



TrustPlatform Manifest File Format

Overview

Manifest files provide a way to link an actual Microchip Trust Security Device for a given customer to the infrastructure environment that it needs to connect to. These files are a critical aspect of the Microchip Trust&GO, TrustFLEX and other development environments. Whether you are connecting to an IoT cloud or a LoraWAN network or potentially any other infrastructure environment the manifest file uniquely ties a given device to that environment.

When working with Microchip Trust&GO or TrustFLEX products a manifest file will be generated for a group of devices that have been provisioned through the Microchip Just In Time provisioning services. Each device is known as a SignedSecuredElement and is signed by a Microchip ECC private key to validate its authenticity. The overall manifest is made up of multiple SignedSecuredElements. Specific information associated with the manufacturer, the secure product device and specific individual device information is all part of the information associated with a given SignedSecuredElement.

The manifest file is made available in a secure fashion only to the customer that has ordered the group of devices. Accessing these manifest files are part of the whole development and provisioning flow provided through Microchip. Once provisioning has been completed for a group of products the manifest file will be made available for download.

Table of Contents

Overview.....	1
1. Structure and Format of a Manifest File.....	3
1.1. Introduction.....	3
1.2. Binary Encoding.....	3
1.3. SecureElementManifest Object.....	3
1.4. SignedSecureElement Object.....	4
1.5. SecureElement Object.....	4
1.6. EntityName Object.....	5
1.7. PublicJWK Object.....	6
1.8. EncryptedSecretJWK Object.....	6
1.9. ModelInfo Object.....	6
2. Manifest File Example and Decoding.....	8
2.1. Example Manifest.....	8
2.2. Decode Python Example.....	10
The Microchip Website.....	13
Product Change Notification Service.....	13
Customer Support.....	13
Microchip Devices Code Protection Feature.....	13
Legal Notice.....	13
Trademarks.....	14
Quality Management System.....	14
Worldwide Sales and Service.....	15

1. Structure and Format of a Manifest File

1.1 Introduction

The secure element manifest format is designed to convey the unique information about a group of secure elements including unique ID (e.g. serial number), public keys, and certificates. This was primarily developed for Crypto Authentication (currently ATECC508A and ATECC608A) secure elements, however, it is structured to work for other secure elements as well.

The base format is an array of JSON objects. Each object represents a single secure element and is signed to allow cryptographic verification of its origins. The format is intentionally "flattened" with common information repeated for each secure element. This is to facilitate parallel processing of manifests and to allow splitting of entries into smaller manifests, where appropriate.

This format makes use of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) set of standards to represent keys (JSON Web Key - JWK), certificates (x5c member in a JWK), and provide signing (JSON Web Signature - JWS).

In the object definitions, member values may either be the name of another JSON object or just an example value.

1.2 Binary Encoding

JSON has no native binary data format, so a number of string encodings are used to represent binary data depending on context.

BASE64URL This is a base64 encoding using a URL-safe alphabet as described in [RFC 4648 section 5](#) with the trailing padding characters ("=") stripped.

This is the encoding used by the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards and will be found in the JWS, JWK, and JWE objects used. This is documented in [RFC 7515 section 2](#).

This encoding is also used in a few other non-JOSE members to maintain consistency.

BASE64 This is the standard base64 encoding as described in [RFC 4648 section 4](#) and includes the trailing padding characters ("=").

This is used for encoding certificates (JOSE x5c members), presumably to more closely match the common PEM encoding that certificates are often found in.

HEX In some cases, short binary values are expressed as lower-case hex strings. This is to match convention with how these values are typically seen and worked with.

1.3 SecureElementManifest Object

At the top level, the secure element manifest format is a JSON array of [SignedSecureElement](#) objects where each element represents a single secure element.

```
[
  SignedSecureElement,
  SignedSecureElement,
  ...
]
```

1.4 SignedSecureElement Object

The signed secure element object is a JSON Web Signature (JWS) ([RFC 7515](#)) object using the Flattened JSON Serialization Syntax ([section 7.2.2](#)).

```
{
  "payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(SecureElement)),
  "protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(SignedSecureElementProtectedHeader)),
  "header": {
    "uniqueId": "0123f1822c38dd7a01"
  },
  "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
```

[RFC 7515 section 7.2.1](#) provides definitions for the encoding and contents of the JWS members being used in this object. Below are some quick summaries and additional details about these members and the specific features being used.

- payload** An encoded [SecureElement](#) object, which is the primary content being signed. All information about the secure element is contained here.
- protected** An encoded [SignedSecureElementProtectedHeader](#) object, which describes how to verify the signature.
- header** JWS unprotected header. This object contains the uniqueId member repeated from the [SecureElement](#) object in the payload. Since the unprotected header isn't part of the signed data in the JWS, it doesn't need to be encoded and is included to facilitate plain-text searches of the manifest without needing to decode the payload.
- signature** The encoded JWS signature of the payload and protected members.

1.4.1 SignedSecureElementProtectedHeader Object

JWS protected header, which describes how to verify the signature. While [RFC 7515 section 4.1](#) lists out the available header members for a JWS. Only the ones listed here will be used.

```
{
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": BASE64URL(Subject Key Identifier),
  "x5t#S256": BASE64URL(SHA-256 Certificate Thumbprint)
}
```

- alg** Describes the key type used to sign the payload. See [RFC 7518 section 3.1](#). Only public key algorithms will be used.
- kid** Encoded Subject Key Identifier ([RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2](#)) of the key used to sign the payload. This is the BASE64URL encoding of the subject key identifier value, not the full extension. Used to help identify the key to use for verification. kid is a free-form field in the JWS standard (see [RFC 7515 section 4.1.4](#)), so this definition applies only to the [SignedSecureElement](#) object.
- x5t#S256** SHA-256 thumbprint (a.k.a. fingerprint) of the certificate for the public key required to validate the signature. Like kid, can also be used to help identify the key to use for verification. See [RFC 7515 section 4.1.8](#).

1.5 SecureElement Object

The secure element object contains all the information about the secure element.

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "model": "ATECC608A",
  "partNumber": "ATECC608A-MAHDA-T",
  "manufacturer": EntityName,
}
```

```
{
  "provisioner": EntityName,
  "distributor": EntityName,
  "groupId": "359SCE55NV38H3CB",
  "provisioningTimestamp": "2018-01-15T17:22:45.000Z",
  "uniqueId": "0123f1822c38dd7a01",
  "publicKeySet": {
    "keys": [ PublicJWK, ... ]
  },
  "encryptedSecretKeySet": {
    "keys": [ EncryptedSecretJWK, ... ]
  }
  "modelInfo": ModelInfo
}
```

version	SecureElement object version as an integer. Current version is 1. Subsequent versions will strive to maintain backwards compatibility with previous versions, where possible.
model	Name of the base secure element model. Current options are "ATECC508A" and "ATECC608A" from the Crypto Authentication family.
partNumber	Complete part number of the provisioned secure element.
manufacturer	An EntityName object that identifies the manufacturer of the secure element.
provisioner	An EntityName object that identifies who performed the provisioning/programming of the secure element.
distributor	An EntityName object that identifies who distributed the provisioned secure elements. In many cases, this will be the same entity that generates the manifest data being described here.
groupId	Secure elements may be organized into groups identified by a single ID. If the secure element is part of a group, this is the unique ID of that set. Group IDs should be globally unique.
provisioningTimestamp	Date and time the secure element was provisioned in UTC. Formatting is per RFC 3339 .
uniqueId	Unique identifier for the secure element. For Crypto Authentication devices, this is the 9 byte device serial number as a lower-case hex string.
publicKeySet	An object representing all the public keys (and certificate chains, if available) corresponding to private keys held by the secure element. This object is a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) per RFC 7517 section 5 , where keys is an array of PublicJWK objects.
encryptedSecretKeySet	An object representing all the secret keys (a.k.a. symmetric keys) and data held by the secure element that have been marked for export. The keys member is an array of EncryptedSecretJWK objects. Note that an encrypted JWK Set is not being used so the metadata about the individual keys (number and key IDs) can be read without decrypting.
modelInfo	If additional non-cryptographic information about the secure element needs to be conveyed, then this ModelInfo object may be present with model-specific information.

1.6 EntityName Object

The entity name object is used to identify an entity responsible for some part of the secure element. The members in this object are variable and should be the same as the attributes defined in section 6 of [X.520](#). While none of the members are required, there should be at least one.

```
{
  "organizationName": "Microchip Technology Inc",
  "organizationalUnitName": "Secure Products Group",
}
```

organizationName	Name of the entity organization (e.g. company name).
organizationalUnitName	Optional name of a unit within the organization that the entity applies to specifically.

1.7 PublicJWK Object

This object represents an asymmetric public key and any certificates associated with it. This is a JSON Web Key (JWK) object as defined by [RFC 7517](#). Some JWK member specifications are repeated below for easy reference along with expectations for specific models of secure elements.

The following definition is for Elliptic Curve public keys, which is what the Crypto Authentication family of secure elements support.

```
{
  "kid": "0",
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": BASE64URL(X),
  "y": BASE64URL(Y),
  "x5c": [ BASE64(cert), ... ]
}
```

The following JWK fields required for elliptic curve public keys are defined in [RFC 7518 section 6.2.1](#).

- kid** Key ID string. This uniquely identifies this key on the secure element. For Crypto Authentication secure elements, this will be the slot number of the corresponding private key.
- kty** Key type. Crypto Authentication secure elements only support "EC" public keys as defined in [RFC 7518 section 6.1](#).
- crv** For elliptic curve keys, this is the curve name. Crypto Authentication secure elements only support the "P-256" curve as defined in [RFC 7518 section 6.2.1.1](#).
- x** For elliptic curve keys, this is the encoded public key X integer as defined in [RFC 7518 section 6.2.1.2](#).
- y** For elliptic curve keys, this is the encoded public key Y integer as defined in [RFC 7518 section 6.2.1.3](#).
- x5c** If the public key has a certificate associated with it, then that certificate will be found at the first position in this array. Subsequent certificates in the array will be the CA certificates used to validate the previous one. Certificates will be [BASE64](#) encoded (not BASE64URL) strings of the DER certificate. This is defined in [RFC 7517 section 4.7](#).

1.8 EncryptedSecretJWK Object

This object represents a secret key (a.k.a. symmetric key) or secret data in a secure element that has been encrypted for the recipient of the manifest.

It is a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object as defined by [RFC 7516](#). The JWE payload will be the JSON serialization (not compact serialization) of a JSON Web Key (JWK) object as defined by [RFC 7517](#) with a key type of octet ("kty": "oct"). See [RFC 7518 section 6.4](#) for details on the symmetric key JWK. This technique is described in [RFC 7517 section 7](#).

Additional details on encryption schemes and algorithms to be determined.

1.9 ModelInfo Object

This object holds additional model-specific information about a secure element that isn't captured by the other cryptographic members. It has no specific members, but is dependent on the model of the secure element.

Currently only the Crypto Authentication models (currently ATECC508A and ATECC608A) have a ModelInfo object defined.

1.9.1 Crypto Authentication ModelInfo Object

Below are the model info members defined for Crypto Authentication models (currently ATECC508A or ATECC608A).

```
{
  "deviceRevision": "00006002",
  "publicData": [ CryptoAuthPublicDataElement, ... ]
}
```

deviceRevision The 4-byte device revision number as returned by the Info (Mode=0x00) command. Encoded as a lowercase hex string.

publicData An array of [CryptoAuthPublicDataElement](#) objects, which define a location and the public data at that location.

1.9.1.1 CryptoAuthPublicDataElement Object

This object defines the location and contents of a public data element in Crypto Authentication secure elements.

```
{
  "zone": "data",
  "slot": 14,
  "offset": 0,
  "data": BASE64URL(data)
}
```

zone Crypto Authentication zone where the data is found. Options are "data" for one of the slots, "otp" for the OTP zone, or "config" for the configuration zone.

slot If the zone is "data", then this is the slot index (0 - 15) the data can be found in.

offset Byte offset into the zone/slot that the data can be found at.

data Actual data at the location specified by the other members. This data will be [BASE64URL](#) encoded (with padding characters ("=") stripped).

Decoding the payload member gives the following [SecureElement](#):

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "model": "ATECC608A",
  "partNumber": "ATECC608A-MAH22",
  "manufacturer": {
    "organizationName": "Microchip Technology Inc",
    "organizationalUnitName": "Secure Products Group"
  },
  "provisioner": {
    "organizationName": "Microchip Technology Inc",
    "organizationalUnitName": "Secure Products Group"
  },
  "distributor": {
    "organizationName": "Microchip Technology Inc",
    "organizationalUnitName": "Microchip Direct"
  },
  "groupId": "359SCE55NV38H3CB",
  "provisioningTimestamp": "2019-01-24T16:35:23.473Z",
  "uniqueId": "0123f1822c38dd7a01",
  "publicKeySet": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kid": "0",
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "x8TPQk7h5Ow-cb15p-TE6IRqHQSETPRNNbu7n10FowM",
        "y": "ux3uP8AloUm8QnNnyFL6R0KKZYxFCItU_QLgguhXoos",
        "x5c": [
          "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",
          "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"
        ]
      },
      {
        "kid": "1",
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "2Ohne9v0aTSCdrZNmXvtOWir5ETgRhnnvecJDXPHzFpg",
        "y": "hcP9lCMTAKvjdz6_iNWO46g5uPjRvJkuuQ_6THckF-A"
      },
      {
        "kid": "2",
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "EEExiRf0TBXwPkLihJVRteSY3hU-IGTLlUO-FRMJZFg",
        "y": "Nuboaw4W_a3Kwi0lVeG9p4h42I4m7vmK5P49SPebFvM"
      },
      {
        "kid": "3",
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "jKB8Dkci5ExRzg0qtDdAjpRIHShxYON82YZ2-hajenY",
        "y": "NYMJ9DtbCt6Opnj2g43Ahk2pxQu9KRdMy3m0f-J_rRE"
      },
      {
        "kid": "4",
        "kty": "EC",

```

```

        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "LTU0IGh3ymAzWlWmZ84fhX7YkB4ZCmmlV-YONdtDaDU",
        "y": "cvNr2TJDWxf4XO6PzybRWoEcQLT4F3NVP8Yj2-X8qbw"
    }
}
}
}

```

The SignedSecureElement example above can be verified with the following certificate:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

2.2 Decode Python Example

Below is an example python script for verifying the signed entries and decoding the contents. Script has been tested on python 2.7 and python 3.7. Required packages can be installed with the python package manager, pip:

```
pip install python-jose[cryptography]
```

```

# (c) 2019 Microchip Technology Inc. and its subsidiaries.
#
# Subject to your compliance with these terms, you may use Microchip software
# and any derivatives exclusively with Microchip products. It is your
# responsibility to comply with third party license terms applicable to your
# use of third party software (including open source software) that may
# accompany Microchip software.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS SUPPLIED BY MICROCHIP "AS IS". NO WARRANTIES, WHETHER
# EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, APPLY TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED
# WARRANTIES OF NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, AND FITNESS FOR A
# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT WILL MICROCHIP BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT,
# SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS, DAMAGE, COST OR EXPENSE
# OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER RELATED TO THE SOFTWARE, HOWEVER CAUSED, EVEN IF
# MICROCHIP HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OR THE DAMAGES ARE
# FORESEEABLE. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW, MICROCHIP'S TOTAL
# LIABILITY ON ALL CLAIMS IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS SOFTWARE WILL NOT EXCEED
# THE AMOUNT OF FEES, IF ANY, THAT YOU HAVE PAID DIRECTLY TO MICROCHIP FOR
# THIS SOFTWARE.

import json
from base64 import b64decode, b16encode
from argparse import ArgumentParser
import jose.jws
from jose.utils import base64url_decode, base64url_encode
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec

parser = ArgumentParser(
    description='Verify and decode secure element manifest'
)
parser.add_argument(
    '--manifest',
    help='Manifest file to process',
    nargs=1,
    type=str,
    required=True,
    metavar='file'
)

```

```

parser.add_argument(
    '--cert',
    help='Verification certificate file in PEM format',
    nargs=1,
    type=str,
    required=True,
    metavar='file'
)
args = parser.parse_args()

# List out allowed verification algorithms for the JWS. Only allows
# public-key based ones.
verification_algorithms = [
    'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512', 'ES256', 'ES384', 'ES512'
]

# Load manifest as JSON
with open(args.manifest[0], 'rb') as f:
    manifest = json.load(f)

# Load verification certificate in PEM format
with open(args.cert[0], 'rb') as f:
    verification_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(
        data=f.read(),
        backend=default_backend()
    )

# Convert verification certificate public key to PEM format
verification_public_key_pem = verification_cert.public_key().public_bytes(
    encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
    format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
).decode('ascii')

# Get the base64url encoded subject key identifier for the verification cert
ski_ext = verification_cert.extensions.get_extension_for_class(
    extclass=x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier
)
verification_cert_kid_b64 = base64url_encode(
    ski_ext.value.digest
).decode('ascii')

# Get the base64url encoded sha-256 thumbprint for the verification cert
verification_cert_x5t_s256_b64 = base64url_encode(
    verification_cert.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256())
).decode('ascii')

# Process all the entries in the manifest
for i, signed_se in enumerate(manifest):
    print('')
    print('Processing entry {} of {}'.format(i+1, len(manifest)))
    print('uniqueId: {}'.format(
        signed_se['header']['uniqueId']
    ))
    # Decode the protected header
    protected = json.loads(
        base64url_decode(
            signed_se['protected'].encode('ascii')
        )
    )
    if protected['kid'] != verification_cert_kid_b64:
        raise ValueError('kid does not match certificate value')
    if protected['x5t#S256'] != verification_cert_x5t_s256_b64:
        raise ValueError('x5t#S256 does not match certificate value')

    # Convert JWS to compact form as required by python-jose
    jws_compact = '.'.join([
        signed_se['protected'],
        signed_se['payload'],
        signed_se['signature']
    ])

    # Verify and decode the payload. If verification fails an exception will
    # be raised.
    se = json.loads(
        jose.jws.verify(
            token=jws_compact,

```

```

        key=verification_public_key_pem,
        algorithms=verification_algorithms
    )
)
if se['uniqueId'] != signed_se['header']['uniqueId']:
    raise ValueError(
        (
            'uniqueId in header "{}" does not match version in' +
            ' payload "{}"'
        ).format(
            signed_se['header']['uniqueId'],
            se['uniqueId']
        )
    )
print('Verified')

print('SecureElement = ')
print(json.dumps(se, indent=2))

# Decode public keys and certificates
try:
    public_keys = se['publicKeySet']['keys']
except KeyError:
    public_keys = []
for jwk in public_keys:
    print('Public key in slot {}'.format(int(jwk['kid'])))
    if jwk['kty'] != 'EC':
        raise ValueError(
            'Unsupported {}'.format(json.dumps({'kty': jwk['kty']}))
        )
    if jwk['crv'] != 'P-256':
        raise ValueError(
            'Unsupported {}'.format(json.dumps({'crv': jwk['crv']}))
        )
    # Decode x and y integers
    # Using int.from_bytes() would be more efficient in python 3
    x = int(
        b16encode(base64url_decode(jwk['x'].encode('utf8'))),
        16
    )
    y = int(
        b16encode(base64url_decode(jwk['y'].encode('utf8'))),
        16
    )
    public_key = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(
        curve=ec.SECP256R1(),
        x=x,
        y=y
    ).public_key(default_backend())
    print(public_key.public_bytes(
        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
        format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
    ).decode('ascii'))

# Decode any available certificates
for cert_b64 in jwk.get('x5c', []):
    cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(
        data=b64decode(cert_b64),
        backend=default_backend()
    )
    print(cert.public_bytes(
        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM
    ).decode('ascii'))

```

The Microchip Website

Microchip provides online support via our website at <http://www.microchip.com/>. This website is used to make files and information easily available to customers. Some of the content available includes:

- **Product Support** – Data sheets and errata, application notes and sample programs, design resources, user's guides and hardware support documents, latest software releases and archived software
- **General Technical Support** – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), technical support requests, online discussion groups, Microchip design partner program member listing
- **Business of Microchip** – Product selector and ordering guides, latest Microchip press releases, listing of seminars and events, listings of Microchip sales offices, distributors and factory representatives

Product Change Notification Service

Microchip's product change notification service helps keep customers current on Microchip products. Subscribers will receive email notification whenever there are changes, updates, revisions or errata related to a specified product family or development tool of interest.

To register, go to <http://www.microchip.com/pcn> and follow the registration instructions.

Customer Support

Users of Microchip products can receive assistance through several channels:

- Distributor or Representative
- Local Sales Office
- Embedded Solutions Engineer (ESE)
- Technical Support

Customers should contact their distributor, representative or ESE for support. Local sales offices are also available to help customers. A listing of sales offices and locations is included in this document.

Technical support is available through the website at: <http://www.microchip.com/support>

Microchip Devices Code Protection Feature

Note the following details of the code protection feature on Microchip devices:

- Microchip products meet the specification contained in their particular Microchip Data Sheet.
- Microchip believes that its family of products is one of the most secure families of its kind on the market today, when used in the intended manner and under normal conditions.
- There are dishonest and possibly illegal methods used to breach the code protection feature. All of these methods, to our knowledge, require using the Microchip products in a manner outside the operating specifications contained in Microchip's Data Sheets. Most likely, the person doing so is engaged in theft of intellectual property.
- Microchip is willing to work with the customer who is concerned about the integrity of their code.
- Neither Microchip nor any other semiconductor manufacturer can guarantee the security of their code. Code protection does not mean that we are guaranteeing the product as "unbreakable."

Code protection is constantly evolving. We at Microchip are committed to continuously improving the code protection features of our products. Attempts to break Microchip's code protection feature may be a violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. If such acts allow unauthorized access to your software or other copyrighted work, you may have a right to sue for relief under that Act.

Legal Notice

Information contained in this publication regarding device applications and the like is provided only for your convenience and may be superseded by updates. It is your responsibility to ensure that your application meets with

your specifications. MICROCHIP MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WRITTEN OR ORAL, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, RELATED TO THE INFORMATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ITS CONDITION, QUALITY, PERFORMANCE, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE. Microchip disclaims all liability arising from this information and its use. Use of Microchip devices in life support and/or safety applications is entirely at the buyer's risk, and the buyer agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Microchip from any and all damages, claims, suits, or expenses resulting from such use. No licenses are conveyed, implicitly or otherwise, under any Microchip intellectual property rights unless otherwise stated.

Trademarks

The Microchip name and logo, the Microchip logo, Adaptec, AnyRate, AVR, AVR logo, AVR Freaks, BesTime, BitCloud, chipKIT, chipKIT logo, CryptoMemory, CryptoRF, dsPIC, FlashFlex, flexPWR, HELDO, IGLOO, JukeBlox, KeeLoq, Kleer, LANCheck, LinkMD, maXStylus, maXTouch, MediaLB, megaAVR, Microsemi, Microsemi logo, MOST, MOST logo, MPLAB, OptoLyzer, PackeTime, PIC, picoPower, PICSTART, PIC32 logo, PolarFire, Prochip Designer, QTouch, SAM-BA, SenGenuity, SpyNIC, SST, SST Logo, SuperFlash, Symmetricom, SyncServer, Tachyon, TempTrackr, TimeSource, tinyAVR, UNI/O, Vectron, and XMEGA are registered trademarks of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A. and other countries.

APT, ClockWorks, The Embedded Control Solutions Company, EtherSynch, FlashTec, Hyper Speed Control, HyperLight Load, IntelliMOS, Libero, motorBench, mTouch, Powermite 3, Precision Edge, ProASIC, ProASIC Plus, ProASIC Plus logo, Quiet-Wire, SmartFusion, SyncWorld, Temux, TimeCesium, TimeHub, TimePictra, TimeProvider, Vite, WinPath, and ZL are registered trademarks of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A.

Adjacent Key Suppression, AKS, Analog-for-the-Digital Age, Any Capacitor, AnyIn, AnyOut, BlueSky, BodyCom, CodeGuard, CryptoAuthentication, CryptoAutomotive, CryptoCompanion, CryptoController, dsPICDEM, dsPICDEM.net, Dynamic Average Matching, DAM, ECAN, EtherGREEN, In-Circuit Serial Programming, ICSP, INICnet, Inter-Chip Connectivity, JitterBlocker, KleerNet, KleerNet logo, memBrain, Mindi, MiWi, MPASM, MPF, MPLAB Certified logo, MPLIB, MPLINK, MultiTRAK, NetDetach, Omniscient Code Generation, PICDEM, PICDEM.net, PICkit, PICtail, PowerSmart, PureSilicon, QMatrix, REAL ICE, Ripple Blocker, SAM-ICE, Serial Quad I/O, SMART-I.S., SQI, SuperSwitcher, SuperSwitcher II, Total Endurance, TSHARC, USBCheck, VariSense, ViewSpan, WiperLock, Wireless DNA, and ZENA are trademarks of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A. and other countries.

SQTP is a service mark of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A.

The Adaptec logo, Frequency on Demand, Silicon Storage Technology, and Symmcom are registered trademarks of Microchip Technology Inc. in other countries.

GestIC is a registered trademark of Microchip Technology Germany II GmbH & Co. KG, a subsidiary of Microchip Technology Inc., in other countries.

All other trademarks mentioned herein are property of their respective companies.

© 2019, Microchip Technology Incorporated, Printed in the U.S.A., All Rights Reserved.

ISBN:

Quality Management System

For information regarding Microchip's Quality Management Systems, please visit <http://www.microchip.com/quality>.

Worldwide Sales and Service

AMERICAS	ASIA/PACIFIC	ASIA/PACIFIC	EUROPE
Corporate Office 2355 West Chandler Blvd. Chandler, AZ 85224-6199 Tel: 480-792-7200 Fax: 480-792-7277 Technical Support: http://www.microchip.com/support Web Address: http://www.microchip.com	Australia - Sydney Tel: 61-2-9868-6733 China - Beijing Tel: 86-10-8569-7000 China - Chengdu Tel: 86-28-8665-5511 China - Chongqing Tel: 86-23-8980-9588 China - Dongguan Tel: 86-769-8702-9880 China - Guangzhou Tel: 86-20-8755-8029 China - Hangzhou Tel: 86-571-8792-8115 China - Hong Kong SAR Tel: 852-2943-5100 China - Nanjing Tel: 86-25-8473-2460 China - Qingdao Tel: 86-532-8502-7355 China - Shanghai Tel: 86-21-3326-8000 China - Shenyang Tel: 86-24-2334-2829 China - Shenzhen Tel: 86-755-8864-2200 China - Suzhou Tel: 86-186-6233-1526 China - Wuhan Tel: 86-27-5980-5300 China - Xian Tel: 86-29-8833-7252 China - Xiamen Tel: 86-592-2388138 China - Zhuhai Tel: 86-756-3210040	India - Bangalore Tel: 91-80-3090-4444 India - New Delhi Tel: 91-11-4160-8631 India - Pune Tel: 91-20-4121-0141 Japan - Osaka Tel: 81-6-6152-7160 Japan - Tokyo Tel: 81-3-6880-3770 Korea - Daegu Tel: 82-53-744-4301 Korea - Seoul Tel: 82-2-554-7200 Malaysia - Kuala Lumpur Tel: 60-3-7651-7906 Malaysia - Penang Tel: 60-4-227-8870 Philippines - Manila Tel: 63-2-634-9065 Singapore Tel: 65-6334-8870 Taiwan - Hsin Chu Tel: 886-3-577-8366 Taiwan - Kaohsiung Tel: 886-7-213-7830 Taiwan - Taipei Tel: 886-2-2508-8600 Thailand - Bangkok Tel: 66-2-694-1351 Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh Tel: 84-28-5448-2100	Austria - Wels Tel: 43-7242-2244-39 Fax: 43-7242-2244-393 Denmark - Copenhagen Tel: 45-4450-2828 Fax: 45-4485-2829 Finland - Espoo Tel: 358-9-4520-820 France - Paris Tel: 33-1-69-53-63-20 Fax: 33-1-69-30-90-79 Germany - Garching Tel: 49-8931-9700 Germany - Haan Tel: 49-2129-3766400 Germany - Heilbronn Tel: 49-7131-72400 Germany - Karlsruhe Tel: 49-721-625370 Germany - Munich Tel: 49-89-627-144-0 Fax: 49-89-627-144-44 Germany - Rosenheim Tel: 49-8031-354-560 Israel - Ra'anana Tel: 972-9-744-7705 Italy - Milan Tel: 39-0331-742611 Fax: 39-0331-466781 Italy - Padova Tel: 39-049-7625286 Netherlands - Drunen Tel: 31-416-690399 Fax: 31-416-690340 Norway - Trondheim Tel: 47-72884388 Poland - Warsaw Tel: 48-22-3325737 Romania - Bucharest Tel: 40-21-407-87-50 Spain - Madrid Tel: 34-91-708-08-90 Fax: 34-91-708-08-91 Sweden - Gothenberg Tel: 46-31-704-60-40 Sweden - Stockholm Tel: 46-8-5090-4654 UK - Wokingham Tel: 44-118-921-5800 Fax: 44-118-921-5820