THE (UNINTENDED?) EFFECTS OF US MILITARY TRAINING DURING THE COLD WAR IN LATIN-AMERICA

DARIO A. ROMERO[‡]

This version: October 2019

ABSTRACT. Different country own features and experiences have been associated with the emergence of democracy and democratic values. This paper goes beyond this framework and explore how changes in democracy is explained by foreign interventions and policies. I study the *School of Americas*, a US military training program of Latin-American armed forces during the Cold War. I find that this program had a negative effect on democracy levels. The increase of repression after sending high-rank officials explains this results. I exploit the geographical distributions of commanders in Colombia to test locally my results and show that places commanded of SOA trainees experienced an increase of illegal contra-insurgency activities. However, after the program change of focus, countries with more trainees (and therefore repression) experienced positive effects on democracy support.
JEL CODES: F51, N46, P48
KEYWORDS: Democracy, Military Training, Armed Conflict

[‡]Department of Economics, Columbia University. 1022 International Affairs Building, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027. E-mail: dr2879@columbia.edu.

1. Introduction

Several papers have associated the emergence of support for democracy in societies with historical exposure to different phenomena, such as their own previous experiences with democracy (Bautista et al., 2019) or repression (Persson and Tabellini, 2009). Other ways in which such support can emerge is through international interventions. These can take direct forms such as promotion of coup d'états (see Kinzer, 2006) or explicit intrusion in civil wars (see (see Reagan, 2002) but there are also less direct tools such military aid and training. They can also take less direct forms, such as such as economic sanctions or conditional aid programs Toke et al. (2019).

One way in which support for democratic values can be influenced, and that has not been studied, is through a less direct international intervention: military cooperation and training. This can be thought to, indirectly, affect democracy and democratic values. This kind of strategy has been used widely by different States to influence the action and goals of other states. In this paper, I study this type of intervention on internal affairs. I use the School of Americas (SOA) case and assess the effects of an international intervention program beyond its initial aim. The United States government designed this program to instruct Latin-American armed forces into the same costumes and professionalism of US army, but it had effects beyond the initial goal. This paper shows that the program also influenced the democratic path in the region.

I use official attendees' records for 40 years to recover graduates' country of origin. I combine this information with a long time-series measures of democracy for 18 Latin-American countries to analyze the effects of the program. Moreover, I use a series of democracy health indicators and particular data for Colombia to test the mechanisms that drive my results. Finally, I assess the effects on democracy perceptions after the program changed its goals to study the long term consequences of the program.

I estimate the effect of graduates in democracy when they return to their countries. I show that countries that sent more high-ranked military to the US program experienced a bigger reduction on democracy index. The fact that this type of personnel is in charge of military units explain my negative results and contrary troops and lower rank personnel that are not able to set the goals of military operations have not effects on democracy indicators.

I am able not only to disentangle the effect of the US military training on the region democracy path but also the effects on intermediate mechanisms that explain the negative effects of the program on democracy. After the return of graduates to their

countries there is a decrease in newspaper circulation, strikes, riots and anti-government demonstrations without any change in guerrilla warfare levels. Moreover, using the case of Colombia and find that the this results are also present inside the different regions of this country. Regions that were under the control of *SOA* attendees 20 years after their graduation report an increase in the number of illegal contra-insurgence activities.

I also use cross-country survey information to estimate the effects of the program on democratic perception and support in the period after the program changed its focus. I use exogenous variation on each county initial willingness to send troops and estimate the effect of the program on democracy culture. More graduates translated in more support to democracy after the end of the Cold War.

2. Background

2.1. ***The School of the Americas.*** In contrast with other type of US intervention in the region such as invasions (e.g. Panama 1989, Dominican Republic 1966) or the support of military coups (e.g. Chile 1973, Guatemala 1954) I look of a case where the intervention took a less direct form. I study the School of the Americas, a military cooperation program designed by the United States to train Latin-American armed forces under the same background and tactics of US army.

The initial scope of the Program was not to influence directly democratic outcomes of Latin-American countries. *SOA* was funded with the propose of fill the space left by the European powers after World War II. The objective was to align the hemispheric countries with US national interest. From its beginnings in 1946, the school was located in the Panama Canal exclusive zone controlled by the US government and it aimed to train troop under the professionally traditions of US army.

However, the goal gradually mutated and the school became a program for communist contention. With the rise of the Soviet Union and in particular with the Cuban Revolution, Kennedy administration changed the focus and the school transformed into an instrument of national security doctrine. Under this view countries in the Americas did not faced an international threat to democracy but an internal threat: left parties and social movements. Instead of providing conventional strategies of international war United States gave skills to defeat this unconventional enemy such as intelligence tools and anti-guerrilla warfare tactics. During the Cold War, the US government goal was to minimize this internal force that might help and support the international communist and its rival superpower, the Soviet Union.

The school has been criticized by its human right record. According to several non-governmental organizations, graduates were trained into illegal tactics designed for

dirty war. The school introduced graduates into tactics for torture, interrogation, infiltration, psychological warfare and kidnappings and enforced disappearance of political opponents. Under the school view own citizens were potential threat to national security and such tactics were necessary to neutralize the enemies. However, and despite these human rights violations the countries kept sending school trainees during the whole the Cold War period.

3. Data

A detailed register of *SOA* trainees allows me to track graduates' country of origin. I combine this information with the standard democracy measurements and perceptions in the region to assess the effect of the program on democracy evolution path.

3.1. **SOA Graduates.** I use the official attendees' records of United States Government. This data contains information some characteristic of the program attendees since its opening in 1946.

3.2. **Democracy Measures.** I use traditional democracy Polity IV index to measure democracy "quality". This index record not only a distinction between democracy and authoritarian regimes but also it is able to distinguish different degrees of variation within each system. I can construct a panel from 1946 to 1991 with democracy trajectories of all 18 countries in my sample

3.3. **Democracy Perception.** I measure the perceptions of democracy in the region using the results of Latinbarometer from 1995-2017. This survey not only record how citizens in the region measure the useless of the democracy compared with an authoritarian regime but also it assesses democratic behavior such as willingness to vote and perception towards institutions like the army.

3.4. **Within Country Data: Colombia.** I combined the detailed *SOA* graduates records with military commanders in Colombia. I exploit the fact that these attendees must reach higher army ranks after 25 years and I look their performance when they are in charge of a brigade.

3.4.1. *Brigades Commanders and Army Structure.* I constructed a biannually dataset of brigade commanders in Colombia from 1990 to 2010.

3.4.2. *Armed Conflict Outcomes.* I use the violence data created by Restrepo et al. (2004) and updated by *Universidad del Rosario*. This data allows me to recover the operation performance of each military unit in all Colombian municipalities.

4. Effect of SOA on Democracy

I estimate the effect *SOA* graduates on democracy once they returned to their original countries in Latina America. For this purpose, I use the variation in the years when countries use the program' services, the number of trainees and the rank of graduates at the time of the training.

4.1. **Empirical Strategy.** I use dynamic panel estimations to disentangle the causal effects of the program on changes in the democratic paths amongst 18 Latin-American countries.

4.2. **Results.** I find that countries that sent more troops to SOA experienced bigger reduction in democracy levels. When I desegregate the effect according to the trainees' rank, I found that the relation is explained by high rank graduates. In contrast to regular troops and student officers, high rank officers are in positions where they take decisions and set operational direction of big units.

4.3. **Robustness.** I explore the robustness of my results to the presence of other source of variation and in particular features of my baseline setting. I test if the effect is persistence to the use of different measure of democracy. Moreover, it might be the case that bigger countries send more troops to the program and this is relations is explaining my results. I control for different country size measures to rule out this relation is driving my results.

5. Mechanism: Increase in Repression

I estimate the effects of SOA graduates on different possible mechanism that explain the negative effect of the program on democracy. I test which features of a well functioning democracy were affected by the graduates. Moreover I test if this results are also present when I analyze the individual case of a county.

5.1. **Empirical Strategy.** I test the effect on intermediate variables such as amount of social movements, media circulation, political institutions and communist contention. The aim of this variables is to measure the functioning structure of social manifestation and expression of civil society, feutures taht have been associated to the well performance of democracy.

5.2. **Results.** I find that SOA graduates are associated with a reduction in democracy health measures. I document a relation between trainees and reduction in strikes, riots and violent demonstrations; an increase in the possibilities of political parties bans; and a decrease in newspaper circulation.

5.3. **Effects in Colombia.** I test if the increase in repression activities is also present analyzing the particular case of a Colombia. The ongoing civil conflict and the fact it was the biggest client of the program allows me to test if *SOA* graduates are associated with increase in anti-guerrilla illegal activities when they return and become commanders of military operations.

5.3.1. *Results.* Municipalities under the command of *SOA* graduates report an increase in paramilitary activities, measure as the number of paramilitary and guerrilla clashes. Moreover, there is an increase in civilian victimization coming from paramilitary structures.

6. Long Term Effects: Effects on Democratic Perceptions

I exploit the exogenous variation in the countries willingness to use the SOA services and estimated the programs effect on Latin-American perception towards democracy after the end anticommunist period.

6.1. **Empirical Strategy.** I use the distance of each capital city to the Panama Canal Zone to measure the initial ties of each country to Panama and their willingness to send troop to the "tropic". This exogenous variation to the exposure of the program allows me to recover the long-run effects of SOA over democracy perceptions after the end of the Cold War and the change in the focus of the program.

6.2. **Results.** I find that the total amount of trainees translates on more support to democracy and better democratic culture after the end of the program. Countries that used more actively SOA services have on average less support of authoritarian regimes and less uncertainty about political deviation affiliation.

7. Conclusion

References

BAUTISTA, M., F. GONZÁLEZ, L. MARTÍNEZ, P. MUÑOZ, AND P. MOUNU (2019): "The Geography of Dictatorship and Support for Democracy," Working Paper 298, Households in Conflict Network.

KINZER, S. (2006): *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq*, Times Books.

PERSSON, T. AND G. TABELLINI (2009): "Social Capital and Political Accountability," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1, 88–126.

REAGAN, P. (2002): "Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46, 55–73.

RESTREPO, J., M. SPAGAT, AND J. VARGAS (2004): "The dynamics of the columbian civil conflict: A new dataset." *Homo Oeconomicus*, 21, 396–429.

TOKE, A., F. ALBORNOZ, AND E. HAUK (2019): "Foreign influence and domestic policy," Discussion papers, University of Nottingham.

FIGURE 1. **SAO Graduates by Country**

Notes: This map presents the spatial distribution by origin country of SOA graduates from 1946 to 1991.

FIGURE 2. **Distribution Share Rank Gradautes**

A. Enlisted

B. Students Officers

C. Officers

Notes: This figure presents the total share of SOA graduates by rank for each country. Panel A presents the share of enlisted personnel, panel B presents the share of officer students and panel C shows the share of low officer graduates.

FIGURE 3. **SOA Gradautes and Regime**

A. SOA Graduates by Region of Origin

B. Democracy Deterioration

Notes: In panel A I present the temporal distribution of SOA graduates from 1946 to 1991. I show two-year moving averages to smooth the data. In panel B I present the timeline of democracy deterioration. *Andean countries* are Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru. *Central America countries* are Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. *Southern Cone countries* are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. *Other countries* are Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Dominican Republic.

FIGURE 4. **Colombia SOA Graduates by Rank**

Notes: I present the temporal distribution of Colombia SOA graduates 1946 to 1991. I show two-year moving averages to smooth the data.

FIGURE 5. **Evolution Colombian Brigades Commanders**

Notes: This graph presents the evolution of number of brigades in Colombia from 1991:1 to 2010:2 and the share of brigades according training of commander.

FIGURE 6. **Evolution SOA Influence on Colombian Brigades**

Notes: This graph presents the evolution of peer influence on brigades from 1946 to 1991. Also it presents the semester of graduation for Colombian brigades commanders between 1991:1 to 2010:2.

FIGURE 7. **First State: Distance to Canal Zone and SOA Graduates**

Notes: This graph shows the relation between the total number of graduates between 1946 and 1991 and the distance to capital cities.

FIGURE 8. **Evolution Predicted Stock and Influence**

Notes: I presents the evolution of predicted stock of SOA graduates able to command a brigade. i also show the predicted influence of the stock between 1991:1 to 2010:2 .

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: Brigade Commanders by Training

	Trained by SOA			Trained by SOA while student		
	No	Yes	Diff	No	Yes	Diff
	(131)	(78)		(28)	(50)	
Military						
Number semester in charge	3.6	3.5	0.164	4.0	3.2	0.186
	(2.2)	(2.1)	(0.295)	(2.0)	(2.1)	(1.042)
Number of brigades commanded	1.4	1.3	−0.042	1.5	1.2	0.028
	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.094)	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.225)
First Brigade Characteristics						
Historic Violence						
Clashes 1985-1990	37.4	46.3	10.464*	67.6	34.3	−29.683
	(33.6)	(44.2)	(6.072)	(54.4)	(32.1)	(24.643)
Guerrilla Attacks 1985-1990	45.1	62.6	19.003*	91.0	46.7	−25.497
	(51.0)	(73.3)	(9.646)	(91.2)	(56.1)	(45.136)
Paramilitary Attacks 1985-1990	3.7	4.3	0.797	6.6	3.1	−2.400
	(4.3)	(5.7)	(0.800)	(6.8)	(4.7)	(3.254)
Government Attacks 1985-1990	5.3	6.9	1.886*	10.6	4.9	−4.952
	(6.1)	(7.9)	(1.116)	(9.5)	(6.1)	(4.259)
Kills civilinas 1985-1990	100.4	121.2	25.313	180.6	87.9	−33.828
	(93.2)	(131.2)	(17.604)	(157.4)	(101.3)	(72.127)
Geographic						
Distance to capital city	310.3	350.3	26.302	327.6	363.1	−111.778
	(217.9)	(242.4)	(40.464)	(271.2)	(226.6)	(98.204)
Altitude	798.4	725.0	−111.624	847.5	656.3	−272.510
	(678.2)	(594.9)	(108.853)	(562.4)	(607.0)	(251.287)
Soil erosion	1.6	1.5	−0.088	1.6	1.5	−0.091
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.094)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.225)
Water availability	3.4	3.4	0.111*	3.5	3.4	−0.058
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.060)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.167)
Soil quality	2.5	2.5	0.039	2.5	2.5	0.043
	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.094)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.217)
Rainfall	1941.9	2084.2	173.225	2104.4	2072.9	−295.962
	(612.7)	(729.2)	(108.684)	(722.0)	(740.3)	(371.920)
ln Population	13.8	14.0	0.202	14.6	13.7	−0.721
	(1.1)	(1.2)	(0.189)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(0.441)
Number of municipalities	53.9	58.2	3.665	79.9	46.0	−8.814
	(40.1)	(43.5)	(6.572)	(44.1)	(38.5)	(20.218)
Area km^2	58586.9	60084.1	5619.681	82515.6	47522.5	$4.6e + 04$
	(65306.1)	(64119.6)	(9755.047)	(78816.2)	(50883.8)	(3.7e+04)

Notes: Difference controlling by first brigade appointment halfyear fixed effects.

TABLE 2. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)								
Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$/100	−0.036	−0.030	−0.006	−0.008	−0.056*	−0.045	−0.212***	−0.184**
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Democracy								
Democracy Index$_{t-1}$	0.844***	0.908***	0.843***	0.910***	0.844***	0.909***	0.841***	0.905***
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.039)
Democracy Index$_{t-2}$	–	−0.049	–	−0.049	–	−0.048	–	−0.050
	–	(0.037)	–	(0.037)	–	(0.037)	–	(0.037)
Democracy Index$_{t-3}$	–	−0.033	–	−0.034	–	−0.033	–	−0.033
	–	(0.058)	–	(0.058)	–	(0.058)	–	(0.058)
Democracy Index$_{t-4}$	–	0.039	–	0.039	–	0.039	–	0.040
	–	(0.048)	–	(0.048)	–	(0.048)	–	(0.048)
Democracy Index$_{t-5}$	–	−0.047**	–	−0.049**	–	−0.048**	–	−0.043*
	–	(0.021)	–	(0.021)	–	(0.021)	–	(0.023)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	−0.131	−0.116	−0.023	−0.031	−0.204*	−0.173*	−0.774***	−0.704***
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.216)	(0.242)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy Polity IV index. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$ is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 3. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy (Dichotomous)

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable: Democracy ($\mu = 0.4, \sigma = 0.5$)								
Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$/100	−0.001	−0.001	0.003	0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.011*	−0.009
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Democracy (Dichotomous)								
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.833***	0.826***	0.831***	0.825***	0.833***	0.826***	0.834***	0.824***
	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.042)
Democracy$_{t-2}$	–	0.021	–	0.021	–	0.021	–	0.022
	–	(0.035)	–	(0.035)	–	(0.035)	–	(0.035)
Democracy$_{t-3}$	–	0.015	–	0.014	–	0.015	–	0.015
	–	(0.062)	–	(0.062)	–	(0.062)	–	(0.062)
Democracy$_{t-4}$	–	0.007	–	0.007	–	0.007	–	0.008
	–	(0.033)	–	(0.033)	–	(0.033)	–	(0.033)
Democracy$_{t-5}$	–	−0.060***	–	−0.060***	–	−0.060***	–	−0.056**
	–	(0.020)	–	(0.020)	–	(0.020)	–	(0.020)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	−0.003	−0.002	0.009	0.006	−0.008	−0.004	−0.040**	−0.034*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	730	716	730	716	730	716	730	716
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy dichotomous indicator. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$ is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 4. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy with Additional Controls

	No Control		GDP 1946		Pop 1950		Military Size 1950	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)								
Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$/100	-0.212^{***}	-0.184^{**}	-0.161^{**}	-0.141^{*}	-0.226^{***}	-0.204^{***}	-0.222^{***}	-0.203^{**}
	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.071)
Democracy								
Democracy Index$_{t-1}$	0.841^{***}	0.905^{***}	0.834^{***}	0.894^{***}	0.833^{***}	0.890^{***}	0.830^{***}	0.886^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.039)
Democracy Index$_{t-2}$	–	-0.050	–	-0.046	–	-0.048	–	-0.047
	–	(0.037)	–	(0.040)	–	(0.037)	–	(0.038)
Democracy Index$_{t-3}$	–	-0.033	–	-0.034	–	-0.033	–	-0.034
	–	(0.058)	–	(0.057)	–	(0.059)	–	(0.059)
Democracy Index$_{t-4}$	–	0.040	–	0.041	–	0.042	–	0.044
	–	(0.048)	–	(0.052)	–	(0.050)	–	(0.052)
Democracy Index$_{t-5}$	–	-0.043^{*}	–	-0.044	–	-0.036	–	-0.035
	–	(0.023)	–	(0.026)	–	(0.026)	–	(0.027)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	-0.774^{***}	-0.704^{***}	-0.578^{**}	-0.531^{*}	-0.810^{***}	-0.761^{***}	-0.793^{***}	-0.748^{***}
	(0.216)	(0.242)	(0.261)	(0.296)	(0.222)	(0.246)	(0.228)	(0.253)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy Polity IV index. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees$_{t-5}$ is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 5. Mechanism: Effect of SOA Graduates on Social Manifestations

	Strikes (1)	Violent Riots (2)	Anti-governemnt Demostrations (3)	Parties Banned (4)	Newspaper Circulation (5)	Guerilla Warfare (6)
Stock Lower Rank Trainees$_{t-5}$/100	−0.032**	−0.046**	−0.066***	0.011***	−5.891***	−0.011
	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(1.589)	(0.014)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	−0.038**	−0.056**	−0.092***	0.035***	−37.249***	−0.015
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(11.222)	(0.021)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.1	803.3	0.4
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	756	756	756	756	756	756
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainings on intermadate variables. Sample from 1951 - 1991. *SOA Trainees* is the per capita number of SOA graduates of the country. Democracy Index$_{t-1}$ is the per capita stock of SOA graduates in total for the privious five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 6. Long Term Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy Perception

	No Additional Controls (1)	Settlers Mortality (2)	Anti-government Demonstrations (3)	Newspaper Circulation (4)	Expropriation Risk (5)
Panel A: Authoritarian regime is better or as good as democracy ($\mu = 0.19$)					
All SOA Trainees/100	−0.001**	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.002***	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	46.40	46.73	43.97	57.07	26.11
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	325	306	325	325	306
Panel B: Which party would you vote? – Abstention ($\mu = 0.26$)					
All SOA Trainees/100	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	45.21	46.71	43.10	55.75	25.58
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	307	289	307	307	289
Panel C: Which party would you vote? – Undecided ($\mu = 0.24$)					
All SOA Trainees/100	−0.003**	−0.002**	−0.003**	−0.003***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	47.02	47.23	44.61	57.48	26.51
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	324	305	324	324	305
Panel D: Negative Perception Armed Forces ($\mu = 0.54$)					
All SOA Trainees/100	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	48.10	46.97	45.48	59.85	34.22
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	298	279	298	298	279
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of all SOA trainees on vote abstention. Sample from 1995 - 2017 with gaps. *SOA Trainees* is total number of SOA graduates of the country from 1946 to 1991. Basic controls include share of democracy and the total economic aid received from US during the cold war; latitude, GDP in 1946 and regional dummies. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

8. Analysis

TABLE 7. SOA Training and Militar Performance

	Clashes			Attacks			Casualities		
	Gov.-Gue. (1)	Gov.-Par. (2)	Gue.-Par. (3)	Gue. (4)	Par. (5)	Gov. (6)	Gue. (7)	Par. (8)	Gov. (9)
Panel A: SOA Attendance Effect									
SOA Training	−2.057*	−0.183***	0.502***	−0.150	−0.838***	−0.687**	−5.638	2.382**	−2.181
	(1.053)	(0.038)	(0.101)	(0.869)	(0.276)	(0.274)	(3.894)	(1.113)	(2.212)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54
Panel B: SOA influence Effect									
Influence Index	−0.812**	−0.055***	0.103***	−0.103	−0.202***	−0.203**	−1.386	0.514	−0.488
	(0.316)	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.173)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.863)	(0.345)	(0.316)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 8. SOA Training and Civilian Casualties

|	Total	Civilian Killings during...			
	Killings (1)	Clash (2)	Gue. Att. (3)	Par. Att. (4)	Gov. Att. (5)
Panel A: SOA Attendance Effect					
SOA Training	0.509 (1.199)	0.772 (0.608)	−0.028 (0.715)	2.048*** (0.698)	−0.972*** (0.345)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54
Panel B: SOA influence Effect					
Influence Index	−0.097 (0.344)	0.239 (0.181)	0.075 (0.211)	0.133 (0.226)	−0.200*** (0.059)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 9. First Stage Results

	SOA Training (1)	Influence Index (2)
SOA Stock	0.000***	–
	(0.000)	–
Influence SOA Stock	–	0.180***
	–	(0.008)
N Mun.	1091	1091
N	40786	40786
Period FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

FIGURE 9. **Influence to Colombian Peronel in SOA**

Notes: This map presents the spatial distribution by country of procedece of SOA graduates 1946 to 1991.

Table 10. SOA Training and Military Performance

	Clashes			Attacks			Causalities		
	Gov.-Gue. (1)	Gov.-Par. (2)	Gue.-Par. (3)	Gue. (4)	Par. (5)	Gov. (6)	Gue. (7)	Par. (8)	Gov. (9)
Panel A: SOA influence Effect – Academy Trainees									
Influence Index	−22.767	−1.637	3.563	0.755	−3.279	−5.590	−38.017	17.820	−12.362
	(42.909)	(3.050)	(6.690)	(5.734)	(6.404)	(10.644)	(75.594)	(34.976)	(25.153)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
Panel B: SOA influence Effect – Lower Officers Trainees									
Influence Index	−0.307***	−0.020***	0.030***	−0.083	−0.105***	−0.083***	−0.581**	0.154	−0.230*
	(0.108)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.067)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.296)	(0.108)	(0.127)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10
Panel C: SOA influence Effect – Enlisted Trainees									
Influence Index	−0.260***	−0.017***	0.024***	−0.087	−0.076***	−0.073***	−0.558**	0.108	−0.239*
	(0.081)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.061)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.257)	(0.076)	(0.140)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.