed by Yamaguchi sufficient to warrant a derivation of free indirect discourse from the echo question, the discussion of this syntactic structure constitutes more than a red herring. This will become clearer towards the end of our examination of speech and thought representation when reconsidering the makings of free indirect discourse in the light of schematic language representation. (Compare [Chapter 9](#).)

In this second, syntactic section of the chapter I have outlined the much stricter definability of free indirect discourse in terms of syntactic patterns. Nevertheless, as with the referential shift, numerous exceptions to the rule and, even more importantly, ambiguous cases can be found where sub-ordination can be left pending, and where free indirect discourse employs transcriptions that are remarkably similar to indirect discourse patterns. We will now turn to the most knotty problem of all—the temporal shift in (free) indirect discourse.

Part C:

Tense, mood and aspect in (free) indirect discourse

We have had to deal with questions of tense already in the initial introduction to temporal deixis under (1.3), and I have noted problems of temporal aspect for Russian in Chapter 2 and have remarked on the crucial importance of the German subjunctive in the previous sections of this chapter. Tense, aspect and mood interrelate in different ways in specific languages so that it is difficult to draw any general conclusions. This is also one of the areas of linguistic study which needs to be regarded as highly controversial and where the mass of recent publications may overwhelm even a specialist in that area. If analyses of the temporal system depart from a number of incompatible presuppositions, this is even truer of the question of aspect, since with aspect the distinction between morphological marking, the relevance of *Aktionsarten* and their interconnection with tense and mood are more crucial to the constitution and definition of this elusive concept. The following remarks necessarily have to remain eclectic since no theory of aspect is currently available that could command unqualified assent.¹ In this section we will be concerned specifically with the famous sequence of tenses which is observable in all languages with a temporal shifting mechanism, and this already correlates with aspect in the case of French, where indirect complement clauses and free indirect discourse shift into the backgrounded *imparfait*, *plusqueparfait* and *conditionnel II*. The English aspectual progressive, on the other hand, appears to be restricted to certain contexts, among which perception will interest us most. We will highlight a number of features that are particularly relevant to a discussion of speech and thought representation. A more exhaustive analysis of tense or aspect would have required a study in its own right.

3.4

THE TEMPORAL INTEGRATION OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

3.4.1

Sequence of tenses

In (free) indirect discourse, as is well known, the introductory verb of enunciation, parenthetical or contextual reference point, if in a tense other than the present, triggers a shift in the tenses of the subordinate clauses that in English is usually referred to as the sequence of tenses (SoT), and in French the *concordance des temps*.² If the verb of this introductory clause is in the past tense system, there is a shift into a backgrounding tense of the preterital system for the reported complement clause. In French the background tense is morphologically marked (*imparfait*, *plusqueparfait*). Whatever the tenses of the 'original' discourse, the speech representation clause only marks anteriority, simultaneity or posteriority in the unshifted present tense system or the shifted past tense system. Thus clauses dependent on an introductory verb in the future tense (which is part of the present

tense system) have present tenses, present perfects or future tenses to mark the three temporal relations, and in the case of a preterital context an 'original' French *imparfait* transforms into a simultaneous *imparfait* to signify simultaneity within the past tense system. The standard account of this can be found in Benveniste (1966) and Weinrich (1964/1985).

- (1) Sophia now desired her father to return home; saying she *found* herself very faint, and *apprehended* a relapse.

(*Tom Jones* V, xii; Fielding 1966:202)

- (2) Colonel Wallis *had known* Mr Elliot long, *had been* well acquainted also with his wife, *had perfectly understood* the whole story.

(*Persuasion*, xv; Austen: 1987:153)

- (3) At breakfast next day it was the same talk renewed; and when my lady said there was something free in the Lord Mohun's looks and manner of speech which caused her to mistrust him, her lord burst out with one of his laughs and oaths; said that he never liked man, woman, or beast, but what she was sure to be jealous of it; that Mohun was the prettiest fellow in England; that he hoped to see more of him whilst in the country; and that he *would let* Mohun *know* what my Lady Prude said of him.

(*Henry Esmond*, xii; Thackeray 1985:164)

In response to an article by Comrie (1986b) the SoT mechanism has recently sparked an intense debate between him, Huddleston (1989) and Declerck (1990a, 1991). Comrie had proposed a definition for an automatic (basically non-semantic) SoT rule. Exempted from the tense shift in its traditional version are clauses of 'current relevance' for the context of the reporting, either because the reported discourse is one about generally valid propositions in the gnomic present tense,

- (4) But, having watched Edward all her life, she [Leonora] knew that that laying on of hands, that answering of gaze, meant that the thing was unavoidable. *Edward was such a serious person.* [...] And she so despised Florence that she would have preferred it to be a parlour-maid. *There are very decent parlour-maids.*

(*The Good Soldier* IV, i; Ford 1983:190)

or because the state of affairs referred to is still valid or lies in the anticipated future (Quirk *et al.* 1985:1027).³ It is a fact frequently overlooked in grammatical descriptions of the English language that in conversation the tense shift is suspended in a great number of cases, and one may wonder whether this oversight does not point towards remnants of a prescriptive practice of English grammar. In conversation SoT, when it occurs, in fact frequently *signals* the speaker's refusal to accept responsibility for another's utterance, reporting it non-committally or with critical intent:⁴ when the reporter is convinced of the truth of the reported proposition, s/he will be understood to add his or her weight to the statement by the suspension of the shift.

- (5) Tom said the letter was sent on April 9, so if it isn't here by now it must have got lost.

It would indeed be stylistically odd to have a past perfect tense in this context, and one would even tend to interpret the initial *Tom said* on the lines of *As Tom said* (transforming this into a kind of initial discourse parenthetical).⁵ In fact the tense shift rule—for conversational reported discourse—should be rewritten to stipulate the preservation of the tenses of the original utterance *unless* these tenses interfered with the correct reading. Thus, the past tense is a requirement in,

- (6) A: How did you know that Mr Bennett was at home on Thursday, March 3?
B: Tom phoned to say he was ill.

since

- (7) Tom phoned to say he **is** ill.

would imply that Tom is still ill at the time of utterance to the best of the speaker's belief. This sentence can therefore only be used in a report during a reasonable period of time after the phone call. However, at a later hearing the full force of a past tense is added to the shifted verb, since the witness is in fact claiming that Mr. Bennett *was* ill on March 3, since that is what he said on the phone that day. By contrast, if one is asked at a party about Bill's whereabouts and answers,

- (8) Bill phoned to say he was ill.

the understanding is that the speaker is either merely reporting what Bill said or is not particularly convinced of the truth of this statement. As Declerck very convincingly argues, the tense shift (relative tense) is the unmarked pattern for past contexts, since (8) is definitely read as a statement about Bill's sickness at the time he called and *not* as his statement about a previous incapacity; then one would have to have a shift into the past perfect:

- (9) Bill phoned to say that he had been ill.

(Compare Declerck 1990a: 519)

The shift can therefore be superseded by an absolute tense if a deictic reorientation takes place and the speaker signals current relevancy. However, there are many other cases where the shifted preterite stands in for a pluperfect.⁶ Thus, although a past tense verb—the most frequent case—would seem to trigger a shift into the past perfect tense for references to anterior events, such a shift is not always observed, particularly in oral discourse, and it is never persisted in for long if longer utterances are being reported the

tense shifts back to the past tense after the first sentence of a sequence of sentences detailing anterior events. Once anteriority has been established, there is no need to persist with a cumbersome form. This converts the function of the past perfect tense into that of a signal. Unlike the present and past tenses, the pluperfect does not participate in temporal *obstination* (Weinrich 1985:16).

There is, however, no necessary contradiction here to either Comrie's or Declerck's arguments since both recognize pragmatic parameters and can therefore easily incorporate a 'lazy' past tense that fails to mark anteriority. Such lazy preterites occur only in contexts that do not result in ambiguity because anteriority can be recuperated from the semantics of the situation, from the frame:

(10) When I visited Wallace in the hospital he told me he was run down by a bus.

Although one could easily take this to be a deictic reorientation—the accident is past for the speaker of (10)—a comparison with

(11) When I got to the hospital I heard (i.e. learned) that Wallace ?was run down by a bus.

proves that the pluperfect is actually the expected form in a reporting context, and that the preterite, which is read as 'simultaneous', sounds odd because the time of the accident seems to be left tantalizingly indefinite. In fact (11) can be used felicitously only if the speaker is, for instance, an investigator into the causes of Wallace's death and acquires factual information at the hospital, which s/he now reports. If Wallace's accident is 'news' the pluperfect is mandatory, and in fact one can now see why this is so: the pluperfect replaces a 'hot news' present perfect and *not* a preterite of an 'underlying' schematic utterance. Hence the felicity of (10), where a preterite is attributed to the original speech act and the anteriority can be reconstructed from the cause-effect relation of the hospital-accident frame.

Exceptions to the SoT rule exist on the formal level, for instance with some English modals that have only one morphological form—*should*, *might*, *ought to*. These, in the synchronic language, carry modal and not temporal force, and remain unshifted (since there is no past tense for these morphologically preterital modals). Thus,

(12) He said that he *might* come.

could be an indirect report of 'I might come.' This sentence is, however, ambiguous since *might* also functions as the shifted form of *may*, in parallel with *should* for *shall* in those sociolects where *shall* is used in collocation with the first person (instead of *will*).⁷

Real counter-arguments against a SoT rule come from Huddleston (1989: 335–6), who points out a number of cases in which the past tense has a *modal* meaning in English.

(13) How did you know what my name *was* ?

Did I tell you I **was** here today?

Declerck (1991) explains this kind of past tense as the *unmarked* preterite: in past domains complement clauses use relative tense unless there is a marked shift of domain and hence a semantically motivated deictic reorientation. This is the one point where Declerck fails to provide an intuitively adequate explanation for the empirical facts. Most speakers would argue that the past tense in (13) has a quality different from the past tense in *He conceded that he **knew** the problem very well but **could** not propose any immediate solution*. My own improvement on Declerck (1991) would be to suggest that in such cases where an immediate relevance to the reporting situation cannot be denied, a reversal of marking takes place—a present tense would be the expected norm, and the shifted past tense therefore acquires an exceptional quality, a quality describable in terms of *modality* for lack of a better definition.

As regards free indirect discourse, the tense shift can, in appropriate contexts, come to function as a signal of speech or thought representation, particularly in passages where idioms otherwise reserved for direct discourse are incorporated into free indirect discourse and shift their tense:

(14) *How did she do?*

(*Ulysses*, 'Wandering Rocks', i; Joyce 1984:473)

- (15) *Eternity, timeless experience of good, time as the substance of evil- it was bad enough, **God knew**, in books; but, fired at you like this, point- blank, by somebody who really took it seriously, why, it was really frightful*

(*After Many a Summer I*, viii; Huxley 1950:106)

- (16) *Sie [Frau Stuh] hatte, **strafe sie Gott**, niemals eine schönere Braut gesehen, lag, so dick sie war, auf den Knien und befestigte mit bewundernd erhobenen Augen die kleinen Myrtenzweiglein auf der weißen moiré antique...*

(*Buddenbrooks* III, xiv; Mann 1991:162)⁸

Such odd effects can be achieved by pronominal shifts, too, as when *between you and me* appears as *between her and him* or *between themselves*.

The issue of the shift in tense for free indirect discourse has been particularly blurred by the concentration on (modern) English and French examples. If one also considers German, where indirect discourse frequently requires a **subjunctive** form, and Russian, where **no tense shift** is observable even in most cases of standard indirect discourse, one needs to conclude that the famous SoT is an optional feature of both free indirect discourse and indirect discourse, and that in English and French, where SoT has been observed meticulously, present tense narrative has considerably eroded this grammatical bulwark.

It is now the proper place to enquire more theoretically into the status of the so-called SoT, particularly in relation to temporal deixis in complement clauses. In a model that links the temporal system to a general deictic theory as presented by W.P.Schmid (1972/1983), Gisa Rauh (1983c, 1984, 1985a) proposes an account of the tense systems of

English and German that offers a very precise, if overly complex and abstract, definition of the correlations between tense and systems of adverbial deixis. Already in 1978 Rauh had, however, described tense in shifted contexts in terms of a double underlying hypersentence on the basis of Ross (1970).⁹ Rauh subscribes to the narrator text since she assumes a direct deictic position in every narrative sentence (as documented by the hypersentence(s)). Rauh's main contribution, as I see it, lies in her very regular alignment of tense and deixis, and also in her earlier (1978) analysis of temporal layers in subsidiary clauses. In subsidiary clauses Reichenbach's reference point¹⁰ is substituted with the temporal point of the main clause. Tense in subsidiary clauses can take one of three forms. For one, it can be an independent *non-deictic* tense, i.e. it relates neither anaphorically nor deictically to the speaker position. Rauh's example for this category,

(17) John will arrive after Billy *cleaned* the house.

(Rauh 1978:83)

is agrammatical in English. I suspect that Rauh means *after Billy has cleaned the house*, in which case the non-deictic subsidiary clause would signal pure anteriority or posteriority. However, from Rauh's earlier remarks about a *Tiefentempus* ('deep structure tense'; *ibid.*, 83) I suspect that Rauh intended to refer to the adoption into the subsidiary clause of the deep structure tense of this subsidiary clause. Since at the time when John arrives, Billy's cleaning of the house is a past event, the deep structural tempus morpheme must be *past*, and this past tense would be transferred into the subsidiary clause, without a mediate tense *shift* or an absolute reorientation towards the speaker's enunciation time. Rauh's first example, incorrectly translated from German, might therefore correspond to Fabricius-Hansen's (1989) Principle I, which no longer exists in English but is the standard temporal system in subsidiary clauses in Russian.¹¹ The deixis in Rauh's first case would then relate to the event time as viewed absolutely from the reference time perspective.

Secondly, the subsidiary clause may establish a dependency on the main clause (Rauh calls this *mittelbar deiktisch*, 'deictic at second remove'):

(18) John hit Bill after he had hit Charles.

John will arrive after Billy will have cleaned the house.

Dependent tenses can occur only in subsidiary clauses or in contexts where one can locate a preceding reference point.¹² The mediate deictic category seems to coincide with anaphoric or relative use of tense, which for Rauh apparently is identical to the SoT schema. Mediate deixis, which combines the adeictic signalling of anteriority, posteriority and simultaneity with absolute deixis, is of course the crucial category for most indirect discourse and all free indirect discourse.

Thirdly, the speaker may overrule dependency requirements (Rauh calls this a deictic *reorientation* of the subsidiary clause with regard to the speaker):

(19) a. Mary said that Bill *loves* her.

- b. John hit Bill after he *hit* Charles.

In both clauses of (b) the preterite *hit* relates to the present deictic position; in the (a) clause *loves* is still valid at the time of enunciation. Declerck (1989, 1990a) calls this the *absolute* use of tense.

Indirect discourse with its SoT constitutes one of the most common examples of the anaphoric use of tense, since it involves an automatic backshifting. Rauh's examples here move into the past tense whereas her other two categories were mainly analysed by means of future tense examples; the precise difference between the past perfect in indirect discourse and in a subsidiary temporal clause thus remains unexplained.¹³ There may be a difference in *interpretation*. In *after Billy will have cleaned the house*, the present speaker aligns the temporal point of Billy's cleaning with the future but recognizes it to *precede* John's (also future) arrival. One therefore has:

- (20) a. John will arrive after Billy will clean the house. [deictic reorientation]
 b. John will arrive after Billy has cleaned the house. [adeictic]
 c. John will arrive after Billy will have cleaned the house. ['mediate' deixis]

In my view, the last of these, (c), precisely corresponds with,

- (21) John said that he had seen Billy.

since, from the speaker's perspective, John's seeing of Billy is also past, and anterior to John's utterance. Mediate deictic temporality thus combines anteriority with a deictic marker, hence constitutes a kind of 'shift'. However, in the SoT reading one usually speaks of purely anaphoric tenses, and no deictic reorientation is felt to occur.

Carlota S. Smith (1980) presents an equally interesting distinction when she contrasts sentences that *demand* 'capture', sentences that are *available for* capture and sentences that *resist* (or are protected from) capture:

- (22) a. Scott can't come to the picnic tomorrow. He is working.
 b. Next Sunday we're flying to Amsterdam. We visit friends on Monday.
 c. Every summer Robert travels. He is leaving for Greece tomorrow.
 (C. Smith 1980:358–60; [= (7), (12) and (14)])

(a) illustrates the obligatory 'capture' of sentences with no time adverbials. In (b) the time adverbial is relative to the original reference time or included in its scope, so that the second time adverbial is read as dependent on the first. Finally, in (c) a new deictic reference point is established, which roughly corresponds to Rauh's deictic reorientation. (22a) and (22b) are relevant to the SoT issue, and particularly to the workings of free indirect discourse, since they illustrate the SoT phenomenon in independent sentences instead of complement clauses. C. Smith (1980) therefore anticipates Ehrlich's (1987, 1990a) work on temporal linking.

A second even more interesting model has been proposed by Fabricius-Hansen (1989). She argues that there are basic systems of regulating tense in subsidiary clauses. Fabricius-Hansen starts out from a critique of Plank's (1986)¹⁴ contention that deictic categories are interdependent, with tense necessarily shifting if deictic adverbials do. Free indirect discourse, as Plank himself notes, does not observe this rule, nor does much indirect discourse of the expressive or mimetic kind (cp. Chapter 4). Fabricius-Hansen concentrates on tense in the indicative forms of German indirect discourse in a comparison to the Scandinavian languages. Following Solfeld (1983), Fabricius-Hansen illustrates three possible strategies of dealing with tense in indirect discourse. According to Principle I no 'shifting' takes place, the tense of the original utterance is preserved—this of course corresponds to the standard situation in Russian and Japanese.

- (23) Petra fragte ihn, wie ihm das Buch gefällt.
 'Petra asked him how he [lit.] likes the book.'
 (24) Petra fragte ihn, ob er den Film gesehen hat.
 'Petra asked him if he [lit.] has seen the film.'

Principle I entirely neglects the time of reporting (*Wiedergabezeit*). According to Principle II, on the other hand, the time of the original utterance (*Originalzeit*) can remain relevant in the function of an additional reference time (for the perfect tenses) or—for the simple tenses—as an additional perspective (*Betrachtzeit*). This is the regular case of 'shifting'. Principle II*, newly proposed by Fabricius-Hansen, completely disregards the original time of utterance and concentrates exclusively on the reporter's temporal situation. This, if I understand Fabricius-Hansen correctly, corresponds to absolute temporal deixis, or Rauh's deictic reorientation. Fabricius-Hansen now argues that in German Principle I is still operative, but that in English and in most Scandinavian languages it has disappeared and that unshifted tenses are only available as deictic reorientations according to Principle II*.

Fabricius-Hansen does not contend that her principles are intuitively present to the speaker, and it is therefore perhaps no real counter-argument that *all* of her German sentences illustrating Principle I are actually read as Principle II*, i.e. as talking about deictically relevant relations to the time of the *reporting*. This is true, I would argue, even for the use of the present perfect, as in (24), and one would also have to allow for differences in the context of the Southern German loss of the preterite and its apparent¹⁵ replacement by the perfect.

There does therefore appear to be something like an SoT rule which is operative in German, French and English, but the application of this rule depends on a number of pragmatic and stylistic criteria. The situation is most complex in German, where the tense shift competes with a shift in mood, with an additional interference from syntactic alternatives (cp. under (3.3)). However, German at the same time documents the existence of an SoT rule most forcefully since—in contrast to free indirect discourse—the standard form of subjunctive ('free') indirect discourse exclusively relates to the temporal utterance point of the reported enunciation (Fabricius-Hansen's Principle I). Alternative

uses of the past subjunctive do not institute an SoT, but locally and unsystematically signal the presence of the subjunctive mood (where the present subjunctive form is homophonous with the present indicative), or mark disagreement with the content of the reported utterance (but only where the present subjunctive is the expected norm¹⁶—therefore only in certain stylistic registers and with educated speakers).¹⁷ There are also some German dialects and sociolects in which the preterital subjunctive has *replaced* the present subjunctive in all environments—speakers of those dialects *never* employ present subjunctive forms.

3.4.2

The tense shift as a signal of free indirect discourse¹⁸

I have noted above that *must*, *ought to*,¹⁹ *might* and some other auxiliaries frequently ‘give away’ a free indirect discourse reading, whether because there should be a tense shift which for lack of a past tense form does not occur, or because of a tense shift that, on a literal, non-shifted reading, would alter the meaning of the sentence: *may/might; shall/should*.

- (25) If any one strongly impressed with the power of the human mind to triumph over circumstances, will contend that the parishioners of Basset might nevertheless have been a very superior class of people, I have nothing to urge against that abstract position; I only know that, in point of fact, the Basset mind was in strict keeping with its circumstances.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, viii; G.Eliot 1986:80–1)

An unshifted speculative *might* occurs in the following free indirect discourse passage:

- (26) Matilda reflected that Isabella had been twice delivered by Theodore in very critical situations, which she could not believe accidental. *His eyes, it was true, had been fixed on her in Frederic’s chamber; but that might have been to disguise his passion for Isabella from the fathers of both.*

(*The Castle of Otranto*, iv; Walpole 1964:83)

Contrary to earlier English usage, *must* in present-day English is shifted into *had to* (which then loses its deontic force). It is for this reason that some instances of *must*, *should* or *would* signal free indirect discourse.²⁰ Deontic *must* can otherwise only occur as part of a command in an actual utterance. Compare:

- (27) He told Jim that he **must** take the exam (on Monday).
 He told Jim that I **must** take the exam (on Monday).
 (28) He told Jim that he **must** take the exam last week/the previous week.
 He told Jim that I **must** take the exam last week/the previous week.

Must functions as an index of subjectivity not merely because it remains unshifted in free indirect discourse, but because it reflects a speaker's speech act of command. Only the speaker with the proper authority can address a *must* to an appropriate commandee (of subordinate status), and the precise illocutionary meaning of *must* can therefore not be preserved in a third person context except in free indirect discourse. Thus in (27) the force of the command is still operative, and the speaker joins in the obligation.

- (29) They stay a long time in the sun-kissed garden, considering that there is after all not very much to see there. But Elizabeth's light steps, that to-day seem set to some innocent dancing-tune, are loath to leave it; *she must smell the great new peonies.*

(*Alas!* I, xiv; Broughton 1890:223)

- (30) *She must get her boat into the current of the Floss, else she would never be able to pass the Ripple and approach the house:* this was the thought that occurred to her, as she imagined with more and more vividness the state of things round the old home.

(*Mill on the Floss* VII, v, G.Eliot 1986:507)

- (31) she [Anne] found herself accosted by Captain Wentworth, in a reserved yet hurried sort of farewell. '*He must wish her good night. He was going—he should get home as fast as he could*'

(*Persuasion*, xx; Austen 1987:199)

- (32) I shake my head in a fury of disbelief. No! No! No! I cry to myself. *It is I who am seducing myself, out of vanity, into these meanings and correspondences. [...] There is nothing to link me with torturers, people who sit waiting like beetles in dark cellars. How can I believe that a anything but a bed, a woman's body anything but a site of joy? I must assert my distance from Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his crimes!*

(*Waiting for the Barbarians*; Coetzee 1982:44)

- (33) and since natural history is threatened, like all language, by the radical doubt that Hume brought to bear upon the necessity for repetition in experience, it must find a way of avoiding that threat. *There must be continuity in nature.*

(Foucault 1970:146)

Besides deontic *must* there is of course additionally epistemic *must*, which is even more specifically a free indirect discourse signal in narrative texts. *That must be Tom* constitutes a conjecture on the speaker's part, and this can only be transformed into an indirect discourse *Sheila said that the person in the painting must be Tom* if the speaker joins in the conjecture. If s/he does not, the report needs to be something like *Sheila conjectured that the person in the painting was Tom*. In free indirect discourse, typically, the reported character's conjecture rather than the narrator's is generally responsible for *must*, and *must* therefore becomes one prominent signal of free indirect discourse:

- (34) The sound of wheels while Mrs Glegg was speaking was an interruption highly welcome to Mrs Tulliver, who hastened out to receive sister Pullet—it **must** be sister Pullet, because the sound was that of a four-wheel.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, vi; G.Eliot 1986:58)

- (35) She [Phoeby] walked around the fence corner and went in the intimate gate with her heaping plate of mulatto rice. *Janie **must** be round that side.*

(*Their Eyes Were Watching God*, i; Hurston 1978:14)

- (36) The next day, more Indians moved east, unhurried but steady. Still a blue sky and fair weather. *Beans running fine and prices good, so the Indians could be, must be, wrong. You couldn't have a hurricane when you're making seven and eight dollars a day picking beans. Indians are dumb, anyhow, always were.*

(*Ibid.*, xviii; 1978:229)

- (37) Mr Dombey would have reasoned: That a matrimonial alliance with himself must, in the nature of things, be gratifying and honourable to any woman of common sense. That the hope of giving birth to a new partner in such a House, could not fail to awaken a glorious and stirring ambition in the breast of the least ambitious of her sex. [...] That Mrs Dombey **must** have been happy. That she couldn't help it.

(*Dombey and Son*, i; Dickens 1985:50–1)

Other 'shifted' modals such as *would*, *should*, *might*, *could*, in appropriate idioms that proscribe the unshifted forms, also become signals of free indirect discourse. Here are some examples:

- (38) *Mr Barnacle would see him. **Would** he walk up-stairs? He **would**, and he did; and in the drawing-room, with his leg on a rest, he [Clennam] found Mr Barnacle himself, the express image and presentment of How not to do it.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, x; Dickens 1978:152)

- (39) But Tom's influence among these young people began to grow, now, day by day; and in time he came to be looked up to, by them, with a sort of wondering awe, as a superior being. *He seemed to know so much! and he **could** do and say such wonderful things! and, withal, he was so deep and wise!*

(*The Prince and the Pauper*, ii; Twain 1983:8)

In earlier English texts *will* still has full volitional force, and it therefore implies a subjective point of view. Dry (1990) quotes a selection of instances of free indirect discourse examples of such shifted *will*:

- (40) He could not have come nearer to her if he would; she was so surrounded and shut in.

(Jane Austen, *Persuasion*; quoted Dry 1990:144)

Contrary to Dry's argument, however, most of these passages in fact *signal* free indirect discourse by the use of *would*. It is a shifted will attributable to the reported character's expression of volition that underlies the represented discourse.

- (41) 'Did Charlotte dine with you?'

'No, she would go home. I fancy she was wanted about the mince pies.'

(*Pride and Prejudice*, ix; Austen 1985:89; quoted Dry 1990:144)

(42) *He was better and would be left alone; so the doctor went away.*

(*Wuthering Heights*; quoted *ibid.*)

In both cases a speech act is implied, although *she would go home* can be read as a simple report with no submerged residuum of Charlotte's words. What is odd in these passages is in fact the use of *will*, not that of shifted *would*—present-day rewritings would probably be on the lines of *He could not have come nearer to her if he **had wanted to**; He was better and **wanted to be left alone***. My reservations about Dry's cautionary remarks on the signal character of *would* apply with equal weight to her (briefer) discussion of *must*. In all her examples *must* is a subjectivity indicator on account of its deontic or epistemic meaning, and it signals the subjectivity of either the current speaker or the reported character. In the following passage from a modern text *must* and *would* are so idiomatic, so obviously referable to Amerigo's very words, that one cannot have any doubt.

(43) He had told her of his day, the happy thought of his roundabout journey with Charlotte, all their cathedral-hunting adventure, and how it had turned out rather more of an affair than they expected. *The moral of it was, at any rate, that he was tired, verily, and **must** have a bath and rest—to which end she **would** kindly excuse him for the shortest time possible.*

(*The Golden Bowl*, xxv; James 1979:312)

Yet the only difference to the more classic examples of Dry's is in the *formal* past tense *must* as clear and necessary evidence for the presence of free indirect discourse. That clear and necessary evidence never exists in twentieth-century texts either:

(44) When they **must** descend and walk away, she was unhappy, feeling like a giant suddenly cut down to ordinary level, at the mercy of the mob.

They left the fair, to return for the dog-cart. Passing the large church, Ursula **must** look in. **But** the whole interior was filled with scaffolding, fallen stones and rubbish were heaped on the floor, bits of plaster crunched underfoot, and the place re-echoed to the calling of secular voices and to blows of the hammer.

(*The Rainbow*, xi; Lawrence 1988:296)

In the first occurrence of *must*, which may be dialectally motivated and therefore comparable to eighteenth-century English usage, mere conventional necessity ('they had to') is implied; the second *must*, however, reflects Ursula's urge, and it occurs outside free indirect discourse and nevertheless signals her perspective. (Note also the initial *But* in the next sentence which captures her disappointment at the disarray of the church.)

An especially interesting case is the following, in which the now obsolete *shall*-form is shifted in a peremptory I shall rather than the more common *shall* I? pattern:

- (45) This observation of hers [Mrs Tulliver] tended directly to convince Mr. Tulliver that it would not be at all awkward for him to raise five hundred pounds; and when Mrs. Tulliver became rather pressing to know how he would raise it without mortgaging the mill and the house, which he had said he never would mortgage, since nowadays people were none so ready to lend money without security, Mr. Tulliver, getting warm, declared that Mrs. Glegg might do as she liked about calling in her money—he **should** pay it in, whether or not. *He was not going to be beholding to his wife's sisters.*

(*Mill on the Floss* I, viii; G. Eliot 1986:78)

- (46) Never **should** she forget Herbert killing a wasp with a teaspoon on the bank!

(*To the Lighthouse* I, xvii; Woolf 1985:82)²¹

In the following passage I suspect that *should have had may* be the shifted form of speculative *should have to*:

- (47) *What fun! What splendour! What self-parodying emphasis! What staggering beauty! What enormous bad taste! And what a shame that the man **should have had** to be content with mere daylight and tallow candles!*

(*After Many a Summer* I, xi; Huxley 1950:151)

These signals are equally valid in French and German, as observe the case of French *devoir* and German *mögen* or *sollen*:

- (48) Cette apprehension se tourna vite en impatience, et Paris alors agita pour lui [Léon], dans le lointain, la fanfare de ses bals masqués avec le rire de ses grisettes. *Puisqu'il **devait** y terminer son droit, pourquoi ne partait-il pas? qui l'empêchait?*

(*Madame Bovary* II, vi; Flaubert 1972:140)²²

- (49) Cloué sur sa chaise, il [Laurent] se désespéra jusqu'au soir. *Il **devait** gagner son pain, il ne pouvait se faire mettre à la porte.*

(*Thérèse Raquin*, ix; Zola 1979:87)²³

- (50) *Daß etwa der neue Lehrling, der unbeholfene Gnom, der in der Werkstatt hauste wie ein Hund und den man manchmal, wenn der Meister heraustrat, im Hintergrund stehen und Gläser wischen und Mörser putzen sah—daß dieses Nichts von Mensch etwas zu tun haben **sollte** mit dem sagenhaften Aufblühn des Geschäfts, das hätte Chénier nicht einmal dann geglaubt, wenn man es ihm gesagt hätte.*

(*Das Parfum* I, xvii; Süskind 1985:116–17)²⁴

- (51) Die Magd stand noch und schaute, da hatte er sich schon umgewendet und war aus der Gasse verschwunden, entschlossen, sich nie mehr dort zu zeigen. ***Mochte** ein anderer diese Brüste streicheln! **Mochte** ein anderer diese guten Würste essen! Überhaupt, was wurde hier in dieser fetten vergnügten Stadt nicht Tag für Tag gefressen und vergeudet!*

(*Narziß und Goldmund*, xii; Hesse 1970:191–2)²⁵

The tense shift in itself and by itself, with a regular verb, can also come to ‘signal’ free indirect discourse, particularly in the shift of future verb forms into the future in the past, that is to say into the French *conditionnel*, the English *would* and German *würde*:

- (52) Already when he [Lydgate] was re-entering the town after that ride taken in the first hours of stinging pain, he was setting his mind on remaining in Middlemarch in spite of the worst that could be done against him. *He would not retreat before calumny, as if he submitted to it. He would face it to the utmost, and no act of his should show that he was afraid.*

(*Middlemarch*, lxxiii; G.Eliot 1986:796)

- (53) Et il se mit à faire des préparatifs intérieurs; il arrangea d’avance ses occupations. Il se meubla dans sa tête un appartement. *Il y mènerait une vie d’artiste! Il y prendrait des leçons de guitare! Il aurait une robe de chambre, un bérêt basque, des pantoufles de velours bleu!*

(*Madame Bovary* II, vi; Flaubert 1972:140)²⁶

Likewise, the shift into the past perfect tense frequently triggers a free indirect discourse reading:

- (54) As he [Rosedale] spoke, he was checked by an embarrassing sense of the complications to which this might lead. *Though he had not seen her he had heard of her; he knew of her connection with Mrs. Hatch, and of the talk resulting from it.*

(*House of Mirth* III, x; Wharton 1962:337)

- (55) Shortly and kindly Sir William explained to her the state of the case. *He [Septimus] had threatened to kill himself. There was no alternative. It was a question of law. He would lie in a bed in a beautiful house in the country. The nurses were admirable. Sir William would visit him once a week. If Mrs. Warren Smith was quite sure she had no more questions to ask—he never hurried his patients—they would return to her husband.*

(*Mrs. Dalloway*; Woolf 1976:107)

Finally, the ‘simultaneous’ past tense and, even more strikingly, the past progressive in English, as well as the equivalent *imparfait* in French, in certain contexts make a free indirect discourse interpretation imperative:

- (56) The land-steward, a moderate and well-balanced man whose family also had been with the Ashburahams for over a century, took it upon himself to explain that he considered Edward was pursuing a perfectly proper course with his tenants. *He erred perhaps a little on the side of generosity, but hard times were hard times, and everyone had to feel the pinch, landlord as well as tenants.*

(*The Good Soldier* III, iii; Ford 1983:145)

- (57) Lucy, for the third time, said that poor Charlotte would be sopped. *The Arno* **was rising** in flood, washing away the traces of the little carts upon the fore-shore.

(*A Room with a View* I, iii; Forster 1977:33)

- (58) Nun kreuzte Doktor Mantelsack im Stehen die Beine und blätterte in seinem Notizbuch. Hanno Buddenbrook saß vorübergebeugt und rang unter dem Tische die Hände. *Das B, der Buchstabe B* **war** an der Reihe! Gleich wurde sein Name ertönen, und er würde aufstehen und nicht eine Zeile wissen, und es würde einen Skandal geben, eine laute schreckliche Katastrophe, so guter Laune der Ordinarius auch sein mochte.

(*Buddenbrooks* XI, ii; Mann 1991:725–6)²⁷

- (59) elle [Thérèse] parla d'une cliente qui avait déménagé sans la payer, elle fit la créancière intraitable, elle déclara qu'elle voulait aller réclamer son argent. La cliente **demeurait** aux Batignolles.

(*Thérèse Raquin*, ix; Zola 1979:89)²⁸

Susan Ehrlich, in her modification of Banfield's theory of represented speech and thought, discusses the three temporal shifts in terms of temporal linking and point of view coherence.

Besides these very typical shifts there are in French and English some periphrastic tense uses that are also shifted into free indirect discourse and then are frequently regarded as a kind of 'signal' of the device. This is true of the English *is to leave*, *going to leave* and *is leaving* constructions, as well as of the French *il va téléphoner*, *elle vient de gagner*, etc.:

- (60) Il [Laurent] resta ainsi quelques minutes, faisant ses adieux a son grenier qu'il trouvait ignoble. *Enfin, il allait quitter* ce chenil et avoir une femme a lui.

(*Thérèse Raquin*, xx; Zola 1979:179)²⁹

- (61) He [Elihue] never got over her desertion. *She was to have been* the answer to his unstated, unacknowledged question—where was the life to counter the encroaching nonlife? *Velma was to rescue* him from the nonlife he had learned on the flat side of his father's belt.

(*The Bluest Eye*, 'Seethedog...'; Morrison 1972:134)

- (62) *When they had got settled in the new parish to which they were shortly moving* she would dig out her notes again. There would be much more time for one's own work in the country.

(*Jane and Prudence*, i; Pym 1987:11)

- (63) The wants and sufferings of the poor family, however, were the first subject on meeting. *He had been going to call on them. His visit he would now defer*; but they had a very interesting parley about what could be done and should be done.

(*Emma*, x; Austen 1986:112)

Like many other 'signals' or indices of free indirect discourse, the above tense shifts alert the reader to a free indirect discourse reading only in contexts of a possible speech or thought representation. Greater care will be taken in Chapters 4 and 6 in analysing the various ways in which expressive features signal free indirect discourse, and the frame

conditions considered at that point are basically relevant for the above morphological features, too.

3.4.3

Present tense free indirect discourse

In this section I will briefly discuss the use of the present tense system (Fabricius-Hansen's Principle I) in FID clauses *outside* the narrative or 'epic' (Stanzel 1981b) present tense (cp. under (2.2) above). I here also exclude from consideration the so-called 'gnomic' present tense in subsidiary ID and FID clauses because it is obviously motivated semantically as a 'current relevance' phenomenon and has been integrated into the SoT account by Comrie as well as Declerck. What I want to note in this section is the comparative frequency of unshifted (free) indirect discourse clauses in past tense contexts in early English narrative and—until late into the nineteenth century—in French and German texts. In fact, although I have not made a statistical analysis of Middle English texts, Fabricius-Hansen's Principle I is as common in Middle English as the standard Principle II, and in medieval French the unshifted tense forms predominate. Indeed, in French the SoT replaces the alternative unshifted system only with Flaubert, who is the first French writer exclusively and consistently to apply SoT (Lips 1926:186 ff.).

In Middle English the situation is quite confusing. The tense usage is generally so uneven that one cannot speak of a pure preterital narrative on nineteenth-century lines. One additionally needs to evaluate occurrences of the present in the narrative in terms of the historical present tense distribution within episodic narrative structure (Fludernik 1991a, 1992c). There are several contexts where a gnomic reading or an irrealis construction (as in unreal conditional clauses) camouflage the present tense system:

- (64) *For unto a povre ordre for to yiue
Is signe that a man is well yshryve
For if he yaf, he [the Friar] dorste make avaunt,
He wiste that a man was repentaunt;
For many a man so hard is of his herte,
He may not wepe, although hym soore smerte.*

(*Canterbury Tales*, General Prologue, Friar; A 225–32)

The friar is uttering what one may well take to be gnomic truths or generalizations which have continued relevance and are therefore exempted from the tense shift, with the friar's personal evaluation duly shifted (*wiste*). Sometimes one may wonder whether there is not a shift into direct discourse:

- (65) *For unto swich a worthy man as he [the Friar]
Accorded nat, as by his facultee,
To have with sike lazars aqueyntaunce.
It **is** nat honest, it **may** nat avaunce,*

For to deelen with so swich poraille.

(Ibid., A 243–7; quoted Burnley 1983:50)

There is a real ‘temporal metaphor’ (*accorded*), but the continuation of this shifted free indirect discourse clause in the present tense (*is, may*) can be read as direct speech. In (66) the immediate context has a conjunctive VP, which combines a preterite (*sworen*) and a present (*assenten*) so that again no clear ‘shift’ into the present on the lines of temporal metaphor can be posited. (67) is perhaps the best example for such a ‘shift into the present’ reading, moving from a shifted preterite in the indirect discourse (*knew; was; was*) to present tense *nyl*, but *sholde* again interferes with such neat categorization.

- (66) They sworn and assenten, every man,
 To lyve with hire and dye, and by hire stonde,
*And everich, in the beste wise he **kan**,*
To strengthen hire shal alle his frendes fonde.

(*Canterbury Tales*, ‘Man of Law’s Tale’; B¹ 344–7)

- (67) This senatour repaireth with victorie
 To Rome-ward, sailynge ful roially
 And mette the ship dryvyng, as seith the storie,
 In which Custance sit ful pitously. Nothyng ne knew he what she was, ne why
 She was in swich array, *ne she **nyl*** [present tense] *seye*
*Of hire estaat, althogh she **sholde*** [shifted past/unshifted modal] *deye.*

(Ibid., B¹ 967–73)

In (68) the indirect discourse is in the present tense (*seyn, kan*)—with a shift into the *past perfect* (*had doon*)—so that *han seyn* then can be interpreted equally as a continuation of the present tense *seyn* or as a break with the shifted *had doon*, i.e. a reassertion of present reference.

- (68) But nathelees, ther was greet moornyng
 Among the peple, and *seyn* they **kan** not gesse [indirect discourse]
 That she had doon so greet a wikkednesse;
 For they **han seyn** [present perfect] *hire evere so vertuous,*
And lovyng Hermengyld right as hir lyf.

(Ibid., B¹ 621–5)

The situation is similarly inconsistent in Gower.³⁰ There are, however, passages in which the SoT fully applies already in Middle English:

- (69) She swoor him, ‘Nay,’ for *al this world to wynne*
*She **molde** do that vileynye or synne,*
To make hir housbonde han so foul a name.
*She **molde** nat telle it for hir owene shame.*

(Ibid., 'Wife of Bath's Tale'; D 961–4)

Whereas in the medieval context the temporal shift constituted a temporal metaphor in Weinrich's sense, it is now the suspension of shifting that catches the reader's attention because SoT has become the expected norm for speech and thought representation in preterital contexts. In English the use of the present tense as a temporal metaphor is fairly rare:

- (70) An ordinary Knothead couple recently transferred from Jackson, he the new manager of Friendly Finance, they having inquired after the whereabouts of the local Catholic church and being directed here, perhaps as a joke, and now standing around, eyes rolled up in their eyebrows, wondering: *could this be the right church, a tin-roofed hut in a briar patch? **They're in the wrong place.***

(*Love in the Ruins*, 'July Second', iii; Percy 1989:159–60)

In German, on the other hand, one can find this much more commonly. Compare, for instance, the passages quoted in Herdin (1905:27–9), G. Steinberg (1971:259–61) and Neuse (1990:190, 203, 215, 321). In all of these cases there is a preterital context, and the free indirect discourse tense metaphorically employs the present tense system, shifting only the referential categories. A special case of temporal metaphor occurs in Franz Werfel's *Das Lied von Bernadette*, where the narrative is in the present tense and—by way of marked contrast—FID passages shift into the preterite (Weinrich 1985:183). This is, one may want to observe, a purely literary, semiotic kind of tense shift, since there is no linguistic 'linking' anchor for this preterite which would allow one to read the preterite as an anaphoric tense. I believe that this artistic use of temporal morphology can be integrated into a tense model on the lines of Declerck (1991), since Declerck's theory of English tenses is discourse oriented and can therefore integrate pragmatic functions of tense phenomena.

Present tense free indirect discourse in German preterital narrative shares a basic foregrounding feature with the 'free' subjunctive form of indirect discourse which is employed extensively to render utterances, and which syntactically has the same freedom as free indirect discourse, both in its ability to integrate interrogative structures and in its easy incorporation of narrative parentheticals. In contrast to free indirect discourse, however, the free subjunctive form can also integrate discourse parentheticals, and its use of parentheticals is much more extensive (Herdin 1905:124 ff.). As we have already noted, the free subjunctive form additionally is able to incorporate all the deictic and expressive elements that are so typical of free indirect discourse (cp. under (3.2.4) and Chapter 4). For the representation of utterances, the free subjunctive form is therefore a true alternative to *erlebte Rede*, and its marking by means of the subjunctive makes it a useful alternative in, for instance, present tense narrative, where free indirect discourse in the present tense except for the referential shift has become almost completely assimilated to the narrative context.

3.5

**TENSE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE FRENCH *IMPARFAIT*,
THE ENGLISH PAST PROGRESSIVE AND THE GERMAN
*PRÄTERITUM***

Whereas for Benveniste *histoire* is treated as the basically a-deictic field of reference, the objective, third-person realm—a view that Banfield's speakerless narrative concept seems to perpetuate—Reichenbach (1947) in his classic study of temporal reference observed the possibility of shifting the temporal reference point into the past (or future) and to determine anteriority, simultaneity and posteriority from that reference point rather than exclusively in relation to the time of enunciation. Reichenbach is therefore able to explicate the basic phenomena of the SoT by illustrating how a reference point in, say, the past can trigger temporal shifts into the past perfect or conditional.

Reichenbach's model helps us recognize the deictic characteristics of (free) indirect discourse which I treated under (3.1) to (3.3) to be no longer simply an assimilation to the (narrative) reporting instance, but as equally indicative of an underlying *perspectual* or deictic shift which, however, remains subordinate to the ruling narrating instance. Indirect discourse, just like free indirect discourse, therefore, requires the positing of an embedded deictic centre whose referential coordinates (existential, temporal and spatial) need to be related to the current reporting instance, the situation of enunciation. Banfield's theory of course goes on to bracket the enunciatory instance completely—claiming that free indirect discourse can occur only where there is no competition from a speaker function. However, if one wants to preserve the possibility of speaker involvement—and one definitely needs to do this for oral examples of free indirect discourse—then one can alternatively treat the manifestation of subjectivity in indirect and free indirect discourse as *exceeding* its existential anchoring. (Free) indirect discourse can therefore accommodate the lexical and syntactic devices of subjectivity including the preservation of temporal and spatial deictics of the reported speech act (which we will analyse in Chapter 4), because these deictics refer to deictic positions that are posited *in relation to* a (past) (fictional) 'reference point' deictic centre, rather than establishing the one and only *deictic centre itself*. (If there is a speaker, the speaker's deictic centre continues to operate as a latent point of enunciation with its own deictic properties.) The referential shift and the so-called SoT are, I claim, relationally linked to an imagined deictic centre, to the positioning of subjectivity in the text that then makes it possible to project a perspective on the (fictional) world. It needs to be identified with Bühler's *Deixis am Phantasma* rather than exclusively with the 'relational' deixis of the type *the day before*. Indeed, relational deixis, which establishes a reference point apart from the speech time (time of enunciation) and the event time (point of action), shares such a reference point with *Deixis am Phantasma*, which, however, involves less *temporal* than *perspectival* distancing. This is why in oppositions such as,

- (71) a. John didn't know I was a teacher.
 b. John didn't know I am a teacher.

the temporal signal of marked present versus unmarked past relates to a deictic reference point. In (a) one continues with the established reference point in the past; in (b) a referential linking to the current situation occurs by means of a marked shift into the present. The existential fact of being a teacher, of course, is valid for the situation of utterance in *both* sentences, but (a) transfers the reference point and deictic centre into the past of the reported utterance, whereas (b) lifts it into the present of current enunciation.

Banfield's major achievement has of course been to link the *subjectivity* of the deictic centre to the representation of *consciousness* in fiction, and to distinguish between the subjectivity of the SPEAKER, the *I*, and that of the SELF, whose 'I' may have been replaced by a logophoric *she* or *he*. As she correctly points out, a SPEAKER necessarily implies the existence of a co-referential SELF, whereas the existence of SELF does not imply that of a SPEAKER, with the function of enunciation and communication superimposed on that of subjectivity. What precisely, however, are the indices of enunciation and communication? Banfield's criterion that these indices can be established by contrasting the syntactic features of direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse (compare under (7.1) and (7.2)) does not work very well. Her exclusion of the second person form *you* from free indirect discourse, even if rephrased to relate only to the current ADDRESSEE (if any), does not really constitute a watertight definition of 'communication.' Second person narrative and colloquial free indirect discourse frequently have passages of free indirect discourse in which the ADDRESSEE can *also* be the represented SELF. In fact, the separation between the speaker's enunciation and the reported level of the story (the narrational signified) cannot be determined on purely linguistic grounds at all: if there is no shifted past tense, or no marked pronominal shift, only the *content* and the *context* of a passage allow the construction of SPEAKER and SELF. We will return to this problematic in Chapters 5, 6 and 9.

Käte Hamburger, a leading German philosopher of narrative and fictionality, needs to be considered at this point. (Compare also under (1.3)) Hamburger had considerable influence on Banfield, and she also determined much of Dorrit Cohn's thinking in her classic study of the representation of consciousness in fiction (Cohn 1978). Hamburger adopted Bühler's influential theory of the deictic centre, or *origo*—as he called it—to demonstrate how in fiction alone the *origo* of a person other than oneself or the SPEAKER'S *I* could be presented from within that other person's *I*-originarity. As we have seen, Hamburger's account of, basically, third person past tense fiction is closely linked to her analysis of the preterite in fiction, which she describes as being divested of 'past' deictic content. The past tense of fiction (in contrast to the preterite of historical writing) is not truly 'past' because it can collocate with deictic adverbs such as *tomorrow* or *now* that refer to the deictic centre of the story-world, and—more precisely—to the *I*-originarity of a character within that story-world. The past tense in fiction therefore does not signal an actual reference to the past, but can be defined as an 'epic preterite' which is experienced by the reader as 'present' from within the story world. Hamburger's theory has been decisively modified by Cohn (1978), who noted Hamburger's error in contending that the past tense in first person narrative constituted 'real' and not fictional

reference. On the other hand, Cohn emphatically endorses Hamburger's central insight, namely that it is only in fiction that the I-originarity of another person can be presented directly, in that person's perspective, whether in an omniscient description of a character's psyche, a free indirect discourse 'transcription' of that character's feelings or an interior monologue (Cohn 1978).

In (1.3) I have also noted the famous debate between Hamburger and the Austrian narratologist F.K. Stanzel on the issue of Hamburger's 'epic preterite.' As we have seen, Stanzel contended that it was exclusively in free indirect discourse and in what he calls the 'figural narrative situation' in his typology of narrative situations that the preterite lost its 'past' value, because texts in which the narrative is reflected through the consciousness of a reflector character do not juxtapose a narrative 'past' with a here and now of a narrator's enunciation. More recent formulations in Stanzel's *Theory of Narrative* (1984b) suggest an identification of the epic preterite with the unmarked quality of the past tense in those reflector mode narratives that are written in the traditional past tense, whether in the first or the third person, and—I add—the second person. There now exist a great number of narrative texts written in the 'narrative' present tense, employing all three persons. In reflector mode narrative a character's deictic centre prevails as the major narrative orientation point, and the preterite—which is no longer opposed to the present of a narrator (as in authorial narrative on the lines of, say, Fielding's *Tom Jones*)—becomes an unmarked index of simultaneity within a general past tense frame. In these circumstances alone, Stanzel contends, does the preterite acquire the characteristic of fictionality. In my *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology* (in preparation) I extend this argument, concluding that in reflector mode narrative tense is just as exchangeable as is pronominal reference. Stanzel had suggested that in the reflector mode first and third person reference to the reflector character can alternate. I additionally maintain that the second person, too, is exchangeable for first and third person reference and that the same neutralization applies also to the factor of tense. In fact, the pronominal unmarkedness observed by Stanzel can now be explained by the logophoric quality of the personal pronoun in reflector mode narration, a fact well illustrated by the Chinese and Japanese translations of free indirect discourse in novels written in the major European languages. The reflector character's self-reference to her-/himself underlies all textual references to her or him, with the pronominal surface structure of merely secondary importance. In like manner, reflector mode narrative unproblematically alternates between the preterite and the present, as in Proust's *Recherche*, and I have even found a text written in the (unmarked) future tense (Houston's 'How to Talk to a Hunter').³¹

Hamburger's concept of I-originarity relates to consciousness alone since others' utterances are of course easily accessible to the I of a speaker. I will now turn to the question whether any other indications of such an alignment of the narrative past with consciousness can be posited. The main touchstone for such an enquiry would seem to lie in the presentation of perception in the narrative, in particular in the forms of narrated perception, as discussed under (5.5). However, even contexts that do not seem to relate to characters' perceptions frequently imply a consciousness factor, and this implication, it can be argued, derives from the use of the preterite in those contexts. In the following I will briefly summarize some recent research which accumulatively suggests that one could

indeed posit such a link between temporal usage and the evocation of an experiencing self in the past.

3.5.1

The French *imparfait*

It needs to be noted at the outset that the connections which I will draw from very diverse work conducted within different methodological frameworks cannot claim empirical (scientific) validity. To arrive at incontrovertible interpretations of the evidence outlined below would require an erudite study of tense and aspect, an area that has remained highly controversial and has seen some intense and widely diverging activity in recent years. It will be beyond the scope of the present inquiry to integrate the subsequent findings about the ‘consciousness’ connotations of the German preterite, the French *imparfait* and the English past progressive with a unified theory of tense and aspect because no *one* such theory currently exists; on the contrary, one is faced with a multitude of mutually incompatible ‘unified’ theories, among which it is patently impossible to decide. Secondly, the phenomena here analysed would first need to be properly related to the entire temporal and aspectual system of their respective languages before one could hope to draw some theoretical conclusions of a more general nature. Nevertheless indications of a connection between the preterite and a consciousness factor are suggested in much material that has recently surfaced here and there, and I therefore deem it relevant to the present inquiry even if these findings need to be treated with extreme caution.

The major disagreement among studies in tense and aspect concerns the question of the intrinsic temporal value for morphologically established tenses: if a verb form is in the present tense, does it confer a value of presentness? It is now almost generally agreed that marking relationships—at least in English—confer a value of default to the present tense as the unmarked verb form *par excellence*.³² The present is then frequently called the non-PAST (Lyons 1977:678). However, such a move alone does not solve any questions about the existence of true ‘past’ value for the preterite. The concepts of aspect and modality are then frequently resorted to in an attempt to explain (away) those morphological preterites that do not seem to have a deictic quality. This second approach, which claims that morphological tense forms have *no* intrinsic temporal values and to which I myself subscribe (Fludernik 1992a, 1992c), analyses temporal forms in terms of textual functions. It is to this textual approach that we are indebted for some very interesting contributions to the understanding of discourse functions in general. If all tenses are conceived of as meaningful only in opposition to one another within a system of differences on the lines of Saussure’s *langue*, then these oppositions under the influence of contextual factors can be demonstrated to acquire a variety of micro-textual functions that modify and even contradict the systematic distribution on the level of the *langue* as a whole. Important contributions to such a view of tense in language have come from Emile Benveniste’s analysis of *discours* tenses and *histoire* tenses, from David Crystal’s (1966) examination of the collocation of tense with temporal adverbs—an analysis that suggests that adverbs are more crucial for establishing temporality than is verbal morphology—and

from Weinrich's classic (1964/ 1985) study of tense. Weinrich, inspired by Benveniste, posits a semiotic frame of textual (temporal) signals that guide the reader's temporal (deictic) construction of the textual signified, with morphological and adverbial changes triggering a 'reading' of anteriority or posteriority, but also of 'background' or the 'discussion' or 'narration' modes. Although Weinrich's study (see earlier under (1.3)) may be faulted for some of its details, particularly concerning the thesis's applicability to non-Romance languages, most of the severer criticism levelled at Weinrich's theory fundamentally disagrees with his method of functional analysis. Thus Pollak (1960/1988), for instance, is very much an adherent of an intrinsic tense theory, even though he also includes a major functional contribution to the study of tense and aspect in his discussion of what he calls the 'schema of incidence'.³³

Benveniste and Weinrich have been very influential for more recent work conducted on tense in narrative: both Banfield (1982) and Fleischman (1990) depart from a functionalist paradigm. Temporal distribution in narrative is now discussed in terms of foregrounding and backgrounding (Hopper 1979a, 1979b; Givón 1987; Chvány 1984; Reinhart 1984)—independently of Weinrich, as far as I can see—with the narrative past tense regarded as the unmarked tense form *in the context of narrative* and the historical present tense as its *marked* opposite, both on the plot-line level. By contrast, preterite and (historic) present tense *in tandem* are considered to be foregrounded against orientational material, which constitutes the narrative background. This schema elaborates the well-known contrast between

- (72) a. Joan opened the door. Lucien looked out of the window.
 b. Joan opened the door. Lucien was looking out of the window.

in which the simple past in (72a) signals a move on the time line (Dry 1981, 1983; Kamp/Rohrer 1983), whereas the past progressive in (72b)—in French it would be the *imparfait*—implies temporal overlapping, simultaneity.

In the discussion of free indirect discourse in Banfield's treatment and even earlier in the more traditional approach, too, the factor of tense has been handled as a prominent signal of the device. Both the French *imparfait* (noted particularly as a stylistic feature of Flaubert's work) and the English past progressive have been noted as tense signals of free indirect discourse. One has to be careful, however, about the contexts in which the *imparfait* or the past progressive acquires such a signal function. Thus, Banfield's opposition of

- (73) a. Elle vit la lune
 b. Elle voyait la lune.

(Banfield 1982:157)

is significant only in its form as a separate sentence, where the *imparfait* then indeed suggests a reading of consciousness or experience on the part of the character.

(74) Elle raconta que Madelaine voyait la lune et s'exclamait sur sa beauté.

(75) Elle voyait la lune! C'était incroyable. Jamais n'avait-elle vu cet astre. A Paris il n'y avait pas de ciel, lamentait-elle.

In (74) the *imparfait* is merely the shifted tense of the *que*-clause, and in (75) we have a passage of free indirect discourse, temporally and referentially linked to the parenthetical *elle lamentait*, if we follow Ehrlich's (1990a) frame of explanation. These cases have to be distinguished carefully. The *imparfait* in (75) is that of free indirect discourse or narrated perception;³⁴ that of (74) the *imparfait* of SoT in indirect discourse. The *imparfait* in (75) is 'shifted' openly only in the final sentence with the parenthetical; earlier *imparfaits* have a modal value on account of their consciousness reading.

However, one also needs to contrast such an example with tenses in subsidiary clauses in general, with Weinrich's foreground/background criteria and with narrative structure. Thus, it should be mentioned that verbs in subsidiary clauses in French are frequently in the *passé simple*, the *passé antérieur* or the *passé composé*/*passé sur composé*. The verb then marks an event on the plot-line, on the model

(76) Il courut a l'avant de la cour quand le puits explosa.

'He ran out to the front of the yard, when the well exploded.'

Much of the linguistic discussion on the backgroundedness of subsidiary clauses (Hopper/Thompson 1980, Weber 1983, G.Lakoff 1984, Thompson 1987) has quite misleadingly departed in principle from the prior assumption that main clauses constitute narrative foreground and subsidiary clauses narrative background. This may be true for oral storytelling, at least up to a point (but see the frequently noted introduction of major plot development in a *when*-clause); it certainly cannot serve as a model for literary narrative with its sometimes multi-layered deployment of subsidiary clauses.³⁵ Additionally, recent work by Matthiessen/Thompson (1988) critiques the very notion of syntactic subordination on traditional lines and comes close to an approach to clause linking that allows a gradual move from parataxis to hypotaxis. Such an approach also facilitates the analysis of oral language production (cp. Halford/Pilch 1990).

The existence of the *passé simple* in subsidiary clauses, however, where it demonstrably marks movement of time, suggests that the use of the *imparfait* in indirect discourse and free indirect discourse can after all be aligned to some kind of backgrounding in the sense of Weinrich. The *content* of speech and thought acts can reasonably be regarded as backgrounded in relation to plot, even if the verb introducing indirect discourse (as part of the plot) comes in the *passé simple*.³⁶ An argument supporting an implicit backgrounding quality of the *imparfait* comes from the replication of the *passé simple*/*imparfait* alternation in oral narrative, where the *passé simple* of the written language is replaced with a *passé compose*, and then alternates with the *imparfait* in identical environments. One may therefore be justified in aligning the use of the *imparfait* (and the shifted *plusqueparfait*) with a macro-structural background factor. Secondly, the prototypical 'simultaneity' marking of the *imparfait* has been used to explain the characteristic description of consciousness as

‘overlapping’ with the ‘external’ action or plot, accompanying rather than constituting plot in its own right (Labov 1972). This has been rejected with justification by Dry (1981, 1983), who adduces several example passages in which the major plot development depends on the ratiocinations of the protagonist. A good example of this would be the following in which the expanded past is definitely on the plot-line, backgrounded only against the enunciatory act which is part of the plot:

- (77) But what about me, you *are asking* yourself, what about my life? My safety? And why am I now subjected to foolish philosophy mouthed by a man who has suddenly become an insufferable egotist and who threatens to kill me, maim me, by smashing this car into the trunk of an unmoving tree in ten minutes, or twenty, or thirty?

(*Travesty*; Hawkes 1976:20)

This takes me to the prevalence of the *imparfait* in narrative *parentheticals* within free indirect discourse passages, but also among verbs introducing indirect discourse. These are in fact the prominent examples of the ‘interminable *imparfaits*’ or ‘*imparfaits par attraction*’ of which Flaubert was accused (Proust 1920, Thibaudet 1922). There are again several important factors to be observed here. Iterative and habitual uses of the *imparfait* need to be discounted because they do not belong to the plot-line or to a singular instance of thought representation—compare the English *he used to say, he always told me*.³⁷ There are furthermore three important types of the French *imparfait*—the *imparfait narratif*³⁸ or so-called *imparfait pittoresque*³⁹ (Brunetière); those cases of the *imparfait* in which the *saying* or *thinking* is simply a background to a foregrounded action (*‘What a bore’ she was thinking*); and, more interestingly, instances of a character’s *perception* of others’ saying—very common in the fiction of Virginia Woolf (cp. below under (3.5.2)).

The *imparfait de narration*, already discussed by Lerch (1922a), according to Pollak has two variants; either it describes an action which is to be regarded in a totalizing manner—Pollak defines this as the ‘final consequence’ (143):

- (78) Un mois plus tard, elle signait le contrat de vente et achetait en même temps une petite maison bourgeoise.

(Maupassant; quoted E.Lerch 1922a: 312, and Pollak 1988:128)

or, alternatively, it induces a connotation of emotional involvement (hence the term *pittoresque*):

- (79) Le 4 septembre 1768, naissait a Saint-Malo, dans la sombre rue des Juifs, le chevalier François de Chateaubriand.

(Lanson; quoted Pollak 1988:132)

This latter use can be linked to an evocation of consciousness by means of the *imparfait*.

Besides, as Pollak additionally notes, the *imparfait* strongly correlates with perception, and in fact the Old French *imparfait*, according to Lerch (1922b: 407 ff.), occurs exclusively to render perceptions.

(80) Comme il mettait le pied sur l'échelle...une longue secousse ébranla le navire; [...]
On partait.

(Daudet; quoted Pollak 1988:180)⁴⁰

For the moment I would therefore like to note that there are a number of uses of the *imparfait* that evoke the presence of a consciousness either micro- or macro-structurally, but that no unique, simple signal function can be postulated for this tense in view of its many additional uses and functions. I will come back to this kind of *imparfait* briefly below under (3.5.3) in connection with Pollak's schema of incidence and Harweg's extensions of it.

3.5.2

The English past progressive⁴¹

We have seen above that the past tense of narration has frequently been interpreted as a signal of fictionality, particularly when contrasted with the 'discussing' (Weinrich) nature of the present tense. As Pascal (1962:8) suggests, '[t]he present as used by the critic makes the events seem far less 'present' than does the past tense, which makes them seem actually to be taking place'. The past tense of memory, or reliving the past, has therefore had an irresistible attraction for the phenomenologists. Besides Barthes (1972:48) and Hamburger (cf. under (1.3)), Jean Pouillon has emphasized the experiential quality of the fictional past tense, the French *imparfait*:

[le véritable sens romanesque de l'imparfait...] ce n'est pas un sens temporel, mais, pour ainsi dire, un sens spatial; il nous décale de ce que nous regardons. Cela ne veut pas dire que l'action est passée, car on veut au contraire nous y faire assister, mais qu'elle est devant nous, à distance et que c'est justement pour cela que nous pouvons y assister.

(Pouillon 1946:161)⁴²

This fully corresponds with Lorck's (1921:72) characterization of the *imparfait* as signalling a 'Phantasie-Denkakt' ('imaginative thought process').

Banfield postulates that the English past progressive, with non-stative verbs, has the same 'consciousness' function as the French *imparfait*:

(81) A few drops of rain were now falling.

(Banfield 1982:106)

Here are some examples from psycho-narration and free indirect discourse—all referring to *perception*—in which the progressive can be said to indicate the character's point of view.

- (82) Kitty sat down at her dressing-table and kicked off her shoes. *Satin shoes were always too tight.* She glanced at the clock on her dressing-table. She just had time.

Baxter *was handing* her coat. *Now* she *was handing* her bag.

'Now my hat,' said Kitty.

(*The Years*, '1914'; Woolf 1979:288)

- (83) The boy Curnow knew that Mrs. Durrant was saying that it is perfectly simple: you mix the powder in a gallon of water; 'I have done it with my own hands in my own garden,' Mrs Durrant *was saying*.

(*Jacob's Room*, iv; Woolf 1982:52–3)

This function frequently overlaps with foreground and background structures. It can be argued that the 'perceptual' quality of the past progressive (as of the *imparfait*) is due primarily to the implicit positing of the character's viewpoint: *when she looked, quand il regarda*. The activity rendered in the progressive can then be 'explained' as being simply simultaneous with the temporal point at which the looking occurred.⁴³

It has to be pointed out, however, that the past progressive occurs in free indirect discourse and in the narrative at large in all places where simultaneity with events has to be marked, a feature that need not necessarily constitute a backgrounding function:

- (84) And when he [Will Brangwen] came home at night, his heart relenting and growing hot for love of her, when he was just ready to feel he had been wrong, and when he *was expecting* her to feel the same, *there she sat* at the sewing-machine, the whole house was covered with clipped calico, the kettle was not even on the fire.

(*The Rainbow*, vi; Lawrence 1988:164)

Here the past progressive seems to be due to the simultaneity and comparative expandedness of Brangwen's expectation in relation to this homecoming. The simple past in *There she sat* is doubly odd because *to sit* is a stative verb, and the evocation of the pattern of incidence induces one to expect a dynamic verb; moreover, since this is obviously a report of Brangwen's emotionally heightened perception, one would even more expect to find a progressive *she was sitting*. The tense usage highlights Brangwen's impression that her activity is not a circumstantial one but a deliberate slight to himself, a premeditated affront, and as such it does indeed intrude on his frame of expectation like a dynamic incidence.

The past progressive also occurs in all passages that are functionally equivalent to a present progressive of intention, future reference, irritation, etc.

- (85) Presently he told her the motion of the boat upon the stream *was lulling* him to rest. *How green the banks were now, how bright the flowers growing on them, and how tall the rushes!*

(*Dombey and Son*, xvi; Dickens 1985:297)

As has frequently been argued against Weinrich's backgrounding function, and therefore touches Banfield in like manner, the past progressive in English of course also has a number of other functions.⁴⁴ Most importantly, the progressive of course serves as part of a binary opposition in the present tense 'habitual' vs. 'right now' dichotomy, and, in the past, the 'and then' vs. 'simultaneous ongoing process' readings. (Compare (72) above.) A much-noted use of the progressive is its 'evaluative' function (also called the 'interpretative' progressive—Ljung 1980:69 ff.; Edgren 1985),⁴⁵ which comes very close to the French *imparfait pittoresque* :

- (86) The question that *you're really asking* is the result of almost sort of the Enlightenment that saw the cult of the Saint as an expression of popular culture. *How could an educated person believe in the stuff?*

(*Soundings*, no. 536, broadcast January 1991)

Another characteristic special use of the progressive is that expressing emotional involvement, especially irritation:⁴⁶

- (87) She [Miss Ophelia] sat with grim determination [...], wondering to Eva, in each interval, '*what upon earth her papa could be thinking of; he couldn't have fallen over, now,—but something must have happened*';—and just as she had begun to work herself into a real distress, he came up with his usually careless motion, and giving Eva a quarter of the orange he was eating, said [...].

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xv; Stowe 1981:159)

In fact the past progressive can be found in all contexts where it occurs in the present tense (cp. Bache 1985).⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in the following passage, as Ljung himself has to admit, one is hard put to find a corresponding explanation for the progressive, whereas a consciousness reading makes perfect sense:

- (88) For three long years the very sight of an orange-coloured envelope struck terror to Higgins' heart and a swift dread to Sybil's, for they always feared the War Office was regretting to announce that the beloved Flip had been killed in action.

(Ljung 1980:73)

It seems to me that the progressive could here possibly be aligned with a function of the German subjunctive or the French *conditionnel journalistique*, i.e. to note that the proposition is somebody else's responsibility. The letter '*was saying* that the War Office regrets' is what the phrasing implies.⁴⁸

I have seen three more discussions of the progressive besides Banfield and Ehrlich that make interesting contributions to the evocation of consciousness by means of this form. (The third, Wright 1992, has come to my attention too late to consider here.) First there is an article by Edith Raybould (1957), in which she analyses the expanded form in infinitives of the pattern *she is supposed...to be making, are you out of your senses to be accepting* (1957: 180–3) in Jane Austen. Raybould argues that, whereas the simple infinitival form implies ‘intention’ and ‘action’, the expanded infinitives suggest an ‘imaginary picture’—and, one could therefore argue, a consciousness factor. The construction is now of course obsolete, yet some rare passages can be found that seem to have the same effect:

(89) Anna loved the child very much, oh very much. Yet still she was not quite fulfilled. She had a slight expectant feeling, as of a door half opened. Here she was, safe and still in Cossethay. But she felt as if she were not in Cossethay at all. She was straining her eyes to something beyond. And from her Pisgah mount, which she had attained, what could she see? A faint, gleaming horizon, a long way off, and a rainbow like an archway, a shadow-door with faintly coloured coping above it. *Must she **be moving** thither?*

(*The Rainbow*, vi; Lawrence 1988:195)

This passage is of course part of a paragraph of psycho-narration which changes into free indirect discourse. The expanded infinitive captures Anna’s expectancy of future developments. The obsolete morphology can be retained because in the reflectoral context it strengthens the tentative character of Anna’s musings. Whereas Raybould’s examples also come from the dialogue in Austen’s fiction, the progressive is here preserved only in an environment of represented consciousness.

The second contribution on the progressive which I want to note is Toolan’s (1983, 1990) discussion of progressives in *Go Down, Moses*. In the wake of Allen (1966/1982) Toolan interprets the numerous progressives in his corpus as suggesting the reflecting consciousness’s inclusion in the events described and as lending those events some ‘finite duration’ (216) rather than simple ‘instantaneous’ simultaneity. Progressives, no doubt on account of their customary ‘simultaneity’ function, overlay the linear succession of plot clauses and lend an effect of ‘density’ to the plot, adding a level of figural *perception* to the mere recounting of plot action. Toolan is able to illustrate this thesis by pointing to the great number of temporal and spatial adverbials which occur in collocation with these perception progressives and which locate the perceived action in relation to the thought of the reflecting consciousness. Finally, Toolan also provides some interesting remarks on the frequent present participles, which he calls ‘non-finite progressives’ (225–6). These Toolan links to an intention on the narrator’s part not to specify precisely what is the causal or temporal relationship between actions and events narrated in the participle clauses and those presented in the main clause, realistically evoking the character’s experience of submersion in an overwhelming stream of multi-levelled, indistinguishable experiential being.

- (90) Now he *was kneeling* too, the other six dollars of his last week's pay on the floor before him, *blinking*, still *smiling* at the face of the white man opposite, then, still *smiling*, he watched the dice pass from hand to hand around the circle as the white man covered the bets, *watching* the soiled and palm-worn money in front of the white man gradually and steadily increase, *watching* the white man cast and win two doubled bets in succession then lose one for twenty-five cents, the dice *coming* to him at last, the cupped snug *clicking* of them in his fist.

(*Go Down, Moses*, 'Pantaloon in Black'; Faulkner 1990:148; quoted Toolan 1983: 226)

This construction is very common in literary texts, in fact much more common than the past progressive proper, which is barred from extensive use on account of the interplay between aspect and *Aktionsarten*. There is of course no progressive for stative verbs in English, and the progressive also transforms semelfactive into iterative verbs. 'Non-finite progressives', on the other hand, are available for all kinds of situations, processes, activities or achievements (Vendler 1967:99–107),

- (91) Brangwen could not understand. [...] It was too much for him. And there she sat, *telling* the tales to the open space, not to him, *arrogating* a curious superiority to him, a distance between them, something strange and foreign and outside his life, *talking, rattling*, without rhyme or reason, *laughing* when he was shocked or astounded, *condemning* nothing, *confounding* his mind and *marking* the whole world a chaos, without order or stability of any kind.

(*The Rainbow*, ii; Lawrence 1988:61–2)

As with the French *imparfait*, the English 'consciousness' progressive has to be carefully distinguished from its alternative functions, and Toolan—relying on several linguistic studies of the progressive in English—is laudably circumspect. The material he presents makes a strong case for the past progressive as a consciousness marker in contexts of narrated perception and consciousness presentation in general. It needs to be emphasized, however, that for this consciousness marker to become operative, one needs to be able to align such a progressive with an available consciousness or SELF on stage, with the presence of what Stanzel calls a reflector-character.

- (92) Mr. Worthington Aldridge took to his horse and sped out of the enclosure. As are all men of an impatient temper, Mr. Aldridge was engaging in one of those actions that one later wishes one had not been led to perform. The miserable choleric reached Middletown after a ride of half an hour. *The sun was setting and the streets were half empty*, when he dismounted in front of the sheriff's office.

Although the fictional hero (a villain) must have noticed the setting of the sun and the emptiness on the streets, the past progressive here does not necessarily force one to *infer* such a perception because the framing narrative concentrates on external plot and on an

(external) evaluation of Aldridge's intentions. Most critics would therefore agree that this is 'simple' orientational background, reinforced by the schema of incidence. I will argue below that one can impute an implicit *structural* consciousness feature even to passages of this narratorial style, but this does *not* warrant the imputation of *individual* perception, as in narrated perception passages. One therefore needs to consider macro-textual features of a narratological kind when discussing temporal consciousness signals in narrative. It should also be noted emphatically that, at least in English, vicarious (third person) **oral** narratives *do not* generally⁴⁹ employ the past progressive (or 'historical' present progressive) for narrated perception. Linking narrated perception to reflector mode narrative, which is a not naturally occurring storytelling mode, can somewhat help elucidate its absence from oral narration of others' experience.

3.5.3

The German preterite (*Präteritum*, *Mitvergangenheit*)

There are several linguistic factors that allow one to postulate a connection between the use of the preterite in narrative texts and an evocation of figural consciousness or deictic centre. The most important of these is the German preterite's exclusive ability to render thoughts in syntactic free form: the free subjunctive forms of indirect discourse are reserved for the representation of utterances or clearly verbalized thought processes.

It is a fact consistently ignored by free indirect discourse studies that German does not allow the representation of consciousness by means of the free subjunctive form. The preterite is here *obligatory*. Herdin (1905:151–82) had speculated early on that free indirect discourse could only occur for the representation of thought and the free subjunctive only for the representation of utterances. The former part of his thesis is obviously incorrect, but the latter is correct to this day. G.Steinberg (1971:145 ff.)—the only person to comment on this, as far as I know—has even collected examples that demonstrate how indirect discourse presentations of thoughts in the subjunctive, at the point where they shift into the free form, inevitably move into free indirect discourse, i.e. into the indicative:

- (93) Esch war fassungslos, eigentlich fassungsloser als er sich's eingestand. *Er wußte bloß, daß er Wein trinken müsse, um Ordnung in die Welt zu bringen: Martin, der gegen den Streik war, wurde verhaftet, verhaftet von einer Polizei, die es mit den Reedern und mit einem entlaufenen Offizier hielt, einer Polizei, die sich nun in ruchloser Weise an einem Unschuldigen vergriff—vielleicht weil man ihr den Kopf Nentwigs schuldig geblieben war!*

(*Die Schlafwandler* II, i; Broch 1978:229; quoted G.Steinberg 1971:146)⁵⁰

The only cases in which the free subjunctive form can be used for the articulation of thoughts are general (and imputed) attitudes and opinions as well as cases where a character literally says certain things to her-/himself. The examples quoted by Steinberg

from Jeremias Gotthelf are all of this kind—in each of them the character debates with her-/himself certain questions and problems:

- (94) Uli sah seinem Meister unzufrieden nach. 'Ich hätte nicht geglaubt,' dachte er, 'daß er mir mein Glück nicht gönnte. Aber so sind die Donners Bauren, sie sind alle gleich; sie mögen es nicht leiden, wenn ein Knecht zu einem Hof kömmt. [...] *Er lasse sich ab er nicht s nichts dir nichts absprengen; das sei ihm jetzt schon zu lang gegangen und das Gerede zu fast unter die Leute gekommen, als daß er so davonwolle.*

(*Uli der Knecht*; Gotthelf 1911:256–7; quoted Steinberg 1971:150)⁵¹

One can therefore argue that the unacceptability of the subjunctive form is restricted to presentations of non-reflective consciousness, or to passages that describe 'deeper layers' of the mind, feelings and emotions. Compare, for instance,

- (95) Sie stand vor dem Spiegel. *Warum sei er noch nicht da. Sie habe ihn doch extra gebeten, pünktlich zu sein.* Sie faßte sich. *Man müsse bedenken, daß er möglicherweise aufgehalten worden sei.*⁵² [subjunctive]
- (96) Sie stand vor dem Spiegel. *Er war nicht gekommen. Seine Worte waren nur Lüge und Trug. Die Zeit war leblos geworden. Er liebte sie nicht mehr.*⁵³ [indicative]

Although the first is somewhat odd, the tone of debate lends it some acceptability, whereas a subjunctive in the second passage sounds agrammatical. The shifted preterite in German, one can argue, implies a special modal consciousness reading. Moreover, as Kaufmann (1976:21–2) has illustrated, the German free subjunctive is barred from contexts of *perception*. If one uses a subjunctive, actual utterances or explicit thought processes have to be attributed to the perceiving subject.⁵⁴ (Compare also Pütz 1989: 201.) This result conveniently correlates with the predominance of the English past progressive and the French *imparfait* in contexts of narrated perception.

In 1975 Roland Harweg presented an analysis of three types of oral narrative in German whose tense systems are strikingly differentiated (Harweg 1975a). I have analysed these data in detail elsewhere (Fludernik 1992a) and therefore will here concentrate on a brief summary and on the significance of these data for the consciousness connotations of the German preterite, the French *imparfait* and the English ('past') progressive.

Harweg organizes the structure of oral storytelling on the basis of a central schema of incidence pattern, which constitutes the core of the oral story:

- (97) and whyle they thus rode/ **aroos a storme** wyth a grete rayne whyche endured tyll on the morne at nyght.

(*Paris and Vienne*; Caxton 1957:36)⁵⁵

The schema of incidence consists of an activity or state of affairs ('...whyly they thus rode...') that is being interrupted by outside interference ('aroos a storme'), and this

Table 2: Tense and narrative structure

	Abstract/ résumé	Endogenic situative	Exogenic progređient	Exogenic situational	Endogenic progređient
Narrative of personal experience	<i>Yesterday we met Uncle Paul</i>	<i>We were standing in front of the window display,</i>	<i>when suddenly someone tapped me on the shoulder.</i>	<i>It was Uncle Paul.</i>	<i>Then we all went to a film.</i>
German	perfect	preterite (historic present)	preterite (historic present)	preterite	perfect
French	<i>passé composé</i> literary: <i>passé simple</i>	<i>imparfait</i> oral language: historic present	<i>passé simple/ passé composé</i> historic present	<i>imparfait</i>	<i>passé simple/ passé composé</i>
English	past tense	past progressive historic present progressive	past tense historic present	past progressive	past tense

conjunction of stative or progressive background and invasive foreground is held typically to constitute the story experiencer's, first person narrator's or character's experience in time: the schema of incidence relates to the experiential I-originary of the narrative protagonist. Harweg invents the term *endogenic situative* for this ongoing activity (which I have termed a *setting* in Fludernik 1991a, 1992a, 1992c). The endogenic situative in narratives of past personal experience—the story type that manifests the greatest differentiation in tenses—employs the German preterite—and, as we know, in English and French has the *past* (*progressive*) and *imparfait*. The (usually surprising) incidence that intrudes upon this static being in time Harweg calls the *exogenic progredient*, and it is rendered also in the preterite in German, but requires a *passé simple* and a non-progressive past in English. (Compare Table 2.) Additionally, Harweg points out that the reactions to such intrusive events can be active (*progredient*), in the shape of a reaction by the protagonist: this is Harweg's *endogenic progredient*, which in German oral narrative of personal experience *always* comes in the German *perfect* tense, and in English has the past tense, in French the *passé simple*. If, however, a state of affairs materializes as a consequence of the intrusive exogenic progredient (the 'incident'), one gets what Harweg calls the *exogenic situative*, which in German comes in the preterite, in French in the *imparfait*, and in English in the past progressive. This resultant state of affairs can, I argue, be interpreted as the protagonist's *perception* of the consequences of the incidence. An example would be, in English:

(98) When they came out of the picture gallery, it was raining.

(Leisi 1960:224)

Secondly, since the personal state of experience on which the incident intrudes correlates with the same tense manifestations, there is, I claim, a *structural* evocation of a sphere of (implicit) consciousness which provides the background for the plot experience. The past progressive in English and the German preterite and French *imparfait* can therefore correlate both with the consciousness of the protagonist in the setting (which is then invaded by the incidence) and with the protagonist's awareness of observation—corresponding to the typical perception pattern of what has been called narrated perception (cp. under 5.5.). In neither case is the consciousness factor an 'inherent' meaning of the progressive or *imparfait* but a collocational acquired *connotation*. The progressive in both instances marks the ongoing activity in relation to an event that is visualised as *punctual*. In the setting the progredient event emerges from outside the sphere of observation and is felt to intrude upon it; in the second case the agent herself intrudes on something that s/he now becomes aware s/he is intruding on. It is therefore the fact of comparative extendedness in time, of processuality which accounts for the aspectual choice; the object of observation is different. Yet in both cases the observation of an experiencing agent is implied—and this allows the connotation to develop. The consciousness factor is therefore derived from a *perceptual* schema, and the perceptual

schema utilizes a grammatical schema for expressing simultaneity by means of aspectual form.

Finally, one can take these analogies between perception and temporal morphology one step further to posit a structural equivalence between the orientation section of narratives (*Il était une fois*, etc.) and the endogenic situative. Pollak (1988:133) suggests such a structural equivalence between the story-internal schema of incidence, on the one hand, and the sequence of the story opening followed by the onset of the story proper (what I call the *incipit*), on the other: *One day as she was sitting on the verandah, a carriage appeared on the horizon*. Temporal usage here provides a clear indication that this analogy can be pursued only in story-dynamic terms but not with regard to the positing of a story-internal experienter: although the initial story orientation has pervasive *imparfaits* and German preterites, it does *not* easily accommodate a past progressive for accomplishments or achievement verbs (which immediately imply the onset of events). Moreover the orientation section in all three languages can include presents (and present perfects) of *current* relevance. Thus, for instance, the long orientation section to *Le Père Goriot* contains frequent present tense forms, and so does the initial orientation to *Eugénie Grandet*. As I have argued (in Fludernik 1991a, 1992a), the initial story orientation section preserves the full temporal marking of the past tense as past, and the backgrounded, experiential status of the epic preterite can only come into force after the marking distribution has been reversed.

One can therefore conclude that consciousness is marked or, rather, implied linguistically by a number of linguistic features, including—primarily—*tense*. In particular, tense usage at structural points in the narrative seems to correlate with experiential *perception*, whereas the occurrence of the *imparfait* within free indirect discourse appears to be linked to consciousness factors in much less directly a manner since it can accommodate a large number of aspectual *imparfaits* or progressive contexts, i.e. contexts which require a backgrounding tense for entirely non-perceptual reasons (e.g. simultaneity, future readings, interpretative or ‘picturesque’ uses). Unlike Banfield, I am reluctant to identify narrated perception passages with RST (namely free indirect discourse proper) because, unlike thought, perception implies a non-verbal (though verbalizable) consciousness.

NOTES TO PART A

- 1 R-expressions are ‘non-pronominal NPs’ (Kuno 1987:59).
- 2 Compare Rauh (1982:40) on *hier* versus *dort*.
- 3 Compare Ehrich (1982).
- 4 See also Declerck (1991:183).
- 5 A standard view on adverbial shifting is presented in Kaufmann (1976:71–4).
- 6 This is how Fabricius-Hansen (1989:162) interprets the category, saying it concerns *personal*, not possessive, pronouns.
- 7 Plank’s talk about the ‘future’ gives away his non-anaphoric approach and also reflects the fact that most of his examples are from the spoken language with the verb of saying in the German *perfect* and with complement clauses therefore employing the present tense system.

- 8 (a) 'Heinz tells me, "I hear that Peter is ill."' (b) 'Heinz tells me that Peter is supposed to be ill.'
- 9 The most extensive treatment can be found in G. Steinberg (1971), who does not, however, discuss pronominal usage from the point of view of deictic centre. There is also a rather automatic treatment by Brainerd (1972) from a linguistic perspective. See also Ingram (1971).
- 10 On the deictic nature of these expressions which are also called *shifters* see Jespersen (1923/1959) and Fludernik (1991b).
- 11 An intra-fictional narratee is a fictional persona, a character, who functions as an addressee. Compare, for instance, Nelly Dean's narrative to Lockwood, who would be an intra-fictional narratee in *Wuthering Heights*.
- 12 For second-person narrative see Fludernik (in preparation). Second-person texts frequently play with the function of *you* as address. Examples are, for instance, O. Henry's 'Strictly Business', where the much-suffering father of a son at college explains to his friend Harry why he had to leave the Rotary Club; Alice Munro's 'Tell Me Yes or No' (1974), in which a woman writes to her dead lover; or John Hawkes's *Travesty* (1976), in which the narratorial level consists of an ongoing threatening harangue at the narrator's lover while driving at reckless speed with the intent to kill all three passengers (i.e. the narrator, his male lover—and rival—and the narrator's daughter). In fact this narrator is less of a narrator than simply a speaker, and one would be hard put to split the fictional realms of existence even into the simple narrating and experiencing selves.
- 13 '“My dear lady,” said Mme Couture, addressing Mme Vauquer, “just imagine it; he did not even ask Victorine to sit down, she was standing the whole time. He said to me quite coolly, without putting himself in a passion, that **we** might spare ourselves the trouble of going there; that the young lady (he would not call her his daughter) was injuring her cause by importuning **him** (importuning! once a year, the wretch!); that as Victorine's mother had nothing when he married her, Victorine ought not to expect anything from him; in fact, he said the most cruel things, that made the poor child burst out crying.’ (Balzac 1948:41)
- 14 'And Catherine Legrand says, and the children that have died, does one also put them into a hole in the ground? *One doesn't know.*' (My translation)
- 15 The big girl called Inès after class takes the form to the house [of the dead girl]. *Perhaps one will be able to see something.*' (My translation)
- 16 'Look at him. I've picked him up. [...] One is afraid, one trembles, one would like to go home now... *How could one have been so blind, to put oneself at the mercy of these barbarous ruffians?*' (My translation) The official translation by Maria Jolas uses the second person pronoun (just like the translation of *L'Opoponax*).
- 17 Compare the passage quoted in [Chapter 2](#).
- 18 'No matter: she wasn't happy, and never had been. [...] Besides, nothing was worth looking for: everything was a lie! Every smile concealed a yawn of boredom; every joy, a curse; every pleasure, its own surfeit; and the sweetest kisses left on one's lips but a vain longing for fuller delight.' (Flaubert 1957:322) Kalepky (1899:500) has an especially nice example in which the reflexive *se* is followed by generalizing *vous*.
- 19 'Maheude went on standing there, unable to tear herself away. [...] Clearly they had got rid of the old woman and shut up the child so as to guzzle rabbit on their own. Ah, well! it [lit. 'one'] was no use denying it, when a woman misbehaved herself it brought good luck to the house' (Zola 1969: 255)
- 20 'Mamsell Jungmann and the servant had opened the folding doors into the dining-room; and the company made its way with studied ease to table. *One could be sure of a good square meal at the Buddenbrooks*.' (Mann 1984:11)

- 21 'Pierre felt that tears were coming to his eyes, and with an unconscious movement [...] he opened his arms and extended them towards the real Rome [...] stretched out at his feet. *Would she prove responsive to his dream? Would he, as he had written, find within her the remedy for our impatience and our alarms?*' (Zola 1898:1, 50)
- 22 'Certainly they had thought of it when they were at the Grotto, but was not the Blessed Virgin wisdom itself? Did she not know far better than *ourselves* what she ought to do for the happiness of both the living and the dead?' (Zola 1897: II, 236–7)
- 23 '[A]nd there was Monseigneur the Bishop, who, as if he were taken ill, slumped forward and banged his forehead against his knees sending his little green hat rolling—when in fact he was not ill at all, but rather for the first time in his life basking in religious rapture, *for a miracle had occurred before their very eyes, the Lord God had personally stayed the executioner's hand by disclosing as an angel the very man who had for all the world appeared a murderer. Oh, that such a thing had happened here in the eighteenth century. How great was the Lord! And how small and petty was he* [lit. 'one'] *himself, who had spoken his [one's] anathema, without himself [oneself] believing it, merely to pacify the populace!*' (Süskind 1986:172)
- 24 'Left to himself in the window recess the Cardinal remained there motionless for another moment. With eyes blurred by tears, he gazed towards heaven. And his quivering arms were suddenly raised in a gesture of ardent entreaty. [...] *O God, why not a miracle which should proclaim the splendour of Thy Almighty Power! A miracle, a miracle!* that was what the Cardinal asked from the depths of his believing soul.' (Zola 1898: II, 276–7)
- 25 The passage was the subject of a heated debate between Kalepky, who first introduced it in 1899 and quoted it again in (1913:612), and Bally (1914a: 415). Kalepky predictably saw this as an exclamation by the narrator, whereas Bally relegates the participation of the narrator to nil: 'Il n'en est pas moins vrai que la tirade et surtout le *ô Dieu! que ne faisiez-vous un miracle* qui a tant tourmenté M. K[alepky], est un tour de force par lequel Zola, peut-être inconsciemment, fond **D** [direct discourse] avec **I** [free indirect discourse] au prix d'une monstruosité grammaticale; car il accouple une deuxième personne (*vous*) propre à **D**, avec un imparfait que seul **I** [indirect discourse] justifie. L'effet de style est très heureux, et une chose demeure certaine: c'est le cardinal qui prononce ces paroles, Zola reste entièrement dans la coulisse.' See also Lorck (1921:33–5), as well as Steinberg (1971).
- 26 Cp. Stanzel (1984b), as well as Stanzel (1977), and my discussion of this device below under (7.4). (See also Fludernik, in preparation, and 1992b.)
- 27 In this passage Charles Tansley goes on about 'our own class'—a phrasing of great implicit irony since this is the class (namely the common people, the workers) Tansley alone identifies with—certainly not Mrs Ramsay, whose consciousness reflects this *our* and to whom it is quite inappropriate; nor indeed did the empirical reader most likely identify with the working class. A second example (I, xiii, 69) is equally ironic, since there Mr Banks talks about 'humble people like *ourselves*' after having expatiated on his many travels to the continent, shaming poor Lily Briscoe.
- 28 The inverted commas are Schuelke's, since this is quoted as a radio newscast from January 10, 1956.
- 29 Quoted as *Stanford Daily*, February 20, 1956, p. 1.
- 30 The *Survey* classes this kind of typical speech act as 'extra-idiolect'. Compare below under (8.3).
- 31 Glauser (1948:47, 64) quotes two more examples.
- 32 Compare Brecht (1974:515) and Vološinov (1986:126, fn.).
- 33 The most recent contribution to this discussion is the excellent paper by Zribi-Hertz (1989). Besides Kuno (1987) see also Parker *et al.* (1990), who only discuss what Zribi-Hertz calls 'emphatic' uses.

- 34 'What the two women, in the urge of their souls, felt to be possible, he also could believe to be feasible, moved as he was, as he felt himself to be at this propitious moment. *Hadn't his own wish been fulfilled?* [...] It was his own [*selbst*] responsibility to break the applause, to decide the fate of his *own* play and that of his friends.' (My translation)
- 35 There is a quite extensive literature on pronominalization in English alone. Besides Chomsky's own work, one should point to Ross (1967), Langacker (1969), Lakoff (1968), Postal (1970), Jackendoff (1972), Lasnik (1976) and Reinhart (1983). A recent attempt by Bosch (1985, 1987) to distinguish between syntactic and referential pronouns seems to me to be fundamentally misguided, particularly because his examples suggest interference from logophoric phenomena and special conditions that are in force in the vicinity of negative expressions.
- 36 For the details of Kuno's extensive discussion of picture nouns refer to Kuno (1987).
- 37 Compare McCawley (1988, ch. 11, esp. 358–9), who also briefly discusses picture nouns.
- 38 My (77) and (78) are her (55b) and (56b).
- 39 On the connection between logophoric pronouns and quasi-indexicals see above under (1.4), as well as Rapaport (1986), and Castañeda (1967a). The phenomenon was anticipated in an aside in Lethcoe's superb dissertation of 1969, where he says, The pronoun [*she*] then does not signal narrated speech, but because of the presence of speech signals, it is inferred as having a slightly different function [i.e. roughly the 'same function as 'I' in a direct speech'] than if occurring in a purely narrative context.' This replicates Castañeda's formulations almost in verbatim fashion. (Compare under (1.4) above.)
- 40 This is part of a hand-out of Naicong Li's paper read at the Symposium on 'Cognitive, Computational, and Phenomenological Approaches to Understanding Narrative' in Buffalo (April 19–20, 1991). The Chinese original reads as follows: '(a) Fan Danni chui zhe yan, (b) lianse nankande kuaibu zou zhe. [...] (c) Zhehuir, zhidao likai le Hu Zhengqiang jia, (d) ta cai gandao le quru. [...] (e) Zhen shi fuqiyidui de xuwei! (f) Keshi, zhe xuwei nong de *ziji* ye bunengbu xuwei.'
- 41 See Kuno (1987:84) for his revised Anaphor Rules.
- 42 On k-command (Lasnik 1976) see the examples in Kuno (1987:37). The definition of k-command is 'A kommands B if and only if the first S(entence) or NP node that dominates A also dominates B.' (Kuno 1987:36) Since an NP-node intervenes between *Alice* and the S-node, *Alice* cannot k-command *her*.
- 43 'Node A c(constituent)-commands node B if and only if the first branching node alpha, dominating A (i) either dominates B, or (ii) is immediately dominated by alpha₂ which dominates B, and alpha₂ is of the same category type as alpha,' (Kuno 1987:50, after Reinhart).
- 44 If one adopts Matthiessen/Thompson's (1988) model of clause combination, the notion of command will have to be abandoned and one may have to find an explanation for the existence of cataphoric phenomena in what are now coordinate clauses (Matthiessen/Thompson 1988:316) by a different syntactic or pragmatic constraint.
- 45 The expression 'familiarizing' article (Bronzwaer 1970) refers to definite noun phrases that *introduce* new topics of discourse. Such definite reference is illicit unless one's interlocutor can easily retrieve the reference from the context; at the beginning of stories, however, definite reference, like pronominal reference to story participants, is frequently employed to evoke the perspective of the ruling centre of consciousness for whom these objects are known and can therefore be referred to by means of definite noun phrases.
- 46 On parentheticals in free indirect discourse see below under (3.3.1).

- 47 A very laudable exception is Uspensky (1973), who devotes an entire chapter to the referential expressions in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. Another outstanding example is Cohn's analysis of references to Aschenbach in 'Death in Venice' (Cohn 1983).
- 48 Substitution is, for instance, hard put in a case such as the following: 'I had my first divorce case today. The husband said she was always nagging him and the wife said he never talks to her.' (Toolan 1990:141; constructed example) On 'pronouns of laziness' see Partee (1975), and note Bolinger (1977) as well as Nieragden (1991) and Ward *et al.* (1991) for other types of pragmatic non-substitutionally determined pronominals. Note also the cohesive devices presented by de Beaugrande (1980:133), who eschews the notion of substitution and operates within a framework of reference and PRO-forms. His categories are: recurrence, definiteness, co-reference (*the man...Karl*), anaphora/cataphora (PRO-form), exophora (PRO-form for extra-textual entity), ellipsis and junction.
- 49 *Soundings* is the cultural radio station at the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
- 50 Compare E.Prince (1979, 1981b) as well as Chafe (1976).
- 51 McCawley (1988:360) calls these 'anaphoric epithets'.
- 52 This issue will receive ample illustration in Chapters 4 and 6.
- 53 Indeed, one might speculate whether the proper name is the adeictic equivalent of clock time temporal reference.
- 54 '[S]ûr qu'on me croyait assez d'ardeur, j'ai essayé un ton plus tendre. *Ce refus ne me fâchait plus, il m'affligeait; ma sensible amie ne me devait-elle pas quelques consolations?*' (Laclos 1981: II, 42)
- 55 'Esch was brought up with a start when he thought of Martin; *the devil alone knew what he, August Esch, was doing here in this place!* but it was clear that it had no connection with the wrestling.' (Broch 1986:265–6)
- 56 Ehrlich (1990a: 100) discusses a good example: 'She said she loved Bach. So did **Hutton**. That was the bond between them, and Hutton (a very bad poet) felt that Mrs Dalloway was far the best of the great ladies who took an interest in art. *It was odd how strict she was. About music she was purely impersonal. She was rather a prig. But how charming to look at! She made her house so nice, if it weren't for her Professors. Clarissa had half a mind to snatch him off and set him down at the piano in the back room. For he played divinely.*' (*Mrs Dalloway*; Woolf 1976:195) Ehrlich notes that with the shift from *Mrs Dalhowsay* to *Clarissa*, one moves out of Mr Hutton's RST, since he would not have called her *Clarissa*. Likewise, *So did Hutton* signals a shift towards Hutton's small talk and accompanying musings.
- 57 Examples can be found as early as Bally (1914a: 408)—Bally already notes that the NP sometimes distinguishes one 'actor' from another (*ibid.*, 409) -, Kalepky (1899: 501) or Hoffmeister (1965:35–6).
- 58 This was noted as early as Bally (1914b: 420).
- 59 In Russian the turn of the phrase is: 'I on byl tut.' (Tolstoy n.d.: 84)
- 60 See also, for instance, in the same novel: '*Those were the things that came; why couldn't they take them, quietly and sensibly? But no, they had to gibber about eternity and all the rest That sort of stuff* always made Jeremy want to be blasphemous.' (*After Many a Summer* I, viii; Huxley 1950:107)
- 61 According to Wiebe, 'neither the mirror, the gifts, the baby, nor Ellen have been mentioned before in the novel' (*ibid.*). Compare also Banfield (1973:32 f.), Fillmore (1974:V, 14) and Dillon/Kirchhoff (1976:430).
- 62 For further discussion of this type of shifter see Fillmore (1975), G.Lakoff (1974) and Fludernik (1990).

- 63 Note also the colloquial *like*, another clue that this is probably Slothrop's point of view, since he is observing the waves.

NOTES TO PART B

- 1 To whom Mrs Veneering incoherently communicates, **how that** Veneering has been offered Pocket-Breaches; **how that** it is the time for rallying round; **how that** Veneering has said "We must work"; **how that she** is here, as a wife and mother, to entreat Lady Tippins to work; **how that** the carriage is at Lady Tippins's disposal for the purposes of work; **how that** she, proprietress of said brand new elegant equipage, will return home on foot—on bleeding feet if need be—to work (not specifying how), until she drops by the side of baby's crib.' (*Our Mutual Friend* II, iii; Dickens 1979:300)

See also the German recurrent *wie*-clauses in the speech report recounting of detailed narrative statements, e.g. in the following passage from *Buddenbrooks*: 'Diese Aufzeichnungen begannen mit einer weitläufigen Genealogie, welche die Hauptlinie verfolgte. **Wie** am Ende des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts ein Buddenbrook, der älteste, der bekannt, in Parchim gelebt und sein Sohn zu Grabau Ratsherr geworden sei. **Wie** ein fernerer Buddenbrook, Gewandschneider seines Zeichens, zu Rostock geheiratet, »sich sehr gut gestanden«—was unterstrichen war—und eine ungemeine Menge von Kindern gezeugt habe, tote und lebendige, wie es gerade kam.' (*Buddenbrooks* II, i; Mann 1991:55–6; continues with several further *wie*-clauses)

- 2 'Catherine Legrand asks Valerie Borge if one shall go into the cave that is right before one's eyes and where Mother St Jules has forbidden us to go, and Valerie Borges says that yes we will.' (My translation)
- 3 'He said he was tired.'
- 4 Compare below under (3.5.3) on the interdiction to use the 'free' subjunctive indirect for the representation of consciousness.
- 5 Pütz (1989) calls the 'free' subjunctive indirect discourse 'Berichtete Rede'. The choice of this term is singularly unfortunate since it is bound to be taken for the equivalent of what I call 'Redebericht', *speech report*, in Chapter 5 (i.e. the 'narrative's report of speech acts' in Leech/Short's terms). Since Pütz writes within a linguistic frame, he must have been unaware of the narratological currency of 'Redebericht'. Both of these terms evoke the same image, that of the narrative's (or a speaker's) reporting of speech, and they are really synonymous for the average German native speaker without prior narratological training. The continuation of indirect discourse by non-subordinated clauses in the *indicative* is of course the standard case of free indirect discourse.
- 6 'I replied that my bodily well-being had been consistent throughout. *From childhood on, I had been reared to a simple life which, combined with being out of doors a great deal, had given me lasting good health.*' (My translation) Note that the italicized clause is definitely interpretable as free indirect discourse in English.
- 7 This type of sentence was Bally's exemplum for free indirect discourse as a *figure de pensée*: *Sa soeur fait sa première communion* (Thibaudet 1922). Compare also Karpf (1928:581): *So I had an engagement with the dressmaker*. There are two excellent examples in Gertrude Stein: 'As we went out she [G.Stein] said to me [Alice B. Toklas], it is to be hoped that they [Picasso and Fernande] will be together again before the next comic supplements of the Katzenjammer kids come out because if I do not give them to Pablo he will be all upset and if I do Fernande will make an awful fuss. Well I suppose *I will have to lose them or have my*

brother give them to Pablo by mistake.' And: 'there was a little girl in the corner of the school yard and the other little girls told her not to go near her, *she scratched*' (*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*; Stein 1990: ii, 25–6; iv, 71)

- 8 'Napoleon" pod"exal" so svitoy k" Shevardinskomu redutu i slez" s" loshadi. *Igra nachala* .' (Tolstoy 1921:355) Note the perfective aspect of *nachala* , which can be read as either 'started' or 'had started.'

- 9 ' "You won't try a game, Father?"

No, Lebrecht Kröger would stop with the ladies, but Justus might go if he liked... Senator Langhals, Köppen, Grätjens, and Doctor Grabow went with the Consul, and Jean-Jacques Hoffstede said he would join them later. "Johann Buddenbrook is going to play the flute," he said, "I must stop for that. Au revoir, messieurs." ' (Mann 1984:28)

Note the implicit free indirect discourse in the German original in *nachkommen wollte*, which the translation makes explicit: '*said* he would join them later'.

- 10 'After a long, silent pause, in which they both endeavored to collect themselves, he explained in a few words why and how he had come there. *He had sent the major to Charlotte; and perhaps at that moment their common destiny was being decided. Never had he doubted her affection, and she assuredly had never doubted his.* He begged for her consent' (Goethe 1962:233–4) Note that the last clause could easily be read as pure narrative in its English translation, whereas the subjunctive in the German original *requires* an indirect discourse reading. Thus in the English translation one would tend to attribute this last sentence to the narrator, who reports Eduard's illocutionary act, whereas in German one has to read this as an (indirect) rendering of Eduard's words.
- 11 'After some talk about it on the doorstep we decided to take the bus. The beach was within easy walking distance, but we would be there sooner if we went by bus. Raymond thought his friend would like us to come early.' (My translation)
- 12 Interestingly, *He asked how she was doing* is quite idiomatic.
- 13 In Extended Standard Theory (Chomsky 1965) WH-movement shifted WH-terms into the complementizer position under S-bar, hence the impossibility of **that why* or **that if*, etc. In X-bar theory, however, the landing site for WH-terms is in CP-specifier position, to the left of complementizer. Even more recent proposals include the involvement of IP adjunction for I-movement (A. Weinberg 1990).
- 14 Radford (1988:299) calls such constructions 'semi-indirect speech'.
- 15 Note that formal assertion with interrogative intonation is possible in both English and German, but that in both languages it cannot be used to *elicit* information; it can function only as an echo question. (See below under (3.3.3).)
- 16 Compare Radford (1988:533) on dislocated constituents, which are CP adjuncts.
- 17 In this and the following I rely on the results of a questionnaire distributed among French native speakers with university education at Harvard during my stay there in the academic year 1987–88.
- 18 'But their bodies had recoiled from the married state and they wondered with dread where their terror and disgust were going to lead them.' (Zola 1968:213)
- 19 The judge exhorted him to speak the truth. [ID] *Had he or had he not been* [subjunctive] *at the scene of the crime at the given time?* Preserving the syntactic peculiarities of the passage necessitates a free indirect discourse translation into English and French.
- 20 'Was the boat of the company at anchor near the station? [Literally: 'If the boat was at anchor near the station?'] The man swore that it was directly outside.' (My translation)
- 21 'Diedrich had to tell him [i.e. the father] all about Göppels. *Had he seen the factory?* [Literally: 'If he had seen the factory?']' (My translation)

- 22 Compare (8) above.
- 23 'He debated with himself why Mimi might have gone to the baker's at such a time and where she could possibly be now.'
- 24 There is a difference between the *subjonctif du présent* and the *subjonctif du passé*: the former implies that the action may still have to be performed after the time of utterance, the latter that the entire situation is in the past from the current speaker's perspective. Compare, on the same point, Comrie (1985), who illustrates the point on the Spanish subjunctive.
- 25 Quoted from Kalepky (1899:498) See also Bally (1914a: 409) and G.Steinberg (1971:222). Translation: 'And in reply to a question from Madame de Jonquière, she also had to tell the story of her boots, a pair of beautiful new boots which Madame la Comtesse had given her, and in which she had run, jumped, and danced about, full of childish delight. *Boots! think of it, she who for three years had not even been able to wear a slipper.*' (Zola 1897:94)
- 26 Compare, in English:

Let them be happy!
 That they be happy!
 Be they happy!
 May they be happy!

and German:

Mag/Möge er glücklich werden!
 Seien sie glücklich bis ans Ende ihrer Tage!

- 27 This is an obsolete form of command in German now. The third person singular used to be employed when addressing a servant. Using *man* rather than *er*, the construction is however still current though entirely literary: *Man bringe mir den Mantel*.
- 28 'He said to Marie that he wanted a day in the woods, and might not come back till late that night. Would she give him a good loaf to take with him, and not sit up, this time, for his return?' (Hesse 1980:887)
- 29 '*But he was about to be taught his lesson, the impertinent boy! He would give him such a tongue-lashing at the end of this ridiculous performance that he would creep away like the shrivelled pile of trash he had been on arrival!*' (Süskind 1986:59)
- 30 '*One only had one head. When one's brain had once been set in turmoil, that is the swarm of bees in it, then the devil **might** try to calm the uproar?* (My translation)
- 31 For a good survey of English exclamatory structures see Quirk *et al.* (1985) and for their syntactic properties Elliott (1974). Exclamatory syntax as an expression of subjectivity has been analysed extensively by Milner (1978b).
- 32 See also the French examples with *comme* and *combien* in Verschoor (1959:15, 31–2).
- 33 Compare examples of equivalent French *combien* and *comment*-clauses quoted by Verschoor (1959:15–16, 31–2). Verschoor also notes French dialectal and popular complementizer formations such as *comme quoi* (p. 16), and the syntactic integration of *indirect* speech by *il m'a dit comme ça*, etc., constructions that are of course typical of direct speech (*ibid.*, 14).
- 34 This is enough, in view of the memory of the big day, to make your life sing, sing discreetly as you would like it to sing. *No matter the brusque behaviour of Yvette and Amélie 's father 's*

asperity! *Grotesque they are, one enamoured of his bones, the other of the bronzen stetue!*' (My translation)

- 35 'At least she wouldn't have to face another court. Thinking of that, he breathed more freely. *How to keep* his enemies from bothering the wound [he would have to see about that]. *He was going to have a word with the prefect tomorrow.*' (Mauriac 1947: 9; greatly changed)
- 36 Radford (1988:296–8) uses the existence of these constructions to claim that even non-embedded sentences have a complementizer (S-bar) position.
- 37 'And then the three women came at me as if they wanted to kill me. *That I* was a brute, a savage, an assassin, and that it was entirely my fault.' (My translation)
- 38 Quirk *et al.* (1985: § 11.40) call this 'irregular WH questions'.
- 39 This construction (with and without the *and*) is also frequently employed to render a speaker's perception of (fast, surprising) event or actions, and can also mark narrative incipits (Fludernik 1992a):


So into a back room he led me, where, after he had spit on his finger and picked off two or three motes off his old moth-eaten velvet cap, and sponged and wrung all the rheumatic drivel from his ill-favoured goat's beard, he bad me declare my mind, and thereupon he drank to me on the same. *I up with a long circumstance*, alias a cunning shift of the seventeens, and discoursed unto him what entire affection I had borne him time out mind. (*The Unfortunate Traveller*; Nashe 1985:256)

- 40 As early as Old English *verba dicendi* took a subjunctive complement in English, too. (Compare Visser 1966, and Traugott 1972:100: 'In fact, reported speech [in Old English] is usually expressed in the subjunctive.')
- 41 Although they did not receive a name of their own, discourse parentheticals were documented extensively as early as Herdin (1905:108–18). Herdin also illustrated narrative parentheticals at length, in free indirect discourse and in the German free subjunctive indirect discourse.
- 42 She contrasts two paradigms.


In these paradigms a cataphoric demonstrative pronoun (*this*) and an anaphoric adverbial proform *so* are introduced as dummy units to be deleted and replaced by direct discourse clauses. However, Banfield then has to take account of further grammatical facts to determine whether deletion of proforms is a sufficient explanation of the two forms of direct discourse (parenthetical and introductory).

- 43 For a full discussion of this issue and further examples see under (5.4.1).

Model 1



Model 2



- 44 On tag question formation see Bennett (1989).
- 45 Banfield claims that final *this/that* can occur in parentheticals. However, Banfield's example *They gave him something—William Banks acknowledged that.* (1982:48) is really a case of a tag that is properly free indirect discourse in its own right. (For further examples of this common type see under (5.4.1) (iii).)
- 46 For less common tag question types see Bennett (1989).
- 47 For the narrative episode structure to which this refers compare below under (3.5.3) and in Fludernik (1991a, 1992a, 1992c).
- 48 *He should say so*, even in a present tense context, would signal free indirect discourse on account of the difference in meaning. Outside free indirect discourse *He should say so* would, of course, be generally equivalent to *He ought to say so*, a reading that is discounted in a FID context. Compare under (3.4.2) below.
- 49 Echo questions can, but need not, shift adverbs of time and place (Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 51, 54).
- 50 For French examples with *ce que* and *si* see Verschoor (1959:18).
- 51 ‘“Oh, Mlle Javotte, please lend me your yellow dress, the one you wear every day!”—“Really,” said Mlle Javotte, “that is something! **Lend me your dress**, to a dirty Cinderella like you! I would be out of my mind to do so.”’ (My translation)
- 52 Yamaguchi also notes that such modifications can occur in direct speech report (ibid., 32), a fact that we will return to in Chapter 8.
- 53 For French examples see, for instance, Bally (1912a:555).
- 54 ‘That is what the people were saying, and I was listening to them with intense curiosity, and heard also the counter-arguments. *What, cousin Lampos should simply have forgotten to ask the Pythia concerning our most important Trojan state affairs just because he had fallen in love with Apollon’s priest Panthous?*’ (My translation) See also the following passage in the official translation, where the original has a direct speech passage: ‘What, Calchas had gone over to the Greeks? Our highly respected seer, who was privy to the innermost state secrets, was a deserter? ‘Yes, that’s it exactly.’ (Wolf 1984:38)
- 55 Note also Yamaguchi’s example on p. 10: ‘JANET: Who else could it have been?/ SIR WILFRIED: Exactly. *Who else could it have been?* That was the way your mind worked.’ (Agatha Christie, *Witness for the Prosecution*) Here the thought report is emphasized after the fact. Yamaguchi calls this a ‘thought echo’.

NOTES TO PART C

- 1 For important studies of aspect consult Comrie (1976) and Bache (1985, 1986) as well as Vendler (1967) for a classic model of *Aktionsarten*. Recent contributions to aspect include the excellent work by Steedman (1977), Jacobson (1980), Mourelatos (1981), Dowty (1986) and Caenepeel (1989). See also the literature on tense quoted under (1.3). The best work on the German subjunctive in indirect discourse is Kaufmann (1976). Cf. also Starke (1985) and Steube (1985:400–2; 1986).
- 2 For extensive examples see G. Steinberg (1971), Lips (1926) and Verschoor (1959).
- 3 This has recently been emphasized also by Newby (1989). Costa (1972:46) aligns the optional use of a present tense in indirect complement clauses with introductory verbs of a ‘factive’ nature (Kiparsky/Kiparsky 1971), and factivity of course semantically implies a degree of current relevance.
- 4 Compare Declerck (1991:186–7).
- 5 I model this remark on Reinhart (1975). See under (3.3.2)
- 6 Huddleston (1989) notes this as a counter-argument to Declerck (1990a) and Comrie (1986b), and Declerck (1991) devotes ample space to the refutation of his argument.
- 7 Comrie argues that there is no ‘past of the past’ form for cases such as *might* or *ought (to)*, but this still fails to take account of other kinds of shifting as into ‘past in the future’ environments. (Compare Huddleston 1989:338.)
- 8 ‘*She had, as God was her judge, never seen a more beautiful bride. Fat as she was, she went on her knees; and, with her eyes rolled up in admiration, fastened the myrtle twigs on the white moiré antique.*’ (Mann 1984:134)
- 9 For a similar model see Authier (1979).
- 10 As will be remembered, Reichenbach (1947) had distinguished between the speech time (time of utterance), the event time (when the event referred to occurred) and the reference time (different from the utterance time, in relation to which an event could be viewed). The concept of reference time in Reichenbach typically helps to explain the perfect tenses which are relative rather than absolute tenses (cp. Rauh’s mediated deixis discussed below). For an interesting redefinition of Reichenbach’s categories see Ehrlich/Vater (1989).
- 11 On Fabricius-Hansen (1989) compare below in the same section.
- 12 Rauh’s ‘mediate’ deixis has been called ‘sharing’ by Carlota S. Smith (1981), although in reference to sentences with deictic and relative adverbials of time.
- 13 Temporal clauses apparently pattern differently from *that* complements. See Declerck (1989: 27) for acceptable past tenses in *that* complement clauses and the equivalent present perfects in *when-clauses* (1989:73–4).
- 14 Compare my discussion of Plank under (3.1).
- 15 As I have argued elsewhere (Fludernik 1992a), in narrative the perfect may actually belong to an entirely different category, the replacement of the preterite being by means of the present time.
- 16 Most German dialects, according to Kaufmann (1976:32), do not have a present subjunctive but only a past subjunctive (*Konjunktiv II*) form which alternates with the indicative, especially in the oral language. For speakers with competence for the written language the subjunctive is mandatory in indirect discourse but alternates between present and past subjunctive forms. Markus (1977:79) has proposed a ‘modal value’ for the German preterite on account of the distribution of the German subjunctive. In some areas there no longer exists a subjunctive in any shape, but there does exist a preterite; in other areas there is no

preterite, but the preterital subjunctive (*Konjunktiv II*) has been preserved. Preterite (indicative) and subjunctive II are thus in complementary distribution. Markus does not provide any examples.

- 17 Compare Kaufmann (1976:54–5).
- 18 Bally (1912a: 602) was the first to note the French *imparfait* as a signal of free indirect discourse. See also Bally (1914a: 417–18), Thibaudet (1922:246–7), Lips (1926:57–61), Verschuur (1959) and McHale's discussion of the problem in McHale (1978:265).
- 19 Compare, for instance: 'When he was calmer he turned to his original conviction that he must somehow find her and his little Elizabeth-Jane, and put up with the shame as best he could. *It was of his own making, and he ought to bear it*' (*The Mayor of Casterbridge*, ii; Hardy 1986:84)
- 20 Dry (1990) has challenged the signal function of *must* and *would* for early English texts. See below for my misgivings on this score, where I also provide a discussion of some relevant *would* passages. Dry seems to be entirely correct, on the other hand, in cautioning against a subjective reading of the English reflexive pronoun.
- 21 Compare also other examples quoted by G.Steinberg (1971:211).
- 22 The more he thought about it all, the more impatient he became. Paris, in his inward ear, sounded a sort of trumpet call, with her masked balls and laughing *grisettes*. *Since he had to go there for his final Law exam, why not go now? What was to prevent him?*' (Flaubert 1950: xv; 116, slightly changed)
- 23 'And so, tied to his stool, he fumed in despair until evening. *He had to earn his living, he could not risk the sack*' (Zola 1968:74) *Falloir* is another auxiliary that operates in this manner.
- 24 '*That perhaps the new apprentice, that awkward gnome, who was housed like a dog in the laboratory and whom one saw sometimes when the master stepped out, standing in the background wiping off glasses and cleaning mortars—that this cipher of a man might be implicated in the fabulous blossoming of their business*, Chénier would not have believed had he been told it.' (Süskind 1986:90)
- 25 The maid still stood there peeping out at him, as already he turned his back, and went his way, resolved never to enter the street again. *Let someone else stroke those breasts of hers. Let someone else eat her good sausage! Oh how these citizens guzzled away their lives!*' (Hesse 1980:846; slightly changed)
- 26 'He thought out all his occupations in advance. He furnished his rooms in imagination. *He would lead the life of an artist. He would take lessons on the guitar. He would have a dressing-gown, a beret, blue velvet slippers*' (Flaubert 1950: xv, 116)
- 27 'Now Dr. Mantelsack crossed his legs, still standing, and began to turn over the leaves of his notebook. Hanno Buddenbrook wrung his hands under the desk. *B, the letter B, came next. Now he would hear his name, he would get up, he would not know a line, and there would be a row, a loud, frightful catastrophe—no matter how good a mood Dr Mantelsack might be in*' (Mann 1984: 579–80)
- 28 '[She] mentioned a customer who had moved away without paying, and acted the part of the relentless creditor, declaring that she was going to demand her money. *The customer lived in the Batignolles district*' (Zola 1968:75)
- 29 'Laurent sat up in bed and stayed in that position for several minutes, bidding his farewells to this attic of his which struck him as beastly. *At last he was about to leave this kennel and have a wife of his own.*' (Zola 1968:150)
- 30 My quotations are all from *The Canterbury Tales*, but comparable instances can be found in *Troilus and Criseyde* (Karpf 1928:571–2) and in Gower. Just for completeness's sake, here is an indirect discourse passage from Gower with mostly shifted indirect discourse tenses except for the one clause that could conceivably be argued to be free indirect discourse:

And fell so that be nyhtes tide

This knyht withoute felaschipe
 Hath tak a bot and cam to Schipe,
 And thoghte of hire his lust to take,
 And swor, if sche him daunger make,
 That certainly sche *scholde* deie.
 Sche sih ther was non other weie,
 And seide he *scholde* hire wel conforte,
 That he ferst loke [subjunctive] out ate porte,
 That noman *were* nyh the stede,
 Which myhte knowe what thei *dede*,
 And thanne he *mai* [present] do what he *wolde*.

(*Confessio Amantis* II, 1106–17)

- 31 Michael Frayn's *Utopia A Very Private Life* (1968), on the other hand, has passages of external viewpoint so that the future tense there is deictic, and the text in fact shifts into the present tense when figural perspective takes over. (Compare Bronzwaer 1970:70–80.)
- 32 But note Comrie (1985), as well as Bache (1985), who maintains that both the present and the past tense (in English) are unmarked in relation to the perfective and expanded and modal tenses.
- 33 See also Heger's and Bache's remarks which reject the very spirit of Weinrich's analysis (Heger 1967; Bache 1985:20–4).
- 34 See under (5.5) for narrated perception and (5.4.2) for psycho-narration. The English past progressive also occurs in a significant quantity in sentences of psychonarration, as documented by Wiebe (1990). (Wiebe calls these 'private state' sentences.)
- 35 This criticism has been proffered for instance by R.Lakoff (1984), Tomlin (1985a), Toolan (1990), and Ehrlich (1990a).
- 36 There are, however, examples of thought representation which Dry (1983) analyses as moving plot forward:

(a) Farrington gazed admiringly at the plump arm (b) which she moved very often and with much grace; and (c) when after a little time, she answered his gaze, (d) he admired still more her large dark brown eyes. (e) The oblique staring expression in them fascinated him. (f) She glanced at him once or twice and (g) when the party was leaving the room, (he) she brushed against his chair (i) and 'O pardon'. (Quoted Dry 1983:38)

Clause (d) seems to me to move time forward in a significantly different manner from passages of resultative perception:

There was still the sound of leaves, a terrified terrifying rushing. All light was gone. Darkness was complete. Suddenly, the wind was gone, and all sound. (Quoted Dry 1983:28)

Whereas the (d) sentence in the first quotation is a summary of Farrington's developing fascination with the woman with no sequence of individual plot events implied, the final sentence of the second passage marks a *result* on the plot-line. As Dry also very perceptively illustrates, movement in time even on the plot level crucially relies on the reader's reconstruction of plot sequence—new information about 'events', even if only implied

contextually, always correlates with the movement of narrative time. (See the examples in Dry 1983:34–7.) These results reinforce the otherwise noted fact that the marking of plot-line—morphologically signalled in French by the *passé simple*—is not an objective *given* on the basis of the plot, but a creative, evaluative strategy of plot constitution on the part of the narrator.

- 37 A good example of the habitual *imparfait* is the following passage from Daudet: ‘En outre, tante Portal **accrochait** tous les mots, non au gré de sa fantaisie, mais selon les us d’une grammaire locale, **prononçait déligence** pour diligence, **acheter, anecdote**, un **régitre**. Une taie d’oreiller **s’appelait** pour elle une **coussinière**, une ombrelle était une **ombrette**, la chaufferette qu’elle **tenait** sous ses pieds en toute saison, une **banquette**. Elle ne **pleurait** pas, elle **tombait des larmes**; et, quoique très **enlourdie**, ne **mettait pas plus de demi-heure** pour faire son tour de ville.’ (Numa Roumestan, ‘Une Tante de midi’; Daudet 1929:40) This translates as: ‘But besides all this Aunt Portal **played**[habitual] upon her words by no means according to her fancy but in accordance with the rules of some local grammar. Thus she **said déligence** for **diligence**, **acheter** for **acheter**, **anecdote** for **anecdote**, **régitre** for **registre**. She **called** a pillow-slip (**taie d’oreiller**) a **coussinière**, an umbrella was an **ombrette**, the footwarmer which she **used** at all seasons of the year was a **banquette**. She **did not cry**, she ‘fell to tears’; and though very ‘overweighted’ she never **took** more than ‘half hour’ for her round of the city.’ (Daudet 1899:69–70)
- 38 See Pollak (1988:124–44).
- 39 Lerch (1922a:321). Compare also Bally (1912b:600–3), where Bally distinguishes between an ‘imparfait par l’attraction’ and ‘imparfaits subjectifs’.
- 40 ‘When he put his foot on the ladder [...] an extended trembling shook the ship; [...] **They were leaving**’ (My translation)
- 41 Classic studies of the progressive aspect in English are Scheffer (1975), Ljung (1980), Edgren (1985), Legenhausen (1985) and Jørgensen (1991). See also Brunner (1955), Leisi (1960), Paccaud (1988), as well as Toolan (1983, 1990) and Raybould (1957), which are discussed below.
- 42 ‘[the real meaning of the *imparfait* in the novel] cannot be defined in temporal but rather in spatial terms: it distances us from what we are observing. The *imparfait* does not signify that the action is past—on the contrary, it wants to involve us with it—but that it is right before our very eyes, at a distance, and it is precisely on account of this distance that we are enabled to get involved with it.’ (My translation)
- 43 A simple non-perceptual simultaneity progressive can be observed for instance in the following passage: The sound of wheels while Mrs Glegg **was speaking** was an interruption highly welcome to Mrs. Tulliver, who hastened out to receive sister Pullet—it *must be sister Pullet, because the sound was that of a four-wheel*. (*Mill on the Floss* I, vi; G.Eliot 1986:58)
- 44 Pollak is the most vociferous in his condemnation of Weinrich and the progressive as ‘merely’ a background marker. See also the standard studies on the progressive by Scheffer (1975) and Ljung (1980).
- 45 Examples of this can be found already in Jespersen (1931:187): ‘If I should go to one of the tea-parties in a dressing-gown and slippers, I should be insulting society, and eating peas with my knife.’
- 46 Edgren, in an excellent paper, suggests that this use can be subsumed under a simultaneity reading. *Everytime I see her she is smoking* would be rendered as *She is always smoking* (1985:71, fn. 14).
- 47 Such contexts, however, seem to be discourse sensitive and not purely ‘grammatical’. (Compare the excellent paper by Legenhausen 1985.)

- 48 Compare Wunderlich's examples (1970:117 [= (99)]). Whereas *We arrived in Florence which lies/lay in a wide valley* emphasizes Florence's location either in general terms or from the perspective (perception) of the experiencer, a German subjunctive *liege* would indicate an utterance and hence evaluation on somebody's part.
- 49 As usual, there are exceptions in the stories of Stud Terkel's interviews. Vicarious narratives are in any case hard to come by, so that my finding of an absence of the past progressive may be accidental. Chafe's film summaries (Chafe 1980b), which do contain numerous progressives, cannot be counted as evidence because the film viewer's experience of observation of the events on screen interferes with the rendering of the 'story'.
- 50 'Esch felt upset, indeed more upset than he would admit. *All that he knew was that he must [subjunctive] have some wine if he was to bring order into the world again; [shift into FID, indicative:] Martin, who was against the strike, was arrested by police who were in with the shipping companies and a renegade officer, police who, in the most infamous manner, had seized an innocent man —perhaps because Esch himself had not handed Nentwig over to them!*' (Broch 1986:204)
- 51 'Disgruntled, Uli followed the farmer with his look. "I wouldn't have believed it," he thought, "that he wouldn't accept my good luck. But this is how the Donners all are; these farmers cannot tolerate it if a farm labourer manages to acquire a farm. [...]" *But he wouldn't allow them to get rid of him that easily; this had been going on far too long, and the talk had started in the village too quickly for him to just up and leave like this.*' (My translation)
- 52 'She was standing in front of the mirror. *Why wasn't he here yet? She had asked him particularly to be on time. She pulled herself together. One had to consider that he might simply have been delayed*' The subjunctive and its tone of argument are not reproducible in English.
- 53 'She was standing in front of the mirror. *He hadn't come. H is had lie d and be her. Time had become a dead weight. He was no longer in love with her*'
- 54 Kaufmann links the subjunctive in his examples to underlying direct discourse—a consequence that I will not adopt.
- 55 Examples of this typical collocation can be found in great number in the classic grammars of English. See also the quotes in Leisi (1960:223) and Declerck (1991: 145).

Indirect and free indirect discourse: deictic features and expressivity

In the previous chapter I have dealt with those features of indirect and free indirect discourse which align the representation of discourse with the deictic centre of the reporting instance. We have, however, already encountered examples of an alignment with the reportee's deixis in instances of logophoric pronominal reference and 'subjective' NPs, and in the comparative lack of subordination in the free indirect. In this chapter I will deal more fully with the so-called *expressive* features of free indirect discourse, which relate to the deictic centre of the reported speech or thought act, and I will provide numerous examples of the same kind of expressivity even in indirect discourse. Such expressivity—in the narrative text—is interpreted as signalling the deictic centre of a *character*. The presence of these expressive elements in free indirect discourse has therefore been largely responsible for the traditional dual voice interpretation of free indirect discourse, in which the 'voice' of the narrator (signalled by referential and temporal 'government') and that of the character (the character's deictic centre as instanced in the many expressive devices) intermingle in free indirect style. We will discuss this theory of the dual voice perspective in detail in [Chapter 6](#). In the present chapter I will illustrate different kinds of expressive devices and will especially concentrate on syntactic deviations and their claim to expressivity. The most complete list of expressive elements in free indirect discourse has been provided by Ann Banfield, from whom I borrow the basic order of presentation. I will give examples of my own and additionally present some devices that I have come across which are not mentioned in Banfield (1982). Of the enumerated expressive devices *all* occur in free indirect discourse, but—*pace* Banfield—a great number (though not as consistently as in free indirect discourse) can be encountered in indirect discourse, too. I will provide extensive examples of free indirect discourse and indirect discourse in this section. The same expressive devices can also be encountered in speech and thought report as well as narrated perception, and I will quote instances of this when discussing the spectrum of forms in [Chapter 5](#). As we will see, expressive syntax can be used also as a means of rhetorical emphasis in discursive texts.

Besides Banfield, Wiebe (1990) has studied what she calls 'potentially subjective elements', and her analysis is perhaps the most exhaustive of all. Wiebe notes the following areas of subjectivity:¹ (1) evidentiality (i.e. characters' surmisings); (2) lack of

knowledge (*whoever; a kind of NP*); (3) emotion, evaluation and judgement (including obligation); (4) psychological effect (e.g. *boring*); (5) modifications, including intensifiers (*hot enough, sort of grey*); (6) relationship (*aunt, father*); and (7) reasoning (as attributed to a character). These subjective categories show up in a variety of linguistic elements. My own presentation is structured from a linguistic point of view, although semantic categories also interfere. This leaves purely inferential cognitive factors in a category to themselves. Excellent examples of such inferential subjectivity are sentences using *this proved* or *this meant*, which imply an inductive reasoning process on the part of a character (Wiebe 1990: 100–1), or passages like *There was no sign of Dennys* (ibid., 88), which directly implies a character's perception. In contrast to Wiebe, the expressive elements that I locate in this chapter are primarily linguistic categories, and they do not necessarily correlate with a character's subjectivity but may also establish the deictic centre of a narrative voice. Purely deictic elements always establish a perspective, and the reader then has to infer to whom this perspective can be attributed; more generally 'subjective' elements of implicit evaluation and only cognitively significant expressions do not necessarily correlate with such a perspective, as Wiebe's 'objective' uses amply demonstrate.

4.1

ADVERBIAL DEIXIS

As we have seen above under (1.3), deictics can be divided into 'absolute' deictics related directly to the subject of enunciation (*today, here*) and 'relational', anaphoric deictics that refer back to a Reichenbachian reference point which does not coincide with the enunciatory centre (*three days before, in that place*). The standard accounts stipulate that in indirect discourse only the latter, anaphoric deictics can be used.

- (1) I first saw the above on 8.11.=22= with a history very much resembling polymyalgia rheumatica which she said had come on fairly suddenly after a fall eight weeks *previously*.

(*Survey of English Usage* W.7.12.51)

In free indirect discourse, however, the 'original' subjective deictics that refer to the reported speaker's deictic centre are allowed to remain in place:

- (2) Presently he told her the motion of the boat upon the stream was lulling him to rest. *How green the banks were now, how bright the flowers growing on them, and how tall the rushes! Now the boat was out at sea, but gliding smoothly on. And now there was a shore before him. Who stood on the bank!*

(*Dombey and Son*, xvi; Dickens 1985:297)

- (3) *But today it was clear that the good principle was triumphant: this affair of the water-power had been a tangled business somehow for all it seemed—look at it one way—as plain as water's water; but, big a puzzle as it was, it hadn't got the better of Riley.*

(*Mill on the Floss* I, iii; G.Eliot 1986:19)

- (4) *The way to Regent's Park Tube station—could they tell her the way to Regent's Park Tube station—Maisie Johnson wanted to know. She was only up from Edinburgh two days ago.*

(*Mrs Dalloway*, Woolf 1976:29–30)

- (5) *Herrn Gosch ging es schlecht; mit einer schönen und großen Armbewegung wies er die Annahme zurück, er könne zu den Glücklichen gehören. Das beschwerliche Greisenalter nahte heran, es war da, wie gesagt, seine Grube war geschaufelt.*

(*Buddenbrooks* IX, iv; Mann 1991:594–5)²

However, one can also find such shifters in indirect discourse, as we have already observed in our discussion of Plank under (3.1)- here an example of a past tense and present tense context respectively:

- (6) Nevertheless he [Tom] submitted to be kissed willingly enough though Maggie hung on his neck in rather a strangling fashion, while his blue-grey eyes wandered towards the croft and the lambs and the river, where he promised himself that he would begin to fish the first thing *to-morrow* morning.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, v; G.Eliot, 1986:36)

- (7) Mr. Bucket (still grave) inquires if *to-morrow* morning, now, would suit.

(*Bleak House*, liii; Dickens 1975:776)

Although figural deixis is prominent in free indirect discourse, there is no consistency in its usage. No interference with the narrational stratum occurs if there is a clear temporal shift—a finding that nicely correlates with Crystal's (1966) results on the interdependency of temporal morphology and temporal adverbials: if the tense establishes a temporal reference point which does not coincide with the reporter's enunciation time, then the shifter—in appropriate pragmatic circumstances—can easily be aligned with the reference point rather than the enunciatory present:

- (8) a. In 1980, Umberto said that he *had arrived* five years *ago*.

(Comrie 1986b:295, fn. 7, iv)

- b. At midnight Brenda realized that Paul (*had*) *called* three hours *ago*.

(C.Smith 1981:219 [= (15)])

The main interpretation of (8b) is that the embedded adverb, *three hours ago*, is anchored to *midnight*. It also has an interpretation in which both adverbs are anchored to ST [speech time] rather than three hours before midnight. This second reading is acceptable to speakers for whom *have* is optional in sentences such as (8b) (Smith 1981:219).

Conversely, narrator's deixis can also occur within free indirect discourse although this seems to happen predominantly in speech contexts (Kullmann 1992).

- (9) Und wie er auch gebeten hatte, es nicht anzusagen, *so hatte sie es doch an dem Tage noch* ihrem Guten redlich gemeldet, weil er's wissen mußte.

(*Lotte in Weimar*, ii; Mann 1982:31; quoted Weinrich 1985:242)³

Besides, the deictic position *in* the story can be preserved not only in indirect discourse—as in (6) and (7)—but also in the narrator's description:⁴

- (10) A young man, named Giovanni Guasconti, *came*, very long ago, from the more southern region of Italy, to pursue his studies at the University of Padua.
(‘Rappaccini’s Daughter’; Hawthorne 1974:93)

The deictics that are important in the discussion of free indirect discourse are the ones linked to a deictic centre and the subjectivity of a self; other kinds of deixis, such as discourse deixis or transferred deixis (*Deixis am Phantasma*), need not concern us here.

4.2

PRAGMATIC CATEGORIES OF EXPRESSIVITY

4.2.1

Typographical signals of expressivity

In standard printing, direct discourse is usually signalled by means of quotation marks or by a dash. So-called ‘free’ direct discourse (Leech/Short 1981:322; Chatman 1978:181–6; McHale 1978) dispenses with even these signals, and interior monologue of course does so regularly and by definition. Especially in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century texts, however, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse passages can mark their reporting status by adding redundant **quotation marks** (Page 1988:31). I here quote some more recent instances:

- (11) He only laughed, and told me the boy had got his deserts. *He’d got to be broken in—the sooner the better; ‘what did I expect?’* he asked.
(*Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, xxxiv; Stowe 1981:364)
- (12) ‘*Impulses came upon him sometimes?*’ Sir William asked, with his pencil on a pink card.
That was his own affair, said Septimus.
(*Mrs. Dalhousie*; Woolf 1976:108)
- (13) ‘*Was their nonsense the only barrier?*’ he asked himself. ‘Had he been thwarted by such a low hurdle?’
(*Miss Lonelyhearts*; West n.d.: 15)
- (14) «*C’était, disait-elle, une des plus anciennes et des plus estimées pensions bourgeoises du pays latin. Il y existait une vue des plus agréables sur la vallée des Gobelins (on l’apercevait du troisième étage), et un joli jardin, au bout duquel s’ÉTENDAIT une ALLÉE de tilleuls.*» Elle y parlait du bon air et de la solitude.
(*Le Père Goriot*; Balzac 1966:40)⁵

Loanings from characters' lexis are generally made explicit by the use of inverted commas. Schuelke (1958) has included this type of quotation among his examples of 'slipping'.

- (15) Mr. Temby [...] said his wife Shirley, 27, was so embarrassed when she saw the men *that she 'took one look at them and then put her head under the bedclothes'*.

(*Survey of English Usage* W. 12.4.49; police report)

- (16) The only problem gift was Hagar's. *It was hard to select something hurriedly for her since she liked everything but preferred nothing. More important, he wasn't sure he wanted to keep it up. Keep up the whole business of 'going with' Hagar.*

(*Song of Solomon*, iv; Morrison 1977:91)

- (17) *It might interest Mr. Powell to know, he added with cold fury, that some Labour MPs were dubious about going into the division lobby against the Government's plan in case it was 'soiled' by the presence of Mr. Powell.*

(*Survey of English Usage* W.12.4.3)

Sometimes free indirect discourse is separated from the narrative proper by means of a **colon** or **semicolon**:⁶

- (18) He moved restlessly and sighed; *what was the use?*

(*The Thorn Birds*; McCullough 1978:181)

- (19) Goethe objects with brusque obviousness: *is the love between sisters not even purer, are there not numerous instances in which the love between sister and brother carries a sensual strain? No; Hegel-Hinrich 's error lies deeper:they regard a Sophoclean drama as the enactment of an abstract idea.*

(G.Steiner 1986:49–50)

- (20) She muttered to herself continually; *this was dreadful, that was an absolute horror, was Mary color-blind, did she have no taste at all?*

(*The Thorn Birds*; McCullough 1978:216)

The last but one example has a double-tiered free indirect discourse rendering, representing, first, Goethe's argument and—within it—Goethe's summary of Hegel-Hinrich's views on Sophoclean drama. One therefore has free indirect discourse within free indirect discourse, although the former can also be classified as attributive direct discourse (cp. under (8.2)).

One can additionally find **exclamation marks** and **question marks** in indirect discourse, which emphasize the expressive quality of the reported utterances. Exclamation marks naturally constitute a common element of exclamatory sentences in free indirect discourse.

- (21) But before I could find her, Lord Orville saw and approached me.

He begged to know if I was not well? [...]

He then [...] asked if he had been so unhappy as to offend me?[ID]

'No, indeed!' cried I: and then [...]! desired to know if he had seen the young lady who had been conversing with me?[ID] *No; — but would I honour him with my commands to see her?* [FID]

(*Evelina*, Letter XI; Burney 1968:31; quoted Page 1988:37–8)

- (22) And to Mrs John Harmon, in confidence, did Mr Eugene Wrayburn impart that, please God, she should see how his wife had changed him /

(*Our Mutual Friend* IV, xvi; Dickens 1979:883)

- (23) He had the infant in his arms, he walked backwards and forwards troubled by the crying of his own flesh and blood. *This was his own flesh and blood crying!*

(*The Rainbow*, viii; Lawrence 1988:211)

Besides punctuation marks, emphasis by means of **italics** or **capitals** (as in (14) above) occurs both in indirect and free indirect discourse.

- (24) Meanwhile Flora was murmuring in rapid snatches for his ear, that there *was* a time and that the past was a yawning gulf however and that a golden chain no longer bound him [Arthur] and that she revered the memory of the late Mr F. [...]

(*Little Dorrit* I, xiii; Dickens 1978:201)

- (25) She only raises her eyebrows. *It was a shitty thing to say.* Remorse, or some late desire to be pure, rush into his blood like dope.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:545)

- (26) He [E.Brown] protested vehemently. [...] *Had he not perfected the art of making the old man look good in combat without hurting him? Had he ever complained that NTR never pulled his punches, so that he, Eustace, invariably ended up black and blue, having been beaten stupid by a little old guy whom he could've eaten for breakfast, on toast, and had he ever, even once, lost his temper? Well, then? How could anyone think he would hurt the immortal Gibreel?*

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:27–8)

Another typographical signal of expressivity can be found in spellings indicative of dialectal, sociolectal or other linguistic (e.g. foreign accent) deviations from the standard language of the text:⁷

- (27) 'Aren't yer a fidget, I'll learn you to fidget.' He [Alex] wasn't deferential any more. The British Museum had cured that. *This was 'oliday*, London with Maurice, all troubles over, and he wanted to drowse and waste time, and tease and make love.

(*Maurice*, xlv; Forster 1987:200)

- (28) He [Big Boy] remembered the day when Buck, jealous of his winning, had tried to smash his kiln. *Yeah, that ol sonofabitch! Naw, Lawd! He didnt go t say tha! Whut wuz he thinkin erbout? Cussin the dead! Yeah, po ol Buck wuz dead now. N Lester too.*

(*'Big Boy Leaves Home'*; Wright 1979:584)

- (29) [Speaker pretends to be French] I explained that my *fathaire* *wass* a *deeplo mat* and we *traffled* everywhere.

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'Home': Keillor 1987:24)

As one can see, such peculiarities occur within **indirect discourse**, too, contrary to Banfield's claim on this point. For numerous additional examples see McHale (1983).

4.2.2

Addressee-oriented and speaker-oriented expressions

Although not as frequently as the cases cited under (3.2), address formulas and addressee-oriented adverbials can indeed be found in free indirect discourse, and even in indirect discourse. For instance, one finds cases of **direct address**:⁸

- (30) *For (said the Bleeding Hearts), if a gentleman with that head of hair and them eyes took his rents into his own hands, **ma'am**, there would be none of this worriting and wearing, and things would be very different.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xxiii; Dickens 1978 : 325)

- (31) Once he had got it through his thick skull that she meant business, *no more hanky-panky, **no sir**, she was a decent woman, not a lust-crazed libertine*, he began to stay out late at night.

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:248)

- (32) To such questions, the Major, waxing very purple, would reply that it was a bad world, altogether; that Joey knew a thing or two, but had been done, **Sir**, done like an infant; that if you had foretold this, **Sir**, to J.Bagstock, when he went abroad with Dombey and was chasing that vagabond up and down France, J.Bagstock would have pooh-pooh'd you—would have pooh-pooh'd you, **Sir**, by the Lord!

(*Dombey and Son*, lviii; Dickens 1985:910)

- (33) She began piteously declaring that she didn't mean any harm, she didn't mean any harm, **Mrs Snagsby!**

(*Bleak House*, lix; Dickens 1975:865; quoted Sørensen 1959:434)

In all these cases the 'original' address function can remain unaffected because it clearly is not interpreted as an address to the narratee or reader. However, in the following example an actual address to the real-world reader comes into conflict with the address implied in the reported typified speech act:

- (34) Who does not know how our great men are outdoing themselves, in declaiming against the foreign slave-trade. There are a perfect host of Clarksons and Wilberforces risen up among us on that subject, most edifying to hear and behold. *Trading negroes from Africa, **dear reader**, is so horrid! It is not to be thought of! But trading them from Kentucky, — that's quite another thing!*

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xii; Stowe 1981:130)

Note that in this passage the attributive discourse is part of the narratorial evaluative commentary and relates not to the story but to the real world of Stowe *qua* narrator, Clarksons and Wilberforces *qua* characters and the narratee *qua* real reader.

Addressee-oriented adverbials, our next category, have been introduced into the discussion by Banfield. They include locutions such as *between you and me*, *frankly*, *honestly*, *confidentially*.⁹ Banfield claims that these occur in direct discourse only, but McHale (1983) has presented a number of convincing free indirect discourse examples:

- (35) *Honestly*, she was surprised when Susan Gillespie came up to her when they were getting their wraps to go home and giggled, 'My dear, you were the belle of the ball'.
(U.S.A.; Dos Passos 1978:549; quoted McHale 1983:25)

Although less common than other sentence-modifiers (such as *indeed*, *in a way*, *naturally*) and topicalized CP-adjuncts (see under (4.3.1) below), these sentence adverbials, in the appropriate context, will be interpreted as the reported speaker's responsibility. Banfield is, however, correct in pointing out that these addressee-oriented adverbials co-occur with the representation of *utterances* only (unless the thoughts are clearly verbalized as self-address or an imagined address to a fictional interlocutor).

Free indirect discourse also has a number of **addressee-oriented constituents** that preserve the second person pronominal, such as *you know* :

- (36) *Though, of course, she had to admit that it had happened at least once before he came along, because if it hadn't there'd have been no excuse for him. It had happened, but quite unwillingly—you know, practically a rape—or else some fellow taking advantage of her being so dumb and innocent [...]. But in that case, it now suddenly occurred to Virginia. [...]*

(*After Many a Summer* I, xii; Huxley 1950:168)

- (37) It was at first difficult to lead him [Mr Doyce] to speak about himself, and he put off Arthur's advances, in that direction by admitting slightly, *oh yes, he had done this, and he had done that, and such a thing was of his making, and such another thing was his discovery, but it was his trade, you see, his trade*; until, as he gradually became assured that his companion had a real interest in his account of himself, he frankly yielded to it.

(*Little Dorrit* I, xvi; Dickens 1978:232)

Additionally, one can find some exclamatory or addressee-oriented expressions with a first person pronominal in both free indirect discourse and indirect discourse:

- (38) 'Good evening,' she answers.

Excuse me, was she looking for anything? I had noticed her before; could I be of assistance to her in any way? begged pardon, by-the-way, so earnestly for inquiring.

(*Hunger* III; Hamsun 1935:154)

- (39) Mr Sparkler, growing rash on his late success, observed that Edward had had, biggodd, a long bout of it, *my dear girl*
(*Little Dorrit* II, xxiv; Dickens 1978:762)

4.3

SYNTACTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY

4.3.1

Exclamations, interjections and sentence modifiers

We have outlined exclamatory patterns of syntax under (3.3.1), including exclamatory sentences of various types, verbless exclamationatives and incomplete sentences with exclamatory intent. In the present section we will look at those syntactic patterns and constituents that fall outside exclamatory syntax but definitely suggest expressive functions.

There are, first of all, **(A) incomplete sentences**. These can be verbless sentences of truncated syntax¹⁰ or unfinished clauses with missing constituents:

- (40) So, back to the whitewashed library of the monastery [...] and there through the merits of the case as summed up by the Abbot. *No clue to how body came into river. Very often was no clue. Too late to know for certain, whether injuries received before or after death; one excellent surgical opinion said, before; other excellent surgical opinion said, after. Steward of ship in which gentleman came home passenger, had been round to view, and could swear to identity. Likewise could swear to clothes. And then, you see, you had the papers, too.*

(*Our Mutual Friend* I, iii; Dickens 1979:67)

- (41) [ID] Fascination wished to know if the colour were not called rose-colour? Yes, said Mr Lammle [...]. Notwithstanding, Fascination's *opinion was that* we all had our eyes—or at least a large majority of us—and *that—and—and* his further opinion was several ands, with nothing beyond them.

(*Ibid.*, II, iv; 316)

A variant of incomplete syntax is **(B) inconsistent syntax**, as in the following example from Virginia Woolf, where the syntactic pattern flounders in an imitation of the oral language:

- (42) *Ah, said Mrs Bast, they'd find it changed. [...] They might well ask, what had been done to it? seeing how old Kennedy was supposed to have charge of it, and then his leg got so bad after he fell from the cart; and perhaps then no one for a year, or the better part of one; and then Davie Macdonald, and seeds might be sent, but who should say if they were ever planted? They'd find it changed.*

(*To the Lighthouse* II, ix; Woolf 1985:131)

(C) Hesitations—a frequent feature of colloquial language—can be represented in free indirect discourse as signals of ‘mimetic closeness’ to the original speech or thought act, and they can be incorporated into indirect discourse, too. This is usually done for the purpose of parody and persiflage.

- (43) *The dark gentlemanly fellow couldn't be Wimbleby if he said he wasn't.* He [Mr Ducie] said, ‘I'm extremely sorry, sir, it's so seldom I make a mistake.’ And then, determined to show he was not an old fool, he addressed the silent pair [Alex and Maurice] on the subject of the British Museum—*not merely a collection of relics but a place round which one could take—er—the less fortunate, quite so—a stimulating place—it raised questions even in the minds of boys—which one answered—no doubt inadequately*; until a patient voice said, ‘Ben, we are waiting,’ and Mr Ducie rejoined his wife.

(Maurice, xliii; Forster 1987:196)

- (44) But he [Mr Dorrit] had spoken to her alone, and had said that people—*ha*—people in an exalted position, my dear, must scrupulously exact respect from their dependants; and that for her, his daughter, Miss Amy Dorrit, of the sole remaining branch of the Dorrits of Dorsetshire, to be known to—*hum*—to occupy herself in fulfilling the functions of—*ha hum*—a valet, would be incompatible with that respect.

(*Little Dorrit* II, iii; Dickens 1978:516)

I also include in this category what usually goes under the title of interjection (Quirk *et al* 1985:§ 11.55): *Ah, Aha, Boo, Mm, Ouch*, etc. (Compare also Ehlich 1986.). I have reserved the term *interjection* for lexical constituents—see below under (H).

(D) Repetition of sentence constituents, anaphorically related or not, very commonly constitutes a sign of rhetorical and emotive discourse. In free indirect discourse (as well as narrated perception) repetition is therefore a conspicuous clue for a free indirect discourse reading:

- (45) When he [Arthur Clennam] got to his lodging, he sat down before the dying fire [...] and turned his gaze back upon the gloomy vista by which he had come to that stage in his existence. *So long, so bare, so blank. No childhood; no youth, except for one remembrance; that one remembrance proved, only that day, to be a piece of folly.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xiii; Dickens 1978:206)

- (46) But such was the secret operation of the gold, helped with the persuasion of the Amazon, Zelmane (who said it was pity *so* handsome a young man should be any where else than with *so* good a master) that in the end he agreed, if that day he behaved himself so to the liking of Basilius as he might be contented, that then he would receive him into his service.

(*Arcadia* I, xix; Sidney 1977:174–5)

(E) Free indirect discourse only very rarely has what Banfield calls **subjectless imperatives**, which seem to be largely restricted to direct discourse and free indirect discourse. (Compare under (3.3) above.) Some of these are idiomatic expressions in the syntactic function of interjections:

- (47) *Hang it, if he [Trenor] could find a way out of such difficulties for a professional sponge like Carry Fisher, who was simply a mental habit corresponding to the physical titillations of the cigarette or the cocktail, he could surely do as much for a girl who appealed to his higher sympathies, and who brought her troubles to him with the trustfulness of a child.*

(*The House of Mirth* I, viii; Wharton 1962:98)

- (48) *Or the Upper House could be elected. Then the conundrum would arise: Which House really represented the people?*

Then look at the House now proposed.

(*Survey of English Usage* W. 12.4.6)

(F) Free indirect discourse sentences additionally allow the full integration of **sentence-modifiers** such as *indeed, in any case, naturally, after all, obviously, of course* and many more. Quirk *et al.* count these as various categories of conjuncts (1985: §§ 8.137–45). Like some sentence-initial *ands* and *buts*, such conjuncts help to present an argument, and this argument is here referred to the reportee.¹¹

- (49) *And she began to tell her story: They had lived on the Treasure plantation—not as tenants but as owners—all their lives. [...] In any case, Miss Margaret Treasure—at Little Sister Lucille's prompting—had been selling bits and pieces of the place until now all that was left could be seen from the front and back porches.*

(*Meridian, Treasure*; A. Walker 1976:208)

- (50) *and, anyhow, Our Lady would be a lot more understanding and forgiving than he was.*

(*After Many a Summer* I, iv; Huxley 1950:50)

- (51) *Except Councillor Wylde, whom he had heard at the last sessions, Mr. Tulliver thought the Rev. Mr. Stelling was the shrewdest fellow he had ever met with—not unlike Wylde, in fact: he had the same way of sticking his thumbs in the armholes of his waistcoat.*

(*Mill on the Floss* II, i; G. Eliot 1986:138–9)

- (52) *His brother Frederick was much broken, no doubt, and it might be more comfortable to himself (the Father of the Marshalsea) to know that he was safe within the walls.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xix; Dickens 1978:269)

- (53) *There was the hedge, sure enough. But one got nothing by soliciting urgently.*

(*To the Lighthouse* III, xi; Woolf 1985:178–9)

- (54) *so I wrote her ever such a nice little letter saying after all- you know she was old and on her own . my auntie Elsie and. if she had something like knitting that kept her happy all day. surely that was better than sitting doing nothing you know she was ((a)) poor old thing after all*

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.12.112–13)

- (55) *Either They have put him here for a reason, or he's just here. He isn't sure that he wouldn't, **actually**, rather have that reason.*

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:434)

- (56) Well if the report which I read was correct this particular lady was reported as saying finally at the end of an interview which she gave to the one reporter something to the effect that **really** *she'd worked things out because she wanted to know if it was **really** possible for a family of five to live on unemployment pay.*

(*Survey of English Usage* 5b. 16.38 (=5.4))

(G) There are also numerous **clause-initial adjuncts** such as *o(h), yes, no, why, well, alas* or *nay*: These have been discussed by Schiffrrin (1987) under the title of discourse markers, and have been called 'Einstellungspartikel' by Steube (1985:399) in reference to Doherty (1985).¹²

- (57) **Yes**, *there were some things about himself he [S.Beckett] didn't like... French had the right 'weakening' effect.*

(Herbert Blau on Beckett; quoted Hassan 1971:213)

- (58) **Nay**, *on ingenious gentleman connected with the Department, and himself a valuable public servant, had done him the favour to make a curious calculation of the amount of stationery consumed in it [the Circumlocution Office] during the same period.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, viii; Dickens 1978:572)

- (59) He's even aware, usually, of the times when he's being creepy [...] and their response to it is predictable, they run uttering screams only they, and he, can hear. **Oh** *but how he'd like someday to give them something really to scream about.*

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:141)

- (60) everyone said marvellous what luck and I said **yes** *I was very lucky*

(*Survey of English Usage* W.1.5c.4)

- (61) **Well**, *he was very good in his father's business, for one thing. Excellent, in fact. But he had to admit right away that real estate was of no real interest to him.*

(*Song of Solomon*, iv; Morrison 1977:107)

- (62) and I said *did she mean for lunch or dinner* and she said *o either* and I said **well** *I would be you know willing to come in every day for lunch, not adding that any way for a free meal and I would come in sometimes for dinner and that* **yes of course** *I would be willing to come into the common room and* **in fact** *I would like nothing I would like better*

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.3.52)

- (63) she was very sort of putting off and said **well** *she didn't really know when they could manage it*

(*Ibid.*, S.2.14.104)

I will have more to say about the typicalizing aspect of these adjuncts under (8.3).

(H) **Interjections** such as *God!*, *for God's sake*, *Jeez*, *golly*, *Gosh*, *by Jove*, *Jeepers* and the like (Quirk *et al.* 1985: § 11.54 call these expletives, but they need not necessarily be used as swearwords) are another important expressive category:¹³

- (64) **Great God!** *there were floating masses in it, that might dash against her boat as she passed, and cause her to perish too soon. What were those masses?*
 (Mill on the Floss VII, v; G.Eliot 1986:508)
- (65) Jessica Swanlake, a young rosy girl in the uniform of an ATS private, noticing prewar perfume, looks up, *hmm, the frock she imagines is about 15 guineas and who knows how many coupons, probably from Harrods and would do more for me, she's also sure. The lady suddenly looking back over her shoulder, smiles oh yes? **My gosh**, did she hear? Around this place almost certainly.*
 (Gravity's Rainbow; Pynchon 1981:30–1)
- (66) Mr Sparkler, growing rash on his late success, observed that Edward had had, **biggodd**, a long bout of it, my dear girl.
 (Little Dorrit I, xxiv; Dickens 1978:762)¹⁴
- (67) [ID] In the meanwhile the old man rises, who finding both his son and Don Tomazo absent, could not conjecture **what the De'll should be become of them.**
 (Don Tomazo; Peterson 1961:196)
- (68) Der erschöpfte Hanno Buddenbrook drückte sich an der Wand entlang und blickte um sich... *Nein, **gepriesen sei Gott**, es sah ihn niemand.*
 (Buddenbrooks XI, ii; Mann 1991:707)¹⁵
- (69) *An einem Zahne... Senator Buddenbrook war an einem Zahne gestorben, hieß es in der Stadt. Aber, **zum Donnerwetter**, daran starb man doch nicht!*
 (Ibid., X, ix; 689)¹⁶

Some interjections have verb forms which suitably shift tense in free indirect discourse:

- (70) As war drew closer, the game of priorities and politicking grew more earnest, Army vs. Luftwaffe, the Weapons Department vs. the Ministry of Munitions, the SS, given their aspirations, vs. everybody else, and even a simmering discontent that was to grow over the next few years into a palace revolt against von Braun, because of his youth and a number of test failures—*though **heaven knew**, there were always enough of those, they were the raw material of all testing-station politics.*
 (Gravity's Rainbow; Pynchon 1981:416)

(I) Speaker-related sentence-modifiers such as *for myself*, *as for me*, *in my opinion*, etc. also occur in both free indirect discourse and indirect discourse:¹⁷

- (71) the one who's supposed to have saved it he'd heard rumours that Peel might join the brain drain on this account—*as far as he was concerned any old drain was good enough for Peel*
 (Survey of English Usage S. 1.6.133)
- (72) Giles nicked his chair into position with a jerk. Thus only could he show his irritation, his rage with old fogies who sat and looked at views over coffee and cream when the whole of Europe—over there—was bristling like...[...] His

father, whom he loved, he exempted from censure; *as for himself*, one thing followed another; and so he sat, with old fogies, looking at views.

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:43)

(J) Discourse parentheticals and other. qualifying constituents such as **question tags** can equally be detected in free indirect discourse:

- (73) For a moment she [Prudence] almost regretted her own stillborn ‘research’—‘the influence of something upon somebody’ *hadn’t Virginia Woolf called it?*—to which her early marriage had put an end. She could hardly remember now what the subject of it was to have been—*Donne, was it, and his influence on some later, obscurer poet?*

(*Jane and Prudence*; Pym 1987:11)

- (74) Guitar knew that wasn’t all he was interested in, *didn’t he?* He knew Milkman had other interests. *Such as? he asked himself.*

(*Song of Solomon*, iv; Morrison 1977:107)

(K) Free indirect discourse—and this is another syntactic signal of the device—allows sentences with **clause-initial coordinating conjunctions**, which are usually barred from the written language, although they are very common in the oral language. The most frequent of these coordinators is *for* (G.denn, F. *car*):¹⁸

- (75) Yes: it was a fifth-rate Empire. But to Mahmoud it was quite something, a Slave King’s estate, *for* had he not begun his career out on the suppurating streets as one of those no-account types who push the movie adverts around town on wheelbarrows, shouting, ‘It is now- showing!’ and also ‘Plans filling up fast!’—and did he not now sit in a manager’s office, complete with cashbox and keys?

(*Shame*; Rushdie 1984:60)

- (76) She told him the neighbours thought she’d dropped her wits over the pier when she agreed to take him in, *but* a great lot she cared what they thought or didn’t think. *For* it was a sure thing there was none that wasn’t jealous that old Meg Delaney had got the man with God in his pocket sleeping under her very roof.

(*The Invention of the World, The Eden Swindle*; Hodgins 1977:101)

- (77) Étienne, alors, parla de la République, qui donnerait du pain à tout le monde. Mais la Maheude secoua la tête, *car* elle se souvenait de 48, une année de chien, qui les avait laissés nus comme des vers, elle et son homme, dans les premiers temps de leur ménage. Elle s’oubliait à en conter les embêtements d’une voix morne.

(*Germinal* IV, iii; Zola 1978:281)¹⁹

- (78) Monseigneur, der Bischof, der, als sei ihm übel, mit dem Oberkörper vornüberklappte und die Stirn auf seine Knie schlug, bis ihm das grüne Hütchen vom Kopfe kollerte; und dabei war ihm gar nicht übel, sondern er schwelgte nur zum ersten Mal in seinem Leben in religiösem Entzücken, *denn* ein Wunder war geschehen vor aller Augen, der Herrgott höchstpersönlich war dem Henker in den Arm

gefallen, indem er den als Engel offenbarte, der vor der Welt ein Mörder schien—o daß dergleichen noch geschah im 18. Jahrhundert.

(*Das Parfüm* III, xlix; Süskind 1985:302)²⁰

One also finds *and*, (*n*) *or*, *so*, *because*, *but*, *unless* or the conjunction *no w that*.²¹

- (79) The Governour had no sooner recover'd [...] but he called his council, who [...] consisted of such notorious villains as Newgate never transported; [...] they all concluded, that (damn 'em) it might be their own cases; and that Caesar ought to be made an example to all the Negroes, to fright 'em from daring to threaten their betters, their Lords and masters: **and** *at this rate no man was safe from his own slaves*; and concluded, nemine contradicente, that Caesar should be hanged.
(*Oroonoko* ; Behn 1986:91–2)
- (80) They quizzed him eagerly upon his return from Outside about ladies' fashions and all the minutiae of town life, **and** *had he heard anything about them*.
(*Shame* ; Rushdie 1984:46)
- (81) Friar: [...] Then comes she [Juliet] to me,
And with wild looks bid me devise some meane
To rid her from this second marriage:
Or *in my Cell there would she kill her selfe*.
(*Romeo and Juliet* V, iii, 239–42; Shakespeare 1964:94)
- (82) Pilate was surprised that they were successful, but the captain was not, **because** *there could hardly be many people with such a name*.
(*Song of Solomon*, v; Morrison 1977:151)
- (83) Twelve miles toward that I rode, beside an animal [i.e. the slave!] [...] who could not permit himself to force the mule which drew us beyond a walk **because** *'hit warn't none of mine nor hisn neither and besides hit aint had a decent bait of vittles since the corn give out in February'*; who, turning into the actual gate at last, must stop the mule, and, pointing with the whip and spitting first, say, 'Hit was right yonder.'
(*Absalom, Absalom!*, v; Faulkner 1982:111–12)
- (84) Maggie felt sure that Bob was wicked, without very distinctly knowing why; **unless** *it was because Bob's mother was a dreadfully large fat woman, who lived at a queer round house down the river; and once, when Maggie and Tom had wandered thither, there rushed out a brindled dog that wouldn't stop barking*.
(*Mill on the Floss* I, vi; G. Eliot 1986:50)
- (85) When, he wondered, will those people ever be anything but animals, fit for nothing but substitutes for mules, **only** *mules didn't kill each other the way niggers did*.
(*Sula*, '1922'; Morrison 1982:63)
- (86) conceive [imperative] a great heart-leaping desire for Doris, go fetch Doris, whose lip would curl at my proposal but who was nonetheless willing, *who in fact now that she thought of it* was as lusty as could be, her old self once again, a lusty

Shenandoah Valley girl, Apple Queen of the Apple Blossom Festival in Winchester.

(*Love in the Ruins*, 'July Fourth'; Percy 1989:11)

Additionally, free indirect discourse is sometimes introduced by **subordinating** conjunctions such as *while*, *if*, *when*,²² or by *relative* clause CP specifiers, as already exemplified in the *now that* construction of (86):²³

- (87) I have a message from . Mister Preston . **who** *isn't well today and is sorry that he can't be in—m but he should be back . tomorrow if you could very kindly leave a note on his door to explain this—thanks*

(*Survey of English Usage* S.9.3.108)

- (88) The Boss was introducing Mr. Duffy, **who** *was delighted to meet Mr. Stark, yes, sir, and introducing the gang who had just come up in the second car.*

(*All the King's Men*, i; Warren 1982:24)

(L) Besides the above sentence-modifiers and conjunctions, one also needs to note argumentative, concessive, adversative adverbials and phrases which Quirk numbers among conjuncts that occur exclusively as initial CP-adjuncts.²⁴ They can be found widely in free indirect discourse, but are also common in rhetorical, argumentative writing (i.e. in *prima facie* direct discourse) and of course the narrator's commentary. Examples are uses of *now*, *then*, and *yet*.

- (89) **Now** *it was perfectly true that harmlessness was the highest ideal most people could aspire to [...]. Nevertheless, mere harmlessness [...] most certainly didn't represent the highest possible ideal.*

(*After Many a Summer* II, v; Huxley 1950:227)

- (90) *For, after all, old Propter had written Short Studies ; what he said couldn't just be dismissed as the vapourings of a deficient mind. Besides, he hadn't talked Christianity.*

(*Ibid.*, I, viii: 107)

- (91) *One could talk of painting then seriously to a man. Indeed, his friendship had been one of the pleasures of her life. She loved William Banks.*

(*To the Lighthouse* III, v; Woolf 1985:164)

- (92) *There must have been people who disliked her very much, Lily thought [...]— People who thought her too sure, too drastic. Also her beauty offended people probably. How monotonous, they would say, and the same always! They preferred another type — the dark, the vivacious. Then she was weak with her husband. She let him make those scenes. Then she was reserved.*

(*Ibid.*, III, xi; 180)

- (93) *They were made of the finest leather in the world, also.*

(*Ibid.*, III, ii; 144)

(M) Another construction that occurs frequently in free indirect discourse is the concessive *not that* clause, which also requires an argumentative context.

(94) *Not that those guys knew how to paint, of course; but that was quite O.K. seeing that the murals had to look phoney anyhow.*

(*After Many a Summer* II, iii; Huxley 1950:204)

Observe also the *seeing that* clause in this quotation, a further concessive subordinate phrase.

4.3.2

Root transformations

Emonds (1970/1976) has claimed that certain transformations, such as subject-verb inversion, prepositional preposing, left and right dislocation and others (see below), can occur only in 'root' sentences. Put differently, such constructions, he argued, are barred from subsidiary clauses, which at the time were identifiable as S-clauses, whereas root or matrix clauses were S-bar (and S-double-bar) constituents. This theory came under heavy attack from Hooper/Thompson (1973), Georgia M.Green (1976) and N.A.McCawley (1977), all of whom discovered root transformations in subsidiary clauses, and Emonds's formulations have since been modified by Ogle (1981). Hooper/ Thompson carefully analysed the category of the introductory indirect discourse verbs which allowed this kind of transformation, suggesting that root transformations can occur only in *non-presupposed*, i.e. asserted, clauses.²⁵ However, not only are their examples of doubtful validity (Green, like myself, has different intuitions about some of the sentences), the analyses also fail to take more pragmatic, situational context into account. Actually, root transformations are very common in both colloquial and literary speech and thought representation, in fact in all contexts where a speech and thought act is implied or could be interpreted to have occurred (N.A.McCawley). Hooper/Thompson had already demonstrated that verbs of saying easily accommodate root transformations in their complement clauses, i.e. in indirect discourse, and although McCawley—with Banfield—claims that root transformations in such indirect clauses need to be read as an expression of SPEAKER, the examples really point towards a prevalent association of root transformations with the *quoted* speaker's expressivity, the reportee's SELF (in Banfieldian diction):

(95) Henry declared that never had he had such a wonderful holiday.

My father early impressed upon me that this book I should read.

It was explained to me that significant above all was the amplitude of the oscillation graph.

One may also want to note that constructions which are known to correlate with the description of a perception invoke a perceptual context even when introduced by a verb of *saying*, rather than a verb of perception:

- (96) Judith told us that standing in the middle of the swimming pool had been her son Tommy, with the hose tucked around his waist.

Secondly, as McCawley has demonstrated in depth, root transformations are also easily accommodated in the complement clauses following verbs of consciousness.

- (97) All of a sudden, John realized that never in his life had he really loved his wife.
(N.A.McCawley 1977:386 [17])

A context of 'active' consciousness²⁶ alone in fact seems to be sufficient to trigger a root transformation, as in the following *because-clause* :

- (98) Robert was quite nervous, because never before had he had to borrow money.

Conversely, root transformations do *not* apply in what Hooper/Thompson call presuppositional clauses (which are really clauses referring to received opinion, common knowledge, etc.—precisely topics not necessarily processed by individual consciousness):

- (99) * That standing in a corner was Joe was not surprising to anyone.

This result ties in with Kuno's remarks about clauses of general knowledge or 'old' information, which do not allow a logophoric pronoun. (Compare under (3.2.2) above.)

Since the advent of revised X-bar theory in *Barriers* (Chomsky 1986a) the concept of root transformations has vanished along with S-bar and S-doublebar.²⁷ In the newest transformational models subsidiary clauses link up via CPs, and these CPs can even incorporate adjuncts for topicalized constituents (formerly located in S-double-bar) (Radford 1988).²⁸ This has shifted the explanation of root transformations from the syntactic to the semantic and pragmatic level. Certain contexts will be unlikely to have expressive syntax; others easily incorporate it.

Root transformations include the constructions listed below, for which I provide examples from direct discourse, free indirect discourse and indirect discourse, where readily available. I exclude from consideration question formation, exclamatory sentences (*How nice she looked!*; *Boy, were we happy!*) and verbless exclamations (*What the heck!*), which have been mentioned above under (3.3.1). Most of the root transformations involve subject-verb inversion (or I-movement) or exclamatory WH-movement. In subsidiary clauses, interestingly, I-movement sometimes takes place in contexts where the equivalent direct discourse sentence (exclamation) would not require inversion:

- (100) One has only to think of the reckless assumptions once made about El Greco's mental stability [...] by writers unfamiliar with the anatomical distortions popular with other artists of the late sixteenth century to *realize how complex are the issues at stake*.

(NYRB 36.12 [1989]:36–7)

It should also be emphasized that the following discussion concentrates on root transformations in *prose* (texts). Inversion has been analysed frequently also for its use in poetry, i.e. in *verse* writing. Optional inversion can improve the rhythmic structure of poetic texts, and this effect is entirely different from the use of inversion in prose. Poetic inversion is excluded from the present analysis.²⁹

The following are the major root transformations as treated in Hooper/ Thompson and somewhat extended by myself:

(i) Negative constituent preposing with *never*, *not* (+NP), *not...ever*, *nor*, *neither*, *scarcely*, *hardly*, *rarely*, etc.:

- (101) *Never should she forget* Herbert killing a wasp with a teaspoon on the bank!
(*To the Lighthouse* I, xvii; Woolf 1985:82)

- (102) *no, never again will she stand* at their kitchen sink with a china cup squeaking in her fingers, its small crying-child sound defenseless, meekly resonating BLOWN OUT OF ATTENTION AS THE ROCKET FELL smashing to a clatter of points white and blue across the floor.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:638)

- (103) Je n'imaginai pas sans doute qu'il en sortirait du son, comme du ventre crevé d'un poupard; mais je sais que *jamais de ma vie je n'éprouvai* une aussi grande surprise, et il me sembla qu'il venait de m'arriver quelque chose d'inouï.

(*Mademoiselle de Maupin*, xiv; Gautier 1966:331)³⁰

- (104) And she [Anna] felt always belittled, as if *never, never could she stretch* her length and stride her stride.

(*The Rainbow*, iv; Lawrence 1988:106)

The preposing can occur also with *not ... ever* :

- (105) I *don't* think that *ever* before *have the media played* such a major role in a kidnapping.

(TV coverage of Patty Hearst's abduction; quoted Horn 1978:168)

(ii) Emphatic object preposing: *This book you should read* (Hooper/ Thompson 1973: 468).

- (106) [DD] They come in together and sit opposite me across the desk. [...] *That much I know*. Ted brings me up to date.

(*Love in the Ruins*, 'July First', xiv; Percy 1989:137)

- (107) [FID] Edward always called her ‘the girl,’ and it was very pretty, the evident affection he had for her and she for him. **And Leonora’s feet she would have kissed**— *those two were for her the best man and the best woman on earth*—and in heaven. I think that she had not a thought of evil in her head—the poor girl.
(*The Good Soldier* II, i; Ford 1983:95)
- (108) [FID] **Crabs**, *she had to allow, if Andrew really wished to dissect them, or if Jasper believed that one could make soup from seaweed, one could not prevent it; or Rose’s objects—shells, reeds, stones; for they were gifted, her children, but all in quite different ways.*
(*To the Lighthouse* I, v; Woolf 1985:30)³¹
- (109) [ID] so I said **research I would have next**
(*Survey of English Usage* S.1.12.112–14)
- (110) So Veneering, without the formality of rising, launches into a familiar oration, [...] in which he also sees at that board *his dear friends Boots and Brewer whose rallying round him at a period when his dear friend Lady Tippins likewise rallied round him—ay, and in the foremost rank—he can never forget while memory holds her seat.*
(*Our Mutual Friend* II, xvi; Dickens 1979:474)

(iii) **Directional adverb preposing:** *Up he went; Away rode the travellers.*

- (111) ‘I looked out the window,’ the Archbishop said, remembering the day that the group of influential neo-conservative Catholics was scheduled to arrive, ‘and **up pulled these** limousines with smoked windows, having whisked the occupants in from their private planes, which had landed minutes before at the Milwaukee airport.’
(*The New Yorker*, July 15, 1991:50)
- (112) **Here sat Doris** with Alistair and his friend Martyn whom, I confess, I liked to hear Alistair address not as we did, with the swallowed n, Mart’n, but with the decent British aspirate Mar-ty-n.
(*Love in the Ruins*, ‘July Fourth, 8.30 a.m.’, iv; Percy 1989:230)
- (113) Sir Philip Sidney [...] describes himself as ‘great with child to speak,’ but the poem is ultimately produced at the expense of no literalized child. Sidney’s labor pains are smoothed away by a midwifely apostrophe [...] and by a sort of poetic Caesarian section, **out springs the poem** we have, in fact, already finished reading.
(Johnson 1986:37)
- (114) well I don’t think you can blame the press without being a bit priggish [...] I think probably the villain in the piece is some alleged shrinking violet of a Civil Servant in the War Office who suddenly found for the first time in his life that somebody’d taken some notice of him the press had rung him up right left and centre and **there hewas** like so many nearly all the rest of us finding himself in the limelight
(*Survey of English Usage* S.5b.1.10 (=S.5.1))

- (115) [FID] *But for a sight, for a glory it surpassed everything in her experience, and burnt year after year like a signal fire on a desert island at the edge of the sea, and one had only to say 'in love' and instantly, as happened now, **up rose Paul's fire** again.*
(*To the Lighthouse* III, v; Woolf 1985:163)
- (116) [ID] Wendy was sad that she opened the window and **out flew Peter Pan**.
(N.A.McCawley 1977:388)

A variant of directional adverb preposing occurs when the verb of the clause is in the progressive aspect, or combines with a present participle:

- (117) The mother, with a querulous satisfaction in the monotony of her complaint, was still repeating it in a low voice from time to time, and the proud form of her daughter moved beside her slowly, **when there came advancing over a dark ridge before them, two other figures**, which in the distance, were so like an exaggerated imitation of their own, that Edith stopped.
(*Dombey and Son*, xl; Dickens 1985:662)
- (118) 'Why were you depressed?'
'It was Christmas Eve and **there I was watching** Perry Como.'
(*Love in the Ruins*, 'July First', iv; Percy 1989:100)
- (119) They turned, and Clennam said, **Here was Maggy coming!**
(*Little Dorrit* I, xxii; Dickens 1978:306)

(iv) **Prepositional phrase preposing** fronts more complex constituents, also usually initiated by a directional preposition:

- (120) [DD] Little by little, Janie begins to talk back to Joe, finally insulting him so profoundly that, in a sense, he dies of it. Some time later, **into Janie's life walks Tea Cake Woods**, whose first act is to teach Janie how to play checkers.
[summary of Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Watching God*] (Johnson 1987:160)
- (121) At Chattanooga, for example, southerners turn out by the thousands to attend three days of a writers' conference, and **to Nashville flock** scores of thousands for a four-day book fair.
(NYRB 36.16 [1989]:16)
- (122) [ID] Dave was saying **at the bottom of the road there was** this man that was planting roses in his garden
(*Survey of English Usage* S.4.7.55)

As with (v), all free indirect discourse examples render a perception, are instances of narrated perception (cp. under (5.5)).

(v) **Participle preposing:** *Standing at the corner was Jill*

- (123) [DD] However, *accompanying Florence is Mr Toots*, who comically ‘dotes upon’ her, just as she dotes upon her image of Paul, and in addition to a ‘requiem of little Dombey’, he hears ‘praise of Florence’ in the waves.
(Waters 1988:20)
- (124) And thus ever, by day and night, under the sun and under the stars, *climbing* the dusty hills *and toiling* along the weary plains, *journeying* by land and *journeying* by sea, *coming* and *going* so strangely, to meet and to act and react on one another, *move all we restless travellers* through the pilgrimage of life.
(*Little Dorrit* I, ii; Dickens 1978:67)
- (125) I have not seen the town. I have never even set foot inside the State of Arkansas. But I have seen the town in my head. And *standing on the steps of the commissary is a girl with yellow hair hanging in two heavy braids and with large blue eyes and with the hint of a delicate, famished hollow in each cheek.*
(*All the King's Men*, iii; Warren 1982:129)
- (126) [ID] There was a knock at the door... When I opened it, I saw that standing there was me!
(N.A McCawley 1977:388)

(vi) Adverbial preposing: *Greatly would I admire this if I could but under stand it.*

- (127) The Methodists and Baptists of America owe much of their condition to the silent but potent influence of their millions of Negro converts. *Especially is this noticeable* in the South, where theology and religious philosophy are on this account a long way behind the North, and where the religion of the poor whites is a plain copy of Negro thought and methods.
(*The Souls of Black Folk*, x; Du Bois 1989:157)

This construction is highly rhetorical and therefore not particularly suited to ordinary free indirect discourse contexts. I have not come across any FID or ID examples but the two following constructed passages seem to be perfectly acceptable:

- (128) Mainly had he come to see Rogers; but it would do no harm to see the boss either.
(129) Jimmy insisted that definitely could one try to contact Esso, but that he was not too sanguine about the outcome.

(vii) Verb preposing: *Mary plans for John to marry her, and marry her he will* (Hooper/Thompson 1973:466).

- (130) I confess to being terribly nervous until they came back *but come back they did.*
(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, vi; Stein 1990:173)
- (131) Sally plans for Gary to marry her, and *he vows that marry her he will.*
(Hooper/Thompson 1973:474)

I have not found any examples of this construction in a FID passage, but constructed passages again seem to be perfectly idiomatic: *He had promised to marry her, so marry her he would*. Although this is the standard pattern proposed for verb preposing, the following example from Virginia Woolf which preposes the entire verb phrase seems to be the more basic pattern for this root transformation:

- (132) [FID] Their heads were bent down, their heads were pressed down by some remorseless gale. *Speak to him they could not*
(*To the Lighthouse* III, iv; Woolf 1985:152)

(viii) BE-complement preposing: *Absurd she is* (Banfield 1982:29).

- (133) And although it is not among the instincts wild or domestic of the cat tribe to play at cards, *feline from sole to crown was Mr Carker the Manager*, as he basked in the strip of summerlight and warmth that shone upon his table and the ground as if they were a crooked dial-plate, and himself the only figure on it.

(*Dombey and Son*, xxii; Dickens 1985:372)³²

- (134) *Nunneries*, however, *here are none*.

(*Observations and Reflections*; Piozzi 1789/1967:379)

- (135) We had Abel come and stay with us a few days *and a proud boy he was* when he climbed to the top of the Strasbourg cathedral.

(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, vi; Stein 1990:176)

- (136) *He said it so wisely, as if he knew so well the things that happened in the world*, that she put it back at once, and then he gave her, from his own parcel, a gingerbread nut, *as if he were a great Spanish gentleman*, she [Cam] thought, *handing a flower to a lady at a window (so courteous his manner was)*.

(*To the Lighthouse* III, xii; Woolf 1985:189)

I have not found any similar example in indirect discourse, but suspect that they occur only in small numbers. A sentential raised complement of a different kind appears in the following:

- (137) and then he remembered that he was in a university not just the Army, and *to think* was just what the student *was* here for

(*Survey of English Usage* 6.2 (=16.2) 103–2)

I have additionally come across the following pattern, which seems to move the complement into an empty subject position. In actual fact the idiomatic *there* construction results from a transformation on the basis of such sentences, at least according to standard TG accounts (J.McCawley 1988:86–8). This already problematizes the notion of root transformations from a pragmatic perspective: the sentence with optional *there* transformation is definitely backgrounded against the (transformationally) primary

structure. This construction appears to be an equivalent of negative constituent preposing in terms of emphasis.

- (138) She [Fee] knew her son well enough to be convinced that one word from her would bring him back, *so she must not utter that word, ever. If the days were long and bitter with a sense of failure, she must bear it in silence. Paddy hadn't been the man of her choice, **but a better man than Paddy never lived.***

(*The Thorn Birds*, 'Ralph'; McCullough 1978:152–3)

(ix) **Verb complement preposing** after *to seem*, *to look*, etc.

- (139) He would have liked to hold on for a moment longer to the emeralds and rubies dug up, so people said, by thin Ralph Manresa in his ragamuffin days. *But alas, sunset light was unsympathetic to her make-up; **plated it looked**, not deeply interfused.*

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:146)

- (140) She was aware of the great flash of hoofs, a bluish, indescent flash surrounding a hollow of darkness. ***Large, large seemed the bluish, incandescent flash** of hoof-iron, large as a halo of lightning round the knotted darkness of the flanks.*

(*The Rainbow*, xvi; Lawrence 1988:488)

(x) **Emphatic preposing around 'to be'**³³ is a common argumentative or rhetorical transformation:

- (141) *Central* to any linguistic model **are the types** of differentiation that a competent speaker is presumed to have mastered [...]

(Reeves 1983:56)

- (142) *Fairly widespread is the opinion* that O'Neill wrote reasonably good dialogue when he dealt with some kind of vernacular [...], but was at a loss when he attempted to catch ordinary middle-class language or soaring poetical speech.

(Törnqvist 1968:185)

- (143) *No less real* than Don Quixote's chivalric Spain or the Spain of the lunatic asylum, **is the vision** at the end of a more beautiful world.

(Sicher 1986:217)

- (144) It involves no moral turpitude on the part of the speaker. **Different would be the case in which** the speaker uses an expression, by way of apparently intended identifying reference, to invoke what he knows or thinks the audience thinks.

(Strawson 1971:90)

- (145) [ID] I predict that **more significant** will be the amount of money contributed to campaign funds.

(Green 1976:391)

However, the construction also occurs in the context of narrated perception (cp. below in my discussion of Green's article in (4.6)):

- (146) *Very strange* was the constant glitter of the sea unsheathed in heaven, very warm and sweet the graveyard, in a nook of the hill catching the sunshine and holding it as one holds a bee between the palms of the hands, when it is benumbed. Grey grass and lichen and a little church, and snowdrops among coarse grass, and a cupful of incredibly warm sunshine.

(*The Rainbow*, ii; Lawrence 1988:52)

(xi) Concessive preposing: *Wonderful though it is, there's something uncanny about it.*

- (147) *However disturbing are the consequences* of this metamorphosis of sleepy St. Petersburg for both the author and his readers, we can hardly deny that in *Huckleberry Finn* Twain went out of his way to render the central shame of American democracy.

(NYRB 36.12 [1989]: 42)

- (148) [FID] While they had their coffee, and on the ride uptown, they talked, principally about Florence, how badly people treated her, and how empty her life was now that her husband was dead. *He had adored her, she told Elizabeth, and satisfied her every whim, but he had tended to irresponsibility. If she had told him once, she had told him a hundred times:* 'Frank you better take out life insurance.'

(*Go Tell it on the Mountain* II, iii; Baldwin 1985:177)

(xii) Left and right dislocation: *This book, it has a recipe in it; You should go see it, that movie* (Hooper/Thompson 1973:468).

- (149) [DD] And yet he had a sense of injury upon him, too, *had Bitherstone.*

(*Dombey and Son*, xii; Dickens 1985:220)

- (150) [FID] Tom, for his part, was rather glad he was not in danger of those mean accomplishments. *He was not going to be a snuffy schoolmaster—he; but a substantial man, like his father, who used to go hunting when he was younger, and rode a capital black mare—as pretty a bit of horseflesh as ever you saw: Tom had heard what her points were a hundred times.*

(*Mill on the Floss* I, viii; G.Eliot 1986:80)

- (151) *As for being sure which was which, or in what order they came, that was beyond him* [Mr Banks].

(*To the Lighthouse* I, iv; Woolf 1985:25)

- (152) *Die Atmosphäre der Stadt, diesen leis fauligen Geruch von Meer und Sumpf, den zu fliehen es ihn so sehr gedrängt hatte,—er atmete inn jetzt in tiefen ärztlich chmerzlichen Zügen.*

(‘Der Tod in Venedig’, Mann 1989:51)³⁴

There are no really convincing examples of left dislocation in an indirect complement clause; in fact the ungrammaticality of such a collocation has been remarked upon by TG-syntacticians (Lasnik/Uriagereka 1988).

(xiii) **Perceptual right-postposing:**³⁵ I have come across this in passages of narrated perception.

- (153) Meanwhile the tall girl gave a shrill cry, and *presently came running up the boy*, whom Maggie had passed as he was sleeping.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, x; G.Eliot 1986:112)

(xiv) **That-topicalization** ('subject replacement'): *That Henry forgot the key irritated Carmen* (Hooper/Thompson: 467). I do not consider this a particularly expressive construction. However, variants of object preposing in which the object is a whole clause come much closer to having an expressive function: *Why he came, I don't know*. These I propose to identify as **sentential object preposing**.

- (154) And she began to tell her story: *They had lived on the Treasure plantation—not as tenants but as owners—all their lives. How their father had managed to own a plantation in that part of Georgia they had been as children forbidden to ask.*

(*Meridian, Treasure*'; Walker 1976:208)

- (155) [FID] But *what she wished to get hold of was* that very jar on the nerves, the thing itself before it has been made anything.

(*To the Lighthouse* III, xi; Woolf 1985:178)

- (156) [FID] And, besides, *who was Uncle Joe to be prudish, she'd like to know?*

(*After Many a Summer* I, xii; Huxley 1950:168)

- (157) [FID] *Whose fault it was he could not say, only, after a time, repetition had taken the place of newness.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, iv; Woolf 1985:24)

- (158) [ID] It was the plunging of some small body in the water from among the neighbouring bulrushes: *if it was not a water-rat, Bob intimated that he was ready to undergo the most unpleasant consequences.*

(*Mill on the Floss* I, vi; G.Eliot 1986:52)

(xv) **Emphatic subject postposition:** *Jane's a great cook, is Jane; Malcolm goes to concerts a lot, does Malcolm*. I have not found any references to this construction among the studies on root transformations, but it is clearly a popular one:

- (159) But Ted is more than ever the alert young crop-headed narrow-necked Oppenheimer. Tanya is an angular brunette who has moldering violet eyes, one of which is cocked, and wears a ringlet of hair at each temple like a gypsy. They love each other, *do Ted'n Tanya*, and, though heathen, are irrevocably monogamous and faithful.

(*Love in the Ruins*, 'July First', xiv; Percy 1989:137)

- (160) *He was a coward **was this Pefer** [the dog], but he had kindly, gentle eyes and a pretty collie head, and his fur was very thick and white and nice when he was washed.*

(*Three Lives*; Stein 1936:67–8)

- (161) *She was one of those old women, **was Mrs Betty Higden**, who by dint of an indomitable purpose and a strong constitution fight out many years, though each year has come with its new knock-down blows fresh to the fight against her, wearied by it.*

(*Our Mutual Friend* I, xvi; Dickens 1979:246)

- (162) *Thus, Florence was in the habit of having the Daily Telegraph sent to her every day from London. She was always an Anglomaniac, **was Florence**; the Paris edition of the New York Herald was always good enough for me.*

(*The Good Soldier* I, iv; Ford 1983:34)

This construction has a very similar effect to the exclamatory sentence pattern of *I know, Jesus, do I ever know* (cp. under (3.3.1) above), except that it always correlates with a full NP in a construction that is the obverse of dislocation. There also exists a similar pattern without inversion:

- (163) *He went home talking to himself and to the moon, that was very high and small, stumbling at the flashes of moonlight from the puddles at his feet, wondering What the Hanover! then laughing confidently to the moon, assuring her this was first class, **this was**.*

(*The Rainbow*, i; Lawrence 1988:27)

(xvi) Adverb dislocation: *The thief sneaked away, evidently* (Hooper/ Thompson 1973: 468). This is one of the constructions I have earlier treated under sentence-modifiers (4.3.1).

(xvii) Tag question formation. Question tags are of course common in free indirect discourse and can also be found in indirect discourse. However, I have not seen any equivalents of transposed *n'est-ce pas* in French examples. This would require further study. I have noted tags above under (4.3.1) (J).

Discussion

The above constructions (which I continue to label root transformations for merely practical purposes) need to be distinguished for various grades of emphasis and expressivity. Thus, emphatic preposing around *to be* (x) is arguably a construction that has little expressivity in the Banfieldian sense—it posits no experiencing SELF or consciousness from whose deictic centre the emotion would be registered. (x) in fact occurs most commonly in argumentative prose, as the examples demonstrate, where it helps to introduce the sentence topic, ensuring successful cohesive structure to the argument. In other constructions inversion (I-movement) is obligatory from a grammatical point of view, for example after negative constituent preposing. The preposing itself, on the other hand, is an expressive device since it implies the speaker's (or SELF's in free indirect

discourse) emotional involvement (surprise, insistence, emphatic promise, etc.). Some of the constructions here listed are quite clearly linked to the *perception* of the speaking or thinking consciousness: *Standing at the corner was Dick* describes the order of perception from the initial discovery of the person seen at the corner to his eventual identification by the perceiving consciousness. Another palpably perceptual category is the directional preposing device which is very commonly linked to the surprise, dismay, fear, etc. experienced at the onset of unexpected events: *Up pops Redeye*. Yet this construction, with its characteristic inversion, is additionally a common sequentational feature that occurs in conjunction with the historical present tense at crucial ‘turns’ of the narrative, i.e. at the beginnings of new subepisodes, and at the climax of unexpected incidences.³⁶ The inversion (I-movement) here seems to be an old Germanic feature—at least for episode beginnings (cp. Hopper 1979a, 1979b)—also mirrored in the frequent inversion at the beginning of ballads (*Sah ein Knab ein Röslein stehen*), where the narrative starts *medias in res*.

Besides carefully distinguishing between preposing (which seems to correlate with the expressivity of the construction) and the inversion (more properly structural, attention-inducing), one also needs to consider the case of do-emphasis within these constructions. In Table 3 I have noted those cases where DO-inversion necessarily occurs and have marked those that cannot take DO-inversion by means of *DO: *Into the cabin *does Ahab come*.³⁷ The table includes only those root transformations which are the result of a stylistic choice, that is to say, in which the relevant constituent could have remained in its original position, and the sentence would have then remained unemphatic, ‘unexpressive’. Note, for example, the contrast between

- (164) Never had Joe done such a thing!
 Joe had never done such a thing.
 (165) Into the alley went the little girl.
 The little girl went into the alley.

Only constructions in which one has a stylistic choice can properly be considered emphatic.

In some cases inversion is not applied when the subject is a pronoun: *Up he goes*; * *Up goes he*. This is entirely logical if one considers that the NP following the verb marks the object or person whose appearance has caused the surprise, motivating the construction in the first place, so that this NP thus constitutes *new* information. Appropriately, *Up goes he* in a contrastive or otherwise empathic context is perfectly acceptable. The ‘newness’ of the final, full constituent also requires the use of an indefinite article at this point—a fact I realized when reading the following sentence from a (non-native) student’s essay:³⁹

- (166) [From a summary of Oscar Wilde’s *The Canterville Ghost*] Rushing downstairs they found a large suit of armour lying on the stone floor and *the* ghost sitting in a chair.

Table 3: Root transformations—overview

(i)	Negative constituent preposing (I-movement; DO)
(ii)	Emphatic object preposing
(iii)	Directional adverb preposing (I-movement; *DO)
(iv)	Prepositional phrase preposing (I-movement; *DO)
(v)	Participle preposing (I-Movement; *DO) ³⁸
(vi)	Adverbial preposing (DO): <i>Greatly do I admire Jake's cuisine</i>
(vii)	Verb preposing (<i>and marry her he will</i>) (obligatory auxiliary, which may be DO)
(viii)	BE-complement preposing: (I-movement; no full verb)
(ix)	Verb complement preposing after <i>to seem</i> , etc. (I-movement; *DO)
(x)	Emphatic preposing around <i>to be</i> (I-movement; no full verb)
(xi)	Concessive preposing (no inversion)
(xii)	Left and right dislocation (no inversion)
(xiii)	Perceptual right-postposing (<i>Presently came running up the boy</i>) (no inversion)
(xiv)	Subsidiary clause-topicalization (no inversion)
(xv)	Emphatic subject postposition (I-movement; DO)

The anaphoric pronoun, of course, refers back to *known* information (as does the definite article): *Down he went*, for instance, registers surprise not at the disappearance of an unknown person but at the unexpected movement of a person already present (and presupposed).⁴⁰ The definite article in (166) is odd if the perspective of the children is taken to be dominant and the ghost is mentioned for the first time in the essay, as is here the case.

Besides producing the effects of ‘expressivity’ (which can be interpreted as the expression of emotional involvement and/or the expression of simultaneous perception or realization) and, secondly, of ‘mere’ emphasis, some root transformations additionally provide an index of colloquiality: the prevalence of root transformations in the language of conversation and oral storytelling makes it possible for them to connote a character’s point of view in literary narrative, where the narrator traditionally would not condescend to colloquialisms (cp. under (9.4) below). Among the constructions named above, the following are usually considered to be decidedly colloquial:

- Up we went. (iii)
- Into the garden ran Julie. (iv)
- Standing at the corner was Joe. (v)
- Joe wants to marry Hilda, and marry her he will. (vii)
- Absurd she is. (viii)
- This book, you must read it. He’s a real conman, he. (xii)
- They go out a great deal, do Tom and Mary. (xv)

Purely emphatic constructions, on the other hand, are less colloquial than merely rhetorical and can frequently also be encountered in the narrator’s more literary style.

Some of the constructions, such as object fronting, dislocation and negative constituent preposing, can be formal as well as colloquial depending on the circumstances:

- (167) This holy book you should see rising above the skies.
 The lamb of peace and innocence—it was here among us tonight.
 Never again will the peace of God descend upon us.

There is also the question of person. Root transformations, since they express emphasis or subjectivity, are constrained in their occurrence to awareness criteria similar to those stipulated to exist by Kuno (1987) for reflexive pronominals.⁴¹ The experiencer can give expression to his or her own emotions, but others' emotions can only be rendered if these have been expressed verbally to the reporter. Thus,

- (168) * Greatly does Tom admire General Washington.
 Tom acknowledged that greatly did he admire General Washington.

Indeed, it is in unembedded clauses in a third-person context that these root transformations are banned unless the sentence is free indirect discourse or can be conjectured to hint at that third person's speech or thought:

- (169) Never had Judith seen a more beautiful dress.

Unless SPEAKER empathizes with Judith's realization—which she must have uttered—or unless this is a rendering of Judith's thoughts in free indirect discourse, the sentence cannot stand as it is.

The case is similar to those constructions that do not include a reference to the perceiver:

- (170) Into the well dropped the bucket.

In this sentence SPEAKER is most naturally taken to be PERCEIVER because the sentence articulates surprise—of the speaker. The sentence can, however, easily transfer into a third person context:

- (171) Tom stood the bucket on the rim of the well and peered down the shaft. Into the well dropped the bucket.

If SPEAKER is *physically present* at this scene, then this can mirror SPEAKER's consternation or simply surprise at what happened to the unminded bucket. However, if we have an elusive narrator, the consternation expressed by the root transformation will be attributed to Tom, who is on the scene and might well be the party to perceive this

event and react to it emotionally. It can also be attributed to any other character on hand who disposes of the relevant perception and emotion.⁴²

- (172) As Susan was walking towards Tom, he stood the bucket on the rim of the well and peered down the shaft. Into the well dropped the bucket.

Note—in parentheses—that this is an argument in favour of Mieke Bal's complex system of focalization (Bal 1985). The event of the bucket dropping into the well is focalized either by a narrator-focalizer or by a character on the scene of action—whether Tom, Susan or a past narrator-SELF ('experiencing I'). The point is well taken since the narrator *qua* narrator can empathize with the figural perspective—a case of Bühler's *Deixis am Phantasma*—and transfer his or her deictic system within the scene of past fictional events. The narrator in this instance *mimes* the reaction of a perceiver of the event (situated within the world of fiction) and adopts that perceiver's stance. Only in this case (which evokes the reflectorization pattern which we will analyse in Chapter 7) can the narrator be justified in using such a perception-invoking root transformation. *Qua* omniscient narrator, the narrator cannot (by definition) be surprised at the event—s/he can only mime surprise by implicitly pretending to be on the scene and by, for the moment, forsaking narratorial omniscience. Let us now look at embedded sentences with these root transformations.

- (173) ? It is true that into the well fell the bucket.
 Hilary explained that into the well fell the bucket.
 Mary heard from Timothy that standing at the bar were Marilyn and Oswald.

It is quite clear that the surprise or other emotional reaction attaching to the root transformation in (173) needs to be related to Hilary and Timothy (i.e. the quoted speakers) respectively. Emphatic root transformations, however, can be attributed either to the SPEAKER or to the quoted speaker:

- (174) It is true that most important of all is the defence budget for this year.
 a.
 b. Hilary acknowledged that most valuable was the initial step towards effective disarmament.
 c. It was explained to Mary that significant above all was the oscillation rate of the graph.

The most common reading for (b) and (c) would still attach the emphasis to the original speaker, but in (a), and as a second alternative for (b) and (c), one can take the speaker of the sentence to be the originator of the emphasis. *It is true* as an 'impersonal' construction lends itself most easily to such an emphasis, and this emphasis can carry over into embedded clauses also because it is not expressive of subjectivity; independently of the

quoted speaker's statements or beliefs, SPEAKER can therefore readily assert his or her own evaluation of the proposition. However, this is true *only* of emphatic constructions; perceptions and emotional emphases need to be laid at the quoted speaker's door:

(175) Gloria complained that it asphyxiated her, that disgusting cigar.

Indeed, one can conclude from the above that acceptability of root transformations is the same within or without embedded clauses, only that embedded clauses are usually introduced by a verb that explicitly mentions the relevant factors of perception or speech. Although these findings invalidate the Banfieldian claim that root transformations in subsidiary clauses need to be attributed to SPEAKER exclusively, they also corroborate the construction of third person SELF for some contexts—including *indirect* discourse—and, even more clearly than does Banfield's theory, help to point towards the fundamental cognitive significance of the first vs third person distinction (discussed in terms of embodiment by Stanzel) and the equally fundamental constraints on subjectivity.

4.4

MORPHOLOGIC, SYNTACTIC AND PHONETIC INDICATIONS OF REGISTER

Free indirect discourse can easily incorporate dialectal morphology and syntax as well as lexical peculiarities of the dialect in question.

(176) 'Wahs?' Miss Amma Dean said, and looked at me a long time. *She **knowed** it was Timmy, because Timmy was Robert's son, and Robert would 'a' done the same thing. No, not would 'a', did it. To one of her cousins. Had put one of her own cousins on a half-broke horse, and the horse had **throwed** him 'cross the fence.*

(*Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman*; Gaines 1971:141)

(177) 'Her bairn,' she [Mrs Murdockson] said, 'was her bairn, and she came to fetch her out of ill **haft** [dwelling place] and **waur** [worse] guiding. If she **wasna sae** wise as **ither** folk, few **ither** folk had suffered as **muckle** as she had done; **forby** [besides] **that she could fend the waur for hersell within the four wa's** [walls] **of a jail**. She could prove by fifty witnesses, and fifty to that, that her daughter had never seen Jock Porteous, alive or dead, since he had **gien** her a loundering **wi** ' his cane, the **neger that he was!** for driving a dead cat at the provost's wig on the Elector of Hanover's birth-day.'

(*Heart of Midlothian*, xviii; Scott 1989:186–7)

(178) They [Jacob and the Frenchman, Tassigny] nodded at each other and laughed. *Rosie should only see him now, Jacob thought. **Now she couldhear some real French**. It did his heart good to be sitting here, talking casually with a Frenchman. A real Frenchman, not one of your phonies. A real Frenchman — direct from France! He was immensely pleased.*

(*The Rich Man*, iii; Kreisel 1985:28)

- (179) Mr Towlinson returns thanks in a speech replete with feeling, of which the peroration turns on foreigners, regarding whom he says they may find favours, sometimes, with weak and inconstant intellects that can be led away by hair, *but all he hopes, is, he may **never hear of no foreigner never boning nothing out of no travelling chariot.***

(*Dombey and Son*, xxxi; Dickens 1985:531)

In indirect discourse such quotations from the characters' speech can also be found, but they are perhaps less common and usually tend to be used in a predominantly ironic manner.

- (180) Mr Blandois, taking him by both shoulders again, rolled him about a little in his former merry way, then drew his arm through his own, and invited him to come off and drink a bottle of wine *like a dear deep old dog **as** he was.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xxx; Dickens 1978:411–12)

- (181) [...] *to protest, like the Japanese in the anecdote, that he was **altogether flummoxed and perplexed by position of Honorable Bird.***

(*After Many a Summer* I, viii; Huxley 1950:107)

The clash between a narratorial standard and the lower-class, dialectal or ethnic speech of the characters is a phenomenon of the realist novel and has obvious ideological underpinnings. In twentieth-century literature this marked contrast has frequently been inverted by narrators of a decidedly colloquial and even dialectal style, and the ironic juxtaposition of standard versus non-standard language has been lost, superseded or used parodically. We will return to this problem in [Chapter 6](#).⁴³

4.5

LEXICAL INDICATIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY

Free indirect discourse frequently attempts to suggest the precise flavour of the original utterance or consciousness that is 'true' to a character's mind. One prominent and pervasive manner of doing so is to incorporate lexical items from the character's or reported speaker's idiolect, sociolect, dialect or (foreign) language. The more precisely evaluative adjectives and adverbs have been categorized in great detail by Quirk *et al.* (1985), who chose semantic criteria for their presentation. Thus in their basic distinction between adjuncts (which serve as modifiers or complements of phrasal categories and include, e.g., intensifiers), subjuncts (which play a subordinate role, e.g. *fully appreciate, bitterly regret*), disjuncts (which cover the meaning of the entire clause, e.g. *honestly, seriously, roughly*, etc.) and conjuncts (which link argumentative structures). This categorization, which has been adopted by Wiebe (1990), does not really serve my own purposes, namely that of noting kinds of subjectivity, and not semantic categories of modification. I have noted below where my slots overlap with Quirk *et al.*'s subcategories. The reader is referred to Wiebe (1990) as well as the original Quirk for a

full list of all the adjectives and adverbials of evaluation, modality, connection and intensification.

(A) Lexemes of a foreign language:

- (182) He and his six *amis* had come to the New World to gain *gloire* and *honneur* through *nouveaux exploits* despite *les dangers*, but instead got lost and spent June and July looking for the route.

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'New Albion'; Keillor 1987:30–1)⁴⁴

(B) Dialectal, sociolectal, ideological peculiarities of a lexical kind. This category somewhat overlaps with morphological infractions of standard grammar (cp. under (4.4) above).

- (183) *[S]he was going to clean out those snowball bushes. She never really had liked them big droopy things. And she was going to water the yard and sit down and read the Gospel of John.*

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'Revival'; Keillor 1987:412)

(C) Free indirect discourse also typically incorporates **evaluative** modifiers and attributes appropriate to the reported speaker's outlook such as *spiffing*, *terrific*, *wonderful*, *marvellous*, *stupendous*, *gorgeous*, *awful*, *preposterous*, *peculiar* and the like:⁴⁵

- (184) What he would have liked, she [Mrs Ramsay] supposed, would have been to say how he had been to Ibsen with the Ramsays. *He was an awful prig—oh yes, an insufferable bore.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, i; Woolf 1985:17)

- (185) *And then, of course, the London library; and Vespers at Westminster Cathedral, if they happened to be singing Palestrina; and every alternate week, between five and six-thirty, an hour and a half with Mae or Doris in their flat in Maida Vale. Infinite squalor in a little room, as he liked to call it; abysmally delightful*

(*After Many a Summer* I, viii; Huxley 1950:107)

(D) Additionally, free indirect discourse employs a number of expressive **intensifiers**,⁴⁶ from the emotionally loaded *so* or *too*, to a whole variety of post-nominal and post-verbal complements (usually of a decidedly colloquial if not vulgar style):

- (186) She reminded me of the maternal regard which she had always manifested towards me, and appealed to my own heart whether anything could be said in vindication of that reserve with which I had lately treated her, and urged me, as I valued her good opinion, to explain the cause of dejection that was too visible.

(*Edgar Huntly*; Brown 1973:69–70)

- (187) Fee stared at her stupidly, shocked out of her habitual indifference. *It was so incongruously bridal, so grossly unsuitable — why on earth had she tricked herself out like a raddled old spinster playacting at being married?*
(*The Thorn Birds* II, vii; McCullough 1978:175)
- (188) *But she 'd find it some day anyway, she was confident she 'd find it some day if she just kept moving; there were only so many places it could be on an island, though she hoped to hell it wouldn't take forever because her idea was to have herself buried there.*
(*The Invention of the World*, 'Maggie', i; Hodgins 1977:15)
- (189) *And yet, if Mr. Propter was right, old Royce's ideas about loyalty were all wrong.*
(*After Many a Summer* I, xiii; Huxley 1950:173)
- (190) He **sho** was what Miz Harris would call bad, cause every time he was with her he tried to take her back of a palmetto clump or some'n.
(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:210)
- (191) the . kid has now left her . ((she says she just)) doesn't know **what in the hell** [sic!] to do with ((her))
(*Survey of English Usage* S.2.13.44)

There are numerous other such intensifiers.⁴⁷

(E) There are also **epithets** which Banfield calls 'qualitative nouns' (1982: 54)⁴⁸ that always have a subjective interpretation. Examples are *that idiot of a doctor*, *that son of a bitch of a foreman*, *sa mondaine de soeur*, etc. The construction seems to be particularly popular in French. Within one paragraph of *Le Père Goriot* I have found *cet horreur d'homme* and *son dadais de fils*⁴⁹ (Balzac 1966:63). Besides these more striking epithets there are however a great number of more standard evaluative NPs, some more inventive than others. This category clearly overlaps with expressive designation (3.2.4).

- (192) He didn't know who he felt sorry for, her for the disappointment ahead, or himself for envying her hope. *But he knew he sure as hell didn't feel sorry for those others, the buggers that ran the thing, they had a cozy little set-up there if he'd ever heard of one.*
(*The Invention of the World*, 'Wade', iv; Hodgins 1977:168)
- (193) **That little fart** couldn't make a speech to save his ass, he [Danny Holland] said, because the little fart was a goddam government man who didn't know nothing.
(*Ibid.*, 'Second Growth'; 351)
- (194) Having finally discovered that the seat adjoining Miss Bart's was at her disposal, she [Mrs George Dorset] possessed herself of it with a farther displacement of her surroundings, explaining meanwhile that she had come across from Mount Kisco in her motor-car that morning, and had been kicking her heels for an hour at Garrisons, without even the alleviation of a cigarette, her **brute of a husband** having neglected to replenish her case before they parted that morning.
(*The House of Mirth* I, ii; Wharton 1962:28)

(F) In addition, one also needs to note evaluative adjectives that lexicalize a speaker's attitude towards the modified person or object: *poor, damned, lousy*. There are also verbs with expressive non-literal meanings: *I'll be damned, I'll kill myself with laughter* (Banfield 1982: 91–2).

(195) Daniel Doherty the blacksmith stepped forward from the gathering crowd in the road and told him they'd line up once a day, every man of them, and kiss his rear end if only he'd take them off **this godforsaken mountain**.

(*The Invention of the World, The Eden Swindle*; Hodgens 1977:103)

(196) **Poor Uncle Jo!** *she thought, with a rush of affectionate pity for the old gentleman.*

(*After Many a Summer* I, iv; Huxley 1950:48)

(197) Gertrude Stein remonstrated, she said half in english half in french [sic], thats **s he wo uld be hanged** if after the struggle of getting Marie Laurencin up that terrific hill it was going to be for nothing.

(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, v; Stein 1990:105)

Note that these adjectives have a non-subjective literal reading also. They are therefore to be distinguished from more purely evaluative adjectives treated under (C) above.

(G) Another set of subjective elements are **epistemic lexemes** that give away the character's cognitive limitations, such as *probably, certainly* and a number of modal adverbs.⁵⁰

(198) Hearing Pilate talk about caves and woods and earrings on Darling Street [...] seemed exotic, *something from another world and age, and maybe not even true.*

(*Song of Solomon*, x; Morrison 1977:231)

(199) She had ordered smoked salmon *to begin with, and afterwards perhaps she would have some Brie, all creamy and delicious.*

(*Jane and Prudence*, x; Pym 1987:102)

Besides, many such modifiers additionally imply a character's evaluation or cognitive position:

(200) *For, after all, old Propter had written Short Studies ; what he said couldn't just be dismissed as the vapourings of a deficient mind.*

(*After Many a Summer* I, viii; Huxley 1950:107)

(201) He too, as I have said, is going to church, and is presently asking his way to the English chapel. *The Wilson family will certainly be there, and it has struck him that the dreaded meeting will be robbed of half its painful awkwardness if it takes place in public.*

(*Alas! II*; Broughton 1890:32)

(H) Many lexical peculiarities are clearly part of a character's **private language**:

- (202) *Her language: obliged, now, to emit these alien sounds that made her tongue feel tired, was she not entitled to moan? Her familiar place: what matter that they had lived, in Dhaka, in a teacher's humble flat, and now, owing to entrepreneurial good sense, savings and skill with spices, occupied this four-story terraced house? Where now was the city she knew? Where the village of her youth and the green waterways of home? [...] Furthermore: was she not forced to put up with a **husband of no account**, whereas before she could bask in his dignified position? Where was the pride in being made to work for her living, whereas before she could sit at home in **much-befitting** pomp?*

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:249)

- (203) On all these grounds the Captain soothed himself with thinking that though Ned Cuttle was forced by the pressure of events to 'stand by' almost useless for the present, Ned would **fetch up with a wet sail** in good time, and **carry all before him**.

(*Domby and Son*, xvii; Dickens 1985:299)

One should include here also characters' **malapropisms**, so frequently exploited for comic effect in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century-novel:

- (204) 'I've just had some new photers taken, my dear,' she [Mrs Stubbs] shouted cheerfully to Alice. 'Tell me what you think of them.'

In a very dainty refined way Alice wet her fingers and put the tissue back from the first one. *Life! How many there were! There were three **dozzing** at least.*

(*'At the Bay'*, viii; Mansfield 1988:286)

- (205) He told her that he was twenty-eight years old and had lived a varied life. [...] He said he had fought and bled in the **Arm Service** of his country and visited every foreign land and that everywhere he had seen people that didn't care if they did a thing one way or another. He said he hadn't been raised thataway.

(*The Life You Save May Be Your Own*; O'Connor 1985:148)

- (206) They condemned me not for not keeping my whore, but that I did not keep her more under. The thing is laudable, said one, to have a miss, though he hath a very handsome wife of his own, and is agreeable to the custom and honour of the times; *and should we throw any **'approbium'** upon it, it would reflect upon ourselves.*

(*Jackson's Recantation*; Head in Peterson 1961:157)

(I) Besides these rather personal expressions there are numerous real **idioms** that signal colloquial language, and hence implicitly allow one to posit a reported consciousness:

- (207) Now that was done with and, quite coldly, she [La Dolciquita] said that she wanted money if he was to have any more of her. *It was a perfectly reasonable commercial transaction. She **did not care two buttons** for Edward or for any man and he was asking her to risk a very good situation with a Grand Duke.*

(*The Good Soldier* III, iv; Ford 1983:160)

- (208) [...] but, **come to think of it**, it was those dark ones with oil on their hair that had always given her the biggest kick!

(*After Many a Summer* I, iv; Huxley 1950:49)

- (209) **Trouble was**, nobody'd be looking. [...] **Trouble about going** to white folks, they always think you're exaggerating.

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:333)

- (210) [Mr Snagsby's loving] to remark (if in good spirits) that there were old times once, and that you'd find a stone coffin or two, **now**, under that chapel, **he'll be bound**, if you was to dig for it.

(*Bleak House*, x; Dickens 1975:181; quoted Sørensen 1959:434)⁵¹

That leaves us with the quantitatively largest category of lexical items which contextually point to the 'original' speaker or his or her consciousness. Frequently there is little evidence for such an alignment except in the reader's stylistic perspicacity. Such cases are usually discussed in terms of 'stylistic deviation from the norm'. When free indirect discourse evokes a character's 'voice', the idiomaticity of the phrasing, the more colloquial (or more learned) tone (as the case may be), the too enthusiastic or too sceptical evaluation of the matter in hand—all these may hint at the other-directedness of the linguistic representation:

- (211) 'What do you think of that?'

Anthony really didn't know what to think of it; but said, meanwhile, that it was *wonderful*.

(*Eyeless in Gaza*, xxii; Huxley 1955:320)

- (212) His [Tom's] stable services were merely a sinecure, and consisted simply in a daily care and inspection, and directing an under-servant in his duties; for Marie St. Clare declared that she could not have any smell of horses about him when he came near her, and that he must **positively** not be put to any service that would make him unpleasant to her, as her nervous system was entirely inadequate to any trial of that nature.

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xvi; Stowe 1981:177)

- (213) In the meanwhile Gertrude Stein had received a letter from Fernande, very dignified, written with the reticence of a french-woman [sic]. She said that she wished to tell Gertrude Stein that she understood **perfectly** that the friendship had always been with Pablo and although Gertrude had always shown her every mark of sympathy and affection now that she and Pablo were separated, it was naturally impossible that in the future there should be any **intercourse** between them because the friendship having been with Pablo there could of course be no question of a choice. That she would always remember their **intercourse** with pleasure and that she would permit herself, if ever she were in need, to **throw herself upon Gertrude's generosity**.

(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, v; Stein 1990:112)

- (214) Ihre Gesichter [der Kinder] waren rot und erregt. *Welch ein Festtag heute! Der Storch, ein Storch mit braven Muskeln, **entschieden**, hatte außer dem Schwesterchen noch allerlei **Prachtvolles** mitgebracht: eine neue Schulmappe mit Seehundsfell für Thomas, eine große Puppe mit wirklichem — dies war das Außerordentliche—mit wirklichem Haar für Antonie, ein buntes Bilderbuch für die artige Klothilde, [...] und für Christian ein komplettes Kasperle-Theater mit Sultan, Tod und Teufel.*

(Buddenbrooks II, i; Mann 1991:58)⁵²

Many of these cases are clearly debatable, and individual judgements will vary from person to person. As these examples show, literary texts frequently evoke a quasi-verbatim nature of free indirect discourse, an aspect that will be discussed in more detail in [Chapter 6](#). For the moment I merely wanted to describe lexical evocations of ‘voice’ as one of the most noticeable characteristics of free indirect discourse, noticeable above all on account of its potential function as a signal (*indice*) for a FID reading.

4.6

EXPRESSIVITY

Now that I have presented a number of so-called ‘expressive devices’ it will be well to inquire a little more particularly into their expressivity. What exactly are they expressive of? Are all these devices *equally* expressive? I have already touched on these questions with regard to root transformations. There we were able to actually observe grammar evoke subjectivity in appropriate contexts that allow the reader or addressee to invoke the presence of logophoric awareness, of a perceiving or experiencing consciousness. Many of the root transformations in fact occur in what narratologists have come to call narrated perception (see under (5.5)): the presentation of events in a manner evocative of a character’s perceptual experience.

The problem of expressivity becomes more complex with lexical items. These are indicative also of social status, local origin, colloquial speech (idiomaticity) and a character’s individuality of speech or judgement. No ‘deictic centre’ of a character’s subjectivity can necessarily be posited for these kinds of direct discourse clues in free indirect discourse or indirect discourse or in the narrative. Yet they nevertheless evoke the character’s (or original speaker’s) voice, or standpoint, and/or connote his or her social and geographical background. Should one reduce these phenomena to direct discourse features? This is problematic because they *become* direct discourse features only once they have been *taken out of* context, in fact they are signals of direct discourse *only when* there is in fact no direct discourse. It is the contrast with the surrounding narrative that makes a morphological dialect form such as *he done gone* into a kernel of deictic, subjective and expressive alterity. All these devices evoke the illusion of a verbatim faithful transcription of reality, and they supply a realistic motivation to the reading process. Even outside free indirect discourse and outside figural narrative such lexical morphological and syntactic devices suggest the presence of discourse and hence of a human mind in all its

emotional, rational, motivational plenitude including its social and regional situatedness in the (fictional) world.

The suggestiveness of these devices is much reduced in conversational speech reports where the communicational urgencies usually win out over subtle evocations of the kind encountered in the literary language. The use of expressive devices is perhaps cruder, executed with a broad brush and some exaggeration. Oral discourse reports tend to maximize the effectiveness of derogatory epithets, and intensifiers or modifiers are usually limited to a small repertory, whereas in literature the full palette of stylistic nuances—the *mot juste* recreation of implied pretentiousness, affectation, understatement, complacency, naïvety, etc.—can be observed at work in the masters of the trade (Jane Austen, George Meredith). Speakers, of course, also give themselves away in precisely the same way by their own linguistic usage, but are less likely to catch the precise tone when quickly rendering others' utterance.

The expressive quality of the subjectivity devices outlined in this chapter has very rarely been defined with any precision. In particular, the notions of emphasis ('focus'), expressivity and subjectivity have been invoked either separately or without any attempt at a functional analysis of discourse interdependence. I will return to the issue of root transformations one more time because this syntactic phenomenon at least allows for empirically verifiable determination. Lexical expressivity will be discussed in [Chapter 6](#), when I turn to the pitfalls of stylistic deviation (6.3).

Predictably, Milner, Banfield and (partly) N.A.McCawley concentrate on the expressive (i.e. subjective) nature of root transformations—treating emphatic root transformations as 'expressive of SPEAKER's point of view'. Lavric (1992), on the other hand, for obvious pragmatic reasons concentrates on topic/focus (or theme/rheme) distribution in argumentative prose. The most balanced and probably so far the best contribution to the subject has been Georgia M.Green's excellent paper on inversion in English (Green 1980). Green distinguishes between (a) the 'connective function' of English inversion:

(215) *At issue is* Section 1401 (a) of the Controlled Substances Act.

(Green 1980:586 [= (8c)])

(b) an 'introductory' function—which seems to closely correspond with the use of directional adverb preposing and prepositional phrase preposing at incipit points of the narrative episode (Fludernik 1992a):

(216) *Into the consulting room* of a fairly mad physician, whose name I somehow remember as Lucas Membrane, *hurtled* a haggard middle-aged woman, towing her husband, a psychotic larrikin about seven feet tall.

(Green 1980:589: [= (15b)])

(217) Just *down Highway 20 stands* the Hill of Cumorah, where the angel Moroni revealed to Joseph Smith the golden tablets (sorry, no sampling allowed), on which were inscribed the teachings of Mormonism.

(NYRB 39.3 [1992]: 4)

and (c) an ‘emphatic’ function, which has been argued to correlate with implicit surprise at the onset of unexpected developments (Gary 1976).

As Green herself so aptly notes, this last ‘anaphoric’ category has been used pervasively as a ‘wastebasket’ term for all manner of inversions (1980:595). Specifically, it comprises root transformations at the incidence point in narrative structure, but also exclamative inversion (*How dreadful is this place!; Bitterly did he rue it; Few and evil have been the days of my life*).⁵³

Green then proceeds to distinguish between what she calls a ‘scene-setting’ function:⁵⁴

- (218) The guest house was densely populated with ceramic, stone, and wrought metal sculptures. There was an enormous stainless steel frog and two tiny elves in the foyer, and *outside stood a little angel*.

(Green 1980:596 [= (30)])

When I arrived at the Pearly Gates, St. Peter was seated at a desk in a little sentry box. *Outside stood a little angel*, intently observing the proceedings.

(Ibid. [= (31)])

and the ‘resolution function’:

- (219) One night there was a tap on the window. Mrs. Rabbit peeped through the window. *Outside stood a little angel*. ‘Your wish is granted,’ it said. ‘A baby rabbit is on her way to you.’

(Ibid., 595 [= (28)])

I find Green’s terminology not particularly helpful at this point. It is true that in (218) the inversion occurs within descriptive passages, yet in the first example the lines seem to come from an initial orientation phase of the narrative, whereas in the second it correlates closely with Harweg’s (1975a) *exogenic situational* category, that is to say with the perception of the scene on the part of the arriving person. Indeed, the ‘resolution’ example (219) *also* captures the experiencer’s *perception*, and this perceptual quality seems to me to greatly outweigh the resolution function. Or, put differently, scene-setting and resolution functions belong to a level of narrative analysis (including suspense-creating strategies, the arrangement of the chronological sequencing, etc.), whereas the perceptual and orientational quality belongs to a more story-bound schematization of the narrational material. *Both* kinds of inversion seem to occur exclusively in *narrative*—another indication that the invocation of perception on the part of the story agents is of considerable relevance. In particular, it should be noted that the *same* root transformation is at issue in all of Green’s examples for the emphatic and introductory functions of English inversion, namely directional adverb or (locative or directional) prepositional phrase preposing. The semantic implication of perception therefore not merely has a basis in the narrative discourse scheme within which it occurs but additionally correlates with

static existence in a locality or dynamic movement impinging on such a locality—both typical parameters of (human) perception. In fact, one can additionally argue that the structural transferral of a perceptual root transformation to the very story beginning (216) constitutes a way of evoking story experience *per se*, facilitating the reader's immediate empathy with the story experience. What we have here then is a kind of radicalized *medias in res* device equivalent to the use of the familiarizing article, referentless (logophoric) pronouns and other indications of a 'figural' consciousness, of a reflector narrative (Stanzel 1984b: 169–70). However, in contrast to the typical reflector narrative, story incipit inversion marks story experience on a less narrowly story-internal experiential level, merely underlining the entry into the story world. (The narrative pattern is fairly common in nineteenth-century authorial narrative.)

I now return to Green's 'connective' function, which mainly occurs in argumentative prose. Although all of Green's and Lavric's examples are indeed from argumentative texts including newspaper articles and legal prose, I find that this use has actually some similarity to Green's 'scene-setting' examples.

- (220) The guest house was densely populated with ceramic, stone, and wrought metal sculptures. There was an enormous Stainless steel frog and two tiny elves in the foyer, and *outside stood a little angel*.

(Green 1980:596 [= (30)])

As the eye shifts from the inside to the outside, a change in focus is indicated by the use of the root transformation. Argumentative root transformations typically draw the reader's attention to a certain aspect of an already introduced subject or theme. In a sense they particularize or specify a location, point or aspect within a larger frame that has already been evoked in the reader's mind—is 'active'—and direct attention to or focus on one part of this frame, or shift the attention from one aspect within the frame to the next. The use of root transformations in such argumentative texts—and it needs to be noted that, unlike the perceptual root transformation, these devices *typically* occur in *written* discourse—are therefore attention-related, structure-defining and focus-inducing.

- (221) *Even more improbable is his commitment* to theatre, that province of an elite that does not usually follow the masses to cowboy movies and rock concerts. *Most improbable of all*, perhaps, is Shepard's idiomatic range—not only Western colloquialisms and rock slang, but also the vernaculars of sport, drugs, the underworld, science fiction, and the mass media.

(Bock/Wertheim 1981:161)

- (222) *Contributing* to the economic growth, moreover, *was an unprecedented tide* of immigration.

(NYRB 36.20 [1989]: 55)

- (223) alle Christen sein wahrhaftig geistlichs stand und ist unter ihnen *kein Unterscheid* denn des Amts halben allein.

(Quoted Weimann 1986:455)⁵⁵

- (224) 'Du wirst aber, liebes Kind,' versetzte Charlotte, 'dem Anblick der Menschen dich nirgends entziehen können. *Klöster haben wir nicht*, in denen sonst eine Freistatt für solche Gefühle zu finden war.'

(*Wahlverwandschaften* II, xv; Goethe 1986:231)⁵⁶

- (225) Insistons sur un dernier point. La quantité d'occurrences, ou si l'on préfère, la part representative, n'est pas seule decisive. *Déterminante se révèle* également la façon dont se distribuent les occurrences sur l'intervalle temporel.

(Quoted Lavric 1992:16)⁵⁷

As Lavric remarks, the fronted element highlights the new aspect to be considered, and one has therefore got a discourse structure in which a *new* element (rheme) occupies the position of the *old information* theme, with the rheme position still active since it provides new information on the new aspect that has been put into theme position. Lavric correctly insists that the basic theme-rheme sequence is not *replaced* but overlaid with a new emphasis structure that is not sentential but discourse (paragraph) related. I am therefore distinguishing between *topic* and *focus*, arguing that the fronted constituent introduces a new topic about which the rheme then presents relevant information. This topic—as Lavric already notes—is part of an argumentative superstructure. The inversion sentences, one may want to note, occur within the step-by-step argument structure rather than as text beginnings or text conclusions:

- (226) *Significant in today's society is the population's general mobility.

To summarize: one can establish several typical functions of root transformations which are clearly discourse-type related: the argumentative (connective) function the narrative-perceptual function, and the clearly emotional or emotive function (*How big are your eyes, grandmother!*). Rather than having root transformations that specialize in one or the other of these functions, however, one can in fact employ many root transformations in a variety of texts and therefore in any of these functions. From this conclusion it naturally follows that one *cannot* in blanket fashion link the use of root transformations with either 'expressivity', 'subjectivity' or 'emphasis' *per se*. Indeed, *expressivity*—which is the term I have employed so far—is useful exclusively in suggesting the common denominator (justifiably vague) of all the various functions, and this common denominator can lie only in the focussing, attention-directed aspect of root transformations. Once the reader's attention has been rerouted to a specific argumentative or narrative point, s/he will interpret such discontinuity within a suitable frame—in terms of argumentative structure, narrative structure or the evaluative, emotional make-up of the discourse's SPEAKER or SELF.

Take, for instance, the following passage:

- (227) The Countess of Rocksber sat at the head of the table alone with Jacob. Fed upon champagne and spices for at least two centuries (four, if you count the female

line), the Countess Lucy looked well fed. *A discriminating nose* she had for scents, prolonged, as if in quest of them; her underlip protruded a narrow red shelf; her eyes were small, with sandy tufts for eyebrows, and her jowl was heavy. *Behind her* (the window looked on Grosvenor Square) stood Moll Pratt on the pavement, offering violets for sale.

(*Jacob's Room*, ix; Woolf 1982:96)

This is the beginning of the ninth chapter of *Jacob's Room*. The two root transformations emphasized in bold italics argumentatively direct the reader's attention from the countess's general appearance to her nose, and from there proceed to a catalogue of all her facial features, eventually shifting to the outside world, a move determined by further *contiguity* (face-window-square). This argumentative structure is utilized *narratively* for the purposes of internal focalization: the text evokes a perception of various items (the countess, her appearance, her nose, her facial features, the window behind her, Moll Pratt) with an implied train of thought that ironically points up the visible effects upon the Countess of hereditary wealth, and it then juxtaposes these with the isolation and poverty of picturesque Moll Pratt outside on Grosvenor Square. This train of thought will most likely be attributed to Jacob Flanders who, sitting at the Countess's side, would naturally observe these things and tend to make injurious comparisons. However, the passage immediately shifts into a description of external goings on in Grosvenor Square which can hardly be aligned with Jacob's realistic story-internal perception, and the reader is therefore thrown back on a more evaluative strategy on the part of the narrator: the already noted sarcastic undertone—implied, for instance, in the chiasmic structure of the second sentence—will now be interpreted as indicative of narratorial rhetorical argumentation. We come full circle, returning to the narrowly argumentative interpretation of the functions of the root transformations in this passage.

What this exercise has demonstrated can be summarized in two theses:

- (a) So-called expressive features acquire their functions in the *context* of a specific genre, e.g. argumentative prose or narrative.
- (b) Within a specific genre, expressive features are, above all, attention-directing, focussing devices. All more narrative explications of their *function* amount to interpretative moves on the reader's part. Because genres have recurrent underlying contexts, focussing tends to occur in similar environments. Hence the various interpretations of the surprise function, the emphatic or connective function, the scene-setting function, etc. As a corollary one may want to add that the writer's 'choice' of an expressive device should *not* be interpreted on intentionalist lines: syntactic choices, at least, are rarely deliberate and presumably follow from the cognitive focussing inherent to the writing process itself. If this argument appears to be circular, it can at least lay claim to having demonstrated where the standard account went astray. In fact, what now seems to be mere inconsequentiality will however receive a more general explanation with the theoretical framework which I will present in Chapters 8 and 9.

A word is due also on the validity of the categories here presented for languages other than English, for example German, French, Russian or Japanese. I am unable to provide an equally complete list of devices for any of these languages, and I suspect that some categorial distinctions do not apply, or apply differently, in some of them. The category of deictic verbs and of address-related expressions, for instance, is certainly larger and immeasurably more complex in Japanese, where politeness levels of deference and humble self-abasement, in-group and out-group distinctions and male versus female language signals need to be considered. In Russian, aspectual differences and diminutives and pet names constitute a great percentage of expressive devices.

Root transformations exist in German and French, but not exactly the same ones as in English. German has directional adverb and prepositional phrase preposing (*herein kam, ins Zimmer trat*), but they are employed at structural incipit junctures rather than at points of incidence as in English:

- (228) Als wir so beim Essen saßen, * herein kam Fritz/kam Fritz herein. ‘When we were sitting at dinner, in came Fritz/Fritz came in. Sah ein Knab’ ein Röslein steh’n. (lit. ‘Saw a boy [subject] a rose [object]’)

There are, however, some equivalent⁵⁸ English examples, but the construction is possible only with intransitive verbs (*Exit Macbeth*) or when the object NP can be divorced from its governing verb:⁵⁹

- (229) *Thomas Whittemore was a bostonian [sic] archeologist and professor at Tufts College, a great admirer of Matisse and this was his tribute. Said Matisse,* still more rueful, but I am not dead yet.

(*Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, v; Stein 1990:94)

- (230) Followed a dark and bitter time.

(‘England, My England’; Lawrence 1986:322)

In contrast to English, topicalization in German seems to go in the same place as WH-constituents (Haider 1991:709), and left dislocation, which also exists in German, apparently has different syntactic properties from topicalized constituents (ibid., 707). Other German root transformations have entirely different discourse functions from their English equivalents. Thus, in English participle preposing invokes a context of perception, whereas the following German passage correlates with a journalistic effect of ‘literary language’:

- (231) Angebunden an die Glocke ist ein traditionell gefertigtes Trachtenband, das den Betreter des Gotteshauses zum Läuten auffordern soll.⁶⁰

There is a clear argumentative tone to the passage, most appropriate in a context where the bell has been mentioned before. A similar effect can be observed with left dislocation, which again evokes a tourist guide register and a romanticizing stylistic device:

- (232) Dieser Brunnen im Schloßhof, er ist nicht gerade gut erhalten, aber bei Abendrot macht sich das bröckelnde Gemäuer umso romantischer aus.⁶¹

Compare an equivalent English construction:

- (233) But *older even* than this old hall is perhaps the *bit of wall* now built into the belfry of the parish church, and said to be a remnant of the original chapel dedicated to St. Ogg, the patron saint of this ancient town, of whose history I possess several manuscript versions.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, xii; G.Eliot 1986:17–18)

German, additionally, tends to replace emphatic syntax by lexical intensifiers: *She opened the window and in flew a big red bird*, for instance, might be rendered as

- (234) Sie öffnete das Fenster, und schwupps *da flog auf einmal* ein großer roter Vogel herein.

Da has an additional function as a common sequentational marking device in popular tales, even further corroborating the existence of an underlying structural story ‘turn’ that can be signalled by means of the historical present tense, syntactic inversion and/or directional preposing, as well as by a number of adverbials, here *da*.⁶² German owns a whole battery of discourse modifiers of this sort, many of them even with several different meanings depending on syntactic position and context:⁶³

- (235) ganz, sonst, endlich, nichtsdestoweniger, auch, schon, nicht (alles) (280)⁶⁴, allerdings, schließlich, eigentlich, (nicht) (ein)mal, gerade, dann (auch), nun (denn), denn, da, allemal, ja, nein, erst, noch, mal, vielleicht, doch, aber, also, wohl, dann, jedenfalls, jetzt, bloß, wenigstens, eben, gar (nicht/s), freilich, immerhin, ebensogut, ohnehin, überhaupt, richtig (263), gewiß, etwa, nur...

Many of these are practically untranslatable. These discourse modifiers can be found indiscriminately in direct discourse, indirect discourse, ‘free’ subjunctive indirect speech and free indirect discourse.

- (236) *Was ging vor. Wo lebte ich **denn**. Wie viele Wirklichkeiten gab es in Troia noch außer der meinen, die ich **doch** für die einzige gehalten hatte. Wer setzte die Grenze fest zwischen Sichtbarem und Unsichtbarem. Und wer ließ nun zu, daß der Boden, auf dem ich so sicher gegangen war, erschüttert wurde.*

(*Kassandra*; Wolf 1989:25)⁶⁵

In French left and right dislocation is a standard grammatical pattern of topicalization;⁶⁶

(237) Son sac, elle l'a trouvé?

and inversion, instead of noticeably marking free indirect discourse sentences, frequently carries a *literary* rather than colloquial implication:

(238) Les rues, où jouaient les enfants, étaient presque vides.

(239) Ce n'est que récemment *qu'est apparue*, dans le cadre des grammaires génératives, *la nécessité* d'introduire dans le modèle de compétence la référence au sujet et à la situation d'énonciation, pour pouvoir rendre compte du fonctionnement et de l'interprétation sémantique des *shifters*.

(Kristeva *et al.* 1975:86)

(240) En principe, *devraient être réservées* à l'expression orale *l'emploi* des déictiques, c'est-à-dire des termes qui renvoient à quelque aspect de la situation, *des adverbess* comme *ici*, *là*, *aujourd'hui*, *hier*, ou *les démonstratifs* avec leurs gammes de trois distances.⁶⁷

(Martinet 1990:134)

Such inversion even occurs in English without any 'expressive' effect, but apparently obeying a stylistic rule of rhythmic euphony. (Compare the passages quoted under (100) and (147) above.) Most of the English examples seem to occur in well-defined clausal patterns such as comparative clauses. (Cp. Green 1980:594.)

Another question is the consistency of these devices within the regional, social and dialectal variants of the English language. There are obviously striking differences in the specifically regional, social and dialectal categories, whether syntactic, morphological or lexical (and in fact in the typological evocation of phonological differences). However, the lexical categories themselves (epistemic, evaluative, etc.) seem to be equivalent in all the varieties of English I have looked at—British English, American English, Canadian, South African and Australian English—and they are to a large extent valid even for eighteenth-century English.⁶⁸ The syntactic devices, particularly the details of DO-paraphrase inversion, modal auxiliaries and the intensifier and modifier categories, however, change quite radically as one moves from the eighteenth century backwards. It is for this reason—as I have mentioned before (2.2)—that Chaucer's free indirect discourse has been so stubbornly ignored and so persistently dismissed as not quite the real thing after all.

In the following chapter we will turn to the theoretical consequences of the empirical evidence presented in the previous chapters: the prevalence of expressive elements even in indirect discourse, and the existence of many other cases of overlapping categories.

NOTES

- 1 See also Caenepeel (1989:5–6) for a different choice of categories. The difficulty of such categorization of subjective categories appears also from the comparison with Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980:86), who distinguishes between *evaluation* (in relation to norms—*big*—or to axiomatic scales—*beautiful*) on the one hand and *affectivity* (*poor girl*) on the other.

- 2 *Things were going badly with Herr Gosch. He made a fine sweeping gesture to wave away the imputation that he was a prosperous man. The burdens of old age approached* [lit. deictic 'came hither'], *they were at hand even now; as aforesaid, his grave was dug.*' (Mann 1984:479)
- 3 'And however much he had begged her not to, she had [scil. **on that day**] honourably confessed to her good, upright bridegroom, who had to know.' (Mann 1940:28) Weinrich's example is part of a long recollection on the part of Charlotte, and not unequivocally free indirect discourse throughout.
- 4 See the examples quoted in the excellent paper by Bronzwaer (1975) and work in progress by Tucker (1992).
- 5 '[She drew up a prospectus headed MAISON VAUQUER], in which was asserted that hers was "one of the oldest and most highly recommended boarding houses—in the Latin Quarter". "From the windows of the house"—thus ran the prospectus—"there is a charming view of the Vallée des Gobelins [so there is—from the third floor], and a beautiful garden, extending down to an avenue of lindens at the further end." Mention was made of the bracing air of the place and its quiet situation.' (Balzac 1948:17) Note the mistranslation of the parenthetical: *on l'apercevait* signals that this is still part of Mme Vauquer's prospectus, so one should have 'there was a charming view of the Vallée des Gobelins, which one *could* see from the third floor'.
- 6 For some early examples of this, see the quotations from *Foxe's Book of Martyrs* in [Chapter 2](#), and the Old English examples of slipping in Kerling (1982).
- 7 Compare also below under (4.4).
- 8 A famous French instance of this address pattern occurs in *L'Étranger*:

Il [the state prosecutor] disait qu'il s'était penché sur elle [l'âme de Meursault] et qu'il n'avait rien trouvé **messieurs les jurés**. Il disait qu'à la vérité, je n'en avais point, d'âme, et que rien d'humain, et pas un des principes moraux qui gardent le coeur des hommes ne m'était accessible. (*L'Étranger*; Camus 1955:118)

The passage has quite a number of the expressive elements banned by Banfield from indirect discourse: interjections (*qu'à la vérité*), right dislocation (*je n'en avais point, d'âme*) and complement preposing (*rien d'humain, et pas un des principes moraux ... ne m'était accessible*).

- 9 Quirk *et al.* (1985) include these expressions in their category of disjuncts (see § 8.124).
- 10 On truncated syntax see Karpf (1933:255).
- 11 For French, expressions like *pourtant* and *sûrement* (see, e.g., Lips 1926:67, 72) or *au fond, vraiment* (Verschoor 1959:47) can be mentioned.
- 12 See also the expression *Abtönungspartikel* in Simonin-Grumbach (1975:117).
- 13 For French examples see Lips (1926:33–4) as well as Verschoor (1959:43): *jour de Dieu, sans crainte de Dieu, ma foi, plutôt a Dieu*.
- 14 See also the many examples quoted by McHale (1978, 1983) and Sternberg (1991).
- 15 'The exhausted Hanno stuck close to the wall and kept his eyes open as he stole along. **Heaven be praised**, the corridors were empty [lit. 'nobody saw him']. ' (Mann 1984:567)
- 16 'Of a bad tooth, can you believe it, Senator Buddenbrook had died of a bad tooth, it was rumoured in town. **But damn it**, people didn't die of a bad tooth!' (My translation)
- 17 French *quant à lui*, etc. have been noted by Lips (1926:184) and Kalik-Teljatnicova (1966:130).

- 18 For examples see Verschoor (1959:91–2), Karpf (1933:260) and Steinberg (1971: 100–5) and in Spitzer (1923a), where *parce que* and other causal conjunctions are analysed.
- 19 Then Etienne talked about a republic which would guarantee a living wage for everybody. But Maheude shook her head, *for she could remember 1848, the hell of a year that had left her and her husband stripped naked as worms in the early days of their married life*. She talked on, telling him about those troubled days in a mournful voice.’ (Zola 1969:225)
- 20 ‘and there was Monseigneur the Bishop, who, as if he were taken ill, slumped forward and banged his forehead against his knees sending his little green hat rolling—when in fact he was not ill at all, but rather for the first time in his life basking in religious rapture, *for a miracle had occurred before their very eyes, the Lord God had personally stayed the executioner’s hand by disclosing as an angel the very man who had for all the world appeared a murderer. Oh, that such a thing had happened here in the eighteenth century.*’ (Süskind 1986:172)
- 21 Such clauses also lend themselves to marking the shift into the German ‘free’ subjunctive indirect discourse. For examples see Pütz (1989:202).
- 22 Quirk *et al.* (1985:23) note the relative syntactic independence of *when* clauses. See also Matthiessen and Thompson (1988).
- 23 For French examples after relative *qui* see Bally (1912a: 554–5) and Lips (1926:45).
- 24 But CP-adjuncts, on account of the process of Chomsky-adjunction, are also in principle allowed to adjoin to the right: ‘*They were made of the finest leather in the world, also*’. (*To the Lighthouse* III, ii; Woolf 1985:144)
- 25 Hooper/Thompson (1973:473–4) unfortunately take their division into five verb classes, three non-factive and two factive, for granted, quoting no original source of reference for them.
- 26 That is to say, ‘active’ in the reader’s cognitive reading frame (compare under (9.3)).
- 27 As early as 1982 Baltin, although as yet still operating with S and S-bar phrasal nodes, re-analysed Emonds’s and Chomsky’s general movement rules by specifying landing sites for topicalization, dislocation and AP-movement.
- 28 I have not seen a clear presentation of how this new model would distinguish between simple fronting and dislocation (which cannot occur in complement clauses), and I wonder whether Baltin’s adjunction to S-bar for topicalization could be replaced by adjunction to CP-head, with dislocation adjoined to CP-specifier. Lasnik/Uriagereka (1988:155) count the determination of landing sites for topicalization and left dislocation among the as yet unsolved puzzles of current TG theory. One could also speculate whether Baltin’s AP-movement, which allows adjunction to *any* phrasal mode, would not solve the problem of interjections or sentence modifiers (*anyway*), and—particularly—discourse parentheticals and dislocated constituents such as *in his opinion*, *as for X*, etc.
- 29 See, for instance, Barry (1988:183), who discusses Holloway’s (1979) remarks on the line *his head he raised* in terms of a ‘sort of optional poetic transformation’.
- 30 ‘Of course I didn’t imagine that bran would come out, as if it had been the body of a chubby doll; but *I know that never in my life had I felt so suprised*, and it seemed that something unheard-of had happened to me.’ (Gautier 1981:311)
- 31 Although one can interpret *crabs* as part of a left dislocation construction, the sentence reads more smoothly with *crabs* the direct object of *allow*, in spite of the comma after *crabs*.
- 32 See also ‘*Busy is Mrs Miff this morning at the church door*, beating and dusting the altar-cloth, the carpet, and the cushions; and *much has Mrs Miff to say*, about the wedding they are going to have.’ (Ibid., 517)
- 33 This seems to be distinguished from (viii) mainly for pragmatic reasons—its argumentative use and the inanimate subject NP.

- 34 The atmosphere of the city, the faintly rotten scent of swamp and sea, which had driven him to leave—in what deep, tender, almost painful draughts he breathed it in!’ (Mann 1936:37–8) Note that the English translation by using *breathed* rather than *was breathing* suggests that this is the narrator’s exclamation, not Aschenbach’s subjective self-realization, an interpretation which the German original, mainly on account of the left dislocation, seems to propose.
- 35 Ogle (1981:121) calls this ‘prepositional phrase substitution’.
- 36 Harweg calls this incidence an exogenic progredient (Harweg 1975a). See my discussion of these issues in Fludernik (1992a), and my earlier introductory remarks under (3.5).
- 37 Note, however, that in earlier literary texts this construction occurs with great frequency, e.g. still in the eighteenth-century verse epic.
- 38 Usually constructed with *to be*, hence no DO-inversion, however in cases such as *Standing at the corner I see Bill* one could argue that the injunction not to use DO-inversion applies (**do I see Bill*), but of course there is no I-movement in this case anyway.
- 39 Compare also the argument presented in Gary (1976).
- 40 Admittedly, the semantic context plays a large role, since somebody’s disappearance can only be surprising if the presence of this person has in fact been noted before.
- 41 See also N.A.McCawley (1977) and my earlier discussion of *that-clauses* under (3.2.2).
- 42 Note also Wiebe’s enlightening remarks on the attribution of subjective elements to a ‘last active character’ and to ‘agents’ (Wiebe 1990).
- 43 The incorporation of dialect material into free indirect discourse has been noted particularly in French studies, especially for Zola’s adoption of *argot* vocabulary. (Compare Lips 1926:70, or Verschoor 1959:43–4.)
- 44 McHale (1983) quotes some other examples from Dos Passos.
- 45 Of these evaluative expressions one could quote pages and pages. In *To the Lighthouse* (Woolf 1985), for example, one finds also the following: ‘awfully strange’ (p. 18), ‘absurd’ (p. 23), ‘poky’ (p. 18), ‘shamefully’ (p. 117), ‘horrible’ (p. 142), ‘indecent’ (p. 143). See also Quirk *et al.* (1985:621 ff.).
- 46 On intensifiers, which subcategorize into emphasers, boosters and downtoners, see Quirk *et al.* (1985: § 7.33, 429–30; § 8.105, 590–2).
- 47 Note also: ‘Stuck up *like Almighty* (*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:1); ‘*mighty* surprised’ and ‘*mighty* sorry’ (ibid., 333–4); ‘*almighty eager*’ (*The Invention of the World*, The Eden Swindle’; Hodgins 1977:104); ‘so *blasted* long ago’ (ibid., ‘Maggie’; Hodgins 1977:15); ‘*a great lot* she cared what they thought or didn’t think’ (ibid., The Eden Swindle’: 101); ‘*what in the name of hell*’ (*The Rainbow*, i; Lawrence 1988:27); ‘*too dashed bad*’ (Wodehouse; quoted Karpf 1933:256).
- 48 In imitation of Milner’s ‘noms de qualités’ (Milner 1978b).
- 49 ‘the monster’; ‘his great booby of a son’ (Balzac 1948:42).
- 50 Quirk *et al.* (1985: § 8.8, 485) call these ‘adverbs of modality’, including also *allegedly*, and *hardly*. They seem to treat them as belonging with ‘content disjuncts’ (§8.127, 620), where they additionally cite *arguably*, *apparently*, *conceivably*, as well as *admittedly*. Many of these are much too formal in stylistic register to operate as free indirect discourse signals.
- 51 Some further examples from *After Many a Summer* (Huxley 1950) are: ‘she wasn’t going to stand for it’ (169), ‘served him right’ (ibid.), ‘give her a real kick’ (ibid.), ‘tell him where to get off (48), ‘that way at all’ (49), ‘kind of real’ (204), ‘get a real thrill’ (204). One also finds idioms with dialectal forms: ‘get shet’ (*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:210).
- 52 Their [the children’s] faces were rosy with excitement. *This was a wonderful holiday, for the stork, decidedly a hefty one, had brought not only their baby sister, but all sorts of wonderful presents as well.* [The translation replaces ‘decidedly a hefty one’—my more literal attempt—

by an entire new clause: 'How tremendously strong the stork must be, to carry all that!']
*There was a new seal-skin school-bag for Tom, a big doll for Antonie, that had real hair-imagine that!-
 a picture book for Clothilde, [...] and for Christian a complete toy theatre, with the Sultan, Death,
 and the Devil!*' (Mann 1984:46; my changes)

- 53 See Fowler (1923:13; quoted Green 1980:595).
- 54 Ljung (1980:135–8) argues that the predicate in such sentences does not 'refer' but merely notes the expected canonical orientation of the object. I find it hard to relate this argument to any of my own findings.
- 55 'All Christians be of truly spiritual standing and [lit.:] is among them no distinction except according to their office.' (My translation)
- 56 'But, my dear child,' answered Charlotte, 'you will never be able to withdraw yourself where no one can see you; we have no cloisters now [i.e. 'cloisters we have none']; otherwise, there, with your present feelings, would be your resource.' (Goethe 1962:246)
- 57 'Let us dwell on one last point. The number of occurrences alone, their representation if you want, is not the decisive factor. Equally determining appears to be the manner in which these occurrences are distributed over the time frame.' (My translation)
- 58 Note, however, that the construction can also be used in a narrative's result section. (See Fludernik 1992c.) For the correlation between I-Movement and the incipit function cp. also Wunderlich (1970:116). Steube (1985:399 [(28)]) has an interesting emotional use of inversion, which may perhaps be interpreted as a perceptual variant rather than a marker of narrative structure. An equivalent French usage (*arrivent trois étrangers*) has been noted by E.Lerch (1922c: 98–101).
- 59 R.D.Levine (1989:1016) even speculates about the requirement of an empty position under the direct object NP for constructions like *Out of the lake emerged a gigantic reptile*.
- 60 'Attached to the bell is a ribbon embroidered in the traditional folk art manner which should invite visitors to the church to ring the bell.'
- 61 This well in the yard of the castle, it is not precisely well preserved, but at dusk the crumbling stone of the enclosure appears appropriately more romantic.'
- 62 See Fludernik (1991a, 1992a, 1992c).
- 63 Compare also the interesting study by Borst on a few of these particles and their discourse pragmatic relevance (Borst 1985), as well as some of Ehlich's examples (Ehlich 1986).
- 64 Page references are to Neuse (1990).
- 65 'What was happening? What kind of place did I live in? How many realities were there in Troy besides mine, which I had thought was the only one? Who fixed the boundary between visible and invisible? And who allowed the ground to be shaken where I had walked so securely?' (Wolf 1984:20) (There are no equivalent modifiers in the translation.)
- 66 On this and other kinds of topicalization in French see Cadiot (1992).
- 67 The sentence has three subjects which are enumerated after the constatation that their analysis should be limited to the discussion of the oral language.
- 68 But note interesting lexical and morphological changes in the category of epistemic modals (Dry 1990).

A scale of forms: speech and thought representation in context

5.1

THE DELIMITATION OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE: PROBLEMS WITH THE TRIPARTITE MODEL

In the previous two chapters I have discussed all the basic deictic or ‘expressive’ characteristics of free indirect discourse, and only occasionally did I imply that free indirect discourse cannot actually be defined by such linguistic criteria, at least not in a definitive manner. This chapter, by way of contrast, proposes to discuss the ways in which free indirect discourse formally and pragmatically *overlaps* with other forms of speech and thought representation, how the ‘establishment’ of a free indirect discourse reading in fact frequently relies on the linguistic evocation of a character’s ‘voice’ or on the tracing of a cognitive viewpoint. I will also note (at least) two more categories of speech and thought representation that are defined propositionally rather than formally—speech and thought report, and narrated perception.

The tripartite schema of direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse from which we started out can be considered as a ‘core’ theory of free indirect discourse. On this view, free indirect discourse is situated half-way between indirect and direct discourse, and seems to be an alternative to either. This tripartite schema has by now been ‘canonized’ in both literary and linguistic studies. Thus one finds a number of grammars, even for instance a grammar of Ancient Greek,¹ that include a section on free indirect discourse tagged on to their explication of indirect discourse formation. Likewise, literary guides to fiction these days consider a reference to free indirect discourse indispensable, summarizing it in terms of its midway status between direct and indirect discourse, with example sentences illustrating the basic ‘transformations’ between the three forms.² And indeed, if one is going to teach basics, a delimitation of free indirect discourse from both direct and indirect discourse is at least an initially necessary first step, since those are the two forms of represented discourse that are known actively as well as passively to every speaker of the language.

Nevertheless, this initially commendable course implies a number of unacknowledged presuppositions about free indirect discourse and it does not take account of all formal patterns that—on closer inspection—can be found in individual texts. These unwarranted

(transformational) presuppositions have been refuted recently in Ann Banfield's theory. Some of these presuppositions are relevant to the present discussion of formal irregularities, and I will therefore start by briefly outlining the basic pitfalls of the tripartite schema in so far as it implies linguistic or grammatical views either which—far from being self-evident—are patently wrong, or whose validity would first need to be carefully demonstrated.

One of the underlying presuppositions of the tripartite scheme is the implication that direct speech is the basis of transformations that convert direct into indirect or free indirect discourse respectively. This has in effect been claimed by early transformationalist critics (Ohmann 1964), and adequately represents current teaching practice: in classrooms students are actually taught that every direct utterance can be expressed indirectly or 'free-indirectly' by observing a few grammatical 'rules'. The fallacy involved is two-fold. For one, we have here an instance of the 'direct discourse fallacy' that Meir Sternberg (1982a, 1982b) has so admirably exposed, i.e. the mistaken (ingrained) belief that direct discourse is in every sense of the word *primary* and *originary* to other types of quotation. As Sternberg has shown, this is at best a *convention* (in the real world as well as in fiction), and it is a convention which fiction in fact frequently subverts, either by inventing words which were not actually spoken (1), or by distorting what *was* spoken to serve the ulterior ends of the narrative (2):

- (1) These sly little faces peeped out of the grand tide of the cathedral like something that knew better. [...] They winked and leered, giving suggestion of the many things that had been left out of the great concept of the church. 'However much there is inside here, there's a good deal they haven't got in,' the little faces mocked.

(*The Rainbow*, vii; Lawrence 1988:204)

- (2) 'You can't,' said Mrs. Trumper, 'because you don't have her address.' 'Yes, I have,' said Mrs. Fisher, 'so sucks to you!' She used a far cruder expression in fact, having been, as she kept saying to Ruth, in the gutter.

(*She-Devil*, xvii; Weldon 1990:101)

We will come back to the many non-mimetic forms of direct discourse in [Chapter 8](#).

A second type of the direct discourse fallacy occurs in the very 'practical' test that is frequently made to bear on putative free indirect discourse passages. If a sentence suggests a figural reading (contextually, for instance, by expressing views that only this character—not the narrator—could hold), then one will tend to transpose this sentence into direct discourse and, coming up with a statement the character could conceivably have uttered (e.g. in talking to her-/himself), one concludes that this sentence 'must be' free indirect discourse. The fallacy here consists in the unproven conviction of the easy *retrievability* of an underlying sample of direct discourse. That is, whereas the philosophical variant of the direct discourse fallacy took direct speech to be *typologically* originary, or basic, the *practical* direct discourse fallacy relies on a putative (*factual*) direct discourse deep structure for all sentences of indirect or free indirect discourse, and as such is basically a

grammatical argument amenable to linguistic refutation. And indeed, as can be demonstrated by linguistic analysis, direct discourse and indirect discourse are *not* transformable (Banfield 1982). For the intractable phenomenon of free indirect discourse, transformability (or retrievability) is even more problematic. When presenting my own model for speech and thought representation in [Chapter 8](#), I will take these remarks a few steps further.

Besides falling prey to this two-fold direct discourse fallacy, the tripartite discourse model also displays a marked disregard for linguistic facts. In an attempt at clarity each of the three types of speech representation is described as an ideal *type* that acquires normative proportions. Thus indirect discourse is esteemed to be ‘by nature’ (yet, really, by definition) subordinative and descriptively reduced to the formula ‘verb plus conjunction plus subsidiary clause’—with the subsidiary clause of course an unproblematic transposition of a supposedly underlying direct discourse phrase. In the previous syntactic account that I have supplied, I have not yet fully challenged the appropriateness of these ideal types, but have already registered some anomalies or exceptions to the ‘standard patterns’. We noted, for instance:

- indirect discourse continued over several sentences, relinquishing sub-ordination and therefore turning into free indirect discourse (cp. (3.3.1))
- ambiguous sentences (free indirect discourse or narrator’s discourse?) (cp. (3.3.1))
- coordinating *for* (*car, denn*) clauses or relative clauses initiating FID (cp. (4.3.1))
- a shift into free indirect discourse after colons, semicolons and even commas (cp. (4.2.1), (4.3.1))
- free indirect discourse with inserted or final parentheticals (3.3.2)
- German ‘free’ subjunctive indirect discourse (cp. (3.3.1))
- indirect discourse with characters’ deictic and subjective expressions ([Chapter 4](#)*passim*).

This last category is believed to be anomalous by Ann Banfield, but McHale (1983) has argued it to be all-pervasive, as indeed I have demonstrated myself throughout [Chapter 4](#). One can additionally discover numerous gradations between speech report (i.e. the narrative’s summative description of an utterance) and indirect discourse, as will be illustrated in the following. For each of these intermediary categories the supposed anomaly or ‘misfit’ can be ‘naturalized’ by acquiring a specific name, a strategy that allows one happily to disregard the ‘exception’ as a marginal case, now categorized and well disposed of.

An alternative to such exclusionary taxonomics presents itself in the attempt to integrate these supplementary types of speech representation into the framework of textual (rather than purely formal) categories. This subtler approach has traditionally come up with the proposal of a *scale* of formal manifestations, which is meant to replace the trinity of ‘ideal’ types (direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse). A flexible scale model can more easily accommodate formal variety, providing positions for ‘intermediary’ phenomena, the formerly ‘deviant’ cases. Among major proponents of

such an approach, Brian McHale (1978) is probably the most consistent, but the scale explanation has also been the preferred option with Cohn, Genette, Stanzel (as well as Chatman, Leech/Short, Prince, Rimmon-Kenan).³

The advantages of this position are manifold. A scale model is, for instance, able to account for all the empirical data without privileging one form or type over another. It also allows one to analyse more closely the interaction between lexical and syntactical properties and their textual and interpretative functions. An even greater advantage of the sliding scale lies in its thematization and terminological specification of large-scale constraints and phenomena that have previously been recognized but, within the purely tripartite scheme, could not be taken into consideration except as interpretative functions. Thus, the scale model allows for an integration of the important issue of 'dual voice', that is to say of the putative overlapping of narratorial and figural idiom in free indirect discourse. Syntactic independence is generally taken to correlate with a maximum of figural voice, whereas a predominance of the authorial idiom seems to go hand in hand with the narrator's syntactic rule over the world of fictional events (McHale 1978). Indeed, the sliding scale of purely syntactic and linguistic phenomena can be complemented by a second parallel cline relating to the continuum between diegesis and mimesis, a conjunction that firmly ties together linguistic and narratological perspectives. Genette's clear distinction between mimesis of events on the one hand (the narrator transcribing fictional reality) and mimesis of speech on the other (characters' verbal actions) provides an influential background to such analyses: the transcription of narrative events can be indirect (and it needs must be in a rendering of events), or it can verge on the 'direct' (most perfectly in the verbatim rendering of characters' discourse). Disregarding for the moment the direct discourse fallacy implied in this conception of things, we can thus see Genette making maximal use of a linguistically definable scale of the forms of speech and thought representation for the purposes of institutionalizing a sliding scale of degrees of fictionality and narrative transmission. McHale (1978, 1983), as well as Leech/Short (1981), likewise makes ample use of the gradational spectrum of formal and conceptual areas on the scales that they propose.

In the following I will present a detailed discussion of the sliding scale and its individual gradations. However, it should be clarified at the outset that, much as this conception is an improvement on the tripartite scheme, it still presupposes a number of things that cannot be taken for granted without verification. One of these is, still, the direct speech fallacy, in its philosophical version, although the transformational hypothesis is minimized in the sliding scale schema. (It is not really disposed of completely, because indirect discourse continues to be explained as a derivation from direct discourse. The derivation is, however, seen as a *surface* structure phenomenon—the adding or subtracting or changing of various items—whereas the tripartite scheme clearly posited a properly transformational, deep-structural derivation in the manner of Ohmann.) The sliding scale theory gets into trouble primarily by incorporating extra-linguistic concepts (which, in another way, is one of its prime advantages), such as 'the narrator', 'voice', 'irony' and 'empathy', and by its implicit or explicit postulation of the above-noted parallelism between linguistic and narratological functions. As we will see in our discussion of the scale, an originally purely formal continuum (in which, for instance, speech and thought

presentation are considered to be strictly parallel, and in which narratorial idiom has to decrease, and figural idiom to increase, towards the free indirect discourse pole) is in fact not borne out by the empirical data (even though it much more adequately conforms to the facts than did the earlier 'totalitarian' tripartite scheme). The scale model therefore needs to be restructured and dynamized in order to reflect the empirical data, a procedure that has most admirably been performed in Leech/Short's excellent discussion of speech and thought presentation in fiction. However, even at this very best, the presuppositions mentioned above still largely hold and remain unreflected and uncritiqued. I hope to address these issues more forcefully and to suggest a theoretical model within which such methodological inconsistencies can be resolved or 'sublimated.'

Finally, the scale model also leaves one with a terminological hassle in which it becomes difficult to delimit phenomena and keep current terms intelligible. For instance, should one include free indirect discourse with a parenthetical with the free indirect discourse category, or should it be, precisely, 'free indirect discourse plus parenthetical'? Although this may sound judgemental, it is so only verbally, pragmatically. A consensus on terms and their reference, their definition, is indispensable, since without them the dearly bought precision of what one can now observe would again be endangered. The disadvantage of scales is their tendency to negate the relevance of ideal types, and to subvert the very possibility of categorization. In particular, the scale model seriously undermines the usefulness of statistical analysis in this area. Whereas a grouping of phenomena into the three traditional categories neglects the extent of non-conformity, play and idiosyncratic creativity in the texts, a categorization into subtypes and sub-subtypes would tend to document the prevalence of non-canonical forms but obstruct one's view of significant textual effects unless one was able to compute precisely the frequency of determinable *sequences* of subcategories. A computer-based analysis might here therefore still offer interesting new results and insights if conducted in the spirit of detecting literary structures behind the chaos of formal linguistic variety.

5.2

CONTEXTUAL SIGNALS OF FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

In this section I wish to discuss some external or contextual signals of speech or thought representation which help to locate either the mode of enunciation (uttered aloud, or silently to oneself) or the person responsible for the speech or thought act. Sometimes these signals are in fact the only clue that a speech or thought act may have taken place, allowing one to 'glimpse' another's discourse through the narrative prose.

Free indirect discourse can be instantiated most clearly by a narrative parenthetical that identifies the reported speaker or consciousness and its mode of speech (utterance or thought):

- (3) *And his [Sidney Gattick's] profile, Anthony suddenly perceived— that too was an actor's: too noble to be quite true. And after all, he went on to think [...]*

(*Eyeless in Gaza*, xxx; Huxley 1955:402)

However, not all free indirect passages have parentheticals. Traditional accounts of free indirect discourse discounted clauses with parentheticals as an intermediary form between free indirect discourse and indirect discourse (e.g. Cohn 1966), but in the wake of Reinhart (1975) and Banfield (1982), the parenthetical has now become an important (though non-obligatory) element of free indirect discourse clauses. Temporal and referential linking between free indirect discourse clauses and parentheticals (Ehrlich 1990a) is very frequently complemented by interpretative *obstination*:⁴ the reader, once s/he has started to read in terms of speech or thought representation, will continue processing the text in this frame until alerted by textual and semantic (contextual) features to reinterpret in terms of a new frame.⁵ Such contextual features may be explicit and implicit to various degrees. A free indirect discourse reading can, for instance, be established on the basis of an introductory sentence that mentions a speech or thought act.

- (4) Predictably, the Bercovitch project is already being *greeted with resentment and anxiety*. It isn't that anyone believes LHUS to have stated the final word about American literature, but that relative youth and radicalism are thought to be dubious criteria for participation in an undertaking of the kind. [Reporter's presentation or FID?] *Shouldn't Bercovitch have tried to enlist the most knowledgeable rather than the most like-minded team of writers?* A good many Americanists with no conscious investment in the Spiller world view believe that the Cambridge history will strike a blow against disinterestedness and for the 'ideologizing' of scholarship.

(*NYRB* 35.16 [1988]:68)

- (5) He should have been a great philosopher, said Mrs Ramsay, as they went down the road to the fishing village, but he had made an unfortunate marriage. Holding her black parasol very erect [...] *she told the story*; an affair at Oxford with some girl; an early marriage; poverty; going to India; translating a little poetry 'very beautifully, I believe', being willing to teach the boys Persian or Hindustanee, *but what really was the use of that?—and then lying, as they saw him, on the lawn.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, i; Woolf 1985:15)

The presence of free indirect discourse can be corroborated also belatedly by an explicatory narratorial note appended *after* the free indirect discourse passage:

- (6) He [Dr Smallweed] is borne into Mr. Tulkinghorn's great room, and deposited on the Turkey rug before the fire. *Mr. Tulkinghorn is not within at the present moment, but will be back directly.* The occupant of the pew in the hall, having *said thus much*, stirs the fire, and leaves the triumvirate to warm themselves.

(*Bleak House* xxvii; Dickens 1975:432; quoted Sorensen 1959:437)

- (7) Dr. Obispo laughed indulgently, 'But to come back to what I was saying about Uncle Jo...'

Just having that girl around the house was the equivalent of a hormone treatment. But it wouldn't last. It never did. [...] Hormone treatments were just palliatives and pick-me-ups. Helped you for a time, but didn't prevent your growing old.

Jeremy stifled a yawn.

For example, Dr. Obispo went on, why should some animals live much longer than human beings and yet show no signs of old age?

(After Many a Summer I, v; Huxley 1950:61)

In this last example the *went on* additionally marks the fact that the previous free indirect discourse paragraph is not, as one might have supposed, Dr Obispo's private aside, but the continuation of his lengthy analysis proffered to Jeremy.

Less explicit integration can be by means of an NP that implies a speech act:⁶

- (8) and received a doubtfully orthographical but charmingly amiable **reply**. *Herr Rappaport was so desolated to hear that the beautiful rings had not yet found the appreciation they deserved, and which they were sure to meet with, given a little patience. As to the suggestions that he should take them back, he was truly sorry not to be able to entertain it, such a course being entirely against his business principles, which were of the strictest.*

(The City of Enticement; Gerard 1911:238)

- (9) Then the **conundrum** would arise: *Which House really represented the people?*

(Survey of English Usage W.12.4.6)

- (10) *As for being sure which was which, or in what order they [Mrs Ramsay's children] came, that was beyond him [Mr Bankes]. He called them privately after the Kings and Queens of England; Cam the Wicked, James the Ruthless, Andrew the Just, Prue the Fair -for Prue would have beauty, he thought, how could she help it?—and Andrew brains. While he walked up the drive and Lily Briscoe said yes and no and capped his **comments** (for she was in love with them all, in love with this world), he weighed Ramsay's case, commiserated him, envied him, as if he had seen him divest himself of all those glories of isolation and austerity which crowned him in youth to cumber himself definitely with fluttering wings and clucking domesticities.*

(To the Lighthouse I, iv; Woolf 1985:26)

This is also an especially striking example of belated identification as a speech act, rather than thought process, as the earlier *he thought* might have led one to believe. In fact the mention of *comments* retrospectively inclines one to include *he thought* with Mr Bankes's utterances as a discourse parenthetical (equivalent to an *I think* in direct discourse).

Instead of a mere NP, clauses of speech or thought report may serve as an introduction to free indirect discourse.

- (11) Then she **switched the conversation on to another line**; *who was I having an affair with at the moment?*

(Eyeless in Gaza, xxxviii; Huxley 1955:480)

Banfield has mentioned the case of *fit une remarque*, and in German there is a variety of such formulas: *er gab ihr zur Antwort*; *er bedauerte es*. Kurz (1970: 113–21) has provided an impressive list of such expressions in German. To my knowledge no comparable analysis exists for either English or French.⁷ The relevant locutions admittedly seem to be less numerous in those two languages, whereas they are particularly common in German journalistic prose, the area of Kurz's analysis. All these types of signalling free indirect discourse are of course equally used to signal direct discourse. Such introductory or after-the-fact inquit clauses have been noted, for instance, by Michel (1966:339, 347) as 'Fernstellung' of the verb. In many cases such hints can consist, simply, in a situation, a *script* (Schank/Abelson 1977), that allows one to infer speech or thought processes on the part of the actors involved. There are numerous quite explicit introductions of free indirect discourse (and in fact direct discourse), all of them *without an actual verbum dicendi*:⁸

- (12) Shortly, **I began to feel insupportable disquiet** at the thought of postponing this discovery. *Wiles and stratagems were practicable, but they were tedious, and of dubious success. Why should I proceed like a plotter?*

(Edgar Huntly; Brown 1973:41)

- (13) Her wet lips **tittered**:
—He's killed looking back.

(Ulysses, xi; Joyce 1984:553)

- (14) 'No understand,' Rinaldi **shook his head**.

(Quoted Peprník 1969:145)

- (15) My eyes **popped out of my head with horror**. **HELL AND DAMNATION!**... *I had to get out of the building. I had to get by myself and think.*

(Theophilus North, xxii; Wilder 1976:279)

- (16) Dick scrawled the name in a notebook, excused himself, and hurried to a **telephone booth**.

It was convenient for Doctor Dangeu to see Doctor Diver at his house immediately.

(Tender is the Night III, ii; Fitzgerald 1984:267)

- (17) The news was on; an item about a plane crash. [...] *You go up in planes, you go to Minneapolis, you take your life in your hands. You're not even safe in your own backyard.*

(Lake Wobegon Days, 'Revival'; Keillor 1987:392)

Peprník (1969) has analysed this phenomenon and provides many further examples.⁹ Analyses of inquit tags and introductory verbs of (free) (in)direct discourse likewise note a large number of proper tags which are semantically descriptive of gestures or other physical movements accompanying the speech act (*sigh, sneeze, tremble, waved his hands about*).¹⁰ Contextual hints of this sort only become important as signals when the free indirect discourse passages have few formal features that would allow an unambiguous free indirect discourse interpretation. The most complete list of such contextual expressions of subjectivity in English has been provided by Wiebe (1990).

Parentheticals or contextual signals, even if minimal, frequently disambiguate various possible alternative readings of FID passages. Thus, in the following extract from *To the Lighthouse*, the reader goes through various possible interpretations of the emphasized passage.

- (18) *There wasn't the slightest possible chance that they could go to the Lighthouse to-morrow*, Mr Ramsay snapped out irascibly.

How did he know? she asked. *The wind often changed.* [FID]

The extraordinary irrationality of her remark, the folly of women's minds enraged him. [PsN] He had ridden through the valley of death, been shattered and shivered; *and now she flew in the face of facts, made his children hope what was utterly out of the question, in effect, told lies.* He stamped his foot on the stone step. 'Damn you,' he said. [DD] ***But what had she said? Simply that it might be fine to-morrow. So it might*** [FID]

Not with the barometer falling and the wind due west. [DD, FID?]

To pursue truth with such astonishing lack of consideration for other people's feelings, to rend the thin veils of civilization so wantonly, so brutally, was to her so horrible an outrage of human decency [PsN] that, ***without replying***, dazed and blinded, she bent her head as if to let the pelt of jagged hail, the drench of dirty water, bespatter her unrebuked. *There was nothing to be said.* [FID]

(*To the Lighthouse* I, vi; Woolf 1985:33–4)

First one takes the two FID clauses (here printed in bold italics) to be Mr Ramsay's belated realization that he has wronged his wife, and only when one gets to the critique of Mr Ramsay's pursuit of truth does one attribute this to another external consciousness, Mrs Ramsay's, and then realizes that there is a dialogue between the two. Even with the give-away *replying*, the passage is more than obscure. Is Mr Ramsay actually accusing her of telling lies to their children, or is that part of his internal tirade against her? The sentence is formally interpretable as free indirect discourse (*now*, exaggerated style), but it is highly unlikely to be an anywhere near as verbatim rendering of Mr Ramsay's thoughts. The passage epitomizes what is frequently discussed in terms of dual voice, i.e. free indirect discourse with a clearly 'authorial' tone. We will return to this recurrent problem in [Chapter 6](#).

So far we have noted the tendency of actual texts to merge and move between categories of speech and thought representation, and to clarify (and sometimes deliberately obscure) what is being represented by bracketing narrative statements or in parenthetical asides. I will now discuss one scale model as an illustration for those readers unfamiliar with the literary debates on speech and thought representation.

5.3

THE SCALE MODEL

Of the many scale models proposed, McHale's (1978) has probably been the most influential. McHale posits seven categories:

(i) *DIEGETIC SUMMARY* (Page's 'submerged speech')—involving 'only the bare report that a speech event has occurred without any specification of what was said or how it was said' (McHale 1978:258). Diegetic summary collocates with many illocutionary verbs:

He *challenged* him to a duel.
 She *quoted* Lady Ashwortham.
 Judith *asked the waiter for the time*.

As McHale correctly states, '[r]eported speech of this type is on the same level as the report of any non-verbal event'. This is a limit case of speech report (cp. under (5.4.2) below).

(ii) '*Summary, less "purely" diegetic*: summary which to some degree represents, not merely gives notice of, a speech event in that it names of conversation' (259). In this type of *speech report* or *thought report* (*psycho-narration*), as I will call it, the bare statement that some kind of discourse (external or internal) has taken place is expanded by a description of its content or topic(s), or by a description of the manner in which the utterance was delivered. For examples see below under (5.4.2).

(iii) *INDIRECT CONTENT-PARAPHRASE*. This McHale defines as 'the paraphrase of the content of a speech event without regard to the style or form of the supposed "original" utterance' (259). The criterion here is less grammatical than stylistic. It is important to note that on the more formal, linguistic scale that I propose McHale's category (iii) comprises *both* indirect discourse proper *and* speech report or psycho-narration that is *formally* indirect discourse (or indistinguishable from indirect discourse) but actually represents an expanded seemingly 'true' rendering of a character's utterances or thoughts on a conceptual (not merely lexical) level inaccessible to the character her-/himself.

(iv) *INDIRECT DISCOURSE*, 'mimetic to some degree'—indirect discourse that seems to transpose an underlying direct discourse. This includes the many examples of indirect discourse which 'preserve' expressive syntax, morphology and lexicon, and which—traditionally—have been regarded as 'impure' indirect discourse.

(v) *FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE*: 'not only grammatically intermediate between indirect discourse and direct discourse, but also mimetically intermediate; [...] FID may, in fact, be mimetic to almost any degree short of 'pure' mimesis' (259).

(vi) *DIRECT DISCOURSE*: 'the most purely mimetic type of report, though of course with the reservation that this "purity" is a novelistic illusion; all novelistic dialogue is conventionalized or stylized to some degree. Straightforward transcription would be intolerable in a novel, since "normal non-fluency" of ordinary speech has the appearance of illiteracy in print'¹¹ (259). Not only is mimesis an illusion in the manner McHale outlines here; direct discourse itself is frequently a conscious non-mimetic artifact (Sternberg 1982a, 1982b). I will return to direct discourse in Chapters 8 and 9.

(vii) '*Free direct discourse*', McHale's last category, describes direct discourse that is not marked by typographical means. In the realm of thought representation this corresponds with Dorrit Cohn's 'unsignalled quoted monologue' (1978:63) (of the type used in Joyce's *Ulysses*), her 'autonomous interior monologue' being devoid of any framing third person narrative.

McHale then goes on to mention 'slipping' as a phenomenon now accommodatable on the scale. He uses the term to refer to individual snatches of direct discourse that are incorporated into the narrative, indirect discourse or free indirect discourse and which are marked off by quotation marks. He also notes the pervasive phenomenon of 'coloured narrative' (Hough 1978), of 'contamination' or 'contagion' (McHale 1978:261; Stanzel 1984b: 29, 192–3) of the narrative by mimetic material. Hough had treated free indirect discourse as condensed coloured narrative. McHale does not, however, pronounce on the precise status of such colouring within the scale model, although it crucially overthrows the scale if conceived in terms of a top to bottom increase of mimeticism. We will return to the issue of coloured narrative below under (6.2), where it will be treated as both an issue affecting the 'dual voice' theory of free indirect discourse and as a question closely linked to the problems of stylistic deviation (cp. under (6.3)). McHale also already highlights the importance of context for the perceptibility of free indirect discourse, and touches on the crucial irony versus empathy question (see below under (6.4) and Chapter 7).

Besides McHale, Leech/Short (1981), too, have suggested an influential formal scale model, ranging from narrative report of action (NRA) and narrative report of speech (or thought) acts (NRSA/NRTA) through indirect speech (IS) and free indirect speech (FIS) to direct and free direct speech (DS, FDS). Leech/Short are to be particularly recommended for their crucial discovery (anticipated in literary criticism by Cohn 1978) that the *formal* scale, although equally applicable to speech and thought contexts, correlates with entirely different proportions, rates of occurrence and marking distributions in the realm of consciousness as compared to the distribution of formal alternatives in *speech* contexts. A similar conclusion, we may want to add, holds true for the distribution of irony and empathy. Whereas, as Leech/Short correctly note, the rendering of *utterances* privileges DS (but—one has to add -only in oral discourse and most literary language; in journalism indirect discourse and even free indirect discourse outweigh direct discourse passages), in the representation of *consciousness* direct discourse is the least common technique (except in the interior monologue of the twentieth-century novel), with a traditional preponderance of psycho-narration and, in second place, free indirect discourse, which comes close to competing with psycho-narration in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century fiction.¹² Free indirect discourse rarely displaces psycho-narration from its quantitatively dominant position, except perhaps in Faulkner's *Go Down, Moses*.¹³ Although free indirect discourse representations of consciousness are either empathetic or ironical (consonant or dissonant, as Cohn 1978 would say),¹⁴ free indirect discourse passages representing *speech*, on the other hand, appear in the ironical or *neutral* mode—no empathy effect can be discovered. The reason for this imbalance seems to lie in the perceptibility of speech and the imperceptibility of consciousness—empathy with a

character's mind becomes possible only if one gains access to that mind through internal focalization, whereas utterances are generally available story elements.

Another scale model has been proposed by Josef Kurz (1970) in the wake of Kaufmann (1976). Kurz distinguishes between direct discourse ('direkte Redewiedergabe'), indirect discourse ('indirekte Redewiedergabe') and 'free' indirect discourse ('freie indirekte Redewiedergabe', i.e. the German non-subordinated indirect discourse in the subjunctive), 'Redebericht' (a report of a speech event), 'nacherlebte Rede' (i.e. free indirect discourse), and 'abstrahierte (verallgemeinerte) Rede'. This last category is not another variant of speech report but formally direct discourse which typicalizes the report, producing an ideal, generalized utterance. 'Abstrahierte Rede' corresponds to what the *Survey of English Usage* calls extra-idiolect (see under (8.3) below), and somewhat overlaps with 'fingierte Rede' (invented discourse)—i.e. discourse which was not really uttered and the reporting of which therefore cannot be identified with *reporting* in the ordinary sense of the term, but needs to be described as a kind of imaginative extrapolation.

Other scale models have, for instance, been proposed by Bronzwaer (1970: 66–7), Ryan (1981b:149–52) or Strauch (1984). In the following I will illustrate a few more intermediary formal phenomena and discuss some general overarching aspects of speech and thought representation which argue against a neat diegesis versus mimesis cline.

5.4

SYNTACTIC GRADATION ALONG THE SCALE

5.4.1

The syntactic integration of direct, indirect, and free indirect discourse

As we have already noted under (1.2), direct and indirect discourse (as well as the parentheticals in free indirect discourse) take different (introductory) verbs. Banfield derives the syntactic structure—and provides another argument for the non-transformability between the three forms—from this fact, and notes several classes of verbs that take various combinations of direct, indirect and free indirect discourse (Banfield 1982:34–6).¹⁵ I here present a much more substantial list of such verbs, according to the relevant categories. These data are in no way complete but should be helpful as a preliminary introduction to the problematic.

(A) First, there are those verbs that can **only take direct discourse** (both introductory and parenthetical):

(19) go (like this),¹⁶ (be) like,¹⁷ sing, chant, intone, recite, echo...

These verbs cannot be used in either indirect or free indirect discourse: they imply mimetic echoing of the articulated utterance.¹⁸ Note that there are no *verba cogitandi* in this group.

(B) The following verbs can introduce direct discourse and be used as parentheticals in direct and free indirect discourse, but cannot serve as matrix verbs for indirect discourse (i.e. **cannot be used with a *that* complement**). Here valency plays a crucial role.

(20) cry, splutter, query ('ask'), think aloud, consider...

(C) Then there are verbs that occur **only parenthetically**. If they occur to the left of direct (or free indirect) discourse at all, they need to be taken as introductory speech report: *she implored him*.

(21) clamour, claim, insist, regret,¹⁹ implore, break off, remind X,²⁰ address X, retort...

(D) The next category comprises verbs that can occur in indirect discourse as well as (free in)direct discourse parentheticals, but **cannot at all introduce direct discourse**. In their indirect discourse reading, all these verbs have illocutionary force or move in the direction of thought report.

(22) recommend, reveal, mention, note,²¹ gather, notice, realize, reflect, warn, object, insinuate, opine, stipulate, feel, know, understand, intimate, mean,²² find (*she found that*), acknowledge, allow, it occurred to X,²³ assure X...

Some of these verbs can be used in a parenthetical following direct discourse: since they are clearly illocutionary, they then need to be read on the lines of implicit utterance: *he objected by saying*.

(E) Then there are those verbs that **take only indirect discourse**, i.e. neither direct nor free indirect discourse (that is to say, **cannot be used parenthetically**):

(23) indicate, demonstrate,²⁴ convince, alert...

(F) Finally, there are those verbs that can be used only parenthetically and **exclusively with free indirect discourse**. These are otherwise typical verbs used in thought report (see below).

(24) see²⁵ ('realize'), muse, ponder, it seemed to him/her, suppose, suspect (in the meaning of 'suppose'), guess, reckon,²⁶ observe (in the meaning of 'perceive'), it appeared,²⁷ believe, feel, know,²⁸ remember, wish...

(G) There are also verbs that can be used only in connection with speech report or psycho-narration. These frequently are complex NPs including a PP: *to expatiate on*, *to take into consideration*, *to render account of* and numerous others. This kind of construction is exceptionally prolific in German journalistic prose as the accounts of Kurz and Kaufmann document. Like German infinitive and French *de (à) + infinitive* constructions these verbs

all have illocutionary or even perlocutionary meanings, and their status again depends on valency criteria.²⁹

(H) The largest number of verbs occur with **all three forms** of speech and thought representation. This category comprises the most common communication verbs including *think*.³⁰

- (25) say, think, retort, add, reply, repeat, explain, answer, scream, exclaim, shout, whisper, pray (in the meaning of 'ask', 'implore'), admit, agree, wonder, decide, observe (in the sense of 'remark verbally'), declare, murmur, continue, went on³¹...

The integration in literature of speech and thought representation by means of introductory verbs or clauses and inquit-tags or parentheticals has been studied in some detail for French,³² but probably most thoroughly for German.³³ One finds most variation and, indeed, ingenuity in introductory clauses which *suggest* rather than denote an act of utterance (cp. under (5.2) above).

(i) There are a number of verbs that actually describe, not a speech act, but an **accompanying gesture or sound**. These are frequently used to introduce direct speech, to the extent that they can almost be regarded as *verba dicendi*, but in free indirect discourse parentheticals they do strike one as somewhat odd:³⁴

- (26) *And the result of it was, she **sighed**, [...] that things gets habbier and got shabbier summer after summer.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, v; Woolf 1985:30)

- (27) 'Jaja,' Lope **stotterte wieder**.

(Quoted Michel 1966:221)³⁵

Some verbs seem to be peculiar to certain writers, such as the use of *smile* as a *free indirect discourse* parenthetical by V. Woolf.³⁶

(ii) Besides detailing accompanying gestures and actions, or the tone of voice with which something is said, parentheticals can also foreground the illocutionary and perlocutionary nature of the reported speech act, to the point of briefly characterizing it in a kind of minimal **speech report** (cp. below under (5.4.2)). I have noted this phenomenon increasingly in recent Austrian radio and television news, the last place where one would expect such a literary technique:

- (28) Der Irak habe den moralischen Sieg davongetragen, **gab sich Saddam Hussein dann doch noch zuversichtlich**.

(ORF, *Zeit im Bild*, January 17, 1992)

- (29) [ID] **weiß** Voggenhuber über die grünen Empfindlichkeiten **Bescheid**.

(Öl, *Morgenjournal*, January 15, 1992)³⁷

I have also encountered similar instances with a parenthetical **thought report** in free indirect discourse:³⁸

(30) *Only Lily Briscoe, she **was glad to find**; and that did not matter.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, iii; Woolf 1985:21)

(31) *He had been killed by the splinter of a shell instantly, she **bethought her**.*

(*Ibid.*, III, ii; 145)

(iii) There are a number of verbs also that are used as discourse parentheticals in both direct and free indirect discourse, but which in a *that*-construction neutrally signify psycho-narration or other illocutionary speech acts. I have noted above under (F) verbs like *suppose* or *guess*, and one will have to add *hope*, *doubt*, *wish*, *be afraid* and others. Here are some examples:

(32) *In a word, their behavior was quixotic: to die, to risk death, even to raise a finger for any Cause was to pennon one's lance with the riband of Purpose, **so the poet judged**, and had about it the same high lunacy of a tilt with Manchegan windmills.*

(*The Sot-Weed Factor* III, xviii; Barth 1984:723)

(33) *And what would be done, **I wanted to know**, with our toasters and roasters?*

(*Memoirs of a Survivor*, Lessing 1975:117)

(34) *And then everybody left the table, having no more than tasted their ice cream; even Miss Jane who liked ice cream better than anything, **Dessie knew**, didn't touch hers, feeling sorry, **she reckoned**, for Miss Laura and Miz Deen.*

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:261)

(iv) The subjective flavour of these verbs can, however, be retained in a matrix clause in a number of that-complement constructions in collocations that echo the typical idiomatic expression:³⁹

(35) *Mr Banks **thought** one could carry that point of view too far. We can't all be Titians and we can't all be Darwins, he said; at the same time he **doubted** whether you could have your Darwin and your Titian if it weren't for humble people like ourselves.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, xiii; Woolf 1985:69)

(36) *The paternal entrance made a sensation of course; and Mr Chivery, touching his hat (in a short manner though) with his key, **hoped he found himself tolerable**. Thank you, Chivery, quite well. And you?*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xix; Dickens 1978:268)

(37) *Fanny was passionate with the tea-cups and the bread as long as her passion lasted, and then protested that she was the wretchedest girl in the world, and **she wished she was dead**.*

(*Ibid.*, I, xx; 290)

- (38) 'I see Léonce isn't coming back,' she said, with a glance in the direction whence her husband had disappeared. **Robert supposed he was not**, as there were a good many New Orleans club men over at Klein's.
(*The Awakening*, ii; Chopin 1987:47)
- (39) Dick, with a grin of relief, stood up. He **guessed** Bill and he would be going back to fix those wires. He **guessed** Mr Haze and Dolly had loads of things to say to each other. He **guessed** he would be seeing me before I left. Why do those people guess so much and shave so little, and are so disdainful of hearing aids?
(*Lolita* II, 29; Nabokov 1981:273)
- (40) for while he [Walter] sat with a heavy heart [...]. Perch the messenger [...] **begged his pardon, but wished to say** in his ear, *Did he think he could arrange to send home to England a jar of preserved Ginger, cheap, for Mrs Perch's own eating, in the course of her recovery from her next confinement?*
(*Dombey and Son*, xiii; Dickens 1985:250)
- (41) Without presuming to decide where doctors disagreed, **it did appear to Bar**, viewing it as a question of common sense and not of so-called legal penetration, **that** this new system was—might he, in the presence of so great authority—say, Humbug? Ah! Fortified by such encouragement, **he could venture to say** Humbug; and now Bar's mind was relieved.
(*Little Dorrit* II, xii; Dickens 1978:616)
- (42) As to Mr Merdle, he was so much wanted by the men in the City and the rest of those places and was such a doosed extraordinary phenomenon in Buying and Banking and that, that Mr Sparkler **doubted if** the monetary system of the country would be able to spare him; though that his work was occasionally one too many for him, and that he would be all the better for a temporary shy at an entirely new scene and climate, **Mr Sparkler did not conceal**.
(*Ibid.*, 553)
- (v) *Ulysses*, as Banfield already noted,⁴⁰ has a large number of deliberately obsolete and playful introductory verbs and parenthetical tags:⁴¹
- (43) —Jews, he softly **imparted**⁴² in an aside in Stephen's ear, are accused of ruining.
(‘Eumaeus’; Joyce 1984:1405)
- (44) —Was she? Bloom **ejaculated** surprised, though not astonished by any means. I never heard that rumour before.
(*Ibid.*, 1425)
- (45) —Or his jennyass, Buck Mulligan **antiphoned**. [...]
—Which Will? **gagged** sweetly Buck Mulligan. We are getting mixed.
—The will to live, John Eglinton **philosophised**, for poor Ann, Will's widow, is the will to die.
—**Requiescat!** Stephen **prayed**. [...]
—History shows that to be true, **inquit Eglintonus Chronologus**.
(‘Scylla & Charybdis’; *ibid.*, 441–3)

Some of the restrictions noted above can be explained on the basis of the illocutionary value of the verb introducing indirect discourse. Thus the verbs banned from introducing direct discourse all have an illocutionary value, which can apparently be preserved in the free indirect discourse parenthetical because free indirect discourse does *not* imply a literal transcription of the represented discourse. The verbs that *only* take indirect discourse, on the other hand, do not necessarily refer to a speech act at all, but are equivalent to a perlocutionary effect: *convince*, *demonstrate*, *alert*. Verbs that can exclusively occur with direct discourse, by contrast, seem to introduce sounds or speech tokens that have no propositional content or are interpreted as a sound chain (as in singing).

The establishment of reliable figures outside a large-scale corpus of fictional texts is fairly difficult. The most prevalent verb is *say*, besides some fifty or so frequent alternatives. Other verb forms are fairly rare,⁴³ and when they do occur, they are frequently idiosyncratic, as in *Ulysses*, or obsolete, which makes it difficult to decide whether such verbs actually have case-grammatical indices in the lexicon to restrict them to the observed collocations, or whether they are, strictly speaking, used in an agrammatical or innovative way that *cannot* support inferences on the linguistic system. As has been noted, especially by Körner, there has been a marked diversification of *verba dicendi* since the eighteenth century, from a handful of core verbs (*say*, *answer*, *ask*, etc.) to increasingly innovative and attention-catching examples. Since narrative parentheticals themselves distribute very unevenly between writers, the occurrence of playful verbs in these is restricted to an even smaller group of *littérateurs*. In English Joyce probably might take pride of place, in German a couple of popular writers seem to lead the field.⁴⁴

5.4.2

Speech report and thought report (psycho-narration)

The standard definition of speech and thought report is in terms of its content and lexis—the narrative's description of a character's speech or thought act. This description can include the manner of performance, tenor and make-up of the utterance, or—in the case of thought-report—touch on states of consciousness or feeling that the character may be *unaware* of (in which case this implies a narrator's external description) or of which s/he may only be dimly cognizant, and certainly not in the terms of description supplied by the narrative. An example of external speech report is the following.

- (46) Mr Wegg then goes on to enlarge upon what throughout has been uppermost in his crafty mind [...]. He expatiates on Mr Venus's patient habits and delicate manipulation; [...] Mr Wegg next modestly remarks on the want of adaptation [...]. Lastly, he returns to the cause of the right, gloomily foreshadowing the possibility of something being unearthed to criminate Mr Boffin (of whom he once more candidly admits it cannot be denied that he profits by a murder), and anticipating his denunciation by the friendly movers to avenging justice. And this, Mr Wegg expressly points out, not at all for the sake of the reward—though it would be a want of principle not to take it.

(*Our Mutual Friend* II, vii; Dickens 1979:357–8)

Equivalently general and distant descriptions of consciousness are also common in literature:

- (47) These meditations were entirely employed on Mr Allworthy's fortune; for, first, he exercised much thought in calculating, as well as he could, the exact value of the whole: which calculations he often saw occasion to alter in his own favour: and, secondly and chiefly, he pleased himself with intended alterations in the house and gardens, and in projecting many other schemes, as well for the improvement of the estate as of the grandeur of the place.

(*Tom Jones* II, viii; Fielding 1966:64–5)

- (48) She [Anna] perceived that the monotony, the austerity, the melancholy of her existence had been sweet and beautiful of its kind, and she recalled, with a sort of rapture, hours of companionship with the beloved Agnes, when her father was equable and pacific. *Nothing was ugly nor mean. Beauty was everywhere, in everything.*

(*Anna of the Five Towns*, x; Bennett 1936:157)

The following passage in bold italics is an example of psycho-narration in which the character's psyche is rendered from an 'omniscient' standpoint.

- (49) Bit, by bit, like a doom, came the necessity to know. He was hit in the head. [...] *Was there blood on his face? Was hot blood flowing? Or was it dry blood congealing down his cheek? It took him hours even to ask the question: time being no more than an agony in darkness, without measurement.*

('England, My England'; Lawrence 1986:332; quoted Banfield 1982:65)

Virginia Woolf exploits the seeming incompatibility between flights of vision and insipid daily activities for ironic purposes:

- (50) *There it [an element of joy] was, all round them. It partook*, she felt, carefully helping Mr Bankes to a specially tender piece, *of eternity.*

(*To the Lighthouse* I, xvii; Woolf 1985:97)

Formally, this is free indirect discourse (note the parenthetical *she felt*), but on an underlying direct discourse reading it cannot be free indirect discourse—Mrs Ramsay could not literally have thought 'it partakes of eternity'.

Speech and thought report, even more than indirect discourse, lend themselves to critical and distortive reporting:

- (51) So they started talking about capital punishment and of course Bloom comes out with the why and the wherefore and all the codology of the business and the old dog smelling him all the time [...] about I don't know what all deterrent effect and so forth and so on.

(*Ulysses*; Joyce 1984:657)

- (52) Jones went up to Blifil's room, whom he found in a situation which moved his pity, though it would have raised a less amiable passion in many beholders. He had cast himself on his bed, where he lay abandoning himself to despair, and drowned in tears; not in such tears as flow from contrition, and wash away guilt from minds which have been seduced or surprised into it unawares, against the bent of their natural dispositions, as will sometimes happen from human frailty, even to the good; no, these tears were such as the frightened thief sheds in his care, and are indeed the effects of that concern which the most savage natures are seldom deficient in feeling for themselves.

(*Tom Jones* XVIII, xi; Fielding 1966:413–14)

As Leech/Short (1981) have noticed aptly, speech report is a fairly infrequent technique of speech representation, especially in fiction, whereas thought report used to be the prevalent medium for the representation of characters' consciousness before the advent of free indirect discourse. Cohn in her seminal study of the representation of consciousness in fiction (1978) indeed replaces the tripartite direct discourse/indirect discourse/free indirect discourse schema by direct discourse (i.e. interior monologue), free indirect discourse ('narrated monologue') and *psycho-narration* (our thought report), discounting the very infrequent occurrences of indirect discourse representations of thought processes. In this she is motivated by the realization that the conscience of another cannot be reported except by an omniscient narrator (an insight already formulated by K.Hamburger),⁴⁵ so that what, formally, appears to be indirect discourse (*she felt that, it occurred to him that*) is intrinsically equivalent to more narratorial descriptions of consciousness: neither of these can lay claim to any mimetic verisimilitude in terms of transcribing a self-reflective thought act. Cohn's criteria for psycho-narration are therefore *semantic* rather than formal, including as key examples sentences such as *She knew that ..., he felt that ...*, in which the consciousness verb determines that the complement clause is not to be taken as 'literal' indirect discourse.

The formal conundrums in the definition of speech report centre around the use of quotative *that*-clauses. On the one hand one can simply say that *all* complement clauses are indirect discourse—a move that does not come to terms with all the interpretative facts. There are verbs that take *that*-clauses but are of a clearly illocutionary nature such as *deny* (cp. Strauch 1972:228), in which the propositional content of the *that*-clause is inferred to be the very opposite of the implied original utterance. However, the alternative of restricting indirect discourse to verbs with *that* complements that *cannot* take a direct object NP (cp. *he denied the allegation*) then founders on the existence of *that*-clauses which contain subjectivity markers such as logophoric pronouns: *He proposed that,*

without any doubt, as far as he was concerned there was no such thing as an innocent creature on earth. (Compare: *He proposed a solution.*) One would not want to exclude *propose* from among ID verbs, even though it can take an object NP. The matter is therefore not resolvable in terms of valency. With the exception of *relative that*-clauses in English, such as,

- (53) The book that he loaned from the library cannot be found.

one can conceivably argue that almost all *that*-clauses have a quotative substratum. A second group of exceptions would be ‘impersonal’ constructions such as *it*-clefts and sentences with *dummy-it*: these likewise do not necessarily imply speech acts. Since *that*-clauses presuppose their underlying propositions, they are therefore suitably handled within a topic-focus, theme/rheme account of syntactic structure.

- (54) It is John who broke the window.

- (55) It is disquieting that radiation values have reached the governmentally established limit.

One usually discusses such constructions under the title of factual presupposition. Observe the pragmatically equivalent

- (56) The fact that prices are sky-rocketing is due to an increase in demand and a concurrent decline in supply.

- (57) The question whether or not he was involved in the crime is a serious one.

- (58) It is unclear how he managed to get there in time.

These sentences, too, presuppose ideas⁴⁶ (Was he involved in the crime? He managed to get there in time), which become the basis of a comment: ‘is it true’ in (57), the means or manner of performance in (58). In these cases the position of the *that*-clause defines its focal informative value. In (56) and (58) the content of the *that*-clause is supposed to be common knowledge between speaker and addressee, whereas in (55) and (57) there is an equal emphasis on the proposition and its evaluation, which derives from the fact that the content of the *that*-clause is presupposed but is additionally subordinated to the emotional/evaluative reaction about it on the part of the speaker. One can thus conclude that *all* non-relative *that*-clauses are quotative in nature, in the sense that they refer to and integrate assertive or interrogative propositions into an ongoing discourse.

This has recently been further substantiated by Kuno 1987⁴⁷ in sentences of the type:

- (59) The rumour that *Johni would become the President of the Corporation was spread by himi

- (60) The rumour that Johnj would become the President of the Corporation was denied by himi

(Kuno 1987:110 [= (3.4b)])

In order to explain pronominal behaviour in these sentences Kuno postulates an underlying direct discourse.⁴⁸ Statements which deal with presupposed facts (*the fact that* constructions, *the rumour that*, *the announcement that*, initial *that*-clauses, etc.) require underlying pronominals in the sentential deep structure when the main clause verb implies awareness on the part of the coreferential NP subject. It is then a verb of communication or consciousness. One can therefore observe a sliding scale between impersonal [*the fact that-S'*]-clauses and actual quotations. Kuno also discusses instances like,

- (61) This paper was written by Anne and himself.
- (62) Physicists like himself do not make mistakes.

in which one needs to postulate underlying logophoric pronouns or shifters. The referent of *he* in those sentences needs to be responsible for, or aware of, the propositions expressed about him. Examples like these are therefore a submerged form of quotation. The quotational nature of such sentences, however, can be argued to be independent of the syntactic fact of *that* complementization as in (61) and (62) above.⁴⁹

From the above it would appear that, on a synchronic level, *that*-clauses in English do indeed primarily function as quotatives (in a loose sense, to be sure). Indeed, on the basis of the theory of schematic speech and thought representation that I will present in [Chapter 8](#), this can be regarded as a logical consequence of quotative procedures. *That*-clauses introducing assertions pattern alongside questions (*if/whether-constructions*) and imperatives (*that* plus *should*, or infinitives). This parallel between quotation and metalinguistic performance seems to derive from a hierarchical privileging of types of discourse (or, in our post-Austinian age, illocutionary types) over other linguistic categories. The parallel is good for imperative infinitival constructions, too, as the usual paraphrases of infinitives by *should*-clauses show:

- (63) It is important for him to finish his thesis by August.
- (64) It is important that he should finish his thesis by August.

Compare also,

- (65) What to do with the dripping umbrella was the question.

in which the infinitive can also readily be transformed by a *should* construction:

- (66) What she should do with the dripping umbrella was the question.

(66) is interesting also because it carries unmistakable signals of quotation.

- (67) What Anne should do with the dripping umbrella was the question.

Note that (64) is perfectly ‘objective’, whereas the infinitival construction in (65) also carries some tone of irritation, or in any case emotional involvement. Likewise, in (66) one reads the sentence from Anne’s perspective, whereas in (67) it is not Anne’s problem but that of people taking decisions for or about her that allows a univocal reading of (67). One needs, however, to be aware of the caveats I have mentioned in connection with expressivity and root transformations in [Chapter 4](#). Context is more important than actual syntactic form since syntactic signals will tend to be interpreted differently according to their respective contexts. What appears to be a greater or lesser extent of expressivity in (63) to (67) can be counteracted by appropriate textual placing.

What I have noted here for English also basically holds for German and French, particularly for the distinction between the subjunctive and the indicative in subsidiary clauses. In this chapter I will not discuss any French or German examples because the details of overlapping formal properties would take up too much space.

In the above I have proposed that there is a formal continuum between indirect discourse and speech/thought report that allows for the delimitation of ideal types but cannot lay claim to really viable distinctions of a formal or indeed even semantic nature. In particular, for the presentation of consciousness, practically *all* oblique representations are by definition propositional, and the evaluative nature of indirect discourse, too, makes it imperative to withdraw from a description of indirect discourse in terms of an underlying direct discourse clause—a fact we already noted in connection with the illocutionary nature of much indirect discourse. On the other hand, *that*-clauses to some degree evoke an underlying direct discourse, and not least on account of the distribution of the logophoric pronoun and the semantic motivation for that distribution.

The crucial importance of semantics, or—one might equally say—of pragmatic context, appears also from constructions such as the following:

(68) Marie St. Clare declared that [...] her nervous system was entirely inadequate to any trial of that nature; one snuff of anything disagreeable ***being, according to her account,*** quite sufficient to close the scene, and put an end to all her earthly trials at once.

(*Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, xvi; Stowe 1981:177)

Although the participle construction with *being* formally signals the narrative’s reporting discourse—and that is a stylistic factor since participle constructions typically do not occur in the colloquial language—the *according to her account* explicitly characterizes the clause into which it has been inserted as *speech* report,⁵⁰ and the colloquial *snuff* as well as the trite imagery (*close the scene, put an end to all her earthly trials*) clearly evoke Marie St. Claire’s linguistic performance. Not only can speech report therefore be (formally) implicit, the narrator’s discourse can also freely borrow from the discourse of characters outside definable instances of speech or thought report, indirect discourse or free indirect discourse. I will return to issues of such lexical appropriation in the following chapter under (6.2).

I will here restrict myself to a sampling of various expressive categories as they occur in **speech and thought report** very much on the lines of indirect discourse saturated with expressive elements. Whereas, with speech report, these frequently lend a colloquial mimetic tone to the reported discourse, with psycho-narration they seem to imply a more verbalized level of consciousness, which is why psycho-narration with such expressive elements suggests a closeness to free indirect discourse. Such instances of narratorial appropriation of figural idiom conclusively argue against a characteristic of *decreasing* mimesis towards the 'top' of the scale which is occupied by (authorial) speech and thought representation.

- (69) His mother finally surrendered to his begging for corduroy knickers or straights, which helped a little, but he was never asked to play *those* circle games, *those* singing games, to join in anything, until Guitar pulled *those* four boys off him.

(*Song of Solomon*, xi; Morrison 1977:264) [deictic, emotive designation]

- (70) It appeared, before the breakfast was over, that everybody whom *this Gowan* knew was either more or less of an ass, or more or less of a knave; but was, notwithstanding, *the most lovable, the most engaging, the simplest, truest, kindest, dearest, best fellow that ever lived*.

(*Little Dorrit* I, xvii; Dickens 1978:248–9) [deictic *this*; evaluative lexemes]

- (71) Yet, by 1978, with two slim volumes now to his credit, he faced a crisis. He took another walk, this time through London's East End. *The Spectator*, he felt, was a seductive dead end. Furthermore, he had begun to feel that poetry was simply *too* narrow, *too* exclusive of experience, for what he wanted to do. He determined to write a book, *any book*, to free himself of this crisis.

(*The Times Magazine*, April 9, 1989:53) [intensifiers; vague denomination]

- (72) He [Mr Dorrit] concluded with some further and more general observations on the —*ha* character of an independent gentleman, and the—*hum* character of a possibly too partial and admiring parent.

(*Little Dorrit* II, xiv; Dickens 1978:656) [hesitation, interjections]

- (73) When he [Egbert] was there, moving in his own quiet way, she felt as if the whole great law of sacrifice, by which she had elected to live, were annulled. He annulled by his very presence the laws of her life. And what did he substitute? *Ah*, against that question she hardened herself in recoil.

(‘England, My England’; Lawrence 1986:325) [interjection]

- (74) But no. They stood there, isolated from the rest of the world. His immense self-pity, his demand for sympathy, poured and spread itself in pools at her feet, and *all she did, miserable sinner that she was, was to draw her skirts a little closer* round her ankles, lest she should get wet. *In complete silence she stood there*, grasping her paint brush.

(*To the Lighthouse* III, ii; Woolf 1985:143) [sentential topicalization, right dislocation]

- (75) They [the nurses] didn't like the *son of a whore* who yelled ‘Be quiet,’ but that was natural. *He was always ringing the buzzer on them and complaining about everything*.

(*Lives of Short Duration* ; Richards 1981:73) [lexical and idiomatic signals of
subjectivity]

It additionally needs to be observed that passages of psycho-narration, as frequently in V. Woolf, have little distancing quality and that they can require the positing of an underlying deictic centre much on the lines of free indirect discourse. Indeed, Banfield, for this very reason, collapses psycho-narration and free indirect discourse into her category RST. Not only does psychonarration in the figural or reflectorial novel consistently immerse itself in figural idiom; the line between thought report and free indirect discourse is frequently ambiguous to precisely the same degree that free indirect discourse so frequently becomes indistinguishable from narrative presentation (cp. under (3.3.1)). Since psycho-narration is defined in terms of deictic qualities, one easily finds passages that explicitly describe a character's thoughts or feelings (they are therefore thought representation) and do so in an expressive manner (therefore formally suggesting a free indirect discourse interpretation). Yet, by the style and general content of the passage, such texts appear to be the narrator's or narrative's presentation of the character's psyche after all:

(76) *No matter: she wasn't happy, and never had been. Why was life so unsatisfactory? Why did everything she leaned on crumble instantly to dust? But why, if somewhere there existed a strong and handsome being— a man of valor, sublime in passion and refinement, with a poet 's heart and an angel's shape, a man like a lyre with strings of bronze, intoning elegiac epithalamiums to the heavens—why mightn 't she have the luck to meet him? Ah, fine chance! Besides, nothing was worth looking for: everything was a lie! Every smile concealed a yawn of boredom; every joy, a curse; every pleasure, its own surfeit; and the sweetest kisses left on one's lips but a vain longing for fuller delight.*

(*Madame Bovary*; Flaubert 1957:322)⁵¹

Indeed, what one has here is the typical narrative quality of the figural narrative situation in which the character's idealized deictic centre and mental ideation rule the presentation, but which relies for the evocation of that illusion on a disembodied (in less ironic passages also more inconspicuous) narrative which typically and necessarily exceeds the scope of the SELF's stylistics and epistemics. We will come back to this conundrum in terms of easy categorizations whether linguistic or narratological in Chapters 6 and 7 in connection with our discussion of Banfield's theory and of the issue of 'voice'. As Banfield has proposed with such happy intuition, figural consciousness in such passages rules supreme, and the expressive devices underline this fact. Where I will depart from Banfield's standpoint will be in the conclusions that one can draw from this, especially as they relate to free indirect discourse. I agree with Banfield that the distinction between free indirect discourse and psycho-narration may be elusive in such contexts, but in order to be fair to the empirical facts one will have to allow expressive features outside such contexts, too,

and cannot therefore make a definition of free indirect discourse dependent on their presence in a specific sentence.

5.5

NARRATED PERCEPTION

One part of consciousness which may or may not be fully articulated in terms of verbalization consists in visual, aural, gustatory or tactile perception. Perception itself is generally taken to be non-verbal, 'non-reflective'—as Banfield calls it—although it can give rise to thought processes and emotions, even to exclamatory utterance:

(77) Oh, this is wonderful!
What a view!

In narratives that do not provide (or pretend not to provide) an external, reliable, 'objective' description of the story world, it becomes important to give some sort of description from the perspective of the ruling consciousness. This ties in with the tendency to have etic text beginnings (Harweg 1968) with referentless pronouns and familiarizing articles. (See earlier under (4.2.2).) Within such reflector mode narrative (Stanzel 1984b) there is an attempt to portray what characters see from their point of view, in their terms. Therefore, rather than getting,

(78) He saw a tall building with all the blinds drawn.

such narratives will foreground the character's categories of perception in the description of what s/he is observing. For instance, the order of perception may be mirrored iconically by the word order:

(79) He was about to ask them what the trouble was when, ***running across the tracks towards them, and followed by a white man, he saw another colored boy***; and at the same instant another white man came running down the subway steps.

(*Go Tell It on the Mountain*; Baldwin 1985:171) [perceptual right postposing]

(80) He turned to ***see, entering the door, his father, his mother, and his aunt***
(*Ibid.*, 60)

(81) The mother, with a querulous satisfaction in the monotony of her complaint, was still repeating it in a low voice from time to time, and the proud form of her daughter moved beside her slowly, ***when there came advancing over a dark ridge before them, two other figures***, which in the distance, were so like an exaggerated imitation of their own, that Edith stopped.

(*Dombey and Son*, xl; Dickens 1985:662)

(82) Turning round upon his stool behind the counter, Mr Gills looked out among the instruments in the window, to see if his nephew might be crossing the road. ***No. He was not among the bobbing umbrellas, and he certainly was not the***

newspaper boy in the oilskin cap who was slowly working his way along the piece of brass outside, writing his name over Mr Gill's name with his forefinger.

(Ibid., iv; 90)

- (83) He examined *the bushes, the branches, the ground for a berry, a nut, anything.*

(*Song of Solomon*, x; Morrison 1977:253)

In these examples the order of words traces the order of perception on the part of the character. Other descriptions of a narrator's perception register the character's inability to name or even conceptualize what s/he is seeing:

- (84) Big dusty drops splash on the windshield.

Here he comes.

Here comes something anyhow. Rubber treads hum on the wet asphalt.

(*Love in the Ruins*; Percy 1989:229)

- (85) They saw a place where *something* was caught. It was a boat, or part of one.

(*The Found Boat*; Munro 1974:127)

In so far as such descriptions of a character's perception—on the whole mostly visual—incorporate cognitive, notional and lexical material from that character's perspective, one can speak of 'narrated' perception. Hints of the character's subjectivity, of the character's deictic centre, include practically all the expressive elements discussed in [Chapter 4](#). To the extent that passages of narrated perception incorporate extended clauses, questions and exclamations (as in (82) above), they can be said to merge with free indirect discourse. Hence the terms *narrated perception* (modelled on Cohn's *narrated speech*),⁵² *represented perception* (Brinton 1980) or *free indirect perception* (Chatman 1978:204).⁵³ Of the many expressive devices—besides the indeterminate designations quoted above—one can note repetition, root transformations (these specifically correlate with the rendering of perception) and all kinds of lexical and evaluative phenomena. The extended use of the English progressive and the French *imparfait* is also considered typical for narrated perception. Brinton (1980) has extensive exemplification of this.

- (86) After all the others had gathered round the card-tables and young Duval had been warned by Prudence, Marguerite descended the staircase with Varville; *such* a cloak, *such* a fan, *such* jewels—and her face! One knew at a glance how it was with her.

(*My Antonia*; Cather 1984:276–7) [repetition, subjective modifier, exclamation mark]

- (87) She [Mrs Swithin] stopped at a window in the passage and held back the curtain. Beneath was the garden, bathed in sun. The grass was sleek and shining. Three white pigeons *were flirting* and tiptoeing as ornate as ladies in ball dresses. Their

elegant bodies swayed as they minced with tiny steps on their *little pink feet* upon the grass. Suddenly, *up they rose* in a flutter, circle d, and flew

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:54) [past progressive, lexis, directional adverb
preposing]

- (88) And he [George] stared at the mound of dirt and looked at the strands of grass and padded weeds growing beyond the mesh fence. And when the clouds blocked the sun, *how cold, how sad and faraway they seemed. And too he was hungry* —

(*Lives of Short Duration*; Richards 1981:16) [incomplete sentence, WH-constituent
preposing]

- (89) And his [Pip's] hand opened; he held up to the light something that flashed, that winked, that was a *most lovely* green.

'It's a nemeral,' said Pip solemnly.

'Is it really, Pip?' Even Isabel was impressed.

The *lovely green things* seemed to dance in Pip's fingers. *Aunt* Beryl had a *nemeral* in a ring, but it was a very small one. This one was as big as a star and far more beautiful.

('At the Bay', iv; Mansfield 1988:273–4) [character's designation, subjective
evaluation]

- (90) She [Florence] trembled, and her eyes were dim. His [Mr Dombey's] figure seemed to grow in height and bulk before her as he paced the room: *now* it was all blurred and indistinct; *now* clear again, and plain; and *now* she seemed to think that this had happened, just the same, a multitude of years *ago*.

(*Dombey and Son*, xxxv; Dickens 1985:585) [deictic *now*]

- (91) The insipidity of what was said needs no illustration—Bonamy kept on gently returning quiet answers and accumulating amazement at an existence squeezed and emasculated within a white satin shoe (Mrs Durrant meanwhile enunciating strident politics with *Sir Somebody* in the back room) until the virginity of Clara's soul appeared to him candid; the depths unknown; and he would have brought out Jacob's name had he not begun to feel positively certain that Clara loved him—and could do nothing whatever.

(*Jacob's Room*, xii; Woolf 1982:148) [designation]

- (92) One day, just as he's entering a narrow street all ancient brick walls and lined with costermongers, he hears his name called—and *hubba hubba what's this then, here she comes all right, blonde hair flying in telltales, white wedgies clattering on cobblestones, an adorable tomato in a nurse uniform, and her name's, uh, well, oh — Darlene. Golly, it's Darlene*.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:114–15) [hesitation, interjections]

The linguistic evocation of perception was first discussed by B. Fehr (1938) in a classic essay on 'substitutionary narration', and the term narrated perception was subsequently applied both to free indirect discourse renderings of perception and to less obvious cases of character's deixis on the lines of *Ansteckung* (see under (6.2)). Banfield includes narrated

perception as part of her non-reflective consciousness category, and she bars parentheticals and expressive elements such as interjections and root transformations (including questions) from it. I will come back to these issues in Chapters 7 and 8 because Banfield's claims need to be discussed within a theory of consciousness, deictic subjectivity and linguistic expression. Like free indirect discourse representing consciousness, narrated perception, it needs to be noted, *does not* usually occur in oral discourse of vicarious experience. Narrated perception, however, can sometimes be traced in summaries, such as those collected by Chafe in *The Pear Stories* (Chafe 1980b):

- (93) [.45] he sees...and and there's *one* [.25] *full basket of pears* there, and and *an empty basket* [.4] And *the other full basket is gone*. [.65] And he goes... [counting gesture] [2.7] And he sees the kids walking by and eating their pears... And he and *he looks after them, and they disappear*, [.6] and that's the end of the movie. (Chafe 1980b: 302)⁵⁴ [sequence of perceptions mirrored in syntax]
- (94) [1.9][.7] But u-h [.35] still.../It/ *comes back to the old man*, [.3] *up in the pear tree*, he's *still picking the pears*.

(Ibid., 303) [described as perception of viewer when watching the film; mirrors recognition of the man, his location and his activity]

Studs Terkel's interviews, too, which are of a more literary cast, include numerous instances of narrated perception:

- (95) We look around and see all *this* devastation, airplanes burning, hangars burning, gas trucks burning. Men yelling and screaming. Wounded and dead all over the place. Jap fighters followed 'em in, about eighty of 'em. Just strafed everything that stood. Amos started shootin' at 'em with our little old putt-putt. (Laughs.) I stood by with the ammunition box. After it was over, we were kinda in shock.
- (*'The Good War'*, Anton Bilek; Terkel 1990:84)

The most important single feature of narrated perception, however, is its correlation with the German (preterital) *indicative* (the subjunctive is barred from the narration of perceptions), the English past (progressive) and the French *imparfait*. (Compare above under (3.5).) Besides, as we have seen in our discussion of root transformations, several syntactic focussing patterns strongly correlate with a perceptual interpretation and in fact occur exclusively in contexts of (implied) perception. The traditional approach has been to explain perception as a punctual directedness of the perceiver's gaze in relation to which perceived activities appear to be *simultaneous*. The tense is then taken to reflect its customary 'simultaneity' meaning, and the perception itself identified with the pattern of incidence: while something is going on, PERCEIVER's gaze impinges on it. I have turned this argument on its head, arguing that the perceptual implication of the *imparfait* (past progressive/ German preterite), its consciousness factor, is primary and that its function in the pattern of incidence carries with it the implication of a perceptual schema (in frame-theoretical terms—cp. below under (9.2)) since the incidence can be identified

with an awareness of interruption of ongoing being, state or activity. Action, that is, impinges on a consciousness, and this consciousness is signalled in the text by the use of a 'perceptual' tense. As with psychonarration, the perception seems to be part of the contextual meaning of the language, but the expressive features mark the perception as consciousness.

5.6

RESUMÉ: BEYOND THE SCALE

I am diagramming results of this chapter in [Table 4](#). There is no stringent order in the arrangement of the scale as given in the table. One can move directly from the narrative into free indirect discourse, or even into interior monologue, and from speech report into either indirect discourse or free indirect discourse, or direct discourse. Expressive elements, as I have attempted to show, occur along the entire continuum, in speech and thought report, psycho-narration, indirect discourse and of course free indirect discourse, and they can even be found in the narrative itself. (Compare the examples quoted below under (6.2).) The factor of expressive 'voice' therefore overlaps with the syntactic arrangements in ways that do not allow any predictions about the mimetic value from the grammatical definition alone. Additionally, the manner of integrating characters' 'voice', whether empathetically or ironically, affects actual reading experience more than do merely formal criteria and the simple presence of expressive elements. In particular, empathetic and ironic borrowing of characters' linguistic subjectivity may have very different effects between speech contexts and representations of consciousness. These aspects will be our major concern in the following discussion of the notorious 'dual voice' hypothesis in [Chapter 6](#).

Additionally, one has to observe that not one of these forms (whether ideal type or intermediary category) occurs by itself in actual texts. Pure free indirect discourse⁵⁵ is as rare as pure interior monologue, or texts using indirect discourse exclusively (with no directly quoted dialogue).⁵⁶ More typically, speech and thought representation in literary texts is entirely multi-shaped, so that no specific function can be aligned with any of the formal options, at least not on a generally valid level.

The situation of free indirect discourse embedding in the narrative is very similar to that of direct discourse in cases where it is presented without immediate inquit tags and phrases, or—even more crucially—in cases where there are not even the usual typographical markers. In many twentieth-century novels narrative, interior monologue and utterances may be run together in a paragraph, with the reader having to rely on expressive devices, tense and pronoun shifts, and—above all—contextual clues to see what is going on.⁵⁷

- (96) Tchitcherine one morning finds all the pencils in his conference room have mysteriously vanished. In revenge, he and Radnichny sneak in Blobadjian's conference room next night with hacksaws, files and torches, and reform the alphabet on his typewriter. It is some fun in the morning. [iM, narrative?] Blobadjian runs around in a prolonged screaming fit. Tchitcherine's in conference,

meeting's called to order, CRASH! two dozen linguists and bureaucrats go toppling over on their ass. Noise echoes for full two minutes. Tchitcherine, on his ass, notes that pieces of chair leg all around the table have been sawed off, reattached with wax and varnished over again. A professional job, all right. [iM] *Could Radnichny be a double agent?* The time for lighthearted practical jokes is past. [iM; narrative?] *Tchitcherine must go it alone.*

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:353)

- (97) One of them lives there yet—a short, stocky man, his dull-brown face seamed and drawn, and his tightly curled hair gray white. *The crops? Just tolerable*, he said; *just tolerable. Getting on? No—he wasn't getting on at all Smith of Albany 'furnishes' him, and his rent is eight hundred pounds of cotton. Can't make anything at that Why didn't he buy land? Humph!* *Takes money to buy land.* And he turns away.

(*The Souls of Black Folk*, viii; Du Bois 1989:119)

In the Pynchon passage the formal delimitations are nearly impossible, and there is a radical indeterminacy in general about what can be attributed to whom. In the Du Bois quotation the speech representation moves from one formal category to the other with intermediary one-word clauses that defy categorization;⁵⁸ but at least here it is clear who is saying what, and the passage definitely describes a verbal exchange. In particular the shift into the present tense and into what at least formally is equivalent to direct discourse seems to be backgrounded in the interest of evoking the dialogue with a few strokes of the linguistic brush.

As has, indeed, been variously pointed out, free indirect discourse is notable precisely because it facilitates such smooth transition between different types of discourse representation. Such formal camouflaging of moves from potentially more mediated to less mediated speech and thought report can serve a variety of textual functions from the gradual zooming in on a character's psyche to the clever manipulation of figural discourse within an ironic, narratorial argument.

Not only do forms of speech and thought representation therefore occur in quick succession and in formally 'impure' manifestation, the scale model also cannot adequately deal with those non-formal overarching discourse effects which do not allow accommodation on the scale. The scale model is quite unable to deal with the functional difference between the representation of

utterances and that of consciousness. Although apparently the same means of linguistic expression are at one's disposal in the utterance and consciousness domains, their discourse effect is entirely incompatible. In particular, what is formally indirect discourse, i.e. sentences with a *that* complement clause, not only occurs very rarely in actual texts, but the majority of *verba cogitandi* with a *that*-clause is typically equivalent to what has here been termed psychonarration.⁵⁹ To put it differently, the definition of indirect discourse in terms of subordination by means of a complement clause leads to counter-intuitive results when applied to the representation of consciousness. There is some deeper reason for this apparently purely terminological hassle. Consciousness is not exclusively a verbal domain,

Table 4: Formal gradations along the scale

(A) Pure narrative – action, background description plus evaluative commentary by the narrator

(B) Narrated perception – description replaced by evocation of character's perception

(C) Speech report/psycho-narration – the narrative's (frequently evaluative) rendering of utterances or feelings/thought processes

Intermediary forms between (A), (B), (C) and (D):

- narration with expressive elements (6.2)
- *he hoped that; he supposed that* (see (5.4.1) (iii, iv))
- ambiguous sentences (between free indirect discourse and narrative) (5.4.2)
- narrated perception turning into free indirect discourse (5.5)

(D) Free indirect discourse

Intermediary forms between (D) and (E):

- indirect discourse continued by free indirect discourse (3.3)
- indirect discourse without complementizer (3.3)
- free indirect discourse with parenthetical
- indirect discourse with expressive elements (Chapter 4)
- *she asked would he come* (indirect question with inversion (3.3.1))
- German 'free' subjunctive form of indirect discourse (3.3.1)

(E) Indirect discourse

Intermediary forms between (A), (B), (C) and (E):

- *that*-clauses with perlocutionary verb
- descriptions of illocutionary speech acts
- indirect discourse with consciousness verbs
- free indirect discourse with parenthetical (*she felt*; (50) above)

Intermediary forms between (D) and (F):

- ambiguous forms in first person present tense narrative
- free indirect discourse with unshifted tense/pronouns
- incomplete sentences
- interjections

Intermediary forms between (E) and (F):

- 'slipping' (3.1)
- indirect discourse without complementizer (3.3)

Intermediary forms between (A), (D), and (F):

- sentences with non-finite verb forms
- verbless sentences
- exclamations
- gnomic present tense clauses

(F) Direct discourse (quoted and unquoted)

and the canonic indirect discourse forms, even if employed to render more illocutionary force than propositional content, consistently relate to an intentionality and implicit (verisimilar) literality that cannot be presupposed for the rendering of consciousness. And it cannot be presupposed for the description of consciousness because the human mind,

unlike the human utterance, not merely resists verbalization but also defies easy accessibility. Whereas utterances, like events, can be experienced objectively, that is to say are empirically verifiable between observers (listeners), thought processes, attitudes, intuitions and emotions *cannot* be 'observed' except by self-distancing (introspection), nor can they be 'known' except by the experiencer her-/himself.

This is naturally an insight already well known to phenomenologists and that was introduced into narratology Jean Pouillon (1946), K. Hamburger (orig. 1957) and Dorrit Cohn (1978). Consciousness is an experience that even the self can 'know' only in memory of introspective analysis. In fiction it becomes possible to mediate internal consciousness linguistically, and typically this can be achieved in *narration* (psycho-narration or free indirect discourse, Cohn's 'narrated' monologue) rather than indirect thought report.

That speech and thought representation are 'doing' entirely different things can be gauged also from the different positions and functions of irony and empathy (Cohn's dissonance and consonance) in the speech and thought realms. Thus, as has variously been noted, the representation of consciousness can be either empathetic or (sometimes even heavily) ironic. Reports of utterances, on the other hand, fail to be 'empathetic' or consonant; they may be scathingly ironic, but can otherwise only be neutral or objective (Müller 1985). Again, the subject matter interferes with form and functional symmetry: one can empathize with people's emotions but not with their utterances. If one agrees to what they say, one can report this *approvingly*. Empathy is hardly an issue. Banfield's theory of represented speech and thought, which basically centres on the representation of consciousness, comes to some highly remarkable conclusions which characterize the peculiarities of the linguistic evocation of figural consciousness. If these conclusions cannot be transferred into the realm of utterances, this only underlines the fundamental incommensurability between verbalized linguistic expression and the semi-verbalized instinctual realm of the mind, that most elusive of all human appurtenances.

Connected with this constitutive divide between utterance and consciousness is the *literality* (Strauch 1984) factor of speech and thought representation, variously discussed in terms of mimesis or 'verbatim' faithfulness to the original discourse. I will deal with this issue more fully in the following chapter in relation to the so-called dual voice hypothesis. As we have already observed so far, there is no direct correspondence between the level of syntactic (in)dependence and the literality factor as instanced in the presence, or absence, of 'expressive' and therefore putatively 'literal' elements. There are highly mimetic passages of speech report and extremely 'authorial' free indirect discourse passages. Moreover, as we will see under (6.2), expressive elements pervade the narrative itself, borrowed from what appears to be the characters' discourse, as a consequence of empathetic and ironic appropriation of figural idiom on the part of the narrative. Mimeticism or literality, like empathy, is therefore a factor that straddles and counteracts the divide of forms on the scale model, and one can in fact propose a scale between literality and abstraction (Strauch 1984) which does not fully correspond with McHale's diegesis vs mimesis cline. Literality is a factor very much based on narrative verisimilitude —mimesis, on the other hand, can be defined in more linguistic terms. Also, the verisimilitude makes sense only within a framework of the conventions of literary

discourse, conventions which are operative already in fictional (and dramatic) dialogue, and cannot be reduced to empirical faithfulness:

- (98) Even allowing that dialogue is not Mrs. Gordimer's strength as a novelist, this simply is bad writing. No mother would talk to a child like this; in life, perhaps, she might, but not in fiction.

(NYRB 38.19 [1991]:27)

Contextual and particularly generic frame conditions will be awarded more attention in the remainder of this book. They typically exceed the purely formal and typological approach to which I have preliminarily adhered in the interests of lucid presentation.

A generic interpretation of a theoretical cast has been proposed by Ron (1981) in an excellent paper on what he calls the 'mimetic language game'. According to Ron, free indirect discourse is not an instance of embedded discourse (as for most narratologists including McHale), but a rhetorical language *game* that merely operates with the illusion or *semblance* of embedded discourse (1981:18). Although Ron's formulations are highly judicious and perceptive for the literary realm, they cannot lay claim to equal significance for the domain of oral discourse, where one cannot *prima facie* reduce linguistic interaction to a 'mimetic language game'. However, with some important qualifications, my own model in Chapter 8 will bear an uncanny resemblance to Ron's theses, even if it has been developed on the basis of a discourse-analytical approach rather than departing from purely literary text analyses. It is not a 'game' that I am after: my concern has been and will be with a linguistic phenomenon of more general proportions and applications.

The opposite of literality, *abstraction*, or—more appropriately—*selection* and *distortion*, has been discussed primarily in relation to indirect discourse (the noted freedom of the indirect reporter), but it has also been acknowledged as a frequent device in free indirect discourse and interpreted as direct evidence for the mediated quality of free indirect discourse and for the narrator's active interference with characters' discourse. Abstraction and selection were first observed to be relevant by Lorck (1921:32–3) in a debate over a passage from Prosper Mérimée's *Colomba*:

- (99) En vain il parla de la sauvagerie du pays et de la difficulté pour une femme d'y voyager : elle [Lydia] ne craignait rien; elle aimait par tout a voyager a cheval; elle se faisait une fête de coucher au bivac; elle **menaçait** d'aller en Asie-Mineure. Bref, elle avait réponse a tout, car jamais Anglaise n 'avait été en Corse; donc elle devait y aller.

(Quoted Lorck 1921:32)⁶⁰

The tirade is here nicely condensed and compressed, highlighting and exaggerating the tenor of Lydia's argumentation, whose perlocutionary effect constitutes a threat—note the interpretative *imparfait*. Müller (1985:215, 220) has aptly characterized this reporting strategy in Jane Austen under the terms of *Selektion* and *Zuspitzung*, i.e. selective condensation and exaggeration.⁶¹ Such a strategy can be observed also in indirect discourse (Espinola 1974), and in fact even in interior monologue.⁶² I will devote ample

space to a discussion of condensation features in [Chapter 8](#), concentrating on direct discourse and free indirect discourse.

One of the most incisive contributions to narrative mimesis and the verbatim factor has of course come from Sternberg (1982a, 1982b) who has, precisely, deconstructed mimesis as a unitary textual element. Mimesis in fact needs to be regarded in terms of mimetic *effect* which, textually and narratologically, may combine a number of quite disparate aspects: faithfulness to a putative 'original' reproductiveness; narrative empathy ('directness' as a renunciation of narratorial, evaluative intrusion); the evocation of an *effet de réel*; and particularity, or as Sternberg calls it (1982b: 111), 'distinctiveness', creating an effect of a 'full' character whose individuality shows through his or her linguistic performance, idiosyncrasies of style and idiom as well as manners or gestures. Sternberg's analysis aims at a description of direct discourse and its mimetic effects; the categories of mimetic effect which he proposes can, however, be applied to *all* speech and thought representation which evokes an underlying 'voice'. When we believe we hear a character speak in his or her own words (even if these are filtered through the narrative syntax and lexis), the same kinds of naturalization within a frame of narrative verisimilitude immediately become operative.

It is when analysing such macro-structural textual phenomena that one feels constrained to leave behind the scale model of narrative forms of speech and thought representation. In view of the phenomena noted in this section, even the liberally knitted categories of a formal cline prove to be constrictive. Not only are the formal definitions of categories insufficient because the phenomena taper off into the marginal and indefinable; even a constitution of speech categories on the basis of ideal types, in a sort of 'fuzzy set' conceptualization,⁶³ comes into conflict with pragmatic and functional aspects of both individual texts and observable phenomena. One can probably outline a 'fuzzy' definition of various *forms* of speech and thought representation and a 'fuzzy' definition of various conceptualizations of the 'meaning' of direct and (free) indirect discourse. The problem is that one would still have difficulties in relating these two sequences of 'fuzzy' sets to one another. Even if the scale model does not 'work' as a watertight theoretical account, however, it constitutes an immense advance over the traditional tripartite schema which is hopelessly inadequate to the empirical textual evidence.

NOTES

- 1 See Stahl (1907).
- 2 Free indirect discourse is treated in great detail in Leech/Short (1981), Rimmon-Kenan (1983) and Toolan (1988).
- 3 See also Dillon/Kirchhoff (1976) and my own earlier work on Joyce (Fludernik 1986a).
- 4 This is Ricoeur's translation of Weinrich's term (Ricoeur 1985b: 68; Weinrich 1985: 14–17).
- 5 The only critic to have explicitly noted signals alerting the reader to a switch *back* to the narrator's text is Lethcoe (1969:167–9)—an insight that can now be related to the computer-inspired stacking account of embedded discourse. (Compare Wiebe 1990:35–8; Grosz/Sieder 1986 on cue words; and the literature quoted in de Beaugrande 1980:44 ff.)

- 6 For an extensive analysis of German speech act or thought act NPs see Kurz (1970: 121–2) as well as Kaufmann (1976:155–88). See also Wiebe (1990:87–93) for English, who includes NPs that mark visual apprehension and therefore imply a perception on the reportee's part, facilitating a FID or narrated perception reading of subsequent 'subjective' discourse. Her examples include NPs like *sign*, *indication* and *glimmer*.
- 7 See, however, Bally (1912a: 554): *M.Lavisse donne son mot a son tour; s'en vinrent demander quelque aumône légère*. Note also Bessonat (1990) and Collier (1992).
- 8 Bally (1912a: 554) discusses a number of very interesting introductions: *Illo ne cacha plus rien; se mit a parler longuement; un doute singulier me saisit; j'entendis d'étranges propos sur le compte des Vial; il bégaya l'histoire tout de travers; cette pensée le travaillait encore le soir*.
- 9 'She put out her hand: "Good night."' (Peprník 1969:145)
- 10 Compare Kaufmann (1976). There are some wonderful German examples of this both in passages of free indirect discourse and in the 'free' subjunctive form of indirect discourse. I have found the following in a newspaper article on students' baneful search for accommodation:

'Franz versucht es wieder, schließlich, beim achten Versuch, nach über einer Stunde am Telefon, meldet sich eine Dame, der er seinen Fall vortragen kann. Von außerhalb sei er, er hätte wenig Geld und suche eine kleine Wohnung ohne besonderen Komfort, das wäre ihm lieber als ein Zimmer in einer Wohn-gemeinschaft. Die Dame **hat eine mitleidsvolle Stimme**: es sei Juli, da wären die Angebote ganz besonders dünn gesät, **wenn sie ehrlich sei**, sie hätte im Augenblick überhaupt keine Wohnung zu vermitteln.

Womit er denn so bei den Mieten zu rechnen hätte, **wenigstens das möchte Franz erfahren**. Die mitleidsvolle Stimme meint, daß zweieinhalb bis dreitausend Schilling und eine Befristung auf ein Jahr üblich seien. Ob es denn nicht noch andere Vermittlungsbüros für Studenten gebe, fragt Franz—leider nein, **bemitleidet ihn die Dame**, aber er solle doch einfach wieder anrufen, am besten im August. Und dann fällt der Dame doch noch eine Telefonnummer ein.

(*Salzburger Nachrichten*, Uni-Magazin, October 1991, p. 11)

- 11 See Page (1988:3–22), Leech/Short (1981) and Chapman (1989) on the artistic impossibility of using transliterated samples of actual speech in fiction (or, indeed, journalism).
- 12 Leech/Short (1981:344) contend that IT [indirect thought] is the standard category, but their evaluation departs from a definition of IT as 'all sentences with complement clauses', including *he knew that S'* or *she wondered how S'*. These, in Cohn's and in my own terminology, belong with psycho-narration. Compare below under (5.4.2).
- 13 Works by H. James, V. Woolf and Joyce (*Portrait*) include extensive passages that are ambiguous between psycho-narration and a FID reading.
- 14 Compare also the excellent paper by Müller (1985).
- 15 See also, for English, the excellent discussion of inquirers by Bonheim (1982b) as well as Strauch (1972). The very best treatment is in Collier (1992), published after the completion of this manuscript.

- 16 ‘“And that’s not all!” screeched Brenda. Again she was dressed in her cut-off jeans and her EVIL WOMAN T-shirt. She *goes*, “Have you ever snorted coke!” So I *goes*, “How else you think I’d have the nerve to make this fool of myself every day?”’ (*The Honorary Patron*; Hodgins 1989:171–2)
- 17 ‘And I just felt like, “This is where I belong.”’ (Tannen 1989:152) or: ‘and they said “*Okay, take your clothes off*” We’re like “*What?!*”’ (Ibid., 115–16)
- 18 Compare, for German, Steube (1986:334): ‘Was hat Peter Schreier gerade gesungen? Er hat gesungen: Mein Mädel hat einen Rosenmund. *Er hat gesungen, daß sein Mädel einen Rosenmund hat.’ An English equivalent would be **He sang that God should rest you merry gentlemen* or *She sang that the month of maying was now*. This rule can be broken for peculiar stylistic effect: *How did she do?*(*Ulysses*, x; Joyce 1984:473). See also:

Becker, the first time you see him, is at the mainland terminus, waving your car down the ramp onto the government ferry and singing to your headlights and to the salt air and to the long line of traffic behind you that he’d rather be a sparrow than a snail. [ID] *Yes he would if he could, he loudly sings, he surely would. [...] He’d rather be a forest, he sings, than a street.*

(*The Invention of the World* ; Hodgins 1977:vii)

- 19 *He regretted that he could not come*, as a report of a speech act, can only be free indirect discourse—compare below under (iv). Otherwise, this is a report of somebody’s thoughts, hence psycho-narration. It *cannot* ever be read as *indirect* discourse.
- 20 Whereas the indirect discourse use of this verb requires a prepositional phrase complement as well as an indirect object (*George reminded me of the stove*) or a gerundial construction (*He reminded me of lighting the fire*), in direct and free indirect discourse *remind* can be used with an indirect object NP alone: ‘*Put out the fire,*’ *she reminded him*.
- 21 ‘*That brought the eyes wide open! he noted with glee.*’ (*The Thorn Birds*; McCullough 1978: 280)
- 22 ‘there is a coherence in things, a stability; something, she *meant*, is immune from change, and shines out.’ (*To the Lighthouse* I, vii; Woolf 1985:97)
- 23 ‘*But suppose, it suddenly occurred to Brian, suppose she were suddenly left with no money at all?*’ (*Eyeless in Gaza*, xix; Huxley 1955:250)
- 24 Cp. Banfield (1982:284–5, fn. 19).
- 25 ‘she said compassionately, smoothing the little boy’s hair, for *her husband, with his caustic saying that it would not be fine, had dashed his spirits, she could see*. This going to the Lighthouse was a passion of his, *she saw*, and then, as if her husband had not said enough, with his caustic saying that it would not be fine to-morrow, this odious little man went and rubbed it in all over again.’ (*To the Lighthouse* I, iii; Woolf 1985:19)
- 26 On *suppose*, *suspect*, *guess* and *reckon* see further down. These verbs are frequently used as discourse parentheticals within direct discourse, where they serve as a sentence modifier rather than an indicator of *reporting*. In free indirect discourse these verbs therefore can also be employed to replicate a direct discourse ‘I guess’, etc. When used in a *that*-construction such verbs have a definite free indirect discourse meaning.
- 27 In indirect discourse (psycho-narration) *it appears* requires an obligatory indirect object and *that* complement; as a free indirect discourse parenthetical, however, no indirect object is required: *He was already married, it appeared*.

- 28 An extremely odd example is the following: 'He really thinks he's going to sell, Childan **knew**.' (*Man in the High Castle*; Dick 1988:138) I suspect that one reads this parenthetical as free indirect discourse, with Childan saying to himself 'I know.'
- 29 For French examples of the type *essayer de se disculper*, *rejeter la responsabilité sur*, *accueillir avec mauvaise humeur*, etc. see Herrmann (1973:81).
- 30 Verbs of non-communication are barred from introductory position, although they freely occur in indirect and particularly parenthetical free indirect discourse position. *Think* is an exception, and Banfield makes the interesting point that it is syntactically equivalent to *se dire*, and not really a pure consciousness verb (1982: 35–6). This would interestingly link up with the German use of an optional subjunctive in indirect discourse and in the 'free' subjunctive form: *Er dachte, daß +subjunctive/indicative*; [indicative/subjunctive], *dachte er*.
- 31 This seems to be entirely unidiomatic in the present tense, even in present tense narrative.
- 32 Herrmann (1973), Körner (1977:155–77), Sabban (1978).
- 33 Michel (1966), S.Jäger (1968), Brinkmann (1969), Wunderlich (1969), Henning (1969), Kurz (1970) and Kaufmann (1976:48–54, 155–88).
- 34 Excellent German examples can be found in Henning (1969):

Wilhelmine Butenhofs Schuhspitze klappte noch immer auf und nieder: 'Da möchte ich mir wohl mal alles vorlesen lassen'. (116)

'Ob wir dich nicht auch...adoptieren...', ließ die Kapitänin das Mädchen nicht aus den Armen. (116)

'Für die Oder', schlang der Junge das Essen herunter. (117)

'Ich werde dir sagen, daß ich dir von Ohnesorge den Popo verhauen lasse', schmiß Wilhelmine ihn hinaus. (118)

- 35 '“Yes, yes,” Lope stuttered again.'
- 36 'So that was the story of the Rayleys, Lily **smiled**.' (*To the Lighthouse* III, v; Woolf 1985, 162) Compare also the appendix to my thesis (Fludernik 1982).
- 37 'Iraq had carried the moral victory in the war, Saddam Hussein finally voiced his confidence.' And '[ID], Voggenhuber is aware of [and can therefore report about] the sensibilities of the Greens.'
- 38 Henning (1969:110–18) provides numerous examples for German parentheticals.
- 39 An example of this nature (*he was very glad*) has been discussed by Karpf (1933: 265, 267–8).
- 40 Most of Banfield's (1982) examples on pp. 34–6 are from *Ulysses*.
- 41 Körner (1977:165) cites a French oddity: 'Je vois, anglicis-je.'
- 42 The verb *impart* is usually only used with indirect discourse: *he imparted to us (the news) that*.
- 43 A historical survey shows that the number of *verba dicendi* rose drastically during the eighteenth century, reaching a peak in mid-nineteenth-century fiction. Compare Körner (1977:168–77).
- 44 See the examples quoted in Michel (1966) and Henning (1969).
- 45 See Hamburger (1973). We will return to this central aspect of thought representation in Chapter 7.
- 46 I use *idea* to eschew the term *proposition* which is usually restricted to assertions.
- 47 And earlier in Kuno/Kaburaki (1977).
- 48 In this connection compare also Tamir (1976).
- 49 Equivalent Japanese examples, too, can occur without a *to*-attributive complementizer, although the presence of *to* aids a logophoric reading. Kuno's pragmatic awareness condition

- has been criticized by Sells (1987), who argues that point of view or deictic centre is exclusively responsible for Japanese uses of the logophoric *jibun*.
- 50 Compare the German *laut*, which is a common attributive expression (Pütz 1989: 192), or 'wie es hieß' (Herdin 1905:118), as well as French à l'entendre de or d'après (Bally 1914a: 421).
 - 51 'N'importe! elle n'était pas heureuse. D'où venait donc cette insuffisance de la vie, cette pourriture instantanée de s chos es où e l le s 'appuyai t?... M ais, s'il y avait quel un être fort et beau, une nature valeureuse, pleine à la fois d'exaltation et de raffinements, un coeur de poète sous une forme d'ange, lyre aux cordes d'airain, sonnant vers le ciel des épithalames élégiaques, pourquoi, par hasard, ne le trouverait elle pas? Oh! quelle impossibilité! Rien, d'ailleurs, ne valait la peine d'une recherche; tout mentait! Chaque sourire cachait un bâillement d'ennui, chaque joie une malediction, tout plaisir son dégoût, et les meilleurs baisers ne vous laissaient sur la lèvre qu'une irréalisable envie d'une volupté plus haute.' (*Madame Bovary* III, vi; Flaubert 1972:335)
 - 52 Cohn (1978); Lethcoe (1969:180–206).
 - 53 Lips (1926) has 'style indirect libre de perception', G.Steinberg (1971) uses 'erlebte Wahrnehmung', W.Bühler (1937) has 'erlebter Eindruck', and Fehr (1938) 'substitutionary description', and Hernadi (1972:203) 'substitutionary and represented perception'. Wiebe (1990:16) partly subsumes narrated perception under 'iconic syntax'.
 - 54 Numbers in square brackets indicate length of pauses in seconds.
 - 55 A rare example is, e.g., the opening story of Faulkner's *Go Down, Moses*, 'Was', which is almost pure free indirect discourse.
 - 56 Such a text is quoted by Espinola (1974), namely Flannery O'Connor's *The Life You Save May Be Your Own*.
 - 57 Stanzel (1981b) quotes several excellent examples of this, especially a passage from Ingeborg Bachmann.
 - 58 Cp. Kurz (1970:72) on this overlap between FID and DD.
 - 59 Verschoor (1959:13) has noted that verbs of perception can freely introduce ID clauses but cannot collocate with direct speech.
 - 60 'In vain he spoke about the wildness of the country and the difficulty for a woman to travel through it: she was afraid of nothing; she loved travelling on horseback above everything; it was a treat to sleep in the open air; she threatened to go to Asia Minor.' [so far translation as quoted in Pascal 1977:11] 'In short, she had an answer to everything, for never before had an Englishwoman been to Corsica, and so she must absolutely go' (My translation) The passage is discussed also in Lips (1926:64–5) and E.Lerch (1928:466–7).
 - 61 See also Funke (1929:456) and Steube (1985:391).
 - 62 Stanzel (1984b:59) discusses a passage from the 'Nestor' episode of *Ulysses*. See also Stone's enlightening remarks on the development of Dickens's interior monologue, which becomes increasingly more condensed and exaggerated (Stone 1959).
 - 63 On 'fuzzy' sets cp. Rieger (1977), G.Lakoff (1978) and Dahl (1985).

Dual voice and stylistic deviation

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the very definition of various forms of speech and thought representation often depends on the establishment of the ‘voice’ of the represented speaker. If this is something a character could conceivably have said to her-/himself, one will argue that the passage is free indirect discourse; if the thoughts could not reasonably be part of the character’s own verbal repertoire, one concludes this is the narrator’s description of his or her psyche—hence psycho-narration or speech report/indirect discourse. As has been noted frequently, passages treating of a character’s ignorance are by definition psycho-narration: *She ignored that/did not know that...* always implies a narrator’s superior perspective (Stanzel, 1984b: 197; Rimmon-Kenan 1983:83).¹

Banfield’s theory of unspeakable sentences has partially obviated the inherent problematic of positing a character’s actual direct discourse underlying free indirect discourse passages. By defining free indirect discourse not in terms of ‘voice’—the intuitive reader’s reaction—but by means of a set of linguistic criteria of syntactic and lexical deixis relating to the character’s subjectivity or SELF, she eschews the transformational fallacy that goes hand in hand with an ‘underlying direct discourse’ reading. We will concern ourselves in more detail with the effect of these deictic elements in [Chapter 7](#). On the other hand, as we will see, attempts to confine free indirect discourse exclusively to sentences that have recognizably subjective elements (deixis, and expressive elements of a syntactic or lexical nature) founder for different, namely contextual reasons. Banfield’s theory has meanwhile been modified to include sentences without such subjective elements (Ehrlich 1990a), but even this revised model still does not take account of the pervasive incorporation of expressive elements into indirect discourse, speech report and even the narrative itself.

As Ehrlich, who surreptitiously reintroduces the narrator into Banfield’s theory, has also demonstrated, narratives (her example is Virginia Woolf’s text) of course do not neatly distinguish between any of the categories so laboriously established by linguists and literary critics: texts typically move in and out of characters’ consciousness, from psycho-narration to free indirect discourse and back. Observe the following passage:

- (1) ¹*Foolishly, she had set them opposite each other.* ²*That could be remedied to-morrow.* ³*If it were fine, they should go for a picnic.* ⁴Everything seemed possible. ⁵Everything seemed right. ^{6b} Just now (⁷but this cannot, she thought, ⁸dissociating herself

from the moment⁹ *while they were all talking about boots*)^{6b} just now she had reached security;¹⁰ she hovered like a hawk suspended;¹¹ like a flag floated in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her body fully and sweetly;¹² not noisily, solemnly rather;¹³ *for it arose, she thought*;¹⁴ *looking at them all eating there*;¹⁵ *from husband and children and friends*;¹⁶ all of which rising in this profound stillness (¹⁷ she was helping William Bankes to one very small piece more and peered into the depths of the earthenware pot) ¹⁸seemed now for no special reason to stay there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards;¹⁹ holding them safe together.²⁰ *Nothing need be said; nothing could be said*.²¹ *There it was, all round them*.²² *It partook, she felt*;²³ *carefully helping Mr Bankes to a specially tender piece*;²⁴ *of eternity*;²⁵ as she had already felt about something different before that afternoon;²⁶ **there is a coherence in things, a stability**;²⁷ *something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out* (²⁸ she glanced at the window with its ripple of reflected lights) ²⁹*in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby*;³⁰ so that again to-night she had the feeling she had had once to-day already, of peace of rest.³¹ **Of such moments**, she thought, **the thing is made that remains for ever after**.³² *This would remain*.

(*To the Lighthouse* I, xvii; Woolf 1985:97)

I have underlined all passages that suggest psycho-narration, and italicized all free indirect discourse. Besides, there is some seemingly objective report (which is, however, highly conspicuous in its ironic juxtaposition with the thoughts of Mrs Ramsay), and some interior monologue (printed in bold). In the segments of psycho-narration many of Banfield's expressivity signals (*today, now*) can be found, and instances of these are printed in bold italics. As we have seen in Chapter 5, here, too, delimitation proves to be extremely arbitrary. For example, (4) and (5) certainly portray Mrs Ramsay's feelings, and the *seem* therefore does not signal an (objective) 'private-state' sentence (Wiebe 1990), but suggests a definitely subjective perspective. However, because such sentences are unlikely to have been verbalized, I have here opted for the standard label of psycho-narration. (6) and (8) are more unambiguous instances of psycho-narration, portraying realizations that seem less likely to be part of a conscious thought act; yet *just now* is a subjective phrase that Banfield would certainly have taken as a signal of free indirect discourse: is (6b) therefore free indirect discourse? Again, the collocation with a deeper layer of feeling than might be expressible in utterance has made me opt for psycho-narration. (9), on the other hand, is more clearly free indirect discourse because of the referentless *they*, the expanded past tense and the obvious thematic connection to the story: Mrs Ramsay, involved in her musings overhears what the others are talking about.

A transition between psycho-narration and free indirect discourse occurs between (12) and (13) by means of a discourse modifier, *rather*: 'not noisily, solemnly rather, for it arose, she thought [...]'. The *for*-clause with the explicit *she thought* has to be free indirect discourse, but Mrs Ramsay's voice is muted by the additional narrative insertion of 'looking at them all eating there'. Although the paragraph centres on Mrs Ramsay's consciousness, the narrative moves in and out of it, quite deliberately juxtaposing the

mundane dinner affair with Mrs Ramsay's intermittent musings on eternity. (27) is also interesting, particularly in relation to (31): in both cases we have what seems to be interior monologue ((26), too). However, the parenthetical *she meant* can *only* collocate with free indirect discourse, and—on account of the syntactic regime—one then also has to read (29) as free indirect discourse, since it is the continuation of the (27) clause. The present tense is quite appropriate here because the reported ideas are gnomic truths, and the present tense of gnomic statements usually remains unshifted in indirect and free indirect discourse.

The evocation of various levels of consciousness in narrative is frequently achieved by means of a graded continuum between psycho-narration and free indirect discourse, where a character's 'voice'—parentheticals aside—comes across mostly through a number of lexical and syntactical signals and by means of idiomatic phrases. By contrast, literature is also rich in passages of stilted, stylized and even parodic free indirect discourse, where the lexical and stylistic texture argues against a figural 'voice' even in cases where the syntactic factors and the presence of deictic or epistemic elements might allow a classification of free indirect discourse:

- (2) *It was not to be contested that he [Willoughby] must speak with Mrs Mountstuart, however he might shrink from the trial of his facial muscles. Her not coming to him **seemed** ominous: nor was her behaviour at the luncheon-table quite obscure. She had **evidently** instigated the gentlemen to cross and counter-chatter Lady Busshe and Lady Culmer. For what purpose? [DD, or non-finite FID]*

Clara's features gave the answer.

They were implacable. And he could be the same.

(*The Egoist*, xxxvii; Meredith 1979:450)

In Henry James, for instance, both the characters' and the narrator's style are precious to an extent that distinctions between narratorial and figural idiom become well-nigh impossible to ascertain.

- (3) *He was a huge expense **assuredly**—but it had been up to **now** her conviction that his idea was to behave **beautifully enough** to make the beauty **well-nigh** an equivalent. **And that he had carried out his idea**, carried it out by continuing to lead the life, to breathe the air, very nearly to think the thoughts, that best suited his wife and her father—**this she had till lately enjoyed the comfort of** so distinctly perceiving as to have even been moved more than once, to express to him the happiness it gave her. He had **that** in his favour as against other matters; yet it discouraged her too, and **rather oddly**, that he should **so** keep moving, and be able to show her that he moved, on the firm ground of the truth.*

(*The Golden Bowl*, xv; James 1979:207)

Here, from a traditional perspective, all one has is psycho-narration, but with some rare loans from the character's language—*assuredly*, *beautifully*, *well-nigh*, *that*, *so*—here

emphasized in bold italics. However, from the perspective of expressive syntax, the occurrence of root transformations allows a possible identification of a free indirect discourse passage in the middle section of the quotation. There is no question that the entire paragraph consists in a representation of consciousness; the factor of 'voice', however, is teasingly elusive.

Textual examples of this kind already introduce us to the difficulties of distinguishing between what is usually referred to as the character's style and the diction of the narrator.

6.1.

'VOICE' IN FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

Free indirect discourse has been described recurrently in terms of a 'dual voice', a merging of characters' and narrator's discourse. The term was originally coined by Roy Pascal in his seminal (1977) study.

At the same time the FIS [free indirect speech] serves, as always, a double purpose. On the one hand it evokes the person, through his words, tone of voice, and gesture, with incomparable vivacity. On the other, it embeds the character's statement or thought in the narrative flow, and even more importantly in the narrator's interpretation, communicating also his way of seeing and feeling.

(Pascal 1977:74–5)

Dual voice is first and foremost a linguistic concept, the literal description of the syntax of free indirect discourse, of the retention of the narrator's temporal and pronominal deixis on the one hand and the integration of expressive features relating to the character's deictic centre. This cautious position is taken by Cohn (1966, 1978), Stanzel (1984b) and Chatman (1978). The first discussions of dual voice in fact related to a double *intonation*, seen to be characteristic of, especially, *oral* free indirect discourse (Thibaudet 1922; Verschoor 1959:42, 49). Spitzer introduced a more narratological perspective by claiming that the free indirect mixed the style of the narrator with the perspective of the character—an anticipation of Genette's concept of internal focalization (Spitzer 1928b, Genette 1972/1980), and Günther (1928), too, put perspective first when talking of *Doppelsicht* ('double view'; Günther 1928: 86).

However, since many critics—unlike Banfield—were looking at the nineteenth-century novel with its frequently prominent narrator personae, a more extensive interpretation of 'dual voice' became current, namely one which saw in free indirect discourse a dialogue, a contest, between figural and narratorial idiom, a merging or juxtaposition of voices, of the narrator and the character respectively. This mingling of voices, it was said, was recognizable particularly in ironic passages of free indirect discourse, where the narrator's and the characters' perspectives most harshly clashed. Such is the position taken in the majority of free indirect discourse studies: Hoffmeister (1965), Kalik-Teljatnicova (1966:123), Hernadi (1971a), Espinola (1974), Dillon/Kirchhoff (1976), Pascal (1977), Ferguson (1979), Jefferson (1980), Weinberg (1981), or

McHale (1978, 1983), and it is repeated in most narratological investigations (Lanser 1981:142; Rimmon-Kenan 1983; or Toolan's excellent chapter on speech and thought representation, 1988:119–39) and even in linguistic studies (e.g. Schopf 1987b: 207–8). A typical statement on the duality of free indirect discourse is the following by Guiraud:

Free indirect style provides the solution to this problem [the narrator has to choose between direct and indirect style] in that it superimposes the primary speaker's voice and the secondary speaker's voice; or rather, the primary speaker's voice and the secondary speaker's words.

(Guiraud 1971:85)

This is the very position that Banfield's work sets out to refute, and in doing so she goes back all the way to Bally and his disciple Marguerite Lips (1926), both of whom had emphasized the univocality of free indirect discourse.² Bally, who was an indefatigable proponent of this univocality even before the official notion of a dual voice had been invented, insisted on the neutrality of the authorial idiom and the indisputable attribution of the discourse to the reported speaker or consciousness. As Marguerite Lips put it,

Or, le style indirect libre, pour être un procédé de grammaire, exige qu'on ne puisse hésiter sur l'identité ni douter de l'objectivité de l'écrivain.

(Lips 1926:126)³

G.Müller (1985) takes a similar position by denying the narrator in free indirect discourse any narrative substance except for his function of mediation of utterances and thoughts:

Von einer doppelten Stimme ['dual voice'] kann somit nur dann die Rede sein, wenn man beachtet, daß die beiden darin vereinigten Komponenten nicht gleichgewichtig vertreten sind. Explizit erscheint der Erzähler im freien indirekten Stil nämlich nicht, seine Funktion ist—zumindest prima facie—auf die Vermittlung der Äußerungen bzw. Gedanken einer Romanfigur beschränkt, und eigene Akzente kann er nur indirekt setzen. [...] Es kann hier nicht von einem sich äussernden Erzähler die Rede sein. Das Narrative eignet dem freien indirekten Stil nur als Residuum. Es wird kein Geschehen erzählt. Es fehlt jede narrative Substanz. Die minimale Erzählerpräsenz [...] gilt grundsätzlich für den freien indirekten Stil, der nur 'Spurenelemente einer Vermittlung durch einen Erzähler' [Broich 1983: 137] aufweist.

(Müller 1985:211)⁴

Yet Müller does actually straddle the line towards the dual voice hypothesis by allowing an implicit dual voice effect, especially for ironic passages of free indirect discourse, which has the 'typical double perspective of explicit figural and implicit authorial viewpoint'.⁵

Free indirect discourse as a dual voice has received some additional confirmation from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose meditations on the polyvocality of narrative discourse

seem to corroborate the dual voice analysis. The dialectic between narrator's and characters' voices is, however, mistakenly cited as evidence for Bakhtinian polyvocality. Bakhtin's own presentation—at least in the available English translations—does not define his position on this issue, and it is therefore easy to mistake his more ideological polyvocality for the simple 'voice' reading or double-tiered juxtaposition of narratorial and figural perspectives.⁶ Bakhtin, for example, argues that there can be a dual voice in *one* word, and his example is a passage from *Little Dorrit*:

It followed that Mrs Merdle, as a woman of fashion and good breeding who had been sacrificed to wiles of a vulgar barbarian (for Mr. Merdle was found out from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot, the moment he was found out in his pocket), must be actively championed by her order for her order's sake.

(*Little Dorrit* II, xxxiii; Dickens 1978:873)

This is an analogous hybrid construction, in which the definition provided by the general opinion of society—'a sacrifice to the wiles of a vulgar barbarian'—merges with authorial speech, exposing the hypocrisy and greed of common opinion.

So it is throughout Dickens's whole novel. His entire text is, in fact, everywhere dotted with quotation marks that serve to separate out little islands of scattered direct speech and purely authorial speech washed by heteroglot waves from all sides. But it would have been impossible actually to insert such marks, since, as we have seen, one and the same word often figures both as the speech of the author and as the speech of another—and at the same time. [...] This varied play with the boundaries of speech types, languages and belief systems is one [of the] most fundamental aspects of comic style.

(Bakhtin 1981:307–8)

As it turns out, such *heteroglossia*—'another's speech in another's language'—

- (4) constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author.

(Bakhtin 1981:324)

In fact, as Bakhtin's *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* clarifies, *double-voiced discourse* includes all discourse that 'has a twofold direction—it is directed both toward the referential object of speech, as in ordinary discourse, and toward another's discourse, toward someone else's speech' (Bakhtin 1984: 185). Such double-voiced discourse includes, above all, the stylistic *procédés* of *stylization*, *parody*, *skaz* and *dialogue* (see Bakhtin's table on p. 199), and Bakhtin's examples from Dostoevsky's work amply document that he is more interested in the internal dialogization of the minds of Dostoevsky's heroes than in free

indirect discourse pure and simple. On the other hand, some of the more relevant quotations that Bakhtin discusses, particularly his examples from Dickens in *The Dialogic Imagination*, do give rise to very enlightening remarks on the ideological other-directedness of much ironical free indirect discourse. Bakhtin makes some very interesting distinctions between free indirect discourse proper (*nesobstvenno priamaia rech'*), which is characterized syntactically (1981:319), and what we will discuss below as *Ansteckung*, where only individual expressions and half-clauses are 'lifted' from the character's language—Bakhtin calls this 'pseudo-objective' underpinning. Bakhtin also discovers the existence of a special form of linguistic parody of characters' language in Russian literature which seems typologically to coincide with some of Stanzel's examples of reflectorization (Stanzel 1977, 1984b; Fludernik 1992b), a narrative feature which we will discuss below under (7.4). Bakhtin's examples (cp. 1984:211,218–19, and his definition on p. 194) would, of course, need to be analyzed carefully in the original before one could fully confirm such an identification.⁷

The term *voice* in narratology has been coined in connection with the question 'who speaks?' (Genette), usually in distinction from the narrative *categories perspective or point of view* (Genette's 'Mood'), which correlate with 'who sees?' An analysis of 'who speaks?' is patently predicated on a communicative model of narration in which the words of the text have to be *uttered*, i.e. *enunciated*, by a narrative instance, either the narrator or a character. I have already treated Genette's classic presentation of this issue under (1.5). An easy recognition of 'who speaks' does not, however, reflect one's ordinary reading experience, where one encounters numerous passages in which the language does not correspond with the orientation of the discourse, particularly in the presentation of characters' consciousness. It was to account for such cases that the concept of narrative viewpoint has primarily been introduced into narratology. As we have seen earlier, the stylistic and cognitive shape of the narrator's description of a character's psychological make-up frequently exceeds the mimetically verisimilar construct of that character's linguistic and notional capabilities; at the same time such descriptions of consciousness are, however, geared precisely towards evoking a perspective of the world from within the character's mind. The most complete attempt to deal with this issue comes from Mieke Bal (1985), who specifies different types of viewpoint within a frame of focalization by a focalizer on a focalized object. The concept of the focalized is necessarily identical with the semantic story content—with what is being represented, the choice of story elements. The focalizer, on the other hand, can be identical either to the narrator-focalizer (external focalizer), or to a character (internal focalizer). This scheme neatly restructures the Genettean paradigm of a narrator narrating from his or her own or the character's perspective. The narrator is assumed to exist as a default value for the enunciation level of the narrative, and the establishment of point of view is taken care of by a prior decision for external or internal focalization on the level of Bal's *discourse* (cp. under (1.5)).

The problem that neither Genette nor Bal fully resolves is the *connection* between voice and focalization. Genette of course presents a full account of the incorporation of figural voice into the narrator's free indirect discourse and quoted direct discourse passages. His

separation of voice and focalization predicts that there will be passages focalized by the character but told in the narrator's language—a prevalent feature of psycho-narration in the realist novel and beyond—as well as passages focalized by the narrator, but employing the character's language. For this latter category Genette does not really provide examples although one can perhaps here include a large variety of modernist (e.g. James Joyce) and post-modernist (e.g. Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*) texts in which the narratorial voice, even in apparently 'omniscient' passages, is charged with figural colloquial idiom:

- (5) And the war, well, she is Roger's mother, she's leached at all the soft, the vulnerable inclusions of hope and praise scattered, beneath the mica-dazzle, through Roger's mineral, grave-marker self, washed it all moaning away on her gray tide. Six years now, always just in sight, just where he can see her. He's forgotten his first corpse, or when he first saw someone living die. That's how long it's been going on. Most of his life, it seems. The city he visits nowadays is Death's antechamber: where all the paperwork's done, the contracts signed, the days numbered.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:39–40)

Hugh Kenner has proposed that the writing of a text in the style of a character who is currently 'on stage' is a pervasive feature of Joyce's narrative art (Kenner 1978; see below), and he has dubbed this technique the 'Uncle Charles Principle'. I will argue below that one needs to distinguish between a mere appropriation of what is probably a character's style or idiomaticity and a more sustained effort at narrating from the style, ideology and evaluative perspective of the character—the latter a narrative strategy identifiable with Stanzel's concept of reflectorization (1977, 1984b—see below under (7.4)).

Genette never really specifies how precisely voice and focalization interact, combining voice and mood varieties by mathematical combination, and Bal's near silence on the issue of representational speech and thought demonstrates little consideration for its significance. Bal's silence on these matters is particularly odd since the existence of the 'focalizer' as a narrative instance needs to be deduced not only from the propositional content of narrative phrases but, even more importantly, from deictic signals in the text, which have to be aligned with the narrator-focalizer or the character-focalizer. Even on the view that all language except direct discourse is the narrator's (a view that Bal does *not* take in her brief discussion of free indirect discourse—1985: 137–42), lexical items that appertain to a character's linguistic perspective (no matter if one considers them to be deliberate colloquialisms on the narrator's part) require at least *some* explanation in terms of *mimetic effect*, if not necessarily in terms of *mimetic viewpoint*.

In spite of these attempts to neatly separate lexis and implied point of view, it will here be argued that viewpoint is established *linguistically*, with cognition and perceptual adequacy interacting to abet or refute the linguistic evidence. For the moment I will postpone a more detailed analysis of just how language correlates with a deictic centre and

with viewpoint—we will come back to this in the following chapters. Instead I would like to turn to the standard ‘dual voice’ explanation of free indirect discourse and show how it correlates with the empirical (textual) facts. My approach has profited immensely from the work of F.K. Stanzel, whose typology—in contrast to Genette and Bal—has managed to reconcile the voice vs focalization dichotomy within schematic types of ‘narrative situations’. Stanzel’s contributions to the dual voice analysis therefore locate the site of combat not between ‘who sees’ and ‘who speaks’ but between the language of the teller on the one hand and that of the character/reflector on the other.

All the various lexical and syntactic elements that I have presented in [Chapter 4](#), since they relate to a deictic centre and therefore establish a notional subjectivity (a SELF), are usually regarded as evoking a character’s ‘voice’. The narrative can, however, in quite misleading ways play with this evocation of voice. For instance, one can find numerous passages in which the narrative appears to reflect the narrator’s evaluations, or to present affairs objectively, only to have the language explicitly attributed to a character:

- (6) Prudence remained *rooted to the spot; really, there was no other way to describe it*. *That he should even have heard of Coventry Patmore! And then to quote those lines, those telling lines.*

(*Jane and Prudence*, iv; Pym 1987:45)

- (7) She had every right to enter the sitting-room—*lounge, as she must remember to call it.*

(*Survey of English Usage* W.6.5.25.3)

- (8) Had their unabashed admiration been *lustful* (he could not think of a better word) it would have embarrassed him acutely, but he accepted it.

(*The Thorn Birds*, ‘Luke’, xii; McCullough 1978:357)

The last example is particularly odd since it seems to pose a counterfactual eventuality which one intuitively refers to the omniscient narrator, only to be immediately rapped on one’s knuckles by the give-away parenthetical clause.

In the following passages, a break in the text is retroactively motivated as a break in a character’s train of ideas.

- (9) [Ebenezer’s] interest was aroused by his recent debate with Burlingame, for one thing, and he hoped as well to spawn couplets on the majesty of Maryland’s law, as had been suggested by—

‘Sdeath!’ he thought, and winced and sighed: *he could not manage to remember that it was Burlingame, not Charles Calvert, who had issued his commission*; it was a thought too great and painful in its implication to hold fast in his awareness.

(*The Sot-Weed Factor*, xxvi; Barth 1984:405)

- (10) Giles nicked his chair into position with a jerk. Thus only could he show his irritation, his rage *with old fogies who sat and looked at views over coffee and cream when the whole of Europe — over there—was bristling like... He had no command of*

metaphor. Only the ineffective word ‘hedgehog’ illustrated his vision of Europe, bristling with guns, poised with planes.

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:43)

- (11) But alas, sunset light was unsympathetic to her make-up; plated it looked, not deeply interfused. And he dropped her hand; and she gave him an arch roguish twinkle, as if to say—*but the end of that sentence was cut short*.

(*Ibid.*, 146)

The uncanny effect of such passages derives from the enforced reinterpretation of what one took at (neutral) face value to be in fact a character’s (internalized) linguistic performance. In the following, particularly playful passage what appears to be the first person narrator’s later rendering of his former experiences suddenly becomes conflated with the actual experience:

- (12) I drank right from the frosted spigot and tossed the empty pitcher in a trash can, but only after I’d lit a match to look at those initials incised in white metal. The engraver had worked cleverly; at first glance the design seemed to be a flourish in a scroll. The letters became apparent only after—ouch! I dropped the pitcher and it made a pathetic clang against the bottom of the trash can.

(*Nocturnes for the King of Naples* ; White 1978:19–20)

Sometimes there is little doubt that a free indirect discourse passage is pretending to transcribe a character’s verbalizations, but this illusion is playfully undermined by means of a juxtaposition with ‘intruding’ discourse. The effect is odd because the foregrounding of the supposed literality of the transcription should reinforce the mimetic illusion, whereas it ends up exposing it in self-reflexive manner.

- (13) *Her late mother’s advice [...] Philonoë regarded as sensible enough if it meant love should be equal, basely self-gratifying if it meant the opposite inequality; what it lacked in either case was the dimension of Tragedy, which in her view—but there’d be time enough for her view, and my rape tale, and Corinth, too, when we’d deposed her dad and taken charge of Lycia—which we could do by nightfall if we played our cards right.*

‘What are cards?’

(*Chimera*, ‘Bellerophoniad’; Barth 1983:239)

- (14) *Not that there weren’t a lot of funny things in the book too. The piece she had made Sig read over again—that was grand, that had given her a real kick. And that other bit where the girl...*

‘Well, Baby,’ said Mr. Styte, as he did up the last button of his waistcoat. ‘You’re not saying much, are you? A penny for your thoughts.’

(*After Many a Summer I*, xii; Huxley 1950:169)

From examples such as these it appears that the character’s voice is therefore a palpable textual phenomenon, produced by very deliberate narratorial strategies. In such passages

the reader is quite deliberately shocked out of his or her intuitive reading frame—what Weinrich, in the wake of Jakobson, calls the *Einstellung*. The evocation of figural voice traditionally rests on the reader's natural tendency to equate the lexical factor with linguistic mimesis. From the above, one can, however, infer that the textual evocation of 'voice' is not as reliable a guide towards establishing fictional mimetics as one might have concluded from the linguistic discussion in earlier chapters: 'voice' may be entirely unrelated to utterance on the story level.

Fictional 'voice' is additionally a very elusive concept in texts which do not generally use colloquial language to signal characters' phraseology (H. James), and in texts with a colloquial narrator (Pynchon). Observe the following two quotes from *What Maisie Knew* and *Gravity's Rainbow*:

- (15) It seemed wonderfully regular, the way he put it; yet none the less, while she looked at it as judiciously as she could, the picture it made persisted somehow in being a combination quite distinct—an old woman and a little girl seated in deep silence on a battered old bench by the rampart of the haute ville. It was just at that hour yesterday; they were hand in hand; they had melted together.

(*What Maisie Knew*, xxx; James 1984:231)

- (16) Well: he guesses They have euchred Mexico into some such Byzantine exercise, probably to do with the Americans. Perhaps the Russians. The White Visitation,' being devoted to psychological warfare, harbors a few of each, a Behaviorist here, a Pavlovian there. It's none of Pirate's business. But he notes that with each film delivery, Roger's enthusiasm grows. Unhealthy, unhealthy: he has the sense of witnessing an addiction. He feels that his friend, his provisional wartime friend, is being used for something not quite decent.

(*Gravity's Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:34–5)

The first passage renders Maisie's memory of her and Mrs Wix's epiphany in reaction to her father's argument that they could now dispense with a governess for her. However, on any mimetic dual voice reading, one flounders trying to attribute words or phrases to either the narrator or the centre of consciousness, Maisie. *Wonderfully regular*, although probably a telling indicator of figural perspective, lexically seems on a par with the society language ridiculed elsewhere in the book, and would have been an appropriate idiom for Maggie in *The Golden Bowl*. *Judiciously*, on the other hand, cannot belong to any perspective and language other than the narrator's. It is this curious stylistic merging in which characters' voices become indistinguishable from the narrator's style that gives James the peculiar tone and effect of his narratives. In a content-oriented analysis, the first sentence in the James quote is of course psycho-narration (starting with narrated perception). The semantic factor proves to be the more important in the interpretation of the passage; after all, readers are hardly ever aware of formal distinctions.

The Pynchon quotation, on the other hand, once one provisionally suspends the colloquial and expressive items, appears to be more authorial than one might perhaps have guessed at first sight. The third sentence, for instance, appears to provide some delayed

orientation on the general background or setting. There is no clue to the extent of Pirate's involvement: is he 'literally' thinking about Behaviourists and Pavlovians? On the other hand, the deictic *a few of each*, which, at first reading, seems cataphorically to refer to Behaviourists and Pavlovians, on a second, closer reading *anaphorically* refers back to the Americans and Russians of the first two sentences. This 'referential linking' (Ehrlich 1990a) allows a free indirect reading, and is then supported, in the fourth sentence, by the idiomatic *It's none of my business*, which serves as an indicator of 'voice', assigning the viewpoint to Pirate Prentice. The authorial narrator (obviously in existence elsewhere in the novel) has no reason to rudely reject Pirate's curiosity on the lines of *It's none of his business*—this is too crude an evaluative strategy for the narrator of *Gravity's Rainbow* in any case, and entirely unmotivated; the narrator never propounds moral precepts. In the remainder of the passage, puzzlement persists on account of the colloquial phrases *unhealthy, unhealthy; addiction; not quite decent*. This, as one can conclude from a comparison with other narratorial passages, can be narratorial as well as figural linguistic material, and it is not even possible to align *provisional wartime friend* with the narrator's perspective, since Pirate himself may just possibly be aware of the fragility of wartime friendships. Since stylistic choice as a mimetic guideline to the story is no longer a reliable tool of interpretation, interpretative strategy falls back on psychological and contextual verisimilitude in terms of narrative frames and schemata (cp. Chapter 9) as well as specific narrative context. That the reader's inferences then frequently founder on deliberate textual contradiction is no rarity in post-modernist literature, where plot and character, too, may remain tantalizingly elusive even for the most ingenious reader-detective.

What examples like these suggest very forcefully is a pattern of two *cognitive* levels, one aligned to a narrator persona, indexed by narrative 'knowledge', the other to the ruling figural consciousness. This then coincides with (deliberate) ambiguity on what Uspensky would call the phraseological plane. In the James passage the phraseology consists in a narratorial idiom that allows one a vague and unreliable glimpse of the character's voice; in the case of Pynchon one has a pervasively colloquial idiom that merges the characters' and the narrator's voices. In both cases there is a deliberate attempt to erase stylistic *difference*, the difference between background and foreground, or between a neutral narrative style and colloquial deviations from it—an attempt to erase, that is, the very difference that had determined the ideological economy of discourse in the nineteenth-century realist novel. As Bakhtin noted so convincingly, the classic realist text juxtaposed a univocal author's voice (which united in itself the positions of authorial omniscience, omnipresence and reliable evaluation of the story world) with the characters' utterances as 'reported' direct speech, subordinating the alterity of figural language to its own mastery of and by the narrative discourse (Bakhtin 1984: 186–7).

The Jamesian ambiguity is one that still relies on a sophisticated narratorial tone, and it is relevant that the characters portrayed are of a social class that identifies with the cultured language of the text. **One** can find a similar stylistic ambiguity of mimetic attribution in Edith Wharton's *The House of Mirth*, whose heroine belongs to the same class as James's fictional dramatis personae. The colloquial style of Pynchon, on the other hand—and this is of equal ideological significance—'steps down' to the level of the characters and identifies with them, rejecting a (middle-class) 'superior' attitude. Such identification

of the narrator with the characters of the fiction can be observed in equal measure in Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1981). Pynchon and Rushdie in fact reactivate a true Bakhtinian dual voice, which is properly ideological and not merely phraseological; they practise a dialogics of discourse that comes close to evoking the qualities of Russian *skaz*, a narrative genre in which the limited discourse of an oral narrator enters into true dialogue with the discourse of the represented personae. If one compares these strategies of double-voicing in Russian *skaz* with the nineteenth-century 'realist' English novel, one notices immediately how monologous in Bakhtin's sense Victorian novels still are: they propagate a superior, frequently ironic, narratorial viewpoint which looks *down* on a fictional world, on characters riddled with moral, intellectual and linguistic foibles. The realism of much of nineteenth-century fiction indeed strategically depends on the merciless exercise of a stylistic parody of the linguistic and social other, an other that is usually of lower-class origin. Nor does the narrator ever identify completely with the cultured classes, either, since their vanity, hypocrisy, cowardice or irresponsibility are likewise persistently caricatured and exposed to ridicule. In spite of all the social concerns of the nineteenth-century novel, Dickens and even Eliot adhere to the eighteenth-century technique of irony, castigating social ills very much in terms of individual human failings, and these human failings are metaphorically highlighted in characters' grammatical, phonetic or lexical gaffes. We will return to the diachrony of style in the final section of [Chapter 9](#).

6.2

APPROPRIATION AND IMMERSION: ANSTECKUNG AND THE 'UNCLE CHARLES PRINCIPLE'

Until now I have concentrated on the appearance or evocation of character's voice in contexts of speech and thought representation. Character's language can, however, be appropriated by the narrative much more extensively in practically any context, and for ironical as well as empathetic purposes. This has been recognized in German narratology ever since Spitzer's (1923b) article on the mingling of styles, a widely influential essay. A theory of dual voice is decisively strengthened by the discovery of a general tendency of the narrative to incorporate characters' expressions, phrases, solecisms, malapropisms and habitual idioms. This phenomenon was not discovered in English criticism until Hugh Kenner's response to Wyndham Lewis's remarks on Joyce's sentence: *Uncle Charles repaired to the outhouse* (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, ii; Joyce 1974:60). Lewis had criticized Joyce for slipping into authorial style (ruining the effect of immediacy of presentation, i.e. the reader's illusion of being within Stephen's consciousness throughout the novel). Kenner, by contrast, argues that *repair* in fact echoes Uncle Charles's linguistic preciousness, describing his action in the very terms he might euphemistically have used himself.⁸ Kenner then baptized such infection of the narrative by figural language the 'Uncle Charles Principle' (Kenner 1978: ch. 2).

One should note that the discovery of this narratorial assumption of subjective figural language constituted a really sensational find in the frame of Joyce studies which, until that time, had subscribed to a highly mimetic view of Joyce's language. The standard

interpretation of Joycean narrative had been in terms of objectivity and Flaubertian inconspicuousness. Kenner's *Uncle Charles Principle* therefore was one of the first attempts to question the seeming transparency of Joycean narrative. Since then Joyce criticism has come to question with increasing radicality the artless objectivity of Joyce's early narrative style, uncovering cross-references and submerged allusions, numerological aspects and a pervasive contextual mimeticism the very opposite of 'unnarrated' (Chatman 1978) objectivity.⁹

The origins of the traditional views on Ulyssean prose are instructive. They rely on a narrative model that contrasts a 'simple' narrative of events with 'pure' interior monologue and a grey area of overlap in indirect discourse and free indirect discourse. And this, for the most part, applies to the narrative paradigm endorsed by Genette and Chatman, too. Because these models posit a narrator, who *qua* enunciator of the narrative discourse soon acquires existential proportions, they need to discuss language that cannot be assimilated to the narrator's style (presumed to be consistent, and usually neutral) in terms of deliberate or furtive borrowing from the characters' language (presumed to be existentially 'out there' as a fictional construct in the fictional world). It is then disconcerting to find the characters' diction invade the very territory of narratorial purity and to see such mimetics assume a hold over its mediating narrative, when one had expected the mediating narrative to *control* the mimesis of the represented fictional world.

The phenomenon of narratorial appropriation of figural idiom is, however, much more pervasive than a naturalist poetics might want to acknowledge. Indeed, in the nineteenth-century English novel the narrative is frequently saturated with figural expressions, particularly for the purposes of linguistic comedy. So pervasive is the borrowing of characters' voice that its antimimetic potential has become obscured in the general semblance of real-life transcription. In nineteenth-century authorial narrative, and even in the many passages of free indirect speech, such figural idiom is frequently used in an ironical fashion:

- (17) All Miss Crawley's symptoms, and the particulars of her illness and medical treatment, were narrated by the confidante with that fulness and accuracy which women delight in. About their complaints and their doctors do ladies ever tire of talking to each other? Briggs did not on this occasion; nor did Rebecca weary of listening. *She was thankful, truly thankful, that the dear kind Briggs, that the faithful, the invaluable Firkin, had been permitted to remain with their benefactress through her illness. Heaven bless her! though she, Rebecca, had seemed to act undutifully towards Miss Crawley, yet was not her fault a natural and excusable one? Could she help giving her hand to the man who had won her heart?* Briggs, the sentimental, could only turn up her eyes to heaven at this appeal, and heave a sympathetic sigh, and think that she, too, had given away her affections long years ago, and own that Rebecca was no very great criminal.

(*Vanity Fair*, xxv; Thackeray 1972:300)

- (18) [Mr Tulliver] got up a due amount of irritation against Moss as a man without capital, who, if murrain and blight were abroad, was sure to have his share of them, and who, the more you tried to help him out of the mud, would sink the farther

in. [...] But Mr. Tulliver was determined not to encourage such shuffling people any longer; and a ride along the Basset lanes was not likely to enervate a man's resolution by softening his temper.

(*Mill on the Floss* I, viii; G. Eliot 1986:80)

Besides such crude satire, however, one also finds more empathetic borrowing of a character's vocabulary, particularly when the narrative is not critical of the fictional events. When Stanzel uses the term *Ansteckung* ('infection', 'contagion'—as in 'infectious or contagious laughter') to describe the incorporation of figural language into the narrative, this is meant to signify a merging, in empathetic contexts, of the voice of the narrator and those of the characters, resulting in an intensification and expansion of figural viewpoint.¹⁰

The issue of 'voice' in fiction cannot be restricted to environments of speech and thought representation, but needs to be considered within the general strategies of the narrative to appropriate characters' language for the purposes of comedy or irony, and to assimilate figural style in order to intensify the evocation of figural perspective.

(19) *For she was going to inherit her own estate, when she went to the High School. There, each girl was a lady. There, she was going to walk among free souls, her co-mates and her equals, and all petty things would be put away. Ah, if only she did not bite her nails! If only she had not this blemish! She wanted so much to be perfect—without spot or blemish, living the high, noble life.*

(*The Rainbow*, x; Lawrence 1988:268)

The phenomenon of *Ansteckung* has in fact been noted by various scholars, most prominently by Graham Hough, who characterizes it as 'coloured narrative' (Hough 1978: 49–60), and Page also comes close to describing it, though he locates his 'submerged speech' in contexts of indisputable speech and thought representation (Page 1988:33–5).

In the following I again provide a collection of narrative passages in which numerous 'expressive' features have been adopted and integrated.

Adverbial deixis:

(20) The Veneerings have been, as usual, indefatigably dealing dinner cards to Society, and whoever desires to take a hand had best be quick about it, for it is written in the Books of the Insolvent Fates that Veneering shall make a resounding smash **next week**. [...] it shall come to pass **next week**.

(*Our Mutual Friend* IV, xvi; Dickens 1979:883)

(21) Penelope has been given 'a rather stronger and more cunning role in the plot' than is usually recognized. It is right to emphasize that the poet of the *Odyssey* has promoted Penelope from being like a parcel, checked in at the left-luggage desk twenty years **ago**, and waiting to be claimed by the man who presents the right ticket (kills the suitors).

(NYRB 37.5 [1990]: 11)

- (22) Hunger had once more taken up its abode in my breast, and I had not tasted food since *yesterday* evening. This, 'tis true, was not a long period; I had often been able to hold out for a couple of days at a time, but latterly I had commenced to fall off seriously; I could not go hungry one quarter as well as I used to do.

(Hunger III; Hamsun 1935:136)

- (23) Er schlief unruhig, wenige Stunden. Schon kurz nach vier erhob er sich. Der Kopf schmerzte ihn. Er schob es auf die lange Eisenbahnfahrt vom *gestrigen* Tage.

('Der Apostel'; Hauptmann 1963:33)¹¹

- (24) But Tom's influence among these young people began to grow, *now*, day by day; and in time he came to be looked up to, by them, with a sort of wondering awe, as a superior being.

(The Prince and the Pauper, Twain 1983:8)¹²

- (25) Und einmal flog sogar die Tür auf, daß es nur so schepperte, und *herein trat* der Lakai des Grafen D'Argenson und schrie, wie nur Lakaien schreien können, daß er fünf Flaschen von dem neuen Duft haben wolle, und Chénier zitterte noch eine Viertelstunde später vor Ehrfurcht, denn der Graf D'Argenson war Intendant und Kriegsminister Seiner Majestät und der mächtigste Mann von Paris.

(Das Parfum I, xvii; Süskind 1985:115)¹³

Hesitation:

- (26) Lily stepped back to get her canvas—*so*—into perspective.

(To the Lighthouse III, v; Woolf 1985:160)

Epistemics:

- (27) It was after dinner, and the Bishop had settled himself for a pleasant season of contemplation, when the bell *must* needs ring, and there *must burst* in upon the Bishop a letter and a thin, ungainly Negro. Bishop Onderdonk read the letter hastily and frowned.

(The Souls of Black Folk, xii; Du Bois 1989:182)

Epithets; designation:

- (28) As for imperialism, the sooner it was buried the better. All his life Woolf fretted as British governments procrastinated and broke their word to the inhabitants of their colonial Empire, imprisoned native leaders, and quelled riots with bloodshed. He lived to see *that cockatoo*, Harold Macmillan, get the credit for withdrawing from East Africa, a policy Woolf had been advocating for thirty years.

(NYRB 37.5 [1990]:29)

- (29) The darkest day in Vry's young life came without warning. *Big Missy* and *Marse* John had arranged to sell Aunt Sally. [...] *Big Missy* came out in the kitchen after

breakfast and told Aunt Sally to get her things together; there was a wagon in the backyard waiting to take her to Savannah.

(*Jubilee*; M. Walker 1966:70)

Typographical signals:

- (30) The young peasant himself was still more astonished, not conceiving how he had offended the prince: Yet recollecting himself, with a mixture of grace and humility, he disengaged himself from Manfred's gripe, and then with an obeisance, which discovered more jealousy of innocence than dismay; he asked, with respect, of what he was guilty!

(*The Castle of Otranto*, i; Walpole 1964:18–19)

Lexis:

- (31) The dinner bar was at the great Physician's. [...] There were *brilliant* ladies about London who *perfectly* doted on him, my dear, as the most *charming* creature and the most *delightful* person, who would have been shocked to find themselves so close to him if they could have known on what sights those thoughtful eyes of his had rested within an hour or two, and near to whose beds, and under what roofs, his composed figure had stood.

(*Little Dorrit* II, xxv; Dickens 1978:768)¹⁴

A probably very rare transposal of an idiom into the narrative occurs in the following passage:

- (32) Rudbeck is extremely busy. [...] At the same time he is planning the most difficult section of the road, where it runs through high jungle among lakes and swamps. Swamp road is expensive and he has to pick the driest route, in spite of deviations. He *thanks goodness* very often while he wades through half-dried swamps, from dawn to dark, in clouds of tsetse, that Celia is happy with Johnson, visiting the sights. Rudbeck adores his young wife, but is still, like other young married men, the essential bachelor. He cannot do with a woman except for amusement.

(*Mister Johnson*; Cary 1962:111)

- (33) 'I give this woman to be married to this man,' saith Cousin Feenix therefore. Cousin Feenix, meaning to go in a straight line, but turning off sideways by reason of his wilful legs, gives the wrong woman to be married to this man, at first [...] but Mrs Miff, interposing in her mortified bonnet, dexterously turns him back, and runs him, as on castors, full at the 'good lady:' whom Cousin Feenix *giveth to be married to this man accordingly*.

(*Domby and Son*, xxxi; Dickens 1985:531)

Repetitions, root transformations and exclamations, however, are only attributable to the stylistic idiosyncrasies of the narrative voice, unless they are used to represent a character's speech, perception or consciousness—but then, of course, those passages are properly psycho-narration, or speech report (see Chapter 5). Here are some examples of repetition and root transformations employed in the narrative proper which cannot be aligned with a figural consciousness.

- (34) Nothing more was said between the happy pair. [...] Next day came; **came Georgiana; and came Fledgeby.**

(*Our Mutual Friend* II, v; Dickens 1979:312)

- (35) The Preacher is the most unique personality developed by the Negro on American soil. A leader, a politician [sic], an orator, a 'boss,' an intriguer, an idealist,—**all these he is**, and ever, too, the centre of a group of men, now twenty, now a thousand in number.

(*The Souls of Black Folk*, x; Du Bois 1989:155)

- (36) To these glad tidings as to a voice from Heaven, Don Tomazo cheerfully condescended, so that obeying such welcome orders, they presently drew him up. But he was no sooner come forth, but the old caitiff was as yare for his cash, who with a grim aspect threatened to stab him with his dirk, a doleful sight, **God wot**, if he did not fairly deliver all he had.

(*Don Tomazo*; Peterson 1961:197)

- (37) After they had thus practised against him [James Bainham] what they could by tortures **then was he brought** before John Stokesley, Bishop of London, the 15th of December 1531.

(*Foxe's Book of Martyrs*, 'Henry VIII; Luther, Tindall, and Their Disciples'; 1965:95)

However, there is also the case of simply shifting into characters' discourse for entire clauses *within* the narrative, which can be for adding free indirect discourse or direct discourse, and constitutes an extended application of 'slipping' (Schuelke 1958):

- (38) Once he had got it through his thick skull that she meant business, **no more hanky-panky, no sir, she was a decent woman, not a lust-crazed libertine**, he began to stay out late at night.

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:248)

- (39) So just as Kovalyov was about to tell the driver to go straight to the Security Office, it struck him that the scoundrel and impostor who had behaved so shamelessly could quite easily take advantage of the delay and slip out of the city, in which event all his efforts to find it [his nose] would be futile and might even drag on for another month, **God forbid.**

(*'The Nose'*; Gogol 1987:52)

- (40) All were retreating, withdrawing and dispersing; and he was left with the ash grown cold and no glow, no glow on the log. What word expressed the sag at his heart, the effusion in his veins, as the retreating Manresa, with Giles attendant,

admirable woman, all sensation, ripped the rag doll and let the sawdust stream from his heart?

(*Between the Acts*; Woolf 1982:146–7)

Although root transformations seem to be definitely restricted to the narrator's emphasis outside contexts of figural perception, exclamations which are attributable to a character can in principle be incorporated into the narrative, but are usually felt to be explicit borrowings with suppressed quotation marks around them. They therefore resemble some of Schuelke's examples of 'slipping' (Schuelke 1958).

6.3

THE MECHANICS OF 'VOICE': STYLISTIC DEVIATION IN NARRATIVE PROSE

How, precisely, does narrative evoke characters' voice(s)? Or, for that matter, how do we distinguish the narrator's voice from that of the character's in typical dual voice texts such as Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*? What are, really, the mechanics of dual voice? This question has not really been posed in any detail by narratologists, although in the interpretation of individual texts it necessarily surfaces again and again. The only serious attempt to discuss figural voice has been Banfield's, and we will have to debate more carefully in the following chapter how her linguistic category of deictic SELF correlates with the evocation of figural voice. Banfield's theory is, in any case, too restricted to handle general borrowings of figural idiom since she explicitly bars the occurrence of SELF markers from indirect discourse as well as from the narrative proper. Let us look more closely for the moment at the list of expressive features which Banfield proposes and which we have observed to recur both in contexts of speech and thought representation (Chapters 4 and 5) and in the narrative *per se* (6.2). Some of these expressive features are lexical, and their subjective nature is usually described in terms of a deviation from an objective, neutral 'norm' of the narrator's discourse. Other expressive elements are syntactic, e.g. the root transformations which we looked at in Chapter 4. Not only are some of these syntactically marked because the fronting, dislocation or I-Movement which they entail results in a different word order from that expected on the basis of the syntactic norm; these deviations can additionally be described as infractions against definable rules of the *langue*—a fact that renders them more precisely 'deviant' than merely lexical, 'stylistic' foregrounding, where the expected 'norm' from which such expressions are said to deviate is frequently an all too vague and ill-defined notion.

Previous analyses of stylistic deviation, most famously conducted by Michel Riffaterre in a series of articles (Riffaterre 1959a, 1960, 1961), have centred on semantic and syntactic anomalies or peculiarities of the text which invite interpretation. Such idiosyncrasies can then be 'naturalized' as mimetic features correlating with the assumption of figural viewpoint and voice. Most studies of stylistic deviation after Spitzer's early *Stilstudien* indeed focus on poetry or the issue of poetic versus non-poetic

language, and this is where the term *deviation* originates. In poetry at least, stylistic effect is frequently achieved by means of a violation of selection and subcategorization rules (e.g. *colourful green ideas sleep furiously* ; *a grief ago*). In fictional and, indeed, natural narrative, however, local agrammaticality plays a much more restricted role and cannot be used as a paradigm from which to generalize about the issue of narrative voice. Nevertheless, some of Riffaterre's more immediately stylistic discussions treating the difficulties of recognizing within a certain stylistic context what is or is not a deviation are indeed germane to the inquiry at hand.

The concept of stylistic deviation originates with Russian Formalism, in stylistic foregrounding (*ostranenie*),¹⁵ which was considered an important element of the 'literariness' (*literaturnost'*)¹⁶ of poetic language. Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism concentrated on poetry—the clearest case of non-standard language within literature. Even Roman Jakobson more or less consistently ignores prose style, except by accommodating it within a scale of genres in which various linguistic functions coexist ('Closing Statement'—Jakobson 1958/1987). Much of the linguistic approach to literature has therefore concentrated on the fundamental difference between poetic language and more 'standard' written and oral discourse, and much energy has been devoted to a linguistic description of this difference. The major conundrum—a conundrum very specific to the subject matter of poetry—has been whether one can describe poetic language in terms of a linguistics of poetic language, or whether each poem in itself posits a new *langue*. A very successful example of a fruitful application of the former persuasion is Dillon (1980), who establishes separate transformation rules for the syntax of blank verse poetry—his example text is Milton. Banfield's attempt to define free indirect discourse in terms of generative grammar therefore needs to be regarded as indebted to this project of discovering the linguistics of literature, in her case the linguistics of narrative prose. The second orientation, which claims that one needs a specific grammar for each poem, has been established mainly by people studying 'agrammatical' texts, for instance the poetry of e.e. cummings. Here one can reasonably posit a separate grammar for each poem, such that even standard English syntax becomes a deviation from the poem's syntactic norm.¹⁷

Although linguistic analyses of this type have provided us with many insights into the use of language in (certain kinds of) poetry, they all suffer from what Posner (1982:126) calls the 'linguistic fallacy', namely the unwarranted belief that the essence of poetic language can be completely comprehended by purely linguistic rules. The emphasis here should be on *rules*. Most poetic and literary effects can indeed be *described* linguistically; what is less easily achieved is a subsumption of poetic language under the general linguistic rule system. The most promising progress towards such subsumption has indeed been made in the area of *pragmatics*, which concerns itself with literary *texts* and their meaning-effects within such frameworks as script notions, situational implicature, textual relevance and macro-textual structure. (See, for instance, the relevant sections in de Beaugrande 1980.) Such a pragmatic approach is eminently suited to dealing with narrative. It does, however, need to be emphasized that a pragmatic study of stylistic phenomena constitutes no longer a purely linguistic analysis, that is an analysis in terms of the *rules* of the linguistic system, the *langue*. Pragmatic constraints, such as Gricean conventions or maxims

of discourse, provide an interpretative frame for the use of language; they integrate the linguistic system within a general framework of behavioural rules or conventions which do not themselves become part of the (linguistic) *langue*.

Such preliminary methodological caveats are crucial to the analysis of dual voice, a stylistic effect fostered by the *difference* between the narrator's and a character's styles, or languages. Probably the two most important critics to analyse stylistic deviation in prose texts, Leo Spitzer and Michel Riffaterre, both contend with the limitations of *langue* as an explanatory system for stylistic effect. Spitzer, in his analysis of Louis Philippe's novel *Bubu de Montparnasse*, interprets the extensive use of causative clauses that have a present tense verb as indicative of the fatalistic atmosphere of the novel.

Der Satz On n'en comprenait pas toutes les causes parce que les causes débordent et suspendent sur nos têtes leurs cent mille poings de fer zeigt so recht die Ironie, die allen diesen à cause, parce que usw. zugrunde liegt: Die Gründe, die wir für ein Geschehen angeben, sind nach Philippe Scheingründe, die unser tatsächliches Tun nicht zu erklären vermögen. In Wirklichkeit gibt es für uns Menschen nur ein Ignorabimus. Die fortwährenden Motivierungen bedeuten nichts als Wortberauschung, Selbstbetörung des nach Klarheit fahndenden, aber unter der Lebenslast erdrückten Menschen. Der Mensch erscheint Philippe nur als ein armes scheinstolzes Geschöpf, sein Tun ist voller Widersprüche, Unlogik, Eitelkeit: die Ironie, die das Unlogische wie etwas Selbstverständliches, das so sein muß, betrachtet, ist für dies hohle Scheinwesen der richtige Ausdruck—die Ironie, die in jenen 'weil', 'wegen', 'man' liegt, hinter denen keine wirkliche Autorität steckt.
(Spitzer 1923a:380)¹⁸

For such far-reaching general conclusions the evidence seems rather slim, particularly because these conclusions relate to a quite different interpretative level. Spitzer justifies his method by a long excursus on the hermeneutical circle, in which he claims that one's intuition about a certain 'meaning' of an author's style will direct one to a specific peculiarity of grammar, which will in turn strengthen one's original hunch, which can then be further confirmed by even more linguistic evidence of a similar kind in the text. Spitzer even uses the term 'psychologische Radix' (Spitzer 1923a: 359, fn. 1), i.e. 'psychological root', from which the stylistic peculiarities are said to derive in true philosophical fashion. Since the stylistic devices that Spitzer analyses—causal clauses—suggest a certain mode of reasoning, they can then be taken to imply a world view of a specific kind (fatalism). Yet it is difficult to believe that one can deduce such a world view from every instance of a *parce que* followed by a gnomic present tense. It is of course not the *because* clause and the gnomic present in themselves which lead to Spitzer's interpretation, but the naïvety of the explanations thus proffered in the text, which are in turn identified as being typical of the protagonist's world view. It is, in fact, that world view, and it alone, which can conceivably be characterized as 'fatalistic'. The implication arises from the comparative frequency of the construction on the one hand—frequent enough to have attracted Spitzer's attention as being different from the norm—and,

secondly, from the general evaluation of the meaning(s) of the novel, which motivates the specific interpretation that Spitzer provides.¹⁹ It is this second point that raises the specifically hermeneutic questions which Spitzer addresses in *Linguistics and Literary History. Essays in Stylistics* (1948) and his remarks demonstrate that the roots of his interpretation lie not in the linguistic device *per se* but in his *reading* of the text: in the process of such reading stylistic factors acquire nameable functions and then—on account of their specific functions—become ‘devices’, ‘strategies’, ‘techniques’. Spitzer obscures this process because he starts out by discussing the linguistic pattern, which effectively closes the reader’s eyes to the presuppositions from which he departs.

In order to be fair, one should here add that it is quite possible that Spitzer should have detected the linguistic peculiarities first and, after a protracted study of the novel, found that these peculiarities lent themselves to a confirmation of what the novel as a whole seemed to suggest about the characters’ world view. The point here is, then, *not* that Spitzer’s method is useless, or disingenuous; as far as finding further evidence for the book’s meaning in a rather marginal (i.e. purely grammatical) aspect of the text is concerned, Spitzer’s method is surely exemplary, and this explains Spitzer’s continuing importance for and influence on subsequent generations of scholars. However, Spitzer certainly fails to provide a methodologically adequate cause-and-effect pattern between the uses of *parce que* plus present tense and the novel’s meanings. There is no intrinsic *necessity* for this construction to suggest fatalism—naïvety would be as good an implication, and, in a novel by George Eliot, wisdom, masterful insight into the depths of the human psyche, etc., could be equally valid interpretative explanations for the same grammatical device. The connection is therefore clearly one of interpretation and not of entailment. Indeed, what this example can teach us is along the lines of a lesson in premature jumps from textual evidence to very high-level interpretative ‘meanings’. That is to say, a recurrent syntactic pattern has no *meaning* in itself and by itself, it can only acquire a function of foregrounding, of alerting the reader’s attention to its peculiarity. This is a very specific *textual* function with a ‘meaning’ too general to be of any interpretative use. Only on a higher level, where the pattern has been recognized as signalling a function, can one start to look for a ‘meaning’ of that function, and the higher one climbs on a scale of interpretative levels, the more specific such a function can become within a specific text. I have already noted this pattern in discussing ‘the’ (putative) function of free indirect discourse in [Chapter 2](#); one there moves from the linguistic deviation (if one wants to regard free indirect discourse as a deviation on the lines of Weinrich’s ‘temporal metaphor’) to a discourse level, on which the discourse becomes structured and patterned, to a narratological level in which the discourse is a narrative text with its own rules, and from there to yet another text-specific level of a novel and its thematic concerns, within which frame more metaphorical functions may be projected on the ‘device’. What Spitzer does in his analyses is to cross from level 1 to the top level of interpretation, thus repeating the infelicities of linguistic criticism generally deplored in the work of Jakobson.²⁰ David Zubin, in a presentation to the narrative study group at SUNY Buffalo (Zubin 1991), has attempted to describe this poly valency of the stylistic device in terms of what he calls the alpha-function. Individual stylistic or linguistic

characteristics $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ are—according to textual environment - correlated to an alpha-function that then projects, e.g., a deictic centre of subjectivity.

Riffaterre's analysis of French inversion is more sophisticated than Spitzer's. Riffaterre chooses to question the definition of the central concept of the *norm*. Indeed, there are numerous norms. A norm may be a grammatical or a semantic norm, a stylistic or a referential norm, a norm established by frequency of occurrence or a norm established by 'correctness', 'appropriateness' and the like, a norm for prose texts, or a norm for poetry, a norm in present-day French, or in eighteenth-century French, a literary or non-literary, a written or colloquial norm. Inversion is of course a syntactic phenomenon and similar to the kind of deviation devices with which we have been concerned in [Chapter 4](#).

Riffaterre's second concept, that of the *context*, is designed to clarify precisely the very presuppositions for the establishing of norms. To analyse the concept of norm in this manner is a decisive advance over the absolutist versions of stylistic deviation models as practised by Lotman or Levin. However, even Riffaterre cannot eventually resolve this issue since what used to be the problem of the lack of precise definability of multiple norms now resurfaces as the relativity and non-definability of *context*. In spite of this drawback, Riffaterre provides an invaluable contribution to stylistic foregrounding, noting - most importantly - that deviation may become significant in certain contexts rather than others and be interpreted differently according to where it occurs. This constitutes an immense advance over former reflections on the dialectic between norm and deviation. Riffaterre's model, for instance, allows one to discuss, say, topicalization as a significant device in a context of presentation of characters' consciousness, whereas it may suggest a free indirect discourse reading in a historical work, or be recognized as a device of argumentative emphasis in a scholarly article. As we will see, even these results do not constitute much help with literary texts, unless one can define in more detail the story context, the meaning of the narrator's argument, the ideational possibilities of a specific passage, and unless one recognizes that one is talking about interpretational moves within a frame of expectations based on generic recurrence and hence probability. Such a set-up never allows a one-to-one correspondence between a linguistic phenomenon, its 'function' and its 'meaning'.

Functions, it needs to be noted, are interpretative entities, too, since they posit a place for an observable item within a constructed system within which such an item then acquires a *function*. This is the reason why deviations are always dependent on interpretation—the system within which they acquire a function needs to be extrapolated interpretatively from the text and is therefore no longer conceivable in empirical, linguistic terms. However, in so far as the systems thus extrapolated fulfil significant functions in constituting textual meaning they also receive some deductive corroboration from the fact of their pragmatic usefulness.

Besides the problems of norm and context, Riffaterre also deals with the even more difficult issue of stylistic *commutation*, that is to say with the theory that stylistic deviation consists in an intentional stylistic *choice* of a particular lexeme or syntactic structure over an expected (unmarked) norm for which it substitutes. Riffaterre (1959b) takes up this conundrum in his review of Ullmann's *Style in the French Novel* (1957).²¹ In this article Riffaterre concentrates on the two main presuppositions of Ullmann's method—(a) the

fact that any stylistic device presupposes a choice between various alternatives (against which one lexeme, one construction rather than another, will appear foregrounded); and (b) the logical implication of positing a 'deviation from a norm'. Riffaterre concedes that Ullmann does not contend that *all* stylistic effect is due to deviation, but this only raises the question of how such stylistic effect comes about in other contexts. Do we have to deal with choice among equally valid alternatives? But how does deviation then become operative as creating a very specific effect?²²

In principle the so-called norm and the possible alternatives to a particular textual given remain rather elusive. Riffaterre approvingly notes Ullmann's recognition that the *same* device (for instance inversion) may give rise to several different stylistic effects and that the same meaning effect can be derived from a variety of different stylistic devices (409; Ullmann 9). This is a signal insight frequently disregarded by linguistic criticism, which all too often succumbs to the urge to establish a relationship of entailment between device and stylistic effect. Riffaterre aptly points out that a stylistic device is an 'empty sign' (Zubin's alpha-element) that may (or may not) give rise to a variety of effects, and he calls this the principle of polyvalency:

It would be useful to deduce the necessary corollaries of this principle of polyvalency (which I should prefer to call polyvalence): first, that the style device is an empty sign which stresses the meaningful linguistic elements it affects without modifying their contents, only forcing the decoder's attention to them; second, that the same device may give rise to a variety of effects or to none.

(Riffaterre 1959b:409)

Riffaterre also emphasizes that a purely linguistic definition of stylistic devices is insufficient since 'these features are not consistently or permanently expressive' (409). In particular, Riffaterre justly remarks that many linguistically traceable devices such as subject-verb inversion frequently become so common that they lose their expressive quality. Hence Riffaterre's proposal of the equation 'context=stylistically relevant norm' (408). Riffaterre demonstrates his argument on the example of Sartre's *Demain viendront les oiseaux noirs* (from *La Mort dans l'âme*). Subject-verb inversion is expressive here 'because of its scarcity *in the context*' (411), because this is the last sentence of the book (which would tend to attract special attention) and on account of the striking image. This example very usefully demonstrates the fallacy of interpreting every occurrence of, say, inversion as an inherently expressive feature, and it additionally exemplifies how general 'emphasis' can direct the reader's attention to a device which s/he may have found unnoteworthy in a different context. For instance in a passage such as,

(41) Demain viendront les oiseaux noirs, et puis on ira à la plage, et on les tuera.

the inversions would tend to be much less striking since they occur in succession, which allows them to establish a mnemotechnically effective rhythm that facilitates a reading in terms of the progression of three events (a kind of *veni vidi vici* pattern). One should also

note that one here has to do with a more extensive stylistic strategy (*device* seems inappropriate) affecting the entire passage. It also immediately becomes apparent how difficult it will be to grasp such a stylistic strategy in purely linguistic terms.

Another problem that Riffaterre briefly touches on in his much more extensive articles (1959a, 1960) is the fact that the conventional account of style consists in discovering a connotative emphasis added to the lexical (denotative) meaning or linguistic structure, and this connotation results in an expressive, affective or aesthetic effect (1959a:155). The important point here is that according to this kind of argument *no alteration in meaning* must occur since that would undermine the basic presupposition of a choice between alternatives. 'Meaning' is here equated with denotation (the encoded meaning in the lexicon).²³ Connotational meaning is of course never simply equivalent to denotation, and it is the former that produces stylistic effect, at least in contexts of lexical 'choice.' Here is Riffaterre's example:

- (42) Poor Mr Pecksniff (...) is represented as a criminal instead of as a / very typical English / *paterfamilias* / keeping a roof over the head of himself and his daughters.
(from G.B.Shaw, *Getting Married*, Preface; quoted *sic* in Riffaterre 1960:213–14)

Now *paterfamilias* instead of *head of the family*, *patriarch*, *father* or other lexical alternatives certainly preserves the denotational meaning of the intended (intensional) sense. However, as a Latin expression, or a choice that does not automatically suggest itself in 'ordinary' English, it arrests the reader's attention and consequently evokes a number of *connotations*. Prime among these are suggestions of register (affectation, pompousness) and—less patently—Dickensian overtones: Mr Pecksniff is the first who would tend to see himself as a *paterfamilias* (donning the cloak of benevolence and authority) and cling to the cliché of 'keeping a roof over the head' of his family (all of this quite on the lines of the Uncle Charles Principle).

What one here comes up against is the problem of whether lexical meaning is to be seen as a 'proper meaning' within a 'proper context' (with some extensions into different contexts), or simply as the sum of all possible collocations (Lyons 1977:265). Or, to put it differently, does a word acquire a new 'meaning' because it is used in an unexpected context?²⁴ One is thrown back on the native speaker's judgement of whether s/he finds a particular usage to be peculiar (foregrounded) or not, and whether (and what) connotational meanings s/he associates with the idiosyncratic expression. If one had the choice between a *hut*, a *cabin* and a *shack*, no question of foregrounding might interfere with the choice between 'equally appropriate alternatives'—whereas *chalet*, as a foreign term, *would*, particularly in a non-Alpine context. However, do we actually believe that all three lexemes would be equally appropriate in all contexts, and if not, can we specify that context? Even more so, are there not denotational (or merely intensional?) differences between them? Would we not picture a *hut*, a *cabin* and a *shack* differently as made of different materials and situated in different locations? Semantics usually proposes that no two lexemes are entirely synonymous in all contexts, although their *semes* or semantic

features may largely overlap. The problem with the naïve stylistic approach is therefore the presupposition of lexical synonymy, which is never adequately defined, nor is it usually recognized that synonymy constitutes a serious linguistic problem in its own right. Riffaterre's concept of context is useful in so far as it exposes the fallacy of adopting the linguistic norm *per se* as a basis for discussing stylistic deviation. Yet one also needs to note that his criteria for what is a relevant context are equally elusive as the former definitions of norms.

This becomes very obvious from Trabant's (1974) proposals which claim to resolve Riffaterre's theoretical shortcomings. Trabant notes that one has to define the concept of *relevance* since the notion of context requires a selection of a relevant context. He therefore institutes the reader (*Textrezipient*) as the arbiter of relevancy, who decides what is relevant for him or her (1974:52), or—more precisely—for his or her meaning hypothesis (*Sinn-Hypothese*—*ibid.*, 53). Trabant explicitly refers to the relevance of rhetorical, metric, ideological and generic norms and very commendably insists that the fulfilling of expected norms constitutes a stylistic effect in its own right. He additionally notes that in found poetry and similar literary recontextualizations the aesthetic effect most clearly cannot derive from the language—which is the same in the original newspaper article and in the found poem—but has to be explained in terms of the (re) contextualizing effect. One here has to note immediately that Trabant envisages 'literaricity', the *aesthetics* of literary language, rather than mere *style*, as his object of argument. More problematic still is his identification of style with interpretative meaning. If the reader judges stylistic effects according to their relevance for his or her textual interpretations, this need not necessarily result in an appreciation of literary style as *literary*: after all, what is interpretatively relevant need not be particularly aesthetic or poetic. Trabant therefore errs in the other direction by unnecessarily widening the scope of what can count as a stylistic device—a tactic which unfortunately results in the complete (linguistic) indefinability of style.

Perhaps this is what Trabant in fact intends—to shift the responsibility of explaining literary style from the linguist to the interpretative literary theorist. Style would then be no more than an interpretative effect; but if we end up at this point, the linguistic bases of style are entirely lost sight of. Trabant therefore joins forces with the traditional (anti-linguistic) stylistician and practically denies that there has been any progress in the discussion in the wake of Formalism and Structuralism. Trabant's proposals thus become comparable with Genette's recent formulations (Genette 1991), although emitted from a linguistic standpoint.

The indefinability of the notion of linguistic, particularly stylistic, *context* (except for the rarely applicable empirical word frequency count) has received some brilliant theoretical treatment in Derrida's critique of Searle's *Speech Acts* (1969). The reference is to Derrida's famous article 'Limited Inc' (Derrida 1977b; see also Derrida 1977a and Searle 1977 for the previous stages of the debate).

Y a-t-il un concept rigoureux et scientifique du contexte? La notion de contexte n'abrite-t-elle pas, derrière une certaine confusion, des pre-suppositions philosophiques très déterminées? Pour le dire des maintenant de la façon la plus

sommaire, je voudrais démontrer pourquoi un contexte n'est jamais absolument déterminable ou plutôt en quoi sa détermination n'est jamais assurée ou saturée. Cette non-saturation structurelle aurait pour double effet:

1) de marquer l'insuffisance théorique du concept courant de contexte (linguistique ou non linguistique) tel qu'il est reçu dans de nombreux domaines de recherches, avec tous les concepts auxquels il est systématiquement associé;

2) de rendre nécessaires une certaine généralisation et un certain déplacement du concept d'écriture.

(Derrida 1972:369)²⁵

1. Since the role of context is determinant, and the horizon of the 'total context' is indispensable to the analysis, the contextual difference here may be fundamental and cannot be shunted aside, even provisionally, in order to analyse intention. Isn't the assertion that the difference involves *only* the context a surprising proposition to make, even from the standpoint of speech act theory? 2. Intention, itself marked by the context, is not foreign to the formation of the 'total' context. For Austin it is even an essential element of that formation. And yet, Sarl²⁶ feels authorized in excluding temporarily the consideration of context. Yet even if it were only temporary and methodological, useful for the clarity of the demonstration, such an exclusion would, it seems to me, be both impossible and illegitimate. *To treat context as a factor from which one can abstract for the sake of refining one's analysis, is to commit oneself to a description that cannot but miss the very contents and object it claims to isolate, for they are intrinsically determined by context.* The method itself, as well as considerations of clarity, should have excluded such an abstraction. *Context is always, and always has been, at work within the place, and not only around it.*

(Derrida 1977b:198)

Indeed, context is inseparable from what it supposedly merely frames and defines, since context originates in the extrapolation from what is given, as an interpretative concept, a reading strategy, allowing textual units to signify *textually* rather than lexically, in a discourse rather than a word-by-word or sentence-by-sentence reading. Discourses are always of a generic and situational type, and narrative discourse happens to be related to narrative plot, including narrative existants which fulfil actantial roles. Narrative discourse therefore invites a reading in terms of mimetic representation, and it is for this reason alone that certain stylistic textual effects are immediately recuperated or 'naturalized' in terms of verisimilar 'voice', characters' perceptions or consciousness. Riffaterre's and Trabandt's analyses of stylistic context broach the relevant problems but fail to radicalize the concept. We will return to contexts of interpretation in [Chapter 9](#), where frame theory will be presented as a possible way out of the theoretical maze.

One last point in Riffaterre's work on stylistic deviation deserves to be noted here. Riffaterre distinguishes between three *kinds* of effects that are usually said to arise from stylistic deviation. These he classifies as expressive, emotive and aesthetic respectively.

The aesthetic is most easily disposed of as both obvious and least objectively definable: it includes the effects of parallelism, chiasmus and various sound effects in poetry and prose. Emotive devices, if the term is meant to suggest that the deviation corresponds to an emotional involvement on the part of the speaker, can perhaps be dealt with in a purely linguistic framework, and we will have more to say on this score below when arguing that emotiveness can be linked to certain linguistic expressions of subjectivity. Which leaves us with the issue of 'expressive' effect. Riffaterre's examples here show a variety of possible kinds of expressivity, starting with emphasis and ending with particular (connotative) suggestions of verbosity or pompousness (the example from Shaw) or incongruity.²⁷ Whereas emotive and aesthetic effects are in some sense empirically verifiable against native speakers' intuitions, there is no such criterion for Riffaterre's expressive effects.

Although speakers still concur *that* there is a stylistic effect, opinions may diverge drastically on its interpretation which, like much of the connotative expressivity, is rooted in the ideology of linguistic style.

The main insights gained from the discussions of Riffaterre and Spitzer can be summarized in the following conclusions.

- (1) Style cannot be identified with choice, unless there is a decisive difference in meaning. Stylistic analyses so far have taken it for granted that a writer will choose between synonyms, and that the effect of style is therefore one of the more or less idiosyncratic choice of lexemes. Although on a more sophisticated level, this is still the point of view of Genette in his recent attempt to resuscitate the concept of style for the study of literature (Genette 1991). Genette recognizes, however, that everything is style—there is no discourse which is not, at the same time, style.
- (2) If style is defined as difference from a norm—and I do not use the term deviation because this implies grammatical 'abnormity'—then it is of primary importance to specify the precise mode of difference, that is, to identify the different norms, whether syntactic, morphological, lexical, semantic or pragmatic, from which a specific device or passage departs.
- (3) Thirdly, one will have to distinguish between stylistic differences that are systematic and those that occur as solecisms without being linked to a recognizable grammatical subset of the language and without correlation to a text-specific systematics. Syntactic and morphological differences—except in deliberately 'agrammatical' formulations such as e.e. cummings's *she danced his did-* need to be describable within a language's grammatical rule mechanism. The expressive syntactic features that I have presented in [Chapter 4](#) (root transformations, etc.) all need to be described *within* a syntax of the English language. They are as grammatical as sentences of 'standard' word order, and the question is therefore one of context, i.e. linguistic and pragmatic environment. Morphological deviations of course frequently constitute a linguistic subsystem, a sociolect or dialect, within which they are as grammatical as the standard morphological forms.

The gravest problems of systematicity arise in the lexical and semantic field. The theory of deictic centre, for instance, makes it possible to systematize lexical and semantic aspects by aligning them to an ordering centre of reported subjectivity.

Such an ordering system comprises *both* lexical and morphological terms that systematically relate to deixis (such as expressions of address and reference) and items not systematically identifiable in linguistic terms that become associated with a character's subjectivity only in the specific narrative context. Examples of the latter are epistemic terms indicative of cognitive viewpoint, such as *probably*; argumentative discourse particles such as *too* or *then* (cp. (4.3.1) (L)); and of course lexical idiosyncrasies such as characters' favourite expressions (Mr Sparkler's *no nonsense* ; Captain Cuttle's nautical terms).

- (4) Riffaterre's principle of polyvalence needs to be insisted on most emphatically. A given linguistic characteristic, in so far as it departs from a specific norm, can be employed for a variety of presumed purposes, as well as for none at all. Thus, subject-verb inversion in English—which accompanies several root transformations as well as constituting one in its own right—can be used in order to signal subjective point of view or narrator's emphasis; it can be used for the purpose of rhythmic euphony, and also for no observable purpose at all. An example of such pure 'stylistic' variety is the occurrence of inversion in inquit-tags, where it has become a common, conventionalized textual feature of obscure (if any) stylistic effect.
- (5) By the same token, even more importantly, the very same *effect* can be achieved by a great variety of *different* linguistic devices. This is true quite obviously of the stylistic evocation of a subjective deictic centre—whether by means of actual deixis, evaluative lexis, syntactic features or any other 'expressive' elements. The same applies also on a macro-textual level, where the evocation of character's consciousness, for example, can be achieved by means of free indirect discourse, psycho-narration, interior monologue or narrated perception.
- (6) 'Dual voice' both inside and outside free indirect discourse, like all semantic deviation, is a result or effect of the reader's pragmatic interpretation of textual elements within their specific literary context. This interpretation can be based on a very deliberate device, as in direct discourse or in the frank quotation of figural idiom by the narrator; the meaning effect may also be more indirect and implied, the effect of a cluster of subjectivity devices that perhaps do not result from a writer's deliberate stylistic choice.
- (7) The explicatory power of stylistic deviation breaks down at the point where one can no longer establish a norm, or where deviations from the norm are no longer empirically perceptible. This is the case in many of the examples of free indirect discourse dual voice, where certain otherwise quite inconspicuous linguistic expressions can be argued to reflect the precise 'tone' of an idiolect, or sociolect. Such passages usually represent debatable evidence for individual readings of 'Voice'. There is thus a grey area of indeterminacy in the definitions of norm and deviation from it, which significantly affects the usefulness of the deviation concept for the analysis of stylistic effect.

In spite of these rather tepid conclusions, one also needs to insist on the cognitive validity of deviation as a foregrounding device that manipulates readers' attention levels.²⁸ If deviation is linguistically describable, then there is a good chance of discovering a function for it on some level or levels. The chances are better for syntactic items than for lexical items, unless the latter are very noticeable as in poetic metaphor. The reason for this may perhaps be found in the presence of a very noticeable syntactic system and the less generally observable presence of any systematic link between stylistic elements of a lexical nature.

6.4

THE DUAL VOICE HYPOTHESIS—IRONY RECONSIDERED

In this final section I wish to illustrate where, why and in what way the dual voice hypothesis loses explanatory power. In the discussion of free indirect discourse so far we have mentioned how the dual voice hypothesis relies on the narratological frame of the mimesis/diegesis opposition, and how—within that frame—it accommodates the formal irregularities and ambiguities of individual types of speech and thought representation within a scale of formal and mimetic gradations reaching all the way from pure diegesis to pure mimesis. This scale, as we have seen, is not of a uniform linear kind but many-levelled, with interacting transitions between formal, lexical (voice) and semantic (depth of consciousness, narrative context) planes, and the feature 'voice' can both intensify and reduce the mimetic status of a specific passage, depending on whether the expressivity and stylistic register are attributable to a character or to the narrating instance.

The dual voice approach, with the scalar model in tow, can therefore explain many features of free indirect discourse and related phenomena. It is an improvement over a purely grammatical (linguistic) explanation of free indirect discourse and other types of speech and thought representation because the impossibility of precise delimitation can be treated as, simply, a consequence of the gradational overlap of diegetic and mimetic features, of linguistic form and mimetic voice. The scalar approach, secondly, allows an alignment with narratological issues. Voice is aligned with the theoretical constructs of narrator and characters, and the diegetic and mimetic levels therefore become identified with hierarchical structural levels of narrative. Formal syntactic subordination can be correlated with stylistic control and the narrator's cognitive and ideological domination of the narrative discourse. The dual voice hypothesis is, finally, a convincing model of narrative speech and thought representation because the concept of a textual *agon* of voices corresponds with the reader's intuitive perception of discourse in general (the properties of conversational language that I will analyse in [Chapter 8](#)), and with the reader's intuitions about the effects of such voice. Readers do in fact construct a narrator's (or author's) voice as a default value and, given sufficient linguistic evidence, experience an evocation of figural voices on that background. The 'dual voice' hypothesis, indeed, has been the standard account of free indirect discourse and similar phenomena of speech and thought representation precisely because of readers' *experience* of a dual voice,

of an overlapping of the languages of the narrative report and the idiom of characters' discourse.

However, the dual voice hypothesis also has some serious drawbacks. As regards free indirect discourse (or indirect discourse, or speech/thought report, for that matter), the dual voice hypothesis supplies no definition of these phenomena which does not strain against an arbitrary imposition of boundaries. The credibility of such boundaries is, however, undermined formally as well as contextually by the inadequation between the definition and the actual formal variety and the range of connotations accessible through the scalar model. Secondly, the dual voice model suffers from a linguistically or methodologically insufficient determination of the status of 'voice', and from the impossibility to account for the eventual narratological attribution of the voice factor; as a consequence, it fails to describe textual phenomena and meaning effects with any acceptable precision and ultimately exposes itself to the charge of mere amateurish impressionistic dabbling—an accusation that has been put forward against literary discussions of free indirect discourse by linguists such as Banfield.

The Banfieldian linguistic model, as we are going to see in the following chapter, attempts to address precisely these shortcomings by providing a purely linguistic definition of free indirect discourse, and by establishing a list of linguistic criteria designed to account for the 'voice' effect. That Banfield's model fails to find a niche for all textual features is a different matter. In true Kuhnian fashion, the method she employs addresses itself directly to the limitations of the standard dual voice hypothesis.

There is one narrative meaning effect directly linked with the issue of 'voice' that is particularly recalcitrant to Banfield's formulation of her theory and that is usually considered the prime explanatory triumph of the dual voice hypothesis. I am referring to the effect of textual irony. Whereas, within the dual voice model, irony is simply (and seemingly non-controversially) accounted for in terms of contradictory authorial and figural voice in an area of overlap, Banfield has to go to great argumentative lengths to 'prove' that there is no dual voice, not even in contradictory sentences. This leads her to look for falsifying evidence in what I consider to be deliberately inappropriate contexts. For instance, Banfield discusses the passage on Mr Ramsay's beliefs about the folly of women's minds (*To the Lighthouse* I, vi; Woolf 1985:34),²⁹ as well as several passages from the 'Nausicaa' and 'Eumaeus' chapters in *Ulysses*, in which the effect of irony relates to the cliché quality of the narratorial style. In all these instances it is indeed the general context that makes us read these passages ironically; it is our own moral convictions as well as the stylistic conventions and the interpretative norms which one constructs for the text as a whole³⁰ that determine the ironical reading.

Banfield's second strategy in attempting to discredit the dual voice approach is to construct sentences such as,

(43) That damn fool of a doctor was a genius, he thought.

which are obviously self-contradictory. The unacceptability of such sentences—in contrast to the acceptability of, say, *John said that the idiot of a doctor was a genius*—does

not, however, provide any proof against the dual voice hypothesis. After all, proponents of the dual voice hypothesis adduce examples of a quite different nature in support of their argument.

Banfield's attempt to demonstrate that a dual voice does not exist in free indirect discourse departs from a very specific understanding of irony as *either* contradiction *or* inappropriate (clichéd) form or content of a represented utterance (thought). In this Banfield confuses two levels of the manifestation of irony. There are some cases of ironic contradiction (but this is by no means true of the majority), in which an utterance literally says the opposite of what it implies, or implicitly signifies. Standard examples are *What a beautiful day!* or *Well done!* as references to miserable weather or the addressee's blundering (dropping a vase, e.g.). However, the irony—even in this very restricted account of the phenomenon *qua* contradiction—lies not in the contradiction *per se* but in the conversational implicature that the speaker cannot possibly have uttered the sentence seriously. Irony is always a pragmatic phenomenon of an implicational nature; textual contradictions and inconsistencies along-side semantic infelicities, or discrepancies between utterance and action (in the case of hypocrisy), merely *signal* the interpretational incompatibility, the break in the argument, the crack in the mirror which then requires a recuperatory move on the reader's part—aligning the discrepancy with an intended higher-level significance: irony. I am here describing the case of intentional irony (this is also Banfield's exemplum), which is part of a deliberate textual strategy. However, one really has to distinguish between different levels of irony, between authorial and narratorial irony. If there is a textual speaker who utilizes contradictions on whatever level, one can speak of narrational or narratorial irony; if the contradictions are recognized only by the reader, and the ironic intent is hence attributed to the (implied) author rather than the narrative voice, one can call this authorial irony.³¹

A fine example of such contextual, authorial irony occurs in *Pride and Prejudice*, where Mr Collins's letter regarding Lydia's elopement amply documents his lack of true Christian forgivingness—a lack immediately commented upon by Elizabeth's father:

- (44) 'I am truly rejoiced that my cousin Lydia's sad business has been so well hushed up, and am only concerned that their living together before the marriage took place, should be so generally known. I must not, however, neglect the duties of my station, or refrain from declaring my amazement, at hearing that you received the young couple into your house as soon as they were married. It was an encouragement of vice; and had I been the rector of Longbourn, I should very strenuously have opposed it. You ought certainly forgive them as christians [sic], but never to admit them in your sight, or allow their names to be mentioned in your hearing.'

(*Pride and Prejudice*, lvii; Austen 1985:372)

Here Mr Collins gives himself away by voicing his attitudes which are found to be preposterous under the circumstances. Since the letter is an intra-fictional document and commented on explicitly in the text, there can be no question about the presence of irony

in this passage. However, many texts employ much less explicit irony, either in the presentation of characters' attitudes—as in the following typical description of the musings of a slave trader—or within the narrative itself where the narrator's own presentation of events and his evaluations cannot be taken at face value:

- (45) As, for example, Mr. Haley; he thought first of Tom's length and breadth, and height, and what he would sell for, if he was kept fat and in good case till he got him into market. He thought of how he should make out his gang; he thought of the respective market value of certain supposititious men and women and children who were to compose it, and other kindred topics of the business; then he thought of himself, and how humane he was, that whereas other men chained their 'niggers' hand and foot both, he only put fetters on the feet, and left Tom the use of his hands, as long as he behaved well; and he sighed to think how ungrateful human nature was, so that there was even room to doubt whether Tom appreciated his mercies. *He had been taken in so by 'niggers' whom he had favored: but still he was astonished to consider how good-natured he yet remained!*

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xii; Stowe 1981:114–15)

- (46) The presumptive heir in England, the deposed Mary Queen of Scots, was at the time a prisoner in England, but if Elizabeth should die, she would be brought out. The pope and the king of Spain approved of assassination in *so holy a cause*.

(*NYRB* 38.21 [1991]: 3)

Note that the Stowe passage practises deceit in pretending to be objective free indirect discourse, while the very terms of the description are in fact loaded ironically, much as in Mr Collins's letter. In (46), on the other hand, *in so holy a cause* obviously echoes the convictions if not the words of the historical personae and therefore introduces the germ of contradiction on the phraseological and ideological level. It is the narrator's adoption of the attitude of the reported *acteurs*, his refusal to verbally distance himself from the criminal proceedings, that adds the finest touch to the implicit irony—that the passage is in fact ironical is merely emphasized by the incompatible mention of 'so holy a cause', where the *so* cohesively refers back to the enormity of callous, politically motivated murder.

The pragmatic nature of irony as implicature, however, in no way essentially refutes the dual voice hypothesis; if there is in fact a dual voice. Banfield very cavalierly refuses to consider the standard examples of ironic free indirect discourse, in which—besides discrepancies in, simply, figural attitude (Mr Ramsay's view of women's minds, Emma Bovary's view of herself as religious)³²—the appropriation on the part of the narrative of individual phrases or expressions attributable to the character ensures an intra-sentential effect of irony:

- (47) Mrs Rushworth acknowledged herself very desirous that her son should marry and declared that of all the young ladies she had ever seen, Miss Bertram seemed, by her amiable qualities and accomplishments, the best adapted to make him happy.

Mrs Norris accepted the compliment, and admired the nice discernment of character which could so well distinguish merit. *Maria was indeed the pride and delight of them all—perfectly faultless—an angel; and of course, so surrounded by admirers, must be difficult in her choice; but yet as far as Mrs Norris could allow herself to decide on so short an acquaintance, Mr Rushworth appeared precisely the young man to deserve and attach her.* (*Mansfield Park*, iv; Austen 1983:72)

The passage, in superbly crafted irony, provides a very realistic evocation of the stylistic and semantic clichés which are exchanged by Mrs Rushworth and Mrs Norris and which the reader knows well bear little relation to the true character of the young woman. Besides the hilarious shallowness of this dialogue, the narrative additionally exposes the interlocutors' scheming and dishonesty. All these factors, however, come across *implicitly*. Nor does the narrative distance itself from the content or language of the dialogue. Within the free indirect discourse of course the pronominal and temporal alignment to the narrative provides a clear frame for the embedded dialogue that is being represented, but to speak of a narrator's voice intermingling with the figural idiom—or even juxtaposed to it *within* the free indirect discourse—is clearly incorrect.

Clashes between a narrator's lexical choice and the reportee's diction can, instead, be observed with great frequency in evaluative comments on a character's opinions or utterances, whether in indirect discourse, speech report, psycho-narration or a narrative commentary. The reportees' expressions are in fact frequently marked by *quotation* marks or supra-segmentational quotative signals (*as he calls it*, etc.) in order to facilitate the clear distinction between responsibilities—an important factor certainly in journalism. However, not always is this attribution successful:

- (48) According to a report in The Dallas Morning News, Bush told the crowd that 'union dues are being used today for the promotion of extremist groups,' that the United Auto Workers 'guided and influenced' the civil rights movement by providing organizers and funds to such groups as the Committee for Equal Opportunity, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Bush even quoted the *scandalous* amounts that these 'extremist groups' had received; the NAACP, for example, had received \$15,000 from the union. The report closed by noting that Bush said the UAW [United Auto Workers] 'even donated \$50 to the militant Martin Luther King.' It is not clear from the article if the adjective 'militant' was Bush's or the reporter's.
(NYRB 39.1–2 [1992]:21)

It is probably Bush who employs the word *scandalous*, but the reporter, however critical of his colleague, does not clarify.

In fact the entire issue of dual voice in free indirect discourse can be reduced to two contentions—(a) that the pronominal and temporal shifts constitute an authorial 'voice'; and (b) that there is an intermingling of voices in free indirect discourse passages where

the register tends to be 'authorial' or narratorial (as, mostly, in Henry James) and there is a faint hint of the character's idiom between lines. Besides Banfield only van der Voort (1986) has attempted to refute the dual voice hypothesis, and he alone has based his arguments on the relevant evidence.³³ The first argument can be quickly disposed of: the pronominal and temporal alignment of free indirect discourse with the narrative proper does not constitute a *voice* factor, but it helps to explain implicit irony by linking the free indirect discourse passage to the text and its entire evaluative quality (as construed in the position of the implied author), therefore facilitating the effects of implicit irony.

The second contention is the one that has caused most controversy. However, as we have seen earlier, in the discussion of Jamesian passages, the adoption of figural idiom into a narratorially heavy-handed rhetorical passage does not in fact result in a clash of styles, or a double voice—the figural idiom remains firmly subordinated to the narratorial tone which, because it is the narrator's voice, is the stylistic background on which a realistic voice effect of the character's language can materialize. Irony does not invalidate this explanation because *implicit* irony leaves the narrator's stylistic neutrality intact, and *explicit* irony requires a clear linguistic distancing on the part of the narrative voice, a distancing that—in so far as it is evaluative rather than reportive—transforms the discourse into a report *on*, rather than *of*, the speech or thought act in question. Most explicit ironical comments in fact attach to the framing devices of free indirect discourse—the previous or following discourse characterizing the speech or thought event rendered in the free indirect discourse passage, or the parenthetical interpolated within free indirect discourse—which can easily be expanded into narrative proper or lengthy commentary:

- (49) There it was, all round them. It partook, she felt, *carefully helping Mr. Bankes to a specially tender piece*, of eternity; as she had already felt about something different once before that afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a stability, something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out (*she glanced at the window with its ripple of reflected lights*) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby.

(*To the Lighthouse* I, xvii; Woolf 1985:97)

It needs to be noted emphatically that such parentheticals cannot be adduced to account for a dual voice effect since they are already located outside the represented discourse. One can therefore chime in with Verschoor's remarks anent Lips's rejection of evaluative reproduction (*reproduction appréciée*), in which he claims that the differing intonation of free indirect discourse, even if ironical, in no way detracts from its reproductive (i.e. mimetic) effect:

Mais cette intonation secondaire ne supprime aucunement le caractère de phrase reproduite, au contraire elle fait ressortir cette 'intonation par différenciation' qui caractérise d'après nous la reproduction directe. Et elle réalise cela grâce à l'exagération qu'est au fond l'ironie. L'intonation ironique par conséquent, loin

d'affaiblir le caractère de phrase reproduite, le renforce encore! L'ironie est un des indices de cette reproduction.

(Verschoor 1959:9)³⁴

The only instance of a possible dual voice effect that is in fact no double voice—an overlapping of two voices in one text—can be encountered in ironic quotation within free indirect discourse. Van der Voort quotes the following passage modelled on Lawrence's 'England, My England' invented (and discussed) by McHale (1983:35–6):

(50) She was fed up with both of them, father and daughter. Above all, she was sick and tired of hearing him moan about his poor child. His poor child this, his poor child that: enough already! Yes, she could hear his poor child crying now.

According to van der Voort, this is Winifred's use of 'poor', which—through her ironic use of it—ceases to be her husband's language.³⁵ By contrast, I would not want to deny the other-directedness of her ironic or rather irritated echo of her husband's ineffectual pity as epitomized in the quoted expression. However, the example is not, simply, free indirect discourse but a free indirect discourse rendering of Winifred's thoughts within which she echoes Egbert's language—it is thus free indirect discourse at double remove, the duality of double-layeredness a direct consequence of double filtering. Winifred's 'Oh he loves his poor child!' uttered with evident scorn in her tone of voice clearly borrows its sarcasm from Winifred's tone, which *implies* (but does not lexically encode) her disagreement, anger and mockery.

Within the terms of the dual voice hypothesis, I therefore endorse Banfield's single voice theory, but (I hope) with some more convincing arguments based on more acceptable examples. Also, as we will see in [Chapter 8](#), the single voice is all the reporter's language, even if it appears to be the reportee's, with a dual voice *effect* on a higher interpretative plane. We will now turn to the major contributions of Banfield's model of representational speech and thought, her theories about the linguistic evocation of consciousness.

NOTES

- 1 Rimmon-Kenan has 'He [...] did not see,' which naturally implies lack of awareness on the character's part. On the creative use of the narrator's ignorance see Füger (1978).
- 2 See also Bronzwaer (1970:46–9, 85–93).
- 3 'On the other hand, free indirect discourse—as a grammatical device—necessarily implies that the writer will be identifiable and will render the discourse objectively.' (My translation)
- 4 'One can therefore only speak of a dual voice in the sense that both components are not equally represented in a passage of free indirect discourse. The narrator does not explicitly make his appearance in free indirect discourse; his function is, at least on the surface of it, geared towards the mediation of the utterances and thoughts of a character, and he can only add his point of view indirectly. [...] One cannot speak of a narrator who enunciates.

Narrative enunciation constitutes a mere residuum of the free indirect style. No plot is recounted; there is no narrative substance. This minimal narratorial presence [...] is a basic feature of free indirect discourse; it subsists as a kind of trace element of narratorial mediation.' (My translation)

- 5 '[...] die für die freie indirekte Rede kennzeichnende Doppelperspektive von expliziter figuraler und impliziter auktorialer Sicht' (Müller 1985:211)
- 6 On Bakhtin's ideological perspective see de Man (1983) and Thibault (1984:90).
- 7 I suspect that the examples quoted in Holthusen (1968) belong to the same type, but again my Russian is not adequate for a reliable analysis.
- 8 There is an explicit attribution of *arbour* to Uncle Charles a line or two down.
- 9 A good example of this orientation is the work of Fritz Senn, who has probably most influentially 'deconstructed' 'simple' referential naturalistic readings of Joyce's prose. For a recent numerological account see, for instance, Sandulescu (1991).
- 10 Chatman (1987a) is therefore misinterpreting the facts of the case when he ascribes derogatory connotations to *Ansteckung*. The term used in the English translation (Stanzel 1984b), *contamination*, admittedly lends itself to such illicit speculation, but a similarly misconstruable terminology can already be found in Spitzer (1923a: 384), who says the authorial language is *infected* (*infiziert*) by the character's idiom. Stanzel in fact bases his remarks on Spitzer's original formulations. See also Verschoor (1959:143; 'contamination') and McHale (1978: 261; 'contamination'), who both used the term in French and English respectively before Stanzel (i.e. his translator).
- 11 'He slept uneasily, only for a few hours. Already shortly after four he got up. His head was hurting. He put it on *yesterday's* long train journey.' (My translation)
- 12 Note the superb analysis of the various uses of *now* in the narrative text in Bronzwaer (1975) and Bertinetto (1991).
- 13 'And one time the door was flung back so hard it rattled; *in stepped* the footman of Count d'Argenson and shouted, as only footman can shout, that he wanted five bottles of this new scent. Chénier was still shaking with awe fifteen minutes later, for Count d'Argenson was commissary and war minister to His Majesty and the most powerful man in Paris.' (Süskind 1986:64)
- 14 A wonderful passage of this sort is quoted in Kalik-Teljatnicova (1965:291): 'Aussitôt qu'on fut à la table, M. Perdrix, dans un petit discours bien senti, remercia ses «collaborateurs», leur promit sa protection d'autant plus efficace que son autorité grandissait et il termina par une péroraison émue où il remerciait et glorifiait le gouvernement liberal et juste qui sait chercher le mérite parmi les humbles.' (Maupassant, *Les Dimanches d'un Bourgeois de Paris*)
- 15 More precisely, *priëm ostraneniia*. See Shklovsky (1965:12 ff.), and already in his *Voskres'enie slova* ['The Resurrection of the Word'] (Petersburg, 1914).
- 16 Jakobson (1972:30). See also Mukařovský's (1964) 'Standard Language and Poetic Language'. Mukařovský replaces the term *ostranenie* with *aktualizace* ('foregrounding').
- 17 See the discussions in Samuel Levin (1963, 1965), Fowler (1967, 1968, 1969) and Hendricks (1969, 1974, 1980).
- 18 'The sentence One couldn't understand all these whys and wherefores because these kinds of reasons quarter themselves on our heads with their ten thousands of iron tentacles demonstrates with singular force the irony inherent in all these because and since constructions. According to Philippe, the reasons which we proffer for an event are only pretended reasons which cannot hope to explain our actions. For us humans only our lack of knowledge is the truth. Our attempts to find reasons and motives signify our yearning to drown out this lack of knowledge by a deluge of words. Man appears to Philippe as a being

seeking for clarity, but weighed down by the burden of living, proud only in appearance, enmeshed in contradictions, unlogic and vanity. By regarding this lack of logic as something quite natural, irony is able to aptly characterize man the empty being of mere external appearances. It is an irony which lies behind all those *whys* and *because ofs* and *ones* which lack true authority.' (My translation)

- 19 This is the conclusion of Coseriu regarding Spitzer's theory of deviation, too (Coseriu 1980: 120–2). Coseriu refers to Spitzer's analysis of naming practices in *Don Quixote*.
- 20 My allusion is to the notorious linguistic analysis of Baudelaire's 'Les Chats' by Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss (1962), and its critique by a number of scholars: Riffaterre (1966), Short (1973a), Posner (1982). See also Werth (1976).
- 21 Coseriu (1980:120–2) also inveighs against commutation as a concept in literary stylistic theory: there is no *choice* between stylistic alternatives of identical 'meaning'.
- 22 Trabandt (1974) and Widdowson (1972) also criticize the explanation of style as a collection of deviation devices, and Genette (1991) sets out to rehabilitate a more traditional concept of style against this identification of style with stylistic *device*. For a similar meditation on style see also Pavel (1985:38–40).
- 23 See Lyons (1977:174–6).
- 24 This is a question that has been heatedly debated within linguistics. The discussion has produced three main lines of argumentation: (a) either one assumes an abstract meaning (common denominator) underlying all individual tokens; (b) or one posits the existence of an 'ideal' type and less typical marginal cases—this is a recently very popular solution in studies of *natural* language phenomena, and it incorporates earlier 'fuzzy concept' theories; (c) or one argues that a lexical item initiates a search strategy (*Suchstrategie*) on the part of the interpreter, who then actively produces (a) meaning on the basis of contextual schema functions. This triad of options has been adapted from Klein (1990:16–17), where it is proposed and documented in relation to the 'meaning' of local prepositions.
- 25 'Is there a rigorous and scientific concept of context? Or does the notion of context not conceal, behind a certain confusion, philosophical presuppositions of a very determinate nature? Stating it in the most summary manner possible, I shall try to demonstrate why a context is never absolutely determinable, or rather, why its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated. This structural non-saturation would have a double effect:
1) It would mark the theoretical inadequacy of the current concept of context (linguistic or non-linguistic), as it is accepted in numerous domains of research, including all the concepts with which it is systematically associated;
2) it would necessitate a certain generalization and a certain displacement of the concept of writing.' (Derrida 1977a: 174)
- 26 'I decide here and from this moment on to give the presumed and collective author of the *Reply* [i.e. Searle 1977] the French name 'Société a responsabilité limitée' [...] which is normally abbreviated to *Sarl*.' (Derrida 1977b: 170)
- 27 An example from *The Rape of the Lock* would be the notorious 'Puffs, powders, patches, Bibles, billet-doux' (1,1. 138) or the collocation of 'to stain her honour or her new brocade' (II, 1. 107).
- 28 See, for instance, the very interesting empirical work by van Peer (1986).
- 29 Quoted above under (5.2) as (18).
- 30 As frequently identified in the concept of the implied author.
- 31 This distinction provides the basis for the narratological concept of unreliability (Booth 1983: 300–8).

- 32 Compare Weinberg (1981), Warning (1981–82, 1985) and—most recently—Ramazani (1988).
- 33 My understanding of van der Voort's article is necessarily partial and fallible. As far as I can see—aided by a brief oral translation of relevant paragraphs—Voort emphasizes the implicit, contextual nature of much ironical free indirect discourse. Voort disposes of Banfield's 'narratorless' sentences, and then explains some passages from Flaubert as either the narrator's tongue-in-cheek assertion or the character's deluded perspective (p. 250). Thanks are due to Jan Fokkelman for his help with the translation.
- 34 'But this secondary intonation in no way drowns out the reproductive quality; on the contrary it helps to underline the very 'intonation through differentiation' which in our opinion characterizes direct discourse. And intonation is able to produce this effect thanks to an exaggeration which is in truth a kind of irony. Ironical intonation, therefore, far from weakening the reproductive effect [of FID], in fact re-enforces it. Irony is one of the signals of reproduction [i.e. irony signals that the sentence in question could be a speech or thought report, rather than the narrator's statement].' (My translation)
- 35 'Volgens McHale behoort het adjectief 'poor' nu tot het discours van de hijfiguur. Maar het is de vraag of dat zo is: de vrouw 'citeert' weliswaar het woord van de man, maar op een ironische manier, zodat het een volstrekt andere betekenis krijgt die, in laatste instantie, toch weer volledig voor haar rekening komt. De vrouw intervenueert dus in het discours van de man, dat daarmee echter ophoudt zijn discours te zijn.' (van der Voort 1986:249)

Language and consciousness: Ann Banfield's *Unspeakable Sentences* and beyond

In our previous discussion of free indirect discourse I kept referring to Ann Banfield's theory of represented speech and thought in *Unspeakable Sentences* (1982). I am now ready to engage more closely with Banfield's paradigm. In [section \(7.1\)](#) I will first present a brief outline of the theoretical set-up of Banfield's model. I dispense with a detailed summary because there are now some excellent reviews of the book which I do not wish to duplicate (Violi 1986, Yamaguchi 1989, Jahn 1983). [Section \(7.2\)](#) will outline some of the problems of Banfield's model, and [Section \(7.3\)](#) will deal with the theoretical consequences of her paradigm, in particular for the linguistic evocation of consciousness. I will finally turn to Banfield's more recent remarks (1987a) on 'texts with an empty centre', that is to say texts with a deictic centre but no SELF aligned with it.

7.1

ANN BANFIELD'S *UNSPEAKABLE SENTENCES*

Banfield's model of represented speech and thought was developed in a series of essays within ten years, between her first article in *Foundations of Language* (1973) and her final somewhat revised presentation of the theory in *Unspeakable Sentences* (1982). Since then she has extended her discussion of the issue by more methodologically oriented arguments (1983, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b). One of these extensions of the theory (Banfield 1987a) concerns the proposal of a so-called 'empty centre' for certain kinds of narrative in which subjective deixis occurs in the absence of a reflector character. Banfield (1987b) takes issue with Kuno's linguistic explanation of empathy structure and point of view (Kuno 1972a, 1972b, 1976, 1980; Kuno/Kaburaki 1975, 1977). Kuno's recent *Functional Syntax* (1987), which—like Banfield's book—brings together and relates work conducted over a period of some years, now allows one to compare the two paradigms.

Banfield's theory concerns itself with what she calls 'Represented Speech and Thought' (RST)—her term for free indirect discourse. As we shall see, Banfield's category covers more than traditional free indirect discourse, including also what I have discussed under the titles of narrated perception and psycho-narration, yet RST, on the other hand, practically excludes the representation of *utterances*. (We will come back to this problem later.) Banfield treats RST within a framework of represented discourse in general and indeed within a model of linguistic utterance. Thus the unspeakable sentences of

Banfield's title designate *both* sentences of free indirect discourse *and* sentences of narration. Indeed, free indirect discourse becomes 'unspeakable' primarily *because* it is part of narration. Within the model, free indirect discourse (RST) figures as the narrative's representation of *reflective consciousness and speech*. Banfield supplements this category by adding *non-reflective consciousness* (see below under (7.1.7)). The two categories (RST; non-reflective consciousness) overlap with my free indirect discourse and psychonarration categories respectively, but do not entirely coincide with them. Banfield's model is useful precisely because it erases the traditional formal distinctions, helping to explain some of the traditional inability to deal satisfactorily with the spectrum between pure narrative and free indirect discourse.

Banfield's paradigm rests on Benveniste's distinction between *histoire* and *discours* (1966/1971) which she modifies to include first person narration in the (fictional) past tense. (Compare under (1.3) above.) The theory thus relies on what is basically a temporal or aspectual distinction between the present tense and *passé simple* temporal systems in French to explain two alternative modes of linguistic activity—that of speaking and that of *writing*. In her model *narration* is conflated with writing. Since writing is supposedly exempted from speech act constraints incumbent on actual discourse, discourse features that are inherently expressive and related to the functions of ongoing conversation (phatic, conative, emotive functions of discourse)¹ can, in narrative, be put to secondary use as signifying characters' ideation. Narrative itself, argues Banfield, has no expressivity at all in as much as such expressivity could be said to relate to a speaker (the narrator).

It is immediately apparent from the above characterization of Banfield's model that it entails very sweeping generalizations and far-reaching implications. Thus, if narrative is conceived of as 'unspeakable', there can be no communication in narrative; and this threatens to shatter the very foundations of narratology, which builds on a model of communicational levels. As we have seen under (1.5), most narratological paradigms rely on a communicational structure in which a narrator persona addresses a narratee, the implied author 'addresses' an implied reader and so on. Besides overthrowing the general narratological concept of narratorial enunciation the speakerless sentence model proposes some very counter-intuitive explanations of various other narrative phenomena. Banfield, for instance, has great difficulties in incorporating what Stanzel calls the authorial narrative situation, i.e. texts in which a personalized narrator is clearly 'on stage' and repeatedly addresses his or her reader(s).² As is well known, free indirect discourse quite regularly occurs in 'authorial' novels written before the end of the nineteenth century. Banfield's model also rules out oral narration, which—on account of its tenses and the presence of a speaker—has to be categorized as 'discourse' within her schema. Banfield's exclusion of a speaker from narrative therefore additionally necessitates the assumption of a separate category called *skaz* for those oral narratives that quite explicitly display a speaker's expressivity. Although *skaz* has been marginalized in most narrative paradigms, Banfield's proposal is still felt to be counter-intuitive because it would relegate the dominant type of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authorial narrative to this marginal position. In fact, Banfield freely admits that her presentation of RST is not valid for eighteenth- or nineteenth-century prose, for which it was not conceived, and she now frankly limits the applicability of her model to the late-nineteenth-century novel and beyond (personal communication).

Banfield's characterization of writing as an ideal activity divorced from communication openly echoes the well-known post-structuralist emphasis on *écriture* and textuality (Banfield 1985a). In this respect Banfield directly developed the legacy of Benveniste, who had himself refined the Saussurean model of systematicity and signification. Her heritage is therefore primarily linguistic³ rather than literary or philosophical, although her contribution to the study of consciousness strongly relies on phenomenological concepts and, particularly in her (1987a) article, recognizes its debt to, among others, Barthes and Blanchot. Jacques Derrida, on the other hand, who certainly constitutes an interesting backdrop to Banfield's position, does not once surface in her text, even though a present-day rereading of her 1982 study seems immediately to invoke his name.

In contrast to the post-structuralist concepts on which Banfield's model is grounded philosophically, her methodology needs to be defined as primarily linguistic, and transformationalist at that. *Unspeakable Sentences* has a Chomskyan Extended Standard Theory (EST) framework, and it is therefore at heart an empirical study. As a *linguistic* theory about free indirect discourse, Banfield's model therefore exposes itself to empirical verification and falsification. The transformationalist approach as a framework also has some serious consequences for the whole set-up of the theory. For one, Banfield's theory for its significant unit centres on *sentences* taken individually. In this her model is no different from the more conventional accounts which we have discussed so far, although traditional studies of free indirect discourse have all been very much aware of the crucial importance of narrative context.⁴ However, whereas for traditional critics sentences were basically whatever came between punctuational full stops, within Banfield's framework a much more stringent definition can be applied on the basis of EST. By contrast, when Banfield eventually has to have recourse to contextual criteria, these are alien to the framework she employs, whereas the conventional account of free indirect discourse can much more easily handle interference from the 'previous sentence' or, indeed, paragraph.

A second major consequence of Banfield's transformationalist model is that it shifts attention to entirely different questions and problems. It moreover proposes new theoretical concepts, such as root transformations and narrative parentheticals, as crucial criteria for recognizing the presence of free indirect discourse. Such new categories allow a much more detailed and precise account of free indirect discourse, even within the traditional range of forms, and I have already availed myself of these advantages in [Chapter 4](#). In other respects, however, the two models (Banfield's and the traditional paradigm) are fundamentally opposed, in fact mutually incompatible almost on the lines of Gombrich's duck versus rabbit figure. This incompatibility explains some of the depth of incomprehension with which Banfield's model has been confronted by literary critics. Traditional critics' linguistics frequently still derives from Latin grammar and its progeny in the major European languages, an approach that (for all its usefulness and accessibility) has greatly distorted our perception of language structure.⁵ Post-Saussurian linguistics, by contrast, is functional and systematic, employing notions such as markedness⁶ in order to describe systematic functional contrast. The transformational model, because it lends itself to empirical falsification, also makes certain predictions; it *explains* linguistic facts rather than merely labelling items, and specific tenets can thus *in principle* be refuted even though the paradigm as a whole displays Kuhnian imperturbability.⁷

Banfield's account of 'representation' (a term deliberately differentiated from *mimesis*) may not be sufficiently sophisticated for current critical theory positions,⁸ but her model allows her to emphasize one extremely important insight, namely that the fictional representation of speech acts does *not* have to be mimetic in the customary sense of the term: representation is *not* verbatim. Unlike traditional free indirect discourse scholars, Banfield therefore does not subscribe to a transcription model of free indirect discourse—and this is all the more remarkable since here she clearly goes against early transformational accounts of indirect (and free indirect) discourse such as those by Ohmann (1964) and by Lee (1970). In Banfield's model free indirect discourse is constituted, not by a verbatim rendering of characters' prior discourse shifted into temporal and referential alignment with the narrative discourse, but by the evocation of subjectivity in the narrative by means of grammatical (syntactical) indicators of expressivity. The model therefore provides an explanation of free indirect discourse in terms of textual *signals* processed by the reader. These signals only partly overlap with the ones traditionally discussed in terms of *indices* by, among others, Bally, Lips and Verschoor. Narration—the narrative text that, according to a metaphor of Benveniste's, 'writes itself' (Banfield, in an almost literal interpretation, takes this as a motto)⁹—evokes the world by means of language as well as characters' linguistic activities.

Banfield's theory has excited some virulent criticism, mostly from the literary camp (McHale 1978, 1983; Jahn 1983). Some of this indignation is no doubt due to Banfield's own self-righteous remarks and the high hand with which she dismisses views held for centuries, and by the best authorities. Some resistance may also derive from her adoption of the non-referential, 'textual' explication of things, an attitude that is causing considerable misgivings in traditional literary circles and appears even more dangerous to linguists.¹⁰ However, attacks on Banfield's paradigm usually concentrate on her general contentions which are of wide-ranging implication, contradict readers' intuitions and seem to be immediately refuted by well-known literary data. Banfield's paradigm certainly constrains her to argue in ways not easily acceptable to non-linguists (she has a habit of discounting counter-evidence as irrelevant or of marginalizing it in terms of dialect or idiolect), and the Chomskyan framework, though reduced to very manageable proportions, is still unpalatable to most literary scholars. Criticism (for example by Brian McHale) has thus tended to focus on a refutation of Banfield's theory by producing counter-evidence to some of the major axioms of her model, such as the claim that (true) indirect discourse cannot accommodate expressive elements (McHale 1978, 1983; Sternberg 1991). Alternatively, critics have countered Banfield's proposals by reiterating the dual voice hypothesis, presenting evidence of ironic voice-over (Weinberg 1977–78, 1981). Reviews of Banfield's book split into two camps. The early literary reviews—with the notable exceptions of Harold F. Mosher's (1984) and Colin Lyas's (1984) discussions¹¹—have tended to rephrase some of the general implications of Banfield's theory for narrative literature, largely ignoring the (alien) linguistic framework. This of course bred confusion because what is perfectly intelligible from the linguistic background seems abstruse from a purely literary perspective. Early linguistic reviews of the book, on the other hand, tended to concentrate on the details of the linguistic apparatus (as did Haegman 1984–85), displaying little or no interest in the narrative part of the business.

Mosher's well-balanced discussion of the book (Mosher 1984), which—by taking the linguistic part of the study seriously—manages to see some of its far-reaching implications and significance, constitutes a laudable exception. Some of the later reviews of *Unspeaking Sentences* are far superior in quality to these early attempts, and the reader is here referred to the excellent articles by Jahn (1983), Violi (1986) and Yamaguchi (1989). All three of these are review essays, which means that they have sufficient space to present and discuss Banfield's paradigm. Of the three Yamaguchi's is the most linguistic, proposing some ideas of his own towards the linking of free indirect discourse with the form and function of the echo question. Jahn and Violi are more oriented towards literary theory and criticism. Both regret the sentence-by-sentence approach in Banfield's model, which—as already noted—is a direct consequence of her modified Chomskyan framework. Since the general move within linguistics towards pragmatics Banfield's model has become doubly outmoded.

Banfield's study restates the old question of the linguistic definability of free indirect discourse, providing an affirmative answer. In arguing for a single voice in her RST, she additionally accepts the heritage of Charles Bally. Banfield's model provides the most comprehensive linguistic account of free indirect discourse in English to date—excepting perhaps Wiebe (1990), which is not 'officially' about RST but about subjective sentences. Banfield in effect *updates* the traditional descriptions of free indirect discourse to make them compatible with modern linguistics, particularly with syntactic theory. By 1992, however, her linguistic model has already become outdated owing to Chomsky's repeated modifications of his own theory. These new developments in syntactic theory ask for a re-evaluation of Banfield's syntactic theses, which do not any longer make sense within an X-bar frame of English syntax. Banfield's paradigm has resulted in new questions and in new views on what does or does not count as evidence. It has to be taken seriously within its own framework before one can fruitfully compare it to the traditional approach, outline its outstanding merits as well as consistent failings and discuss its present relevance and significance.

The following presentation of Banfield's theory is mainly aimed at readers not yet familiar with the Banfieldian paradigm. It is meant to serve as a reference point for extensive allusions to Banfield's model throughout the earlier part of the book. Narratologists familiar with Banfield (1982) may want to proceed to [section \(7.2\)](#).

7.1.1

Methodological assumptions

Banfield's methodology derives from the transformational model of Chomskyan linguistics. In this model grammatical acceptability—or unacceptability—is measured by native speakers' intuitions as instanced in their acceptability judgements of language tokens. This method allows the theory to *predict* speakers' reactions, which can be verified or refuted in empirical texts. Syntactic structures are then extrapolated from the results of such testing, i.e. on the basis of 'acceptable' and 'agrammatical' phrases. As we shall

see, this empirical apparatus in the hands of Banfield turns prescriptive because she privileges one set of data over others in her construction of the theory.


Banfield's methodological concerns are most fully voiced in her two articles 'Linguistic Competence and Literary Theory' (1983) and 'The Nature of Evidence in a Falsifiable Literary Theory' (1987b). Her method consists of the following steps. She starts with direct speech and tries to abstract from it grammatical features specific to discourse, i.e. communication. Then (in the wake of Benveniste) she postulates the existence of non-communicative narration and abstracts typical features of narration, such as the 'aorist' tense. Direct discourse features are then shown to be unacceptable in narration, and features of narration unacceptable in direct discourse. As regards indirect discourse, it can be part of both (communicative) discourse and (non-communicative) narration according to whether it includes specific direct discourse markers. Free indirect discourse, however, definitely belongs with narration since it disallows one set of (direct) discourse markers also banned from narrative. Because free indirect discourse is part of narrative, which lacks the communicative features of direct discourse and is therefore *speakerless*, the direct discourse features of RST (which are identical to those that express the subjectivity of the speaker in direct discourse) must be aligned with the subjectivity of a fictional character (the quoted speaker's SELF) and *cannot* be attributed to a speaker as in indirect discourse in so far as indirect discourse belongs with discourse and not narration.

7.1.2

The TG foundation of Banfield's theory

Banfield's analysis of direct discourse is indebted to Jean-Claude Milner's studies on the syntax of emotionality (Milner 1978a, 1978b). Banfield rewrites Chomsky's Extended Standard Theory, replacing S-double-bar by the E(xpression) node:

(1)



S-double-bar position, which is where topicalization occurs,

- (2) Between you and me, why did you leave John?
 (3) In 1984, another wave of recession occurred.

is the place to locate exclamations, since COMP (complement) position in S-bar is restricted to WH-movement (i.e. the position in which interrogative pronouns go in obligatory fronting during question formation). As already noted ((3.3.1), (4.3.2)), this schema has been entirely superseded in the wake of X-bar theory, according to which S is replaced by IP (the projection of INFL, formerly AUX), and S-bar/S-double-bar structure replaced by the projection of the complementizer, resulting in CP. WH-movement now has CP-specifier as a landing site and topicalization results in CP-adjuncts.

In accordance with Milner, Banfield also rewrites the phrase structure rules to accommodate exclamatory sentences of various types:

(4)

$$E \rightarrow \left(\begin{bmatrix} \text{NP} \\ + \text{VOC} \end{bmatrix} \right) - \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{NP} - \underline{\text{and}} - \text{S}' \\ \text{NP} - \underline{\text{or}} - \text{S}' \\ \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{PP} \\ + \text{DIR} \end{array} \right] - (\underline{\text{with}} - \text{NP}) \\ \text{PREDICATE} - \text{NP} \\ \text{QUASIVERB} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{NP} \\ - \text{PP} \end{array} \right\} \\ (\text{EXCLAM}) - (\text{S}' - \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Q} \\ \text{IMP} \end{array} \right\} \right)) \end{array} \right\}$$

(Cp. Banfield 1982:38 [= (29)])

The E-node can also contain an exclamatory constituent other than NP or VOC:

(5)

$$E \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{NP} \\ \text{VP} \\ \text{PP} \\ \text{AP} \end{array} \right\}$$

Banfield's examples include the following constructions which we have already noted under (3.3.1):

(6) One more can of beer, or I'll leave. [NP-or-S']

A fine thing no beer in the house!

Very funny this little game! [PREDICATE-NP]

Off with his head!

Into the ditch with the rascal! [(PP/+DIR)-with-NP]

Damn it, that's a lie!

Wow, isn't he brave!

Gee, why did he leave? [EXCLAM-(S'-(Q))]

Dogs, indistinguishable in mire.

To forget! Utterly, utterly to forget!

Into the cave!

Slowly! [NP/VP/PP/AP]¹²

The phrase structure rules of (4) and (5) bar certain forms of sentences from direct discourse and illustrate the appositeness of a 'syntax of exclamation':

(7) * That scared me, oh, oh!


* This little game very funny!

* To utterly, utterly in the great forgetting.

* Dogs, horses mire in.

(Banfield 1982:39 [= (31), (32b)])

With Emonds, Banfield allows root transformations to occur only in the topmost S-bar directly situated under E:



- (9) Yes, did John ask if Mary will go.
 * Yes, did John ask if will Mary go.

This has been demonstrated to be an incorrect prediction on the basis of the occurrence of numerous root transformations and expressive elements in subsidiary clauses (Chapters 3 and 4).

7.1.3

Direct versus indirect discourse

The direct discourse features from which Banfield abstracts the above phrase structure grammar are the following structural features which, she claims, are unacceptable in indirect discourse. Since indirect discourse is not transformationally derivable from direct discourse, nor direct discourse from indirect discourse—we will come to this in a minute—direct discourse has to be generated in the deep structure *including* those features, and the deep structure also has to bar them from becoming embedded in indirect discourse clauses. Banfield lists:

(i) **ROOT (or 'LAST CYCLIC') TRANSFORMATIONS.** Here she includes subject-auxiliary inversion (as in questions and exclamations such as *Ain't she a darling*), or inversion of a cliticized subject in French,¹³ emphatic topicalization (*Absurd she is*), right dislocation (*We are great friends, Peter and I*) and directional adverb preposing (*Off you go*).

This, as the reader will remember, is only a fraction of the list provided by Emonds, Hooper/ Thompson, G. Green, N.A. McCawley or Ogle (compare (4.3.2) above).

(ii) NON-EMBEDDABLE EXPRESSIVE ELEMENTS and constructions such as exclamatory sentences, exclamations, verbless exclamatory constructions, repetitions and hesitations (see above (3.3.1), (4.3.1)).

(iii) INCOMPLETE SENTENCES (see above under (4.3.1)).

(iv) SUBJECTLESS IMPERATIVES (see above under (3.3.1)).

(v) DIRECT ADDRESS, including address NPs such as *Sir* or *Madam* (compare above (3.2.4) and (4.2.2)).

(vi) ADDRESSEE-ORIENTED ADVERBIALS such as *as frankly*, *honestly*, *between you and me* (compare (4.2.2)).

(vii) DIFFERENT DIALECTS or LANGUAGES from the ones in the narrative context (see (4.4) and (4.5)).

Of these constructions subject-auxiliary inversion (by itself and accompanying root transformations) certainly requires Banfield's new E-structure. Topicalization is also readily subsumable under E (the former S-double-bar); vocatives, interjections (*O! Ah!*), verbless exclamatory constructions, as well as, possibly, subjectless imperatives,¹⁴ can all readily be accommodated in S-double-bar position. However, exclamatory sentences (*How wonderful pansies are!*) as well as repetitions and hesitations and incomplete sentences do not so easily fit the E-tree because their structure is in no way dependent on the existence of E (S-double-bar) position. Only when hesitation appears at the very beginning of a clause does an analysis of S-double-bar seem appropriate:

(10) Egbert protested: 'But, but—I am almost the unnecessary party.'¹⁵

In this sentence *but*, *but* functions much like an exclamation and could easily be put under S-double-bar. However, *but* as a sentence connective already problematizes this pattern, since a connective can be followed by an exclamation:

(11) And, won't you believe it, then he goes and takes that spade and starts hitting me!

Then as a fronted AP could conceivably be put into S-bar (complementizer) position (at least in an EST frame), but *and* as a sentence connective should really be located *between* rather than *within* sentences, a fact reflected in some models which connect sentences by means of an extra S-double-bar between sentences. (This is a model followed also in X-bar theory, in which CONJ goes under X-double-bar between two separate X-double-bar constituents.)¹⁶ On the other hand, sentences *starting* with connectives are very colloquial, a fact that Banfield's E-analysis would help to explain.¹⁷

Note that the analysis provided here by Banfield does not yet include aspects of deixis or semantic features appropriate to direct discourse. Moreover the model rests on the non-transformability of direct and indirect discourse and on the claim that direct discourse contains structures not allowed in indirect discourse. In fact the non-transformability between direct and indirect discourse rests precisely on the claim that direct discourse

features cannot be accommodated in indirect discourse. The impossibility of deriving indirect discourse by means of a transformation from direct discourse is illustrated by Banfield on the basis of largely philosophical *de dicto/de re* arguments which document the irrecoverability of direct discourse from indirect discourse. Although one could formulate rules to transform direct discourse into indirect—after all we are taught such rules in school—there exists no satisfactory method of reconstructing the precise original utterance. Indirect discourse—as Ryan, too, has nicely demonstrated—is constrained to represent only the propositional (and illocutionary) force of a speech act, whence the impossibility of reconstructing the original model (Ryan 1981b). The opacity of indirect discourse can be explained pragmatically as the consequence of the human limitations of memory (one cannot possibly remember everything word by word) and by the necessity to report relevant information only (the Gricean maxims of quantity and relation). Relevancy in fact allows the quoter to distort the meaning of the original utterance even further to the extent that the meaning that is being reported is manifestly the meaning the quoter creates rather than necessarily the quoted speaker's meaning, even sometimes where the indirect discourse appears to be nearly verbatim, but the propositional and performative meanings are in conflict:

(12) Le président m'a dit *dans une forme bizarre* que j'aurais la tête tranchée sur une place publique au nom du peuple français.

(*L'Étranger* II, iv; Camus 1955:124)¹⁸

In so far as an underlying direct discourse sentence by way of transformation could only account for a *de dicto* but not for a *de re* reading,¹⁹ transformations, in the Chomskyan framework, are necessarily transparent.

The transformational account of indirect discourse—and consequently also of free indirect discourse—is given up by Banfield in favour of a *surface structure model* in which the reader interprets syntactic features on the basis of various principles which can be situated in *logical form*.²⁰ Transformational considerations occur only in her explanation of E- (rather than S-) structures, and particularly in her explication of parentheticals and quotational clauses. Pronominal and temporal concordance as well as other syntactic features of indirect discourse and free indirect discourse are presumably already in place in the deep structure and are processed by the reader via his or her interpretation on the surface structure.

7.1.4

Interpretative principles

Since Banfield relates introductory verb clauses and the direct discourse clauses they introduce via an anaphoric pronominal *this*, and since parenthetical direct discourse as well as free indirect discourse has an anaphoric *so/thus* in the parenthetical, she has to account for embedding and pronominal reference by means of several rules involving the concept of TEXT (basically the unity of one discourse situation within which first person

reference remains constant [1 TEXT/1 SPEAKER Principle]). Within one TEXT, present tense refers to the moment of utterance, which is constant (1 TEXT/1 PRESENT), and all references to anterior events are past in relation to this point in the present. Likewise, temporal and locative deixis (NOW)²¹ remains constant within the same TEXT. In quoted (direct) discourse we have not only two separate Es (sentences containing expressive elements) but also two TEXTS alongside each other. Banfield hence has to add two more principles to account for the relation between introductory clauses or parentheticals and the quoted (free indirect discourse) sentences (which she calls anaphoric Es):

- (13) Shift to a new TEXT: SPEAKER and PRESENT may change their reference in a sequence of two deep structure Es when the new E is coreferential with a demonstrative in the deep structure complement of a communication verb. The new SPEAKER is coreferential with the subject of the communication verb; the new ADDRESSEE/ HEARER, with its indirect object.

(Banfield 1982:61)

This definition depends on the 1 E/1 I principle.²² Concordance of person is effected by 1 TEXT/1 SPEAKER, and concordance of tense by 1 TEXT/ 1 PRESENT principles. Discourse parentheticals, on the other hand, are NOT in this way anaphorically related to the discourse they interrupt but continue the same discourse situation, having the same SPEAKER and the same HEARER as the earlier discourse. (Banfield 1982:80–1)

In order to accommodate free indirect discourse Banfield needs to revise the anaphoric E principle:

- (14) The revised anaphoric E principle: Certain proform complements of a consciousness or communication verb (such as this, that, so, thus, etc.) may be coreferential with a preceding or following E or sequence of Es.

(Banfield 1982:79)

This provides the interpretative rules for the deep structure formations discussed in the previous section. However, for free indirect discourse, the above ‘Shift to a New Text’ principle needs to be revised, too, in order to accommodate the fact that there is no discourse situation to start with, or an emphasis on a consciousness.

- (15) 1 E/1 SELF.

a. For every node E, there is at most one referent called the ‘subject of consciousness’ or SELF, to whom all expressive elements are attributed. That is, all realizations of SELF in an E are coreferential.

b. Priority of SPEAKER. If there is an *I*, *I* is coreferential with the SELF. In the absence of an *I*, a third person pronoun may be interpreted as SELF.

c. If E is related anaphorically to the complement of a consciousness verb, its SELF is coreferential with the subject or the indirect object of this verb.

(Banfield 1982:93)

This accounts for parentheticals of the type *she realized* as well as *it seemed to her*; in the latter the centre of consciousness is in indirect object position. Direct discourse introduces a new SPEAKER (and a new TEXT), and hence there is also a new SELF. It is only in the *absence* of SPEAKER that a third person SELF becomes possible (1982:94).

Banfield's examples are very instructive here because they consist almost exclusively of consciousness verbs. She does note, however, that free indirect discourse may contain a first person self and that what is excluded is the co-presence *within E* of a SPEAKER and a third person SELF (94). This restriction mirrors that of Stanzel, who within his figural narrative situation or reflector narrative, likewise, rules out the existence of *both* an authorial narrator addressing the reader *and*, simultaneously, a figural medium, that is to say he bans the co-occurrence of teller and reflector characters.²³ Note also that Stanzel does not in principle bar free indirect discourse from the authorial narrative situation or from 'authorial' first person narrative (centring on the narrating self), and he also allows for *oral* free indirect discourse. In all these cases free indirect discourse simultaneously includes *both* a speaker (the reporting I) *and* a third person SELF (the quoted speaker's SELF). Banfield categorically denies the existence of oral free indirect discourse, explaining away an example she herself quotes:

- (16) Every time I see him he ridicules me. Oh, I could never repair the car myself. What was I doing lying the middle of the road? No, that wasn't the way to go about it. Here, he'd show me.

(Banfield 1982:299, fn. 10)

The concatenation of Es and the anaphoric E principle have to be supplemented by the description of how point of view (SELF) can change:

- (17) Shift in point of view: SELF and NOW may change in referent in a sequence of Es when the new E is coreferential with a demonstrative in an argument (subject or object) of a verb of consciousness or communication. The new SELF is coreferential with the subject of the consciousness verb or the subject or indirect object of the communication verb.

(Banfield 1982:102)

This takes care of free indirect discourse of thought and of free indirect discourse that portrays speech uttered by the SELF or addressed to the SELF. The formula implicitly rules out 'mere' speech representation in free indirect discourse, since it requires the utterer's self-awareness of utterance or the addressee's *perception* of being talked to as a fact or of SELF. In the *absence* of a parenthetical—the most frequent case of free indirect discourse—the establishment of SELF becomes more problematic, as Banfield herself acknowledges (102). I therefore find it rather curious that she relegates a discussion of this important point to a footnote (290–1, fn. 6), attributing the recognition that free indirect

discourse prevailingly occurs *without* parentheticals to Dorrit Cohn (1966). In fact, it is Banfield's move to consider free indirect discourse as containing an obligatory parenthetical that constitutes a very rare and new development. Cohn actually comments on previous scholarship on free indirect discourse, in which parentheticals were often taken to be part of the narrative's intrusion into free indirect discourse, producing a kind of adulterated, impure free indirect discourse or a transitional form (1978:104). This problematic area has now been tackled by Ehrlich (1990a).

7.1.5

Contrastive features of direct, indirect and free indirect discourse

The fact that free indirect discourse has a separate E-node is established by Banfield by showing that free indirect discourse allows all constructions that were formerly abstracted from direct discourse and are, at least in her view, unacceptable in indirect discourse; these are therefore called non-embeddable. They include exclamatory sentences, exclamations, inverted questions, topicalized constituents, right dislocation, repetitions and hesitations, as well as the sentence connective *for*. Banfield also shows that embedding infinitival constructions that are common in indirect discourse are barred from free indirect discourse, as are complementizer clauses preceding parentheticals:

- (18) * [For Bill] to go, John said.²⁴
 * That he was unhappy, John said.
 * Whether she would be late, the doctor wondered.²⁵

Having clearly established the properties of indirect discourse and free indirect discourse in relation to one another by means of the concept of embedding, Banfield supplements this by reference to point of view structures which are referable to the SELF of the E in which they occur. Such point of view indices are all expressions generated under E (i.e. S-double-bar) as well as 'embeddable expressive elements and constructions interpreted in indirect speech as an expression of the quoting speaker's point of view' (89). These include (i) so-called 'qualitative nouns' (Milner's *noms de qualité*);²⁶ (ii) evaluative adjectives such as *poor*, *silly* and many others (4.5); (iii) kinship terms such as *daddy* or *ma* (3.2.4); (iv) italicized elements indicating contrastive or emphatic stress (4.2.1); (v) reflexivization of the third person pronoun in reference to SELF (3.2.2); and (vi) certain idioms whose subjective interpretation is usually restricted to first person contexts (Ross 1970):

- (19) a. That really killed me.
 b. That really killed her.
 (20) a. What I would do without them both I do not know.
 b. What she would do without them both she does not know.

(Banfield 1982:92)²⁷

In a third person context these expressions need to be interpreted as (literal) assertions and hence sound extremely odd. (Compare under (4.5) above.)

There are, hence, *two* kinds of point of view constructions—syntactic ones associated with E-node, and lexical ones (some of which can be regarded as micro-syntactic—such as the *noms de qualité*). The *lexical* indications of point of view are all embeddable in actual fact, as we have illustrated extensively in Chapter 4. Only kinship terms (iii) are not so readily acceptable in indirect discourse, unless the quoting speaker happens to share the precise kinship relation to the person referred to in kinship terms by the quoted speaker.

7.1.6

Discourse versus narration

Banfield goes on to discuss direct discourse and narration in order to provide more evidence for her syntactic alignment of expressivity with direct discourse features that are also allowed in free indirect discourse and, on the other hand, for her claim that free indirect discourse is *unspeakable*, since it lacks a *different* set of direct discourse features that are also barred from narration, to which free indirect discourse pertains.

DISCOURSE, according to Banfield, is characterized by the situation of communication between SPEAKER and HEARER. This situation is deictically reflected in the use of (deictic) first/second person pronouns and time and place reference anchored in the *hic et nunc* of the speech act, and a use of tense (temporal deixis) related to the moment of enunciation. Temporal indications are thus marked on *two* levels, by means of *tense* and by means of *adverbials* of time. This is no doubt necessary because tenses do not specify *points* in time, and these can be identified if necessary by means of adverbials. Tense is therefore not the unique provider of temporal reference, and one can have languages without a morphological past tense, in which reference to the past is indicated solely by means of adverbs of time, or left unspecified to be established by context.

The DISCOURSE features disallowed in narrative as well as free indirect discourse are, according to Banfield:

- (i) the imperative (deep structure YOU)
- (ii) address to the interlocutor (Sir, *Madam*)
- (iii) indications of pronunciation ('generally' disallowed)
- (iv) addressee-oriented adverbials (*confidentially, honestly, frankly*)
- (v) the second person in the surface structure
- (vi) no present tense in free indirect discourse unless the historic or generic present.

Of these, as we have shown in Chapters 3 and 4, (v) and (vi) can be reformulated to exclude only PRESENT₁, which deictically coincides with the present of the moment of enunciation; PRESENT₂, i.e. a moment of consciousness that is NOT identical to PRESENT₁ and refers to an entirely different point in time, can indeed be found in

narrative and free indirect discourse, and not only in the historical present tense and the generic present but also in ‘unshifted’ free indirect discourse. The second person in reference to the current ADDRESSEE—like the first person pronoun in reference to SPEAKER—can only appear in free indirect discourse when SPEAKER and ADDRESSEE were actually involved in the reported speech act (as they are in first person narration, epistolary novels and oral free indirect discourse passages), or when the speaker and addressee can generically identify with this reference—as in Zola’s *nous* for *nous hommes*. (Compare above under (3.2.1).) Banfield’s categories (iii) and (iv) have been decisively refuted by McHale, especially (iii), the ban on indications of ‘pronunciation’. (Compare under (4.2.1) and (4.4).) Addressee-oriented items are not that easily found in free indirect discourse, but they do occasionally occur, and should not be rejected right away. (Compare (3.2.1) and (4.2.2).)

Banfield then turns to NARRATION and proposes as its *positive* features (i) the aorist (evaluative) and (ii) ‘absolute’ constructions (rhetorical and subsumptive). Subsequently Banfield adds *negative* features of narration, especially the barring of discourse deictics from pure narration. She also analyses at length the aspectual differentiation between the aorist (*passé simple*) and the *imparfait* (in English the distinction between the simple and the progressive past), and proposes a distinction between two kinds of self in first person narrative, that of the narrating and that of the experiencing self, to account for the features of first person narrative.²⁸ Contrary to the literary use of these tenses, however, Banfield goes on to posit that first person narrative comes in two shapes, one of which is speakerless while the other corresponds with *skaz*, a category of marginal status. This distinction is supported solely by the presence/absence of an interlocutor,²⁹ and it illustrates to what lengths Banfield is willing to go as a consequence of her ‘speakerless narrative’ model. Because of the absence of a communication situation for ‘ordinary’, third-person narration Banfield additionally claims that only autonomous or anaphoric deictics can be used in narrative. Although this thesis is mostly borne out by Banfield’s French examples, which prohibit the collocation of *ici* or *hier* with the *passé simple*, my own informants do not concur with the unacceptability of Banfield’s asterisked example sentences.

Banfield’s modification of Benveniste to allow first person narrative with an aorist is a good move; her blindness relates, rather, to the second person. The exclusion of the second person from narrative really seems to derive from contextual factors: second person narrative is a rather recent and comparatively rare, hence ‘marginal’, genre: one usually does not tell (literary) stories about somebody to that very person. Admittedly, French oral narrative employs the *passé composé* and the present tense (rather than the aorist)³⁰. However, it is illicit to reclaim this feature of colloquial language as evidence for a general ban on the co-occurrence of the aorist and the second person: second person narration can easily occur in the ‘literary’ aorist.

Banfield’s discourse versus narration pattern ends with a diagram (p. 167) which neatly explicates the foregoing discussions:

(21) PRESENT without NOW: the historical present

NOW without PRESENT:	the epic preterite <i>imparfait</i> , past and past progressive in represented Es.
PRESENT=NOW:	the present tense of discourse
no PRESENT or NOW:	the aorist and the simple past of narrative. ³¹

7.1.7

Reflective versus non-reflective consciousness

Banfield's fifth chapter introduces the concept of non-reflective consciousness. This part of the study is perhaps Banfield's most valuable contribution to the field, in spite of her unconvincing attempts in the same chapter to refute the dual voice hypothesis.

Banfield locates non-reflective consciousness in represented perceptions and feelings. This level of consciousness *shares* a number of features with free indirect discourse:

(i) Tense. Like free indirect discourse, tense in non-reflective consciousness is equally constituted on PAST AND NOW:

- (22) Now he [Martin] was crossing the bridge over the Serpentine.
(*The Years*, '1914'; Woolf 1979:267; quoted Banfield 1982:200)

(ii) Non-reflective consciousness also shares the use of embeddable reflective elements:

- (23) For at that moment Father turned towards her and said, half-apologetically, stuffing the purse back, 'I gave him a shilling.'
(*'Six Years After'*; Mansfield 1988:639–40; quoted Banfield 1982:202)

On the other hand, exclamations, questions and parentheticals are restricted to free indirect discourse (represented speech and thought), since verbs occurring in parentheticals have a 'reflective' meaning:

- (24) It was raining, she saw.
[...] grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady Bruton felt, ...must respect. [*Mrs Dalloway*; Woolf 1976:121]
'It was raining, she saw' means, not that she saw it raining, but that she discovered or realized that it was raining. This is 'knowing that' and not the kind of knowledge which underlies our awareness of some sensible fact.
(Banfield 1982:205)

Indeed, verbs with a non-reflective meaning seem to be excluded from parentheticals:

- (25) * The perfume of the iris was heavy, he smelt.³²
(Banfield 1982:206 [= (26)])

The one feature that distinguishes non-reflective consciousness from reflective consciousness in a positive way is its ability to allow full NPs (proper names and definite descriptions) rather than merely pronouns. This is no doubt correct. Banfield's examples, however, make the issue seem fuzzy because they are overwhelmingly free indirect *speech*, i.e. the representation of *utterances*, and speech of course is reflective. Even in thought representation, however, names do occasionally occur in free indirect discourse (cp. (3.2.3) above), but the narrative context is then frequently authorial, ironical or distancing. Observe first an example of a proper name in a passage of psychonarration (non-reflective consciousness), and then Banfield's first non-reflective consciousness example from *A Room with a View*, which is actually a representation of a conversation, i.e. *speech*. I also quote two examples from Gertrude Stein, illustrating the use of the full name in free indirect discourse:

- (26) In short woman was a problem which, since **Mr Brooke's** mind felt blank before it, could be hardly less complicated than the revolutions of an irregular solid.

(*Middlemarch*, iv; G.Eliot 1986:65; quoted Pascal 1977:85)

- (27) A conversation [!] then ensued, not on unfamiliar lines. **Miss Bartlett** was, after all, a wee bit tired, and thought they had better spend the morning settling in, unless **Lucy** would rather like to go out? **Lucy** would rather like to go out, as it was her first day in Florence, but, of course, she could go alone. **Miss Bartlett** could not allow this. Of course she would accompany **Lucy** everywhere. Oh, certainly not; **Lucy** would stop with her cousin. Oh no! that would never do! Oh yes!

(*Room with a View* I, ii; Forster 1977:15; quoted Banfield 1982:207)

- (28) [A]nd Mrs. Lehntman needed Anna, but there were always other ways to do and if Anna had once given up she might do so again, so why should **Mrs. Lehntman** have real fear?

(*Three Lives*; G.Stein 1936:55)

Mrs. Haydon felt more and more every year that she had done right to bring Lena back with her, for it was all coming out just as she had expected. Lena was good and never wanted her own way, she was learning English, and saving all her wages, and soon **Mrs. Haydon** would get her a husband.

(*Three Lives* ; G.Stein 1936:250)

Banfield's category of reflective consciousness, which is coterminous with RST, straddles the divide between free indirect discourse and psychonarration and extended narrated perception, or—put differently—it draws the lines between these three types of speech and thought representation not according to semantic *content* (utterance by a character, description of a consciousness by a reporting instance, description of a character's

perception), but in accordance with expressive features which imply awareness: parentheticals (which explicitly attribute thoughts or perceptions), exclamatory constituents and discourse markers, questions, root transformations—in short, all (according to Banfield) non-embeddable expressive elements. By these means Banfield manages both to account for the typical ‘voice’ effect of free indirect discourse (aligning it to its reflectivity) and at the same time to eschew the formal conundrums of attempting to found a ‘voice’ in verbatim rendering. It is the presence of expressive features and not the verisimilitude of an utterance or the perception by a character that count as the one and only criterion. Banfield’s explanation works beautifully for the portrayal of consciousness and perception in a reflector narrative; where utterances are represented and where there is no longer a consistent internal perspective, the model flounders.

Banfield’s reflective consciousness, which was inspired by Kuroda’s (1973, 1976) ‘non-reportive style’ in Japanese, can be identified with what F.K. Stanzel (1984b) calls reflector mode narrative. In so far as Banfield’s findings are related to this text type, they offer us invaluable new insights into the workings of the reflector mode, decisively enlarging Stanzel’s list of reflector mode features (1984b:169–70). As will be remembered, Stanzel’s reflector mode narrative is constituted on the internal perspective of a character (a Jamesian centre of consciousness), from inside whose mind events unfold. Reflector mode narrative therefore strongly correlates with a predominance of the reflector character’s deictic orientation, and this deictic centre can be traced in the presence of linguistic (expressive) elements relatable to the character’s subjectivity, interest focus and physical location. Stanzel’s concept of a reflector character very usefully fleshes out the existential and ideational evocation of a deictic centre as a ‘voice’ and a character. In earlier versions of Stanzel’s theory such a constellation was limited to the figural narrative situation and centrally bound up with free indirect discourse. In Stanzel’s revised version of the theory the reflector mode can, however, include interior monologue narrative, in which the text pretends to transmit a character’s internal thought process directly. Stanzel’s reflector mode is therefore a much wider category than Banfield’s RST, which it subsumes under its wings.

7.1.8

Historical survey

Banfield’s sixth and last chapter is a historical survey of narrative and free indirect discourse. She claims that the aorist of narration is a development of the written language meant to foreground objective statements. Free indirect discourse developed in the eighteenth century in conjunction with the novelistic genre itself, with its interest in subjectivity. Banfield rejects early examples of free indirect discourse, such as those quoted by Vološinov, as lacking proper syntactic features. However, since Banfield does not read German, and does not include Verschoor in her bibliography, she ignores the discussion about numerous relevant passages from medieval German and French. Nor does she take into consideration Bayet’s Latin examples of free indirect discourse—however

pertinent one might believe them to be—or Karpf's numerous examples from Middle English.

It is significant to note that Banfield points out that free indirect discourse (thought) does not occur in oral passages (even in *skaz*) and that free indirect discourse (speech) is 'rare' in written contexts (241–2). All these claims appear to be less than adequate to the actual state of affairs, and Banfield here engages in an extreme *legerdemain* treatment of the philological facts. Weinrich, for instance, devotes a long section to the discussion of old French, in which he argues that the *passé simple* and the *passé composé* alternate without apparent differentiation in Old French verse,³³ but he notes also that the *passé composé* dominates in legal documents, and infers a beginning distinction between narrating and discussing tenses at this early stage of the French language (Weinrich 1985:252–6). Banfield's 'historization' of the linguistic facts moreover contradicts the basic writerly nature of *écriture* that Derrida and others have claimed to have existed from the very beginning: what she takes to be the characteristics of the written language is already inherent in language itself, whether written or oral.³⁴ We have seen above in [Chapter 2](#) that, at least in English, the representation of speech in the form of free indirect discourse preceded that of consciousness by at least three centuries.

7.2

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY

I have mentioned earlier that the theoretical framework of Banfield's theory has to be modified considerably as a consequence of the development of transformational grammar in the 1980s. Thus, Banfield's E-node model will have to be discarded. According to recent transformational accounts, dislocated and topicalized constituents no longer have S-double-bar as their landing site but CP-adjunct, a construction that makes it more difficult to identify CP with E(xpression). Secondly, expressive elements (with very few exceptions) have now been demonstrated to occur in subordinate clauses (see [Chapter 4](#)) so that the very notion of root transformation will have to be dropped. To dispense with root transformations would, additionally, make the construction of E-node unnecessary, at least in the reading in which E-node is allowed only in root clauses. Since even most of the newer grammars are not concerned with exclamatives, or with expressive constructions such as *One more can of beer or I'll leave*, this point cannot be decided on with any certainty. I have not found any discussion of how ordinary fronting of, say, adverbial phrases and topicalization are actually handled by the latest generative grammar, and Fab's recent (1990) work on non-restrictive clauses supports the thesis that narrative parentheticals as well as discourse parentheticals—probably in conjunction with interjections and other discourse modifiers(*anyway*, *of course*, etc.)—may require a very loose syntactic adjunction that, in spite of its similarities to Banfield's *so he said*-analysis, might further invalidate the notion of E-node.

However, these technical problems regarding the *generation* of expressive elements in no way touch on the validity of expressive syntax as such. Banfield's model is perfectly able to deal with the *construction* of SELF by the reader/hearer, even if the precise

syntactic generation of these syntactic forms cannot be determined. As will be argued below, deictic centre theory works very smoothly in a pragmatic framework, and I will even propose an alternative syntactic viewpoint in [Chapter 8](#) which is also non-generative.

The most serious problems with Banfield's theory therefore concern the specific predictions of the model, and the *wording* of some of her principles. These problems are largely the consequence of a very limited corpus of free indirect discourse. Banfield departs from textual analyses that over-whelmingly rely on the Modernist canon—Flaubert to Woolf. Although she acknowledges the existence of free indirect discourse in first-person narrative, there is—as we have noted—no word about second person narrative, and many of Banfield's principles require the specific exclusion of the second person from free indirect discourse. Yet, as my examples in [Chapters 3](#) and [4](#) have illustrated, the second person does in fact frequently occur in free indirect passages, not only in second person narrative but also in conversational free indirect discourse. In addition, Banfield's insistence on the shifted past tense makes the discussion of free indirect discourse in present tense narrative quite impossible. However, all that would be required by way of modification of Banfield's principles would be a distinction between the deictic centre of the *report ing* instance—the communicatory level between narrator and narratee—and the deictic centre of the *report ed* instance, such that reference must be co-referential with the reporting instance whatever the temporal or pronominal make-up of the narrative. This rule is of course liable to apparent exceptions as in those cases where the reference is indeed identical for both narrator, narratee and reported speaker as in *we* for 'we men', etc. By arguing that narrative sentences are 'unspeakable' or have no speaker, however, Banfield makes it impossible to define the two deictic centres and to explain their differentiation and overlap.

A second series of problems derives from Banfield's reliance on Modernist fiction. The unspeakable sentence theory quite clearly breaks down with authorial narrative, where there would of course be a clear speaker function in the text. Although the presence of a speaker in purely narrative clauses does not, by itself, invalidate the univocality of free indirect discourse, it poses serious problems for the alignment of free indirect discourse with parentheticals, which would obviously constitute the narrator's province. The univocality of indirect discourse and the univocality of free indirect discourse indeed, by themselves, only match within Banfield's theory on the basis of a consistent separation of narration and discourse. Only within *discourse* (i.e. communication) does indirect speech present the speaker's point of view; *within narrative*, it has to be robbed of this characteristic on the speakerless sentence presupposition.

Banfield's paradigm, therefore, not only fails because root transformations occur in indirect discourse, or because there is free indirect discourse in the present tense, or even because narratives with a noticeable speaker function cannot be denied out of existence; it fails—most basically—because Banfield separates literary language from natural language use. The only way in which indirect discourse in narrative could lack characteristics it obviously has in non-narrative texts is by way of an incisive separation of the literary from the non-literary. Banfield of course here relies on the Benvenistean *histoire/ discourse* distinction, fortified by Roland Barthes's *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, and she also continues Hamburger's and Weinrich's lines of reasoning, both of whom draw a line between the

fictive and the *non-fictive*, and the *narrated* and *discussed* respectively. The present study, much as it endorses Benveniste's and Weinrich's functionalist approach, nonetheless insists on the basic identity of language in narrative whether oral or literary. Indeed, a transformational account of literary prose would seem to me to *require* the cross-language application that an exclusive relegation of free indirect discourse to literature flatly denies.

This takes me to a third important problem with Banfield's account of free indirect discourse. Banfield's theory is geared towards free indirect discourse as a presentation of *consciousness*. Although examples of free indirect discourse renderings of utterances are quoted in the book, these are mostly discussed in terms of non-reflective consciousness or in terms of a character's *perception* of another's utterance. This strategy is inherently misguided. For one, once the occurrence of free indirect discourse in authorial narrative contexts has been documented, one can no longer explain free indirect speech as part of a reflector character's perception—there is no reflector character 'on stage'.³⁵ Secondly, non-reflective consciousness, since it renders a level of consciousness either *below* or *above* the character's self-awareness, *by definition* cannot be argued to include renderings of utterances; *utterances*, spoken aloud, are the clearest case of *awareness*. Kuno's examples of how the hearer's awareness of others' utterances is reflected in pronominal usage illustrates this point forcefully (Kuno 1987).

Banfield's theory is linked with a historical argument that identifies free indirect discourse with the presentation of consciousness. Yet, historically speaking, as we have already observed in Chapter 2, this contention is true *only* for German, and Banfield proffers this claim for English and French. In German, there are only *minimal* examples of free indirect *speech* in the eighteenth-century novel (Neuse 1990). Early *English* passages of free indirect discourse, on the other hand, predominantly render *utterances*, and medieval English anticipations of the device predominantly use it for the representation of speech. This is interestingly *not* the case in medieval French, where many examples are for the representation of thought processes, although free indirect discourse is *also* employed for the representation of utterances. Much as I would like to endorse Banfield's alignment of free indirect discourse with a deictic centre evoking a SELF of consciousness, the near-exclusion of utterances from Banfield's RST constitutes a serious flaw.

Although the above considerations render Banfield's theory untenable in its present shape, particularly in its details, her major insights into the linguistic evocation of consciousness are fully valid and can be extended, radicalizing her model and reincorporating those instances of free indirect discourse which Banfield herself had rejected or marginalized.

7.3

THE DEICTIC CENTRE: CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF AND SUBJECTIVITY IN LANGUAGE

In this section I want to confront a few issues that have already made their appearance on the sidelines of my presentation but have as yet not received any concerted treatment.

One of these concerns the relationship between utterance and consciousness in terms of the deictic centre theory—or, put differently, why is it that in Banfield's paradigm the deictic centre seems to evoke a subject of consciousness and *not* a subject of enunciation? Secondly, I want to look a little more closely into the proposals of functional syntax (Kuno 1987) and into the hypothesized 'awareness' criteria which this approach has postulated on the basis of syntactic and logophoric properties of English (with the stipulation that similar criteria may be in force in other languages, too). The connection between these two areas of interest can be seen in the fact that Kuno's awareness criteria allow a satisfactory, if perhaps methodologically shaky, explanation of the intractable thought vs. utterance problematic. Moreover, Banfield has herself addressed the adequacy of Kuno's model in relation to her own supposedly superior treatment of the linguistics of consciousness (Banfield 1983). Banfield's positions are perhaps most intransigently summarized in her *The Nature of Evidence in a Falsifiable Literary Theory* (Banfield 1987b), an essay that can serve as a reference point in comparison with Kuno (1987). I will start with Banfield's critique of Kuno (1972b, 1976) and Kuno/Kaburaki (1975) and proceed to evaluate the terms of the debate in the light of the much fuller and more systematic treatment of Kuno (1987).

Banfield starts out from a consideration of pragmatics as compared to 'proper' linguistic methodology. In Banfield's terms Kuno and Kaburaki insistently deny that 'point of view shows syntactic regularities describable by the same formal mechanisms used for other nonsubjective syntactic phenomena' (1983:205). According to Banfield, Kuno and Kaburaki maintain that no formal syntactic account can be provided for what they call 'empathy' phenomena. Kuno's 'conceptual strategies' would need to be located at the performance level of language, and Banfield faults Kuno for not even attempting to formalize empathy structures as a first step towards integrating them with the standard syntactic account. In particular, Kuno's pragmatic claim that discourse phenomena eschew precise syntactic formulation meets with Banfield's unabated sarcasm: 'If the processes he calls "so-called syntactic phenomena" are not syntactic at all, but pragmatic, perhaps they must be excluded from the data of linguistic theory' (207). Kuno's methodological impasse, according to Banfield, is due to his naïve 'assumption that any phenomena of language that can be observed constitute the data of linguistic theory' (*ibid.*). (Compare also her antipragmatic stance in Banfield 1992.)

Banfield goes on to claim that 'an enlightening formal account can be provided' for empathy structures, namely her own syntactic model which relates a deictic centre SELF with interpretative principles. Subjectivity or point of view is established linguistically, Banfield argues, by 'the necessity of referring [the various constructions and lexical items identified as phenomena of point of view] in ordinary discourse to the speaking subject for full interpretation'. Throughout the remainder of the article Banfield presents her own model and phenomena explainable with it—the use of *noms de qualité* (*that idiot of a doctor*), exclamatory syntax (209, 220) and evaluative adjectives (*poor*). Kuno/Kaburaki's examples, however, include entirely different phenomena: (a) passivization;

(29) a. John hit Mary.

- b. John hit his wife.
- c. Mary's husband hit her.
- (30) a. Mary was hit by John.
- b. ?? John's wife was hit by him.
- c. ?? His wife was hit by John.
- d. Mary was hit by her husband.

(Selected from Kuno/Kaburaki 1977 and Banfield 1983)

(b) the issue of choice of NP (*John*; *Mary's husband*) as empathy indicator; and

(c) evaluative adjectives, i.e. *beloved* and *dear old*—a set that differs from that of Banfield.

As Banfield herself recognizes, her own model and Kuno's are predicated on 'two distinct sets of claims' (1983:209). However, it soon appears that she is unable to refute Kuno on his own territory. Kuno, when attempting to explain the compatibility and incompatibility of NPs in (29) and in (30) by proposing the Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy,

Subject>Object>By-passive Agentive

is 'refuted' by reference to Chomsky's Disjoint Reference Rule (Banfield 1983: 213–14) from his 'Conditions on Transformations' essay (Chomsky 1973); and Kuno's analysis of passivization—which has no counterpart in Banfield's framework—is contrasted with so-called counter-examples, but Banfield does not provide any explanation of her own for the phenomena which Kuno had originally presented. Kuno had discussed the oddity of putting the current speaker into a *by-PP* in a passive construction.

- (31) ?? Mary was criticized by me.

This sentence is odd out of context, because a sentence detailing actions by the current speaker can only with difficulty be imagined to have Mary, the object of the action, as its (presupposed) theme. Banfield's counter-examples, quoted from Kato (1977), who cites oral and journalistic instances, in fact all concern discourse contexts in which the current discourse topic corresponds to the referent of the subject NP preferred over the speaker:

- (32) I said 'Me watch it! Fuck that! Let him watch it!' *He was hired by me. I could fire him if I didn't like him.*

(Studs Terkel, *Working*; quoted Banfield 1983:215)

The 'point' of the relevant sentence is the status of having been hired by SPEAKER, of being a dependent, not the activity performed by the speaker when hiring the addressee. Observe, incidentally, that the passage, which Banfield introduces as 'transcriptions of actual speech', is pure free indirect discourse, ironically so since this is the very category Banfield claims does not exist in the oral language.

Kuno's third example case, the correlation between empathetic *beloved* or *dear old* and the Speech Act Empathy Hierarchy ('It is not possible for the speaker to empathize more with someone else than with himself) and the Speech Act Participant Hierarchy

Speaker > Hearer > Third Person > indefinite NP

also comes in for ridicule.

- (33) a. ?? Someone talked to me about his beloved wife.
 b. ?? One should not brag about one's beloved wife.
 c. ?? A stranger talked to me about his dear old friend.

Banfield argues that neither *beloved* nor *dear old* are evaluative adjectives in her own terminology, but Kuno never claimed they were, and Banfield should have compared the two adjectives with *lousy* or *dastardly*, which occur in the same distribution as Kuno's *beloved* and *dear old*. Rather than being willing to admit new evidence for subjective items, Banfield only allows the ones that she has adopted from Milner and no others.

The entire refuting of Kuno's argument is therefore a *tour de force* of non-sequiturs since one dogmatic position is persistently defended against pretenders. Yet a more balanced and fairer account of the debate (if one should call it that) could start by noting that Banfield and Kuno are actually interested in entirely different phenomena and, even more importantly, in entirely different levels of linguistic description. Their one comparable tenet concerns their attempt to describe subjectivity phenomena. However, whereas Banfield locates textual subjectivity in the construction of linguistic point of view, in particular in transformations and syntactic collocations, Kuno's approach is from the start oriented towards semantic and pragmatic criteria which incipiently attempt to account for text linguistic phenomena and not for purely syntactic choices. Or, put differently, the empathy hierarchies that Kuno/Kaburaki postulate relate to a pragmatic plane of discourse description that operates in terms of 'new' vs 'given' information, adducing emphatic foregrounding and empathy or point of view as an explanation for surface structural syntactic form. Kuno, in other words, is interested in the *why* of syntactic choice, Banfield in the *how* of description. Kuno's conviction that numerous observable linguistic phenomena cannot be explained by a syntactic rule system has of course meanwhile been corroborated by a wide and formidable spectrum of pragmatic research that renders Banfield's remarks jejune and fairly ridiculous by hindsight. However, it needs to be conceded that Kuno/Kaburaki did not specify their precise standpoint in relation to Chomskyan syntax, a requirement that can be met only now when pragmatics has established itself as an independent discipline.

I now briefly turn to Kuno's (1987) volume *Functional Syntax*, which performs just this task, in clarifying much more precisely where syntactic rules offer adequate predictions and in which environments discourse features interfere with such predictions. I have already alluded in earlier parts of the book to Kuno's revision of Chomsky's binding conditions and to his observations about reflexives and logophoric pronouns in *that* complement clauses. Although Kuno does not formalize his results on the lines of Banfield's SELF, his proposals also refer to the implicit relation of deictic features to a subjective

orientation point which he characterizes in terms of awareness. Unlike Banfield, Kuno concentrates on non-literary environments and in fact excludes free indirect discourse from his discussion. His results—and their complementary nature in relation to deictic centre theory—are particularly noteworthy because they turn up comparable uses of reflexives and pronominals in contexts of speech report (explicit indirect discourse or implicit speech report) and—as with picture noun reflexives—in contexts of (implied) perception. Especially relevant for our concerns is Kuno's 'Direct Discourse Perspective' which attempts to relate the occurrence of (logophoric) pronouns (in places where a full NP would have been expected even on the basis of his revised Anaphor Rules) to the semantic or more properly pragmatic factor of speaker's knowledge and the subject's feelings, knowledge and awareness. Thus:

- (34) a. That he_i was blond worried John_j
 b. That John_j was blond worried him_i

(Kuno 1987:112 [= (5.1)])

The above analysis suggests that [34a] and [34b] are not exactly synonymous. The primary interpretation of the former is that the sentential subject represents John's internal feeling directly. On the other hand, the sentential subject of [34b] represents the speaker's knowledge of John's feelings.

(Kuno 1987:112)

The verb *worry* implies, or can imply, an internal point of view reading, and this consciousness reading becomes mandatory when 'subjective elements' occur in the *that*-clause:

- (35) ?? That Mary had the nerve to call John_j crazy to his_i face bothered him_i.
 That Mary had described John_j as crazy in front of his friends bothered him_i.

(Kuno 1987:114 [= (5.12a)], (5.15a))

In the first sentence John is directly addressed by Mary, and the NP *John* is therefore odd—one would expect a logophoric pronoun. In the second sentence what bothered John can be interpreted as the (well-known) fact of John's having been called crazy in his friends' hearing. In so far as this has become 'general knowledge' it is no longer merely a psychological datum in John's mind. Kuno eventually integrates the logophoric rule as Condition D' with his revised Anaphor Rules, as a cyclical last-level rule.

Kuno's analyses repose on a number of presuppositions which are relevant to our concerns and which I in fact share (cp. under (9.2.2) below). Kuno's Direct Discourse Perspective builds on rock-bottom cognitive patterns of human life.

- (a) When somebody utters something, the speaker and the addressee can be concluded to be *aware* of the content of the utterance, i.e. their consciousness 'includes' the utterance 'message.'

- (b) Utterances are transparent, objective—once a statement has been uttered, it becomes common knowledge and is no longer exclusively the property of consciousness.
- (c) Somebody's thoughts, feelings and emotions, by contrast, are opaque and cannot become such common knowledge unless uttered.
- (d) Others' utterances about oneself are not simply objective (to others), but also consciousness-determining for the SELF in terms of one's special relationship to oneself (Castañeda).
- (e) This special relationship concerns the emotional subjective attitude towards oneself, and it can therefore be evoked in perceptions (of oneself in the mirror, on a painting or a photo), as well as in utterances which are perceived to have oneself as the topic or referent.

The above trite analysis of perception and consciousness versus utterance factors can be identified as a frame (9.2) and as such it functions as an interpretative schema. Kuno's proposals are nowhere more convincing than in his placing of the logophoric rule, which is applied last after all other Anaphor Rules. Although Kuno does not say this, we can add that logophoric alignments are not intrinsic lexical qualities but pragmatic, interpretative attributions in the production and reception of language.

Utterance and consciousness can now be contrasted not as two incompatible sides of the same coin but as two symmetrical ends of a spectrum that also includes perception and awareness, private knowledge and hearer's (addressee's) perception in a cline between subjectivity and objectivity. I will come back to a more properly linguistic consideration of this scale under (8.5) when I will attempt to reconcile the above reflections with the contradictory observation of the verbal nature of utterance and the fundamentally non-verbal nature of consciousness and perception. We will then observe that non-reflective consciousness, which excludes (linguistic) (self-) awareness, moves towards the realm of non-subjective external views of the self which exceed the subject's self-knowledge but approach the common availability of utterances when reported as the other's presentation of the self that the self can gain only in delayed, deferred, self-analysis. Non-reflective consciousness as the knowledge of the other is not experienceable, nor is utterance experienceable except in so far as it relates to one's self or is perceived as enunciation. Language therefore subsists in a triangular relationship with utterance and consciousness which cannot be defined in either linear or dichotomous fashion. Narrative fiction situates itself squarely in this central paradox of the human language faculty, resolving the incompatibilities between experience, consciousness and linguistic representation.

7.4

BANFIELD'S 'EMPTY CENTRE'

In 1987 the papers of a conference on the linguistics of writing held in 1986 at Strathclyde University, Scotland, were published (Fabb *et al.* 1987). In an article included in this volume Banfield extends her phenomenological account of represented speech and thought

to a set of texts in which one can find deictic or expressive devices which seem to evoke an underlying centre of subjectivity, a SELF, but cannot be attributed to a speaker or a character because no character is 'on stage', nor is this a discourse text (i.e. a text with a SPEAKER). Banfield interprets such texts as indicative of an 'empty' deictic centre and compares them to an epistemological paradox described by Bertrand Russell, according to which even an objective determination of space needs to be projected from perspectival coordinates to become intelligible to the human mind. Banfield goes on to compare such a perspectivization of reality from within an empty deictic centre with the viewpoint provided by a camera whose position is fixed in one place and therefore reflects its surroundings from what can be compared to a deictic *origo*, perhaps in terms of Bühler's *Deixis am Phantasma*, case two (1.3).

The empty deictic centre theory of Banfield is a logical extension of *Unspeakable Sentences*. Since deictic elements have to be aligned to a SELF and since no observable SELF is 'on stage', one has to posit the existence of an empty deictic centre. The major text that Banfield adduces in support of this construction is V. Woolf's *The Waves*, whose section-initial mediations on the sea provide some interesting examples of this category. As one can observe in the following passages, these introductory mediations employ a variety of subjectivity features, in particular familiarizing articles, spatial deixis, subjective *now*, subjective demonstratives (*this*) and expressive syntax:

- (36) In the garden the birds that **had** sung erratically and spasmodically in the dawn on that tree, on **that** bush, **now** sang together in chorus, shrill and sharp; now together, as if conscious of companionship, now alone as if to the pale blue sky. [...] Fear was in their song, and apprehension of pain, and joy to be **snatched quickly now at this instant**

(*The Waves*; Woolf 1959:73)

- (37) Now, too, the rising sun **came in** at the window, touching **the red-edged curtain** and began to bring out circles and lines. **Now** in the growing light its whiteness settled in the plate; the blade condensed its gleam. Chairs and cupboards loomed **behind** so that though each was separate they **seemed** inextricably involved. **The** looking-glass whitened its pool upon the wall. **The** real flower on the window-sill was attended by a phantom flower. Yet the phantom was part of the flower for when a bud broke free, the paler flower in the glass opened a bud too.

(*Ibid.*, 75)

One can additionally locate instances of epistemic modals (*perhaps*—Woolf 1959:74), and references to cognitive orientation (*seemed*—Woolf 1959:75, 208).

When Banfield (1987a) discussed this phenomenon she talked about it in terms of

sentences with a deictic centre but without any explicit or implicit representation of an observer. Grammatically, such sentences would contain place and time deictics, *here* and *now* or their equivalents; they might also contain demonstratives designating sensibilia. But they would not contain those subjective elements and

constructions implying the mental states of a personal subject. These would include embeddable subjective elements such as nouns or adjectives 'of quality' representing a subject's opinions, feelings or thoughts, as well as non-embeddable subjective elements such as exclamations. Nor would such sentences contain any third person pronoun representing a subjectivity or be interpretable, according to its linguistic context, as the perspective of a subject.

(Banfield 1987a: 273)

Banfield describes the quality of subjectivity in the sentences she quotes as dependent on the 'subjective past anchored to a *now*' (273). In contrast to passages of non-reflective consciousness and represented speech and thought there is no character in the text to which the deictic centre could be fitted. Banfield therefore speaks of an 'empty centre.'

The sentences 1–7 [quoted by Banfield on p. 273], centred in an empty here and now, become then the appropriate linguistic representation of the unobserved, here and now defining the Russellian perspective, that physical subjectivity which may remain impersonal. Here and now name a private time and place which need not be occupied by a subject represented by a first or third person pronoun or other syntactically definable subjective elements which must be referred to a subject for interpretation. The deictic system is thus internally divided between those terms which represent the (personal) subject—I in speech, he, she, or a human they in the writing of the novel—and those which represent only a subjective centre—the deictic adverbials of time and place. Moreover, it is the personal pronouns which are defined in terms of the spatial and temporal deictics, and not vice-versa; it is here-now which is primary and not I. Around this empty centre, sensibilia, given a temporal dimension as events, group themselves. Structured by this spatio-temporal centre, which encloses the space of perception or sensation, like the photographic plate 'frames' a portion of the visible world, they provide, so to speak, its content.

(Ibid., 274–5)

However, in equivalent passages from Katherine Mansfield's 'At the Bay' one can additionally find a few expressivity features that are suggestive of an active, *reflective* SELF: questions, exclamations in the shape of imperatives and—most oddly—instances of the second person pronoun:

- (38) Very early morning. The sun was not yet risen, and the whole of Crescent Bay was hidden under a white sea-mist. The big bush-covered hills *at the back were* smothered. *You* could not *see* where they ended and the paddocks and bungalows began. The sandy road was gone and the paddocks and bungalows the other side of it; there were no white dunes covered with reddish grass *beyond* them; there was nothing to mark which was beach and where was the sea. A heavy dew *had fallen*. The grass was blue. Big drops hung on the bushes and just did not fall; the silvery

fluffy toi-toi was limp on its long stalks, and all the marigolds and the pinks in the bungalow gardens were bowed to the earth with wetness. *Dreached were the cold fuchsias* [root transformation], round pearls of dew lay on the flat nasturtium leaves. It *looked* as though the sea had beaten up softly in the darkness, as though one immense wave had come rippling, rippling—*how far? Perhaps if you* had waked up in the middle of the night *you might have seen* a big fish flicking *in* at the window and gone again.

(‘At the Bay’, i; Mansfield 1988:264)

This comes from section one of ‘At the Bay’, which—like the vignettes from *The Waves*—introduces an intra-diegetic deictic viewpoint, but one that is clearly *personalized*, although no character is ‘on stage’. Section one is taken up entirely by this perspective. The shepherd—the only character on the scene—cannot function as the reflective consciousness because he is indeed focussed on by it: ‘He was a grave, fine-looking old man’ (265). The section is saturated with consciousness signals: character-deixis (*at the back; beyond; there ahead*); *come* and *appear* as indices of text-internal perception; *seem* and *look* to indicate a figural subjectivity; *something* to mark the perceiver’s inability to recognize the perceived object; subjective evaluative lexis (*giant*—for a tree; *marvellous*; the *darling little woolly lambs*); tense indicators of figural perception (‘The sun *was not yet risen*’; ‘The sun *was rising*’; ‘now they *had passed*’); signals of actual perception (‘out of sight’, ‘you could not see’).

Banfield does not discuss any of these latter expressivity devices, but they clearly do argue for the implicit presence of a SELF in the text. The question of course then becomes whether there is any subjective entity to which one could attribute these textual signals.

By an odd coincidence in the history of narratology Banfield’s empty centre feature has been discovered independently by two central European scholars—Roland Harweg and F.K.Stanzel. Harweg (1975b) noted precisely the same phenomenon that Banfield had observed in *The Waves* in the beginning paragraph of Thomas Mann’s short story ‘Tristan’. In 1977 an essay of Stanzel’s appeared discussing textual phenomena in Joyce’s *Ulysses* (Stanzel 1977), and he later (Stanzel 1979/1984b) extended this analysis to include the ‘Tristan’ passages noted by Harweg, further adducing examples from K. Mansfield’s short fiction. Whereas Harweg, for the following passage quoted here from the translation given in Stanzel (1984b), assumed a reading on the lines of a tourist guide textbook and hence appealed to a generic speaker model, Stanzel links the expressive elements in the passage to the antics of the omniscient authorial narrator who, *entretemps*, assumes the cognitive and linguistic perspective of an inmate of the sanatorium: the narrator is thus personalized or figuralized—hence Stanzel’s German term for this phenomenon, the *Personalisierung* (figuralization) of the authorial narrator. The now current term is *reflectorization*.³⁶

- (39) The characters whom Einfried has sheltered! Even a writer is here, an excentric person, who bears the name of some kind of mineral or precious stone and who fritters the Lord’s days away here.³⁷

- (40) Spinell was the name of the writer who had lived in Einfried for several weeks. Detlev Spinell was his name, and his appearance was peculiar.
 Imagine a brunet in his early thirties with a portly figure.³⁸
 (Quoted *sic* Stanzel 1984b:182)

Stanzel had earlier illustrated this same phenomenon in a passage of Mansfield's 'The Garden Party,' in which the Sheridans' hypocrisy was revealed through what needs to be interpreted as their reaction to Laura's in their view preposterous suggestion to cancel the garden party.³⁹ In 'Tristan', however, the expressive devices and implied SELF cannot be linked to a character or a group of characters who are 'on stage'; in fact Stanzel claims that the reader intuits this to be the perspective of an hitherto unmentioned inmate of the sanatorium whose SELF (Stanzel does not use this term), i.e. reflectoral position, is temporarily adopted by the authorial narrator.

I will, preliminarily, speak of an evocation of story-internal consciousness—much on the lines of Banfield—but depart from both Stanzel and Banfield in positing that this technique is meant to evoke a perceiving consciousness: not the narrator's—'At the Bay' has no narrator figure at all, at best an implied author who is responsible for the arrangements—but the *reader's*. Just as, in figural narrative, the reader is invited to see the fictional world through the eyes of a reflector character, in such a text the reader also reads through a text-internal consciousness, but since no character is available to whom one could attribute such a consciousness, the reader directly identifies with a story-internal position. Mansfield's free indirect discourse-you is therefore doubly appropriate—as a signal of free indirect discourse and as an inducement to readerly empathy. Contrary to Banfield's empty centre I would therefore argue for a reading process in which the reader takes an internal position on events (as if through a witness) rather than for a mere camera-eye. (The latter would be a sign of neutral narrative, and Mansfield's story is clearly reflectoral.)

This is not to say that reflectorization or the creation of an empty centre necessarily requires a reflectoral position, to be filled by an unnamed story-internal consciousness which the reader constructs on the basis of the linguistic text; in 'The Garden Party' such a consciousness is definitely linked to the Sheridan family, and there are passages in 'At the Bay' where a common attitude of the holiday makers is presented in such terms (Mansfield 1988: 275). In fact an implicit narrative presentation of events through the perspective of a character or through the typicalized evocation of group psychology is already a common feature in much nineteenth-century writing, but there it has so far escaped notice. I cannot at this point provide a full treatment of this issue,⁴⁰ but will present one more characteristic example passage. Suffice it to note that I have meanwhile found examples of such an empty centre in the fiction of Dickens, D.H. Lawrence (particularly in his short fiction, e.g. 'England, My England'), Fay Weldon (*The Life and Loves of a She-Devil*, 'Weekend'), Thomas Mann (*passim* in *Buddenbrooks*), Toni Morrison (*Sula*, *The Bluest Eye*) and Gloria Naylor (*Mama Day*), besides those found in Jane Austen, George Eliot, V. Woolf and K. Mansfield.⁴¹ I will here discuss a passage from *Jacob's Room* which presents what is implicitly Jacob Flanders's perspective, yet does so in the language

of an overly 'active' voice suggesting, on the contrary, that the perspective is that of *anyone* (including the extra-fictional narratee). The effect of such a writing strategy—already present in the earlier examples from *The Waves* and from 'Tristan'—of course appears to be the intentional erasure of a distinction between objective and subjective language. Even what would 'normally' be rendered by an authoritative narrative voice or by a self-effacing narrative language (on the lines of Flaubert's and the early Joyce's cult of impersonality—Banfield's prime category of unspeakable writing) is here subjected to an implicit centre of consciousness, and this consciousness, although it can be linked to Jacob Flanders's subjectivity, to his existence 'on stage', at the same time cannot be exhausted by such realistic reference to plot existants, exceeding realistic SELF in the direction of intercommunal, attributive consciousness created rather than merely evoked by the devices of language: a fiction of language produced by the language of fiction.

- (41) Athens is still quite capable of striking a young man as the oddest combination, the most incongruous assortment. Now it is suburban; now immortal. Now cheap continental jewellery is laid upon plush trays. Now the stately woman stands naked, save for a wave of drapery above the knee. No form can be set on his sensations as *he* strolls, one blazing afternoon, along the Parisian boulevard and skips out of the way of *the* royal landau which, looking indescribably ramshackle, rattles along the pitted roadway, saluted by citizens of both sexes cheaply dressed in bowler hats and continental costumes; though a shepherd in kilt, cap, and gaiters very nearly drives his herd of goats between the royal wheels; and all the time the Acropolis surges into the air, raises itself above the town, like a large immobile wave with the yellow columns of the Parthenon firmly planted upon it.

The yellow columns of the Parthenon are to be seen at all hours of the day firmly planted upon the Acropolis; though at sunset, when the ships in the Piraeus fire their guns, a bell rings, a man in uniform (the waistcoat unbuttoned) appears; and the women roll up the black stockings which they are knitting in the shadow of the columns, call to the children, and troop off down the hill back to their houses.

There they are again, the pillars, the pediment, the Temple of Victory and the Erechtheum, set on a tawny rock cleft with shadows, directly *you* unlatch *your* shutters in the morning and, leaning out, hear the clatter, the clamour, the whip cracking in the street below. *There they are.*

The extreme definiteness with which they stand, now a brilliant white, again yellow, and in some lights red, imposes ideas of durability, of the emergence through the earth of some spiritual energy elsewhere dissipated in elegant trifles. But this durability exists quite independently of our admiration. Although the beauty is sufficiently humane to weaken us, to stir the deep deposit of mud—memories, abandonments, regrets, sentimental devotions—the Parthenon is separate from all that; and if *you* consider how it has stood out all night, for centuries, *you* begin to connect the blaze (at midday the glare is dazzling and the frieze almost invisible) with the idea that *perhaps* it is beauty alone that is immortal.

(*Jacob's Room*, xii; Woolf 1982:143–4)

What we have here, then, is a further radicalization of internal story perspective, a *tour de force* of fictional language in which the impersonalization of fictional presentation by means of limited figural perspective has been radicalized to the point where the subjectivity of a story-internal consciousness or SELF re-emerges as a SPEAKER function which is as impersonal as the former authorial presentation and now entirely divorced from what Stanzel has called 'embodiment'—neither a realistic narrator figure nor a realistic character speaker can be made responsible for the subjectivity and expressivity of the text. The language has both impersonalized itself to a mere evocation of subjectivity without ontological anchoring and, at the same time, intensified its subjectivity quotient to the point where a voice emerges from the figural impersonal subconscious of language.

It is not without historical and typological relevance that such a radicalization of the powers of linguistic 'fictioning' should bring the language of prose narrative into close proximity with the quality of poetry. Historically, this is in fact what Joyce and Woolf were aiming at in the shaping of their prose—to develop prose which was as close as possible to the effect of poetry and which would erase the vulgar kinetic properties of narrative and elevate prose to a level of contemplation where it could rule by poetic metaphor, suspended timeless in the stasis of aesthetic perfection. The term *radicalization* for this attempt to exhaust to its fullest the strategic potential of language to evoke and transcend the human psyche is singularly appropriate even on a metaphorical and etymological level. The *root* of language lies in the human mind, in its engagement with extra-mental realities, and the urge to master self and environment propels the cognitive apparatus towards an interaction with this outside. Language, constituted in the cognitive positioning of self and other—a structure echoed in the very form and materiality of the language system—develops its fullest self-expression by engaging with the non-self, by leaving its mental and bodily confinement to unburden itself in utterance and there to realize the subjectivity and expressivity of the linguistic function. By cutting its roots in the mind, by going native, language transforms itself into its fullest potentiality.

It is this borderline of utterance as linguistic self-revelation that has been the traditional locus of linguistic self-reflection, the site of poetic endeavour. And it is here that the speaker function of language has been most at issue, in a poem's 'I'. Like the empty deictic centre evoked by the narrative text that I have analysed, it, too, is suspended, disembodied in the linguistic utterance of enunciation itself. I am alluding to the 'depersonalization of the modern lyric' (Culler 1987a), which seems to take its origin from Baudelaire's subversive undermining of our reading process, a reading process in which we try to realistically recuperate a poetic voice in the text. The paradigm thus established treats the modern lyric not as patterning of words or as expression of truths (even particular modern truths), but as *dramatization of consciousness attempting to engage the world*' (Culler 1987a: 6; my emphasis). The modern lyric poem, in contrast to romantic poetry and narrative verse, defies the reader's attempts to construct a realistic (story) situation of utterance.

As in Culler's prime example, Baudelaire's 'Spleen IF' from *Les Fleurs du mal*, the 'speaker' of the poem cannot be envisioned as a human person but only as a 'voice'.

(42) J'ai plus de souvenirs que si j'avais mille ans.

Un gros meuble a tiroirs encombré de bilans,
 De vers, de billet doux, de procès, de romances,
 Avec de lourds cheveux roulés dans les quittances,
 Cache moins de secrets que *mon triste cerveau*.
C'est une pyramide, un immense caveau,
 Qui contient plus de morts que la fosse commune.
 —*Je suis un cimetière abhorré de la lune,*
 Où comme des remords se traînent de longs vers
 Qui s'acharnent toujours sur mes morts les plus chers.
Je suis un vieux boudoir plein de roses fanées,
 Où gît tout un fouillis de modes surannées,
 Où les pastels plaintifs et les pâles Boucher,
 Seuls, respirent l'odeur d'un flacon débouché.

(Baudelaire 1972:90; quoted Culler 1987a:12)⁴²

Culler sees the reading of such a poem as an active attempt on the part of the reader to 'identify with an act of consciousness on the part of a [sic] imagined speaker' (7; my emphasis). Not only is the reader therefore encouraged to actively make sense of an enunciation that seems to deliberately defy being read propositionally; s/he is additionally induced to put her-/himself in the place of the enunciating consciousness, to retrace, from within that act of utterance, the elusive signifying chain of linguistic forms and to constitute, by thus putting her-/himself in this privileged position of simultaneously speaking, hearing, interpreting and experiencing language in creation, to thus constitute, that is, the projective and imaginative essence of language itself. Language is here accessible as a medium of evoking fleeting effects of signification, but it does not refer, communicate or signify 'something', whether object, idea or narrative. It is this purity of language as divorced from referential, especially realistic human embodiment, that has beckoned from across the generic divide to lure narrative language into the unrootedness of language as mere self-expression. It is a Siren's song well heard by Woolf and Joyce and a lesson superbly realized in their fiction. Where consciousness and language meet, language fictionalizes itself as fictional consciousness in limbo.

NOTES

- 1 According to the classic model presented in Jakobson (1958/1987).
- 2 Banfield's solution here seems to be to split the text into two categories—(a) those parts in which the narrator discourses with the narratee, and (b) those of the narration proper, which she still considers to be 'unspeakable'. Such a solution, however, disregards the reader's very keen impression of a personalized narrative voice showing throughout the text by means of its style and evaluative techniques.
- 3 A forerunner of Banfield might be discovered in Vachek (1964).

- 4 See especially McHale (1978), Lips (1926) and particularly Fehr (1938). The most thoroughly textual approaches are Fox (1987, 1988) and Wiebe (1990).
- 5 Compare Lyons (1977).
- 6 Compare Lyons (1977:I, 305–11), Eckman *et al.* (1986) and Edna Andrews (1990).
- 7 The reference is to Kuhn (1970), who notes that, in practice, counter-evidence does not in general lead to a falsification of scientific paradigms. See also Goettner/ Jacobs (1978) on the extension of applicational areas in scientific theories, an extension that makes actual refutation highly unlikely.
- 8 See, for example, Derrida's speculations on mimesis in *Dissemination* (Derrida 1972/1981), Ricoeur (1983, 1984a, 1985a [in English: 1984b, 1985b, 1988]) or Cornis-Pope (1991a, 1991 b).
- 9 See Banfield (1982:164). 'A vrai dire, il n'y a même plus alors de narrateur. Les événements sont posés comme ils se sont produits a mesure qu'ils apparaissent a l'horizon de l'histoire. *Personne ne parle ici; les événements semblent se raconter eux-mêmes.* Le temps fondamental est l'aoriste, qui est le temps de l'événement hors de la personne d'un narrateur.' (Benveniste 1971:208; 1966:241)
- 10 Linguists' reluctance to confront Derrida's critique of Saussure is for instance the subject of an admonitory paper by Hopper (1988a).
- 11 See also the reviews by Haegman (1984–85), G. Prince (1984), Taylor/Toolan (1984), as well as Epstein (1982) and Kermodé (1982). Earlier articles of Banfield have been discussed, for instance, by McHale (1978) and Culler (1978).
- 12 Examples partly taken from Banfield (1982:38–40), with some additions and modifications.
- 13 'Comment expliquerai-je mon séjour définitif a Nogent?' (Banfield 1982:29 [= (9c)])
- 14 However, note that these can be 'transformed' into indirect discourse in some way:
 Mr Chubb repeated: 'Excuse me.'
 Mr Chubb said to excuse him. (Banfield 1982:33 [= (18)])
- 15 Compare 'His wife still loved him, physically. But, but—he was almost the unnecessary party in the affair. He could not complain of Winifred. She still did her duty towards him. She still had physical passion for him, that physical passion on which he had put all his life and soul. But—but —' ('England, My England'; Lawrence 1986:310; remodelled by Banfield 1982:74–5)
- 16 Cf. Radford (1981:105).
- 17 On the connecting conjunctions *and* and *but* see also Robin Lakoff (1971).
- 18 'The judge told me in a bizarre manner of speech that I was going to have my head cut off on a public square in the name of the French people.' (My translation)
- 19 See Banfield (1982:27); Quine (1955/1966). Compare under (1.2) above.
- 20 See Chomsky (1986b).
- 21 'a. 1 E/1 NOW. All instances of NOW within a single E are cotemporal.
 b. Priority of PRESENT. If there is a PRESENT, NOW is cotemporal with PRESENT. In the absence of a PRESENT, NOW is cotemporal with PAST. [NARTENSE].
 Definition: NOW=the moment of the present and future time deictics.' (Banfield 1982: 99)
- 22 '1 E/1I: For every expression (E), there is a unique referent of I (the SPEAKER), to whom all expressive elements are attributed, and a unique referent of you (the ADDRESSEE/ HEARER).' (Banfield 1982:57)
- 23 Pascal (1977:95) also notes the incompatibility between free indirect discourse and a narrator's *I*, but one needs to specify: the insight is true only in a hetero-diegetic narrative, and when the FID passage renders a character's consciousness or perception.

- 24 Banfield (1982:71). Compare: * *To open the window, John ordered Bill.*
- 25 Note, however, as we have seen in [Chapter 3 \(3.3.1\)](#) that such constructions are perfectly acceptable in *German* free indirect discourse, and that in some sorts of exclamations they appear in English free indirect discourse—although unaccompanied by parentheticals, or at least accompanied only by parentheticals having an exclamatory verb: *If ever he caught him again! the Major roared.*
- 26 Milner (1978b). For instance: *mon imbecile de cousin, deux crétins de policiers* or—in English—*that idiot of a doctor, a devil of an organ, my brute of a husband.* (Compare above under [\(3.2.4\)](#)).
- 27 Two of the examples given by Banfield are unconvincing, as far as I can see, because they are really intensifiers rather than *verbal* constructions in a non-literal reading. *She cannot for the life of her think what* and *Not for the world will she speak to him* are, I find, much more acceptable than the other third person examples, although I agree that they, too, are probably most natural in a free indirect discourse context.
- 28 These terms go back to Leo Spitzer (Spitzer 1928a).
- 29 Banfield (1982:164 ff.)
- 30 Weinrich (1985:275–6), Fleischman (1990), Fludernik (1992a).
- 31 Or, even more clearly:

PRESENT+NOW: DISCOURSE

—PRESENT+NOW: free indirect discourse/*imparfait*

—PRESENT—NOW: aorist/narration

—PRESENT+NOW: historical present.

- 32 Banfield's examples are ambiguous here, too. Thus she claims that *They would arrive at six, he heard* and *They should have a good time, he wished* are acceptable only when the verb is included in the stream of consciousness or is used as a communication verb (*They will arrive at six, I hear* and *'You should have a good time,' he wished them*). With Kuno's awareness criterion in mind, the first of these should be perfectly acceptable even in the reading of 'he heard' as 'he learned'. Indeed most of the non-reflective consciousness verbs which Banfield rules out from parentheticals are verbs implying an authorial description of the character's state of mind, such as *to like, be sad, be confused*. But these grammatically resist transformation even into indirect discourse since they take prepositional complements rather than *that*-clauses. Note, however, that these supposedly non-reflective verbs can very well occur in characters' thoughts about themselves, in interior monologue as well as in free indirect discourse: *'I really love flowers,' she thought*, or *She was sad, she knew*.
- 33 A conclusion now invalidated by Fleischman's (1990) analyses.
- 34 Compare Derrida's discussion of the inception of writing in *Dissemination* (1972/ 1981) and in *Of Grammatology* (1967/1976).
- 35 This remark, of course, presupposes the incompatibility between teller and reflector characters in a micro-context.
- 36 The term was coined as a derivation from Stanzel's figural narrative situation, which in German is called *personale Erzählsituation*. In the English first draft of my dissertation I therefore translated the concept as 'figuralization', but Stanzel's (1984b) translation of his 1979 German study then used the term *reflectorization* instead. This change of terminology seems to be motivated by Stanzel's recasting of his typology to explain his figural narrative situation as constituted by the reflector mode pole.
- 37 'Was für Existenzen hat "Einfried" nicht schon beherbergt! Sogar ein Schriftsteller ist da, ein exzentrischer Mensch, der den Namen irgendeines Minerals oder Edelsteins führt und hier dem Herrgott die Tage stiehlt.' (Quoted Stanzel 1984b: 182)

- 38 'Spinell hieß der Schriftsteller, der seit mehreren Wochen in "Einfried" lebte. Detlev Spinell war sein Name, und sein Äußeres war wunderbar.

Man vergegenwärtige sich einen Brünetten am Anfang der Dreißiger und von stattlicher Statur.' (Ibid.)

- 39 "But we can't possibly have a garden-party with a man dead just outside the front gate."

That really was extravagant, for the little cottages were in a lane to themselves at the very bottom of a steep rise that led up to the house. A broad road ran between. True, they were far too near. They were the greatest possible eyesore and they had no right to be in that neighbourhood at all. They were little mean dwellings painted a chocolate brown. In the garden patches there was nothing but cabbage stalks, sick hens and tomato cans. The very smoke coming out of their chimneys was poverty-stricken. Little rags and shreds of smoke, so unlike the great silvery plumes that uncurled from the Sheridans' chimneys. Washerwomen lived in the lane and sweeps and a cobbler, and a man whose house-front was studded all over with minute bird-cages. Children swarmed. When the Sheridans were little they were forbidden to set foot there because of the revolting language and of what they might catch. But since they were grown up, Laura and Laurie on their prowls sometimes walked through. It was disgusting and sordid. They came out with a shudder. But still one must go everywhere: one must see everything. So through they went.

"And just think of what the band would sound like to that poor woman," said Laura.' (The Garden Party'; Mansfield 1988:542)

- 40 Figuralization or reflectorization is the subject of Fludernik (1992b) and will take up an entire chapter in Fludernik (in preparation).
- 41 An extended use of reflectorization can also be observed in Huysman's *A rebours* (*Against Nature*).
- 42 'I have more memories than Methuselah.

A bulky chest of drawers stuffed full of bills,
Odd verses, love notes, lawsuits, madrigals,
And locks of heavy hair wrapped in receipts
Hides fewer secrets than *my* own poor brain.

It is a pyramid, a vast dark vault

That holds more dead than any common grave.

I am a cemetery moonlight shuns

Where long worms inch their way, cruel as remorse,
And gnaw relentlessly my most-loved dead.

I am an ancient boudoir filled with withered

Roses and a jumble of old clothes,
Where sorrowful pastels and pale Bouchers,
Alone, inhale the scent of uncorked flasks.'

(Translated Maria Ascher)

Schematic language representation

8.1

THE TYPIIFICATION ISSUE IN FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE

We have seen in the previous chapter that subjectivity can in principle be evoked linguistically by means of a set of expressive features. We have noted, additionally, that—contrary to the predictions of Banfield’s theory—these expressive elements also occur in indirect discourse and even in narrative sentences (Chapters 4 to 6).

One way of looking at these subjective elements is to regard them as indicative of underlying discourse, and this is the solution proposed within the standard accounts of speech and thought representation on the mimetic scale model. However, Banfield’s theory—taken perhaps beyond what she herself originally intended—can lead the way towards a new interpretation of such expressive elements treating them as *signals* deployed intentionally to *evoke* subjectivity rather than a mere surface structure of underlying *actual* consciousness or SELF.

The theory of schematic language representation that I wish to present here is predicated on an anti-mimetic model of speech and thought representation in language. Rather than departing from a consideration of the sources of subjectivity in expressive textual features, I wish to consider how discourse invents and manipulates expressivity which does not necessarily have any basis in reality. From this I will go on to conclude that *all* linguistic speech and thought representation relies on a mechanism of typification and schematization which is independent of actual speech and thought processes and can be analysed in terms of a *fiction* ‘manufactured’ by means of language, by means of linguistic devices.

Such a theory can easily be incorporated within frame and script theories of language production and is therefore compatible with equivalent models in cognitive science. It can, additionally, be correlated with a semiotic model based on Saussurean beliefs in the systematicity of language, since the evocation of subjectivity would be a meaning effect arrived at by manipulation of structural linguistic elements whose combination in a pragmatic context would produce signification on the relevant level of discourse processing.

I will start by presenting a series of typicality features in passages of free indirect discourse which are meant to illustrate standard ways in which language is used to represent, not one specific speech or thought act by a specific person, but a *typical* or *schematic image* of a linguistic expression whose provenance is determined contextually rather than derivationally. Such an image does not correspond to an actual speech act or reproduce it, but evokes a possible utterance that fits the current discourse context.

In Chapter 6 I have quoted examples of free indirect discourse in which the stylistic properties of the passage suggest an 'authorial' origin rather than that of the character's actual speech or thought act. One may demonstrate the non-adequation of a character's observable speech and the narrative's falsification of it most forcefully in *Ulysses*, where free indirect discourse representation in 'Nausicaa' and 'Eumaeus' can be compared to verisimilar renderings of Gerty's and Bloom's utterances and thoughts (at least as far as Bloom is concerned). Gerty's free indirect discourse musings bear little resemblance to her utterances as rendered in the chapter; and within the frame of the novel one has to take these dialogue 'transcriptions' for a truthful representation of her language.

- (1) *It hurt—O yes, it cut deep because Edy had her own quiet way of saying things like that she knew would wound like the confounded little cat she was. [...] She had loved him better than he knew. Lighthearted deceiver and fickle like all his sex he would never understand what he had meant to her and for an instant there was in the blue eyes [Gerty's] a quick stinging of tears. [...]*

—O, responded Gerty, quick as lightning, laughing, and the proud head flashed up. I can throw my cap at who I like because it's leap year.

(*Ulysses*, xiii; Joyce 1984:779)

Nor are Bloom's remarks and musings as rendered in 'Eumaeus' anywhere close to his direct discourse and interior monologue (or even to psychonarration passages) in earlier chapters:

- (2) —At what o'clock did you dine? he [Bloom] questioned of the slim form and tired though unwrinkled face.

—Some time yesterday, Stephen said.

—Yesterday! exclaimed Bloom till he remembered it was already tomorrow, Friday. Ah, you mean it's after twelve!

—The day before yesterday, Stephen said, improving on himself. [...]

Anyhow, upon weighing the pros and cons, getting on for one, as it was, it was high time to be retiring for the night. The crux was it was a bit risky to bring him [Stephen] home as eventualities might possibly ensue (somebody having a temper of her own sometimes) and spoil the hash altogether as on the night he misguidedly brought home a dog (breed unknown) with a lame paw, not that the cases were either identical or thereverse though he had hurt his hand too) to Ontario Terrace as he very distinctly remembered, having been there, so to speak.

(*Ulysses*, xvi; Joyce 1984:1433)

Ulysses is of course a unique text, and one might hesitate to generalize from these facts if it were not for similar phenomena in other novels. In the following lines from John Barth (compare also the passage from *The Golden Bowl* which I quoted as (3) in Chapter 6), free indirect discourse stylistically belongs to a clearly elevated plane; the circumstances of the represented utterance, however, hardly allow for the elaborate diction and the literary tone of the discourse, which is demonstrably of a piece with the surrounding pseudo-colonial narratorial language. Yet these passages are free indirect discourse for both formal and contextual reasons. (I have bold-italicized the formal free indirect discourse signals.)

- (3) From outside came another cry, a hard, high protest that trailed into lamentation. There was an ancient ring to it, an antique sorrow, that put the poet in mind of Philomela, of Lucretia [...] He went to the companionway, and climbing it looked skyward at the stars. *How trifling was the present scene to them, who had watched the numberless wars of men?, the sack of nations, and the countless lone assaults in field and alley! Was there a year in time when their light had not been dimmed, somewhere on earth, by the flames of burning cities? That instant when he stepped out on the deck, how many women heard—in England, Spain, and far Cipango—the footfall of the rapist on the stair, or in the path behind? The ranks of **women** ravished, hundreds and thousands and millions strong of every age and circumstance—the centuries rang and echoed with **their** cries* [left dislocation]; *the dirt of the planet was watered with their tears!*

(*The Sot-Weed Factor*; Barth 1984:275–6)

Although Ebenezer is no doubt predisposed to viewing events in poetic and rhetorical terms and the style can therefore be regarded as appropriate or verisimilar to the tenor of his thoughts, the exclamatory and interrogative syntax is in no way interpretable as a sign of an actual inner speech act along the lines of this poetic effusion. Observe also the following passage from *What Maisie Knew*, whose style and conceptual sophistication can hardly be Maisie's although formally (observe the free indirect discourse parenthetical of the first sentence) this is definitely free indirect discourse:

- (4) *He might be fond of his stepdaughter, **Maisie felt**, without wishing her to be after all thrust on him in such a way; his absence therefore, it was clear, was a protest against the thrusting.* It was while this absence lasted that **our young lady** finally discovered what had happened in the house to be that her mother was no longer in love.

(*What Maisie Knew*; James 1984:73)

The second sentence, as indicated by the authorial 'our young lady,' then definitely shifts perspective away from Maisie.

Similarly in Pynchon one can observe the all-powerfulness of narratorial style, but that style is so colloquial that it does not qualify as 'authorial'. Here expressive features that would seem to indicate a character's discourse can in fact be equally part of the narrator's expressive *habitus*, and the customary distinction between a neutral or elevated rhetoric,

in terms of the code that expressive language signals characters' speech, breaks down completely. We have noted the inherent interpretative game based on this alterity above in our discussion of stylistic deviation (see under (6.3)). In such examples one notices free indirect discourse not mainly on the basis of linguistic form but on the basis of linguistic *content*: this has to be free indirect discourse because this is what the character would be likely to say or voice to her-/himself in the particular context. In Chapter 6 I have also illustrated a common tendency of narrative to play with the expectation of 'verbatim' speech or thought representation in free indirect discourse—another strong indication of anti-mimetic textual investment, even if operative on the prior *expectation* of mimesis. However, free indirect discourse is *typical* in more conventional texts, too.

In the following, I will enumerate a number of strategies or contexts of linguistic typification within free indirect discourse. Not infrequently, for example, one gets a schematic representation of a character's outlook or of a **recurrent speech act**, neatly condensed into one exaggerated tirade (which we, however, infer to be only one instance of repeated utterances on the same lines):

- (5) Charlotte is a secretary at a clinic. *They don't respect her there, they treat her like dirt and have for almost twenty-five years.* Some days, when Ella's phone rings at five-thirty, she lets it ring until it stops, knowing Charlotte is calling with news of outrageous things they did to her at work, especially the office manager, Bernetta Grinnell, who is thirty-one, stacked, dumb as dirt, and has been out to get Charlotte for years. *Bernetta is sleeping with one of the doctors, Charlotte knows the score and Bernette knows that she knows, so there you are. Bernetta dumps everything on Charlotte's desk, then takes credit for the work. She gets away with murder. She takes two hours at lunch, and she steals from petty cash. She lies about Charlotte to the doctors, so Charlotte hasn't gotten a decent raise for years. It's terrible.*

(*Lake Wobegon Days*, 'Spring'; Keillor 1987:353)

It is understood that Charlotte delivers a harangue of just about this kind every time Ella talks to her. Compare also the following passage from a medical case study:

- (6) At first these odd mistakes were laughed off as jokes, not least by Dr P. himself. *Had he not always had a quirky sense of humor, and been given to Zen-like paradoxes and jests? His musical powers were as dazzling as ever; he did not feel ill- he had never felt better; and the mistakes were soludicrous — and so ingenious—that they could hardly be serious or betoken anything serious.*

(Sacks 1985:7)

In the following passage several *different* people talk *at the same time*:

- (7) So redeten die Leute, und ich hörte ihnen gierig zu, und hörte auch die Gegenrede: *Wie! Wegen einer Leidenschaft für den Apollonpriester Panthoos sollte Vetter*

Lampos die Befragung der Pythia über die allerwichtigsten Angelegenheiten Troias einfach vergessen haben?

(*Kassandra*; Wolf 1989:40)¹

This strategy of condensation is at work even more forcefully in the following passage from *The Mill on the Floss*, where what must have been various stages of one extended gossip session are collapsed into one ‘utterance’ reputedly proffered by the society of St Ogg’s, whose precipitate conclusions are ironically pointed up by their condensation into the one free indirect passage:

(8) *For Dr Kenn, it had been understood, had sat in the schoolroom half an hour one morning, when Miss Tulliver was giving her lessons; nay, he had sat there every morning; he had once walked home with her — he almost always walked home with her—and if not, he went to see her in the evening. What an artful creature she was! What a mother for those children! It was enough to make poor Mrs Kenn turn in her grave, that they should be put under the care of this girl only a few weeks after her death. Would he be so lost to propriety as to marry her before the year was out?* The masculine mind was sarcastic, and thought not.

(*Mill on the Floss* VII, iv; G.Eliot 1986:496–497)

A less ironic passage is the following:

(9) *Le soir, quelques amis se présentèrent pour la féliciter et pour la plaindre: elle devait être si chagriné de n’avoir plus sa niece? C’était fort bien, d’ailleurs, aux jeunes mariés de s’être mis en voyage; plus tard, les embarras, les enfants surviennent! Mais l’Italie ne répondait pas à l’idée qu’on s’en faisait. Après cela, ils étaient dans l’âge des illusions! et puis la lune de miel embellissait tout!*

(*L’Éducation sentimentale* III, iii; Flaubert 1971:353)²

If the above passage is one radical instance of **condensation**, the following two quotations from *The Invention of the World*, a comic masterpiece of epic proportions, illustrate **typicality of style**:

(10) *The poor fat man slammed on the brakes, stopped the car under a maple tree, and took the keys out of the ignition. A man in his condition, he admitted, was unfit to be driving a bride and a groom: a man as emotional as he was had no business at all behind a wheel, he was a menace on the roads; a man like himself with a heart condition, a nagging wife, and five sponging sons-in-law ought not to be working at all, especially at his time of life. He would not, he said, drive another inch. But he would, he said, hand the keys over to Wade.*

(*The Invention of the World*, ‘Second Growth’; Hodgins 1977:343)

The driver’s tirade of self-abasement is in terms of a legal and journalistic description of unfitness to drive. This language is neither the narrator’s nor the character’s by any standard of verisimilitude; it is of course a parody of what a traffic court might find in the

case of drunken driving and how this might be reported in linguistic clichés. In spite of the parody, one can quite clearly see that no actual speech act could be (re-)constructed for the situation except perhaps that of a typical tirade about the driver's family circumstances (typified by the clichés of the *nagging* wife and the *sponging* sons-in-law).³

The following passage parodies a political speech whose reliance on clichés of a conceptual as well as linguistic type surfaces in the quasi-direct quote ('You are the light', etc.). This is formally direct speech, but of a clearly typified nature, and there is some more of the same at the beginning of the free indirect discourse speech in the centre of the paragraph.

- (11) During the third hour of the wedding reception [...] the freckle-faced man [...] delivered a speech. What price justice? he said, and whither Love? What man hath seen a greater pair than these? What man hath seen a nobler pair of hearts? [...] *He represented the government, he said, which meant he represented the whole electorate of the province. And he was here to tell them, proud to say, that it was people like them, like you and me, who make this country strong. What we needed he said, and what the whole electorate knew we needed, was a whole new breed of people like—he looked at his monogrammed serviette—like Maggie and Wade, and like the kind of wonderful people who'd turned up, turned up he said in this godforsaken drafty dump of a hall, to wish them well. You are the salt, he said, of the earth. You are the lights, he said, under the bushel. You are the strength, he said, of the land, he said, and the land shall ever be strong. But the beauty of his own words stuck in his throat, he began to feel faint.*

(*The Invention of the World*, 'Second Growth'; Hodgins 1977:350)

A similar passage that disguises its typicality while emphasizing the ironical nature of the speech representation comes from Hurston. One here finds **explicit signals** of typification.

- (12) After his chief scribe got through telling the Hebrews what a blessing it was for Pharaoh to not only let them see his sacred body, *he was actu ally going to let them listen to his voice. He was going to speak to them, using his own sacred voice and lips. They had done nothing to deserve such a great blessing. It just went to show how very kind and gentle and gracious great Pharaoh was. Always considering others before he did himself, and so on and so forth.* Then Pharaoh himself rose to speak.

(*Moses, Man of the Mountain*, iv; Hurston 1984:31)

- (13) Snow White is agitated. She is worried about something called her 'reputation.' *What will people think, why have we allowed her to become a public scandal, we must not be seen in public en famille, no one believes that she is simply a housekeeper, etc. etc.* These concerns are ludicrous. No one cares.

(*Snow White*; D.Barthelme 1987:41)

Such instances of *etc.*, *etc.* or *and so on* have also been documented by Sternberg (1982a: 94).

Moreover, typification of free indirect discourse comes across very forcefully in literary representations of **oral free indirect discourse**. Frequently thoughts and reactions are imputed to the addressee or a third person, and since they are merely imputed they cannot of course be verbatim in any acceptable sense of the term. One typically attributes standard reactions, clichés of opinions and thoughts to other people, and this then shapes the free indirect discourse ‘representation’ of them, too:

- (14) Now, you mean to tell me out of all the doctors you got in a hospital, not one of these doctors know what he’s suppose to do—if to go in the front or the back of a man to keep him from bleeding to death? You trying to tell me that? What you got them there for if they don’t know how to operate? *No, they didn’t want to stop the bleeding. They had paid them guards to kill him, and now they sure wasn’t go’n save his life in no hospital.* I wouldn’t be a bit surprise if one day they don’t find out them doctors didn’t help kill him in that place.

(*Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman*; Gaines 1971:150)

In this passage Jane Pittman evokes the frame of mind which she imputes to the doctors abetting the murderers of Huey P. Long. No definite speech or thought act is likely to have occurred at all, yet the expressive features (*now, sure*) as well as the shifted *going* construction (which signals prospective intent) mark the sentence as free indirect discourse, and it is of course only interpretable as a description of these people’s probable viewpoint or state of mind.⁴ In the following passage from *The Satanic Verses*, the attribution of discourse ironically exposes the tirade-like nature of the complaints in which Salahuddin regularly indulges:

- (15) ‘See how well he complains,’ Nasreen teased him in front of his father. ‘About everything he has such big-big criticisms, *the fa ns are fixed too loosely to the roof and will fall to slice our heads off in our sleep, he says, and the food is too fattening, why we don’t cook some things without frying, he wants to know, the top-floor balconies are unsafe and the paint is peeled, why can’t we take pride in our surroundings, isn’t it, and the garden is overgrown, we are just jungle people, he says this so, and look how coarse our movies are, now he doesn’t enjoy, a nd so m uch dis you can’t even drink water from the tap, my god, he really got an education, husband, our little Sallu, England-returned, and talking so fine and all.*’

(*The Satanic Verses*; Rushdie 1988:44)

In the following examples of actually spoken (oral) direct and free indirect speech a probable attitude, represented by an attributive utterance, is outlined:

- (16) nobody talks during the whole movie there’s no dialogue [1.8] Did you know that? No. [5.15] [laugh] [.45] A—nd u—h [2.55] he has just clambered down, [.35] from his ladder, [.8] and notices [.4] ‘*Whoa.* [.45] *My* [.3] *pear my basket is gone.*’ And goes...one, [.55] two, [1.35] and the .. third one is missing.

(Chafe 1980b:312)

- (17) And my mother had just sat down to have a cup of coffee. And I told him to cut it out.

‘Course kids, you know—*he don’t hafta listen to me*. So that’s when I grabbed him by the arm.

(Labov 1972:239)

There is no indication that the old man gathering pears said anything at all—in fact there is no sound in the movie on which Chafe’s retelling experiments were based: a typical rather than a real speech act is implied by the idiom. Likewise, in Labov’s story the narrator’s brother did not say ‘I don’t have to listen to you’ in so many words: it is his attitude that is here expressed schematically.

Another example, this time from the *New York Review of Books*, illustrates this inventive type of schematic language use:

- (18) Next, *I propose the following outrage*: that ‘Lincoln excluded Union-held areas from the Emancipation Proclamation’ as a favor to ‘pro-Union slaveholders.’ Yet it is a fact that seven counties in and around Norfolk, Virginia, and several Louisiana parishes were allowed to maintain slavery while slavery was banned in the rest of the South.

(Vidal 1988:57)

Gore Vidal here replies to Richard N. Current’s (1986) review of his Lincoln biography in which Current had severely criticized Vidal for claiming what is here outlined in the that-clause. Current, however, nowhere uses the expression *outrage*, and in fact does not use any strong language. The expression *outrage* is entirely due to Vidal himself and his imputation of how Current feels about his historical lapsus:

- (19) Even by this lenient standard Vidal’s Lincoln does rather poorly. At many points it is hard to know whether his version of Lincoln’s life and times is an outright invention, a dubious interpretation, or simply a mistake.

Consider the following contentions: As early as April 1861 Lincoln was thinking of emancipation as possibly justifiable as “a military necessity” (p. 141). He excluded Union-held areas from the Emancipation Proclamation ‘as a favor’ to ‘pro-Union’ (p. 414) slaveholders. [...] Unfortunately, there is no convincing historical evidence for any of these assertions, and there is conclusive evidence against most of them.

(Current 1986:80)

There is no real need, however, for any actual speech act along the lines of ‘outrage’ to have occurred; the evaluative tenor of Current’s review alone suffices for Vidal to project Current’s putative statement, rephrased by him in free indirect discourse.

In colloquial free indirect discourse, when people hurl reproaches or accusations at one another, such typical projections or paraphrases are particularly widespread. I have quoted a good example of such linguistic warfare in [Chapter 3](#):

- (20) (Mrs Zero:) I was a fool for marryin' you. If I'd 'a' had any sense, I'd 'a'known what you were from the start. I wish I had it to do over again, I hope to tell you. *You was goin' to do wonders, you was! You wasn't goin to be a bookkeeper long—oh no, not you. Wait till you got started—you was goin' to show 'em. There wasn't no job in the store that was too big for you.* Well, I've been waitin'—waitin' for you to get started—see? It's been a good long wait too. Twenty-five years! An' I ain't seen nothin' happen. Twenty-five years in the same job.

(*The Adding-Machine*; Rice 1965:5)

Projection occurs also within the representation of consciousness. In the following passage Milkman muses how he could get rid of Hagar his girl-friend. The clichés he uses in his hypothetical speech immediately suggest that he is trying out different typical argumentative strategies, here signified by means of linguistic clichés:

- (21) I'll remind her that we are cousins, he thought. *He would not buy her a present at all; instead he would give her a nice piece of money. Explain that he wanted her to get something really nice for herself, but that his gift-giving was compromising her. That he was not what she needed. She needed a steady man who could marry her. He was standing in her way. And since they were related and all, she should start looking for someone else. It would hurt him, he would say, deeply hurt him, after all these years, but if you loved somebody as he did her, you had to think of them first. You couldn't be selfish with somebody you loved.*

(*Song of Solomon*, iv; Morrison 1977:98)

Indeed, free indirect discourse interpretations in ambiguous contexts frequently rely on the typicality and clichéd quality of the discourse which cannot be attributed to the more refined narrative voice:

- (22) If I told my schoolmates that Lena Lingard's grandfather was a clergyman, and much respected in Norway, they looked at me blankly. *What did it matter? All foreigners were ignorant people who couldn't speak English.* There was not a man in Black Hawk who had the intelligence or cultivation, much less the personal distinction, of Antonía's father. Yet people saw no difference between her and the three Marys; *they were all Bohemians, all 'hired girls.'*

(*My Antonía*; Cather 1984:200–1)⁵

Only the townspeople could be responsible for defining foreigners as 'people who can't speak English properly'.

The typical and schematic quality of free indirect discourse is also instanced in the many passages of free indirect discourse in which a **plurality of voices** is condensed into one

statement. We have observed earlier how the female society of St Ogg's rashly decided that Dr Kenn was guilty of a love relationship with Maggie Tulliver. In the following examples, however, it is a *vox communis* that is being presented:

- (23) *No, they could not hope for home rule in the old country, nor, if Catholic in Scotland or Wales, for much sympathy from the Protestant indigenes. But here in the thousands of square miles around Gillanbone they were lords to thumb their noses at British lords, masters of all they surveyed [...]*

Besides, Mary Carson was footing the bill tonight. She could well afford it. Rumor said she was able to buy and sell the King of England

(The Thorn Birds, 'Ralph', vii; McCullough 1978:177–8)

- (24) *Outdoors, we knew, was the real terror of life. The threat of being outdoors surfaced frequently in those days. Every possibility of excess was curtailed with it. If somebody ate too much, he could end up outdoors. If somebody used too much coal, he could end up outdoors. People could gamble themselves outdoors, drink themselves outdoors. Sometimes mothers put their sons outdoors, and when that happened, regardless of what the son had done, all sympathy was with him. He was outdoors, and his own flesh had done it. To be put outdoors by a landlord was one thing—unfortunate, but an aspect of life over which you had no control, since you could not control your income. But to be slack enough to put oneself outdoors, or heartless enough to put one's own kin outdoors—that was criminal.*

(The Bluest Eye, 'Autumn'; Morrison 1972:17–18)

(23) evokes the general outlook of Mary Carson's clique, and it should be noted that although the second paragraph may be grounded in widespread conjecture about Mary's fortune, the earlier more political attitude is unlikely to have actually presented itself to her guests in quite so concrete or particular a form. Indeed, the expressive elements (*No, here*), which clearly identify this initial section as free indirect discourse rather than the narrator's 'omniscient' historical introduction, create a deictic centre within the story much on the lines of Banfield's 'empty centre' (1987b) in V.Woolf's *The Waves*. (Compare under (7.4).) Likewise, in (24) the two sisters' and their community's views about 'outdoors' have been condensed into one linguistic shape that does not at all correspond to any actual speech or thought acts, not even to traceable utterances overheard by the two girls.⁶

Such imputation of a general attitude in free indirect discourse can be discovered not only in novels. Here are an example from a critical essay on Tennyson's 'Charge of the Light Brigade' and a passage from the *New York Review of Books* that paraphrases political sentiment among British Conservatives:

- (25) *The war had been justified as a battle between right and wrong, which meant that victory had to be attained at all costs unless the foundations of civilisation were to yield. If the aggressors were not halted they might threaten British rule itself, and who was to stop the 'Russian hordes' if righteousness no longer weighed the scales? Against this background*

the news of the virtual annihilation of a large British force might have been received [...]

(Foltinek 1986:28)

- (26) This [referring to a statement of Margaret Thatcher in an interview, in which she claimed that her unpopularity with the party as so often before had been merely temporary] referred to her belief, encouraged by loyal acolytes, that had she not allowed herself to be persuaded by cabinet colleagues that she faced humiliation and defeat, had she gone through to a second ballot in last November's leadership contest, she could have beaten Michael Heseltine's challenge to her leadership of the party. *After all, John Major had been elected with 184 MPs' votes in the three-cornered second ballot, while on the first she had commanded the support of 203, a majority of those voting. Under the peculiar rules of the Conservative party leadership elections this margin of victory was not large enough but, on any reasonable assessment, who was the legitimate leader of the party?* That was the question her friends were asking as the Major honeymoon drew to its close.

(NYRB 38.8 [1991]:43)

I think we are now ready to conclude that free indirect discourse cannot be regarded as a quasi-verbatim representation of an *actual* speech or thought act and that in many cases the typicality and schematic nature of the represented linguistic expression is not only noticeable but indeed deliberately foregrounded and made use of for ironic purposes. I will now turn to a consideration of direct speech and illustrate how direct speech, too, in spite of the conventional requirement to signify a verbatim transcription of original discourse, frequently violates this mimetic convention, which is in fact regularly flouted under equally powerful conventional expectations of brevity and illocutionary adequacy.

8.2

SCHEMATIC FEATURES IN DIRECT DISCOURSE

Direct discourse, for a long time, has been viewed in terms of a verbatim or at least reliable reporting of originary discourse. Even quite sophisticated approaches to indirect discourse representation tend to pass over linguistic tendencies to tinker with utterances when these are reported in the form of direct speech. The temptation to idealize direct discourse has been particularly strong in literary and narratological studies, where one is dealing with 'mere' texts and does not have recourse to data beyond them. Incorrect reports of one's utterances can usually be rectified if one protests against them—a procedure well known in journalism. With regard to literature, however, all we have to go by is the text itself, and within the text's system of hierarchically structured levels of varying reliability, direct discourse is the most reliable, since it conventionally pretends to be a transcription of an original utterance—even if that utterance is actually an invented one. The process relies on conventional and therefore expected reading strategy and on the systematic opposition between frame and inset. Because characters' discourse, in direct speech, is given to us in the least mediated fashion and because—in the real world—verbatim

quotation has a legally bolstered status of self-identity, the mimetic properties of direct discourse in narrative texts seem self-evident and unproblematic to the extent of Genette's (1972/1980) and Chatman's (1978) positing of direct discourse as pure mimesis or non-narration. Yet the literality and faithfulness of reported discourse can be questioned in its fundamental philosophical claim to reproduce the original:

[T]here need not be a maximal degree above which resemblance is replaced by identity and interpretation by reproduction. Identity is a limiting case of resemblance; reproduction is a limiting case of interpretation.

(Sperber/Wilson 1986:229)

In fact, as Sperber/Wilson so aptly note, literality is a presupposition of the literary code model rather than a possible or even desirable empirical strategy in most discourse production.

As far as literature is concerned, we are indebted to Meir Sternberg for an incisive critique of this myth of originary direct discourse. In his two 1982 articles Sternberg has persuasively contested the 'direct discourse fallacy', illustrating not only that the representation of direct discourse is crucially affected by its narrative integration (e.g. by means of inquit-tags), but, even more importantly, documenting the numerous ways in which narratives play with the notion of literal utterance. Thus there are the cases in which the narrative imputes statements or thoughts to characters, where these did not utter a word:⁷

(27) And I just felt like,
This is where I belong.'

(Tannen 1989:152)

(28) An approving murmur arose from the heads of tribes; as saying, There you have him! Hold him!'

(*Our Mutual Friend* I, xi; Dickens 1979:187)

Inversely, there are speech acts that include authorial intervention:

(29) 'Come in, come in,' he said cheerfully, as if he had been expecting me. 'My name is *so-and-so*' I said.

(*Sebastian Knight*; Nabokov 1982:118; quoted Sternberg 1982a: 98)⁸

We have already noted *thus and thus* for free indirect discourse, and this type is particularly common in the context of direct speech report. I have found numerous examples of this curious refusal to name or to report in verbatim fashion:

(30) Here we have the story of how a master of the art behaved in implementing his art. They are surface structure narratives, which run somewhat as follows: So and

so (by name) built a fishtrap on a certain bend of a certain river a certain year. He was highly successful. He caught so and so many fish in his trap, etc.

(Longacre 1983:12)

The device has been noted from a linguistic perspective by R. Harweg (1972), D. Tannen (1986, 1987a, 1989), Mayes (1990), Yamaguchi (forthcoming: 33–4), and von Roncador (1988:104–7). A particularly good example is the following:

- (31) A man's voice said, 'Is that Miss Esther Greenwood?' [...] 'It certainly is,' I said. 'This is Constantin *Something-or-Other*.' I couldn't make out the last name, but it was full of S's and K's.

(*The Bell Jar*, v; Sylvia Plath 1976:52; quoted Yamaguchi, forthcoming: 33)

Besides Sternberg, G. Strauch has noted some equally interesting examples:

- (32) [F]or, says I, there is *such a one*, naming a Woman that mended Lace, and wash'd the Ladies Lac'd-heads, she, says I, is a Gentlewoman, and they call her Madam.

(*Moll Flanders*; Defoe 1989:50; quoted Strauch 1984:162)

This also occurs in indirect discourse:

- (33) As Victor Brombert has so well pointed out, the Stendhalian narrator typically uses hypothetical grammatical forms, asserting that if only Julien had understood *such and such*, he would have done *so and so*, with results different from those to which he condemns himself.

(Brooks 1985:75)

- (34) and I said well it seemed to me to be an example of /this this: this this :this this # and /this and this # m # which it /was # you /knów #⁹

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.3–20)

Likewise, one needs to note **condensed** speech acts, in which a brief discourse schematically represents an entire speech event, mostly a harangue, in typicalized form:

- (35) Mr Dorrit [...] rose to receive Mrs General. A chair to Mrs General. An easier chair, sir; what are you doing, what are you about, what do you mean? Now, leave us!

(*Little Dorrit* II, iv; Dickens 1978:525)

- (36) But then I say, no, that's not the way it went, not what they told themselves they was doing. People don't say: We're bad, going to do evil. They come down south to see his papa just like they told us. *Maybe he needs somebody to see after him*. Maybe they out to take him up to Akron, Ohio, with them and see after him up there.

(*Can't Quit You, Baby*; Douglas 1988:25)

A much more radical kind of condensation, indeed **contraction**, can be observed in fictional monologues, most prominently on the stage, as in Faustus's famous 'one hour' soliloquy (Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus* V, ii, 143–92). In the novel the device is less common, but Page (1988:31–2) notes a few cases such as the following from chapter 11 of Austen's *Northanger Abbey*:

- (37) I [Catherine Morland] do not quite despair yet. I shall not give it up till a quarter after twelve. This is just the time of day for it to clear up, and I do think it looks a little lighter. There, it is twenty minutes after twelve, and now I shall give it up entirely.

(Quoted Page 1988:32)

As with free indirect discourse, a habitual recurrence of a speech act can also be condensed into a schematized representation, this time in the form of direct discourse.¹⁰ The habituality is here signalled by *would*:

- (38) 'Was I an absolute prince,' he **would** say, pulling up his breeches with both his hands, as he rose from his armchair, 'I would appoint able judges, at every avenue of my metropolis, who should take cognizance of every fool's business who came there.'

(*Tristram Shandy* I, xviii; Sterne 1987:74; quoted Sternberg 1982a:94)¹¹

There are, also, direct discourse instances for which several people are responsible, yet we get one specific quotation that gives us a typical *vox communis* image rather than a faithful transcription of one specific token:

- (39) you know the effects have been very bad especially on people wanting to go to university—and the attitude of their parents who have said **no I don't want you to go to university ((or)) to places like that**

(*Survey of English Usage* S.5.10.65)

- (40) the parents listening to this conversation might say Whoops this guy's a relativist I'm putting my kids these tender sensibilities into this man's hands

(*Soundings* broadcast, no. 543, May 1990)

- (41) That's Nonnie Anderson,' **they would tell you**, 'that's one of the Anderson niggers. Been to college. Yeah! Whole family been to college! All right niggers though, even if they have. Had a good mother who raised her children to work hard and know their place. Anderson niggers all right. Good as we have in the county, I reckon.'

'Stuck up like Almighty, Nonnie Anderson,' **some colored folks said**, 'holding her head so high-tighty, not like Bess. Bess common as dirt, friendly with folks.'

(*Strange Fruit*; Smith 1944:1)

- (42) The school was a private one for white English-speaking girls and they innocently expressed their sympathy the only way they knew how:—**Bloody Boers, dumb**

Dutchmen, thick Afrikaners—they would go and lock up your mom. As if she'd ever do anything wrong.

(*Burger's Daughter*, i; Gordimer 1979:19)

As in free indirect discourse instances of explicit *and so on*, *and so forth*, *etc.*, the same can be encountered in the framing of direct discourse by the narrative, or even in the narrative proper:

- (43) He [Edward] was never a man of the deeds-of-heroism sort and it was just as good for him to be sniped at up in the hills on the North Western frontier, as to be shot at by an old gentleman in a top hat at the bottom of some spruit. *Those are more or less his words about it*

(*The Good Soldier* III, v; Ford 1983:171)

- (44) That's you Christians, all over!—you'll get up a society, and get some poor missionary to spend all his days among just such heathen. But let me see one of you that would take one into your house with you, and take the labor of their conversion on yourselves! No; when it comes to that, *they are dirty and disagreeable, and it's too much care, and so on* .'

(*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, xx; Stowe 1981:238)

Direct and free indirect discourse frequently are acknowledged quite openly as schematizations or inventions by the reporter. As Ducrot notes, 'on peut, au style direct, rapporter en deux secondes un discours de deux minutes: En un mot, Pierre m'a dit «J'en ai assez».' (Ducrot 1984:199)

- (45) [H]e said, What is the occasion of your being here? or to that purpose.

(Bunyan, *Grace Abounding*, 'A Relation of the Imprisonment...'; quoted Strauch 1984:163)

- (46) *Was he struck by lightning?* With some incoherent half-formed *thought to that effect*, he turned under the blows that were blinding him and mashing his life.

(*Our Mutual Friend* IV, vi; Dickens 1979:767)

Hypothetical utterances are also in this line:

- (47) In that case I can enter the kingdom of the saved only as a farmgirl, never as a heroine of consciousness. Dare I say, *Then I'll be damned?* Will the voices cease to speak to me? If that happens I will truly be lost.

(*In the Heart of the Country*, § 249; Coetzee 1982:129–30)

- (48) Pflaumen made a great bustle of seating the guests, and finally plumped himself down at the head of the table and beamed at them all as if to say, 'Isn't this cozy?'

(*The Company She Keeps*, The Genial Host'; McCarthy 1942:146)

In fact such invention was a common rhetorical strategy of much writing until the late nineteenth century when attempting to characterize people's frame of mind (Scholes/Kellogg 1966:177–206, 283–99):

- (49) With other black boys the strife was not so fiercely sunny: their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancy, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, *Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house?*

(*The Souls of Black Folk*, i; Du Bois 1989:4–5)

The most typical case in a sense is of course that of literary interior monologue, which cannot readily be identified with purportedly occurring internal discourse, and this not only because it occurs in fiction. The problem is, rather, that even verbalized internal thought cannot be resorted to as an empirical source for mimetic comparison, although each reader by her-/ himself may decide on the adequacy in relation to his or her own performance.¹² Sternberg quotes a wonderful narratorial admission of the inventedness of interior monologue from Sir Walter Scott:

- (50) At length his meditations arranged themselves in the following soliloquy—by which expression I beg leave to observe once for all, that I do not mean that Nigel literally said aloud with his bodily organs, the words which follow in inverted commas, (while pacing the room by himself,) but that I myself choose to present to my dearest reader the picture of my hero's mind, his reflections and resolutions, in the form of a speech, rather than that of a narrative. In other words, I have put his thoughts into language; and this I conceive to be the purpose of the soliloquy upon the stage as well as in the closet, being at once the most natural and perhaps the only way of communicating to the spectator what is supposed to be passing in the bosom of the scenic personage.

(*The Fortunes of Nigel* ; quoted Sternberg 1982a:78)¹³

The reader may have noted that the areas of manipulation in direct discourse are quite exactly those in which free indirect discourse also typifies or deliberately 'misrepresents' the language of the 'original' speaker. With direct discourse such tendencies appear more radical and unexpected because of our conventional expectation of the 'faithfulness' of direct discourse to the utterance which interior monologue purportedly represents. The following categories of anti-mimeticism, I would like to recapitulate, have been exemplified above for direct and free indirect discourse:

- purely invented discourse ('speaking' gestures or objects)
- hypothetical or speculative utterances or thoughts
- attributions of attitudes or opinions to individuals
- attributions of attitudes or opinions to groups of people

- habitual utterances or thoughts
- similar utterances condensed into one set speech
- several utterances by a group of people condensed into one typical utterance
- clichéd stylization of an utterance or thought act, in which the platitude of the style argues for typification
- explicit denials of mimeticism such as ‘etc.’, ‘such-and-such’, ‘in so many words’, ‘to that purpose’ and the like
- open admission of the fictional nature of quoted discourse¹⁴

Although these tendencies have been discovered here and there,¹⁵ only Beyerle (1972) and Strauch (1974, 1984)¹⁶ openly thematize this factor for free indirect discourse. For direct discourse Sternberg, Kaufmann (1976) and Emberson (1986) have noted typicality, abstraction and condensation qualities, even in indirect discourse. To round off this presentation, here is an example of condensed *indirect* discourse that has all the qualities we have so far noted in direct and free indirect representation:

- (51) Among her [Mrs Gowan’s] connections and acquaintances, however, she maintained her individual dignity and the dignity of the blood of the Barnacles, by diligently nursing the pretence that it was a most unfortunate business; that she was sadly cut up by it; that this was a perfect fascination under which Henry laboured; that she had opposed it for a long time, *but what could a mother do; and the like.*

(*Little Dorrit* I, xxxii; Dickens 1978:440)¹⁷

8.3

THE CASE OF ORAL DISCOURSE

Recent developments in linguistics, particularly in the area of discourse analysis, now allow us to analyse departures from verbatim speech representation as a general characteristic of direct discourse, which is operative in both oral and written texts, and to quite an unrecognized extent.

Two scholars have analysed this phenomenon in recent years. M.H.Short (1988) illustrates how direct discourse quotations in some newspaper headlines drastically distort the propositional (and sometimes even illocutionary) tenor of the utterance reported:

- (52) **PREMIER Margaret Thatcher took one look at her new portrait and said: ‘Get rid of that squint!’**

For the painting, which went on show yesterday in London’s National Portrait Gallery, shows the Prime Minister with her gaze decidedly awry.

And artist Rodrigo Moynihan admitted last night: ‘Mrs Thatcher is not entirely happy with it.’

Mr Moynihan, 74, a former professor at the Royal College of Art, confessed to ‘quite a lot of trouble’ over Mrs Thatcher’s eyes.

And he added: 'I could be quite happy with one more sitting and I know she would be.'

The problems began when Mrs Thatcher asked him to put more grey in the blue eyes in the portrait.

'She also noticed a squint—though she pointed it out fairly diplomatically,' Mr Moynihan said.

(*The Sun*, June 21, 1984, p. 11)

Short comments:

The Sun's headline is not only not a faithful reproduction of the words Mrs Thatcher actually used; it also borders on being unfaithful in other respects. We do not know what Mrs Thatcher actually said, but given Mr Moynihan's remarks in the body of the article to the effect that she made her criticism 'fairly diplomatically', it would appear that not only the words used, but the illocutionary force and maybe even the propositional content of the original utterance, have not been faithfully reproduced. Similar remarks apply to the opening sentence of the article itself. In addition, on a first reading, the headline is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the squint belongs to the painting or to Mrs Thatcher herself.

(Short 1988:67–8)

The same story is referred to by the additional captions '**UGH! GET RID OF MY SQUINT**' (*The Sun*, June 21, 1984, p. 11) and by '**You've given me a squint, said Maggie**' in *The Daily Express* (June 21, 1984, p. 7). Such distortions are of course motivated by the exigencies of originality and newsworthiness, with headlines attempting to catch readers' immediate attention.¹⁸ That it is the social context that is responsible for the degree of reliability in quotations has also been noted by Slembrouck (1992b), who adduces considerable evidence for a distinction between 'public' discourse, which corresponds with high rates of verbatimity, and the 'private realm', in which reported speech generally has low reliability ratings.

The second contribution relating to non-mimetic features of direct discourse has come from Deborah Tannen (1986, 1987a, 1989). Her analyses of oral narratives have led her to the conclusion that speakers frequently invent direct discourse to enliven their narratives. This is noticeable particularly when one can compare the retellings of the same story material by different speakers. Thus, Tannen noted Brazilian speakers' tendency to invent whole sections of dialogue between Little Red Ridinghood and the Wolf where there had been none in the original presentation (Tannen 1989:128–31). Also, in some of the stories that Tannen analyses typical responses are described by means of invented direct speech since such direct discourse constitutes a kind of objective correlative to the physical or emotional behaviour registered by the narrator. Such quasi-speeches are frequently introduced by *like*: *He's like 'You know, I really don't want to do this'*. (This construction, incidentally, has to be distinguished from *She goes (like)*, which can be

followed by more verbatim direct discourse.) The following example from Tannen's book documents such invented dialogue with great clarity. I have italicized typical dialogue:¹⁹

- (53) and um they didn't tell us,
 first of all,
 that we were going into the bath,
 so we were standing in the room,
 and they said '*Okay, take your clothes off.*'
 We're like '*What?!*'
 and um
 [...]
 they gave us these kimonos
 and we put the kimono on,
 they brought us to this other room,
 and they said, '*Okay, take the kimono off.*'
 And we're like '*What are you talking about?*'

(Tannen 1989:115–16)

How typical these utterances are can be gauged partly by their repetition, which is not always verbal repetition on the narration plane, but signals repeated elements on the story level.

Typified instances of direct discourse have been noted also by the collectors of the *Survey of English Usage* material. Indeed, a separate subject index file has been created for what the *Survey* calls '**extra-idiolect**'. The definition of this phenomenon in the *Survey* data is 'items outside the speaker's idiolect with or without an introducing speech verb'. This includes the following categories. (I quote, with examples from the definition sheet of the *Survey*.) Extra-idiolect comprises, first, uses of quotation as *mention*, e.g. in literary quotations.

- (54) It is a truth universally acknowledged, Jane Austen tells us, that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.
 (55) Do you love him? Love? That's a big word.

Secondly, extra-idiolect includes 'reported opinions' (such as I've heard it said that London owes its financial pre-eminence to [...]) and 'various semi-institutionalized uses of *say*':

- (56) I was just going to ask/say would it be all right for me to come a little earlier.
 (57) You can come back and say I'll have it or I won't.
 (58) Not for very long, I may say.

Some of the examples in these categories are rather dubious, it seems to me, particularly since they formally span the whole spectrum of direct, indirect and free indirect discourse.

(57), however, is a good instance of the kind of typified utterance I have mentioned earlier.

Further categories of extra-idiolect in the *Survey* are references to written words and phrases, as in,

- (59) a. It says here 'Press the button.'
 b. In the letter the man wrote 'Unless my luck changes, I will burn the church down.'

The latter, obviously, is direct discourse, and I see no reason to divorce the meanings of written verbal forms from those of the spoken language. The first example, however, points to the interesting fact of institutionalized written discourse in our lives which is addressee-oriented rather than reducible to a single person's linguistic speech act.

The fifth category of extra-idiolect according to the *Survey* consists in 'apparent direct speech, but introduced by NEG or INTERROG', which is to say that there is no actual speech act:²⁰

- (60) He wanted to say, 'Do I look older than that? Do I look as old as I feel?'
 (W.16.8.24)²¹

- (61) Well I haven't said I disliked meeting Germans have I?
 (S.2.8a.20)

Here imputation and the construction of typical utterances are again at work.

The *Survey's* last (sixth) category of extra-idiolect is roughly equivalent to the ironical or critical mention of others' wording:

- (62) Hopefully, as some people say, they'll come tomorrow.
 They awarded him some 'gongs'.
 They listened to what we used to call the wireless.

Although the *Survey's* concept of extra-idiolect is a revolutionary advance over direct discourse ideality, the individual examples need some sorting out. For instance, it is rather striking to observe tense shift in sentences of the type,

- (63) I didn't say I was going.
 Did I say I wasn't going to be here?
 He might have told you he was leaving.

In all of these cases no actual speech act has been performed; the temporal shift emphasizes the conjectural quality of the phrases rather than detracting from it. For our purposes quotations of single words or phrases as linguistic tokens will be set aside, and I will instead concentrate on the other categories in the *Survey* which I take to be

representative of current English usage not only in Great Britain. I do not, however, follow the *Survey's* decision to include instances of indirect discourse and free indirect discourse among a general category of extra-idiolect. As I will argue below, typicality does indeed extend across the whole of language representation in whatever grammatical shape, but I also conceive of this tendency as a basic linguistic factor and not an out of the ordinary—not to say ‘deviant’—phenomenon within speech representation.

Typicality is as widespread as it is for good reason. Not only are speakers generally unable to remember overheard discourse in any verbatim fashion—an explanation of this fact would have to depart from the limitations of human memory. Additionally one will have to note that oral discourse, as we now know, is extremely ‘discontinuous’ in comparison to the standard of the written language, the ideal *langue* of linguistics—so much so that to memorize actual utterances in a verbatim manner would seem to be an even more impossible task. In order to memorize anything in verbatim fashion, one must in fact have memorized not a phonetic transcription of uttered discourse but a phonemic, lexical analysis, yielding a formalized, idealized meaning component of the original utterance. Moreover, constraints of the maxims of quality and quantity make it more important to present the ‘gist’ of an utterance rather than its precise wording, which may be all but irrelevant to the matter in hand: propositional and illocutionary content is much more important than precise phraseological reproduction even to the supposedly verbatim direct discourse representation. One should never lose sight of the fact that direct discourse is an inset framed by the reporter’s intentions and argumentation (Sternberg 1982a, 1982b; Strauch 1984). On that score direct report is always a token of the *other*, of alterity, and the reporting instance will be at its best a neutral reportative voice, at its worst a distancing, evaluative, critical speech act quoting the other in order to define itself as the difference from it. It can therefore be argued that physiological, cognitive and pragmatic frame conditions interact in a way that pushes direct discourse towards typicality.

Speakers have a number of methods by means of which they signal actual verbatim quotation on the one hand and schematically inverted non-verbatim quotation on the other. Among the signals used to mark phraseological faithfulness are asides and modifiers such as ‘as some people say’, ‘what we used to call’, ‘what they term’, ‘in their words’ and various intonational foregrounding strategies (usually signalled by means of quotation marks or italics in the written language). Non-literal direct discourse, on the other hand, is usually marked off less clearly intonationally (shorter pauses, lower pitch and volume),²² and is moreover frequently signalled by means of several typicality discourse markers: *like*, *sort of*, *kind of*, *more or less*, *in so many words*, *practically*, *that’s about what they said*, *to the effect that*, etc.:

- (64) they said well *sort of* what would you like next—you had to say either—forces.
research or. industry [...] so I said research I would have next

(*Survey of English Usage* S. 1.12.2)

- (65) well now the five boxers file out of the ring---nodding to both corners at once if that’s possible *sort of* saying good luck good luck and anxious to get out the [...]

(Ibid., S.10.3.13)

- (66) and so she'd then married Bobby to have a roof over her head *is what she practically said in those words*

(Ibid., S.2.14.100)

One further means of signalling typicality is by means of *etc.*, here with free indirect discourse:

- (67) One of the bosses at work has apparently been to the Stribaital [*sic!*, i.e. Stubaital] climbing and he asked me all sorts of questions about Habicht,—*what condition was the snow in, and did we use ropes, etc., etc.*

(Survey of English Usage W.7.3.17)

- (68) The benevolent gentleman is sorry; *but, then, the thing happens every day! One sees girls and mothers crying, at these sales, always ! it can 't be helped, etc.*; and he walks off, with his acquisition, in another direction.

(Uncle Tom's Cabin, xxx; Stowe 1981:334)

There are also some extremely interesting uses of *you know*. *You know* has to my knowledge recently been analysed as an enquoting device (Redeker 1990, 1991), as a kind of discourse marker signalling the onset of direct quotation. I will argue in the following that not only does *you know* introduce direct discourse, it also signals the typicality of the following speech representation. Here are some examples:

- (69) and I thought then . *you know* it would be nice to have the odd post-card one too but naturally they didn't reproduce the ones I wanted

(Survey of English Usage S.4.4.27)

- (70) but she said . *you know* even then it wasn't enjoyable ((because there were)) just so many people in there

(Ibid., S.2.7.106)

- (71) he said the other chap said *you know* have I had enough time and they said yes you have and I'd had about eight or nine minutes on diarrhoea which is quite a long time really . and I still hadn't finished and I was still going quite strong

(Ibid., S.2.9.10)

- (72) [...] so embarrassing because nobody even knew what he had said

SO: no, that's awful

SA: so there was ((sort of)) one of those silences. *you know* at the end—you couldn't very well say well . *you know* would you mind starting again . and telling us

SB: yes ((in fact)) the normal technique ((the thing to do is for the 2 syllables)) the chairman then say((s)) thank you for that most interesting contribution next speaker

(Ibid., S.2.8b.9)

- (73) Joe said how much . *you know* guess what I paid for this

(Ibid., S. 1.7.53)

- (74) so he said oh well m—you know. may I be permitted to m—offer you m a small gateau compliments of the restaurant

(Ibid., S.7.3.i.3)

This usage of *you know* also signals typicality in indirect discourse and free indirect discourse:

- (75) I asked him why since this . if this was official medical treatment ***you know*** why didn't he have a district nurse in—and get a proper domestic in who really did know how to do . look after antique furniture and so on ***you know*** why mix the two which probably don't mix awfully well

(Ibid., S.2.12.95)

- (76) and I said did she mean for lunch or dinner and she said o either and I said well I would be ***you know*** willing to come in every day for lunch

(Ibid., S. 1.3.52)

A similar function can be attributed to *well* in the following examples:

- (77) and for instance my mother said ***well*** . she would obviously rather have him she wasn't going to see him in a home. but [...] if he came to live with us then she would have to give up work she just couldn't manage to look after him—particularly as the years went by

(Ibid., S.5.8.118)

- (78) I remember making some perfectly horrible remarks and saying ***well*** they're occupational hazards of being a rock and roll singer and he deserved what he got and ((he)). he must be a horrible man to make this horrible noise

(Ibid., 5b.1.4.(=S. 5.1))

I have also been told that *hey* in American English seems to function in precisely the same way: *So he came in and said, 'Hey, what's the matter.'*²³

- (79) Have you ever considered that why so many historical movements, not only revolutionary ones, fail, fail at heart, is because they fail to take account of the complex and unpredictable forms of our curiosity.

Which doesn't want to push ahead, which always wants to say, ***Hey, that's interesting, let's stop awhile, let's take a look — see, let's retrace— let's take a different turn? What's the hurry? What's the rush? Let's explore.***

(Waterland, xxv; Graham Swift 1983:168–9)

Frequently, there are no such discourse markers of typicality but the idiomatic nature of the quotation facilitates a schematic reading:

- (80) on the other hand he may say *my dear fellow. of course* we understand this problem and we would arrange it this way

(*Survey of English Usage* S.3.4.72)

I also suspect that some uses of *yes* and *no* operate as typicality markers rather than indexes of expressivity:

- (81) everyone said m marvellous what luck . and I said *.yes* I was very lucky
(*Ibid.*, W.1.5c.4)

- (82) And Jo and David said that *no* they couldn't come over because they had people coming

(*Ibid.*, S.4.6b.1)

- (83) So I said *yes of course*
(*Ibid.*, S.3.2a.2)

- (84) and they know about this and said *.oh* but that is *. only .* for home consumption—it's not published

(*Ibid.*, S.3.2c.30)

As the following utterance using the intensifier (*what*) *on earth* demonstrates, such expressive devices serve to evoke a typical direct discourse rather than literal statements or 'transcriptions':

- (85) I thought. well. *what on earth* is an armature. I thought. and *what on earth* are they winding it round for—and *what on earth* is the point of all that wire

(*Ibid.*, S.1.12.25)

This seems to apply even to some uses of (semi-) embedded exclamations and questions:

- (86) and really gave me a terrible harangue over the phone—going on and on and on about. *how could I say such things*

(*Ibid.*, S.1.12.118)

- (87) saying *how this is disgraceful* and demonstrates degrees are
(*Ibid.*, S.5.11a.58)

- (88) no the thing that does *. astonish me* is this Ted Leather ((says)) *what right have we got* to intervene

(*Ibid.*, S.5b.1.44)

Another discourse marker which correlates with emotional intensity is *hell*, and this seems to be on the increase in American English. Note again the typicality of the utterances prefaced by *hell*:

- (89) Sam laughed uncomfortably and proceeded, as though it pained him to bring up so sensitive a topic, to stumble over his next idea: that patriotism—specifically, the

attention that a particular person or family pays to national holidays—is a stonily reliable class indicator, and so it followed that, being Knowleses and all, we didn't, wouldn't, care anything about ceremony, particularly as it related to death and Independence Day. *We were above all that. **Hell**, we didn't even own a flag.*

(‘Navigators’; Smith 1991:25)

- (90) More important, as he [David Duke] felt compelled to point out election night in his suite, ‘Hell, I won.’

(*NYRB* 39.7 [1992]:20)

‘An Almanac? An almanac?’ Edwards hooted about fifty times that day. ‘**Hell**, an almanac tells you how full the moon is gonna be, an almanac tells you when the tide’s coming in.’

(*Ibid.*, 21)

‘But his affiliation with Nazism precluded his getting a commission in the military. **Hell**, we couldn’t tolerate such a thing.’

(*Ibid.*, 23)

Green (1976:384), finally, noted the very typicalized use of *lo and behold* in constructions that we would identify as clauses of narrated perception. Like *hell*, which signals emotional intensity, *lo and behold* is a cliché signalling surprise in a perceptual context.

Although the *Survey* is limited to British variants of the English language, similar conclusions can be drawn from generally available quotations in studies of discourse analysis. I have even found numerous examples of typicality *you know* in Pynchon:

- (91) There’s Mexico’s girl just entering the room. [...] She ought to be in a NAAFI canteen, filling coffee cups. He is suddenly, dodderer and ass, taken by an ache in his skin, a simple love for them both that asks nothing but their safety, and that he’ll always manage to describe as something else—‘concern,’ *you know*, ‘fondness.’

(*Gravity’s Rainbow*; Pynchon 1981:35)

- (92) what about the charge also that we are trivializing that we are finding in detective fiction women’s fiction ah you name it *y’know sort of* gay lesbian Chicano poetry on the 4th block in *such-and-such* a little town in Dallas Texas that *com’on* this isn’t really the proper study of the literary enterprise

(*Soundings* broadcast, no. 543, May 1990)

An extensive study of an American corpus would here be of great value, and I hope that projects at the University of California, Santa Barbara, will come to fruition and make available a comparable corpus of discourse data for the American variants of English.²⁴

used *had he been in the situation* of the original speaker. Japanese women would not use the direct imperative, but a polite equivalent such as *sugu kite kurenai*, *sugu kite kudasai* or *sugu kite kudasaimasen ka* (cp. Kuno's (4.3)). Likewise, in the second example sentence the *watakusi* for 'I' is a typically male form, with a female speaker expected to use *atashi* instead. I find these examples from Japanese enlightening because the process of typification seems to me to be similar to that occurring in sentences of the type *She said yes of course*, in which the 'yes, of course' is illocutionarily appropriate, implying the original speaker's agreement, but does not need to constitute a verbatim quotation.

Another scholar who has deeply pondered the process of typification in language is Dwight Bolinger, whose paper 'Meaning and Memory' (1976) attempts to complement a purely syntactic view of language generation with an associative, idiomatic level of description. Bolinger starts out from a 'fuzzy concept' approach to linguistic typification, in which some locutions correlate more closely to ideal types, or clichés. He presents an insightful scale of linguistic forms patterned along a cline of high vs low meaning content with corresponding low to high probability count (1976:13). Thus really innovative language exists only in novel expressions generated spontaneously in oral word play or in literary word games, and this innovativeness soon gives way to conventional commonplaces and schemata, greetings and formulaic expressions. At the other end of the scale one has less intentional, more automatic speech modes (involuntary cries, pause fillers), and these overlap with the prime stereotypical curses, exclamations and expletives of emotionally laden expression. Because they are fully determined linguistically, Bolinger here also locates preformed discourse which one knows by heart (songs, lines of poetry). I personally believe that this is not the ideal place to put them,




Figure 2: A hypothetical continuum of propositional and automatic speech modes and their properties (from Bolinger 1976:13)

because they are less stereotypical linguistically (more akin to clichés and proverbs) and less automatic. In fact, Bolinger's categories 'memorized' and 'overlearned'—which border on gestural reflex—seem inherently to contradict automatism. (See [Figure 2](#).)

Viewed from Bolinger's perspective, one might consider phrases such as *yes of course* to be typical collocational associations of agreement. Likewise, surprise or puzzlement can regularly be expressed by means of intensifiers (*What the dickens*, etc.), which can be borrowed to mark the illocutionary value of frustration in the report *He doesn't know what the hell to do with it*. Idiomaticity has also been the focus of a paper by Wallace Chafe (1968), who is particularly concerned with the failure of transformational grammar to integrate idiomatic expressions. Chafe's later analyses of the spoken language make it possible to start thinking about oral language generation in a framework of idioms, set phrases and pre-shaped language material, with truly 'new' utterances taking longest to activate on the spot (cp. Chafe 1979).

What I will propose here is to link the well-known syntactic devices of linguistic expressivity or subjectivity to a general notion of schematicism or typicality that also comprises lexical and idiomatic stereotypes. Within this framework *all* linguistic expression is intrinsically formulaic and stereotypical since it utilizes preformulated units of collocation and combines these into increasingly complex patterns. On this view of linguistic performance, *all* language is intrinsically *expressive* and *subjective*, but it also employs clichés of enhanced (or, one might want to say, *exaggerated*) expressivity to *mark* the expressivity of others. Such markers of typical expressivity are usually sufficient to ensure getting across the gist of the reported utterance. It therefore appears that the very constructions which seem to *mimetically* evoke the flavour of the original discourse are *in fact* idealistic projections of the current speaker utilizing a preformulated repertory of

stock phrases. Mimesis in oral language would then be of the same quality as in fiction—not *imitation*, but invention and projection.

Evidence for such a model of general idiomaticity comes from several areas. It is, for instance, striking that the percentage of expressivity markers is much lower in the actual speech of speakers than in their reported discourse. The data of the *Survey* are, I believe, extremely telling in this respect. Most speakers are speakers of standard British English and do not indulge in a flamboyant self-expressiveness when they interact with others. Indeed, occasions to use expressive linguistic elements are rare. Most commonly these are addressee-oriented expressions such as terms of address and endearment, as well as phatic and hedging devices: *oh, well, really, actually*. One additionally finds a number of *evaluative* expressions (*wonderful, cute, gorgeous, dreadful*). Situations in which one orders people out of one's office (*Get the hell out of here*), and in such terms, are more than rare, and constitute highlights of experience to be immediately turned into story material. Most expressive elements in fact occur in reference to past experience, either within narration, where they highlight *past* perception, surprise, dismay and so forth; or in reports of others' emotions.

This brings me to an even more important point about the expressive devices that are supposedly linked to direct discourse or to the SELF. All of these devices are in fact objective correlatives of *emotion* and hence of consciousness, and their relation to direct discourse is as mediated in the case of free indirect discourse as of indirect discourse: direct discourse typically allows for the expression of emotion. Since we do not usually talk to one another in a consistently emotional manner—for reasons of social distance, politeness, situational etiquette, etc.—emotionality surfaces most prominently when we reflectively *think* about certain issues, when we narrate and report our (past) responses and feelings to others—and thereby evaluate or transform them linguistically—or when we invoke emotional attitudes on the part of other people. Emotional, expressive language is in fact frequently a linguistic posture of sorts—one plays the reckless challenger or the enthusiastic admirer. In so far as emotion becomes expressed linguistically it can be mimed, 'played', pretended or impersonated. In fact, to the extent that linguistic utterance is necessarily *reflective*, only interjections and curses can pretend to any semblance of emotional immediacy at all, and these also are necessarily stereotypical in form. One can even go on to consider the linguistic expression of emotionality, or of consciousness itself, to be of an intrinsically pre-patterned nature. It then becomes possible to identify both lexical and syntactic expressivity as a strategy of typification or symbolization, employed to symbolize the non-linguistic ((free) indirect) discourse of emotion within the boundaries of *linguistic* consciousness.

How does such an approach link up with syntax? And with the creative side of language? Typicality in language can be discussed more easily when dealing with the oral language. As Chafe (1979, 1992) has pointed out so convincingly, oral discourse is structured on a series of tone or idea units.²⁵ These units can be understood to focus on specific propositional predications and claims, but also on more pragmatic co-operative phatic elements of discourse—providing feedback, voicing opinions or evaluations, engaging in concessive conditional asides, providing explicatory and definitional background ('delayed orientation' in Labovian terminology—Labov/Waletzky 1967, Labov 1972), etc. In English such tone units are set apart syntactically by presenting a

more or less complete constituent (S, NP, VP) enriched by interjections and various sentence modifiers (here operative as communicational rather than 'emotional' devices), and they have intonational contours and pauses that separate them.

Focus within Chafe's idea units is necessarily and stereotypically centred on an action (a transfer of goods, the producing of an effect or reaction) or on minimal propositions about existential facts and one's comments on such. For instance, an action can be mentioned summarily (*He went on holiday*) or be related in focussed detail in a series of idea units. (Chafe 1977b calls this 'subchunking'.) Here, too, stereotypicality of a cognitive order interferes: world knowledge and knowledge of scripts, plans and goals (cp. under (9.2.2)). These help us to invoke a potentially complex idea in the space of a few brief words because from the semantic kernel of such idea units one immediately projects an entire world with interrelated dependencies and pragmatic situational settings.

On a more self-reflexive level, complex formulations even in the written language do not eschew typification, either. Typification patterns are of course more formally syntactic (patterns of topicalization and theme/rheme distribution, or cross-sentential cohesive and argumentative balancing), as well as stylistic. In the language of the written text, of writing, of *écriture*, style becomes an issue of sorts, and typification devices of the expressive kind are usually replaced by strategies of precision-enhancing specifications, and by modificatory referential and semantic reformulations. This is why practically the same set of devices can function as signals of 'expressivity' in narrative texts and as 'mere' indicators of topic/focus relations in others.

Despite these tendencies towards typification in language, linguistic creativity is not at all impaired by such a 'natural' (Dressler 1989, 1990) emphasis on schemata, clichés and formulaicity. On the contrary, linguistic creativity can be argued to be in fact enhanced by the typification processes in language. Most linguistic creativity does not consist in the invention of new lexemes but in a creative juxtaposition and combination of expected linguistic structures and well-known lexical material. As the new French critics have insisted, all language is intrinsically *intertextual*. Intertextuality, a formerly marginal phenomenon seemingly limited to quotation and allusion, has now been recognized to pervade all the nooks and crannies of linguistic production and to be a constitutive factor of meaning. Rather than inhibiting linguistic creativity, schematism in fact *enables* creative language behaviour by putting at the speaker's or writer's disposal the toys with which s/he can then play. If uninventive pragmatic language use frequently simply reproduces available linguistic schemata in the attempt to meet pragmatic exigencies of brevity, relevance or emphasis, inventive and creative language use intentionally or unintentionally warps the available formulas in the interests of greater precision, entertainment or aesthetic effect.

This takes me to a final point, to the connection between, on the one hand, the semantic process of symbolization in language in terms of the linguistic code, and, on the other, the typicality framework that I have here proposed and which relies on idiomaticity, conceptual ideality and the linguistic schematism of expressivity. There is in fact no direct access to the non-linguistic through language, and the time-worn distinction between 'transparent' language and language deformed and made opaque by style needs to be put to rest once and for all—and this not only in the realm of philosophical language and

literary prose. I will discuss this point in greater detail in the concluding section of this chapter. For the moment I wish to emphasize that schematism constitutes the linguistic code (in the necessary collocation of situation and linguistic expression), but thanks to the wealth and diversity of available schematic techniques and devices (lexical, idiomatic, syntactic) a creative deployment in terms of collocation and combination becomes possible that provides the basis for linguistic creativity rather than resulting in automatization and de-individualization of linguistic expression. Linguistic creativity, in fact, needs to be gauged in relation to the parameters of generic and stylistic context, particularly to discourse conventions currently in force and to discourse strategies and procedures which may be intentional but are sometimes unwitting (re)actions. Linguistic creativity can be cherished as a desirable aesthetic effect much as it may be discountenanced within a specific generic register; and the creativity can, if allowed, become an end in itself (as in much fictional writing) or serve the purposes of verisimilitude, faithful representation, ironic exaggeration, parody or what Bakhtin has called stylization. Like deviant style, linguistic creativity thus reposes on a notion of automatization, of unmarked 'normality', that is inherently undefinable and context-sensitive.

Let me now return to speech and thought representation and explain how exactly schematism becomes operative in direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse, or on the scale of forms that we have analysed. If one does not take direct discourse to be in any way *primary*—except in the sense that some discourse may have taken place prior to a report of it—then expressive syntax within direct discourse can be viewed not as its 'natural' inherent property but as a linguistic device simply to signal or emphasize emotionality, complementing intonational and para-linguistic factors. Among the signals of emotionality, some are clearly *reflective* in the sense that they presuppose self-analysis, a recognition of one's emotionality. *Boy, am I scared* (and of course all evaluations of *past* emotionality) is used as an explanation rather than as the immediate expression of fear, which is more likely to be along the lines: *I'm (so) scared*. Indeed the use of intensifiers and epithets, interjections and verbless exclamations is closest to non-reflective emotionality, whereas syntactic devices probably require the most reflexivity. Even the supposedly non-reflective 'direct' access to emotion is therefore mediated in linguistic shape and form of a necessarily symbolized, pre-patterned shape—in contrast to, say, screams, gasps of surprise or other behavioural *reflexes*, as one should more properly call them.

When such signals then occur in indirect discourse (or along a scale of forms between non-subordination and subsidiary clauses, as in free indirect discourse) they can be used either as standard phrases, 'yes of course', or they can be integrated syntactically. Yet in both cases, such devices register typical responses and cater to the addressee's schematic expectations. If in the oral language there are differences in the use of free indirect discourse in comparison to its employment in literary texts, they consist entirely in the extent to which such markers of subjectivity have become integrated into the narrative, from the use of cruder interjections to the suggestive play with characters' lexis and style. In oral discourse the status of the reported speaker's language is not focally at issue. What is important is the gist of the reported utterance in compressed and idiomatic form. In

literature, however, expressive devices, particularly because of their predominant deployment for the representation of *consciousness*, trigger a reading of point of view and character's voice, which in turn produces the illusion of immediacy of presentation, of a quasi-literal transcription of consciousness.

Rather, therefore, than providing definitions of discrete categories of speech and thought representation, I see this study as circumventing the necessary compartmentalization of these categories. One has of course got to stick to 'ideal' types of direct, indirect and free indirect discourse in a bid for clarity of reference. Nevertheless actual choices of coordination, sub-ordination, explicit or merely implicit attribution become fairly insignificant in comparison to the stylistic and expressive features employed within those syntactic frames. Syntactic priorities correlate very clearly with the exigencies of oral communication—indirect discourse is simpler only if it is brief, and invented direct speech lends itself to the performative values of urgency and vividness (warding off the annihilating 'So what?'). No such clear-cut alignments can be posited for the written language, and least of all for fictional prose. Here context rules supreme, and aesthetic choice, if choice there is, tantalizingly removes itself from the grasp of neat, scholarly explication. The implied lesson is that formal properties, namely such as those that have traditionally been called upon to distinguish between the (free) (in)direct discourse categories, are cognitively much less significant in the reading process than the manipulation of expressive signals that can claim to attract much higher readerly attention levels.

8.5

DEIXIS, SUBJECTIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE EMPTY CENTRE

Some further explanation is in order at this stage regarding how what I have said in the last section relates to Banfield's theory, or to that part of her theory which I have argued to be valid. Banfield posits a *deictic centre* of subjectivity, of SELF, which—in the absence of a speaker's SELF—can be aligned with a third-person subject, or with SPEAKER's *past* SELF (or *I*). The grammatical (syntactic, pronominal), lexical and pragmatic constraints outlined by Banfield almost exclusively relate to a deictic orientation point on the lines of Bühler. Sentences of free indirect discourse are *readable* as instances of speech or thought representation because they include markers of such a SELF's linguistic point of view.

Now Banfield, as we have seen, is very vague about the relationship between the deictic centre and the notion of consciousness. Examples of non-reflective consciousness, in her terminology, include psycho-narration and narrated perception but also instances of free indirect *speech*. As we have noted, this proves particularly harmful in Banfield's discussion of her *major* criterion of non-reflectiveness, the use of the *proper name* rather than of a *pronoun*, where half of her examples are representations of *utterances* and hence, by definition, *reflective*. One of the main puzzles in her framework is indeed how to account for the free indirect discourse rendering of utterances, particularly in the oral language and in literary representations of such dialogue. However, these difficulties can be

resolved along the lines of Kuno's awareness criteria by positing a scale of reflectiveness, in which the use of a proper name or full NP correlates with *reflectivity*. Since speech acts are maximally reflective, they frequently employ NPs and proper names in reference to the uttering SELF. The more non-reflective a thought act, the less likely it is to have a proper name show up in the parenthetical or other SELF-reference. Indeed, the syntactic criteria adduced by Banfield—that exclamations and questions necessarily imply reflectivity—do not constitute a valid criterion. As we have seen, consciousness ranges over varying depths of verbal and non-verbal substance, and questions can refer to mute puzzlement as well as active, reflective self-questioning.

(95) This time she managed to refasten her veil.

(Banfield 1982:186)

is rewritten by Banfield as

(96) a. There, she managed to refasten her veil.

b. Had she actually managed to refasten her veil?

(Ibid., 210)

Although the character *notices* that the clasp has finally clicked, even in (96b) she does not *reflect* on her achievement in any literal terms. I agree with Banfield that a more reflective representation would be something like

(97) Ah, now, finally, there it was, she'd managed to refasten the veil.

However, in contrast to Banfield, one can argue that the less reflective instances reside in the area of narrativized representations of consciousness, in which the character's increasingly mute feelings and emotions are portrayed from a necessarily external perspective. The more unaware a character is of the thought content described, the more one reverts to an external description of that consciousness, and returns to the narrative proper. (Compare my remarks under (7.3).) There is, thus, a double area of overlap between narrative on the one hand and representations of consciousness on the other. On the one side, narrative in its quasi-objective function of the generally perceivable, including the overhearing of utterances, borders on representations of reflective consciousness; on the other side, omniscient narrative merges with the representation of deep-level consciousness:

NARRATIVE

utterances—reflective
psycho-narration

NARRATIVE

consciousness—non-reflective consciousness—

We can therefore summarize the question of how deixis, subjectivity and consciousness interrelate in the following manner. Deictic expressions (including their syntactic

equivalents)—in so far as they are *shifters* or indicative of a SELF's point of view—are intrinsically 'subjective' (Langacker 1985, 1990; Fludernik 1990, 1991b): *now* and *today* most clearly refer to a SELF's referential deictic centre. Ideational, evaluative and emotional point of view can be linked to the deictic centre with equal justification: hence the shifter use of *this* and *that*; the subjective uses of *poor*, *cursed*, etc. (e.g. *in the poor girl*); designations of existential and societal status (*papa*; *madam*), and of emotional involvement (*enemy*; *the bugger*). Such subjectivity can additionally be represented in syntactic correlates of surprise and other kinds of emotional involvement, in the form of root transformations and related syntactic structures. These are deictic to the extent that they imply subjectivity and allow one to relate that subjectivity to a SELF in the Banfieldian sense of the term. The linguistic evocation of consciousness thus correlates with the establishment of a deictic centre, and it does so precisely through the linkage of subjectivity with presumed emotionality and hence consciousness. Although language, paradoxically, can be used to *evoke* non-verbal states of consciousness (which one may want to call non-reflective), the linguistic, *representation of* consciousness always posits a deictic centre of subjectivity.

Hetero-diegetic narrators, since they address the narratee and evaluate the story (and much more), are speakers but they lack emotional *experience* because such experience requires (self-)reflectiveness, *distance*.²⁶ Most heterodiegetic narrators' subjectivity is indeed reduced to the reflection *on* rather than reflection *of* experience, and with the striking absence of emotional expressivity even in oral discourse of the self, this lack of subjective self-expression on the part of fictional narrators is hardly surprising. From the point of view of the schematic model of linguistic subjectivity that I have here presented, these findings allow for further conclusions. Although the deictic centre and the subjectivity and consciousness with which it correlates are cognitive entities, they can be represented in language only in schematic fashion. Direct discourse and free indirect discourse are therefore equally direct evocations of consciousness by means of linguistic schematics, and even indirect discourse can evoke subjectivity in addition to observing its conventional responsibility of the reportative function. A schematic view of speech and thought representation thus reinstitutes a basic dichotomy between *oratio subiectiva* and *oratio obliqua* (which may include subjective elements). This dichotomy cannot, however, be reduced to the opposition between the narrator's and the characters' discourse, as Banfield—much like the dual voice proponents—would have us believe.

All language, even in free indirect discourse, is the language of the current speaker or text. The differences in subordination, temporal shifting and referential shift can all be dealt with as varying degrees of authorial control. If the framing discourse finally shifts pronouns to assume the embedded speaker's I, this is only the most radical commitment to expressivity on a scale of numerous possible devices of linguistic subjectivity. It is no coincidence that I, the prototypical index of subjectivity, should be devoid of meaning, of denotation. Saying I, one assumes a role of reflective subjectivity, yet this role cannot by its very nature ever become a genuine *expression* of subjectivity, since subjectivity, the sense of self and of emotion and thought, is the least expressible subject, and it therefore requires all the artifice that language can devise. Subjectivity is indeed, as Lacan has

implied, an empty position signalled by its *effect* on its surroundings but accessible only through the mediation of the fictions which are language.

NOTES

- 1 That is what the people were saying, and I was listening to them with intense curiosity, and heard also the counter-arguments: *What, cousin Lampos should simply have forgotten to ask the Pythia concerning our most important Trojan state affairs just because he had fallen in love with the Apollonic priest Panthous?* (My translation)
- 2 That evening, a few friends came by to congratulate her and to condole with her: *she must be missing her niece so much? It was a very good idea, though, for the newlyweds to have gone on a trip; later, difficulties, children come along! But Italy didn't live up to the idea one had of it. Granted, they were at the age of illusions! and then, the honeymoon embellished everything!* (Translation as quoted in Brooks 1985:194)
- 3 A comparable cliché-ridden report, in indirect discourse, is discussed in Firlre (1988: 176–7).
- 4 Kurz (1970:78) notes such cases under the title of 'fingierte Rede'.
- 5 This example corresponds precisely to the direct discourse over-characterization of the Gordimer passage quoted below as (42).
- 6 Such free indirect discourse passages were noted by Wiebe (1990:21) as 'shared' point of view or 'plural SELF'.
- 7 A particularly good example occurs in Freud's case study *Dora*, where in his account of his conversation with his patient he is imputing to her extensive rationalizations, all narrated in invented direct speech: 'Als dann der erste Traum kam, in dem sie sich warnte, die Kur zu verlassen wie seinerzeit das Haus des Herrn K., hätte ich selbst gewarnt werden müssen und ihr vorhalten sollen: »Jetzt haben Sie eine Uebertragung von Herrn K. auf mich gemacht. Haben Sie etwas bemerkt, was Sie auf böse Absichten schließen läßt, die denen des Herrn K. (direkt oder in irgendeiner Sublimierung) ähnlich sind, oder ist Ihnen etwas an mir aufgefallen oder von mir bekannt geworden, was Ihre Zuneigung erzwingt, wie ehemals bei Herrn K.?«' (Freud 1982:182–3). See also a further passage (ibid., 185).
- 8 See also Sternberg (1982a: 93, 100) and Mayes (1990) for further examples.
- 9 Notations: / (onset of tone unit); # (end of tone unit);: (stressed syllable higher than previous stressed syllable); ó, a (rising intonation); ò, a (falling intonation). Still simplified.
- 10 Körner (1977:162) quotes some German examples of the condensation of several people's utterances into one typicalized set speech, or of the presentation of one person's repeated habitual utterance in direct discourse passages.
- 11 Note also, the equivalent case in free indirect discourse just a few lines earlier in the same chapter: '*There was little danger, he would say, of losing our liberties by French politics or French invasions;—nor was he so much in pain of a consumption from the mass of corrupted matter and ulcerated humours in our constitution*' (Ibid., 73–4)
- 12 On interior monologue see the classic study by E.Steinberg (1958/1973) as well as Dujardin (1931), Humphrey (1964), L.Dahl (1970) and especially Cohn (1978), as well as Stone (1959) and Bickerton (1967, 1968).
- 13 See also the excellent examples quoted in Strauch (1984:163).
- 14 Note Lips (1926:132), Kurz(1970:12–13) and Kaufmann (1976:18–20).
- 15 See, for instance, Bally (1912a: 552), or Pascal (1977:26, 73).

- 16 Strauch speaks of abstract and schematic direct and free indirect discourse. In the linguistic camp, typification has recently received much attention from Tannen (1987, 1989) and Mayes (1990). See also von Roncador (1988:89–90, 93–5, 100–1).
- 17 See also von Roncador (1988:93–4).
- 18 I have analysed elsewhere how these strategies are satirized by Joyce in the ‘Aeolus’ chapter of *Ulysses*. See Fludernik (forthcoming).
- 19 See also the excellent and even more convincing story of events in an emergency room (Tannen 1989:199–21).
- 20 Compare (47) above for a literary example.
- 21 This type of hypothetical utterance was already noted by Short (1988:73). See his example [3.13]: ‘Your father’s very angry with you. If you go in there now he will say, “Get out and never darken my door again.”’
- 22 This refers to ‘normal’ contexts only, since stereotypical discourse marking intensity of emotion can be set off additionally from its framing intonational context.
- 23 I wish to thank Erwin Segal and Gail Bruder for this suggestion during the discussion period of my paper at Buffalo in April 1991.
- 24 Interview material collected by William Labov and his colleagues at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, is unfortunately not accessible for external research persons.
- 25 The *Survey* and the *Corpus of English Conversation* (Svartvik/Quirk 1979) have the more precisely phonological tone unit which does not, however, seem to correspond entirely with Chafe’s idea unit.
- 26 The dichotomy between *experience* and a report thereof has recently been noted more generally even in linguistic work, although its roots are in phenomenology (cp. under (1.4)). See, e.g., Ljung (1980:114).

Consequences and conclusions

In the previous chapter I have sketched a view of speech and thought representation that radically departs from the mimetic speech model under-lying most linguistic and literary approaches to discourse mediation. In this final chapter it is therefore necessary to demonstrate how the schematic model relates to presuppositions in the standard approach, and how precisely the proposed schematic ‘solution’ resolves the problems encountered in earlier chapters. The areas affected by an espousal of the schematic language model are numerous, and they concern both linguistics and literary theory. I will start with a consideration of the grammatical implications both from a TG point of view and from a pragmatic discourse-analytical perspective. This is also finally the time to confront the problem of how the deictic properties of speech representation (anaphoric vs subjective deixis) can be described in the proposed model, and how—and to what extent—the presentation of consciousness can be compared to the representation of utterances. Both questions provide a final assessment of Banfield’s paradigm in the light of evidence from pre-figural narrative texts, oral discourse and journalism.

On the literary side, a final confrontation of the narrator vs character duality will be provided, in the course of which I will sketch a model of reading on the basis of frame theory. Finally, and by no means least importantly, I will turn to the status of mimesis in the schematic language model, and will outline both a literary and a linguistic dependence of the handling of speech and thought representation on the problem of literary style. I will also provide a few concluding methodological remarks on the relations between narratology, linguistics, stylistics and pragmatics.

9.1

SCHEMATIC LANGUAGE REPRESENTATION AND LINGUISTICS

In the previous chapter I have proposed a model of speech and thought representation that does not start out from the traditional presupposition of an ‘original’ verbatim direct discourse subsequently adulterated by mediation in (free) indirect speech and speech report. I have argued, on the contrary, that even direct speech representation in a real-life context cannot be identified with verbatim recreation of original discourse. In oral narrative direct speech passages in fact signal performativity (Wolfson 1982) and are

frequently invented *ad libitum* (Tannen 1987a, 1987b, 1989). This applies even more stringently to the 'direct quotation' of thoughts, particularly somebody else's, and it becomes transparently obvious in hypothetical, negative or interrogative clauses and, generally, in modal environments:

- (1) nor could he say that it was the. ((as)) sometimes there's an excuse. that a successor agency after a revolution—is not . bound by the . commitments of a previous agency let's say the successor states to the Austrian kingdom . or . the successor after a great revolution *can say well that's what our predecessors did that was in the bad days of—the old days*

(*Survey of English Usage* S.6.7.28)

- (2) it would be so wonderful if you were here—we would leap around in this glorious park and say *isn't this just wonderful* —and 'twould be perfect—whereas with Nigel we see a glorious view and just say that's rather nice and hop out and photograph it—do you see what I mean?

(*Ibid.*, W.7.4.14)

My arguments primarily relate to the mimetic language model, in which direct quotations are read as verbatim representations of prior discourse. As I have proposed, the non-adequation of direct speech representations to existing prior discourse even in the colloquial language, and the clearly conventional manipulation and fictionalizing of such direct speech tokens, can be resolved on a higher level of discourse strategy, in which what is *factually* non-verbatim is taken for an 'as good as' truly verbatim rendering. Where some recent speculations about quotation have talked of quotation as an instance of *mention* (rather than *use*) (Sperber/Wilson 1981, 1986; Harweg 1981; Yamaguchi, forthcoming), the schematic language model can correlate. quotation with a type/token model of discourse units, in which the relevant discourse level is not that of phonetic tokens and phonemic types, but of individual utterances as tokens of discourse which imply instances of speech acts (illocutionary meaning), propositional content and situational implicature. The well-established prominence of direct speech in all kinds of discourse (synchronically and diachronically) can then be related directly to the exigencies of reporting: direct discourse most clearly distinguishes between the utterances of the reporter and those of the reported speaker, and it nevertheless gives the reporter ample opportunity for manipulation in the framing, selecting and interpreting of the supposedly 'verbatim' utterances; indirect discourse (and, even more clearly, speech report), on the other hand, serves the needs of summary and condensation, and it is therefore specifically designed to disregard, mute or warp propositional meaning.

The above considerations are *pragmatic* in nature. Within fiction they assume a specifically theoretical status. In literature the pragmatic purposes of non-literary communication can be said to attach only to the intra-diegetic communicative situation—the reporting done by characters in their utterances. On the other hand reports of characters' utterances on the extra-diegetic (narrative) level functionally support the rhetoric of narrative and of fiction, whether as 'performative', 'realist' or 'objective' discourse strategies. The

question of speech and thought representation in fictional texts has therefore always been closely linked to narrative mimesis and historically correlates with an ever-increasing tendency towards fictional realism; no Renaissance writer would have agonized over the choice of proper sociolinguistic *register* in the appropriate social circumstances.

However, in formal linguistics, the same set of observable uses of reported speech touches on an entirely different set of problems. In particular the syntactic properties of the various forms of speech and thought representation need to be definable and interrelatable, and in the TG model that Banfield has used the syntactic generation of these discourse forms becomes an important problem. Moreover, besides the narrowly generative issue, the specific grammatical features associated with individual discourse forms also impinge not merely on the formal generation from deep structure but also on the actual process of discourse production—a more properly pragmatic level of analysis. It is these questions that I will turn to first.

Whereas Banfield (and Rauh 1978) generates direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse from deep structures in which the shifting of tenses and pronouns is triggered by a superordinated verb form (or a hypersentence reflecting the narrative's temporal reference point), Ehrlich (1990a), who is not very explicit about the derivational issue, seems to propose a surface structure mechanism, and she definitely relies on the reader's linking of tenses, pronouns and general cohesive devices in his or her perception of free indirect discourse. Wiebe (1990), too, departs from a reception analysis of readers' interpretations.¹ In this section I will therefore start out from the surface level phenomena that I have analysed in the previous chapters and will work my way 'down' to the transformationalist question.

Let us start with a description of the properties of speech and thought representation as I have outlined them in [Chapter 8](#). In a report of another's utterance or thought act, the current speaker is concerned with getting across the illocutionary force of the original utterance and, for mimetic or enlivening effect, may add as much of its propositional content and of its expressive form as s/he pleases. The transmission of illocutionary force corresponds to the conventional responsibility of reporting, if regarded as a speech act in itself, or it corresponds to the particular performance of 'co-operation' that is required by speech participants according to Grice. Any more mimetic effects, ranging from the evocation of a 'literal' transposition into indirect discourse all the way to pseudo-quotation (since this is mostly invented, clichéd discourse), necessarily emerge as additional formal effects for strategic purposes of one sort or another.

On the level of actual locution or linguistic surface structure, there exists therefore a scale of increasing evocation of (another's) speech. That evocation may be purely lexical, as in the pervasive *Ansteckung* ('contagion') in speech report and indirect discourse; or it may become more pronounced on a syntactic and morphological as well as lexical level, when indirect discourse starts to acquire root transformations, and incorporates the deictic centre of the reported speaker. In this spectrum indirect discourse with clear subordination and pure direct discourse are linguistically discrete speech report forms, and free indirect discourse—in certain contexts (particularly third person past tense narrative)—has become an equally recognizable and definable linguistic form. However, in actual linguistic terms, free indirect discourse cannot be delimited precisely, and—in

contrast to direct discourse—works best as a pre-theoretical ‘fuzzy’ concept, with the classical definition providing a form that may or may not be realized concretely in actual texts. As we have seen, even direct discourse does not completely observe the form of pure deictic centre either, as when introducing ‘someone or other’ or ‘such and such’. This is why the explanation of speech and thought representation had to be shifted to a discourse-strategic level on which the frame-oriented *understanding* of speech (thought) representation allows the recipient to pick out mimetic elements (proximal deictics, ‘expressive’ syntax) as schematic indications of alterity, constructing a ‘voice’.

Such a fluid model therefore does not lend itself to a generation of direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse as separate non-overlapping forms in the way Banfield proposes. However, the schematic model nevertheless leaves open whether a schematized (not *real*) direct discourse *form* should be assumed to exist in the deep structure of indirect discourse and free indirect discourse sentences as well as in sentences that are not definitely appropriatable to either type. That this assumption does not bear investigation has been demonstrated convincingly by Banfield—one cannot ‘transform’ direct into indirect discourse and replace, for example, underlying direct discourse-pronouns *I* and *you* by the proper names of these speakers. The sentence-by-sentence approach breaks down precisely for this reason since cohesion can only be formalized on a *textual* level and probably only within a frame account of situational adequacy. If direct discourse should be posited as a kind of underlying structure, it might perhaps be best to locate it on a virtual plane such as Rauh’s embedded hypersentence or a type of logical form, but not on the classic deep structure level that requires transformations to apply before generating a surface structure. The question basically concerns the possibility of appropriating a wide array of direct discourse forms into a reporting syntax *without* transformation, such that the choice of denomination (NP or pronoun) is decided at deep structure level, with (in English) optional logophoric reflexivization of the pronoun (without postulating an underlying ‘I’ or ‘you’), and expressive (deictic) elements, too, already installed on that level. That would leave sequence of tenses to be transformational, but with the proviso that such shifting can be triggered contextually without an explicit triggering verb in an introductory or parenthetical clause. How precisely to formalize such a set-up, whether by means of Rauh’s hypersentences or by a deep structure notation of ‘reference point’, which may be PAST and hence trigger anaphoric shifting—this I will leave for specialists in TG syntax such as Ehrlich to resolve. A particularly thorny conundrum in this set-up is the syntactic root transformation. As a transformation, it cannot be installed at DS level, and one may therefore treat it as an optional transformation which the speaker can apply for expressive effect. However, if the expressivity choice—for deictics—is made at deep structure level, this may cause a number of serious methodological problems. Even more problematic might be the *shifting* in free indirect discourse of *idiomatic expressions* (*how did she do?*), which do indicate that a shifting mechanism is definitely at work and that it can be applied or suspended.

From the above one can conclude that the schematic language model does not offer any specific transformational solution but relies on a level of synchronic discourse analysis. I will leave transformational recuperations to the linguistic camp, since my sole goal in the

present context is to propose a valid explanation of the forms and functions of ((free) indirect) quotation, not of its generational vicissitudes.

The second problem that has been left pending from [Chapters 3](#) to 7 and whose relation to the schematic language model needs to be explicated is that of the relationship of consciousness to expressivity in the various forms of report. I have maintained in [Chapter 8](#) that a deictic centre of subjectivity is operative in both speech and consciousness, so that the use of direct discourse forms, of a deictic or syntactic nature, can be regarded as basically equivalent in speech and thought representation. This flatly contradicts Banfield's view of free indirect discourse as (exclusively) a representation of consciousness, in which others' speech may be *reflected* but not told. This conclusion of Banfield's, as we have seen, was based on a reduced corpus of texts—mostly novels and short stories with a figural narrative situation—and on her *I E/I Speaker Principle*, which also cannot be upheld as a general interpretative rule for either free indirect discourse or indirect discourse with expressive elements. Although the schematic language model maintains that expressive features are, indeed, the reporting speaker's responsibility, I have also argued that the *effect* of this expressivity lies in the projection of a 'voice' effect and hence contradicts any univocality of such 'affective' language.

Where speech and consciousness do differ, however, is in the contexts of such evocation, and—though not regularly—in the kinds of expressive elements chosen to project speech or consciousness. Thus, to start with the latter point, it is quite noticeable that adverbial preposing frequently correlates with surprise in a context of perception, and its incorporation into indirect discourse equally suggests surprise in the reported speaker. This correlation with surprise, therefore, evokes the frame of perception or consciousness in any context. The use of the English expanded past, on the other hand, occurs only in narrative evocations of perception and is barred from a speech context. Of all of Banfield's criteria of non-reflective consciousness, this is the only valid one. I have also treated at length the function of the preterite (*imparfait*, German *Präteritum*) as a narrational tense in the evocation of characters' consciousness, which can be identified with that of the English past progressive. Since the tense distribution in present-day narrative texts relies on much analogical extension of several productive patterns, the interminable *imparfaits* and the (shifted) past tense in English and German can be argued to have acquired a connotation of 'consciousness.' None of the formal patterns, however, exclusively signals consciousness.

My solution has therefore been to analyse speech production as a more accessible form of subjectivity, with the result that evocation of consciousness is prevented only in contexts in which the reporter does not have access to it, whereas speech is always—by definition—'representable'. The solution to the *agon* between consciousness and speech therefore lies in the narrative situation, or in the narrator vs character controversy.

9.2

NARRATORS' AND CHARACTERS' VOICES: A FRAME-THEORETICAL RESOLUTION

We are now in a position to return to the dual voice hypothesis whose *cognitive* appropriateness to the reading experience I have emphasized earlier. In the schematic language model the projection of subjectivity operates as a function of the reporter's language—though meant to signal the reported speaker's (or consciousness's) SELF mimetically, it is the reporter's language, his or her illocutionary intentions and the implicatures that s/he wishes to convey that determine the reporting. By contrast, as we have seen in [Chapter 5](#), even the clearest deictic signals require an appropriate context to establish a reading of (figural) 'voice,' and such a context is provided specifically by the narrated or represented plot-situation—a 'scene' that can be described in terms of the dynamics of human action and the expectations generated in the reader on the basis of such situational understanding. Such results can obviously be linked to several 'contextual' approaches to free indirect discourse and speech and thought representation in general,² and they are the consequence of general cognitive constraints, such as the reader's prior assumption of textual cohesion (de Beaugrande 1980:134).

In Banfield's model the refutation of the dual voice hypothesis comes down to the argument that free indirect sentences (and narrative itself) are speakerless. This analysis, as I have maintained, fails on two counts. A sentence-by-sentence parsing of the text both ignores the supra-sentential evocations of a character's voice (in cases where no unequivocal linguistic markers exist), as it ignores the evocation in some narrative clauses of the text of a narrator role which would then establish a default for the reader. Thus, a narrative that has a personalized teller figure in some passages establishes a situation of telling that is not cancelled out by the occurrence of 'neutral' description in other sections of the narrative. Secondly, Banfield's corpus deals exclusively with *figural* narrative texts, i.e. texts employing internal focalization, in which there is no observable narrator figure, and the resultant predominance of the character's consciousness then precisely manages to convey the illusion that the story is 'told' through the reflecting lens of a character's psyche. In a *purely* figural narrative situation therefore, there actually is no 'speaker' or narrator's voice to come into conflict with the deixis of the current character. However, not only are pure reflector mode narratives rare even in the Modernist canon that Banfield relies on—Flaubert, Henry James, Mansfield and Joyce frequently alternate between figural passages and very definite evocations of a 'teller'; the model that I have presented also removes the primacy of direct discourse from the slate and therefore undermines a 'pure character's expression' reading on different grounds. In particular, although Banfield is correct in discovering few individual free indirect sentences in which one could split the words into expressions belonging exclusively to a narrator or exclusively to a character—disregarding for the moment the question of the anaphoric pronominal and temporal shifts—a 'dual voice' can indeed be posited to exist *on a higher level*. The double-levelled 'intention' of the discourse in ironic passages, in fact, is not a purely linguistic phenomenon but can be explained as the result of interpretative work brought to bear on

the juxtaposition between the wording of the text and the (by implication incompatible) cultural or textual norms of the text as constructed by the reader or implied as values shared by the reader and the realistic textual world. The passages so frequently cited for double voicing, such as Emma Bovary's enthusiasm for religion, or her mirror reflections on herself in love, therefore rely not on a linguistics of double voicing (the language of those passages is definitely the narrator's—and there is of course an explicit narrative voice in *Madame Bovary*)—but on the telling incompatibility between Emma's fantasies and the accepted cultural *episteme* regarding accepted standards of religiosity or the reality of love and passion; it is only from the perspective of such cultural norms that Emma's effusions come to read as naïve sentimental distortions of genuinely religious and amorous feelings, a superficial simulacrum lacking intrinsic similarity.

Rather than in a true dichotomy of two voices, the alterity factor of free indirect discourse therefore resides, on the contrary, in the text's appropriation of syntactic, deictic and lexical strategies which project or evoke a 'voice', a subjective deictic centre which the reader in the interpretive process identifies as the character's. Indeed, the very same expressive elements can be attributed to the narrator of the text if the textual situation warrants such an attribution. Banfield's theory—by ridding itself of the speaker function of narrative—broke new ground in locating expressivity in grammar rather than in the ontology of fictional personae. Nevertheless, such ontological attribution of fictional language cannot be denied some textual relevance, since it regularly recurs in the practice of reading literary texts and is the staple of oral free indirect discourse. One cannot therefore endorse Banfield's paradigm in its original formulations, much as one will want to salvage its truly seminal insight into the linguistics of expressivity.

In the following I will sketch a frame-theoretical analysis of subjectivity and voice, which will attempt to explain how free indirect discourse materializes in the reading process. Such an account can help to provide a rationale for the pragmatic recognition of free indirect discourse, i.e. for the reading of certain passages as a representation of thoughts or utterances, when there are no explicit linguistic signals of free indirect discourse in the text. Moreover, the frame-theoretical model allows one to describe the evocation of a fictional 'voice' in a satisfactory manner and to integrate it with the process of 'attribution' by which linguistic material is identified as 'belonging to' a fictional agent, resulting in the establishment of narratorial or figural subjectivity.

9.2.1

'Communication' in narrative

Before considering the frame theoretical foundations of narrative and its processing, I will need to start by saying a few words about the communication model in narrative. Within the limits of this study I cannot hope to provide an extensively argued defence of the position that I am presenting at this point. An in-depth analysis of the more precisely narratological problems has had to be postponed.³ In the following I will somewhat elaborate on my brief summary under (1.5).

First a preliminary observation on natural narrative. In conversational narratives and oral narrative in general a narrator is always physically present. Even if the story told is not that of the teller's personal experience but a traditional tale, a folk or fairy tale, an epic poem, a battle account, the teller of the tale remains (physically) visible, and there is also usually a thematization in the traditional tale of the narrative act, which functions as a kind of substratum to the text. There is therefore no question about the existence of a narrator in oral narrative; it is always *spoken*, always 'communicative' (in its face-to-face confrontation with a specific audience) and always *narration* (telling, rather than a reflector mode narrative). These features are not at all affected by the communal quality of (epic) oral narrative or by its frequently ritualistic nature (with very specific formulas and even orchestrated responses from the audience), but such ritual does already shift the attention away from the ontology of a personal teller figure to his or her function as a mouthpiece of the narrating process. Narrative commentary subsequently comes to be limited to purely meta-narrative statements (*I now turn to, Next I want to tell you about ...*) and gnomic or evaluative propositions to the exclusion of the teller as a real-life individual engaged in a personal act of telling. Such a receding from the flesh and blood ontology of the real-life storyteller in the narration therefore correlates precisely with the ritualistic, 'literary' function of the tale, whereas topical, contemporary concerns of both the teller and the audience are perfectly acceptable in comic genres from Plautinian comedy through medieval fabliau and up to the parodic sketches in traditional folk theatres. Even though there are therefore indications of a depersonalization of the narrator function in oral storytelling, this narrator function can be resurrected *ad libitum*, and it is of course constitutive of personal storytelling—the most common type of natural narrative.

The question of the narrator's 'existence' poses itself as soon as one is dealing with a written text, with temporally *delayed communication*. It is here that the term communication immediately requires redefinition. In the oral narrative situation, narrative 'communicates' as much or as little as in written narratives—it tells a story. Telling a story, however, 'communicates' in a manner quite different from, say, a letter which may supply some crucial information. This is a point to be kept well in mind when analysing the communication structure of narrative. As we have noted under (1.5), in semiotics communication tends to be based on the referential 'message' that a speaker transmits to the hearer, and this is usually described in terms of encoding-transmission-decoding.

I will here disregard the speech act theoretical discussions of the matter which are particularly beside the (literary) point⁴ and concentrate on the process of narrative transmission (Stanzel's *mediacy*). Let us concentrate on the narratological levels of interaction between characters *within* the fiction, narrator and narratee, implied author and implied reader and—finally—the 'real' author and his or her public. The communication on each of these levels is of a very different kind from the interaction on the others, and the status of sender and recipient, too, needs to be redefined for each level. On the story level, characters interact with one another and talk to one another—hence a mimesis of real-life verbal interaction can be posited. As in real life, communication does not consist purely in the give-and-take of information, and the verbal exchange therefore has to be analysed in accordance with speech act theory and

other discourse structures and discourse strategies (face saving, self-presentation, etc.).- However, *within fiction* this mimetic level becomes subordinated to the plot, and utterances by the characters (letters, telephone calls, etc.) and their content acquire large-scale functions in the framework of the fiction. This applies to drama, too, where—in the absence of a narrator or an enunciatory narrative—characterization has to be achieved mostly in an indirect manner, and where the selection of ‘scenes’ irretrievably limits discourse in structurally relevant ways. In fiction, as I have here argued, such verbal interaction between characters is furthermore removed from a true communicative situation since the mediation by the narrative text, even when using much direct discourse, turns characters’ speech into a function of the narration as much as of the plot. Although, in reflector narrative, the narrational process seems to refine itself out of existence by projecting a character’s deictic centre of subjectivity, there is of course still the linguistic mediation by the narrative which appropriates the character’s deixis. (This is the view in Stanzel 1984b, which I entirely endorse.) In reflector mode narration there is no ‘communication’ between a narrator and a narratee; indeed such an address to a narratee would immediately suspend the reflector mode. It is here that Ann Banfield’s ‘unspeakable sentences’ have their locus.

What this implies is that there *can be* narration without a narrator. That is to say, in *pure* reflector mode narrative there cannot be any indication of a narrative voice. However, purity is an idealized concept, and *actual* narratives of the reflector mode frequently contain digressions into (usually) disguised evaluation and other ‘subjective’ stances of the narrative that must then be aligned with a ‘covert’ narrative voice. I reserve the term *narrator* for those instances of subjective language that imply a *speaking* subject: the personal pronoun *I*, addresses to the narratee, meta-narrative commentary (frequently in conjunction with *I*, *you* and *we*) and explicit commentary and evaluation. The line between an overt and a covert narrative voice cannot be drawn succinctly, and it is here in fact regarded to be a function of interpretation: the reader *qua* textual recipient constructs a narrative voice from textual indications. In the murky area of style, particularly of potentially evaluative expressions, there may be some differences of opinion about the putative subjectivity of certain epithets and descriptions. (If a character is described as *rather tall* is this evaluative or neutral?—compare with *fairly tall*. In fact, the subjectivity of such language will depend in large measure on whether there is a ruling reflectorial or narratorial consciousness to whom the evaluative tendency inherent in *rather*—if one believes there is one—could be attributed with any verisimilitude.)

I am here modifying and refining Chatman’s views on the narrator (Chatman 1978, 1990a). I reject Chatman’s ‘narrator at all times’ (including a ‘cinematic narrator’), but decisively maintain the existence of *narration*, and a gradual scale between an overt (personalized) narrator persona and a more covert narrative voice all the way to an objective backgrounded narrative function in reflector mode narrative. Chatman very perspicaciously defined the speech acts performed by the narrator (1978:161–6), setting the narrator’s performance apart from that of the characters. This is a very important point. Characters can promise, baptize ships, perform marriage ceremonies and the like, but the narrator has only two possible signifieds—the story, and the act of narration. The narrative function in itself performs merely the narration—the presentation of the story in

the form of narrative discourse, what Nünning (1989) very persuasively calls the 'erzähltechnische' function of the narrative. The overt narrator, on the other hand, can comment both on the content of the narration (story world) and on the narrating function itself; the address to a narratee is a part of this meta-narrative performance. Thus, although the teller seems to be a character in his or her own right, this narrator can only promise *to tell*, not promise to *pay* the (extra-diegetic) narratee; only *swear* as a rhetorical gesture but never *offend* the narratee. In so far as the narratee becomes a fictional persona in his or her own right and *interacts* with the narrator, one traditionally speaks of a frame narrative.

These distinctions also apply to homo-diegetic and auto-diegetic narrative. Although the first person narrator has a past (unlike the hetero-diegetic narrator), the act of narration (clearly evaluative and personalized unless in reflectorial first person narrative) usually does not specify more than the results of the action in the story. The narrator is typically in a static position in which s/he looks back on, or immerses her-/himself in, the past. Even if there is a definite situational relevancy to the act of narration, the outcome of this act of narration is (at least in earlier novels) frequently told by an editor of the found manuscript, a frame-narrator (*Frankenstein*), or left pending (*The Stranger*, *Catcher in the Rye*, *Lolita*). Unlike the hetero-diegetic situation, however, the indeterminacy of homo-diegetic plot needs to be seen not as a consequence of the narrative function in the abstract, but as a direct consequence of the mimetic projection of a persona that is more than a mere 'voice' or 'teller'. The 'Ich mit Leib', as Stanzel calls the (homo-diegetic) teller persona, cannot round off the narrative in a definitive manner precisely because s/he relies for his or her existence on the constitutive homo-diegetic make-belief: unlike the hetero-diegetic narrator, the homo-diegetic narrator is writing at a desk in a specified room at a specified time, and—due to these existential constraints—*cannot* go beyond this point of writing either temporally or in terms of cognition and knowledge.⁵ The fact that authors have subsequently created homo-diegetic narrators with prophetic powers only plays with and accentuates the dilemma of the 'realistic' first person narrator. The pattern is replicated in fictional diaries and epistolary novels, with plot being allowed to develop outside the narrative between letters or entries.

The above does not apply to reflectorial first person narration in which the narrator function is suspended in favour of an unobtrusive mediation of figural consciousness. These factors, it needs to be noted, practically constitute a virtual barrier between the homo-diegetic and the hetero-diegetic realms, such as the one already proposed by Cohn (1978, 1981, 1989). However, contrary to Cohn's formulations, I hold this barrier to be operative only in relation to the prototypical, 'realistic' first person narrator persona, who looks back on his or her life and is caught in the writing process at a specific time and place for very specific realistically motivated reasons. Such a narrator 'works' differently from the abstract narrative function and communicative narrational enunciation of the hetero-diegetic narrator, even if personalized in the manner of *Tom Jones*. It is therefore illicit to split the narrative and existential (story) levels of *personalized* homo-diegetic narrative in quite the same manner as in hetero-diegetic narration—a conclusion that radically departs from the conceptualizations of Genette, Chatman and—above all—Bal. Precisely because s/he is a character as well as a narrator, the narrating 'I' cannot always

be neatly distinguished from the experiencing self of the situation if narration becomes thematized in the story.

Which is not to say that *all* homo-diegetic narratives necessarily have such existential interference on the narrating plane. Very few do in actual fact, but the realistic make-belief of a 'real teller' makes such interference (and therefore an incompatibility with hetero-diegetic discreteness of levels) a virtual, i.e. latent, factor. Most homo-diegetic narratives, of course, choose to behave very much in accordance with the narrator as a mere teller and the story-self as a separate past self. There is no difficulty in erasing the process of narration to inconspicuousness as frequently happens in 'camera-eye' first person narrative (Chandler, Hemingway), or in first person present tense narrative that is not decisively reflectorial.⁶ Since such narratives do not thematize the act of narration—and *thematize* is the correct term, since the homo-diegetic narrator *is*, after all, a character in the story whose narrative act usually *subsumes* as well as transmits the plot—such homo-diegetic narratives can be compared with hetero-diegetic narrative. The *story* level does not include the act of narration. Here Bal's approach becomes an adequate theoretical response to the problem.

The 'communicative situation' on the narrational (discourse) plane therefore exists exclusively with overt narrator-personae, and is limited to (meta)narrative themes in the hetero-diegetic field, whereas in homo-diegetic narrative it can acquire a full communicative function of pleading with the narratee, promising, etc. It is a terminological quibble whether one might want to regard such kinds of narrative as a fictional (dramatic) monologue; the decision would depend on the prominence of the situation of narration over the story material. Only if the story is told for the precise purpose of influencing the narratee, and only if the centre of interest is that act of influencing (as in Browning's *The Last Duchess*, where the unreliability of the telling helps implicitly to expose the speaker) would one be justified in speaking of dramatic monologue. The term is usually limited to short fiction (whether in prose or verse, or in drama—see Strindberg's *The Stronger*), because a novel read as realistic dramatic monologue is in itself a very artificial form—similar to the interior monologue novel that subverts rather than affirms the illusion of a realistic communicative situation: imagine *Lolita* actually being addressed in its full length to a jury!⁷

For completeness's sake, a brief note should be appended here on second person narrative. As I demonstrate elsewhere (Fludernik, in preparation), second person narrative can be *both* homo-diegetic *and* hetero-diegetic, such that the speaker and the addressed *YOU* share a world in the present and in the past. In most cases, the addressed *YOU* is dead or absent, and past reference predominates. In these cases the situation of address becomes thematized in a homo-diegetic manner, and the past is a past shared with the *you*. On the other hand, second person narrative can also be hetero-diegetic, with the speaker (addresser), if there is one, *NOT* linked existentially to the world of *YOU*. Such narratives can range all the way from *authorial* over *neutral* to the *figural* mode. The figural mode can even be introduced in homo-diegetic 'second person' narrative if there is no narrational plane of address, and such narrative frequently documents its homo-diegetic quality by employing an interior-monologue *you* which surfaces into the narrative. None of these cases decisively affects my main thesis that the evocation of a real-life situation of

telling in the narrative automatically transfers realistic schemata of action and narration on to the narrational process.

Before, finally, turning to frame theory, I will quickly dispose of the implied and 'real' author. Linguistically speaking, neither communication, telling, utterance nor any other speech act can be posited for the implied author level. Although defined in various ways, the implied author does not *say* or *speak* but is generally agreed to be a construct of the text's 'meaning' or of the 'intentions' of the (real) author (Booth 1983, Chatman 1990a, Nünning 1989). The implied author 'communicates' only in so far as the actual reader *when reading* (i.e. as Nünning's 'empirical reader') constructs the meaning and values of the textual whole from all textual levels of utterance and story content. The so-called 'implied reader' has even less communicative function since the term seems to correlate with the reader's trusting assumption of a recipient role appropriate to the textual values constructed for the 'implied author'. In as much as the (real) reader may hold moral or political opinions inimical to the text's value systems, s/he needs to suspend his or her real-life beliefs in order to enter into a co-operative reading experience (Warhol 1989). The real reader then assumes a certain stance towards the text, which can be identified with the 'implied reader' construct. As regards the real historical author and his or her readers, their communication cannot be the subject of the narrator vs character issue of fictional voice because narrative communication resides, precisely, in the *narration* and *not* the actual *author*. How far authors in fact perform speech acts and communicate with readers is precisely the hotly debated issue in literary speech act theory which I have earlier referred to. That issue definitely needs to be linked to a general theory of *textual* writing acts and their indebtedness to generic models, conventions of production and reception and to a more precise empirical analysis of the *effects* of reading.

9.2.2

A frame-theoretical model of literary communication

Frame theory, instituted by the ground-breaking study of Schank/Abelson (1977), has had a decisive impact on cognitively oriented approaches to narrative (Wilensky 1983, Polanyi 1985). In a recent linguistic trend towards 'natural' categories—see the new *Cognitive Linguistics* journal, especially vol. 1 (1990)—frame-theoretical considerations can be used to supply the higher-level framework of linguistic processing and understanding. In particular, the principle of relevance (Grice 1975, Sperber/Wilson 1986)—which is, technically speaking, a very elusive concept—can be fruitfully specified within specific situational frames.

Frame theory proposes the two crucial notions of the *plan* and the *script*. Whereas plans belong to a very abstract conceptual level, scripts—Schank/Abelson's famous example is the restaurant script—are fairly specific, culture-dependent concepts. Frame theory is set up in ways reminiscent of story grammars, based on the rock-bottom *active* conceptualizations of ACTOR ACTION OBJECT DIRECTION (INSTRUMENT)—very close to the properties of Fillmore's case grammar—and the *stative* conceptualization OBJECT (IS IN) STATE (WITH VALUE) (Schank/Abelson 1977:12). When enriched

with the notion of causation (254 f.) the basic physical (and mental) interdependencies of our cognitive picture of the world can be accessed. (There are of course numerous details such as *causal types*, which I will not go into here.) Plans relate to the key concepts of human agency, goals, choice, causality and the physical world knowledge incorporated in them; scripts, by contrast, fill in the cultural particularities for certain culturally determined courses of action, including location, props, antagonists, etc. Although events can be trimmed down to the bare deep structure of the logic of action (a combination of natural causation and human volition and agency), the surface structure of knowledge is very different in different domains because it is culture-specific. Different situations require different strategies for achieving various goals, and our world-knowledge helps us decide on courses of action in all kinds of situations, as different as they may be.⁸

The most influential concept in Schank/Abelson's important study has been that of the *script*. The script helps explain a number of linguistic features that could previously be aligned only with notions such as 'logical' omission or 'given information', 'relevance', 'presupposition' and the like. For instance, it is a common device in the telling of, say, how you took somebody out to dinner to omit a description of the protagonists' actual eating process; it is likewise common to refer to the waiter or waitress in a restaurant as a 'given' (with the definite article). Although one feels that these discourse strategies are somehow 'natural', they are hard to define or describe, and scripts provide precisely that kind of useful structural scaffolding. Since specific scripts contain a series of (chronologically ordered) processes and a combination of functional props, they holistically bring together cognitive and cultural knowledge which—as soon as the script has been evoked by the mention of the script or the mention of the setting, or of even only one prop or one key action—produces an immediate holistic, situational *understanding*. Thus, whenever a novel starts *in medias res* by *The waiter arrived with the menu*—or even *I was poring over the menu when I suddenly saw ...*—knowledge of the restaurant script allows one immediately to infer the setting from one of its major props, the linguistic item *the menu*. And, as Chafe (1980a) has illustrated, props are 'active' knowledge as soon as the script has been evoked, resulting in the use of the definite article (*the menu, the waiter*).⁹ Moreover, such introduction of props does not trigger hesitational pauses (as with non-active concepts).

Scripts and props are interrelated cognitively as well as linguistically. The script ('Going to a restaurant') evokes the whole situation and its vocabulary on the basis of contiguity; a single prop (and the lexeme for it) in turn contiguously evokes the whole script. Some props occur in several scripts and can therefore evoke different possible situations which are left pending until further confirmation by other props that specify one rather than the other alternative. Thus the sentence *The knife was not cutting well* can be part of a restaurant script, or part of a kitchen (food preparation) scene, and *I reached for the knife* may change either of these scripts into an unexpected turn of events such as the murder script, in which the knife, formerly conceptualized as the instrument aiding food processing, turns into a (murder) weapon. Scripts therefore change with changing goals, not only with a change of setting. As has severally been observed, the script or expected schema overrules actual occurrences in people's memory of event sequences: only events that 'fit' a schema are recalled in retellings of event sequences, with the schema winning

out over actual observation (Brewer/Lichtenstein 1982:474; Chafe 1977b: 239; Tannen 1979). In fact, people have even been observed to substitute likely (i.e. verisimilar, expected in the frame or script context) alternative event sequences at later retellings of film action, for instance inventing a greeting sequence (the boy calling out to the children in lieu of his merely raising his hat in greeting) (Tannen 1979). Narrative dynamics, it can also be observed, strongly correlates with the interruption of expected script sequences. As Quasthoff (1980) has noted, the central schema of incidence in conversational narrative frequently consists in a break of the ongoing frame or script sequence.¹⁰

How does all this relate to narrators and characters, and to the attribution of language to them? As I am arguing in *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*, the narrative process itself can be subjected to a frame-theoretical analysis. Summarized briefly, fiction with a teller figure evokes situational real-life equivalents of telling and their characteristic constellations. If there is a personal narrator, for example, a certain cognitive ideological linguistic and sometimes even spatiotemporal position may become attributed to that narrator, and s/he becomes a 'speaker' on the model of the standard communication script. One can therefore explain the entire communicative analysis of fiction as an (illicit) transferral of the frame of real-life conversational narrative onto literary personae and constructed entities (such as the implied author). Secondly, and even more importantly, one can trace the recurrent personalizations of the narrative function, resulting in the ontology of a 'narrator', to the influence of the very same schema, namely that of the typical storytelling situation: if there is a story, somebody must needs tell it. Even more absurdly, since the earlier (script-logical) tendency to identify the non-personalized narrator with the (historical) author has become untenable in the wake of the Modernist aesthetic, the responsibility for the telling has now been transferred to the (covert) narrator, or the implied author, and that even in narratological circles. The persistence of this preconceived notion that *somebody* (hence a human agent) must be telling the story in my view derives directly from the frame conception of storytelling rather than from any necessary textual evidence. Hence also the (now luckily rarely encountered) illjudged use of the term *narrator* for the centre of consciousness or reflector character in figural narration. I cannot at this point go into the details of the more far-reaching consequences of 'natural' schemata in the interpretation of fictional communication. Suffice it to say that reflectorial narration, for example in its reliance on the figural psyche as the evoked transmissive medium of the story, structures narration around the script of *experiencing* or *viewing*, rather than *telling* events. The details of this argument touch on a number of basic philosophical, linguistic and literary issues besides centrally concerning narratology. I therefore have to refer the reader to *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology* for a well-founded presentation of the frame-theoretical model in its application to the theoretical apparatus of narratology.

At this point I wish to return one last time to the relation of characters' and narrator's 'voice' or 'language' in free indirect discourse as well as in fiction in general.

In the above I have started out from the linguistic strategies that are used to evoke figural deixis and—in the absence of a conflicting deictic centre—are read as a projection of figural consciousness. Banfield's position on free indirect discourse was in fact almost entirely correct in so far as it applied to the use of free indirect discourse for the

representation of consciousness in reflectorial narrative. Where Banfield had distinct problems, however, was in relation to oral contexts, the free indirect discourse rendering of speech (utterances) and 'authorial' narrative where literary scholars keep pointing out a substratum of a narrator's voice.

I propose to resolve this issue in the following manner. First, one has to clarify some terminological matters. The narrator is denied existence by Banfield *qua* speaker, but 'it' is additionally denied a deictic centre of subjectivity. This speaker issue is, however, beside the (methodological) point. Although Banfield's category of narration (typified by the French aorist, the *passé simple*) cannot accommodate a 'real' present or an addressee—a contention that invites some reconsideration on the basis of second person fiction in the present tense and is of course quite invalid for the extra-diegetic narrator vs narratee level of communication—the primary thesis proposed in her study concerns the incompatibility of narrator's and characters' E(xpression)s. Although the contention that passages that render characters' thought or speech events cannot, at the same time, discuss the process of narration seems to be a valid narratological proposition, the point is in fact open to argument since psycho-narration, for instance, very clearly permits just such a combination.

- (3) That, none the less, was but a flicker; what made the real difference, *as I have hinted*, was his mute passage with Maggie. His daughter's anxiety alone had depths, and it opened out for him the wider that it was altogether new. *When, in their common past, when till this moment, had she shown a fear, however dumbly, for his individual life?*

(*The Golden Bowl* II, viii; James 1979:130–1)

In free indirect discourse this is much rarer, but not impossible as the example of James demonstrates.¹¹ Free indirect discourse passages with narratorial commentary frequently concern the *story* rather than the discourse level:

- (4) For a couple of years now she had known as never before what it was to look 'well'—to look, that is, as well as she had always felt, from far back, that, in certain conditions, she might. [...] The sight of him suggested indeed that Fanny would be there, though so far as opportunity went she had not seen her. This was about the limit of what it could suggest.

The air, however, had suggestion enough—it abounded in them, many of them precisely helping to constitute those conditions with which, *for our young woman*, the hour was brilliantly crowned. She was herself in truth crowned, and it all hung together, melted together in light and colour and sound, the unsurpassed diamonds that her head so happily carried, the other jewels, the other perfections of aspect and arrangement that made her personal scheme a success, the proved private theory that materials to work with had been all she required and that there were now none too precious for her to understand and use—to which might be

added lastly, as the strong-scented flower of the total sweetness, an easy command, a high enjoyment, of her crisis.

(*The Golden Bowl* III, xiv; James 1979:191–2)

However ironical a narrator's free indirect discourse, it cannot use a narratorial voice-over except in the referential, denominational category.

From a *contextual* reading, whenever there is a clear narrative voice in the text, the use of narratorial language (and particularly conceptualization) in the presentation of figural consciousness, as in the much-quoted examples from *Madame Bovary*, lends itself to a recuperation in terms of 'the narrator's voice':

(5) He dumped Chicken Little into a burlap sack and tossed him next to some egg crates and boxes of wool cloth. Later, sitting down to smoke on an empty lard tin, still *bemused by God's curse and the terrible burden his own kind had of elevating Ham's sons*, he suddenly became alarmed by the thought that the corpse in this heat would have a terrible odor, which might get into the fabric of his woollen cloth.

(*Sula*; Morrison 1982:63–4)

What one has to do at this juncture is to attempt a radical distinction between linguistic signs of subjectivity (the deictic centre) on the one hand and the constructed notions of 'speakers' and consciousness SELFs on the other, which are equivalent to the 'voice' effect produced by the deictic expressions.

Wiebe's (1990) computer-based research and her subsequent studies of children's narrative (with Bruder 1991), and of adults' interpretative moves after paragraph boundaries amply document that the ascription of 'consciousness' or 'deictic centre' depends as much on the availability of an expected 'subjective' character, i.e. a character about whose psyche the text has informed us earlier, as it depends on the kind of linguistic subjectivity markers that trigger the attribution. What I find particularly instructive in Wiebe's work is her correlation between the presence of an *actor* (i.e. character) and the inevitable ascription of subjective elements to the consciousness of that actor unless there is a prior (competing) subjective character on stage.¹² Paragraph boundaries (as Fox 1987, 1988 has already attempted to demonstrate) frequently serve to shift focus, introducing new agents (named with a proper name rather than continuing the pronominal reference) and new (potential) centres of subjectivity. Wiebe's, like Fox's, examples are mostly from heavily reflectorial narratives, an important factor in the frequently invoked expectations of the reader. According to Wiebe a consciousness (or 'subjective agent') reading materializes in different degrees of probability in the following contexts, here enumerated in decreasing order of importance:

- previous presentation of consciousness by means of free indirect discourse
- immediately preceding descriptions of 'subjective state' (i.e. psycho-narration)

- postactive subjectivity (after an intervening passage of objective narrative or dialogue, or a paragraph boundary) and, least productive of all,
- agency on the part of a (new) character

All these, when followed by certain subjectivity markers, result in a ‘consciousness’ reading. What one observes here is therefore a very distinct cognitive pattern: if there is a subjective character (reflector) ‘on stage’, go on attributing subjective material to him or her, even when there has been some intervening non-subjective material. If, however, a different character is introduced and a description given of his or her mental state, then subsequent subjective elements can be aligned to that character. If no previous subjective agent is ‘on stage’, the last agent becomes the bearer of the subjectivity. Such a set of reading or interpretation strategies can readily be explained in terms of frame theory. Subjective elements have to be aligned to a consciousness, the most obvious candidates being the last consciousness introduced—on the basis of cognitive obstination (Lethcoe 1969:80; Weinrich 1985). Obstinance also requires there to be a definite reorientation before a shift in perspective from one character to the other. If no previous subjective character is ‘on stage’, consciousness will be attributed to the last active character because consciousness is an invariable ingredient of agency (determined by goals, perception, intentions, etc.).

Now since Wiebe’s and (mostly) Fox’s texts do not also have definite personalized narrators, the issue is always one of ascribing subjectivity to *characters*, and this does not reproduce the characteristic quandary of the dual voice alignments which have been at the centre of literary research on free indirect discourse. Wiebe also does not consider free indirect discourse of utterances, believing Banfield’s claim that all formal free indirect discourse representing utterances is filtered through a character’s consciousness (a view also held, rather strangely, by von Roncador 1988). The numerous examples that I have provided in [Chapters 3](#) to [6](#) should, however, have helped to demonstrate the existence, and indeed—in the eighteenth century—*prevalence*, of free indirect discourse for the representation of utterances. And, additionally, it has been pointed out that (at least in English) the free indirect discourse rendering of speech predates its application to thought processes in the eighteenth-century novel.

Here, too, frame theory can easily breach the gap that cannot be closed by a purely formal(ist) poetics. Since narrative texts portray agents, i.e. characters, in an effort at representation that echoes our cognitive understanding of the structure of action (Ricoeur’s *mimesis I*), these agents, once on the fictional stage, become part of the structure of a cognitive frame or script, and they therefore acquire very specific goals and intentions as well as a verisimilar psyche geared towards explaining the motivational structure of the fictional situation. It is precisely the real-world patterns of psychological inferencing (ambition, greed, jealousy) that the reader projects on characters in fiction—and the connection becomes explicit in narratorial commentary in the realist novel. (Compare, for instance, Tomashevsky’s *thematics* and Sternberg’s brilliant elucidation of his theory, as well as the discussion of motivation in Riffaterre’s newest book—Tomashevsky 1965, Sternberg 1983b, Riffaterre 1990.)

Problems multiply as soon as a distinct narrator is on stage. That narrator, too, is linguistically marked by expressions of subjectivity: most minimally by evaluative expressions, maximally by a speaker-addressee level of personal pronouns and by distinct (meta-narrative) commentary. Since pure figural and pure authorial novels are very rare indeed, the resulting overlay of expressions that can be in principle attributed to the subjectivity of either the projected narrator or the existing characters produces precisely the notorious dual voice ambiguities of potential interference or overlap and problematic delimitation. However, where a formalist poetics has to give up in despair, a recognition of the reader's inferencing activity—performed within a frame theoretical understanding of the narrative—produces a good explanation of precisely those points that are most bothersome to the formalist model. Attribution of subjectivity can then be related to verisimilitude within the established frame, a frame that may include a teller figure (latent and ready to resurface) as well as a fictional situation in which certain utterances or thoughts 'fit' the script and others do not. Contrary to Wiebe's analyses, such complex narrative situations tend to be resolved in terms of meaningfulness or relevance: if a specific FID sentence makes perfect sense as an utterance, it will be read in this way. If a certain formally ambiguous sentence makes sense as the narrator's exclamation but cannot reflect the character's verisimilar state of mind at that point in the story, the latent narrator will be said to have 'uttered' that sentence.

This view does *not* imply that there is *always* a latent narrator. Ever since the advent of pure reflector mode and interior monologue narratives, the language of the text may vouchsafe for no expressive/deictic centre on a level outside the fictional story. There can thus be narratorless fiction in the reflector mode, if the term is defined precisely as the absence of linguistic signals that might have resulted in the projection of a speaker. As Meindl (1978) has already suggested, within a different framework, the narrative instance *Erzähler* ('narrator') is a discourse-theoretical construct and not an empirical reality.¹³

Although the same inferential processes are at work in the attribution of speech and thought to characters and in the establishment of a narrator's voice, these two levels are entirely distinct in the frames that they evoke. Whereas characters are primarily cognized in terms of *agency*, and—on account of their being *human* agents—invariably acquire potential speech and thought performance, narrators—on the other hand—are primarily *tellers*, although homo-diegetic narrators on account of the existential link provided by the story acquire embodiment and some measure of agency even on the narrational plane. In hetero-diegetic narrative (third or second person), therefore, the projection of the narrator is primarily in terms of a *speaker* and *knower*, not in terms of an existential figure *within* the fiction. Indeed, even when recognized as a mask, the narrative voice, when existentialized, was very naturally aligned with the historical author and—at that point—also became gendered: Austen's narrators being referred to as 'she', Fielding's or Dickens's as 'he'. With the extension of unreliability from its prototypical homo-diegetic application into the hetero-diegetic realm, narrators who are *not* also protagonists have acquired personalities that may include explicit gendering or implicit (sometimes very ambiguous) hints about their gender¹⁴ (as in George Eliot's novels). I cannot in this place pursue these more specifically narratological issues.¹⁵

The model that I have presented here conceives of style in terms of a speaker conceptualization which need not be empirically present as *language*. Contrary to the standard approach to speech and thought representation, in which the characters' direct discourse is the most reliable part of the fictional universe and in which the narrator's or narrative's mediation is by definition always already a distortion, the approach that I have been advocating regards narrative *discourse* as a uniform one-levelled linguistic entity which by its deictic evocation of alterity—whether in the form of direct discourse, indirect discourse, free indirect discourse or *Ansteckung*—projects a level of language which is not actually *there* but is implied and manufactured by a kind of linguistic hallucination. Rather than the medium covering and drowning out all of the (mimetic) message, the schematic language theory allows the mimetic level to surge from the mediating language in a manner constitutive of the mimeticism which it produces.

9.3

STYLE VERSUS LANGUAGE: SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

A study such as this one raises numerous methodological questions about the use it makes of linguistics, and where precisely within the discipline of linguistics one can locate the area of application chosen for the analysis of 'expressivity' or 'subjectivity' in narrative prose. The latter question was already put forward in Bally (1914b: 467). When Bally contrasted various *formes d'expression* (which one may perhaps translate as *levels* rather than *forms* of expression), he distinguished between (1) a psychological level of 'les formes d'expression encore tributaires de la *pensée*, dont la langue n'est que le véhicule matériel';¹⁶ (2) a psychology of language (*langage*) which constitutes the laws of linguistic innovation 'au sein de la *parole*'; (3) 'la langue expressive'—a level on which the creations of the *parole* have been organized into systematic expressive devices which link the linguistic sign with what Bally calls 'le fait de pensée' (this level belongs to *stylistics*), and (4) the language as a sign system ('la langue organisée'), which is the responsibility of *grammar*:

(1)	<i>formes de pensée</i>	<i>psychologie</i>
(2)	<i>innovations de la parole</i>	<i>psychologie du langage</i>
(3)	<i>langue expressive</i>	<i>stylistique</i>
(4)	<i>langue organisée</i>	<i>grammaire</i>

Bally locates free indirect discourse on level (3), that of stylistics, but—in cases where no precise formal differences can be found (*Sa soeur fait sa première communion*), Bally speaks of a 'forme de pensée', hence of level (1), on which is reflected 'l'emploi que les individus font de la langue dans la parole pour leur usage personnel'.¹⁷ In terms of present-day linguistics this level would therefore squarely correspond with pragmatics, and maybe (for Bally's example) correlate with indirect speech acts. Bally's second level, which he equates with Saussure's *parole*, comprises linguistic (hence *formal*) innovations which are, however, user-specific and not organized within the system of the language. This level,

since Bally explicitly refers to the aesthetic criteria of literature, would seem to be identifiable as individual style (of a speaker, an author). In so far as it is peculiar to one person (idiosyncratic), style does not partake of a *langue* (which has to constitute a *system*); in so far as it innovates linguistic usage, it is more than a 'figure de pensée.' Level 2 therefore seems to correlate with the departure point of Leo Spitzer's stylistic work.

Stylistics, by contrast, constitutes a systematic use of language in so far as it is the forms available to the language already in use and not new creations that are here at issue. Free indirect discourse belongs to stylistics precisely because it lends itself to systematic description and can be applied ready-made as a quasi-grammatical form. Level (3) is, specifically, the locus of linguistic expressivity, since its 'faits d'expression [...] permettent l'expression aisée des mouvements affectifs et subjectifs de la vie'¹⁸ (467). The reason why Bally does not include free indirect discourse as part of grammar or *langue* proper—a step taken since in most standard grammars which at least briefly and superficially treat of the device—appears to lie in his definition of 'la langue organisée'. That definition is no longer adequate to present-day views of grammar. According to Bally, grammatical facts can be identified entirely with the meanings (*faits de pensée*) which they express and are impersonal and objective. Secondly, Bally equates grammar with the linguistic *signs* which are the phonetic materiality of the 'faits de langue' (identifiable in turn with the 'faits de pensée' above). Such a view can no longer be upheld except for the most automatic grammatical processes, and even there recent research has proved the recurrent inadequation of form and meaning. Whereas, in Bally's time, one could think of passivization, question formation, negation and the use of case as a unique grammatical relation welding together sign and meaning (within Saussure's framework), such easy correlations are no longer the order of the day. Pragmatic research keeps reminding us that literal meaning is next to useless in explaining actual linguistic usage, thus casting considerable doubt on syntactic equivalences. Negation, for example, when studied in context, appears to observe very subtle pragmatic rules of application (dependent on presupposition), and therefore no longer allows the description of NEG-transformation in terms of simple (referential) negation (compare Horn 1978, 1989; Givón 1978). Likewise, passivization is now generated in deep structure, and the pragmatic uses of passivization do not allow there to be one simple grammatical form. Even the use of case, a primary candidate for a purely formal grammar model if studied in the wake of case grammar (Fillmore) and valency, yields results the very *opposite* of a linguistic system à la Saussure. Today it is more difficult than ever to isolate a 'pure grammar', a *langue* in itself. Pragmatics has, rather, suggested that syntax, too, is 'functional' and manipulates formal devices which have some standard application for a large variety of pragmatic uses, in a manner which makes it impossible to link a grammatical form with any regularly occurring 'meaning'.

From that perspective, free indirect discourse can be aligned with a grammatical *procédé* that need not be basically different from other linguistic forms. The present study has also documented at length that indirect discourse—contrary to its standard descriptions—is equally susceptible to formal 'impurities' and individual uses.

Bally's four levels of analysis can be upheld as a useful model, but with different applications. Take the example of, say, expressive constituent preposing. Preposing in itself can be considered a syntactic device in the same category as subject-verb inversion (I-movement), WH-movement and the like, and level (3) could then include all systematic *uses* of such movements, including question formation, negation, indirect and free indirect discourse. Level (2), personal style, can be preserved to refer to uses of movements that do not have a generally recognizable purpose, e.g. the preposing in *demain viendront les oiseaux* in the example of Riffaterre (1959b). Level (1), finally, which is extra-formal, would specify the pragmatic conditions and applications of levels (2) to (4). As with Bally, levels (3) and (4) can be considered to be part of the *langue* since they are systematic, but both would now qualify as grammar or syntax, with the pragmatic meaning relation reserved for level (3).

Bally's reflections have more recently been reformulated in the text linguistic model of de Beaugrande (1980). Beaugrande proposes to institute a level of analysis entitled the 'semantics of syntax', which would be responsible for *how formal patterns are utilized*. This level seems to correspond to the kind of analysis which I have provided for root transformations under (4.6). Additionally, Beaugrande also discusses a level called the 'syntax of semantics', which in fact squarely correlates with the frame-theoretical analysis in terms of agent, action, instrument and the like. I will close on this Hjelmslevian reworking of the syntax/semantics dichotomy, noting that the genre of narrative decisively determines the kind of 'generic' syntax of semantics that I have been discussing, just as the utilization of syntactic patterns (the semantics of syntax) appears to be under the control of genre or text type constellations.

This takes me to the second methodological question that I have raised. From what I have said above, this book squarely locates itself in the realm of level (3), which is one of syntax or grammar in a pragmatic framework. Within such a framework what exactly are the empirical data and how scientific (falsifiable) are results obtained in a study such as this?

As far as the formal properties of free indirect discourse are concerned, this book has argued that formal criteria do not necessarily suffice to describe the meaning effects ('voice') of free indirect discourse. Although one can define free indirect discourse in certain ways, one will then encounter a variety of intermediary forms that make the prior classification less than useful. Indeed, the description of free indirect discourse in [Chapters 2 to 5](#) has precisely helped to falsify various prior accounts of indirect and free indirect discourse in purely formal terms, most prominently Banfield's. It has additionally emerged that analyses can be conducted from a variety of different angles, each of which yields very different results. Thus, in the discussion of subordination, the syntactic peculiarities of complement clauses invalidate a distinction between indirect discourse and psycho-narration/speech report—a distinction originally made on the basis of the pragmatic principles of condensation, access to information and the like. An analysis that departs from the introductory verbs, on the other hand, introduces distinctions between locutionary and illocutionary verbs to the detriment of a distinction between the syntactic factors of indirect and free indirect discourse. Nor do temporal and pronominal usage, by themselves, dissolve the ambiguity between purely grammatical and pragmatically

motivated free indirect discourse instances—as observe the irresolvable issues of sequence of tense and the preterite as signals of consciousness.

I have attempted to overcome these difficulties on a pragmatic plane, where quotation has been treated as a stylistic phenomenon of peculiar pragmatic applications, and I have complemented this approach by frame-theoretical considerations which are particularly relevant to literary texts. As has been noted, oral free indirect discourse when its ironic use is predominant can be signalled very clearly by means of intonation and other prosodic features which precisely correspond to the condensation and schematization properties observed in the written corpus. The Schematic Language Theory, therefore, relies on evidence from features observable both in the oral and written narratives which have been analysed.

The question is whether such a theory is falsifiable and therefore meets scientific standards of empiricity. Since the theory applies to several levels of language and textual usage, several falsifying strategies come into play. *Linguistic* schematism in quoting, for example, could be disproved by a grammatical analysis that reinstates an underlying direct discourse as a desirable deep structure without entangling itself in the contradictions that the standard approach has so far generated. Such a solution would require an entirely new syntactic theory. Another direction of attack might come from empirical investigation into the production and reception of quotation. Current research results in so far as I am aware of them (Ludwig/Faulstich 1985, Bruder 1991) support rather than disqualify my theory. However, none of the experiments have, of course, been set up to falsify my particular model, and so one can expect some interesting results from new experiments. Cognitive science, too, may contribute to question the concept of the human mind on which I have drawn (the principles of *obstinance*, the inexpressibility of the purely emotional, the general cognitive tendency to simplify into schemata and—above all—the human urge to create significance, resulting in a first-level prior assumption of cohesion).¹⁹ Here, too, I have so far encountered corroborative evidence from the work of cognitive linguists and even from computer scientists. (The notion of stacking, for example, seems to replicate Weinrich's *obstinance* and Chafe's 'active memory' within a computer model of the human mind. Compare de Beaugrande 1980:44–5 and Wiebe 1990:36–8, esp. the literature quoted there.) I have also implied a view of language production and language acquisition in terms of holistic situation-dependent connectivity. Since such an approach does not lend itself to formalization, it is presumably falsifiable most clearly in the course of empirical research into first language acquisition. Although there exists some preliminary research into script acquisition (Stein/Glenn 1979), there has to my knowledge as yet been no very sustained experimentation regarding the acquisition of script-related vocabulary and syntax. Here, too, new results may make my model less adequate to the data that one will then have at one's disposal.

As regards more literary matters, the conventions of quotation are of course subject to the purposes of the quoter and to changes in literary pragmatics. If my results characterize the process of quotation and reporting in the literature that I know, this does not exclude the existence of different conventions elsewhere. In particular, in the crucial and complex area of irony, I expect that dissent will be inevitable from some quarters. I trust, however, that this will result in productive discussion and a gain in knowledge.

A final word is here also due *re* the limitations of my results with regard to the languages and literatures analysed. For one, results obtained here would need to be checked against the situation in other and particularly non-Indo-European languages. The case of Russian, in so far as it relies on a less finely differentiated formal scale of grammatical devices for the representation of speech or thought, appears to support my major thesis. However, I have no knowledge of the Ural-Altaic language group (Finnish, Hungarian, Turkish), and only very little knowledge of Japanese—too little to come to any systematic conclusions in spite of the wealth of linguistic studies of discourse representation in that language. From the examples quoted in N.Li (1991) I also suspect that an analysis of Chinese free indirect discourse could decisively contribute to the topic. Sternberg's position, which seems to have anticipated the direction of my own analysis, has perhaps been influenced by linguistic forms in ancient and modern Hebrew, two languages which would also merit sustained analysis in the light of the schematic language model.

Within the three languages that I discuss in detail, the overwhelming emphasis has been given to English. I have indicated in the text where German and French veer off into different directions within their own linguistic systems. The cross-linguistic comparison establishes that free indirect discourse occupies a slightly different place both in the grammar and in the stylistics of each *langue*, and I have documented how in one language some devices acquire larger scope or are compensated for by a different set of devices. For obvious limitations of space, qualification, and access to trustworthy data, aspects treated at some length in English have had to be disregarded in the other languages. In particular the thorny historical question of the origins of free indirect discourse and the prevalence of free indirect discourse in the spoken language will, I hope, be taken up by specialists in the French and German national literatures and languages, using some of the new criteria that are now available and which have rendered earlier studies on the question obsolete.

In the following final section of this book I will connect the more precisely linguistic issues that have been at the centre of this book with the literary question of stylistic conventions. This is meant to be a final attempt to rebut the representational language fallacy which one keeps encountering in most philosophical, literary and linguistic approaches. In this final section—a (mainly speculative) historical excursus on the literary functions of style—the emphasis will fall on the conventions of mimetic realism and its consequences for literary stylistics.

9.4

HOW NOT TO CALL A SPADE A SPADE

Narrative theory in its standard story/discourse, or *discours/récit*, distinction has always been based on the concept of mimesis. Whether rendering or evoking a fictional story world, the narrative discourse (narration) has as its main function that of 'telling' or 'showing' the story; it needs to describe the characters in their setting and to delineate the chronology of action (in whatever superimposed narrational sequence). This narrative

function is so much at the core of narratological deliberation that one can simply take it for granted and concentrate on narrative transmission itself (as do Stanzel 1984b and Cohn 1978). Representational mimesis, particularly in the telling vs showing opposition, then comes to privilege the seemingly ‘unmediated’ text of ‘pure’ mimesis, in direct contrast to the Platonic groundings of the distinction, and this development relates directly to the discrediting of narratorial ‘interference’ at the end of the nineteenth century, which was, however, motivated by the attempt to liberate the *what* of fiction from its analytical *how*. As I have argued in this book, ‘pure mimesis’ in narrative prose is a conventional ideal rather than an indubitable empirical reality. Direct speech itself—the one unmediated supposedly transparent part of narration—is unmediated only in terms of the conventions of its interpretation; it is meant to be read as mimetic, even if quite transparently invented and anti-mimetic, or when openly flouting the existing realist conventions. I have started in [Chapter 1](#) with Genette’s proposition that even minimally ‘told’ description is mediated since *action* cannot be ‘reproduced’ in the medium *language*. This insight extends to reflectorial narrative ‘stage directions’ such as *He walked to the pier and sat down*; in contrast to, say, interior monologue, these cannot be regarded as ‘pure mimesis’, although such inconspicuous phrasing has prompted Chatman’s term ‘non-narrated’ (Chatman 1978; but see Chatman 1990a for a retraction). ‘Objective’ narrative has, however, become a common narrative feature only after the invention of both reflector mode and camera-eye narrative, and its seeming objectivity needs to be analysed as a direct function of, and development from, novelistic realism. Reflectorial narrative develops the realist novel’s commitment to quasi-historical accuracy and specificity by being ‘true’ to the subjective experience of a character—much on the lines of pictorial impressionism—whereas camera-eye realism takes objectivity seriously, particularly in restricting access to characters’ motivation and other consciousness factors.

The study of the forms of speech and thought representation conducted by narrative theory has been largely determined by such post-realistic models. Whereas narratologists wax eloquent on the narrator’s presence and on his or her functions, when it comes to speech and thought representation they distrust the narrator’s discourse as a linguistically and ideologically distortive medium, placing a premium on ‘objective’ description and on the use of direct (or at least free indirect) speech. Traditional speech and thought representational categories, for instance, work extremely well in the works by James Joyce from *Dubliners* to the early chapters of *Ulysses* because the narrative norm in these texts is that of the post-Flaubertian narrator ‘refined out of existence’. When I came to look at the eighteenth-century and Victorian novel as well as present-day postmodernist writing, however, categories started to blur, mimesis was openly flouted, and the automatic correlation between expressive elements in the text and an increase in mimetic value could no longer be maintained. The inappropriateness of the conventional account and its categories for such Modernist and postmodernist texts has not only prompted me to develop the narrational theory of speech and thought representation presented in the previous chapter; it has additionally impelled me, in a deconstructive move against the

very possibility of realistic representation within language, to query the very foundations on which the traditional model reposed.

The problem is of course a philosophical and semiotic as much as a merely literary one, and it will be well to get these more general considerations out of the way before turning to the specifically stylistic aspects of the question. What is at issue in the assumption of non-mediated objective description is *not* the problem of referentiality but that of the ability of language to name and denote, and hence of the unequivocalness of the linguistic signifier. Since the relation between signifier and signified is an arbitrary but meaningful one, defined within the system of double-tiered differencing on both levels (Saussure 1966: Part II, iv, 112; 1985:155–6), such unequivocalness is a built-in theoretical feature in the semiotic language system.²⁰ However, such a one-to-one correlation between signifiers and signifieds even within word fields (see the famous word field for tree/wood (material)/forest—Hjelmslev 1961:54 [= 1943:50, § 1.3]) does not yield a very good starting point for an analysis of *style*, or of the objectivity or distortiveness of meaning. Indeed, it flatly contradicts any such concern since (except in the case of synonymy) signifieds would tend to be different when one uses two different expressions for the ‘same thing’.

The problem is a difficult one for semantics, and one way of solving it has been to incorporate connotation and collocation on the signified level: in order to express ‘X’, one has to use *Y* in an environment that contains the elements A and B, or in a string of DEF, within which E is said to connote (or mean) ‘X’. Such context-sensitive approaches, however, do not entirely come to grips with the age-old question of stylistic choice, although they may manage to deal with stylistic register (elevated, colloquial, scientific, etc.). A consequence of such a register-dependent view of the lexical structure of the *langue* would be the stratification of lexical fields in a register-dependent manner such that one signified would correlate with several signifiers on several different register levels. (This is what Chafe 1973 suggests.) However, even here complete overlap is rare, with *guy* not usable in *all* environments in which *man* or *individual* or *person* can be used. (Environment here refers to the context on the level of signifieds.)

The key problem for a linguistic analysis of literary ‘style’ has always been that of *choice*. Naïve proponents of deviation theory have always upheld that there is one proper word (usually objective) to fit each slot, and that the writer’s style can be gauged from the choice of one stylistically loaded alternative. This ‘commutation’ schema has been most emphatically rejected by Coseriu (1980:121). I have briefly mentioned an example of this nature in [Chapter 6](#) when referring to Riffaterre’s subtle analysis of *paterfamilias* (in lieu of, supposedly, *father*). Deviation makes much sense when discussing downright violations of lexical and syntactic rules (as in *a grief ago*), and the reader is therefore alerted to the inevitable necessity of finding the appropriate semantic implicature. With ‘simple’ stylistic variation, however, no such clear-cut choices between an acceptable, literal expression and its ‘literary’ variants exist, nor are the signifieds in these contexts necessarily equivalent. Literary critics have therefore repeatedly underlined the inseparability of form and content and have argued that the style *is* the meaning.

These contradictory stances have most recently been reconciled by Genette in his *Fiction et diction* (1991). Genette rejects the approach of Spitzer and Riffaterre in which

'style' accrues from a noticeable difference from a surrounding context (which, as a consequence, becomes neutralized, unmarked) and instead proposes to see style as a general connotative (or 'indirectly denotative') level of the text:

- (6) Pour le dire plus simplement: en plus de ce qu'il *dit* (denote), le discours *est* à chaque instant ceci ou cela (par exemple: plat comme un trottoir) [...] Le style n'est rien d'autre que ce versant, disons *sensible*, qui fait ce que Jakobson appelait la 'perceptibilité' d'un texte.

(Genette 1991:123)²¹

- (7) Le style consiste donc en l'ensemble des propriétés rhématiques exemplifiées par le discours, au niveau 'formel' (c'est-à-dire, en fait, physique) du matériau phonique ou graphique, au niveau linguistique du rapport de denotation directe, et au niveau figural de la denotation indirecte.

(Ibid., 131)²²

These conclusions develop from Sartre's deliberations in *Saint Genet* on the difference between meaningful words that signify and 'things' which connote ('font sens'—Genette 1991:107). Sartre, in *Situations*, explains this difference as pertaining to the function (*not* to the essence) of the signifiers employed.

It is on this level of general style that objectivity and evaluativeness have to be situated, and the key notion of *function* (although here differently applied from Sartre's use of the term) can help link this issue with the frame notions introduced earlier. Objectivity of style can be examined—not as 'real' objectivity—but as a textual *function* of generic realism and post-realism. 'Objective' description is perceived as objective or neutral not because it is so in some factual or essential manner but because it is recognized or interpreted as neutral in correlation to accepted styles and registers on the one hand and in relation to the non-objective (subjective) style(s) pertaining to the fictional characters on the other. In pre-mid-nineteenth-century literary periods, plain language had no such (positive) connotation, but tended instead to confer a social stigma, implying a lack of education on the part of the (plain) writer (and speaker). (For obvious reasons, the genre of autobiography and its imitations have to be to some extent exempted from this argument.)²³ The beginnings of the novel, at least in the eighteenth century, coincide with the historical period advocating poetic diction, a self-referential poetic code of decidedly elevated, 'literary' connotation. Whether as historian or self-avowed *littérateur*, the eighteenth-century novelist aimed at erudition and refined style. It has been noted that the narratives of Fielding and Smollett observed generic conventions of specific stylistic registers, with Fielding espousing the diction of philosophical discourse, and Smollett that of the natural sciences (Richetti, 1988). But even the language of Dickens or Thackeray dons a variety of stylistic masks, with the subject matter decisively removed from a literal, homespun interpretation. Literality would in fact have flouted the eighteenth-century *politeness* conventions (Sell 1991b) of cultured literary intercourse; outspoken, implicitly lower-class rudeness was not even allowed in direct quotation and in fact does not appear in the English hetero-diegetic novel until Sir Walter Scott, where the popular discourse is

first allowed entry, and for entirely historical as well as ideological and satirical purposes.²⁴

Indeed, the adoption of the rude language of the common people correlates precisely with the Romantic glorification of the 'noble savage' in one's midst. Simplicity and plainness of speech are claimed to no longer imply a lack of culture and refinement, but are instead taken to signify the uncorrupted closeness to nature and 'natural' civilization which Civilization at large has lost in its 'unnatural' sophistication. Linked also, as in Scott, to the political and social upgrading of hitherto marginalized strata of the English populace, including geographic marginalization, the simplicity of the popular tongue is therefore deliberately construed to iconically symbolize a simplicity of mind and ethics which, in the Romantic framework, becomes identified with honesty, common-sense, wisdom and religious closeness to one's origins in Nature and in God. The Romantic movement therefore puts an end to the stylistic tradition that had been in force from the Renaissance onwards and it paves the way for the later realist privileging of faithful reproduction. The Victorian novel here comes to occupy the battleground on which the eighteenth-century conventions and the Romantic ethics of plain language collide in combat, in a tournament of literary styles which is creatively manipulated by some authors such as Dickens, and politely declined by the more 'serious' writers such as G. Eliot and Thackeray. By the time of Joyce one had passed through realism and naturalism, with the result that faithful reproduction of the language of common people came to be taken very seriously indeed, advancing from an ideal to a requirement. Realism of course additionally lost the Romantics' naïve illusions about the aesthetics of plain language and naturally rejected its folkloristic and eth(n)ic agenda. 'Realistic' dialogue is simply taken for granted, and plain speech no longer ridiculed (as in the eighteenth-century novel and much mid-Victorian fiction), nor is it idealized in entirely unrealistic terms.

There is then a tendency in much English literature *not* to call a spade a spade, and this stylistic inclination blossoms in a variety of self-promoting stylistic strategies, whether metaphorical, rhetorical, pseudo-scientific or pseudo-philosophical and so forth. Nevertheless such linguistic expression cannot be conceived of as a deliberate falsification, ornamentation or distortion of plain language, since plain language simply does not figure in the code. It is, ironically, in precisely this kind of artificial, literary language that poetic mimesis in the novel is first created, in a climate of radical inadequation between expression and its signified, a climate in which euphemism, circumlocution, paraphrase, metaphor, understatement and a host of other rhetorical devices reign supreme as the one and only access to the story signified. Here, too, frames of reference are decisively at work in both the production and the decoding of novelistic representation, but these frames are frequently of a conventional, literary kind, instituting an overriding reliance on *topoi* and generic expectations. Not the loadstar of the realistic story referent but the intertextually determined story pattern of well-proven narrative success guides the stylistic invention of eighteenth-century prose, except at the margins of literary discourse, in (pseudo) autobiography and the novel of letters. Narrative theory, particularly in its more structuralist versions, has largely failed to reflect this typical artificiality of narrative discourse except in the thesis of the narrator's discourse as a distortive medium, a thesis developed, however, on the basis of the nineteenth-century intrusive narrator. A

schematic theory of language representation can perhaps more easily deal with such discourse. Mimetic representation does not *imitate* (*wiedergeben*), it *recreates* and *evokes* by means of frames, codes and linguistic correlatives. Free indirect discourse, like all other forms of speech and thought representation, is radically subsumed in this materiality of language as style. The various languages of fiction or narrative, as we have seen, are in fact fictions created by the infinite resources of language as literary style.

NOTES

- 1 Wiebe is by profession a computer analyst and not a linguist, and her type of computer program has not more than a superficial similarity with the transformationalist model. In her book the relationship of surface to (possible) deep structure therefore does not come into focus.
- 2 See, e.g., Pratt (1986:71): 'Representative discourses, fictional or nonfictional, must be treated as simultaneously world-creating, world-describing, and world-changing undertakings.'
- 3 See Fludernik (in preparation), which provides a more detailed analysis of communication in narrative and presents a frame-theoretical model of 'narrative situations' and reading strategies.
- 4 See both my review essay in *Poetics Today* (Fludernik 1993) and Fludernik (in preparation). The standard application of speech act theory to literature is Pratt (1977). See Hancher's review of this (Hancher 1977, 1980) as well as the more recent Petrey (1990).
- 5 This does not apply to recent experimental fiction in the first person which radically subverts the ontological and enunciatory properties of the narrative voice. For an excellent discussion of this deconstruction of the 'I' see Margolin (1987).
- 6 For the latter compare Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians* and *In the Heart of the Country*, as discussed in Wright (1987), Neumann (1990, 1991) and Cohn (forthcoming).
- 7 Such a *tour de force* can, however, be found here and there, for instance in John Hawkes's *Travesty* (1976).
- 8 The easy transferability from one situation to the next is addressed in the most recent update of frame theory, in the 'conversation MOP' (Kellermann *et al.* 1989).
- 9 For the use of the definite article in script and frame related contexts see also Fillmore (1977:114–16), de Beaugrande (1980:140) and van Dijk/Kintsch (1983).
- 10 For other applications of frame theory to narrative see also Brewer (1985).
- 11 This has been documented in great detail by Busch (1967) on the text of *The Ambassadors*.
- 12 See especially Wiebe (1990:87–93).
- 13 See Lindemann (1987) for an excellent contribution on how narrators are conceptualized from textual deviations, and Violi (1986:375), who demonstrates how the *sujet d'énonciation* can be glimpsed from textual traces establishing this enunciatory origin. Compare additionally Briosi (1986:516).
- 14 Indeed, such hints—on account of an implied embodiment of the narrator—concern the narrator's sex (rather than gender), but the hints themselves refer to gender roles (for instance clothing and language codes).
- 15 Note that my attempts to explain how readers resolve ambiguity and the attribution of voice in equivocal contexts is of a more general cognitive tendency than the very literary models

- of Culler's types of naturalization (1975b) or Yacobi's five principles of resolving unreliability and other textual inconsistencies (1981: 114–19).
- 16 '[...] forms of expression still tributary to thought, and for which *langue* [i.e. the language system] is merely the material embodiment' (my translation).
 - 17 '[...] the use which people make of the language system in their speech (*parole*) for their own individual purposes' (my translation).
 - 18 '[...] expressions [...] allow the easy depiction of the emotional and subjective qualities of life' (my translation).
 - 19 Compare de Beaugrande (1980:134).
 - 20 I am of course aware of the post-structuralist critique of the Saussurian model, and of developments in semiotics (particularly those based on the work of Charles Peirce) which have substantially modified the traditional account.
 - 21 To put it quite simply: over and above what it *says* (denotes), discourse at the same time *is* one or the other thing (for instance: flat like the pavement) [...] Style is precisely this, if one wants, experienceable aspect of the text, which Jakobson called its "perceptibility".' (My translation)
 - 22 'Style therefore exists in the collocation of rhematic properties embodied in the discourse, whether on the "formal" (i.e. physical) level of the phonetic or graphic material, on the linguistic level of direct denotation, or on the figural level of indirect denotation.' (My translation)
 - 23 But see Wright (1989) for an excellent analysis of the rhetorical influence on (literary) epistolary narrative.
 - 24 The speech act of cursing has to be excepted from this general rule, at least in the eighteenth-century novel, and one may want to qualify further by allowing for the deliberate infraction of politeness rules in Sterne or, earlier, Nashe. (Compare also Hughes 1991.)

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TEXTS

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