The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy

Political Narcissism and the Problem of Evil

Ben Lazare Mijuskovic

palgrave
macmillan

The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy

Ben Lazare Mijuskovic

The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy

Political Narcissism and the Problem of Evil

palgrave
macmillan

Ben Lazare Mijuskovic
Philosophy
California State University
Dominguez Hills
Carson, CA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-90601-6 ISBN 978-3-030-90602-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my father, whom I sold way too short, and now it's way too late.

Contents

About the Author

Ben Lazare Mijuskovic Since 1970, Ben Lazare Mijuskovic has been publishing articles and books on theories of consciousness in relation to human loneliness. He did his undergraduate work at the University of Chicago. He has a PhD in Philosophy and an MA in Literature both from the University of California, San Diego. He also served as a clinical therapist for many years (LCSW). His work is interdisciplinary. His publications include "Descartes Bridge to the External World," *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia* (1971); *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant* (1974); "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes* (1977); "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (1977); "The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson," *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch* (1977); "Loneliness and Time-Consciousness," *Philosophy Today* (1978); *Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time, and Mind* (1984); "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review* (1979–80); "Loneliness, Anxiety Hostility and Communication," *Child Study Journal* (1986); "The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious in Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant," *Philosophy and Theology* (2008); "Kant's Reflections on the Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious," *Kritike* (2010); *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (2015, 3rd ed.); *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology*

of Loneliness (2015); "The Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness, Coping, Prevention and Clinical Interventions* (2015); *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (2018); "The Role of Empathy as a Path to Intimacy," *Paedagogia Christiana* (2020); *Metaphysical Dualism, Subjective Idealism, and Existential Loneliness* (forthcoming).

CHAPTER 1

Time-Consciousness, Personal Identity, and Loneliness

Immanent time-consciousness is a priori *synthetically related to human loneliness. It is not an issue of whether matter exists or not; clearly it exists; even Hegel confirms that. The question is how we know it, interpret it, and manage its impact. But the problem is that if one theoretically begins with the premise of materialism, the thesis that only matter plus motion exist, then it is not possible to "account" for the incredible complexity and depth of human spontaneity, its temporality, self-consciousness, transcendent intentionality, its unity, and its qualitative distinctions.*

Objective, scientific time is conceived as intersubjective, *externally caused,* and dependent upon measuring the motion of material objects travelling through space. In effect, objective time presupposes and depends on space. By contrast, immanent time-consciousness is subjectively constituted within consciousness, by the *successive* awareness of sensations, feelings, and thoughts flowing or streaming through the mind. We can be aware of time even in the dark with nothing visibly moving, as our feelings and thoughts pursue each other without pause or rest.

Based on this difference, I wish to show how the theory of subjective time, as developed through the philosophical views of Leibniz, Kant, Peirce, Bergson, and Husserl, collectively contributes in grounding the imprisoned solitude of the individual ego, as it is trapped within its own unique *temporal* sphere of self-awareness. This paradigm is also forcefully illustrated in certain works of literature, in the narrative "stream of

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_1

consciousness" styles of expression most notably exemplified in the novels of James Joyce and Thomas Wolfe.

Leibniz on Monadic Time-Consciousness

Leibniz's theory of the Monad, although initially patterned along the lines established by Descartes' model of the cogito, nevertheless exhibits critical differences. Both thinkers concur on the substantial independence of the *psyche,* soul, self, mind, or ego and emphasize its reflexive powers, but Leibniz goes well beyond Descartes by introducing three critical additions to the rationalist principle of self-awareness, thereby underscoring a triad of unique generative features of consciousness: (a) the *dynamical* qualities of temporality, since for Leibniz psychic energy is continuous; (b) its integrative, unifying *temporal* structures accompanied by its manifold unity, whereas for Descartes the cogito is intuitive and time is external to consciousness, since it depends on God's continual conservation of the universe; and (c) the Cartesian cogito is "pure," i.e., empty of contents; it is simply, i.e., purely an act, while the Leibnizian Monad is chock-full of changing perceptual cognitions.

Leibniz also distinguishes three temporal levels of awareness: (a) the unconscious, the *forgotten,* which consists of mnemonic *petites perceptions,* always in principle retrievable; (b) the *immediacy* of present sensory perceptions; and (c) the reflexive *mediacy* of judgmental, inferential, as well as systematic rational thinking, which he conceives as a coherent unity, wherein different and *changing* sensations and conceptions are held together, bound, and *temporally* synthesized. It is to be noted that Leibniz's sensations are actually confused conceptions. The Monad is qualitatively defined as an immaterial active substance or soul.

Descartes is a dualist. Of critical importance is the independent reality of the soul as partnered with an independent realm of extended *quantitative* measurements of matter, which is *separate,* i.e., conceptually distinct from the immaterial *qualitative* features and aspects of human consciousness. But for Leibniz, in his capacity as a subjective idealist, all consciousness is qualitative as opposed to quantitative, since the mind, the monadic soul—qua substance—is an immaterial active unity.

In his argument with Newton's defender, Samuel Clarke, Leibniz argues that space and time are relative, as opposed to Newton, who believes that space and time are both absolute quasi-substances created *ex nihilo* by God, and in effect God's ubiquitous "sensoria," that God is

literally everywhere and infinitely present. Thus, throughout the infinite and eternal expanses of the universe, there is an absolute left and right, an up and down, as well as a before and after. God created the spatial world, matter, and time and each individual soul *ex nihilo*. For Leibniz, by contrast, the mental *appearances* of space and time are the result of an active *relational* ordering and reordering among the *petites perceptions, the minima sensibilia within* the mind.[1] The spiritual Monad is an absolutely self-enclosed substance. Nothing enters from without, and nothing escapes from within. Therefore, all consciousness, perceptions, and self-conscious activity must be *spontaneously* self-generated from *within* the monadic soul.

Again, the Monads are not in space, which is perceived as a *relational* "distancing" between unextended, ideal *minima sensibilia* within consciousness. Sensory perceptions are intensive qualities, while matter and motion are conceived as extensive quantities, *as appearances.* But the point is that the Monad *perceives changes within itself,* between its shifting qualities, and it continues to do so independently of the existence of an external world. Although the Monads are not in space, the *petites perceptions* are continuously present *throughout* the Monad's internal, immanent consciousness of time. Thus, Leibniz concludes:

> 7. The monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out.
>
> 8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existing things. And if simple [i.e., immaterial] substances did not differ in *quality,* there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any [temporal] change in things…Monads, if they had no *qualities,* would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not differ in *quantity* [i.e., the appearance of extension]…Consequently, space being a plenum [of *petites perceptions*], each part of space would always receive in any motion, exactly the equivalent of what it already had, and no one [temporal] state of things [i.e., changes] would be discernible from any other (italics mine).
>
> 9. Indeed, each [soul] Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference founded upon an intrinsic quality.

[1] *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,* edited by H. G. Alexander (Manchester University Press, 1965).

Hence the intrinsic and continuous identity of the soul.

> 10. I assume also as admitted that every created being [by God], and consequently the created Monad is subject to change and further that this change is [internally] continuous in each.
>
> 11. It follows from what has just been said that the natural changes of the Monads come from an *internal principle,* since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being.
>
> 12. But besides the principle of the change, there must be *a particular series of changes,* which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple [i.e., immaterial] substance.

In other words, our unique, singular, monadic, personal identities are constituted *in each of us* by our varying temporally experienced [immaterial] qualities.

> 13. This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit or in that which is simple [i.e., the soul]. For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged [i.e., the monadic self]; and consequently, a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no [physical] parts. [Hence the Monad remains a continuous unity and identity].

Now Leibniz's temporally structured Monad is considerably more complex than the intuitive Cartesian cogito.

> 14. The passing condition, which represents a multiplicity in the unit or is the simple substance, is nothing but what is called *Perception,* which is to be distinguished from *Apperception* or [Self]-Consciousness. In this matter, the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware.[2]

[2] Leibniz, G. W., *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings,* edited by Robert Latta (Oxford University Press, 1968), 220–224. According to Leibniz, every soul Monad is absolutely self-enclosed and "windowless"; nothing can enter from without and nothing can escape from within; it follows that any conscious activity must arise from within, i.e., *spontaneously.* Professor Latta states that for Leibniz, essentially following Aristotle, "freedom is spontaneity + intelligence. But Intelligence is not to be interpreted as the merely abstract understanding of pure self-consciousness; it includes every degree of perception or representation. Thus, there is an infinite variety of degrees of freedom…And as all Monads alike have

Therefore, each soul is *qualitatively* constituted in terms of a unique *temporal* personal identity. For Leibniz, space is defined as an ideal, i.e., an actively mental, subjective, and continuously changing *relational* system of internal perceptions. By contrast, Descartes' cogito consists *of* a spontaneous intuitive act occurring within a purely translucent medium through which objects appear to pass and repass (so Sartre). But the cogito itself is empty of content; it is therefore a pure, i.e., a purely non-sensuous act. Again, for Leibniz, temporal change requires sensuousness, i.e., internal perceptions. The importance of this philosophical clarification is hard to overestimate because it directly leads to a necessary temporal requirement for the establishment of personal identity. The criterion of personal identity must be constituted by the *immanency of continuous* temporal acts rather than, for example, empirically, i.e., passively observing visual movements in space, the empirical scientific approach. For Leibniz, the opening definitions of his *Monadology* are intended to secure for his "philosophy of mind" the principle that human consciousness is only viable in so far as it is *both* a temporal continuity and an active unity; that the self is constituted---not caused---by a continuous temporal thread within consciousness; and further that concepts and thoughts cannot appear and disappear

spontaneity (for they unfold the whole of their life from within themselves), the degree of freedom belonging to any Monad depends on its degree of intelligence" (145 ff.; cf. 39). Actually, the heritage of psychic dynamism conceptually hearkens back to Aristotle's notion of the active temporal development of human thought: on spontaneous activity; on *dynamis* (potentiality), energeia (actuality), and *entelecheia,* which signals that a thought process is completed and it is ready for further thoughts; cf. Hegel's article on Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* VII, 3; *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), II, 138–139; cf. also Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* Allen & Unwin, 1958); on spontaneity, see 95; on dynamism, 97, 193 note 2; cf. C. A. Von Peursen, *Leibniz* (Dutton, 1970), 54, who contends that Leibniz's theory maintains that the temporal elements and structures within consciousness are not analytically reducible to discrete and distinct moments but are rather constituted by "interfluent phases, as has been more recently argued by William James and Husserl." On this account, Husserl can be interpreted as expounding the doctrine of an immanent time-consciousness, which identifies time with the temporal flow or "stream of consciousness," as it meanders temporally, successively within the mind: On the Cartesian–Leibnizian connection concerning time-consciousness, see Charles Sherover, *The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 105–109, 147–148, 161, 167; hereafter cited as Sherover, op. cit.

discontinuously. In turn, this ensures that the activity of self-consciousness is a reflexive *dynamism*. Dynamic psychiatry is essentially temporal.[3]

Kant on Transcendental Time-Consciousness

This subjective theoretical construction in the opening paragraphs at the very foundation of the Leibnizian system—by concentrating on temporal continuity and reflexive unity—must have strongly attracted Kant when he transformed Leibniz's model of immanent time-consciousness into the spontaneity of a synthetic a priori temporal unity for his own purposes. Accordingly, the subjective idealist tendencies prevailing in the first edition *Deduction* carry over into the second edition as Kant undertakes to deepen Leibniz's theory of a dynamic self-productive activity through the formation of his own structuring synthetic a priori categories, while positively exploiting its *temporal* implications. The result is that Leibniz's *spontaneously* generated acts become transformed into Kant's threefold a priori synthetic transcendental acts: (a) grasping a group of immediate, *intuitive* sensory contents; (b) carrying them through a series of *imaginative* acts as both sensuous and yet free; and (c) ending in a continuous but unified *conceptual recognition*, i.e., a temporal retainment of all that preceded.

Kant in his two Deductions, in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* offers two seemingly different premises. In the first edition (1781), immanent time-consciousness serves him as his grounding first principle. It virtually consists of a *Critique* in miniature, as it "productively" creates the transcendental *constitutive*—but *not* empirically *causal*—conditions for *both* inner and outer experiences; for *both* the Aesthetic and the Analytic; for *both* transcendental time-consciousness and the unity of consciousness,

[3] Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 312; cf., 624, 628. The term "dynamic" indicates that the source of the psychic energy spontaneously arises or emanates from within the ego as opposed to being *caused* by external physical stimuli, as advocated by materialism and empiricism. On Nietzsche's influence on dynamic psychiatry, and more specifically on Freud's Id, consult 273–278 and 515–517. The paradoxical problem is how to reconcile Nietzsche's existential freedom with Freud's determinism. On the "subconscious" in Kant, see Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 263–264, 273–274; on spontaneity, cf., Ben Mijuskovic, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA., 2015), 62–63, 155–156, 158; and *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2018); on spontaneity in Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Royce, Husserl, Bergson, and Sartre, see *passim*.

as *constituting* the entire field of human awareness and experience; for *both* Newtonian science as well as for ordinary human thought.

Spontaneity is the "triggering" act that creates and is responsible for producing the pure relational categories of the understanding; for immanent time-consciousness; and for the unity of *self*-consciousness, the latter technically titled the *transcendental unity of apperception*.

> Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise *a priori,* or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and [*a priori* synthetically] brought into relation [i.e., into a temporal continuity and unity]. (A97–104)[4]

This spontaneous act (A 50=B 74, A 51=B 75, A 68=B 93, and A 97) is challenged by the empirical principle of the sensory "association of ideas," which is intended to serve as a substitute for Kant's pure relational

[4] Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Humanities, 1962); A 97–104; cf. also A 34=B 51). On Kant's possible direct knowledge of Leibniz's *Monadology,* see Anthony Savile, *Leibniz and the Monadology* (London: Routledge, 2000), 3–4; cf., T. D. Weldon, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 43, 45; Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: Humanities, 1962), 263 ff. One of Kant's ablest commentators contends that "Kant under the influence of Leibniz continued to regard reality as composed of [immaterial] monads"; H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* (Allen & Unwin, 1965), I, 183. Cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious: Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant," *Philosophy and Theology* (2008–2009); and "The Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious in Kant," *Kritike,* 2:4 (2010). Fichte's absolute subjective spontaneity is indebted to Kant as he states, "We will cite the words of Kant himself. At B 132 he says: 'But this representation ('I think') is an act of *spontaneity,* that is it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception," J. G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge,* translated by Peter Heath (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970), 49; cf. 97; Fichte also connects Leibniz and Kant on the act of "spontaneity" (82–83). Whereas Kant regarded spontaneity as a transcendental *creative* act producing his formal categories, Schopenhauer transformed Kant's spontaneity into his irrational metaphysical Will, a *causa sui, sui generis,* an underlying reality as the ultimate noumenal, unknowable source beneath human consciousness "responsible" for the *qualitas occulta,* for all natural and human phenomena, and more specifically the alleged "cause" for all human pain and moral evil; man is free by proxy and totally unaware of it; *The World as Will and Representation,* translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958), Volumes I and II, *passim*.

categories. Empiricism is grounded in passive "reproductive," mnemonic, contingent "patchings," as in Hobbes and Hume. For Kant, sensations are defined as "non-spontaneous" (B 68). Concepts always include "elements" of both spontaneity and synthesis.

In distinguishing objective or scientific time, which is intersubjective, from subjective time-consciousness, which is intimately personal, Kant describes his transcendental *dynamic* process in the following terms.

> Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge, namely the *apprehension* of representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition, their *reproduction* in imagination, and their *recognition* in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself—and consequently all experience as its empirical product. (A 97)

This entire process is twofold; it both spontaneously (1) a priori synthetically *creates* time and in the same moment (2), it mediately, judgmentally, *intends, produces the consciousness of subjective time*. First there is (a) the given sensory material to work on, e. g., the redness; then (b) its perceptual holding in the imagination as essential to the cinnabar as an object; and thirdly there is (c) the reflexive, conceptual recognition, i.e., retainment of what I am experiencing.

In the second edition Deduction (1787), however, Kant, instead of favoring immanent time-consciousness, promotes the principle of the reflexive "unity of consciousness," the transcendental unity of apperception. In my study, *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis,* I sought to discuss at some length this puzzling but critical inconsistency in Kant by contending that, although seemingly separate, the two premises actually constitute, i.e., *share*—and therefore *unify*—a mutually compatible active synthetic a priori relationship to each other. Again, both are necessary and universal, i.e., a priori *acts,* which *intentionally* transcend the moment of immediacy and then reflexively unify self-consciousness, again as required for both Newtonian science and ordinary human consciousness.

Peirce and the Mediacy of Time-Consciousness

Descartes, in the Second Meditation, distinguishes the immediacy of the cogito from the mediacy of *judgments,* when he points out that we *judge,* we *infer* that it is the *same* piece of wax and that it is pedestrians and not

automatons that are *passing* by my window. All human *judgments*—as distinct from the intuitive cogito—are temporal for Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.

A different but related discussion of time is offered by C. S. Peirce, who highlights the paradoxical relation between the non-temporal immediacy of sensory content in human consciousness "alongside" the transitory mediacy of temporality. Peirce was especially impressed and influenced by Kant as exhibited in the following declaration.

> We observe two elements of consciousness, the distinction between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration. In a piece of music there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single tone may be prolonged for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself. But it is different with the air [or melody], the performance of which occupies a certain time, during the portions of which only portions of it are played. It consists in an orderliness in the *succession* of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it [i.e., the succession] there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the [distinct, separate] notes; yet we cannot be said to *directly* hear it, for we hear only what is present at the instant; and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These two sorts of [mental versus physical] objects, what we are *immediately* conscious of [i.e., the notes] and what we are *mediately* conscious of [i.e., the melody] are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and end in a congruence in the succession of sensations which *flow* through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us but must [mediately] cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread of melody running throughout the succession of our sensations.[5]

[5] Peirce, Charles Sanders, *Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 37–38. Peirce was strongly influenced by Kant. By his own declaration he states, "I devoted two hours a day to the study of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* for more than three years." "The unity of time is requisite for the plurality of activities which it 'permits.'" Moreover, "If purposive activity is fundamental to understanding, it also involves a radical temporalization of the concept of meaning" (Sherover, op. cit., 355); and cf., Ben Mijuskovic, "Descartes Bridge to the External World: The Piece of Wax," *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia,* 3:3 (1971), discussion of Meditation Two; reprinted in

Sensations are simple, transient, immediate, instantaneous, *non*-cognitive presences in consciousness. But a melody is a cognitive, temporally synthesized *meaning,* a sym-phonic temporal unity of consciousness. By contrast, for empiricism, human experience is a phenomenal construction of sense-data patched together, a piecemeal, passive, and repetitive "association of sensations," as opposed to the active, i.e., temporal synthesizing unifying acts of self-consciousness. These Kantian distinctions are critical because it is impossible to account for human time in terms of neuroscientific homogeneous neurons. Neurons are separate, i.e., distinct, disunified existents lying dormant in the brain until electrically, causally, synaptically *put into motion by external stimuli*. But the jostling movement of matter in the brain is not equal to self-consciousness or to immanent temporality.

Bergson and Duration

Bergson summons principles, which are congenial to Leibnizian and idealist tenets when he posits both (a) the reflexive nature of self-awareness, the unifying essence of self-consciousness, while (b) emphasizing the unique aspect of an *unextended*, qualitative, temporal *duration*. What is real is only attainable by an *intuitive, immediate* grasp, which directly *apprehends* the *qualitatively* actual. It is diametrically opposed to the intellectually abstract, the scientific, and the analytic; forever distinct from that which is cognitively reducible to abstract *analyses*. The latter is known *conceptually,* mediately, indirectly, and therefore *quantitatively,* as an abstraction; as an "existent," it is extended, spatial, causal, scientific, and in general mathematically measurable. Its scientific "virtue" is that it represents causal determinism. The "essence" of science is to be causal, deterministic, *and above all to provide predictions*—and often the behavioral control of human beings. Science is pragmatic, as opposed to insightful. For Bergson, science is the antithesis to the freedom of *duration*. In terms of the reality of Becoming—in opposition to Being as abstract and static—Bergson champions the qualitative in consciousness over the quantitative in science. For Bergson, the intellect distorts reality in its pursuit of pragmatic and utilitarian, i.e., scientific goals and ends. But time is not a line consisting of single instantaneous dots pointing in a predictable direction.

René Descartes: Critical Assessments, edited by Georges Moyal (London: Routledge, 1996), Volume II.

Regarding the self, Bergson underscores its intrinsic dynamism as it is temporally expressed in conformity with the spontaneous orientation we are concerned to trace.

> There is at least one reality we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple [i.e., abstract conceptual and distorting] analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures.[6]

This "durational" intuition is spontaneous, which is to say it is free**.** Simply put, for Bergson, *freedom and duration are synonymous.* Bergson also pays tribute to the "multiplicity in unity" principle, as it is intuitively grasped within the mind, and armed with this insight, he proceeds to exploit the medieval distinction between immediate apprehension and mediate comprehension. Qualities are directly intuited, while by contrast concepts are mediately abstracted; intuitions are singular, concepts are universal.

> That the personality has unity is certain; but such an affirmation does not teach me anything about the extraordinary nature of this unity which is the person. That our self is multiple, I further agree, but there is a multiplicity, which, it must be recognized, has nothing in common with any other. What really matters to philosophy is to know *what* unity, *what* multiplicity, *what* reality superior to the abstract one and the abstract multiple unity of the person. And it will know this only if it once again grasps the simple [i.e., durational] intuition of the self by the self.[7]

[6] Bergson, Henri, *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* translated by T. E. Hulme (Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 25–26, 37; and cf. Sherover, op. cit., 173–175, 181, 218 ff.

[7] "Duration," i.e., subjective temporality—as opposed to objective, spatialized time—is an ever-changing, flowing multiplicity of *immediate,* spontaneous *acts.* As distinct from the spatial, the elements, the parts, which are external to each other, duration temporally interpenetrates, fuses the sustaining qualitative "relations," i.e., acts such that if a quality is displaced, the durational moment would change and with it the quality of the whole. If a single quality is removed from a melody, its essence disappears. Real time or duration is therefore what gives meaning and significance; it is the essence or "sense" of real things. And this is so because duration is a constitutive structure or form. Pure change and heterogeneity it is, but it is the heterogeneity of organic growth, which does not exclude continuity but indeed implies a qualitative heterogeneity and multiplicity within unity. *Time and Free Will,* translated by F. L. Pogson (Harper & Row, 3, 31–32, 70, 80–81, 87, 90–91, 92 ff. 102–104,111, 112, 127, 137; on Leibniz 213, 226; spontaneity and dynamism are cited on 140–141, 217, 219–220, 229. Cf. *Creative Evolution,* translated by Arthur Michell, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928), 1–7, 86; cf. Ian W. Alexander, *Bergson* (Bowes and Bowes, 1957), 21–22; cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson,"

> Like Peirce before him, he finds it insightful to press his point by citing the example of a melody: Pure duration is the form which the succession of our [self-]conscious states assume when our ego lets itself live [i.e., his *elan vital*], when it refrains from separating its state from its former states. For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer *endure*. Nor need it forget its former states; it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected? (*TFW,* 100)

Personal identity is embedded in the durational moment. This intuitional unity is further described as a "melting," a "fusion," a "compression," an "interpenetration" of multiple qualities immersed in a single moment (*TFW,* 128–129, 239). It is important to note here that according to Bergson, both the unity as well as the continuity—or more specifically its durational, seamless flow of temporal moments—is guaranteed by an immaterialist paradigm of the mind; and, further, that duration is apprehended directly, immediately by the reflexive power of unimpeded thought. It is characterized by an intuitive, i.e., a *durational* presence within a consciousness devoid of any spatial entanglements. Consequently, it is free of any and all spatially determinative causes.

The neurosciences vivisect self-consciousness and atomize time-consciousness. Neurons are physically truncated and separated parts. But thoughts are unified wholes just as the person is a unified whole and not a mere separated subsistence of physical and separable parts.

Obviously, the reference to a non-temporal duration seems a contradiction in terms. But for Bergson, science is *essentially* comprised of a manifold of separable quantitative aspects or predicates, whereas qualities, in their pure "presences," are immaterial. It follows that the spontaneous *acts* of consciousness, *its creations as well as its decisions,* are both modes of

Schopenhauer Jahrbuch, 58 (1977), 43–58. Again, quantities are extended; qualities are unextended. Sometimes they are "calculated" in terms of "*degrees* of intensity" rather than quantitative *measurements,* but the "degrees" remain qualitative.

pure *becoming*. And what is unextended cannot be attributed to the physical, to the quantitative, nor to the cellular composition of the brain.

> For Bergson, as for the romantics, the human being discovers himself in the depths of memory; and he no longer discovers himself there intermittently, fragmentarily, after a blind groping within the gulf of the mind, but simply by allowing himself, in a moment of pure relation, to be pervaded by an indelible and total memory that is always on the verge of consciousness. For Bergson, all genuine thought is thought of the continuous *becoming* of things; to intuit their becoming is to intuit their essence. Duration is the only reality…there is no longer any opposition between moment and duration; no longer any trace of deterministic [causal] fatalism; but in place of the actual feeling of existence and the profundity of existence, there is the possibility of a mutual communication, of a relationship between the moment and time; and in place of a determinism of cause and effect is the [intuitive] feeling that any moment can be realized as a new moment, and that time can always be freely created from the present forward.[8]

Again, personal time and communal space are separate just as the lonely soul is temporally separate from all other spatially separated souls.

> This intuitive duration, so profoundly Bergsonian in its texture, converges in Bergson on the continual formation of a present filled up at once with the past which is projected into it, and with the future to which it aspires. But this present alone exists, in which the past is resolved and the future implied. There is neither recollection nor foresight, nor permanence of a time already fixed, but a passionate *spontaneity*, which, freed of all determination, seems to create itself and its own time as it goes alone. (ibid., 80)

Duration comprises both the real time of a unified subjectivity as well as the confined temporality of a psychological loneliness. As Sartre declared, to be free is to be lonely.

O*bjective* time is an intellectual abstraction, a manufactured concept, which is dependent on physical objects moving in space; it is a distortion of reality instituted solely for pragmatic purposes, control, and

[8] Poulet, Georges, *Studies in Human Time,* translated by Elliott Coleman (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), 34–35. Marcel Proust is Bergson's nephew and in *A la recherché du temps perdu,* unlike the scientist, the literary artist employs intuition, which is rooted and accessed in our past experiences by an involuntary memory, in *essences* which are not subject to the ravages of time; Poulet, 291 ff.

manipulation. Again, it represents time as linear and inflexible, consisting of separate points distributed as dots on a line. This is scientific time, which is practical and instrumental. By contrast, subjective time is intuitional, free, and reflexively immanent "within" consciousness. To re-present time as external is to treat it as if it were an *object* that exists independently of consciousness. It is to vivisect time into distinct fragments; to chop it up into vanishing intervals. External, objective scientific time is space-dependent. Theoretically, for materialists and empiricists, space without time and/or gravity are conceivable. For the scientist, for the determinist, this is critically important because empirical perception requires first space, then motion, then time, then causality, and finally prediction. As these are given, it allows for the control not only of the environment but of human beings as well. But immanent time, i.e., human duration, and freedom are synonymous.

> Thus, there are two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all alloy, the other surreptitiously bringing in the idea space. Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assume when our ego lets itself *live,* when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states…Nor need it forget its former states; it is enough that in recalling these states, it does not set them up alongside [each other]…but forms both the past and the present state into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting into one another. (Bergson, *TFW,* 100)

Finally, Bergson's conception of a temporally self-enclosed monadic consciousness inevitably leads him to the sphere of the lonely ego, as we realize that in every human life there are *decisional* junctures, pure moments when the self is absolutely alone and free; and each moment is spontaneously undetermined; when the self must decide *who* she wishes to be; *what* she is to do; and *how* she will implement her *values.* In these moments, the self apprehends, grasps its absolute freedom; its real being: to live or to die; to love or to hate; to preserve or to destroy. And it is only in so far as the self is able to intuitively grasp its own intrinsically non-sharable durational flow of qualities, as it exists *alone* and present within consciousness, that it is absolutely free of the world of objects, other selves, and the natural laws of the universe.

Once more, we live together in a communal space, but we exist alone in an intimate time.

Husserl and Internal Time-Consciousness

As early as 1905, Husserl was impressed by Kant's treatment of the subjectivity of time-consciousness and he follows Peirce and Bergson in emphasizing its quality of continuity by appealing to the experience of listening to a song and in describing the flow of time, its stream-like quality. In *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, in which the unity and the identity of the ego are immanently, eidetically given and synthesized, time is constituted as a continuous flux, a temporal flow.

> When for example, a melody sounds, the individual notes do not completely disappear when the stimulus or the action of the nerve excited by them comes to an end. When the new note sounds, the one just preceding it does not disappear without a trace, otherwise we should be incapable of observing the relation between the notes which follow one another. We should have a note at every instant and possibly in the interval in the sounding of the next empty phase but never the idea (*Vorstellung*) of a melody.[9]

Each note and interval are separate from the others and therefore separate from the tune. But the melody is a universal, an eidetic, intuitive, phenomenological *meaning*. By contrast, neuroscience is nominalistic. Only particulars exist: Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Hobbes, Locke (simple

[9] Husserl, Edmund, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,* translated by James Churchill (London: Indiana University Press), 30; cf. 100, 157 ff. The similarity between Husserl's and James' "stream of consciousness" has been sufficiently noticed in the secondary literature. For both, consciousness of time exhibits a certain "spread" or "duration" although it is not a physical or material extension of course; nor is it to be understood by an appeal to anything resembling spatial dimensions. Qualitative time cannot be measured mathematically because it is immanent within consciousness. In Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), he refers to "the individual ego as constituting himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history,'" through an egological temporal genesis, Sections 14; 18, and 37. For a discussion of Husserl's concept of time, see Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 82–88, 160–161; *Husserlian Meditations* (Evanston I: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 136–137, 143 ff.; Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 8, 10, 22, 93, 95–99, 107; Joseph Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology* (Duquesne University Press, 1967), 74–75, 213 ff.; Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 146–149. On the centrality of the Ego in Husserl's philosophy, consult Gaston Berger, *The* Cogito *in Husserl's Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), *passim;* and cf., Sherover, op. cit., 439–440, 445–451.

sensations); Berkeley (simple ideas); Hume (simple impressions); and Wittgenstein (simple words, names, and objects).

We now see why and how Peirce, Bergson, and Husserl—by focusing on the immanent, temporal, flowing *qualitative* features of consciousness while downplaying the quantitative role of separate notes—are able to bring to the fore the *continuity* of consciousness and its defining feature in their confirmation of the identity of the person. The immediate pregnancy of Bergson's durational "becomings" seals the past within the promise of the future. Although each note, each presence is distinct, the melody can only be *meaningfully* constituted as a continuous unity, as a unified whole. Acoustic causes are not meanings. In turn, Husserl speculates that the constitutive factors responsible for immanent time-consciousness could serve as a "transcendental clue" (Kant) for *all* intentional meanings present within the mind (*Cartesian Meditations,* Sections 14, 18, 36, 37). For Husserl, the lone ego a priori *and* synthetically constitutes the continuous temporal flow of consciousness into meaningful structures of retention-presention-protentions. In *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,* he declares his overriding principle rather inelegantly but literally as "The Constitution of Spontaneous Unities as Immanent Temporal Objects—Judgment as a Temporal Form and Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness" (Appendix XIII). For both Kant and Husserl, all consciousness is judgmental, reflexive, and intentional. Note well: *rationalism* is intrinsically intentional, purposeful, teleological. By contrast, empiricism is merely factual.

"Time is motionless and yet it flows." What Husserl means by this is that the ego—along with its attendant meanings—is not in space; it is not material or physical. In the *Cartesian Meditations,* he rejects the application of the empirical "laws of causality"; it is time-consciousness, which "makes the concrete ego (the monad possible as a unity)"; and "We are reminded here of the long-familiar problems concerning the *psychological origin* of the 'idea of space,' the 'idea of time,' the idea of a 'physical thing' and so forth" (Section 37). In section 38, he states, "In active genesis, the Ego functions as productively [i.e., spontaneously] constitutive, by means of processes that are specifically *acts* of the Ego." And in Section 39, he rejects the traditional Humean and the "associationist principles" of psychology, what he interprets as the causal explanation of time, both its "psychologistic" and its "naturalistic distortions," as he concludes with his own imprint of "*a realm of the 'innate, A priori,*" a genesis without which an ego as such is unthinkable.

Scientific time is grounded in separate but "associative ideas," in their *separable motions,* in the measurement of distinct motions *as separable, contingent parts.* It presupposes, the priority of space. But this essentially causal explanation of objective time can be phenomenologically *shown* to rest on a more primordial constitution, one which can only be ascertained by a direct, intuitive, eidetic "seeing," as we reflexively concentrate on an immanent temporal flow, which is only accessible after we have bracketed our mechanical, determinist, scientific, and behavioral prejudices.

In *Ideas* (1913), Husserl's dependence on the Cartesian ego, the Leibnizian Monad, and the Kantian acts of spontaneity illuminates his own inherited debt to his predecessors.

> It is then to this world, *the world in which I find myself and which is also my world-about-me,* that the complex forms of my manifold and [temporally] shifting *spontaneities* of consciousness stand related: observing in the interests of research the bringing of meaning [!] into conceptual form through description; comparing and distinguishing, collecting and counting, presupposing and inferring, the theorizing activity of consciousness, in short in its different forms and stages. Related to it likewise are the diverse acts and states of sentiment and disapproval, joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear, decision and action. All these together with the sheer acts of the Ego, in which I become acquainted with the world as *immediately* [eidetically] given me, through *spontaneous* tendencies to turn towards it, are included under the one Cartesian expression: *Cogito* (Section 28; cf., 23).[10]

Consider in the above passage how many of the acts and judgments are *evaluative.* Again, spontaneity is the triggering act for all meanings and judgments, desiderative, intellectual, teleological, aesthetic, fanciful, and also most importantly, evaluative.

On the empirical paradigm of consciousness, sensations are simple, distinct, mental, *perceptions,* separate from each other; they are disconnected (Locke's simple ideas; Hume's simple impressions). They last for an instant only to be replaced immediately by new sensations and impressions. In

[10] Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Section 28 and 23. These cognitive acts are temporally initiated, "given" and described in consciousness; cf., *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 318 ff.); Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), I, 148–149; and cf. Sherover, op. cit., 465–451.

materialism, empiricism, and the neurosciences, there can be no accommodation for spontaneous *acts* and/or connective relations. But listening to a melody is a *meaningful* unified experience. It is not a disconnected repetition of separate, distinct sounds. That is why Peirce appeals to temporal experience as a "flow," a stream of consciousness; it cannot be intermittently stopped without losing its meaning *as a song*. The flow, the stream *is* the "relation." This is also why Peirce, Bergson, and Husserl address the melody of a song as a paradoxical—*but real*—fusion of interpenetrating qualities as opposed to a quantitative cacophony of aural stimuli.

It is relatively late that we discover a growing appreciation of an *essential* intertwining of immanent temporality with the theme of human loneliness in the novel. In turn, however, these twin alliances increasingly forge our current trend in depicting the individual as a predominantly lonely and isolated being, one who continually struggles against his anxieties of separation and anonymity regarding other selves**.** But as speculation on philosophical time grows and concentrates on the aspect of human temporality sharpens, we find an increasing concern on the relation between immanent time-consciousness and loneliness. A striking example is offered by the "stream of consciousness" narrative style in James Joyce's depiction of the subjective continuity of consciousness, as it transpires within the confines of Molly Bloom's nocturnal soliloquy in *Ulysses*. It serves as a purely reflexive and intimate "uncoiling" of consciousness as the entire external world is suspended and bracketed (Husserl). Molly's loneliness expresses not only the reflexive solitude of self-awareness but also its "naked candour of self-revelation."[11] As one commentator remarks:

> The general [reflexive] movement of Molly Bloom's monologue is egocentric—she thinks of herself, her grievances, her youth…All through the monologue we observe her moving, growing, and expanding, just as the child's vision gradually extends beyond the misty limits of infancy to a wider

[11] A Bergsonian influence on Joyce, specifically in connection with temporal duration, has been recognized by B. Fehr, "James Joyce's *Ulysses," Englische Studien,* LX (1925), 193. And in Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man* (Beacon, 1957), who blames Bergson for polluting the *time-mind* narrative xii–xv, as well as in James Joyce, Chapter XVI, "Analysis of the Mind of James Joyce."

> scope of experience, in increasing circles of [temporal] intellection. (ibid. 402–403)[12]

Constant reflexive self-conscious circularity, coupled with the transcending intentionality of freedom, together function as the twin emblems of the existential human condition, one of utter loneliness. Molly's revery portrays the explicit recognition of the twin aspects of temporal unity and continuity as the essential constitutive features of self-awareness. They are the critical points Joyce seeks in directing our unremitting and transfixed attention to and upon Molly's multifarious images, feelings, thoughts, and aspirations, as she unrolls her memories during the course of the longest unpunctuated sentence in the English language—pages 723–768—as her thoughts reach backward and forward in time. Her self-expression is enveloped within and throughout her intimate uninterrupted and unending flow of self-intimacy, as it meanders through the temporal labyrinths of her fears and hopes, ceaselessly, continuously. Lying there in the dark, with the room's physical space and all its objects placed in abeyance, "put out of gear," "bracketed" from any concerns about an external reality, Molly unravels the unending ball of her consciousness, as if it were a filament, a continuous melodic thread progressing through varying themes and variations. Through Joyce's "stream of consciousness" narrative style, the phenomenological and temporal structures of her mind become unfolded, as they pass through a singularly sustaining continuity consisting of an intimate identity until sleep intervenes.

Literature offers the best means of expressing the moments, feelings, thoughts, and the meanings embedded within consciousness and, in a word, the *quality* of loneliness. But it is important to realize that there is a *critical* difference between the artificial depiction of representational

[12] Gilbert, Stuart, *James Joyce's Ulysses* (Vintage, 1955), 385; cf. 402–403. Even the consideration that *Ulysses* is the record of a single day—patterned chronologically after the great Greek tragedies—is a significant clue to the dominance of time throughout the novel, precisely because it provides an immanent subjective temporal *metastructure* that serves as a background during which the "lesser' or "minor" temporal episodes occur, as they transpire within the larger contextual framework of diurnal time. The theme of loneliness in Joyce is presented most explicitly in *A Portrait of the Artist of a Young Man*. Further, there is an influence on Joyce via his fellow Irishman Bishop Berkeley's emphasis on "subjectivism"; see Gilbert, 126. The reader may also compare with profit the reflexive thoughts of Molly Bloom with the description of the flow of time as a river paralleling consciousness as a subjective stream within awareness in William Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying* (Modern Library, 1946), 438–439, 443, 444–435.

constructions, the artificial stringing of words and language, which are *qualitatively* quite different from the direct imagery and fusing of thoughts within self-consciousness. There is always something "lost in translation." Words are separate, distinct, and static. Think of a dictionary. By contrast, consciousness is a *flow*. Words do not flow, thoughts flow. Thoughts are nuanced, horizons, and halos of temporal meanings permeating the lonely human soul. Words may convey stilted "signs" but not time. A dictionary's contents are static and artificially organized alphabetically. But try to imagine what it would be like if you were forced to think "alphabetically"! By contrast, consciousness is nuanced, throbbing, and pulsating with life; consciousness centers, circles, and wanders; it has fringes and halos of meanings; while words are lifeless, frozen, and distinct. Think of the common phrase, "Words alone cannot express what I feel…" For both Husserl (*Paris Lectures* and *The Idea of Phenomenology*) and Bergson (*Time and Free Will*), consciousness is primary and original, while language is secondary and derivative. But despite these limitations, still it is literature which best teaches us the lessons of loneliness.

Thomas Wolfe is one of the ablest novelists of loneliness (along with Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad), the one who most successfully interweaves the theme of loneliness with our feelings and thoughts. Wolfe's overwhelming sense of loneliness reaches such an intensity that it virtually self-destructs.

> The whole conviction of my life now rests upon the belief that loneliness, far from being a rare and curious phenomenon, peculiar to myself and to a few other solitary men, is the central and inevitable fact of all human existence. When we examine the moments, acts, and statements of all kinds of people—not only the grief and ecstasy of the greatest poets, but also of the huge unhappiness of the average soul as evidenced by the innumerable strident words of abuse, hatred, contempt, mistrust, and scorn that forever grate upon our ears as the manswarm passes us in the street—we find, I think, that they are all suffering from the same thing. The final cause of their complaint is loneliness.[13]

Influenced by Joyce's narrative style in *Ulysses,* with its highly monadic mode of temporal expression, and intensified by Wolfe's own almost pathological feelings of separateness, he proceeds to systematically explore the themes of loneliness in his major autobiographical works, including *Look*

[13] Wolfe, Thomas, *The Hills Beyond* (New York: Signet, 1958), "God's Lonely Man," 146.

Homeward, Angel; Of Time and the River; You Can't Go Home Again; and *The Web and the Rock,* all poignantly portraying his own lonely existence. As he dwells on his feelings and thoughts, as they revolve and spiral in a downward direction, he becomes increasingly consumed by his loneliness.

In *Of Time and the River,* Wolfe offers an impressive and fairly sophisticated variety of philosophical remarks about time, a clear indication that he was seriously concerned with its epistemological and even ontological status. Quite possibly these interests were first generated by his college courses. Like Faulkner after him (*As I Lay Dying* and *The Sound and the Fury*), Wolfe also believes that time "pervades mind and matter alike," but he also suggests that there are two times; there is a common, public, objective time—the time of America's rivers and trains. But there is also a purely personal and intimate time structured by our *sui generis* experiences, as it remains confined within the monadic ego. This second species of time is lonely time. And Wolfe proceeds to develop the view that this "special time" exhibits both a Kantian and Jamesian perspective.

> Time the form of the internal sense and space the form of the external sense [Kant?] Within a definite limited interval of duration [Bergson?] known as the specious present [William James?] there is a direct perception of the temporal relations. After an event has passed beyond the specious present it can only enter consciousness by reproductive memory [Kant?]…Temporal experiences divided into three qualitatively distinct intervals: the remembered past, the perceived specious present, and the anticipated future—By means of the tripartite division we are able to inject our present selves into the temporal stream of our own experience…Thus time has its roots in experience and yet appears to be a dimension in which experiences and their contents are to be arranged [i.e., structured].[14]

But Wolfe is a psychologist as well when he expresses the principle that loneliness is the universal existential condition of mankind, as he cites the Book of Job as symbolizing man's eternal struggle to reach out for help and understanding to a superior Being despite the obvious futility of such efforts and pleas. In a bookending passage paralleling Molly Bloom's

[14] Wolfe, Thomas, *Of Time and the River,* XXV; see Chapters VII, XIV, XVII, XXX; *Look Homeward, Angel,* Preface and Chapter 4; and *You Can't Go Home Again,* IV. William Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying* and *The Sound and the Fury* are also classic examples of the "stream of consciousness" narrative style. Cf., Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness and Time-Consciousness, *Philosophy Today,* 22:4 (1978).

soliloquy, Wolfe describes his sister Helen's reflections on loneliness as the darkness of night surrounds and envelopes her.

> A thousand scenes from this past life flashed through her mind now, as she lay there in the darkness, and all of them seemed grotesque, accidental and mistaken, as reasonless as everything in life. And filled with a numb, speechless feeling of despair and nameless terror, she heard, somewhere across the night, the sound of a train again and thought: "My God! My God! What is life about? We are all lying here in darkness in ten thousand little towns—waiting, listening, hoping—for what?" And suddenly, with a feeling of terrible revelation, she saw the strangeness and mystery of man's life; she felt about her in the darkness the presence of ten thousand people, each lying in his bed, naked and alone, united at the heart of night and darkness, and listening, as she, to the sounds of silence and of sleep. And suddenly it seemed to her that she knew all these lonely, strange unknown watchers of the night, that she was speaking to them, and they to her, across the fields of sleep as they had never spoken before, that she knew men now in all their dark and naked loneliness, without falseness and pretense as she had never known them. And it seemed to her that if men would only listen in the darkness and send the language of their naked lonely spirits across the silence of the night, all of the error, falseness and confusion of their lives would vanish, they would no longer be strangers, and each would find the life he sought and never yet had found. "If we only could!" she thought. "If we only could!"

But the single candlelit glimmer of possible hope and optimism shining through the opaque obscurity of the night is slowly doused by a second passage.

> What is wrong with people?…Why do we never get to know one another?…Why is it that we get born and live and die here in this world without ever finding out what anyone is like?…No, what is the strangest thing of all—why is it that all our efforts to know people in this world lead only to greater ignorance and confusion than before? We get together and talk and say what we think and feel and believe in such a way, and yet what we really think and feel and believe we never say at all. Why is this? We talk and talk in an effort to understand another person, and yet almost all we say is false; we hardly ever say what we mean or tell the truth—it leads to greater misunderstanding and fear than before—it would be better if we said nothing.

But the real reason why we do not say or try to communicate to others what we feel and mean is, as Wolfe recognizes, that we are even strangers

to ourselves—and all that we do know with certainty is that we are alone. And yet this single fact of human existence is paradoxically incommunicable, for we cannot believe that someone else can be as lonely as we are; that another's isolation is as important or as intense as our own. For Wolfe, each of us uniquely lives and exists alone. We are conscious of our separation precisely *because* of our singularly temporal subjectivity; each of us is tightly ensconced in our own circle of isolation; each of us is desperately projected both toward and against an alien world, as we listen to the discordant and lonely "sounds of time, dark time" (Wolfe, Chapter VII). Loneliness *is* immanent time.

We began by contrasting two theories of time: first scientific and objective time, intersubjectively shared; time as *caused* by the *external* perception of the movement of objects travelling through space; time as the measure of empirical change. By contrast, for subjective idealists and phenomenologists, immanent time is *constituted* by both transcendental reflexive acts (Kant), as well as by the accompaniment of corresponding transcendent intentional acts of consciousness (Husserl). This latter dynamic is important because we shall now discuss a failed *empirical, neuroscientific* attempt to connect time and unity to a terribly misleading principle of alleged "intentionality."

What I now wish to explore is the treatment of the twin issues of personal identity *and* its relation to the consciousness of time as presented in Raymond Tallis' book, *Aping Mankind*.[15] Tallis, a renowned neuroscientist, begins by ushering in his discussion on two fronts. First, he criticizes Hume's theory of personal identity, but fails to grasp its relation to the temporal flow of *succession*. Second, he reduces Kant's synthetic a priori version of the reflexive temporal unity of self-consciousness to the Cartesian immediacy of the "I think" and its intuitive activity.

According to Tallis, "in one of the most famous passages in Western philosophy, David Hume argued that the self was a kind of fiction." And he quotes the critical passage from Hume.

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself,* I always stumble on some particular [i.e., separate, disunified] perception or other,

[15] Tallis, Raymond, *Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis, and the Misrepresentation of Humanity* (New York: Routledge, 2012). On William James' treatment of the stream of time-consciousness, see *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950), Chapter IX, I, 224 ff.; and see conceptions of the "self," Chapter X, I, 291 ff.; cf. Sherover, op. cit., 349–353.

> of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception and can never observe anything but the perception.

Accordingly, Tallis states:

> And thus Hume "concluded that humans 'are nothing but a bundle…of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.'" Accordingly, "The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one," he finally says. So that's that. Those of you who think of yourselves as real are plain wrong. (Tallis, 57–58)

But he completely misses the Kantian point, that it is precisely the succession *of impressions that undermines Hume's skepticism*. When Hume admits to a temporal *succession* of perceptions, that can only occur *if* there is a self, the *same* self, connecting, unifying, and synthesizing, relating the *successive* acts in the same, identical *continuous* self-consciousness. This will be Kant's argument. As I have argued elsewhere, once Hume admits to a *succession* of perceptions, he has lost the argument because one cannot be self-conscious of the passage of time unless there is a continuity and unity of self-consciousness, as Kant later emphasized in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 97–104, above). And Hume amply recognized and admitted this theoretical dilemma a year later, in his apologetic Appendix regarding his earlier discussion *Of personal identity* and the incompatibility of reconciling his simple, i.e., single atomistic perceptual impressions with the unity of consciousness, while Dr. Tallis himself is unable to realize what Hume was forced to reconsider and admit.

> Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity *arises* from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. [Sensations and representations are reflected upon, but thought is reflexively self-conscious.] The present philosophy, therefore has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite, our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz, *that all our distinct perceptions* [i.e., simple impressions] *are distinct existences,* and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.* Did our perceptions

> either inhere in something simple [i.e., the mind or soul] or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of sceptic and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. (Appendix to the *Treatise,* 635–636)

Whereas Hume realizes the paradox, Tallis fails to do so. I would also add that there is not much of a difference between Hume's disunified "bundle of simple perceptions," his *distinct* impressions, and the neuroscientific homogeneous "bundle of distinct brain neurons." Both deny the intrinsic unity of consciousness, the principle of reflexive self-consciousness.

But as Tallis proceeds, Kant comes in for some rough going as well.

> Kant suggested, in response to Hume, that there was something else above and beyond experiences that tied them together: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations." This is not a very satisfactory solution and much puzzled over. A constant iteration of "I think," seems implausibly donnish. What is more, the "I" of the "I" think, which he specifically denied had a place in the empirical world of experiences, seemed to have no place at all. (ibid.)

What we are operating with are five competing *first principles* of time. First, the materialist, scientific principle of time, time as the measure of physical objects moving through an extended space. Conceptually space could exist without matter (Newton) but not matter without being spatially extended. Second, Hume's principle of a temporally *successive* passage of mental, i.e., sensory atomistic impressions, which (presumably) cannot, *qua* immediate, *qua* "the specious present," temporally *succeed* each other since they instantaneously appear and disappear in a specious moment. Hume's difficulty is that if all the impressions are instantaneous, then consciousness would be equally instantaneous. Third, Kant's principle supporting self-consciousness as *transcendentally* grounded in a priori synthetic categories and judgments (*Critique,* A 97–104). Fourth, the reductive neuroscientific account of a *materialistic and causally deterministic sequence* of electrical synapses colliding among single, separate neurons. And fifth, Tallis' appeal to Brentano's principle of *"intentionality,"* which latter he wishes to recruit. But in doing so, he unwittingly and inconsistently infects his account by smuggling in idealist and

phenomenological premises, arguments, and conclusions in the bargain. He incorrectly believes he can enlist Brentano's "intentionality" principle and thereby use it as a foil in criticizing his own conservative neuroscientific colleagues' *valuative* reductivism regarding *qualia*.

> There is nothing elsewhere in nature comparable to intentionality. It will prove to be the key to our human differences: to our subjectivity; our sustained [temporal?] self-consciousness; our sense of others as selves like us; first- and second person-being; our ability to form intentions; our freedom; and our collective creation of a world offset from nature. (105)

Thus, Tallis fails to appreciate—*qua a first principle*—the difference between Hobbesian materialism; Hume's empirical atomistic phenomenalism, his "psychological atomism"; Kant's reflexive subjective idealism; and the neuroscientific principle of neuronal electrical synapses and therefore the four options, their respective varying strengths and weaknesses, *qua first principles,* as well as their competing roles in addressing the issue of personal identity and the undeniable temporality of consciousness. In the guise of a humanist, he posits the reality of the brain but then wishes to claim its mysteriousness in terms of *qualia*. "Qualia are the very fabric of [self-]consciousness: the very [neuronal?] material of experience, or the what-it-is-like feel of mental states" (95); and the puzzling statement that "nerve impulses are not at all like qualia" (ibid). Accordingly,

> There are problems we encounter trying to make sense of a neural account of seemingly simple components of consciousness such as qualia. I say *seemingly* simple because qualia are never isolated [physical?] atoms of consciousness; they are always experienced parts of an object. (102; cf. 103)

For dualism and idealism, sensory qualia are immaterial, for example in Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Bergson. But Tallis wishes to induct qualia (95, 102–103), as intrinsically *intentional* (103), and he then proceeds to argue that the unaided qualia somehow miraculously, mysteriously lead to the experiences of time, unity, freedom, the self versus other self, etc., etc.

Further, according to Tallis, there is a real, but non-physical outside that is the "human" world (Metaphysical dualism?). Our perceptions yield objects that transcend our awareness; we are explicitly aware that the object is more than our perceptions—and that it is other than our self

(metaphysical dualism?). Further, for Tallis, this is all a "mystery" because "intentionality highlights the unknown, of what brains are ultimately supposed to do; namely, *to make other items, indeed worlds, appear to someone* (111). Once more, for dualism and idealism, qualia are immaterial, e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and the entire idealist tradition, and Tallis recognizes this (103–104; but cf. 109). For Cartesian dualism, primary "qualities," i.e., quantities are material and extended, whereas secondary qualities, i.e., sensory qualia, are truly immaterial and unextended. There is no conceivable way to view them in neuronal terms. For Kant's subjective idealism, the scientific Axioms of Intuition are ideal "extensive magnitudes" (*Critique,* A 162=B 202), while the subjective Anticipations of Perceptions are ideal "intensive magnitudes," i.e., qualia (A 166=B 207). For Hegel's objective idealism, the primary category of the Quality of Being, of Reality is identical to Consciousness itself (*Science of Logic*). That is why, as Tallis points out, his colleague, Daniel Dennett sought to totally delegitimize qualia in the interests of a materialistic consistency (103). But the problem for Tallis is how to reconcile physical brain neurons and immaterial qualia. Tallis simply suggests it remains a mystery. It's not a mystery for subjective idealists.

> For humans, perception is not simply a means by which, as organisms, we are wired into the world; it is also the basis of the [mental or physical?] distance that is opened up between ourselves as [self-?]conscious agents and the world we can operate on as if [?] from an outside; a virtual outside that is built up…but a *non*-physical outside that is the human world[?]. Our perception yields objects that transcend our awareness; we are explicitly aware that the object is more than our perceptions[?]—and that it is other than our self [!]. This transcendent object, which is seen [conceived?] as something only partly [perceptually?] revealed, is related to a transcendent self that is other than it. There is no room for this kind [of substance?] in a causally hard-wired universe of material objects. (109)

This sounds like a serious flirtation with metaphysical dualism, while at the same time struggling to stay empirically a virgin. It is a version of having your metaphysical cake and eating it.

In his section, "The unity of consciousness: being one over time," Tallis clearly regards time as an objective, i.e., independently occurring sequence of external empirical *"events"* that are anchored in human memory in the fashion of Locke. At this point, Tallis is seriously flirting with metaphysical dualism and subjective idealism.

> [W]e are also unified *over time*…[L]et us just first think of any everyday activity and see how it is dependent on our being intricately internally connected from one day to the next, or indeed one week, month or year to the next…The fact that this ordinary arrangement comes off at all is a striking manifestation of the inexpressibly complex inner organization of our lives and its extendedness across time.

Yet for Tallis these organizational schedulings and re-schedulings are routinely accomplished by our "localizations in the brain" (121). And he proceeds to highlight the difficulties regarding proposed events with a complex example.

> The troubles that the dinner date presents in the neural [!] theory of consciousness go deeper than this. If you think of all the things that would have to be going on *in my brain* in order to ensure that I turned up at the right place at the right time, you could be forgiven for entertaining the image—based on conventional neuroscience—of a vast number of over-lapping electronic microcircuits supporting a huge ensemble of different functions and it is difficult to see how they could be kept [physically as neurons?] apart so as not to interfere with one another. (italics mine)

In this passage, clearly for Tallis time consists of a realm of independent external events occurring in the world. But his notion of time, with its *source,* reduces to physical collisions among neurons. But again, the simple conscious realization of increasingly complex mnemonic external events is in itself insufficiently self-explanatory to account for *human* time, for the immanence of temporal *self*-consciousness. Tallis systematically debunks current neuroscience, but the presence of sensory qualia, *reflexive* self-consciousness (versus *reflective* perceptions), and transcendent intentionality all remain obscurely hidden and by his own admission "mysterious." What he attempts to do is to appeal to the irreducible complexity of physical neural activity, while rejecting the strict *causal* sequences of determinism, and then inexplicably, unaccountably injecting human freedom into the equation. But he does not mean freedom as a quantum indeterminism (Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty) but as a genuinely *humanistic* freedom. In the 1920s–1930s, the Vienna Circle of philosophers, Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap, speculated that the brain atoms moved in discontinuous motions and therefore they were "free." How one ties moral responsibility to unpredictability is another question.

Tallis' own criterion of selfhood is ambiguous, vague, and ad hoc, i.e., "mysterious," and that is because he is forced to conceive it as a *presupposition* necessary for his insertion of a non-sequitur bodily and social context as primary.

> In invoking the existential intuition [sic], I have not provided a fully worked-out theory of personal identity; *indeed,* you may feel that, had you blinked, you would have missed my positive ideas. (Most notably I have not made enough of, even less attempted to give an account of, the sense of temporal depth that informs the moment-by-moment self, which draws on the past and reaches into a future. What I have tried to do is to show that it is possible to have a robust sense of self rooted in *objective reality* and an account [?] of enduring personal identity. (274; italics mine)

Indeed!

> The aspects of the self I am referring to are: that I have enduring traits; that it is correct to relate my actions and feelings and curriculum vitae to an individual who endures over years and is the source of his actions, so that today in 2011, I am responsible for the actions committed by the person answering to my name in 1973; so that I am bound by promises because the self who made them is the same self as the one who has to deliver on them; and that I am the originator of my actions. (274–275)

Indeed! I promise to be me!

At one point, Tallis criticizes Henri Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1908): "how could anyone ever come to believe that memory could be 'a cerebral deposit?'" (129). Tallis compares this to the "neurophysiologists who think of memory as a material state of a material object—as a 'cerebral deposit'—[who] also believe what physicists have to say about matter" (131). Agreed, Bergson's mistake was in trying to broker a liaison between the qualitative unextended mind and the quantitative material brain in deference to Alexander Bain's empiricist associationist psychology (cf., Husserl's criticism of psychologism). But Bergson's true philosophical legacy is preserved in his early treatise, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data* [i.e., *Qualia*] *of Consciousness* (1889). But isn't this precisely what Tallis himself is trying to accomplish? He establishes the physical reality of the brain but then proceeds to endow it with mysterious qualia and all sorts of "intentionalities," as well as "transcending qualia,"

and then further endows them with an abundance of dualist and idealist advantages and virtues that he naively assumes.

The continuing problem, however, is that the current neuroscientists, apart from Tallis' condescendingly "humanist" approach, have no patience in considering the intimate factors and aspects of immanent time-consciousness and/or the unity of consciousness, as they collectively band together by condemning out of hand Tallis' overly generous attributions as completely alien to and different from brain motions, thereby simply avoiding *acts* that intrinsically involve a priori synthesizing relations (Kant, Husserl, et al.). For Kant, all consciousness is constituted through synthetic a priori judgments; but for Tallis, his "self-consciousness" is essentially empirical. If he wishes to take "intentionality" seriously, he needs to take a better look at Brentano and a far more concentrated look at Husserl, who is not even mentioned in the text.

Tallis accords the same interpretational looseness to Brentano's concept of *intentionality,* formulated in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), as it "distinguishes mental terms from physical terms. "Mental terms had the property of 'aboutness'; they were directed on, or about other things" (Tallis, 104).[16] But, for Brentano, following Aristotle, "the word 'psychology' means *science of the soul.* In fact, he [Brentano] meant by soul…the form, the first activity, the first actuality of a living [human] being" (*PES,* 3–4). Again, "Consciousness is immediate [self-conscious reflexive] knowledge of our mental acts, especially the perception which accompanies present mental acts" (*PES,* 101). The operative word is act, activity. Brains are not active; they are causally re-active, re-sponsive to external stimuli. It is the stimulus that is active, i.e., full of motion, while the brain is re-ceptive, re-active. An electrical synapse in the brain does not equate to Aristotle's concept of active thinking. For Brentano, the soul is an *active* substance. Brentano is an Aristotelian and sympathetic to Medieval scholasticism. His intentionality is teleologically endowed with purposiveness.

> In modern terminology the word "soul" refers to the substantial bearer of presentations (*Vorstellungen*) and other activities which are based upon presentations, and which, like presentations, are only perceivable through finer

[16] Brentano, Franz, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,* translated by Antos Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda McAlister (New York: Routledge, 1973); hereafter cited as *PES.* Husserl is not mentioned.

> [immaterial] perception. Thus we usually call the soul substance which has [judgmental predications of] sensations such as fantasy images, acts of memory, acts of hope or fear, desire or aversion (Aristotle, *De Anima,* III, 10, 433 b 21). We too, use the word "soul" in this sense. In spite of the modification in the concept, then, there seems to be nothing to prevent us from defining psychology in the terms in which Aristotle once defined it, namely as the science of the soul. So it appears that just as the natural sciences study the properties and laws of physical bodies, which are *objects of our external perception,* psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we [self-consciously] discover within our selves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others. (*PES,* 5; italics mine)

By the way, Aristotle is epistemically a conceptualist, the principle that mediates between nominalism and realism, and metaphysically he is a dualist. And further, for Brentano:

> Every mental act is conscious; it includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every mental act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary [sensational] and a secondary [self-conscious] object. The simplest act, the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. (*PES,* 153–154)

Again, Aristotle is a dualist. An empiricist when he defines the soul as a *tabula rasa,* a physical blank tablet upon which sensations and experience write (*De Anima,* 430a); and a dualist when he analogizes the immaterial thought of the Unmoved Mover with man's unification of the subject with its conceptual object (*Metaphysics,* 1075a; cf. 1073a). Brentano was a Catholic priest, and he was vitally involved in the issues concerning the immortality of the soul (*PES,* 14–17, 25–26, 72–73).[17]

In *Aping Mankind,* Tallis also alludes to William James' consciousness of a temporal succession.

> The point was made indirectly by William James when he remarked that "*A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession. And since, to our succession of feelings, a feeling of their own succession is added, that must be*

[17] Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Simplicity Argument versus a Materialist Theory of the Mind," *Philosophy Today,* 20:4 (1976); and "Brentano's Theory of Consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,*" 38:3 (1978).

> *treated as an additional fact requiring its own special elucidation*" (James). [The rest of the James quote is: "which this talk about outer time-relations stamping copies of themselves within, leaves all untouched." (As Tallis continues)]. This remark applies with even greater force to the states of a [neuronal electrical] synapse or a pebble. None of those states carries the sense of succession, or of the one being past and the other present, not unless, of course, *we smuggle in consciousness by thinking of an observer who sees both states of the synapse or the pebble*. Smuggling in [self-]consciousness like this is, of course, inadmissible because synapses are supposed to *supply* the very consciousness that reaches back in time to the causes of their present states. (130; cf. 283; italics mine)

The reference to an *observer* is a standard empirical cop-out. This inadequacy is caused by the fact that neuroscience has no ability to articulate the difference between the immediacy of sensation *vis-à-vis* the mediacy of relations. As Kant argues, temporality is the essence of reflexive self-consciousness and therefore the center of our personal identities (*Critique* (A 97–107), as well as our transcendental unities of apperception (B 131). But for James, it is the *brain* and "introspection" that results in "a stream of consciousness." James' *radical empiricism* is a philosophical anomaly. He posits "a stream of consciousness," but it is not attached to any semblance of a traditional "personal identity," as he argues in his article, "Does Consciousness Exist?" as it unfolds his doctrine of neutral monism, so I'm not even sure why Tallis brings James into the conversation. But let us proceed with James.

> The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is *the co-conscious transition,* so to call it, by which one experience passes to another when both belong to the same self. About the [empirical] facts there is no question. My experiences and yours are 'with' each other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another. Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest and purpose *are continuous or may be continuous.* Personal histories are processes of change in time, and *the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced*. 'Change' in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition. But continuous transition is one sort of a conjunctive relation and to be a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation against all others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole be made, all the corruption of [Hegelian] dialectics and all the [Kantian] metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy. The holding fast to this [immediate] rela-

> tion means taking it at its face value, neither less or more; *and to take it at its face value means first of all to take it just as we* feel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract thought *about* it, involving words that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order to neutralize their suggestions and to make our actual experience again seem rationally possible. What I do *feel* simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an earlier one is that though there are two moments, the transition from the one to the other is *continuous.*[18]

But for Kant, relations are not *felt;* they are thought. The relation between subject and object in the self, as well as between object and object in the external world, becomes highly problematic in James. According to James, philosophy is most successful when it can ground conceptualized relationships in *the immediacy of felt experiences.* His entire philosophic enterprise stands or falls according to whether his doctrine of radical empiricism can demonstrate that "*immediately* experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else. It underscores the difference between the brain's passive reception of stimuli versus a creative response; original chaos versus a structured universe" (Seigfried). According to Norman Kemp Smith, Hume also executes a similar strategy when he essentially reduces conceptual relations to feelings and epistemic "truths" to psychological *beliefs.*[19] But Tallis simply leaves the entire James discussion unexplored and dangling amid the philosophical air.

It is important, however, to place James' discussion of the temporal nature of time in its historical perspective. *The Principles of Psychology* was published in 1890. But both "Does Consciousness Exist?" and "A World of Pure Experience" were published in 1904.

Starting with the first publication, "We now begin our study of the mind from within… Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations; and what we call simple sensations are

[18] *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,* edited by William Barrett and Henry Aiken (New York: Random House, 1962), William James, "A World of Pure Experience," I, 225. Cf. Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, *The Status of Relations in William James,* Loyola University dissertation (1973).

[19] 19. Kemp Smith, Norman, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan & Co. (1964), 41 ff.; cf., R. P. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 105–108. As early as 1874, the British Hegelian, Thomas Hill Green's *Hume and Locke* (Thomas Crowell, 1968), Sections 236, 247, 284, 285, criticizes Hume's reduction of "knowledge" to psychological feelings of belief.

results of discriminative attention pushed to a very high degree… The only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking itself."[20] This is how James commences his description in Chapter Nine, "The Stream of Thought," as it exhibits five characteristics of temporal consciousness:

1. Every thought tends to be part of a personal [identical] consciousness.
2. Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.
3. Within each personal consciousness thought is [temporally and] sensibly continuous.
4. It always appears to deal [dualistically with the conjunctive relations concerned] with objects independent of itself.
5. It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others and welcomes or rejects—*chooses* from among them, in a word—all the while.

In *The Sense of Personal Identity* section, James cites "*bodily* warmth and sensory intimacy, which distinguishes those thoughts, which belong to its own Ego, from those which do not."

> Of course this is the case with the *bodily* part of it; we *feel* the whole cubic mass of our body all the while it gives us an unceasing sense of personal existence (I, 333)…The former have a warmth and intimacy about them of which the latter are completely devoid being merely conceived in a cold and foreign fashion…And by a natural consequence, we shall assimilate them to each other and to the warm and intimate self we now *feel* within us…much as out of a herd of cattle let loose for the winter on some wide western prairie the owner picks out and sorts together when the time for the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which he finds his own particular brand. (I, 333–334; italics mine)

For James, personal identity is actually grounded *in warm bodily feelings.* Now Tallis could have taken up this materialistic principle, after all both he and James are brain advocates, but he does not.

But what of our *temporal* consciousness and its vaunted continuity? It is at this juncture that James takes Kant to task. "The soul of Metaphysics and the 'Transcendental Ego' of the Kantian Philosophy are but attempts

[20] James, William, *The Principles of Psychology* New York: Dover, 1950) I, 224; cf. 330–331. 21.

to satisfy this urgent demand of [empirical] common-sense" (I, 339). But to Kant's suggestion that the 'title' of a "collective self," his vaunted "unity of consciousness" nomenclature be recruited, James is critical. Nevertheless, he offers a rather *reflexive* (possibly phenomenological?) description of human temporality.

> It is a patent fact of consciousness that a transmission like this actually occurs. Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other among other things it [reflexively?] knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it [bodily] 'warm,' in the way we have described, greets it, saying; "Thou art *mine,* and part of the same self with me." Each later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is [i.e., ends within] the final [brain] receptacle—and appropriating them is the final owner—of all that they contain and own. Each thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later proprietor. (I, 339)

The problem with this characterization is that James is exploiting a thoroughly self-conscious, reflexive description but ending it with a *bodily* conclusion of a physical "*warmth.*" And in the very next sentence, he switches gears and inexplicably continues with a reference to Kant's criticism of the sophistic, fallacious, and dogmatic Third Paralogism: of Personality in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 364.

> As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up to *its* consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had held and realized it as its own [how physically, warmly?]. It is this trick [of the single words of a sentence in Kant's example of the verse in the Second Paralogism] which the nascent thought has of *immediately* taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it, which is the foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed. (I, 339–340)

Presumably, for Tallis—since he rejects Kant—each Jamesian neuronal ball is self-contained, separate, distinct from the other balls but consciously carries all that the previous neurons carried, both in terms of "motion" and "cognitions."

James' muddled description occurs because James wishes to defend a bodily, i.e., a materialistic and a radically empirical conception of personal identity, while in the same moment his own description is highlighted and couched in Kantian terms. The Third Paralogism represents Kant's criticism of rational psychology's rejection of a materialistic self.[21] But James' rejection regarding Kant's position is that "Thought is never an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns itself" (I, 340). As I say, all this is left unsaid in Tallis' reference to James' *The Principles of Psychology.*

Further in analogically describing "the stream of thought" in spatial and bodily metaphors, James enlists the flight and perchings of a bird.

> Like a bird's flight, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings. The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time and contemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest. *Let us call the resting-places the 'substantive parts,' and the places of flight the 'transitive parts,' of the stream of thought.* (I, 243)

But this distortion of consciousness fails to recognize that there is a universe of difference between the ideal quality of active relations and the empirical quantities of passive associations of bodily warmths. Trapped in the spatial and transient imagery of sensations, James fails to acknowledge the intrinsic connection between active consciousness and temporal relations. In flight or rest, temporal consciousness is active, and the concentration required for "contemplation" is misleadingly described as periods of rest, unless one wishes to confuse or equate depth of thought with inactivity. This analysis is also James' defense of "introspection" as the primary methodology of pursuing psychology as outlined in his article, "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology," *Mind,* 9:33 (1984). All these matters bear treatment beyond a mere mention of a "succession of feelings and synapses" (Tallis, 130). What is at issue is the establishment of a secure neuroscientific criterion of personal identity beyond one's DNA, fingerprints, and driver's license. That is what Tallis is woefully lacking.

A second neuroscientific explanation is also allegedly conducted under the auspices of "phenomenology." In the following, we will return to the

[21] Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 277–278 and note 1.

Jamesian invocation of the immediacy of "conjunctive relations." First it is important to note that James' perspective, in *The Principles of Psychology,* is empirical, introspective, and brain-oriented and consequently (problematically) "compatible" with the current neurosciences. Accordingly, the ensuing analysis of consciousness concentrates on James' metaphor of time in terms of his description of the temporality of consciousness as consisting of a series of "flights and perchings" (as above) and in accounting for its subjective unity, as it "moves from an object in flight to a perched rest," thus forming a continual "flux," a flow of intermittent flights. "James insists that although consciousness is a flux, it is also *discreetly,* i.e., temporally differentiated: 'the bird's life is a seamless unity; but it also contains two different kinds of activity, flying and perchings.'" What is at issue is "the transitive parts" of the stream of consciousness," the "fringes" as opposed to a concentration on the objects perceived. The "transitive parts" correspond to the mediacy of relations in idealism.

> The *contents* of the flow of consciousness are discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before us in a train or a chain…But their comings and goings and contrasts no more break the flow of thought that thinks them than they break the time and space in which they lie…. The transition between the thought of an object and the thought of another is no more of a break in the *thought* than a joint in the bamboo is a break in the wood (quoted by Bailey from James, 142; cf. James, *The Principles of Psychology.* (I, 240 ff.)[22]

But Bailey thinks James is wrong in describing the flux or flow as "a stream of consciousness" because

> the contents of thought—the substantive transitive parts—are not in fact a stream in James' sense at all; they were correctly described by James' psychological [associationist] predecessors as a [causal] 'chain,' a differentiated 'sequence of differents.' What makes consciousness akin to a stream is the embedding of these thoughts into *transitional parts*—conscious activity that intervenes without break between one thought and the next. Conscious awareness, then, is more accurately described as a bird's life or a bamboo pole than a flowing river. (Bailey, 142–143)

[22] Bailey, Andrew, "Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitional Parts of the Stream of Consciousness," in Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear, editors, *The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness,* 141–153.

But that is the difference between a neuroscientific reconstruction of temporal consciousness and James' account. Bailey cannot proceed without conceiving of mediate, discursive relations as "substantive transitional perceptual *parts,*" precisely because brain neurons *are separate parts* and very different from the spark, from the immediacy of electrical synapses. The neurons are the matter and the electricity presumably is the "activity," but relations are nowhere to be found. Thus, *if* James' "conjunctive relations," his "co-conscious transitions," are completely reduced, eliminated, or substituted by the immediacy of electrical synapses, *then* any intimation of temporal transition completely disappears. Spontaneity for the idealists, both subjective and objective, summons the act of spontaneity precisely in order to synthesize, bind, connect, unify temporal immediacy and mediacy; self and object; cause and effect; and Kantian Axioms and Anticipations; etc.

In his essay, "Does Consciousness Exist?" James denies that consciousness is an "entity" or an "aboriginal stuff," but rather that it is a "function" in the sense that it serves as the center for two crisscrossing empirical paths, one historical and the other autobiographical, between the history of a room and its intersection with the autobiography of an observing occupant. These "partial transitions" in consciousness are described by Bailey in supposedly phenomenological terms as replacing James' metaphors of aviary flights and perchings. And importantly, they are also intended to replace the synthetic a priori activity innate to self-consciousness found and attested in both Kant and Husserl. Accordingly, Bailey's analysis is designed to shift the "phenomenological" descriptions toward external observations—to the focused externality of human perceptions—away from the active immanency of subjective time-consciousness and toward the objective perception of flights and perchings. But Bailey avoids mentioning that in the essay, "A World of Pure Experience," James believes—in a manner identical to Hume—that discursive relations can be reduced to the immediacy of feelings and psychological beliefs. For James, the "flights and perchings" are continuous—not partially separated—in consciousness. James wants to claim that (a) *the immediate flying activities* are to be contrasted with (b) *the restful contemplative observational perchings.* But these metaphors only emphasize and *discontinue* consciousness; they are counter-productive.

In short, James said different things at different times. In his theory of neutral monism, a view he shares with Russell, he also denies any *substantial* status to human consciousness. But Bailey's problem is that Husserlian

phenomenological meanings and the neuroscientific readings of the brain are not only strange bedfellows but irreconcilably divorced couples. James, like Hume before him, and all the neuroscientists after both of them, simply reduce *mediate relations* to *immediate feelings.* The prefix "con-" in conjunctive means, intends a *dual* relation but fails. Neuroscience essentially eliminates "transitive conjunctions" by reducing them to the *immediacy* of electrical synapses, just as a light bulb can be activated and deactivated at once, in the blink of an eye. Neuroscience eclipses the dualist and idealist distinctions between Cartesian sensations and inferential judgments (Meditation Two), the difference between Kant's immediate sensations and relational categories, and the Hegelian quantitative features of science from the qualitative aspects of consciousness.

Summary

I have sought to present five different principles regarding human time-consciousness. First an objective and scientific time predicated on the shared empirical experience of the motion of physical objects travelling through space; second an active immaterialist paradigm of self-consciousness and intentionality, in which both dualism and idealism emphasize the *acts of spontaneity* originally constituted by Leibniz's Monads, and Kant's reflexive self-consciousness, and Husserl's transcendent intentionality; third, Tallis' mysterious "intentional" transformation of qualia into a "knitting together of eventful moments" (121); fourth, James' "stream of thought" independently of an ego; and fifth, Bailey's effort to re-establish an associative causal principle and paradigm into a "phenomenological chain of events."

But in terms of human "freedom," Tallis asserts it relies on the basis that "our actions are so irreducibly complex, the simple notion of a "cause"—cerebral or otherwise—loses its application" (250, 261; cf. 51–52). But that is hardly a sufficient ground in which to meaningfully *prove* the existence of freedom as an element in human self-consciousness. Dr. Tallis also promotes a "humanistic" version of the brain that presumably endows all sorts of powers and virtues, but I fail to learn how these enrichments are enabled to surface beyond their homogeneous bed of neurons in which these excellences presumably lie slumbering (16–17). My thesis is that the issue of personal identity requires a necessary and universal activity of immanent time-consciousness. Instead, Tallis defends a social, a "communal" paradigm of the "self," "a community of minds,"

and a cognitive community" evolving through thousands of years (11). By contrast, I promote the singularity of an active, intimate principle within the mind. Beyond that, I concur with all of Tallis' criticism of the current neurosciences and especially with his criticism of the neuroscientific analogizing of the brain to a computer (6). Loneliness, in order to be meaningful, must derive from both a metaphysical dualism and an epistemic subjective idealism, from which its personal identity must emanate from the immanency of an internal time-consciousness.

Today, there is an increasing pandemic of global loneliness, which only promises to exponentially overwhelm us. Politically, many countries, large and small, like the US and Hungary, are xenophobically trying to close their borders in order to promote ethnic and nationalistic intimacy. The efforts will simply fail because of the insatiable appetite for narcissism now developing in the atomistic transiency of the world's population.

In the end, I leave it to the judicious reader to choose which principle and model of personal identity best addresses my universal theme of existential loneliness.

Bibliography

Alexander, H. G. (ed.). *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* (Manchester University Press, 1965).

Alexander, Ian W. *Bergson* (Bowes and Bowes, 1957).

Bailey, Andrew. "Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitional Parts of the Stream of Consciousness," Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6 (2–3) 141–153.

Barrett, William and Henry Aiken, eds. *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1962).

Berger, Gaston. *The* Cogito *in Husserl's Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972).

Bergson, Henri, *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* translated by T. E. Hulme (Bobbs-Merrill, 1955).

Bergson, Henri. *Creative Evolution,* translated by Arthur Michell, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928).

Bergson, Henri. *Time and Free Will,* translated by F. L. Pogson (Harper & Row, on Leibniz 213, 226; f.

Brentano, Franz, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,* translated by Antos Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda McAlister (New York: Routledge, 1973).

Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Faulkner, William. *As I Lay Dying* (Modern Library, 1946).
Fehr, B. "James Joyce's *Ulysses," Englische Studien,* LX (1925), 193.
Fichte, J. G. *Science of Knowledge,* translated by Peter Heath (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970.
Green, Thomas Hill. *Hume and Locke* (Thomas Crowell, 1968).
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
Husserl, Edmond. *Cartesian Meditations,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
Husserl, Edmond. *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 318 ff.).
Husserl, Edmund, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* translated by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962).
Husserl, Edmund, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,* translated by James Churchill (London: Indiana University Press).
James, William, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950).
Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Humanities, 1962).
Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).
Kemp Smith, Norman, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan & Co. (1964), 41 ff.
Kockelmans, Joseph. *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology* (Duquesne University Press, 1967).
Leibniz, G. W., *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings,* edited by Robert Latta (Oxford University Press, 1968), 220–224.
Lewis, Wyndham, *Time and Western Man* (Beacon 1957).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: The History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Brentano's Theory of Consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 38:3 (1978).
Mijuskovic, Ben. *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
Mijuskovic, Ben. "Descartes Bridge to the External World: The Piece of Wax," *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia,* 3:3 (1971); reprinted in Moyal, Georges (ed.), *Rene* Descartes*: Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge, 1996).
Mijuskovic, Ben. *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA., 2015).

Mijuskovic, Ben, "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 15:4 (1977); reprinted in *David Hume: Critical Assessments,* edited by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994), II, 167–175.

Mijuskovic, Ben. "Loneliness and Time-Consciousness, *Philosophy Today,* 22:4 (1978).

Mijuskovic, Ben. "The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious: Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant," *Philosophy and Theology* (2008–2009).

Mijuskovic, Ben. "The Simplicity Argument and Time in Schopenhauer and Bergson," *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch,* 58 (1977), 43–58.

Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Simplicity Argument versus a Materialist Theory of the Mind," *Philosophy Today,* 20:4 (1976); and "Brentano's Theory of Consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,"* 38:3 (1978).

Mijuskovic, Ben. "The Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious in Kant," *Kritike,* 2:4 (2010).

Paton, H. J. *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* (Allen & Unwin, 1965).

Peirce, Charles Sanders, *Essays in the Philosophy of Science,* "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957).

Poulet, Georges, *Studies in Human Time,* translated by Elliott Coleman (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956).

Ricoeur, Paul. *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

Russell, Bertrand. *The Analysis of Mind* (1921).

Russell, Bertrand, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958, first published in 1900).

Russell, Bertrand, *Logic and Knowledge; Essays, 1901–1951,* edited by R. C. Marsh (Allen and Unwin, 1966).

Russell, Bertrand. *Mysticism and Logic.*

Russell, Bertrand, *Our Knowledge of the External World.*

Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1963).

Savile, Anthony. *Leibniz and the Monadology* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation,* translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958), Volumes I and II.

Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, *The Status of Relations in William James,* Loyola University dissertation (1973).

Spiegelberg, Herbert. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

Sherover, Charles. *The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

Sokolowski, Robert. *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

Sokolowski, Robert. *Husserlian Meditations*: How Words Present Things (Evanston I: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

Tallis, Raymond, *Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis, and the Misrepresentation of Humanity* (New York: Routledge, 2012).
Varela, Francisco and Jonathan Shear, eds. *The View from Within: First-Person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness,* (Bowling Green, OH: Imprint Academic, 2002).
Weldon, T.D. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
Wolff, R. P. *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
Wolfe, Thomas, *The Hills Beyond* (New York: Signet, 1958).

CHAPTER 2

Consciousness Versus Language: Wittgenstein and Russell

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies how we know things. It analyzes the elements of consciousness, sensations, feelings, concepts, meanings, judgments, inferences, systems, and its acts, both in relation to the self and/or the external world.

In previous publications, I have sought to historically trace the ubiquitous prevalence of a premise, which Kant christens as the *Achilles,* the most powerful of all rationalist demonstrations in the history of ideas (*Critique of Pure Reason,* A 351–352), from Plato to Kant and beyond. The proof, which originally derives from Plato's argument demonstrating the immortality of the soul (*Phaedo,* 78B), has been continuously recruited, with the consequence that it has both proliferated and strongly influenced the shaping of certain readily recognizable philosophical discussions since the Hellenic Age. The premise is twofold. First that thought or consciousness is immaterial and second that it is self-generatively active, that the essential nature of the soul consists in its power, its *activity* of thinking, whereas sensations are given *passively* to consciousness. Based on these two premises, several inferential arguments follow. First, since the soul is simple, i.e., without parts, it is indestructible, immortal; second, it is a unity of self-consciousness; third, it preserves its personal identity over time; fourth, immanent time-consciousness is different from scientific time, which is measured by the movement of objects in space; and fifth, the preceding four acts result in establishing the principle of subjective idealism. Everything the soul senses and knows is transformed into the ideal thoughts of self-consciousness. I have mapped the incidence and the force

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_2

of these demonstrations into the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, most notably from Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists, Leibniz, and then on to Kant and even later into Fichte, Hegel, Bergson, Husserl, and Sartre, as well as others.[1]

It is natural when someone addresses a complex problem to begin by breaking it down to its simplest "parts." The five simples enumerated in the previous paragraph are the "simple parts" constituting the conception of subjective idealism and its resolution of personal identity. In the following discussion I criticize Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis of language as he reduces it to its simplest common terms: simples; words; and objects. Since this serves as his base, I find that it is conceptually, and philosophically incapable of accounting for the concept of "personal identity," and without a substantial self-consciousness, loneliness is inconceivable.

In Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist,* he presciently foretells the entire future history of Western philosophy, which he defines as a Battle between the Gods and the Giants, between the Idealists and the Materialists (*Sophist,* 245e–246e). And this is also where I wish to begin.

In the wider context of the history of ideas discipline, the philosophical tradition I am concerned to trace and support involves defending the interrelated themes of metaphysical dualism, subjective idealism, and existential loneliness. But by the early period of the twentieth century, my themes were already rapidly coming under increasingly heavy criticism, most notably from sources championing scientific positivism, analytic philosophy, and language theorists. In Chapter I, I criticized both the neuroscientific and the Jamesian theories of consciousness. Within this critical context, I now need to address the epistemic inadequacies of logical atomism and ordinary language theory. More broadly, I wish to challenge the generally materialist, empiricist, and behavioral interpretations of human

[1] Mijuskovic, Ben, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: The History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). In the *Phaedo,* Plato sets the historical and philosophical stage for the principle of human consciousness as both immaterial and active, which evolves into both subjective and objective idealism. In his dialogue, the *Meno,* he also establishes the Kantian distinction of a priori synthetic judgments: "Socrates: Well, now, let's us try to tell you what shape is. See if you accept this definition? Let us define it as the only thing which always [universally and necessarily] accompanies color…I should be content if your definition of virtue were on similar lines" (*Phaedo,* 75b). This is precisely the cognitive *relational* principle that both Wittgenstein and Russell epistemically violate. And although Kant would disapprove of this instantiation as an example, both Husserl and Sartre appeal to it.

consciousness by offering my reservations regarding the twin contexts of predominantly analytic and language-oriented philosophies and continue contending that in epistemological terms, a Kantian and Husserlian version of subjective idealism is primary and original over the secondary and derivative assertions propounded by analytic and linguistic thinkers.

In pursuing this goal, I have elected to begin with the simpler "analytic" and "atomistic" empirical *reflections,* i.e., *perceptions*—as opposed to *self-conscious reflexions*—of Wittgenstein, since his thoughts are simpler and more straightforward in comparison with Russell's often inconsistent theoretical developments. The subject matter of this chapter, then, is twofold, to ascertain (a) the possible role the immaterialist principle may have played in the early and middle periods, respectively, of Wittgenstein and Russell; and (b) more generally, whether language can replace self-conscious thought, if words, as symbols, are merely representations but not the thoughts themselves. More specifically, I wish to contend that there is a definite employment and dependence by Wittgenstein and Russell on the immateriality argument and that it serves them in accounting for both (a) Wittgenstein's unity and identity of *meaning* in consciousness through the *use of words* (or more properly language); and also (b) the unity and identity of the elementary constituents, elements of awareness, i.e., Russell's "sense data" commitments.

I shall begin with the more difficult interpretational case concerning Wittgenstein. In regard to the *Tractatus,* George Pitcher offers the following comment.

> One has the strong impression that each proposition has been carefully thought out and painstakingly worded, and that behind each lies a host of subtle, but mostly unexpressed considerations. Hence the passages of the *Tractatu*s need to be interpreted—somewhat like those in a sacred text.[2]

My primary task is to ferret out certain of those concealed "considerations" to see how they play out. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

[2] *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,* edited by George Pitcher (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 17. As many commentators have pointed out, Wittgenstein shares the "analytic" model of knowledge with most of the notable epistemological figures of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume; cf. John Gibson, John Locke's *Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 47 ff. Basically this principle was critically resumed as the pivotal rejoinder directed against the British Hegelians.

(Kegan Paul, 1933), Wittgenstein rather strikingly announces that "The object is simple" (2.2).

What he means is that the ultimate and most basic constituents or elements of reality are simple objects, which, as it turns out, can be referred to by simple names. As such, simples, objects are indivisible and not further analyzable; it means that a simple object is without parts or components of any kind.

(Question: Simple as an object or a word or both? A meaning is "simple," as an immaterial conception, but it is incredibly complex in terms of its nuances, halos, horizons, subtleties, impressions, multiple usages, etc. And material objects are composed of physical parts. Presumably, then, "objects" are words.) Moreover, "The name means an object. The object is its meaning" (3.203).

(Question: Is the meaning simple or complex"? It follows that the meaning is "representational" and not the object "itself.")

The ultimate elements of a language are the most elementary words or simple names. These names in turn directly denote, intend, mean, or signify simple things, i.e., objects in the world and, in turn, combine into elementary propositions depicting "atomic situations."

(Question: As "existents," are words and objects in different worlds or in the same world, presumably the language world?)

Accordingly, if the latter, any meaningful language in the last analysis must be founded on names, on irreducible, indefinable terms, the smallest units of language, which in turn directly, i.e., immediately denote objects, i.e., simples (*Tractatus,* 3.26, 4.221). And as they serve to form the elementary propositions of meaningful discourse, then it follows that the building blocks of our world and our language are the "same," in a significant but unspecified sense. Objects that are simple and names that are likewise simple then *mean* (phenomenologically *intend?*) and refer to the former pertinent objects. And Wittgenstein, like Russell before him, in his analysis of the theory of descriptions, *assumes* some degree of structural identity between language and existent objects and events (a physical or conscious or "logical" structure?); some [dualistic] correspondence between discourse and reality. The critical assumption here is the principle that the (correct) logical form is *also* the structure of reality (Aristotle?). The concept of logical form is thus taken to belong to ontology as well as to logic and the logical pattern of the proposition, reducible to compositional atomic unities, is held to be the "same" as the inner structure of reality. Consequently, Wittgenstein's ontology is a theory of the ultimate

contents of the world, a world composed not simply of objects but of objects arranged or configured in facts, which "picture" them; although to be sure, Wittgenstein's "pictures" are not (or not just) spatial pictures, like maps or photographs but rather "logical" pictures. For philosophers, who are impressed by logic and mathematics, as Wittgenstein is, the conception that all simples/words are modeled on the principle of simplicity and unity would naturally be led to think of objects as such "existents."

Now if Wittgenstein is proposing, like Aristotle, that language reflects external reality, then he buys into a correspondence theory of truth. If so, then he runs into the problem of dualism, just as Aristotle did. In *De Anima,* Aristotle describes, defines the mind as a blank tablet, a tabula rasa, upon which experience writes (410b, 430a). But in the *Metaphysics,* he characterizes the *human* mind as actively immaterial, comparable to the divine Unmoved Mover's thought, "his" consciousness; and it is also reflexive, circular; God only thinks of God. He is not concerned with human affairs or destinies (*Metaphysics,* 1275a).

But exactly *what* is such a simple object? What is an example of a simple object? This is a difficult problem. Wittgenstein rejects proper names, since they are in fact analyzable into further components, i.e., they are not truly indefinable. They are, bluntly put, not "rock-bottom" descriptions but instead abbreviations for a *complex* of descriptions. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, again, "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition" (3.26).

But once more, just what would serve as an example of a simple? Now although he is certain, during the *Tractatus* period, that there must be such simple objects and hence names—otherwise all language would be devoid of meanings—these simples being the ultimate bearers of meaning—and yet he confesses that he cannot think of a single concrete example of one (cf., *Notebooks, 1914–1916,* 14.6.15, 21.6.15). But that issue he regards as an empirical problem, not a "logical" one. One possibility is the familiar one offered by Hume, "the missing shade of blue." By "simple," of course is meant "without parts," something further indefinable or unanalyzable in terms of *quality,* although to be sure not in terms of quantity (cf., Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* 6); and Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* II, 2, 1). The problem here is that Wittgenstein realized, as Hume earlier did, that a color patch in our visual field necessarily involves divisible extensions. In other words, a blue [physical] *object*—consisting of a single qualitatively uniform shade of blue—nevertheless is composed of *particular* blue points or patches of blueness.

But the real problem is that "blueness," as a color, *means* not red or yellow. Qualities are unextended, but spatial quantities are not (cf., *Notebooks,* 17.6.15). The question then becomes are the single points and patches extended or not? If unextended, how can they be seen; and if extended, then they can no longer be simple. Further, if unextended, how can they be colored (cf., *Tractatus,* 2.0131)? Hume's doctrine of the minima *sensibilia,* consisting of *minima visibilia* and *tangibilia,* which he shares with Leibniz, is just such an attempt to use the points as forming spatial relational locations thus "giving," presenting the *appearance*—but not the reality—of spatial magnitudes or measurements.[3] But to suggest, as Wittgenstein does, that "every tone must have a pitch" and that a "speck must have color" (or a color must have extension) comes dangerously close to opting for the existence of genuine a priori synthetic relations as universal and necessary "ingredients" obtaining within the context of an allegedly "simple" object or name. But, as he states," "There is no picture which is *a priori* true" (*Tractatus,* 2.225). Obviously, however, such a connection, even if it did empirically exist, could hardly be described as "simple" in any usual sense of the term or in the sense apparently intended by Wittgenstein. Subjective idealists, for example, Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte, can invoke simple *conceptions* but to refer to simple sensations, e. g., Hume's simple impressions is highly problematic. Is the missing shade of blue even a conceivable experience?

However, if the disadvantages of finding a clear example of a simple object are considerable, the benefits of stressing the epistemic principle of ultimate simplicity far outweigh the difficulties involved. Apart from it being a dubitable assumption, a presupposed "first principle," that objects and names possess—or are—intrinsic meanings, true simples are entities, which by their very nature, are unities and identities. What is simple, having no parts, must be essentially a unity, although obviously not everything that is a complex unity must thereby by itself be a simple. Similarly, if some thing, an object, actually is simple, it must remain an identity so long as it exists—although then it is puzzling how it could disappear. Needless to point out, anyone who is interested in a theory of meaning would be greatly encouraged if they could establish the real existence of true simples, for then they would have succeeded by a single stroke of

[3] Mijuskovic, Ben, "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 15:4 (1977); reprinted in *David Hume: Critical Assessments,* edited by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994), II, 167–175.

having solved the problem of the unity of meanings (or consciousness). But if this were the case, then the consequence would lead to the doctrine of solipsism and then therefore to the problem of the possibility of intersubjective communication. If one closes the mind within its "self," with *simple* "names," "words," "objects," "meanings," then inevitably at a certain theoretical juncture one would need to induct an "ordinary language" bridge to circumvent the collapse of the "self" into solipsism.

According to Wittgenstein, if we are to know the world, then our signs, symbols, or names (*Tractatus,* 4.24) must remain simple, unique, and determinate. Now change is defined as the redistribution of parts within a complex. But what is simple cannot, in principle, undergo change or transformation. Therefore, Wittgenstein seems to have speculated that the possibility of unified and identical meanings in the final analysis must rest on the identity of simple names, which in turn *mean* or *intend* simple existences. In other words, Wittgenstein substituted a unity and an identity of meaning for the traditional *idealist* concepts of the unity and identity of self-consciousness—*but without a self.*

Wittgenstein's requirement that simple signs must be possible is the same requirement that sense or meaning must be determinate (3.23). Differently put, for Wittgenstein, identity and determinacy of meaning rests on some thing (metaphysically, i.e., ontologically or logically?) being intrinsically simple. Ideally, the names should (and ultimately must) mean, intend, picture, or refer to determinate particular individuals or objects, and not just *some indefinite,* e. g., *universal* watch or table (*Notebooks,* 20.6–22.6.15). But this alternative account would lead to the condemnation of our language as hopelessly flawed, as indeterminate, non-specific, meaningless, in which case we could never mean what we say.

At times, Wittgenstein seems to confess that the metaphysical principle, "There are simples," is an a priori assumption. But in any case, he is convinced that we must "posit" that both simple names, and their indefinable but meaningful signs (?), must exist in order so that we are not trapped into an engendered skeptical crisis, which would lead either: (a) to an infinite regress of reducing complex names and objects to lesser ones but nevertheless compound ones ad infinitum*;* or (b) in regarding all names as circularly interdependent, in which case we would be trapped within an endless Lockean "way of ideas," a "way of words" impasse, forever doomed to the impossibility of having any possible linguistic intercourse with an external social and public world.

But granting—at least in the context of the arguments presented in the *Tractatus* period—that there are true simples, a further question seems important and pertinent, namely what is the ultimate principle of unity underlying not simples but admittedly complex names and objects, whose existence we all wish to admit and maintain; what is their "principle of connection," synthesis, or composition; why do they not fall apart or disintegrate at the breath of a word; and why do we regard them as composing one complex rather than another? Of course, one possible answer is that our forms of language, our linguistic structures function as "connectives" to unify them. But the ensuing problem goes much deeper. I am suggesting that during the *Tractatus period,* Wittgenstein believed that just as there are absolute simples, so likewise he must have been convinced that there is a corresponding final source of unity in the mind, which parallels the simplicity of objects and names. A unity not unlike Schopenhauer's metaphysical will (*Tractatus,* 5.62–5.641, *Notebooks,* 2.8.16–12.8.16); "the willing subject exists. If the will did not exist, neither would there be that [indivisible] centre of the world which I call I" (5.8.16). In this sense, the mind, through the will, could be correctly characterized as a simple, essentially unified existent, whose corresponding reality is the simple object. And the "intercourse" between the object and the mind would be facilitated by simple, unified, identical names. Accordingly, the mind would have the power of unifying diverse simples into stable unities, which we would then call complex objects. Why else would Wittgenstein declare the following?

> This shows that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in superficial psychology. A composite soul would not be a soul any longer. (5.5421)

Is Wittgenstein perhaps suggesting here that all unities of linguistic propositions—simple as well as complex—are, in the last analysis, recognized as such because the mind itself consists in an active indivisible unity? Indeed, I think he is. And it is not an unusual conclusion for a thinker impressed by the speculative thought of Schopenhauer; see again, especially *Tractatus,* 5.62–5.641.

In defense of this rather unorthodox interpretation, I should summon G. E. M. Anscombe's perspicacious remarks.

> If we look for Wittgenstein's philosophical ancestry, we should rather look to Schopenhauer; specifically, his 'solipsism,' his conception of the 'limit,' and his ideas on value will be better understood in the light of Schopenhauer than of any other philosopher…It is not the mythical Schopenhauer of popular repute, but the actual Schopenhauer that we should remember in connection with Wittgenstein…Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and had been greatly impressed by Schopenhauer's theory of the 'world' as idea.[4]

Indeed, Schopenhauer's opening salvo in his magnum opus, *The World as Will and Representation*, is: "The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being."

Further:

> Miss Anscombe also explicitly informs us that it was 'as a boy of sixteen' that Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and had been greatly impressed by Schopenhauer's theory of the "world as idea" (though not of "the world as will"), Schopenhauer then struck him,' she says, as fundamentally right, if only a few adjustments and clarifications were made…the impact of that first and last reading indeed must have been considerable, for not only Miss Anscombe but other Wittgenstein scholars as well have been struck by the Schopenhauerian tone of many of the passages of the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus*…many traces of this sympathy are to be found in the *Tractatus*. The passages on solipsism in the Tractatus…are conceived by Wittgenstein with Schopenhauer in mind. (236–237)

And lastly,

> We have observed how according to both philosophers [Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein], conceptual confusion is something we are almost unavoidably led into; that is so because of something either in our own nature or because our concepts, being ambiguous and lacking clear boundaries, give rise to superficial resemblances; that these resemblances have far-reaching consequences not only for ordinary discourse but also for both science and philosophy, etc. But although this account of the way our language plays havoc with our thoughts is certainly strikingly similar to what can be found

[4] Engel, Morris, S., "Schopenhauer's Impact on Wittgenstein," in *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 236. Schopenhauer's philosophy was very much in vogue during Wittgenstein's Vienna years and served as a constant theme of discussion among the Vienna Circle of philosophers. Cf. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), *passim*.

> on this subject in Wittgenstein, it still leaves a number of rather important questions unanswered. What more precisely, for example, is it either about ourselves or language that makes us so prone to be thus deceived? And what if anything can we do to guard ourselves against these dangers and deceptions. (ibid., 244; cf. also, "thought and language--should not be confused, for they are not identical," 255)

The problem with Wittgenstein is that he wishes to build a language out of single bricks but lacks the connective mortar, the relations, to complete the job. Empiricism in general consistently desires to begin with the utterly simple and then is left with Hume's "bundle of impression" and Wittgenstein's "pile of unassorted bricks, names, and words."

There is that *but,* as we have seen, there is also this as well. In the *Tractatus,* the supreme problem is the relation of language to reality. There it is asserted that "If objects are given, then at the same time, we are given *all* objects [in the world]. If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time, *all* elementary propositions are given (5.524). And "If all other objects are given, then at the same time all *possible* states are also given" (2.0124). In addition, in the *Tractatus, words and sentences are literally pictures.* But pictures, like sensations, are *immediate.* This definition completely eliminates the sense of *inwardness* intrinsic to loneliness. Is my thinking self and a photograph *of* my "self" the same meaning? When I reflect, *observe* my portrait on a wall, and I reflexively think of who I am, these are radically different behaviors; indeed the second one is not a *behavior* at all. Seen in this framework, we are reminded once again that we are revisiting our Battle between the Gods and the Giants.

For the earlier Wittgenstein, the world is an assemblage of atomic facts. These facts are *mirrored* in language. Between facts and sentences, there is a similarity in structure, which, in turn, can be reported in elementary sentences. But all this is now put aside, and we must begin anew. In Section 47 of the *Philosophical Investigations,* there is a long—and rather polemical—criticism concerning the conception of any proposed unity that pretends to and endorses the absolute simplicity of objects and names, as Wittgenstein sought to frame them in the *Tractatus* (cf., also Sections 91, 178). Similarly, any suggestion concerning a parallel metaphysical "unity of consciousness," based on a reflexive paradigm of an *assumed* "simplicity," between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, is likewise completely rejected by him (*PI,* 116, 398, 417). But all this is a rather self-defeating way to let the fly out of the fly-bottle by breaking the

glass. If, however, our original purpose was to make the receptacle useful, then smashing it in order to rid oneself of a nuisance may be going too far. For we may be doing without thinking. But in any case, we must begin anew and take for granted the veridical simplicity of our ordinary language's structural attunement with the complexities of the world.

But let us simplify the matter. *Behaviorally,* how do we learn to *use*, to *apply* our words and language? Let us emulate Augustine's *Confessions* (I, 8).

> His words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence (sic) of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.--In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea. Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with a word. It is the object for which the word stands. (*Philosophical Investigations,* Paragraph 1)

To quote Augustine.

> When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this, and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind (sic) in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified [i.e., meant]; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs [i.e., abstract symbols], I used them to express my own desires. (ibid.)

One is tempted to ask what corresponding bodily behaviors accompanied the monks when the frequent use of the word, the object word God, was used throughout the *Confessions.* Or when religiosity turned to value laden "object" terms, words, like faith, soul, eternity, goodness, sin, free will, etc.

In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," Russell contends that originally, he sought to describe his doctrine as a logical rather than a physical atomism because the ultimate indivisible units for which he was seeking, as the last residue of his analysis, were logical in character as opposed to material. Among these logical atoms was an important group, which he characterized as "such things as little patches of color or sounds," i.e., sense data or qualia. Russell, of course, wishes to place himself in direct

opposition to the monadically-oriented philosophies of the British Hegelians and the rampant absolute idealism current in his day, which stressed that reality consisted "of a single indivisible Reality" (178). In response, he sought to formulate a theory which adopted a plurality of atoms, each indivisible, self-sufficient, and ontologically subsisting apart from both the existence, as well as the non-existence, of any other atom. Each of these single, particular atoms, however, functioned exactly like the ultimate bearers of a "single indivisible reality," a monistic idealist system. It should be noted that early on Russell authored a fine commentary on Leibniz, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, published as early as 1900, and consequently he had ample talent in clothing his logical atoms in Leibnizian garb. Only instead of a single Hegelian reality, the universe was infested with an infinite multiplicity of singular realities. In this respect, Russell did not so much reject the idealist paradigm of singularity, he rather managed to replenish the entire universe with it. Russell's logical atoms, of course, are *qualitatively* simple and not quantitively physical. He also conveniently chose to avoid, for instance, at least the issue of the obvious two-dimensional extended features of our visual patches and the associated difficulty concerning their possible reduction in the direction of a posited "simplicity." In this context, the reader is encouraged to consult Russell's discussion of the Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence, with Samuel Clarke, defending Newton's absolutist theory over the metaphysical status of space and time, the Leibnizian monadic theory, and Leibniz's invocation of the concept of spontaneity in his commentary on Leibniz.[5] Basically, Russell is attracted to the empirical, to the indubitable reality of our sensations. This, as we pointed out previously, is a problem which commands both the attention of Hume and Wittgenstein. Thus, in asserting that the emotions of good and evil are qualitatively simple,

[5] Russell, Bertrand, *Logic and Knowledge; Essays, 1901–1951,* edited by R. C. Marsh (Allen and Unwin, 1966), 179, 203. For the purposes of this discussion, I have elected to avoid the difficult interpretational problems Russell introduces concerning the distinction between sense data, as immediate mental contents, elements of consciousness, and "qualitative" sensibilia, as independent possibilities of unsensed sensa, if one were to compare passages in *Mysticism and Logic* with *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Later, in *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), Russell insists even more clearly that William James' theory of "neutral monism" implies a distinction between phenomenal sense data and physical sensations but that the difference depends on whether we are concerned with a mental, psychological context or with a material physical one. But these distinctions, as critics have pointed, hardly enable Russell any more than they did Hume to escape the confines of phenomenalism; cf., Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), I, 306.

indefinable, unanalyzable, irreducible, etc. (G. E. Moore) may seem plausible enough; but then to claim that a two-dimensional colored sense patch is similarly simple, non-complex seems like a highly equivocal use of the word simple.

In any case, in the essay under discussion, Russell vows that his interest in the "kinds of atoms out of which logical structures are [ultimately] composed" is philosophically justified (189). In pursuing his thesis in regard to his logical atomism, Russell paradoxically offers a view which he wants to reject, but in doing so, he violates his own conclusion.

> Of course, all ordinary objects of daily life are apparently [sensory] complex entities: such things as tables and chairs, loaves and fishes, persons and principalities and powers--they are all on the face of it complex entities. All the kinds of things to which we habitually give proper names are on the face of them complex entities. Socrates, Picadilly, Rumania, Twelfth Night or anything you like to think of, to which you give a proper name, they are all apparently complex entities. They seem to be complex systems bound together into some kind of unity, that sort of a unity that leads to the bestowal of a single appellation. I think it is the contemplation of this sort of apparent unity that has led to the philosophy of [Hegelian] monism, and to the suggestion that the universe as a whole is a single complex more or less in the sense in which these things are that I have been talking about. (190)

Two responses are in order. First, as Russell emphasizes, in the very next sentence, he himself denies that there actually *are* basic complexes of the kind that he has just enumerated. But what strikes me as important in the passage is its concern with the concept of unity. The ultimate unity of the Hegelian absolute rests, on an organic, comprehensive, and coherent paradigm of reality that unifies Being and Consciousness. "Parts" are rather more like living members, which are completely meaningful only in the last analysis, only in so far as they can be comprehended, enjoined as related to the "wholeness of Being and Consciousness." And you cannot remove a member without changing the entire nature or meaning of the "whole of reality." Hegel is an advocate of the coherence theory of truth. He asserts the doctrine of internal relations. A face without a nose is not really a face. Ultimately, of course, with the realization that every "single" object or event depends on every other and is related to everything else, the absolute idealists concludes that only the whole—up to that particular historical point in time—is truly real in the sense that *all* the elements together constitutively and coherently compose a single, indivisible,

unified reality. By contrast, Russell is an empiricist; only particulars exist, and I would add that therefore he is a nominalist.

By contrast, in the atomistic model of reality, as represented in the *Tractatus* period of Wittgenstein, and the middle period of Russell, the collection of separate, of discrete, of particular atomic units is more in the nature of a mass, an aggregation; and the component parts can be quantitively manipulated without any perceptible change to the qualitative "essence" or the aspect of the whole. A piece of gold can be removed from a mass of the same substance without thereby changing in any respect the nature of the remaining composition. Obviously, it follows, on the atomic model, that the units are completely independent from each other.

In short, Hegel is a proponent of the coherence theory of truth. Russell, by contrast, in spite of all his diverse philosophical developments over time, is a defender of the correspondence theory of truth. But the problem is that he uses idealist tools and arguments in reaching an empirical solution.

Second, it is important to remember that Russell, along with Alfred North Whitehead, together formulated their *Principia Mathematica*. But due to his dual loyalties (a) regarding the empirically grounded correspondence theory, coupled with (b) his admiration for the purity of mathematics, he thought he could transform the epistemological equation by changing the title of his new philosophy from "physical atomism" to "logical atomism." You cannot. It would be like calling a mother a virgin.

Now, however, I wish to stress that on both accounts, both idealism and empiricism, the principle of unity is of paramount importance. In rationalism (Plato), dualism (Descartes), subjective idealism (Leibniz, Kant) and objective idealism (Hegel), the unity of self-consciousness arises spontaneously. In Wittgenstein and Russell, it "derives," i.e., is assumed from the unity of words and names, and ultimately one gathers from passive sensations. Russell's "atomic units" then turn out to be "words whose meaning is simple" (193). And "certain words express something [absolutely] simple" (ibid.). They refer to simple empirical sense data.

> Take the word 'red,' for example. And suppose—as one always has to do—that 'red' stands for a particular shade of colour. You will pardon that assumption, but one can never get on otherwise. You cannot understand the meaning of the word 'red' except through [through what?] seeing red things. There is no other way in which it can be done. It is no use to learn languages or to look up dictionaries. None of these things will help you to

> understand the meaning of the word 'red.' All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the last analysis upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain simple symbols. (193–194)

The word "through" is especially vague and ambiguous. "Through" Kant's transcendental categories or "through" Hume's "bundle of impressions"?

Presumably then I physically "see" meanings. (And I am sure certain rudimentary animals "see" red, but do they see meanings in the same manner as humans cognitively "see" red within a spectrum of colors?) When I immediately, directly see/sense red, do I not also cognitively know that it is related to a spectrum of other relational colors. 'Red' alone is conceptually meaningless. But according to Russell, then, the word 'red' is a simple (logical) symbol, which stands for—or means—a *particular*—as opposed to a universal—shade of red, it refers to specific sense datum of red within a specific consciousness. As such, it is simple, indefinable, irreducible, and consequently Russell concludes, in the sense of trying to conduct an "analysis," you cannot define 'red'; rather it is an entity you immediately *know* the meaning of. (Possibly a primitive living organism could also "see" *only* 'red' but then presumably it would "know" the meaning of 'red'?)

Beside the explicit assumption that any simple symbol refers to or represents a qualitatively simple sense datum, there is an implicit presupposition that any and all simples are essentially "atomic logical unities." Since, for Russell, simple words that refer to sense data are intrinsically meaningful, it follows that certain words (or all words?) are unities of meaning and, by implication, potentially recognizable as exhibiting identical meanings in the same consciousness at different times and (hopefully) in various other consciousnesses at the same time thus making communication with others possible.

So far, we have not gone beyond what we have already discussed. But now certain difficulties arise, which shake the foundation of Russell's deceptively straightforward account. Russell assumes that 'red' *alone,* as a single term, is *meaningful;* and it is so because it refers to a particular and simple sense datum. But Russell seems to think *because* of his switch from "physical atoms" to "logical atoms," the latter have suddenly become meaningful merely because they can be miraculously "translated," "transformed" into abstract symbols. All symbols, especially mathematical ones,

are "meaningful; they are "simply" defined, each displays a unique and unified identity. But it is an empty identity. Meanings are not simple. They are marvelously complex, deep, expansive, subconscious, unconscious, and even migratory; they seek intimacy with other related meanings, e.g., anger and jealousy.

But there is also a second question. Again, in what sense are colored sense data meaningful? Consider, for example, two patches of identically measured colored cloth, one red and one blue. Quantitatively they are identical but obviously not qualitatively. In terms of meaning, there is running throughout Russell's discussion a confusion between quantitative existents and qualitative ones. A red 6-inch patch of fabric and a 6-inch blue patch of fabric are quantitatively identical but not *qualitatively.* They are no more *meaningfully, qualitatively* identical than what a red traffic light *means, namely* danger, is *qualitatively* identical and *means* the same as a green traffic light, namely safety. The reason for Russel's confusion is that his brand of empiricism, like all its other variants, reduces qualities to sensations and values to subjective feelings.

On Russell's account, it is theoretically possible for a subject to be aware of just one sense datum, for example, if one were submerged in deep water. But in such a case, we might wish to contend that the subject's consciousness is a blue consciousness, simple, undifferentiated *blueness.* There is no statement connecting my consciousness with a blue object. But there can be no *self*-consciousness without an object. There is no judgment. As Russell puts it, "There is no reason why you should not have a universe consisting of one particular and nothing else" (*Logic and Knowledge,* page 202). *But there is no "you!"* Could this even qualify as consciousness? Could this be a *meaningful* example of an awareness without a subject and an object? A sort of "oceanic feeling" asserted without any conceivable confirmation or verifiable evidence that something like this could actually exist, occur, and qualify as "known"? Is it not really the antithesis of consciousness? An awareness without any distinctions rather seems to be no consciousness at all. Both Kant and Hegel are clearly right on this. What Russell is presenting is a theory of consciousness, a philosophy of mind, which twists intrinsically meaningless sensations into meanings. What he fails to realize is that his marriage of simple abstract symbols, as embedded in physical sensations, are irreconcilable bedfellows. As Russell should have recognized from his own study of Leibniz, the unity of the world, with all its concomitant meanings rests, in the final analysis, on a monadic principle or paradigm of the mind. His recruitment of purely

"simple" or "symbolic" or "logical" atoms inevitably involves implications requiring a monadic, unifying character to the mind.

Russell himself, prior to his "neutral monism" phase, never suggests that the simples exist apart from an already integrated consciousness. In this connection, it is worth remarking that in those earlier works Russell's sense data are just as mental as Hume's perceptual simple impressions in the *Treatise,* and that the mental would seem to be, at least at this stage of Russell's development, immaterial. But logical atoms are certainly not material or physical entities, as Russell himself repeatedly underscores. So, we are not surprised to find Russell, in *The Problems of Philosophy,* puzzling about the existence of the external world and finally declaring that our assurance of it is simply "an instinctive belief" (Chapters I and II; shades of Santana's "animal faith").[6] Russell, no less than Leibniz, has wrapped himself around the monadic world of subjective idealism, in one moment, and yet pleads allegiance to Hume's empirical "atomistic psychology," his phenomenalism, in the next moment.

But the ultimate issue is what is the grounding first principle? For subjective idealists, personal identity and self-consciousness are primary and original while linguistic issues are secondary and derivative. But for both Wittgenstein and Russell, the latter all reduce to atomistic sense data masquerading as names and words. But now we are in a position to contrast the two radically opposing principles and paradigms of consciousness against each other.

In Husserl's *The Idea of Phenomenology,* George Nakhnikian outlines the following contrast on the role of language *vis-à-vis* the consciousness debate. Although disagreeing with Husserl's position, the author makes amply clear the disagreement between the two conflicting views.

> But Husserl's *theory* of philosophical method, the phenomenological method, with its ultimate reliance on intuiting the essence [i.e., the meaning] of this or that entity is radically different from what philosophical

[6] Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1963), 14–16, 29 ff., 36. In his analysis, space is anything but a simple datum. Cf. Russell's *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958, first published in 1900). 103–104, 239, 241, 242; cf., Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* I, II, vi, pages 67–68; and see Ben Mijuskovic, "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 15:4 (1977), which discusses the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence debate over the ontological and epistemological status of Newtonian versus Leibnizian space and time and Hume's doctrine of the *minima sensibilia*.

> method is conceived to be by many British or United States philosophers. The phenomenological method with its ultimate appeal to intuition, not to the logic of language, makes *argument* impossible.[7]

And:

> Husserl's *theory* of philosophical method involves a further… related difficulty. It is rather uncritical of Husserl to assume there are, independently of any linguistic context, objects that are absolute data. This is the Husserlian counterpart of logical atomism's assumption of ultimate absolute simples out of which "the world" is to be "logically constructed." The generic view that there are absolute rock-bottom elements has been powerfully criticized in the recent literature, for example in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations.* (*Paris Lectures,* xxi–xxii)

Apparently, the assumption that patches of red and blue sense data alone are intrinsically meaningful is perfectly persuasive on the surface.

A second equally biased description of the dichotomy between eidetic meanings and language is just as blunt.

> The first premise must be that there are two current philosophical methodologies: philosophy is either the description and analyses of *language,* or, correlatively, that of *experience*…In general, phenomenology--which is entrenched at present in the continent of Europe and from which ensued the burgeoning existentialism--pursues an experience-oriented methodology, whereas positivism, naturalism, and the philosophy of analysis--more typical of England and America--follow language-oriented methods. The second premise is consequent to the first. It establishes the logical and ontological primacy of experience over language. The phenomenological method is the descriptive analysis of experience [i.e., self-consciousness]…The semantic or language-oriented approach assumes the converse to be true (*The Idea of Phenomenology,* xxi–xxii).[8]

This is the contemporary version of Plato's Battle between the Giants and the Gods, as it is placed directly between these two historical and

[7] Husserl, Edmund, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* translated by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), introductory comments, xxi–xxii. For Husserl's view, consult pages 24, 40.

[8] Husserl, Edmund, *The Paris Lectures,* translated by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1974), xii.

philosophical competing principles, whereas the linguists are fundamentally contending that literally "properly speaking," we cannot think without language, the opposing dualists, rationalists, idealists, and phenomenologists—as well as the *psychoanalysts*—are convinced that self-conscious thought without language is not only possible but quite common in the early development of children. And most importantly, for my purpose, is the consideration that the feeling of *cognitive* separation, the *self*-consciousness of loneliness, is not dependent on the use of words. Loneliness is primary, it requires (a) a sense of selfhood and (b) the meaningful sense of loss from a desiderative environment, the absence of a desired "object" or "situation" is sufficient to spontaneously generate the demise of the suffering infant. In sum, self-consciousness is original and primary, while language is derivative and secondary.

The analytic and linguistic advocates are handmaidens to science. Their goal is to expunge anything that reaches beyond simple sense data, names, and words. Their assertion is that the only coin of the realm is what can be reduced to sense data, not even to qualia because that term implies a distinction between the meanings of the two terms, quality and quantity.

In short, neither Wittgenstein nor Russell has any meaningful conception of personal identity. Wittgenstein reduces *all* consciousness to words and language, while Russell compromises it with his theory of Jamesian "neutral monism."

Bibliography

Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969).

Engel, Morris S., "Schopenhauer's Impact on Wittgenstein," in *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 236.

Gibson, John. *John Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature,* I, II, vi, pages 67–68.

Husserl, Edmund, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* translated by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.

Husserl, Edmund, *The Paris Lectures,* translated by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1974), xii.

Janik, Allan, and Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), *passim*.

Mijuskovic, Ben, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: The History of an Argument* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

Mijuskovic, Ben, "Hume on Space (and Time)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 15:4 (1977); reprinted in *David Hume: Critical Assessments,* edited by Stanley Tweyman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994), II, 167–175.

Pitcher, George, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966).

Russell, Bertrand, *Logic and Knowledge; Essays, 1901–1951,* edited by R. C. Marsh (Allen and Unwin, 1966), 179, 203.

Russell, Bertrand. *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958, first published in 1900).

Russell, Bertrand. *Mysticism and Logic* with *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Later, in *The Analysis of Mind* (1921).

Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1963), 14–16, 29 ff.

CHAPTER 3

Loneliness and the Possibility of a "Private Language"

In prior publications, I have argued—on psychological, phenomenological, existential, and even metaphysical grounds—that the basic motivational drive in all human beings is constituted by a continual struggle to escape loneliness, which is always accompanied by an uncanny shadowing presence of the self's solitary isolation, while, at the same time, each of us is seeking companionship with others of our kind. In advancing my thesis, I have defended the underlying Cartesian principle of the reflexivity of self-consciousness, as well as the Leibnizian principle of a uniquely temporal sense of personal identity and monadic insularity. In pursuit of my study, I also discovered that psychologists—who basically agree with my theoretical starting point—by stressing the driving fear of loneliness, have been correspondingly led, as I have, in adopting a similar model of the mind as an enclosed entity, one which nevertheless admits the reality of a restricted form of communication with other lonely selves. For example, psychologists of loneliness, notably Erich Fromm, but many others as well, share my assumption that human loneliness is spawned in the labyrinthine recesses and complexities of the subconscious self.

> Man is gifted with reason; he is *life being aware of itself;* he has awareness of himself, of his fellow man, of his past, and the possibilities of his future. This is an awareness of himself as a separate entity, the awareness of his own short life span, of the fact that without his will he is born and against his will he will die, that he will die before those whom he loves, or they before him, the

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_3

> awareness of his aloneness and separateness, of his helplessness before the forces of nature and of society, all this makes his separate disunited experience an unbearable prison. He would become insane could he not liberate himself from this prison and reach out, unite himself in some form or other with men, with the world outside.[1]

Three remarks are in order. First, Fromm assumes self-conscious reflexivity—what he terms "reason"—in contradistinction to empirical reflection, which is passively observational. Second, he volunteers an existential theme, as each of us is thrown into the world without rhyme or reason, *meaninglessly*. Both the universe and man are without an *essence*, a *meaning*, a *purpose*, for their existence. And third, he intimates that the solution to loneliness depends upon forging an intimate relationship with other self-conscious beings of our kind. Without experiencing the mutual consolation of human connection, we experience fear, sadness, and I would add, which Fromm does not, foremostly anger.

> The experience of separateness arouses anxiety: it is indeed the source of all anxiety. Being separate means being cut off, without any capacity to use my human powers. Hence to be separate means to be helpless, unable to grasp the world—things and people—actively; it means the world can invade me without my ability to react. Thus, separateness is the source of intense anxiety. (7)

In 1975, an interesting book was published, *The Flesh-Colored Cage,* by James Howard. [2] Basically, it was an attempt to introduce an *empirical*, even a materialist and physiological, paradigm of solitary privacy. Howard's materialist and "physicalist" principle contends that man is securely imprisoned *within his body*. Accordingly, he describes cases in which we, as individual subjects, are entrapped within our "separate skins," as he declares,

> No matter how closely we make a contact with another person, we do not occupy a single skin, share a nervous system, or achieve identity in [bodily] structure, function or [physiological] sensations (page x). Each of us exists within his unique epidermal envelope as a separate thing. No other person

[1] Fromm, Erich, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Bantam, 1970), 6–7.

[2] Howard, James, *The Flesh-Covered Cage: The Impact of Man's Aloneness on His Attitudes and His Behaviors* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975). It seems that for Howard, a "private language," what Ryle will term a "privileged access to one's own mind," is a direct implication of the (alleged) fact that our body is securely only our own.

> can enter the envelope, nor can any of us escape from it. We were born in that enclosure, exist within it, and will wear it as our funereal shroud. (10)

The difficulty with Howard's paradigm of "bodily identity" is that it is as philosophically unpersuasive to argue that psychological solitude is "constituted" by and restricted to a bodily identity, as it had been implausible for philosophers, like Hobbes, to contend that the criterion of personal identity can simply be established by citing bodily continuity. Physiologists in the seventeenth century already knew that the person underwent a complete physiological transformation within seven years.[3] For Howard, it follows that we are cut off from others—Fromm's sense of *psychological* separation, by our respective "internally experienced sensations" (4), as well as by our personal "internal language" (5).

> Each of us experiences [physical] sensations privately…In our separate cages, each of us builds a personal and unique intramural language that is fully understood only within that single cage. We have no real mutuality with others of our species or of any other species. We Can speak to ourselves, express ourselves, delight ourselves, and delude ourselves—in our own internal language. When we seek to share that language with any other person, we discover that we can only partially communicate it. Our private speech suffers a loss in translation when it is put into the private language of another. (4)

Basically, what Howard is underscoring is the consistent, pervasive, and unavoidable inability to adequately communicate, to share feelings and thoughts with other selves because our "intramural wordless languages" are so different from each other, trapped within the body, our sensory makeup, and presumably the brain.

And this is a critically important issue that is not directly addressed in his book. But the problem looms before us. *If* in the neuroscientific model of intrinsically different neuronal sensations, and *if* each of our individual sensations are radically different from everyone else's, then the mediating use of communicative "words" by two interlocutors will forever remain in

[3] Martinich, A. P., *A Hobbes Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1995), 143–144. Basically, Hobbes is a nominalist; the infant simply and subsequently bears the same name into adulthood. And s/he can, if it wishes, change their own "identity" at their pleasure. In fact, for Hobbes, essentially each of us is merely wearing "a mask," and masks are readily transferable and as such there is no real "self."

vain. The term "loneliness" may be questionably meaningful, but the word "intimacy" could not convey any possible meaning.

But the problem of *understanding and gaining insight into*—as opposed to causally explaining—the dynamics of loneliness, as well as the attempt to *communicate* with another self, by enlisting Howard's "*physiologically* subjective" archetype, is that it reduces "thought" to physical, material sensations; and although he never mentions the brain, clearly his "private language" empirically, causally depends on the brain. In any case, his description of when we "speak to ourselves," or when we put into motion "our private speech," or when we *seem* to be conversing with another person, the effort is *completely* devoid of "words," we cannot possibly succeed in communicating shared feelings and thoughts. It is a "language" *of sensations* without words. Presumably, when I *think* I am conducting a verbal dialogue with another person, in reality each of us, in the same moment, is also simultaneously experiencing a completely private set of sensations, *but* not meanings; meanings, concepts are "stable," universal; sensations are fleeting, momentary. If this is the case, then essentially, Howard's principle and paradigm of the sensuousness of consciousness—as opposed to Fromm's reflexive act—is fundamentally neuroscientific. Everything he is proposing is perfectly consistent with a neuroscientific paradigm. If we compare Fromm's notion of the "rational," reflexive mediacy of our consciousness, and those of others, we can communicate because we assume we share universal meanings with each other. But in Howard's and the neuroscientific reductivist model of awareness, as limited to the immediacy of sensory feelings and sensations alone, makes shared communication impossible. Howard's sensations and neuroscience's neurons react immediately but not conceptually. Transitional sharing becomes inconceivable.

But let us now turn our attention to another critical issue regarding the relationship between consciousness and language and the problem of communicability by turning to two analytic and linguistic philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. Even if we assume that words are *meaningful*, according to them, it follows that no one can be assured they are lonely without *first* invoking a publicly shared criterion of what, in purely linguistic terms, loneliness means. According to this line of thought, loneliness is a social and public affair, not an intimate or a personal one. If Wittgenstein and Ryle are correct, then it would follow that no one can meaningfully assert—or even feel?—their sense of isolation without *first* learning the social language of loneliness.

In the first chapter, I presented a subjective ideality of a personal "reflexive self-consciousness," as constituted by (a) the *immediacy* of sensations and feelings "accompanied" by (b) the relational *mediacy* of an intrinsic distinction between an active subject and its conceptual object; an immanent temporality and unity of structural cognitive thoughts, all bound together by synthesizing acts. But if all my sensations, feelings, meanings, and experiences can only be, in principle (a) verbal and (b) publicly validated, how can I ever be sure that I am lonely without asking others what they "mean" by loneliness? Is it conceivable that a society might not possess, and hence could not use the word loneliness; and would it then be free of its sadness? And what about other *seemingly* related words like "rejection," "isolation," "neglect," "solitude," "abandonment," "forlornness," "depression," and "despair"? These are not synonyms but rather intrinsically interconnected "auxiliaries" of loneliness. Need I check and compare with my friends whether I am in real despair and not merely lonely or possibly simply bored? Can I possibly misunderstand my own feelings?

But are Wittgenstein and Ryle right? If I *think* of myself *as* lonely, must I *afortiori* be able to use the word lonely or loneliness correctly? Are all feelings susceptible to communal definitions? If I tell-think of my self as sadly alone, must I presuppose a public context; that if I were "really" lonely, I must assume and/or depend on sharing a common public language? Can we think—or even feel—without words? Can't I feel and *know* that I am lonely without words.

> 257. "What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach the child the use of the word 'tooth-ache',—Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation!—But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word.—So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has 'named his pain'?—How has he done this naming of pain? And whatever he did, what was its purpose? When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone's having given a name

> to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.[4]

Obviously, this is a behavioral account of how we learn to use language and how to assign words to different behaviors, how we validate, confirm, verify the correct use of our words. But spoken words exist in an external public universe; while self-consciousness exists in an enclosed internal mental sphere. But let us continue.

> 258. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "E" and write this sign [i.e., E as a formal symbol] in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation—I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition—How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly [reflexively?].—But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the [reflexive?] connexion between the sign and the sensation—But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion *right* in the future. But in the present case, I have no [behavioral or social] criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that we can't talk about 'right.'

The transition from a physical sensation to the formal non-sensory symbol E is problematic; the first is physical but the second is conceptual and not necessarily social.

Despite Ryle's reservations of being classed as a behaviorist, and his qualifying declaration in the final section of his book, *Behaviorism,* that the "object [of my book] has been to show that the two-worlds story is a philosophers' myth," I would prefer to take him at his earlier clearer word:

[4] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), Sections 243–265. Thus, Wittgenstein criticizes such claims as "Only I can [directly, immediately] know I am in pain; you can never know it; you can only infer it." I follow D. M. Armstrong in interpreting Wittgenstein as a behaviorist in *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 10, 54–55, 67.

"There are just things and events, people witnessing some of these things and events, and people fancying themselves as witnessing things and events that they are not witnessing."[5] Similarly, he denies phenomenalism of the Humean variety and considers that the "notion of a sensible object is absurd" (237, 249). Rather Ryle posits the grounding conception of a "gatepost" (presumably a mental meaning) as "lasting, while sensations are fleeting; they (the gateposts) are accessible to anyone, while sensations are proprietary; it (the gatepost) observes causal regularities, while sensations are disorderly; it is unitary, while sensations are plural" (235). According to Ryle, the problem is that "there exists a linguistic difficulty in discussing the logic of concepts of sensation." And the difficulty is that following in the empiricist tradition, perceptions are reflective, but not reflexive, not *self*-conscious.

> This point can serve to introduce a conceptual distinction which will shortly turn out to be of cardinal importance, namely that between having a sensation and observing. When a person is said to be watching, scanning, or looking at something, listening to it or savouring it, a part, but only a part, of what is meant is that he is having a visual, auditory or gustatory sensation. But to be observing something the observer must at least be trying to find something out. His scrutiny is accordingly describable as careful or careless, cursory or sustained, methodical or haphazard, accurate or inaccurate, expert or amateurish. Observing is a task which can be one of some arduousness, and we can be more or less successful in it and more or less good at it. But none of these ways of characterizing the exercises of one's powers of observation can be applied to the having of visual, auditory or gustatory sensations. (203–204)

But Ryle fails to realize that whenever an "outward" observation is cited, then the *reflection* is empirical, i.e., perceptual and immediate, while the meaning of *reflexion* is self-referential, circular, mediately relational; it implies self-consciousness.

This is the crux of the issue between rational, *internal,* reflexive self-consciousness versus empirical perceptual *external* observations. This is why linguistic theorists are only able to "find meaning" in external observations. This is why and how Ryle and Wittgenstein can only "discover meaning" by how the public *behaviorally* learns to use both the "words"

[5] Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), 249.

and the "language" in social contexts. This is how one could be "wrong" about their own feelings.

But consider the example of a preverbal infant suffering a devastating period of loneliness without uttering a word; imagine a tragically neglected child succumbing. without the ability to cite a single word.

As Ryle goes on, he states, "We do not employ a 'neat' sensation vocabulary. We describe particular sensations by referring to how common objects regularly look, sound, and feel to any normal person" (203). And he summarizes his conclusion by stating:

> My argument has been intended to have the predominantly negative point of exhibiting both why it is wrong, and why it is tempting to postulate mysterious actions and reactions to correspond with certain familiar biographical episodic words. (153)

According to Ryle, the problem lies in our erroneous dualistic Cartesian category mistake in thinking that my mind is separate from my physical self, that there is an "immaterial" ghost in the bodily machine.

> *Self-knowledge without Privileged Access.* It has been [correctly] argued from a number of directions that when we speak of a person's mind, we are not speaking of a second theatre of special status incidents, but of certain ways in which some of the members of this one life are ordered. His life is not a double series of events taking place in two different kinds of stuff…Assertions about a person's mind are therefore assertions of special sorts about that [same] person. So questions about the relations between a person's body and his mind are improper questions. They are improper in much the same way as is the question, 'What transactions go on between the House of Commons and the British Constitution? It follows that it is a solecism to speak, as theorists often do, of someone's mind knowing this or choosing that. The [physical] person himself knows this or chooses that, though the fact that he does so, *if desired*, can be classified as a mental act about that person. (Ryle, 167–168)

But notice, Ryle still insists, "if desired [it can] be classified as a mental *fact* about that person." It is a scientific fact because the alleged "mental" fact is the result of the *brain* and not the *act* of a self-conscious mind.

Basically, Ryle wishes to avoid the difficulties of both behaviorism and phenomenalism by first ridiculing Descartes' category mistake of positing a dual metaphysical theory distinguishing two distinct substances, namely

immaterial and active minds, as well inert material and extended substances, the "Cartesian ghost in the machine," while at the same time he insists on validating physical objects and events in companionship with stable gatepost meanings and conceptions (15 ff.). He reaps the advantages of critically exposing a paradoxical metaphysical dualism while in the same moment parading a watered-down behaviorism—"if desired we can call a behavioral act a mental fact."

His thesis unpacked is that whatever possesses physical existence must exist both in space and time. But whatever has mental existence, it exists in time but not in space. What has physical existence is composed of matter or is a function of matter; but what has mental existence consists of consciousness or is a function of consciousness (15–16).

> There is thus a polar opposition between mind and matter, an opposition which is often brought about as follows. Material objects are situated in a common field (sic) known as 'space', and what happens to one body in one part of space is mechanically connected with what happens to other bodies in other parts of space. But mental (sic) happenings occur in insulated fields (sic), known as 'minds', and there is apart from telepathy, no direct causal connection between what happens in one mind and what happens in another. Only through the medium (mental?) of the public physical world can the mind of one person make a difference to the mind of another. The mind is its own place (temporal?) and in this inner life each of us lives the life of a ghostly (lonely?) Robinson Crusoe.

So, the metaphysical problem of dualism is simply solved by arbitrarily inserting the *word* "mental" between material objects and events and "ghostly minds." The two "fields" either inexplicably overlap or run tandem. Is it just like when physical bodies overlap with temporal thoughts? Who can tell? It is all simply attributable to blind observations. There is no "privileged access" to one's own mind (15).

According to A. J. Ayer, it is language and not consciousness, which is the province of truth and fact.[6] Meaningful propositions fall into one of two possible categories: analytic judgements are true by definition, the predicate term is contained within the subject term, e.g., "A=A; All bachelors are unmarried males." By contrast, synthetic judgments are empirical, the predicate term is contingently added to the subject term, e.g., "The cat is on the mat." But significantly, value judgments, ethical and

[6] Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1936).

aesthetic judgments, by contrast, are meaningless, neither true nor false, they are simply expressive of our emotions (20–22). As far as the issues of personal identity and self-consciousness are concerned, Ayer follows Hume.

> Our reasoning…is in conformity to Hume's. He, too, rejected the notion of a substantive ego on the ground that no such entity was observable. For, he said, whenever he entered most intimately into what he called himself, he always stumbled on some particular perception or other—of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. He never could catch himself at any time without a perception, and never could observe anything but the perception. And this led him to assert that a self was "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions". (126–127)

Accordingly, Ayer's own conclusion follows:

> For we have solved Hume's problem by defining personal identity in terms of bodily identity and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of resemblance and continuity of sense-contents. And this procedure is justified by the fact that whereas it is permissible in our language to speak of a man surviving a complete loss of memory, or a complete change of character, it is [linguistically] self-contradictory to speak of a man as surviving the annihilation of his body. (127)

But is Ayer right? He appeals to a *reductio ad absurdum* argument by reducing the "self" to the lowest possible denominator, which he alleges is grounded in the "continuity of our sensations" and allegedly confirmed by our ordinary language. But the *reductio ad absurdum* argument, without a truly self-cognitive, self-conscious *anchor,* is unable to offer a method of verification in ascertaining Ryle's supposed *continuity*, *Hume's "succession"* of sense-contents, as remaining unimpaired and functionally intact during the nightly absences of our sensations in deep sleep. Even the patron saint of empiricism, John Locke, speculated about a cobbler waking up with the memory of a prince.

But once more, what Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Ayer's condemnations collectively entail is a rejection of the reflexive character of thought asserted by subjective idealist philosophers from Plato to Kant and beyond.

> It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany [i.e., synthesize, unify, bind] all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that

> the representation would be impossible, or at least it would be nothing to me…Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself [continuously] the identity of the consciousness throughout these representations…In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 132)

If the state of affairs, which Wittgenstein and Ryle have depicted were to obtain, *then* not only would it be impossible to differentiate my *sphere?* or *realm?* of sensations from yours but even worse, "me" and "you" would be indistinguishable; "me" and "you" would disintegrate into an impersonal amorphous chaos of "sensibility." As Kant intimates, the "self" would evaporate into such radical "series" of distinct, separate disunities and discontinuities that consciousness itself would be impossible "or at least would be nothing to me" (ibid.). But only if Kant's reflexive consciousness persists can the self both emotionally *feel* and cognitively *know* that it is lonely and alone.

Ryle objects that the Cartesian myth of "the ghost in the machine" necessarily entails that "Absolute solitude is on this showing the ineluctable destiny of the soul" (15). Now although this may seem a bizarre conclusion for Ryle, I am convinced that it makes more sense to concur with the untold groups of philosophers, psychologists, poets, novelists, as well as the common man, who, stretching from time immemorial, have avowed the same force of human loneliness apart from the contingencies of human language. Wittgenstein's counterclaim is that we dwell in an inescapable social "togetherness," and that we can only express loneliness if there is someone to confirm it. And since this is the case, then we cannot truly be alone unless there are countless grammarians ready to correct us. Presumably, Wittgenstein and Ryle would contend that Robinson Crusoe could not have written a meaningful diary. But in fact, there was a real Robinson Crusoe, Alexander Selkirk, marooned on a desert isle after an argument with the ship's captain, when he asked to be put ashore at the next island, and as it turned out he dwelled there for five years all alone, and who, after his rescue, shared his story with Daniel Defoe, who in turn chronicled his travail. It is reputed by many scholars to be one of the first *novels* written (1709), at least in the English language.

In opposition to the subjectivist theory of the mind that I am proposing, many "scientifically-oriented" psychologists, sociologists, as well as behaviorally- and linguistically-oriented philosophers, would agree with the account of loneliness as an essentially socially-conditioned phenomenon, one which is acquired and learned rather than innate to human consciousness.

According to analytic and linguistic philosophers, the *use*, the *application* of words and language, is a learned behavior; an acquired behavior; it is a tool. But certainly, higher order animals, dogs for instance, are self-conscious but they do not communicate with each other verbally by using words and language. And yet dogs are often lonely. On the linguistic theory, the use of human language is a learned behavioral response, a *causal* stimulus-reaction. *If* all the "meanings" we use and develop can only be acquired through social interaction and intercourse, *then* it is conceivable, theoretically, that the word loneliness could be totally expunged from any societal context and then we could be behaviorally conditioned not to be lonely.

Psychiatrically, clinically I would further argue that there are innumerable situations and circumstances wherein impaired infants, children, and adults, who experience profoundly limited cognitive abilities (*DSM*, 318.1–318. 2) are yet quite capable of positively responding to nurturing care. I worked at the Fairview Developmental Hospital, a state institution, in Costa Mesa, California, and I daily observed the feeding process and care conducted by staff on the patients. At times, the meals took an hour as the food spilled out of patients mouths and unto the laps of the attendants. One could easily observe the anxiety if there were any delays in implementing the feedings. Patients also responded well to music. It is psychologically naïve to believe that loneliness must be tethered to the ability to be expressed verbally.

At this juncture, it is worth returning to Husserl. All language is mediate, indirectly referential, since it refers to *representational* objects—not the objects and events themselves, as in realism—*symbolically* asserted through the use of words, signs, and noises that are not themselves the intentional realities *meant*, *intended*. But Husserlian eidetic intuitions, as opposed to words and language, are cognitively very different. "Eidetic seeing" is *presuppositionless*. Language is not. It presupposes society.

> *Every intellectual process [activity] and every mental process whatever*, while being enacted, *can be made the object of a pure "seeing" and understanding*,

> *and is absolutely given in this "seeing."* It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted…I am now working on an absolute [presuppositional] foundation: namely this perception is, and remains as long as it lasts, something absolute, something here and now, and something that is in itself what it is, something by which I can measure as by an absolute standard what being and being given can mean and must mean…They are there *open to intuition*. We inspect them, and while inspecting them we can observe their essence, their constitution, their intrinsic character, and we can make our speech [i.e., language] conform in a pure measure to what is "seen" in full clarity.[7]

Again:

> "Seeing" [i.e., phenomenological eidetic intuition] does not lend itself to [inferential] demonstration or deduction. It is patently absurd to [causally] explain possibilities…by drawing logical [and linguistic] conclusions from non-intuitive [mediate] knowledge. Even if I could be wholly certain that there are transcendent [independently existing external] worlds, even if I accept the whole content of the sciences [and the language of the sciences] of a natural [naively naturalistic, scientific] sort, even then I cannot borrow from them. I must never fancy that by relying on transcendent presuppositions and scientific [and linguistic] inferences I can arrive where I want to go in the critique of cognition—namely, to assess the possibility a transcendent objectivity of cognition.

Thus, for Husserl, phenomenological *meanings* are directly, immanently, completely present—without external residue—*to and within* consciousness. Consciousness precedes language and can be "intuitively seen" without consulting an external correspondence and/or by instituting linguistic analyses. Language, then, is secondary and derivative and consciousness is primary and original.

Do we have any empirical evidence that loneliness is cognizable independently of language? We do. The evidence derives from an actual polar expedition conducted in 1934. After less than half-a-month of living in

[7] Husserl, Edmund, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* translated by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 24; cf. xxi–xxii; and cf., Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures,* translated by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964): "Phenomenology is a method that presumes to be absolutely presuppositionless" (x). Interestingly Hegel, because the dialectic is circular, and Husserl, because the eidetic intuitions are absolutely immediate, both claim a presuppositionless beginning.

total isolation at his assignment of living at an arctic base, Richard Byrd recorded the following entry in his diary for May 11.

> I find that the absence of conversation makes it harder for me to think in words. Sometimes while walking, I talk to myself and listen to the words, but they sound hollow and unfamiliar. Today, for instance, I was thinking of the extraordinary effect of the lack of diversions upon my existence; but describing it is beyond my power. I could feel the difference between this life and a normal life; see the difference in my mind's eye, but I couldn't satisfactorily express the subtleties in words. That may be because I have already come to live more deeply within myself; what I feel needs no further definition, since the senses are intuitive and exact.[8]

But there is something more critically important as well as we shall examine more deeply in a later chapter when we discuss the psychoanalytic work of Rene Spitz, who establishes that young infants die from loneliness and neglect before they ever learn to speak a single word. Of course, we cannot prove that they cognitively knew that it was loneliness that took their life away, but we can certainly speculate that the incipient ego must have developmentally progressed and distinguished some desired state of self-consciousness *beyond* Freud's "oceanic feeling."

In summation, we can place the linguistic philosophers in a much wider history of ideas context. The search for the "essence of man" is a much wider search, and linguistics is only a part of it. It begins with Plato, with his emphasis on reason, on mathematics and geometry, but especially on his conception of a dialectical method, on the ability of reason to ascend to higher and higher truths, toward a comprehensive and coherent system of truths, and then on into Kant and Hegel. In Aristotle's definition of science, there are several distinct "sciences," several subject matters of knowledge, the various sciences of analytics, physics, de anima, ethics, politics, poetics, and so on. For Aristotle, as for Plato, the essence of man is reason, but his methodology consists of syllogistic movements of thought from articulated premises to conclusions. In Augustine, however, the essence of man derives from God's "gift of grace," when God bestows on man the freedom to choose good from evil through faith and thus gain

[8] Byrd, Richard, Admiral, *Alone* (Putnam's, 1938), 95–96. It is significant that the author himself admits he could not write his autobiographical experience until four years later after the incidents he described. Only then could he put into words what he both felt and known of the loneliness he had experienced and endured.

immortality. But as early as Hobbes, the distinguishing characteristic of man, the essence of man, was his use of language. The conviction that man's language in some unspecified sense imitates, "corresponds to" a natural state of affairs, to objects and events, that words and names *represent* appearances of reality.

> For Hobbes, language or speech is the concatenation of words, and words are arbitrary signs devised [i.e., invented] by human beings to signify their thoughts. Expressed words are of individual ideas and speech, the verbalization of mental discourse. The general purpose of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal (*Leviathan,* 4.3). This sounds as if the general purpose of speech is communication in a broad sense. Also, speech piggybacks on language that is used to help people remember thoughts. According to Hobbes, words were first invented as items to help people remember things, and only later used to communicate thoughts to other people. Only human beings have language; beasts use signs [sounds?] to communicate but they do not devise sounds or other things with the conscious purpose of having them signify ideas. Beasts use signs because of the "necessity of nature". (Martinich, op. cit., 174)

Artificial words are symbolic representations, the relation between a thought, an idea, a word, and a name is comparable to the relation of a living man to his statue. The statue is speechless. Or as Bergson intimates, words are abstract and lifeless; intuitions are vibrant.

But this brings me to a related but different topic. Currently, there is a crisis in the American universities. I was an undergraduate student at the University of Chicago (1956–1963). I was a Liberal Arts student. I had no major. None of us had majors. It was the tail end of the Great Books Program at the university based on the classics of Western civilization and culture. There were fourteen courses, three years of humanities, in which we started with Homer's *Iliad*, three years of social sciences, in which we started with Plato's *Republic*, and three years of natural sciences, starting with Aristotle's physics, then moving on to the Scientific Revolution, and concluding with Einstein's theory of relativity. The culminating two courses, history and philosophy, were intended to tie everything together into a meaningful, comprehensive, and coherent goal.

Meanwhile the Ivory League institutions, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, about ten in all, were the gold standard for educational prestige. But at the same time, during the 1950s, the state universities, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and so on, were developing into major intellectual

powerhouses and raiding the Ivy League schools for Associate Professors to Chair their departments. Again, at the same time, elite universities were forming PhD programs for interdisciplinary studies, Johns Hopkins and Brandeis for the History of Ideas and the University of Chicago for Ideas and Methods and the Committee on Social Thought. But then a strange thing happened at Chicago. The Liberal Arts graduates, going on to graduate schools, were told that their degrees were deficient because they had no major, no preparation for a profession, no specialization, and consequently they had to "make up" a year of study. That is when and how the age of over-specialization began and how it now continues. The value of expertise was to be valued over and above humanistic knowledge.

Bibliography

Armstrong, D.M., *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).

Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1936)

Byrd, Richard, *Alone* (Putnam's, 1938).

Fromm, Erich, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Bantam, 1970), 6–7.

Howard, James, *The Flesh-Covered Cage: The Impact of Man's Aloneness on His Attitudes and His Behaviors* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975).

Husserl, Edmund, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* translated by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

Husserl, Edmund. *The Paris Lectures,* translated by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

Martinich, A. P., *A Hobbes Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1995).

Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965).

CHAPTER 4

Organic Communities, Atomistic Societies, and Loneliness

I have been writing articles and books on theories of consciousness in relation to human loneliness and intimacy since 1977, primarily focusing on the twin themes as they appear in philosophical, psychological, and literary texts.[1] In the present chapter, I wish to explore the issues within a more prevailing sociological context. Accordingly, I have turned to John Plamenatz's study by concentrating on his version of a humanistic Marxism, as primarily influenced through Hegelian and Feuerbachian sources.[2]

The theme of human loneliness can be addressed in two quite different directions, either in individual and personal terms or in group and social terms. The first favors an approach beginning with human consciousness,

[1] Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 40:2 (1977); *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: iUNiverse, 3rd edition, 2012); "The Sociology and Psychology of Loneliness," *International Journal of Sociology,* 21:1–2 (1984); "Loneliness and Intimacy," *Journal of Couples Therapy,* 1:3–4 (1991); reprinted in *Intimate Autonomy: Autonomous Intimacy,* edited by B. J. Brothers (Philadelphia, PA: Haworth Press, 1991); "Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Human Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness: Coping, Prevention and Clinical Interventions*, edited by Ami Sha'ked and Ami Rokach (London: Routledge 2015); "The Role of Empathy as a Path to Intimacy," in *Paedagogia Christiana,* 2:46 (2020); and *Metaphysical Dualism, Subjective Idealism, and Existential Loneliness* (London: Routledge, 2021).

[2] Plamenatz, John, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); hereafter cited as Plamenatz.

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_4

through literature, philosophy, and psychology, which might include psychoanalysis and neuroscience, although that is not the direction I wish to follow. By contrast, the second path includes societal and political approaches and interventions. In the following, I seek to show how the sociological shortcomings of the Marxist approach fails to deal with the laborer's sense of *alienation* from his fellows. Marx's effort to inculcate a personal sense in the worker, as a Hegelian "organic" member of a "universal species being," falters precisely because the laborer's work is individual and personal, but it is expressed in a *physical* world. His work is judged individually and perforce competitively. Marx appeals to Hegel's conception of an idealistic collective Spirit embedded in a sense of freedom through, in Hegel's case, a nationalistic fervor. But consistently Marx views labor in personal and materialistic terms, as physical—and also as suffering physically. But Hegel's freedom is ideal, developmental, and dialectical precisely because it is imbued with Spirit. It develops from within the mind and not from without. Marx's laborer is intrinsically forced to compete with his fellows and that is a lonely endeavor. Marx is both a moralist and a sociologist. But sociology, economics, and politics, as Weber indicates, are *descriptive* sciences, they are in principle incapable of dealing with normative, ethical values.

John Plamenatz (née Jovan Petrov Plamenac, 1912–1975) was born in Montenegro, then an independent kingdom before its forced incorporation in 1919 into Yugoslavia following President Woodrow Wilson's "principle of self-determination policy," which essentially directed that countries speaking the same language should be incorporated together under a single nationality. Montenegro, although it paid taxes haphazardly and intermittently to the Ottoman Turks, was unique in that part of the world because it was never militarily subdued by the Turks. It remained a fiercely proud and independent, semi-tribal society, ruled by King Nikola I (1910–1918) and aided by his Prime Minister, Lazar Mijuskovic, as well as advisers drawn from the influential members of the village clans. Following the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Montenegro, John's father, Peter, fled with his wife and son and migrated to France in 1917. His father, a politician, was active in the True People's Party and continued to serve as Foreign Minister for Montenegro. In 1919, John was sent to England to continue his formal education, which he eventually completed at Oxford when he was appointed to a professorship and taught philosophy there until he died. Meanwhile his parents had returned to Montenegro in the mid-1930s. John remained firmly proud of both his

Montenegrin ancestry and his status as an 'Oxford man,' a member of the University he admired so much. In 1967, he was promoted to the endowed Chair of Social and Political Theory at Oxford, succeeding Sir Isaiah Berlin, and continued as a Fellow of All Souls College until his death in 1975.

The *Republic* of Plato begins with three possible theories of justice, three distinguishable principles of human relationships among men. First, there is Thrasymachus' view that justice is whatever is in the interest of the strongest. Second, Glaucon proposes the earliest theory of the social contract. It relies on a political compromise between the best and the worst; the best is to be able to injure others with impunity and the worst is to suffer injury and be powerless to redress it. And thus, we compromise and form contractual artificial rules on how to behave toward each other and by empowering a political force to impose order.

In what follows, I wish to explore the relationship between Hegelian and Marxist doctrines of alienation and estrangement, within a sociological context, while concentrating on the dynamics of what I will distinguish as the opposing paradigms of the "organic community" and the "atomistic society," as they influence and impact our fear of loneliness and our desire to secure human intimacy. And I shall begin with a rough sketch of Ferdinand Tonnies' classic sociological treatise *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft* (1887) in which he distinguishes two antithetical forms of human association, essentially symbolizing Plato's view of man's nature as a social being and contrasting it with Glaucon's depiction of men forced to implement artificial contractual alliances in order to preserve peace. Intimate social pluralities—such as families, friendships, groups, clans, shared ethnic values, and religious sects—all fall into the first category, whereas the second classification supports the primacy of the individual will in securing political associations. More specifically defined, the organic community promotes the following human tendencies by contributing to an internal sense of harmony and belonging within a larger unit.

1. 1. The ideal unity of the "whole," the "Universal" (Plato).
2. The natural interdependence of social relationships.
3. The rational parallelism of promoting the metaphoric ideal of a tripartite soul consisting of a body (labor); spirit (courage); and reason (philosophy), while coordinating the three autochthonous races of men, the farmers, workers, and merchants (the bronze class); the guardian soldiers (the silver class); and the ruling philosopher kings

and queens (the gold class), as organically constituting the ideal polis; thus reflecting the virtues of the individual as writ large in the city-state, the polis (Plato, *The Republic*).
4. The guidance of a ruling teleological principle directed toward an ideal unity focusing on a shared common transcendent value.
5. Clearly defined class-proscribed duties and *rules;* and
6. Freedom is defined as doing as one *should*.

By contrast, the atomistic paradigm emphasizes the following principles of human conduct.

1. The independence of the individual, the "particular," in forming "social contracts" with his fellows (Glaucon).
2. The natural independence of the individual, on the atomistic particular;
3. A certain degree of allowance for competitive choices, for how individually one chooses to live one's life;
4. Individual autonomy within certain prescribed legal restrictions.
5. Contractual and artificial *roles;* and
6. Freedom is defined as doing as one *pleases.*[3]

Isaiah Berlin, and Tonnies, allude to a conceptual dichotomy between two kinds of thinkers, thus promoting a dualism of human types, which is a frequent device utilized by historians of ideas. There is a line among the fragments of the Greek poet Archilochus, which says: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Scholars have differed about the correct interpretation of these dark words, which may mean no more than that the fox, for all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog's one defense. But, taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and it may be human beings in general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel—a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and

[3] Tonnies, Ferdinand, *Community and Society,* translated by C. Loomis (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1957); and Ben Mijuskovic, "Organic Communities, Atomistic Societies, and Loneliness," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare,* 19:2 (1992).

say has significance—and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some *de facto* way, for some psychological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle; these last lead lives, perform acts, and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal.[4] As classic examples of the two types of thinkers, and their corresponding paradigms of human association, we can cite Berlin's extended list, which begins with Plato on one side and Aristotle on the other. This is the sort of dichotomy I am seeking to use in gaining insight and understanding into the sociological dynamics of loneliness.

In what follows, I intend to trace Plamenatz's interpretation of the influence of Hegel on Marx's concept of man and his sense of alienation from his fellows. I shall also indicate where I believe the difficulty is philosophically strained. I assume Hegel's paradigm represents the organic community, the hedgehogs, and Marx's model promotes the atomistic society, the foxes. Epistemically the two paradigms also demonstrate the differences between rationalism and empiricism, as well as anticipating the distinction between the coherence and the correspondence theories of truth.

The incompatibility between the two principles becomes obvious when one compares Durkheim's *Suicide* to Mill's *On Liberty*.

> Egoistic and anomic suicide are the only forms, therefore, whose development may be regarded as morbid, so we have only them to consider. Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is insufficiently integrated at all points to keep all its members under its control. If it increases inordinately, therefore, it is because the state on which it depends has itself excessively expanded; it is because society, weak and disturbed, lets too many persons escape too completely from its influence. Thus the only remedy for the ill is to restore enough consistency to social groups for them to obtain a firmer grip on the individual and for him to feel himself bound to them. He must feel himself more solidarity with a collective existence which precedes him in time, which survives him, and which encompasses him at all points. If this occurs, he will no longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself and understanding that he is the instrument of a purpose greater than himself, he will see that he is not without significance. Life will resume meaning in his eyes because it will recover its natural aim and orientation. But what groups are best calculated constantly to reimpress on man this salutary

[4] Berlin, Isaiah, *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (New York: Mentor, 1957), 7–8.

> sentiment of solidarity? Not political society. Especially today in our great modern States, they are so removed from the individual to affect him uninterruptedly and with sufficient force. Whatever connection there may be between our daily tasks and the whole of public life, it is too indirect for us to feel it keenly and constantly.[5]

Essentially, this is Hegel. What follows is Mill.

> What then is the rightful limit of the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality and how much to society? Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong, the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part that chiefly interests society…This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly in each person bearing his share…of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation.[6]

For Mill, this allows for a considerable degree of freedom regarding the individual's rights over his own "self-regarding conduct," including freedom of speech, association, and religion. Essentially, this is Marx as well. But importantly, the two forms of human association represent two options, two existential life choices between opposing sociological *value-laden* systems.

In previous publications, I distinguished three contrasting *epistemic* forms of *judgments.* The first form of judgment applies to propositions indicating so-called *primary qualities,* actually physical, material objects and/or events (presumably) existing independently of the mind, which exhibit external, factual, and scientific "properties," predicates, i.e., measurable *quantities,* as manifest in physically extended matter and the temporal movement of objects in space; it is a *pointing to* the independent realities of matter *plus* motion. As objective, they can be intersubjectively shared and scientifically communicated. And most importantly they obey the regulating causal principle of natural interactions and human behavior,

[5] Durkheim, Emile, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology,* translated by John Spaulding and George Simson (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958), 373–374.

[6] Mill, John Stuart, *On Liberty* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947), 75.

while leading to predictions concerning future events. Empirical science is both causally structured and providentially predictable. The second category is judgments regarding truly *secondary qualities,* i.e., subjective, immanent sensations and feelings predicated on our five senses resulting in sensory *appearances* as caused by—but distinguished from—their corresponding primary realities as they apply to independent objects and events. Judgments and arguments regarding secondary, subjective experiences concerning what I "see" and what I "feel" are in vain. They are absolutely incorrigible and personal; socially and intersubjectively they "represent" no objective or "shared" entities. They are neither true nor false nor correct or incorrect. We cannot argue about them. It is pointless for me to try to convince you otherwise when you believe you are seeing the color "red." The third category is judgments concerning *tertiary qualities,* which indicate distinctions of *value,* which we can define as *constituting* truly cognitive existential *evaluative judgments* concerning ethical, intellectual, political, aesthetic, etc. *meanings.* For example, I can *evaluatively* judge Andrew Wyeth's painting of the 'Chambered Nautilus' as an expression of human loneliness. We can disagree about my aesthetic evaluation, my taste, but *my* declarative judgment is an objective, cognitive value statement regarding *my* aesthetic criteria. And therefore, these judgments can be shared and argued about. Humans are the only higher-order creatures in the animal kingdom who continually and throughout their lives guide their individual existence in accordance with *value* judgments. But this does not *mean* that value judgments are "universally objective," i.e., must be or could be intersubjectively agreed upon in the same manner that scientific judgments are objective and sharable. They are "existentially" objective and absolute at the time of their announcement. For example, the determination of a soldier to declare that he is willing to die for his country is not a factual statement, nor a feeing statement; it is a value judgment. Although value judgements vary during our lives, they are meaningfully "genuine" and existentially *epistemic* in the sense that they declare "objective" assertions concerning *personal* values, as they *intend* what *we mean* when we pronounce "upon" a *value,* an object, an event, or a situation, as it spans a spectrum from good to evil, from beauty to plainness, from intelligence to ignorance, from security to danger, from loneliness to intimacy, and so on. In certain situations, value judgments can determine life and death choices and acts: "to be or not to be." In sum, value judgments are open to meaningful discussion and argument, and they can—and do continually—change throughout our lives. But

again, our ability to make value judgments is what defines our species. As Max Weber states:

> Science is meaningless because it has no answer to the only questions that matter to us. 'What [morally] should we do? How shall we live?' The fact that science cannot give us this answer is absolutely indisputable. The question is only in what sense does it give 'no' answer, and whether or not it might after all prove useful for somebody who is able to ask the right question.[7]

Science can tell us how to make an atomic bomb but not whether to use it or not. As it happened, it turned out to be a political decision, one executed by President Truman in 1945. But as an evaluative decision, it was an ethical judgment that he could defend.

As we go forward with our discussion, we need to bear in mind that wars are not only sociological events but also moral events.

Our defining *essence* as human beings does not lie in our vaunted "rationality." As Montaigne and the Skeptics showed, foxes and dogs are perfectly capable of drawing inferences. Nor in the fact that we can possess and use a language, as Hobbes and our current philosophical linguists maintain. But rather that we alone among higher order animals are the only ones capable of *cognitively* articulating values and living according to ethical and/or non-ethical standards. By contrast, empiricists reduce all "value" judgments—including moral and aesthetic ones—to subjective feelings of pain and pleasure, e.g., Bentham's quantitative utilitarianism (*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) and A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1936).

Currently the two opposing sociological models of human association are highly relevant today. There are eight billion people in the world and the traditional organic, uniting bonds tying humans together are splintering at an accelerating rate. The incredible mobility and transiency of being able to reach the most distant destination on the globe in a matter of hours rather than months, weeks, and days has loosened our sense of belonging and stability. Gone is the traditional sense of belonging intrinsic to conjugal relations, the family, extended families, clans, tribes, rural

[7] Weber, Max, *The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation,"* translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Hackett, 2004), 17; cf. Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), I, 79–80.

communities, villages, ethnic neighborhoods, and inherited professions handed down by fathers to their sons. The welcome financial liberation of women after the Second World War also brought about increasing divorce rates and single parent households. To counteract this burgeoning national fragmentation, some European nations have elected to preserve their values by closing their borders, "closing ranks," and by retreating within "themselves," by imposing discriminatory ethnic, cultural, and religious values and by discouraging immigration and foreign assimilation. In the United States, it has resulted in an uncompromising civil war between isolationists and liberals. These statements can be considered simply as empirical sociological facts, as merely descriptive observations, and not as moral judgments—but they could be the latter as well.

In relation to the issues concerning human loneliness and intimacy, I intend to explore the relative advantages and disadvantages regarding the virtues and vices involved in the paradigms of the organic community versus the atomistic society; between a unified sense of belonging with others of our kind versus an atomistic sense of individual freedom. In doing so, I shall use the terms "principle" and "paradigm" interchangeably.

Aristotle defines philosophy as the search for the first principles of the various sciences, e. g., productive, i.e., the making of things useful and beautiful; practical, i.e., acting socially and virtuously; and thinking theoretically and contemplatively by pursuing knowledge for its own sake. But the controlling question is: how are first principles selected? According to Pascal, "the heart has its reasons, which the head does not know" (*Pensées*); for Fichte, "the choice is governed by caprice and inclination" (*Science and Knowledge*); and for William James it is "a decision determined by our passional natures" ("The Will to Believe"). Philosophically speaking, first principles, relative to each other, are opposites, contradictories, and irreconcilable, e. g., idealism versus materialism; theism versus atheism; freedom versus determinism; good versus evil, and the organic community versus the atomistic society. Thus, the first question which arises is whether, in our desire to avoid loneliness and secure intimacy, it is possible to select the best elements from each of the competing sociological principles; or must we make an either/or Kierkegaardian existential choice? And the answer is no; we cannot share, fuse, mix, blend, or combine "elements" or "parts" of *distinct* first principles with each other. Either one chooses the value of organic unity and belonging, or one instead opts for the virtues of individual separation and freedom. The second question then becomes: in

what manner or fashion can sociology address loneliness and intimacy and provide insight and understanding? And the answer is that only the doctrines of idealism and freedom can provide the required dynamic, while sociology, *as an empirical science,* is only able to provide factual data regarding statistical incidences of loneliness at best. But, importantly, because of Weber's admonition, each of us remains ethically free to judge sociological and political events and situations as good or evil.

In Plato's dialogue the *Sophist,* he presciently anticipates the perennial Battle between the Giants and the Gods, between the Materialists and the Idealists, between the psychological behaviorists and the neuroscientists on one side of the ledger, and the existentialists and the phenomenologists on the other side (*Sophist,* 25E-246E). The *meaningful* study of loneliness and intimacy belongs on the side of Plato's Gods, on the side which favors idealism, epistemic spontaneity, reflexive self-consciousness, transcendent intentionality, existential choices, and so on. The empirical sciences—including medicine, behaviorism, cognitive behavioral psychology, psychoanalysis, the current neurosciences, as well as sociology—can only serve as mere ancillaries in providing empirical factual data. They stand impotent in addressing the spontaneity and dynamics of reflexive self-consciousness, immanent time-consciousness, the unity of consciousness, and the existential freedom of creating principles and selecting judgments of value. In other words, I intend to recruit a history of ideas discipline in pursuing this topic. I might also add that this interdisciplinary approach is quite compatible with Wilhelm Dilthey's threefold conceptions, principles, and paradigms of *Weltanschauungen*: materialism implying mechanism; subjective idealism implying personal freedom (Kant); and objective idealism implying nationalistic freedom.

In the following text, I recruit Plamenatz's study as he analyzes Hegel's idealist influence on the Marxist conception of alienation and Feuerbach's doctrine of estrangement and how both play out in relation to the dynamics of loneliness and intimacy. Hegel's concepts of alienation and estrangement are embedded in both Marx's descriptions of the separation of the laborer from the object of his labor, as well as in Feuerbach's illusionary projection of man's separation from God.

But let us retreat a step and begin with a philosophical—as opposed to a sociological—perspective on the issue by starting with Kant's subjective idealism, his transcendental theory of apperception, i.e., reflexive self-consciousness, which is *constituted*—not *empirically* caused—by the synthetic a priori unification of the subject in relation to its conceptual object, as

both mutually condition each other; both are needed; the mediate relation between the subject and its *conceptual* object are both required for *self*-consciousness (*Critique of Pure Reason,* A 107–110). By contrast, according to Hegel's objective idealism, self-consciousness is constituted by a contentious personal dynamic, a separation between self against an other-self, by a conflict between two selves leading to a "fight to the death"; *a narcissistic desire for recognition* at the price of the second self's freedom (the Lordship and Bondage dialectic, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* Section 178 ff.). The struggle to impose one's identity against all other aspirants can manifest itself in individuals, groups, nations, races, and so on. Developmentally for both Hegel and Marx, as we shall see, the dialectical *dynamic* will phenomenologically describe a role reversal between the master and the slave, as the slave eventually overcomes the master by achieving his personal—or its national—identity over that of the defeated and impotent master because the latter has nowhere further to develop.[8]

Even in Freud, the ego's dynamic separation in relation to the other self initially begins when the infant realizes the mother's breast as a desirable alien object and worse yet under the control of another's ego, the mother's (*Civilizations and Its Discontents,* Part I, the "oceanic feeling" passage). The term "dynamic" here is significant. It means that the *source* of the activity originates in the self, and it is not derived or caused by external, empirical perceptions gleaned from behavioral responses to external stimuli generated by physical motions prevalent in the "outside" world. Loneliness *begins* from *within* and *not* from without. For Kant, Hegel, and Freud, the critical factor is the *identity* of the self or ego as it emanates, arises, develops, flows from *within*. By contrast, for Marx, it is an empirical "self"; it is a laboring subject inherently plying its trade through its capacity as a "particular" subject, i.e., as an individual physical laborer, who merely serves as a replaceable "part" situated in an external competitive environment.

John Plamenatz's study, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man,* emphasizes the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach on Marx. His task is to show "how it is [for Marx] that man comes to be a social being in a way that other animals do not" (46); how "Spirit, as it arises to self-consciousness, is manifest in

[8] Kojeve, Alexandre, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,* translated by James Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 3–30; Hyppolite, Jean, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 156–177.

the activities of finite self-conscious beings living in communities; that is to say, in the activities of men living in society with their fellows" (89), as we come "To understand that man as a species-being is essentially a social being; that he develops his powers and comes to be aware of himself as a man only in society with others" (91). These statements, as far as they go, are compatible with Hegel. But Hegel is a rationalist and an idealist; everything is a product of the mind. Marx is essentially an "economic materialist" and an empiricist; everything begins with *each* individual worker's sensory perceptions *as manifested through their consequent labor.*

According to Plamenatz, for Marx, it is critical "for man to become a *'self-conscious species-being'";* man alone, in separation from other animals, *universally* becomes self-conscious *through his labor, through his "means of production."* Man "creates" himself through his labor. "Man is a producer, a maker, in a sense in which no other animal is." Quoting from Marx's *Capital:*

> Labour is a process going on between man and nature…By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops the potentialities that slumber within him and subjects these inner forces to his own control. (Plamenatz, 77)

The problem, however, is that for the idealists, dualists, and rationalists, physical labor is an activity imbued with and embedded in material, i.e., physical externality. It is an "offshoot" of self-consciousness and not integral attribute. But to combine, to "fuse" the idealist's conception of (a) the immaterial active nature of the mind; (b) its spontaneity; (c) its immanent temporality; (d) its circular reflexivity; and (e) its transcendent intentionality with (f) robotic physical labor is highly problematic. For Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Royce, Husserl, and Sartre, consciousness is literally ushered in by *spontaneous acts independently of physical labor.* Perhaps, "down the line," physical labor may "join" self-consciousness, but it does not begin in labor; it does not initiate it. One might as well claim that the infant lacks self-consciousness until it is able to play with toys.

The philosophical concept of epistemic spontaneity is closely related to the psychiatric concept of dynamism. Henri Ellenberger's monumental study, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry,* lists Jakob Boehme, Leibniz, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson as theoretical forerunners.

Science is deterministic. Its structures are causal. The power of science is practical; it offers predictions about future events. It "explains" but it does not offer insight and understanding into the *active* inner workings of Plato's *psyche*, Augustine's soul, Descartes cogito, Leibniz's Monad, Kant's unity of apperception, Fichte's pure synthetic acts, Hegel's dialectical consciousness, Schopenhauer's irrational Will, Freud's narcissistic ego, and Sartre's "for-itself." As Bergson warned, in *Time and Free Will,* consciousness deals with *qualities,* while science deals with *quantities,* with an extended and homogeneous space, with lifeless matter, with causal physical motions, and with facts rather than values. Science is only able to see things and events from the outside. The opposite of determinism is freedom. But freedom, in Western theological and philosophical thought, expresses diverse aspects. In Genesis, God creates space, time, matter, and each individual soul *ex nihilo.* For Augustine, his faith assures him that he possesses a free will so that he can choose between good and evil. Descartes' cogito is a spontaneous, intuitive act. And, following Augustine, Descartes contends that free will displays *both* an ethical dimension as well as an epistemic one. We are able cognitively to consider, to contemplate a judgment before we pronounce whether it is true or false; the act of judgment follows self-conscious evaluation (Meditation IV, "Of the True and the False"). Thus, freedom has both epistemic as well as ethical import. Leibniz maintains that the Monad is self-contained, windowless; nothing enters from without and nothing escapes from within (*Monadology*). Therefore, it must be an internal act, an innate spontaneity that "gets each of us going."

Kant invokes spontaneity for the creation, the production of his transcendental categories, immanent time-consciousness, and the unity of apperception (*Critique of Pure Reason*); Hegel for the creation of his dialectical categories, first those of Quality and second those of Quantity (*Science of Logic*). But epistemic spontaneity in idealism and dynamism in psychoanalysis, although they appear interchangeable—nevertheless are conceptually distinct, different but both importantly provide insight and understanding—but not explanations—into the forces and structures of loneliness and intimacy.

For psychoanalysis, dynamism is intrinsically unconscious. For both Leibniz and Freud, the unconscious is mnemonic, it can be retrieved. For Freud, the retrieval of the repressed activity is accomplished by the subject's free association and with the analyst's assistance through the interpretation of the subjects dreams. But the problem for Freud's dynamism

is that he is a determinist (whereas Jung is not). For Schopenhauer, by contrast, the spontaneity of the noumenal irrational Will is absolute and irretrievable.

Philosophically, the theory of the unconscious begins in the *Enneads* of Plotinus. Unless the soul continuously thinks, both the security of personal identity and hence its immortality are inconceivable (Leibniz, Cudworth). But by contrast, for both the empiricist doctrines of Locke and Hume, during sleep, the soul ceases to think and the continuity of the soul and its personal identity become problematic.

Subjective idealism originates in Leibniz's *Monadology*. If the soul Monad is absolutely self-enclosed, it follows that the *activity* of self-consciousness, as well as perceptual consciousness, must both emanate and operate from within the immaterial but active soul (*The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments,* Chapter V on Idealism). Further, the concept (a) of the self and (b) the *concept* of the object, *both must be constituted from within*. In Kant's first *Critique,* this *spontaneous* act is described as arising from a pure original unchangeable consciousness creating, producing an a priori synthetic relation unifying the self with a "non-empirical transcendental object=x" (A 107–110). The same a priori synthetic but dialectical constitutive unification of subject and object are also bound and unified in Hegel's discussion of Perception in the *Phenomenology*.

> *Immediate* Sense-Certainty does not take over the truth, for its truth is the universal, whereas certainty wants to apprehend the This [as a particular]. Perception, on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating moments within perception are universal: 'I' is a universal and the object is a universal. That principle has [actively, spontaneously] arisen for us, and therefore the way we take in perception is no longer something that just [accidentally] happens to us like [the immediacy of] Sense-Certainty; on the contrary, it is logically necessitated. With the emergence of the principle [of mediacy, relation], the two moments which in their appearing merely occur, also come into being; one being the [spontaneous temporal] movement of pointing-out or their act of perceiving, the other being the same movement as a simple event or the object perceived. (Section 111)[9]

[9] For the critical concept of spontaneity, as it dominates idealist, phenomenological, and existentialist thought, see Ben Mijuskovic, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 62–63, 99, 155–156, 158 and *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 44–45, 63, 76, 96, 102–103, 136,

For Hegel, this is still only Consciousness, but not yet Self-Consciousness that will have to wait for the Lordship and Bondage dialectic. But the relational unity of the thinking subject and its conceptual "object" constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing the principle of idealism.

In Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, as in Kant, "the transcendental clue" is secured through the immanent unity of the synthesizing, binding, unifying stream of time-consciousness (Section 14) through its *"pole of identity,"* as it introduces and discloses a threefold Cartesian distinction between *ego-cogito-cogitatum* that critically deepens Husserl's treatment and commitment to his subjective idealism as essentially based on the same schema of internal subject-object dualism, as his predecessors had wrought (Section 18). Husserl's debt to Leibniz's monadic paradigm runs throughout Meditations Four and Five.

> *The Ego as identical goal of the subjective processes.* Now, however, we must call attention to a great gap in our exposition. The ego is himself [immediately, intuitively, eidetically] *existent for himself* in continuous [temporal] evidence; he is *continuously constituting himself as existing*. Heretofore we have only touched on only one side of this self-constitution, we have only looked at only the [temporally] *flowing cogito*. The ego [immediately] grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as *I,* who live through this and that

299, 307, 339, 360 370, 376, 288–389, 395, 401; and Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970); see Jakob Boehme, 209–210; Leibniz, 312, 628; Fichte, 517; Hegel, 209–210; Schopenhauer, 208–209; Nietzsche, 208, 271; and Bergson, 312, 624, 628; cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious*:* Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant," *Philosophy and Theology,* 20:1–2 (2008–09); "Kant's Reflections on the Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious," *Kritike,* 4:2 (2010); and John Hendrix, "Plotinus: The First Philosopher of the Unconscious," paper presented at the International Society of Neoplatonic Studies Conference, University of Lisbon, (2004), with references to Freud and psychoanalysis. In Plotinus, emanation is related to the "organic unity of the universe. It is a radiation, or efflux from the One, like light from the sun," A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Amsterdam: Hakket, 1967), 49; cf. Ben Mijuskovic, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 8–10. Like Leibniz's dynamism, Kant and Fichte's spontaneity, while "The Plotinian ecstasy is achieved by a sustained intellectual effort from within and not by a denial of the reason or by a magical intervention from without; it is presented less as an abnegation of selfhood than as its supreme self-realization" (Armstrong, 72).

> cogito, as *the same I*. Since we were busied up to now with the intentional relation of consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum, only that synthesis stood out for us which "polarizes" the multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, accordingly in relation to *objects as poles, synthetic unities*. Now we encounter a second polarization, *a second kind of synthesis,* which embraces all the particular multiplicities of *cogitations* collectively and in its own manner, namely belonging [and unified within and to] the identical ego, who as the *active and affected subject of consciousness,* lives in all processes of consciousness, and is related, *through* them, to all object poles. (Section 31)

It is this polarity of subject and object that Marx violates by completely immersing the subject within and inseparably within its physical labor. In materialism, there is no hiatus or separation between the brain-laboring-man-external-world. It is an amalgamation, but without a distinction between labor and conception, revolution is inconceivable.

The salient point is that science, including sociology, has no answer to human freedom, to the spontaneity of consciousness. Science remains forever shackled by determinism. The collective difficulties with materialism, mechanism, empiricism, and behaviorism are that they emphasize "causes and effects" in human *experience* but totally disregard the *beginning,* the *spontaneity,* the *dynamic* force of a self-creative self-consciousness and a transcending intentionality. (Cf. again Husserl, *Ideas,* "Spontaneity and Ideation," Section 23 and "The Cogito," Section 28). But my view is that spontaneity creates *both* personal identity *and* human values. Notably, the clearest examples of spontaneity are offered in aesthetic creations. They are intrinsically personal and unique. An artist' s creations defy predictability. Even the artist is uncertain about what will result. A second strong class of candidates for spontaneous creation are intellectual theories, "proven" or unproven.

The categories of Consciousness and Labor are quite distinct entities and endeavors, the first rests upon an internal and originating mental act, while the second is grounded in external, physical manipulations. Birds build nests but they do not conceive of themselves as evolving into "species-beings." Essentially, the problem for Marx is that Hegel is an idealist, "All reality is mental, mind-dependent, or spiritual" (G. E. Moore), while Marx is at least an "economic materialist" and an empiricist. Hegel admits matter exists throughout his works, but it can only be *known* through the categories and structures of the mind. If there were no minds in the

universe, it would be meaningless to assert that the planet Mercury would still continue to revolve around the sun. How could you prove it?

The two passages quoted above from Durkheim and Mill are sociologically meaningful, but it is because they are both—in terms of their methods—consistently empirical, they share the same epistemic principle: human perception is molded by *contingent* external experiences. But, to somehow endow human labor with an *intrinsic* activity of self-consciousness is not only problematic but logically inconsistent. For example, in idealism, *mental* acts of consciousness allow for *both* the "interplay" between (a) the *immediacy* of mental, i.e., subjective sensations and feelings, *as well as* (b) the *mediacy* of conceptual, judgmental, and inferential thought. But the "bridge" between "species-being" *and* external, bodily, physical labor, as posited by Marx, is unbridgeable. It can be empirically, behaviorally described, but it cannot be immanently *constituted as* "species-being," as either a *self-* or a *class*-conscious being because it is externally, behaviorally *caused* and not spontaneously and/or dynamically *constituted*.

Collectively, Kant's subjective act of spontaneity, which he invokes in the *Critique* (A 50 = B 74, A 51 = B 75, A 68 = B 93, A 97), as well as in the *Critique of Judgment* (Section 22), creates a structural manifold of diverse but unified *a priori* syntheses: the mediate categories of relation (A 80 = B 106); immanent temporality (A 97–104); the subject and the conceptual object mutually conditioning each other (A 107–110); the transcendental unity of apperception (B 132); and the valuative judgments of aesthetic taste. All this coupled together result in constituting the conditions that make possible in their turn, ordinary human consciousness, Newtonian science, and the categorical imperative.

Similarly, according to Hegel's objective version of idealism, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* the activity of consciousness initially commences by generating and engaging the dialectical categories. It begins with the *immediacy* of Sense Certainty, the "this" and "now"; next Perception, which conceptually, i.e., *mediately* relates the subject to the object; next the Understanding follows as consciousness first becomes aware of external natural forces; and finally, the human dynamism of the contentiousness involved in the Lordship and Bondage relation, "a battle to the death," when the awareness of an *opposing* "other self" threatens the first ego's narcissistic "desire for uncontested self-recognition," for an undisputed acknowledgment at the other's expense, which can only be satisfied by the other's loss of his freedom. Although for both Hegel and Marx, "self-consciousness" exhibits social relationships, Hegel's dialectical dynamic

creates an extensive number of social categories, religious, cultural, political, moral, etc., while, by contrast, for Marx its only important significance is "mediated" through *social* labor. But the critical question is how does Hegelian idealism "manage" to transcend, to overcome the limitations of manual labor? And his answer is that it is the active mind that "runs forward" by dialectically anticipating, conceiving the next level, stage, and structure of thought; it conceives *both* what *and* how it must be done. Hegel's dialectic is a purposeful, teleological, meaningful activity, it *subsumes* the problem within its solution; what needs to be done and how. In idealism, self-consciousness "sees" *both* the subject *and* the object. But Marxist Labor "in-itself" is powerless, it cannot "speak" for itself. Certainly, the sociological—and the political—*facts* of alienated labor can contribute as documented evidence concerning the human *feelings* of loneliness and alienation, but not as its "cause." Feelings and thoughts are separate entities; the first is passively sensory and the second is actively thought.

A similar disconnect occurs when neuroscience reduces human behavior to a causal determinism activated among *homogeneous* neurons put into motion by electrical synapses in the brain. And only then do the neuroscientific adherents claim that this "explains" the *meaning* of human loneliness. Brain neurons, like atomic particles, are *quantitively* homogeneous (Bergson), whereas the cognitive and motivational modes of loneliness and intimacy are *qualitatively,* i.e., humanly and cognitively meaningful and even metaphorically expressive.

For Hegel, the dialectical movements of consciousness assume a historical and triadic pattern—immediacy/-conceptual-mediacy/-and self-immediacy—whereas for Marx, by contrast, his dialectic consists of a dyadic clash between two opposing classes, Proletarians against Capitalists, a fight to the death, which (presumably) can only be undertaken when the *ideal* of a universal classless society is attained—but as yet, it remains an unattained goal (Plamenatz, 10). Only when Marx's proletarians unite as a universal class, a "species-being class," and realize they must eliminate economic inequalities, have they truly attained Hegel's Self-Conscious "spiritual" reflexion. But Marx must somehow "explain" or "account for" how the downtrodden laborer can even begin to *conceive* of uniting with a globally laboring world. Only then is the worker able to fully attain his "species-being" status in order to even think of revolting. To be sure, Marx exhorts, "Working men of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains" (*Manifesto of the Communist Party*). But the dehumanizing activity of long years and generations of enslaved "labor-in-itself" has

already established its toll and disempowered the workers from uniting because of the enforced separation of the workers from each other and their doubly alienating competition against each other. Imagine laborers spending their entire robotic life in repetitious mechanical motions. How are they able to *transcend,* to *overcome* the *quality* of their dehumanized situation without Hegel's transcending acts of a purely spontaneous self-conscious freedom of the Spirit? Significantly, Marx proposes a "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be instituted during the intermediate transition stage between the period of the successful revolution and the actual take-over and implementation by the workers of the means of production, thus suggesting that the liberating outcome still has a considerable distance to travel. Imagine for a moment of the racial plight of the Black workers since the institution of slavery began in the United States. It is still going on unabated.[10] Finally for Marx, the entire laboring history of the world is merely *pre-human* history. As he points out in *The German Ideology,* it began in Egypt with the division of the thinking priests and the laboring pyramid slaves. For Marx, only after the successful revolution will truly *human* history commence. But for Hegel, history will always continue carrying its meaningful past with it. Nothing is forgotten. The only historical feature we can predict is its path of a dialectical development.

Hegel, in his *Science of Logic* (1812–1816, 1831; he was still working on it when he died), seeks to distinguish his principle of spontaneous dialectical, i.e., developmental activity against Kant's merely "oscillatory," pendulous "back and forth" static "spontaneity." The critical issue is the source, the beginning of human consciousness. What begins to "move" Kant's reflexive self-consciousness? In criticizing Kant, Hegel enlists Friedrich Jacobi, a major critic of Kant, who is an advocate for the immediacy of feeling and faith, as he rejects Kant's assumption that mediate thinking is the primary force in consciousness. Here Hegel is specifically objecting to Kant's effort to *synthetically* advance from *abstractions* to *concretions,* to *conceptual determinations.*

> "Let space be *a one;* time *a one* [Kant's intuitions]; consciousness *a one.* Now, do say how any of these three 'ones' *purely* turns itself internally into a manifold: each *is a one* and *no other;* an-all-the-same-ness; just [pure abstract] *selfhood* in general without a he-hood, she-hood, or it-hood, for

[10] Mijuskovic, Ben, "Marx and Engels on Materialism and Idealism," *Journal of Thought,* 9:3 (1974).

> these still slumber together with the *he, she, it* in the infinite zero of the indeterminate from which each and every *determinate being* has yet to proceed! What brings *finitude* [i.e., determinacy] into these three infinitudes? What impregnates space and time a priori with number and measure, and turns them into a *pure manifold?* What brings *pure spontaneity* ('I') into oscillation (*oszillierin*)? How does its pure vowel sound come to its concomitant sound, the consonant, or better, how does its *soundless,* uninterrupted *sounding* interrupt itself and break off [i.e., differentiate itself] in order to gain at least some kind of self-sound, an *accent*?" *The Science of Logic*, George Di Giovanni translation. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21.83; cf., 21.8, 21.62)

The term oscillation is intended to be a criticism of Kant's pendulous undeveloping motions, of his categories that never advance forward, that undulate ceaselessly but never develop.

> But against Kant's *presupposed* abstractions,
>
> The [Kantian] synthesis which is the point of interest here must not be taken as a tying together of *external* determinations already at hand. Rather the issue is twofold; one of a genesis of the second to the first, of a determinate something next to something which is initially indeterminate, but also one of *immanent synthesis,* of synthesis a priori—a unity of distinct terms that exists in and for itself. *Becoming* is this [spontaneous] immanent synthesis of being and nothing. (21.83)

The issue is not spontaneity; that indoctrination remains constant for both thinkers; the issue is abstractness versus concretion, i.e., determinacy.

Further:

> It is after this fashion that I have tried to present consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* Consciousness is Spirit as knowing which is concrete and engrossed in externality; but the *schema of* [temporal] *movement* of this knowing (like the development of all physical and intellectual life) depends entirely on the nature of pure essentialities [as exemplified from Being to the doctrine of Essence], which make up the content of Logic. Consciousness, as manifested Spirit, which as it develops frees itself from its immediacy and external concretions, become pure Knowing, which take as its object its knowing those pure essentialities as they are in and for themselves. Spirit thinking its own mediate essence. Their spontaneous [dialectical] movement is their spiritual life: by this movement philosophy constitutes itself; and philosophy is just the exhibition of this movement

(Johnston and Struthers translation; "self-movement" in the Di Giovani translation, 21.8; cf., "The connection contained within a concrete something, within a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not found already given but is produced rather by the spontaneous return of the moments back into this unity", 21.62.

Thus, Hegel tries to distinguish Kant's subjective idealism as purely abstract, whereas his objective idealism is in some (undefined) manner empirically concrete. In any case, *all* forms of rationalism, dualism, and idealism are collectively committed to the principle of spontaneity.

Parenthetically, cautiously, speculatively, and admittedly without any supporting commentary, I would venture to argue that Hegel's *Science of Logic* represents his solution to the metaphysical problem of Cartesian dualism. The dialectic moves from the categories of *qualitative* determinateness to *quantitative* measurement, to "Specific quantity" and "Real measure," and thereby steps on the path toward the opening to the empirical sciences. I believe that the most impregnable, paradoxical question, issue in Western philosophy concerns the relation between mind and matter. The dialectic seamlessly moves abstractly toward the categories of determinate concretion. It is the consummate idealistic solution.

Both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* are circularly "presuppositionless" (*Phenomenology,* Sections 773–774, 802; *Science of Logic,* Section 12.237). Like Plato's dialectic, his *dialogical* system, one in which one can begin anywhere, and the true path will always lead in the same circular direction. Both Plato's and Hegel's geometrical metaphor, however, belies a veritable conceptual vortex of depths as well.

But Marx's presupposition, his assumption that social consciousness *and* labor are somehow empirically and synthetically (but not of course a priori) related is simply infertile. Against Hegel, he starts with Life; and metaphorically his progress is linear. But Hegel's is circular; it "begins" with subjective Consciousness, Sense-Certainty, and ends with Absolute Consciousness. Marx starts with stunted man and ends with a revolutionary dream but there is no guarantee that it will not be another French "Reign of Terror" (The Bolshevik Revolution and Stalin). And there is also a further a disconnect between stunted man, the revolution, and the ideal of an unalienated economic world of species-conscious workers. Certainly, historically Communism has not delivered Marx's promise.

The critical Hegelian concepts in our discussion concerning loneliness and intimacy are based in (a) the alienation of labor, which is grounded in

social, political, and economic conditions, and more specifically in civil society, as well as in (b) estrangement, which is essentially grounded in a religious separation of man from his God (the Book of Job; Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness; Catholic monasticism; and beyond Marx, the Protestant despair of Kierkegaard; *Phenomenology,* Section 211 ff.). Accordingly, our first query is, *"What did Marx understand by alienation?"* and *"What did Marx point to as the causes of alienation?"* (Plamenatz, 12). Quoting Marx:

> The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process…and that he therefore grasps the nature of *labour* and conceives objective man (true because real man) as the result of his *own labour.* The real, active orientation of man to himself as species-being [as a universal class-conscious-being] or the affirmation of himself as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being) is only possible in so far as he really brings forth all his [class-conscious] species powers…through the co-operative endeavors of mankind. (Plamenatz, 61; Marx, *Early Writings,* trans. T. B. Bottomore (London, 1963, 202–203))

But this is terribly misleading. Hegel's "labor" is conceptual *thinking;* Marx's is physical *work*. Further:

> Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as *loss* of the object, as alienation and transcendence of this alienation; he therefore grasps the nature of *labour,* and conceives objective man [i.e., empirical man] as the result of his own *labour.* Man's affirmation of himself as a real [class-conscious] species-being (i.e., as a human being) is only possible in so far as he really brings forth all his species powers, *which can only be done at first* [dialectically] *in the form of alienation*. (ibid., page 90; cf., ibid; Bottomore, 202–203; brackets mine)

In Hegel, every judgment implies its negation: "all negation is a determination" (Spinoza); e.g., "Being is Nothing" and "Nothing is Becoming" (*Science of Logic*); the movement is driven from within; immanently, dialectically. But Marx, in an external fashion, empirically jumps "illogically" from stunted, alienated man to class-conscious men, without any account of why it did not happen sooner or how it could happen at all.

Marx enlists Hegel's theory of alienation as a process of "objectivizing" the products of man's labor independently of the self, as no longer belonging to him. The process of freeing himself accordingly resides in regaining

control, ownership of what he has been forced to "disenfranchise" from himself, his labor, in the form of his products. But because of Marx's empirical "synthesis" of man's "species-being," as *identical with, as expressed by* his activity of labor, he is not able to execute Hegel's *transcending* dialectical "move" precisely because he cannot *overcome* his empirical chains. Chains are deterministic; revolutionary ideals are "spiritual." But Marx belongs to all those perceptual thinkers, like the foxes, who support the paradigm of the atomistic society, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau's man blessed with an innate goodness. And Marx is first and foremost an empiricist. In agreement with all other empiricists, he grounds human experience in the *concrete particular, the sensuous, and the suffering*—as opposed to the abstract universal—epistemically much like Locke, who bases human experience in separate sensations and Hume in distinct impressions. The defining thesis of empiricism is that *all* our ideas are derived, i.e., by or from *precedent* impressions, *a posteriori,* from experience. Marx's reality *is* the laboring individual. But repetitious labor "in-itself" cannot "override" or "transcend" the drudgery of the work. Its immediacy is self-consumptively self-destructive. Destruction is more facile than construction.

By contrast, Hegel is a rationalist; the rational is real and the real is rational. There are *some* ideas that are transcendently *created* independently of experience. Thinking and self-consciousness is always running ahead of itself; it is transcending.

The non-dynamic element in labor is like the theory behind cognitive behavioral psychology. The dysfunctional behavior of the *passive* patient is to be "corrected," to be modified by the therapist's administrative, *external* intervention, more specifically by the implementation of "objective" contractual "treatment plans." By contracts proposed by the therapist and superimposed on the patient's compliance. Similarly, in neuroscience, the dysfunctional brain is to be corrected by the external administration of psychiatric medications with the hope of improving the "real causes," the chemical imbalances in the brain.

As a clinical therapist for three decades, I continued to have serious reservations regarding the efficacy of psychiatric medications. On the simplest disorders, e.g., sleep, anxiety, and pain disorders, the psychiatric medications are highly addictive. In another setting, I tried doing group therapy sessions with schizophrenic subjects–I avoid the term patient–while focusing on loneliness readings. The group of 8 to 12 subjects were mostly high school graduates with several college students interspersed.

They were all on anti-psychotic medications. The problem was not their intelligence but rather their memory. We met once a week. We started with *I Never Promised You a Rose Garden*, by Joanna Greenberg, an institutionalized young female patient whose real-life psychiatrist was Frieda Fromm-Reichman. Sometimes I would get the impression that the "psychosis" was actually a coping device to offset the ravages of loneliness (Thomas Szasz). But in any case, the soporific effects of the medication destroyed their memories. In the end, we tried O. Henry stories. The discomfort factor of the medications often led to non-compliance. Medication made them feel that they were in a constant fog. In other settings, elementary school settings, "hyper-active" and "attention-deficit disorder" children would be ushered into the principal's office by the teacher and the mother would be called and asked to place the child on medication as a condition for returning the child to school. At the San Diego and LA County clinics, we provided six therapy sessions for adults and then referred them to their medical doctor. Unfortunately, psychoanalysis was not an option. The deep throes of anxiety and anger were not addressed.

But the Marxist problem remains that by indelibly "fusing" idealism's principle of self-consciousness with materialism's premise of the primacy of physical labor, Marx is unable to offer a plausible account for a *liberating, a transcending* act of self-consciousness. Animals "labor," often damn hard, but they are incapable of attaining "species-being." And further, exploited labor during the period of the Industrial Revolution was precisely the sort of labor that dehumanized man, that stunted human beings, both men and women. It exploited women in sweat shops and children as young as eight years of age. It was precisely the type of worker that could not conceive of the possibility of a class-unification, let alone revolutionary activities, let alone what to do *after* the revolution! Once more, Hegel is a rationalist. The operating essence of rationalism is that *self*-consciousness is dualistically active. It distinguishes, it separates the self as *subject* from the "intentional" *object* to be "labored" upon. Marx's version of human labor is mired in the quicksand of metaphysical materialism. There is no option except sinking further below.

But Marx continues to insist that there is a special sense in which man is "species-conscious," while animals are not. Man is allegedly "self-creative," a product of his own activities, his own labor, and also, *in the same moment,* a "'species-being,' who realizes his 'species-powers' (the capacities peculiar to his kind) in the course of history by living and working

with other men." For Marx, "Dogs may be self-conscious, but they cannot think conceptually [inferentially, theoretically?]" (Plamenatz, 61, 68). Again, Marx has impregnated Hegel's self-consciousness with labor, but the offspring is still-born.

> In the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in which Marx pays handsome tribute to Hegel, Marx there praises Hegel for understanding the "self-creation of man as a process" and "for conceiving of man…as the result of his own labour". (Plamenatz, 90)

But Hegel's "labor" is a thought process, a mental, non-religious "spiritual" thinking; it is "beyond" the brain. We must distinguish and unpack what is being said. Marx breaks with any semblance of idealism by emphasizing "labour" as the external, material manifestation *upon which man reflects on himself as a perceptual object; he observes* "himself" as an object in the world. But the critical problem for Marx is that man is *not only reflexively self-conscious, but he also performs transcending acts of intentionality, possibly revolutionary acts.* Both are lacking in Marx. For Marx, man is *already* "out there." The definition of empiricism once more is that *all* ideas are derived from sensory experience, from precedent perceptions. The definition of rationalism is that there are *some* ideas that creatively arise independently of sense experience, i.e., perceptions. In contrast to Marx, for Leibniz, Kant, Fichte and Hegel, self-consciousness *precedes* man's self-awareness of his "physical" existence; self-consciousness needs to *arrive* "*out there";* it does not begin "out there." For idealist philosophers, clearly self-consciousness is subjectively primary, while for Marx, social life is *defined* by social labor. This distinction is critical. For idealism, dualism, and rationalism, self-consciousness is radically different from empirical perception (Locke, Hume). It is the difference between self-active *reflexion* and passive observational *reflection*. And Plamenatz readily acknowledges that Marx is inappropriately mixing mental and physical labor, as well as confusing "species-consciousness," i.e., social consciousness by endowing it with creativity, with Hegelian reflexive *class*-consciousness (Plamenatz, 91). This entire effort to translate sociology into philosophy is doomed to failure. At times, Marx even acknowledges his interpretational looseness.

Essentially Marx is both a sociologist and a politician. My point in belaboring all these Marxist shortcomings is that both sociology and politics are intrinsically incapable of, first, insightfully penetrating and accessing

the dynamical and/or the spontaneous aspects of consciousness, and, secondly, their role in creating the multiplicity of human values. He seems to think that his primary goal is simply to divert the laboring lemmings from going off a cliff, and the rest will come easily.

> Though Marx praises Hegel for 'seeing labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man,' he also complains that 'labour, as Hegel understands and recognizes it, is abstract and mental labour'. (Plamenatz, 91; Bottomore, 203)

But if this is so, then Marxist sociology virtually turns into propaganda.

When Marx turns Hegel on his head and *social* labor becomes primary (*Theses on Feuerbach,* X and XI), he forfeits the Hegelian advantage of "transcendence," the power of "going beyond" the empirically given. The "bridge" between consciousness and labor cannot be breached because of the self-contained exclusionary nature of their opposing first principles. First principles are unlike a philosophical buffet line where you can pick and choose what you like and simply move on. If the Industrial Revolution has created dehumanized, stunted workers, then the only way they can overcome, transcend their situations, is by becoming *reflexively self*-conscious, as opposed to reflectively annoyed by merely observing what is happening to them. To passively observe, i.e., to perceive a situation is not the same as actively seeking, thinking about changing it. And Marx, in *The German Ideology,* unfolds a thoroughly confusing discussion regarding what self-consciousness actually is and does (Plamenatz, 211–213, 215–216, 220, 222).

For Marx, the term "ideology" means a false way of conceiving theories and doctrines; e.g., Christianity is an ideology. *The German Ideology* attempts to show how Marx and Engels are putting forth their positive views about how men come by their erroneous ideas and by comparing their own theories to advantage against the German idealist philosophers. But as Plamenatz warns:

> There is no part of Marxist theory more difficult to understand than the part that treats of consciousness in relation to what it reflects. It is not clear what consciousness is (what forms or spheres of human thought and feeling are included in it), nor what it reflects, nor what precisely this reflecting amounts to (what connection between consciousness and what it reflects upon is supposed to be [i.e., its correspondence]). This part of Marxist theory is so

> obscure and confused that there is no extracting from it a coherent account of how men's ways of thinking are related to other aspects of their life in society. (Plamenatz, 211)

The reason this criticism is so important is because it asserts the theoretical dividing line between a humanistic approach to loneliness and intimacy, as opposed not only to the social sciences but to the physical, i.e., the neurosciences as well. It imposes a strict trespassing limitation to the interdisciplinary study of loneliness and intimacy through the portals of sociology, Marxist politics, and the neuroscience.

To quote Marx:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly [physically?] *interwoven* with the *material* activity and the *material* intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appears at this stage as the *direct efflux* of their *material behaviour* [i.e., their labor]. *The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, law, morality, religion, and the metaphysics of a people*. Men are the producers of the conceptions, ideas, etc., real active men as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive [laboring] forces…Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence (*das bewusste Sein*), and the existence is their actual life-process. If in all ideology, men by their circumstances appear upside down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much out of their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process…We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their life-process we demonstrate the development of the [false] ideological reflexes and echoes of the life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also necessarily [false] sublimates of their mental life-process…Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence [Feuerbach's ideological projections]. They have no history, no development; but men developing their *material* production and their *material* intercourse, alter along with this, their real *material* existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. (*The German Ideology,* trans. by R. Pascal, pages, 13–15; Plamenatz, 211; italics and brackets mine)

As Plamenatz pronounces, this lengthy passage is far from clear.

> Though this account of the origin of ideas is obscure, we can at least say that it is primarily sociological and not epistemological. Marx and Engels are not

> here attempting what Kant is in his *Critique of Pure Reason;* they are not trying to explain what is involved in having and using ideas or how thinking is related to experience. They are merely saying that men acquire their ideas in the first place in the process of engaging in material intercourse or in collaborating to produce what they need to satisfy their wants, and more especially the wants that must be satisfied if they are to keep alive and healthy and their species is to endure. (Plamenatz, 212)

But this admission pretty much destroys any and all allusions to a class-conscious, reflexive "species being." Actually Marx, in his own fashion, is a moralist. To his credit, he truly believes—*ethically*—that human beings *ought* not to suffer unequally. But the development of that thesis would involve a completely different first principle. Further, as Plamenatz observes:

> "How then can they [i.e., the ideas], *in these new uses,* be the 'direct efflux' of 'material intercourse'?" (ibid. 213). "But they [Marx and Engels] never, at any stage, produced a coherent account [of species-being], and one in keeping with their conception of man, how material intercourse [i.e., labor, and language] is related to consciousness". (Plamenatz, 216)

Once more, both Kant and Hegel's self-consciousnesses are *reflexive,* whereas Marx and Engel's laboring-consciousness is infected with empirical observations, i.e., reflections versus reflexions. Empiricism is fatally grounded in perceptions; in passive sensory reflections, Locke, Hume, and the entire empiricist tradition.

An efflux is defined as a material flowing forth, a physical emanation, a *qualitative* change from one material substance into another. But idealists and dualists *conceptually* distinguish consciousness and physical objects as opposing metaphysical substances, while Marx fails when he describes consciousness as a "direct efflux of labor"; and further states that *mental* "consciousness" and "conceptions" are "directly interwoven" with "the material [laboring] activity of men." How so? Marx's dissertation was on the metaphysical *materialism* of Democritus and Epicurus: all that exists is matter *plus* motion. Democritus subscribed to a causal determinism, but Epicurus posited a chance "swerve" to the motions, the trajectories of the atoms travelling through empty space. But even this cannot empirically *explain* the Marxist fusion of consciousness with physical labor. The issue is freedom. How do men, the proletariat, free themselves as a class? For

Hegel, "spiritual" freedom derives ideally, self-consciously through reflexive insight and a gained understanding of the dialectical path of history, as grasped *from within* the contours of the human Spirit. Once more, the rational is real and the real is rational. And ultimately only the whole is real. Hegel's dialectic is an ongoing process; it is not an empirical science. It does not make predictions. All we can foretell is that human history will unfold dialectically, but not the specificity of its occurrences. But for Marx, the destruction of the Capitalist economic system points toward a *predictable* scientific outcome. The capitalists have dug their own graves and their collapse is unavoidable. They are doomed to extinction.

> Some of these ideas are Hegelian as well as Marxist, they are Marxist adaptations of Hegelian ideas—Marx's contribution being chiefly to detach them from their metaphysical setting and so bring them more clearly and forcefully to their social implications. Hegel was a social theorist of the first rank, but his ideas about society, and above all of man as a social being, are part of a grand philosophical system from which it is difficult to disentangle them. It is claimed for Marx that he brought Hegel down to earth. I prefer to say that by dissipating some of the clouds in which Hegel loved to move, he revealed him moving on the earth and not in some regions high above him. He did not just translate Hegelian metaphysics into Marxist sociology; rather he helped to uncover Hegel's sociology in his metaphysics. He sometimes misunderstood Hegel, the social theorist, and learned less from him than he might have done. In some respects, Hegel's ideas about society are more perceptive and discriminating than are Marx's. (Plamenatz, 10)

Indeed! This is a far too generous compliment. As Marx grounded the human Spirit, he robbed it of its flight, its freedom. Sociology can wander into the fields of human labor and social intercourse, but it trespasses when it stumbles on into the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

Hegel's goal is Platonic, in both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic,* he emulates Plato's paradigm of the Divided Line passage in the *Republic* (VI, 509 D—511 E), which illustrates a thoroughly comprehensive and coherent view of reality, a systematic gradation of metaphysical, epistemic, and ethical levels and stages of knowledge constituted by intrinsic *relations* between "objects of knowledge" and "states of the mind" depicting ascending levels of cognition and reality: sensory images are matched with *eikasia*; physical objects are matched with *pistis;* mathematical concepts and inferences are matched with *dianoia;* intuitive Forms are matched with *episteme;* and ultimately the Good is matched with *noesis;* and *all this*

concluding with the identity of Being and Consciousness. (Cf. *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* lecture on Plato, his discussion on Plato's Dialectic, "That is, Plato grasped the Absolute as the unity of Being [Parmenides] and non-being [the void of Democritus]—in Becoming, as Heraclitus says—or of the one and the many, &e" (II, 54). This is what Hegel aspires to in his *Science of Logic* as he died still working on it.

But let us examine more closely Marx's concept of alienation as he describes six developing facets. First (presumably), man is *unconsciously* "self-creative" through his labor; second, he *becomes* virtually "incorporated" into the product of his own labor; third, he suffers alienation when he is separated from the product of his labor; fourth, he *becomes* free when he regains control of the product of his labor; fifth (presumably?) he *becomes* human as a direct result of his "species-being" through his *laboring* activities *and* in conjunction with other laborers; and sixth, he does so in the course of history. This process is not the result of any one man (i.e., Hegel); rather it is the collective history of laboring mankind (Plamenatz, 62). The critical problem, however, is the first premise, the alleged self-creativity of *manual* labor. The difference is that from the very beginning Hegel's creativity is teleologically aiming for the freedom of a universal human Spirit, most notably and ultimately to be found in the German nation, whereas Marx is targeting the economic freedom of the proletarian class through man's labor. But for Hegel, "The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History is the simple conception of *Reason;* that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world therefore presents us with a rational process."[11] For Hegel, the dialectical development of *political* man begins in the *Phenomenology* with the *immediacy* of *feeling* through the Family's sense of unity. Next, it progresses, advances to the *mediacy of individual* separations prevalent in Civil Society and highlighted by aggressive competition; and, finally, the reunification of both the previous stages as they dialectically evolve and fuse into higher and richer categories of organic unity and freedom exemplified in the German Nation wherein all men are free. "The Eastern nations knew only that *one* is free; the Greek and Roman world only that *some* are free; while *we* know that all men absolutely (man *as*

[11] Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of History,* translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 6.

man) are free" (ibid., 19). This has nothing to do with labor or sociology; it is purely a "spiritual" thought and freedom.

Hegel's conception of Civil Society derives from Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Chapter XIII) (1651), wherein "the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"; a state of human existence wherein "it is a war of all against all; where every man is an enemy to every man." The motivational dynamic of both psychological and political narcissism is evident clearly in the following passage in Hobbes.

> So that in the nature of man, we find three causes of quarrel. First, competition; second diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second for safety; and third for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct or indirect in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. (Chapter XIII)

For Marx and correctly, this is bourgeois society as it is ruled by economic competition, it is the Age of Capitalism and the Victorian "Robber Barons," the Captains of Industry and the Lords of the Manor. Although it can be said that for both Hegel and Marx the *value,* the goal resides in man's freedom, for Hegel it lies in the German State and for Marx in the classless society. But what impressed Marx was Hegel's "Lordship and Bondage" conflict, the dialectic wherein the roles of the master and the slave will become reversed.

Marx's theory of alienation is concrete because it is empirically grounded and solidly factual. But it is flawed and limited because of its self-imposed confinement within a solely sociological dimension. To be sure, in ruthless Capitalism, man is alienated, first from nature by the exploitation of natural resources; second from his own labor, which he must sell at the lowest price; third from the product of his labor, which is not his to sell; and fourthly from his fellow man by being "artificially" forced to compete in earning the meagerest of living wages. Interestingly, Marx's conception of unalienated, i.e., free labor is aesthetic.

> Animals construct only in accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standards of every species and knows how to apply the

> appropriate standard to the object. Thus, man constructs also in accordance with the laws of beauty. (from *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* 211)

This passage tantalizingly suggests the possibility of an aesthetic freedom and sadly it stops short of suggesting an impetus either toward an ethical or a political freedom.

Hegel's conception of a triadic dialectic is diametrically opposed to Marx's dyadic one. Negation is determination (Spinoza). The opening triad in the *Logic* is Being-Nothing-Becoming—first Parmenides' idealism; second Buddhism's denial of the self and the Void of Democritus; and third the temporal flux of Heraclitus. For Hegel, to "sublimate" means to *elevate* the prior moments toward a realm of infinitely higher unities. But Marx envisions an "end to prehistory" and to human alienation when the proletariat are victorious over their capitalist foes. I think that is dangerously naïve. As Freud pointed out, and I believe correctly, it is not economic systems that are aggressive and dangerous but men. Men are chronically narcissistic and aggressively competitive and all too often for too many of them, narcissism is the ruling part of their nature. There is something about women that is innately predisposed to producing creative fruitions and unfortunately a vulnerability, a susceptibility in providing human nurturance to their offspring as well as to others.

Ludwig Feuerbach originally began as a disciple of Hegelian idealism but later turned to a more thoroughly empirical and "naturalistic" view of man.[12] In doing so, however, his "transformative method" redefines man as a "species-being," as *socially*-conscious, as opposed to individually self-conscious, as in Kant and Hegel. It is from Feuerbach that Marx appropriates the conception of man as *socially* self-conscious, as a "universal" class, and therefore potentially capable of becoming *class*-conscious, as he embarks on his road to freedom. It is also from Feuerbach that Marx derives and amplifies the conception of alienation as an *estrangement* from the Christian Deity. Man, *qua subject,* psychologically *projects* his illusionary desire for a Greater Being *beyond and transcendent to* himself, as he alienates, objectifies his *predicates* of intelligence, goodness, and power *beyond* his self into an "objective" and "independent" substance, a Greater Being, which is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent only to

[12] Feuerbach, Ludwig, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,* translated by Manfred Vogel (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), Section 41; cf. ix, xxx, xlvi, lxi.

return to himself as he completes his dialectical reflexive movement by returning to himself as the original source of his own "ideology" (Plamenatz, 68–69, 109–114). "To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must become nothing." The richer God becomes, the poorer man is. In this fashion, "Hegel begat Feuerbach who begat Marx." Nevertheless, Marx complains "that Feuerbach still erroneously thinks that the task of philosophy is to supply a truer theory of consciousness about man in the world, thus overlooking the real issue, that the ultimate task of philosophy is not merely to understand reality but to change it" (Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach,* Thesis VI). But Marx goes a step further beyond Feuerbach by transforming laboring consciousness into "species-consciousness."[13] For Hegel, the issue is to understand the tragic Odyssey of the world's history because it is man who has created it. "The World-historical individuals," the Alexanders, the Caesars, and the Napoleons, "through *the cunning of Reason* must trample down many an innocent flower—crush to pieces many an object in its path" (*The Philosophy of History*, 31 ff.). But the glaring difficulty in Marx's "transformative method" is that both Feuerbach and Marx have illicitly fused empiricism and idealism. It is like blending the principles of theism and atheism. Basically, it is a failure of not being able to distinguish philosophy from sociology, an origin from its results. But each first principle, each paradigm has its virtues, vices, and dangers unto itself. The illicit transformative gambit in Marx is in thinking that by connecting laboring consciousness to self-consciousness and then to social consciousness, one has empowered the latter with "creativity." By contrast, it is the *subjective idealism* of consciousness, coupled with its inherent act of spontaneity, which empowers its creativity (Leibniz, Kant, Fichte) and not its fraternity or sociability with adjacent laborers as they stand in competition with each other.

In Hegel's version of absolute idealism, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), he dynamically, developmentally, and historically "moves" from the categories of immediate Sense-Certainty to the mediacy of Civil Society, etc., and ultimately to a "final"—but still to remain always unfinished—comprehensive and intuitive vision of an Absolute Knowing. And in the *Science of Logic,* once more still in the last year of his life, the

[13] Hippolyte, Jean, *Studies on Marx and Hegel,* translated by John O'Neill (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 74, 85, 96–99, 113, 126, 130; Shlomo Aveneri, *The Social & Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 10–14, 30, 66–75, 98, 101, 128–129, 133.

self-movement of his thoughts continue to be seamlessly, dialectically, and progressively enriched by the inherent synthesizing *qualitative* categories of Consciousness, as they *evolve* (significantly enough) into *quantitative* Scientific ones. By an impregnation, by a merging, and by an organic metaphysical transformation of the categories of quality into the quantities of science, Hegel manages to address the and solve problem of metaphysical dualism, from Plato to Descartes. By executing a thoroughly phenomenological method, he describes the transformation of Quality into Quantity, of Being into the quantitative factors of the "empirical sciences." But the ruling metaphors remain *conceptually* biological and organic.

For Feuerbach, since his projection of a Greater Being is an illusion, then clearly it is foolish to depend on the Christian religion. Similarly, for Marx, "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions, it is the opiate of the people." Both religion and capitalism are mutually false ideologies supporting each other.

On the issue of Marx's materialism, Plamenatz regards it not merely as an oversimplification but as a misinterpretation. Classically, metaphysical materialism reduces all reality to matter *plus* motion. But for Plamenatz, this reductive characterization of Marx is misleading.

> The word *materialist* has been used and it is not always clear in what sense writers about Marx use it when they apply it to him, or in what sense Marx himself uses it. I doubt whether it is possible to elicit from his writings any coherent version of materialism…He was not the kind of materialist who holds that mental activities can be reduced to bodily movements and to motions in the brain or can be treated as mere effects of them. There is virtually nothing in his writings to suggest that he held this view and a great deal to suggest that he did not. *He always speaks of man as a self-conscious, rational, active being who can make choices and can initiate change deliberately.* He speaks of man in ways that suggest that he rejected, not only the Hegelian [idealistic] conception of reality as the self-projection of the self-revelation of Spirit, but also the Cartesian separation of mind from matter, which implies that everything is made up of elements that are either purely mental or purely physical. But Cartesian dualism is as much rejected by Hegel as by Marx. (Plamenatz, 1975; 17; cf., 19; italics mine)

The italicized sentence above flies directly into the teeth of empiricism. To repeat. Our "ideas," i.e., Locke's sensations and Hume's impressions, are passively *caused* by the external motions of material particles striking our

five senses. By contrast, for idealism and rationalism, the mind is immaterial, actively spiritual, and self-conscious; it is not reducible to the brain. It is the difference between passive, empirically observed, "reflective" perceptions, on the one side, as opposed to active, innate self-conscious "reflexions," on the other side. Reflection is observational, it is like an image appearing in a pool of water. But reflexion is like a self-generating flowing spring of circulating water.

Marx said different things at different times. He is a fox. But the greater problem is that he also indiscriminately mixed opposing first principles: self-consciousness with physical labor. And even though human beings are social, that in and of itself is not a promise of freedom. Unlike Hegel, he is not a systematic philosopher, a hedgehog. Rather he appears to be an "economic materialist," at least in so far as certain aspects of his view of economics includes labor. Marx wrote his dissertation on the materialism of Democritus and Epicurus and sought to somehow accommodate two opposing themes: "the materialism of Life" with the "idealism of Hegelian Freedom." But Marx simply *assumes* human self-consciousness when he credits man's inherent capacity to historically "create himself" through laborious productivity. We recall that for Kant, reflexive self-consciousness is transcendentally grounded in the mediacy of synthetic a priori categories conditioning the possibility of human experience, in both the ordinary as well as in the Newtonian, i.e., the scientific variety (Plamenatz, 211–212).

In many ways, Rousseau is another key figure in the dialogue between Hegel and Marx. It is Rousseau who is the first to discuss "men as fragments of human beings," as "dehumanized" and "estranged." Rousseau, before Marx, regards contemporary human institutions as corrupting man's freedom, while in the same moment dehumanizing him. "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" and it is man's capacity to work with his fellows that frees him, that liberates man to freedom; it is a freedom of the individual will when it acts autonomously, when it wills as it should and follows its own self-imposed law, as it is later fashioned into Kant's categorical imperative. And yet, Rousseau also paradoxically announces that "Whoever refuses to obey the General Will will be forced to do so by the entire [political] body; this means that he will be forced to be free" (Plamenatz, 13–14, 48, 55–57, 59–60, 328–329, 360).[14]

[14] Taylor, Charles, *Hegel* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), for an insightful connection between Rousseau Hegel, and Marx, consult pages 15–16, 23–24, 186, 368, 370–372, 411, 419–420. *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* translated by

But importantly, Rousseau and Marx "share three ideas common to both…though Marx influenced by Hegel, expressed them differently: the idea that the specifically human needs, those that distinguish men from the other animals, are products of men's living together; the idea that the needs arise only because men have capacities peculiar to their species developed in them by this togetherness; and the idea that the development of these capacities involves the creature that has them in a course of social and cultural change which is dialectical. We have only to translate passages of Rousseau's *Discourse* into a German idiom to see how much is common here to Rousseau and Marx" (Plamenatz, 55–56).

Well, this may be true of the prevailing German culture of the time, but it certainly would not be true of American slavery, which did not "progress" for two hundred years and continues to remain mired in prejudice and racism.

> Hegel's Lordship and Bondage dialectic clearly influences Marx's view of the growing conflict between his two economic classes. This presentation is a twofold action: action on the part of the other, and action on its own part. In so far as it is the action of the *other,* each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus, the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life and death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise certainty of being for *themselves* to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won…Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other's death. (again, *Phenomenology,* Section 182)

Writ large, this is a struggle to the death between Capitalism and Proletarianism. And once more, for Marx, Hegel's Civil Society is basically Hobbesian.[15]

For Hegel, the dialectical method carries all that went before it along with all that will follow, as it organically and historically progresses and

E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), I, xiii; "Aristotle in his philosophy carried out what in the Platonic principle had begun, both in reference to the profundity of the ideas there contained and to their expansion; no one is more comprehensive and speculative than he," II, 117.

[15] Avineri, Shlomo, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge University Press, 1972), 14, 113 and W. T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition* (London: Dover, 1955), 411–422.

develops. He is concerned about the *pattern* of history as it moves qualitatively along; nothing is lost, everything is enriched, deepened as it moves forward. "The owl of Minerva only flies at dusk when a form of life has already grown cold." Unlike the empirical sciences, precisely because they are committed to the unidimensional, external law of causality, mechanism, determinism, behaviorism, and above all pragmatic predictions, the progress is essentially quantitative and merely cumulative. When the various sciences advance, qualitatively the material substance remains unchanged and consistently factual. By contrast, Hegel is concerned with "internal" qualitative insights and understanding. As R. G. Collingwood contends, in the *Philosophy of History* (1930), the historian's task is to "rethink" the thoughts of past thinkers. But Hegel's pursuit goes even deeper; it is to spiritually relive the past epoch. Hegel's teleological goal is to understand reality through philosophical self-consciousness. Fundamentally, Hegel's purpose is Aristotelian contemplation. In his three volumes of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* in his Inaugural Address, he declares:

> Man, because he is Mind, should and must deem himself worthy of the highest, he cannot think too highly of his greatness and the power of his mind, and, with this belief, nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him. The Being of the universe at first hidden and concealed, has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay open before the seeker—to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment, its riches and its depths. (ibid., *Lectures,* "Inaugural Address," 28 October 1816, xiii)

Drawing on Hegel, in his chapter on Alienation, Chapter V, Plamenatz distinguishes the terms *Entfremdung* (alienation) from *Entausserung* (estrangement), and he connects the former to man's objectivizing tendency to view himself in the products of his labor, but then he leaves the concept of estrangement dangling in midair. What is interesting in this regard, as we have seen, is that both Kant and Hegel define *self*-consciousness as mutually *constituted*—not caused—by the *internal* relation between the thinking subject (the human substance) and the conceptual object (Kant, *Critique,* A 107–110), while Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, similarly conceptually connects, unifies the subject to the object in the section on Perception. But for Marx, the strain, the tension, the distress is not within self-consciousness but with an external object, his

own alienated labor as objectified, externalized, and not even to another laborer but to his own product. Because my interest is in loneliness, in human *separation,* I have found it critical to define "alienation" as a separation from both lifeless, inanimate objects as well as other selves and I define "estrangement" as an existential and Kierkegaardian separation of man from God. For Marx, by contrast, alienation is simply defined as man's separation from the ability to control the products of his own labor. This form of alienation is basically economic and lacks both philosophical and psychiatric depth. My interest in Marx concentrates on his description of the crisis of competition with his "fellow" man. Man is competitive by nature. Economic equality does nothing to diminish that, as Hobbes, Schopenhauer, and Freud attest to that.

As to the *causes* of alienation for Marx, they are primarily threefold: the absence of private property and ownership; the forced division of labor by external economic forces; and the artificial implementation of structural competitions between workers vying against each other, as they are compelled in procuring for their economic survival (Plamenatz, 139). As Marx points out, property values fluctuate as social demand increases and decreases. Marx agrees with the socialists that all property is social, not private, as well as Proudhon's declaration, "Private property is theft." But whereas socialism promotes a peaceful resolution to economic inequities, Marx assumes a more violent course of action. Ultimately, the clash between Capitalism and Marxism is one of self-survival and not one of idealistic values. Darwin's theory of natural selection and evolution surfaces circa 1859. And Marx wanted to dedicate the first volume of *Das Kapital* to Darwin. *But all these considerations only amount to and revolve around sociological and political facts. Marx's theory has no room for judgments of value; Marxism is devoid of individual spontaneous, dynamic, and existential acts or forces; and thus, it is irrelevant in gaining insight toward our understanding either in terms concerning human loneliness and/or human values.*

Regarding religion, Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud were atheists. Elsewhere I have argued that Hegel is a panentheist, a thinker who defines God as "an eternal-temporal consciousness, knowing and including the world 'within' his own activity."[16] We need to remember that Fredrick the

[16] Hartshorne, Charles and Reese, William, *Philosophers Speak of God* (University of Chicago Press, 1953), 177, 188, 234, 242, 291; on pantheism, cf. Loewenberg, Jacob, *Hegel's* Phenomenology: *Dialogues in the Life of Mind* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1965),

Great of Prussia had previously curtailed speculations on religious topics (he died in 1786). And Kant writes *Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone* (1793, during the reign of Fredrick William II). And Hegel, as an employee of the State, was circumspect enough to strategically place his section on "Revealed Religion" in the *Phenomenology,* just before his more revealing ending title, Absolute Knowing, i.e., Hegelianism.

> Hegel refrains from saying Christianity is a form of illusion or false consciousness, even though it does not, according to him, express the truth literally. It expresses both man's alienated condition and the overcoming of it but does so only figuratively…Hegel had other reasons for treating Christianity and Christian theology with respect. He was not an iconoclast or a revolutionary and had no wish to weaken the hold on people of beliefs and stories, which he thought salutary because it reconciled them to their lot. (Plamenatz, 231–232)

For Marx to criticize religion is his means of dispelling the illusion by which men seek to comfort themselves for their oppressed condition; it is to compel them to see their condition as it is, to face up to it, so that they are moved to put an end to it. Instead of projecting their ideas of themselves as they would wish to be into myths about life after death in the company of God, they must try to realize and confront these ideas in this world by transforming society and themselves with it.

But for our purposes, there are two important conclusions we can draw. First, neither the neurosciences nor the sociological sciences are able to address the spontaneity of self-consciousness (Leibniz, Kant), nor the dynamism of the unconscious (Freud et al., Ellenberger); nor its transcendent intentionality (Husserl); nor can they account for the human creation of the principle of *value;* nor of judgments of good and evil.

Unlike Kant, who, for ethical purposes, postulated a noumenal reality to God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul in the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Hegel never mentions immortality, personal or otherwise. It is his World-Historical *human* Spirit that is eternal.

Finally, importantly, Hume, as an empiricist, in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Bk. III, Pt. I, Sect. I, page 469), and Kant as a rationalist (*Critique of Practical Reason*), for very different reasons, both separate the Ought from the Is, science from Values, while Marx failed to do so, although he

349 ff.; cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "A Reinterpretation of Being in Hegel's *Science of Logic,*" *Telos,* Volume 6 (1970).

clearly unconsciously assumed an unexpressed humanism as a moral force within himself. He deeply cared for mankind in general, for his devoted wife, née Jenny Westphalen; his seven children, three of whom died early; and his lifelong friend, Friedrich Engels, all of whom remained loyal to him throughout all his tribulations.

At the close of his study, Plamenatz concludes that although man presumably "creates" himself socially in labor with others of his kind, it is nevertheless true to hold that it is as an *individual* that he will be allowed to profit.

> To Marx, it is important that the rights of the individual, merely as such, should be asserted. No doubt, man is essentially a social being; he develops his peculiarly human powers in assimilating a culture and learning particular social roles. Nevertheless, if man is to achieve freedom, if he is ever to be truly autonomous, he must dissociate himself from his parochial culture and social roles; he must assert himself as a mere man, [a singular and particular] member of his species [as an atomistic individual]. (Plamenatz, 285)

In many ways, Marx admired Mill, and both valued "self-realization, the striving to excel, the setting up for oneself of aims difficult to achieve" (Plamenatz, 353–354). Foxes—unlike wolves, who run in packs—are essentially solitary animals. So was Marx.

When we recall Durkheim's admonition regarding the tenuous state of personal allegiance to the modern state, we realize that our current world is unable to provide the sense of secure intimacy that he envisioned. We remember that Hegel's dialectic foretells of a conceptual and historical progress of synthetic *a priori* categories, as the universal World Spirit advances from the immediacy of a feeling state of unity in the family, only to be followed by its advancement to the egoistic and narcissistic competition of alienation characteristic of Civil Society, and which will only later and eventually be able to reunify with the feeling of unity and individual freedom idealized in his Sovereign Nation, we realize how unrealistically naïve and falsely idealistic his system really is. But rather as Durkheim's prophetic warning foretells, the very reverse has occurred; not only is each one of us relegated to assuming an atomistic individuality, as we aggressively confront each other, but so do "nations" (whatever that means today), as each vies for nuclear power and supremacy over other nations and states. Contemporary man, existential man is left totally alone in his solitary crusade toward the holy grail of intimacy. The Stoics believe that

all men are universally brothers (and presumably all women are sisters). They were cosmopolitans, citizens of one world. But that illusion defies current human reality. The contemporary human world as a totality will never accept itself as an organic "whole." That option is gone forever. Man is too narcissistic and contentious.

Nevertheless, I believe that genuine intimacy is *only* attainable between individuals and small groups brought together by a mutual and reciprocal sharing of *empathic* feelings, meanings, and affections leading to more stable and permanent mutual state of reciprocal *intimacy,* through shared trust, respect, and values. But because there are eight billion—and exponentially counting—rootless and lost creatures aimlessly and ceaselessly circulating throughout the globe, the unrealistic ideal of "national" unities and the impossibility of forming any viable sense of organic communions will inevitably continue to increase and prevail. Our current situation is much like when the Roman Republic devolved into the Empire; it was too large and too various to form a unity. At that point, the only possibility of intimacy became reduced to restrictive psychological and ethical isles of friendship. Both Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Books VIII and IX, and the Alexandrian Epicureans extolled the values of small and closed friendships. A global fellowship of human equality and respect is a complete pipe dream.

Concluding Personal Note

My grandfather, Lazar, was Prime Minister to King Nikola I of Montenegro (1910–1918) and the leader of the People's Free Party (Wikipedia). My grandfather died in 1936, a year before I was born. The monarch had nine daughters; two of them, Milica and Anastasia, married Russian nobility, and were befriended by the Czarina, Alexandra. In turn they introduced her to Rasputin, a "mad" mystic monk, who apparently had an uncanny ability to stem the bloodletting flows of the young Tsarevitch, Alexei, who suffered from hemophilia. Unfortunately, Rasputin gained the political ear of the empress and in turn through her it also influenced Czar Nicholas to the extent that on his advice he dismissed three Prime Ministers and several other nobles. This angered the Bolsheviks, who killed Rasputin and, in 1917, assassinated the Royal family of Russia. A third royal daughter of King Nikola of Montenegro, the beautiful and clever Princess Jelena, married Viktor Emmanuel III, the King of Italy, who, among his first official duties at the start of the Second World War, appointed Benito Mussolini

as Prime Minister, and accordingly as the political head of Montenegro, which had become an Italian Protectorate when the Nazis turned it over to the Fascists.

I was born in 1937, in Budapest, an only child. My father, a Montenegrin, was a diplomat attached to the Yugoslavian Embassy. In 1939, with the German military advance into Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland, we were transferred to Palestine and my father—who was fluent in French, Serbo-Croatian, and Italian—was recruited by British Intelligence, as a cryptographer to decipher Fascist communiques regarding Montenegro, and we lived for a year in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In 1940, the Nazis overran Yugoslavia and Montenegro, killed my only male cousin for trying to escape, and castrated my three uncles, and consequently they remained childless. My mother was from a small seaside village, Makarska, in Croatia. During the Second World War, Croatia sided with the Nazis and operated the most sadistic of all German concentration camps, Jasenovac (Wikipedia), as they targeted Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies. I shudder to imagine what would have happened if my parents and I had lived in Croatia during the war—or even for how long we would have survived. Even when I was an adult and went off to college, my parents never told me the history of my dual ethnicities. Meanwhile in Yugoslavia, an intense guerilla warfare consumed the countryside as the Royalist Chetniks, under Mihailovic, and the Partisan Communists, under Tito, fought the Nazis until at a certain point the deadly reprisals against a hundred villagers were exacted whenever a German soldier was killed, which retaliations prompted the Chetniks to begin fighting the Partisans as the next occupational threat to Yugoslavia after the ending of the war. In 1940, the Yugoslavian Embassy reassigned us to Cairo and my father promptly volunteered to serve in the British Eighth Army, first under Generals Claude Auchinleck and then Bernard Montgomery, who were engaged in desert warfare against Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and his elite Afrika Korps and Panzer Divisions. Toward the closing of the war, we were transferred once again, this time to Ankara. In late 1944, at the close of the war, we were reassigned to the Embassy in Washington and flown there in a military B29 bomber. In 1947, as Tito consolidated his regime of Communist power in Yugoslavia, there was an attempt to reassign us to Bucharest behind the Iron Curtain and fortunately for us we were designated as political refugees, as Displaced Persons. Relations between Croatia and Montenegro have always been tense. Sadly, in 1991, during the Balkan

War, which was fraught with ethnic violence, "cleansing," and tragedy, Montenegro bombed Dubrovnik, an exceptionally beautiful Croatian seaside town on the Adriatic coast.

Bibliography

Armstrong, A. H. *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Amsterdam: Hakket, 1967).

Aveneri, Shlomo, *The Social & Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge University Press, 1968).

Avineri, Shlomo, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Berlin, Isaiah, *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (New York: Mentor, 1957).

Durkheim, Emile, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology,* translated by John Spaulding and George Simson (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958).

Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Feuerbach, Ludwig, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,* translated by Manfred Vogel (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).

Hartshorne, Charles and Reese, William, *Philosophers Speak of God* (University of Chicago Press, 1953).

Hegel, G. W. F., *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).

Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of History,* translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956).

Hendrix, John, "Plotinus: The First Philosopher of the Unconscious," paper presented at the International Society of Neoplatonic Studies Conference, University of Lisbon, (2004).

Hyppolite, Jean, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

Hippolyte, Jean, *Studies on Marx and Hegel,* translated by John O'Neill (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

Kojeve, Alexandre, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,* translated by James Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

Loewenberg, Jacob, *Hegel's* Phenomenology: *Dialogues in the Life of Mind* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1965).

Mijuskovic, Ben, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). Mijuskovic, Ben, *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

Mijuskovic, Ben, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Kant's Reflections on the Unity of Consciousness, Time-Consciousness, and the Unconscious," *Kritike,* 4:2 (2010).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness and Intimacy," *Journal of Couples Therapy,* 1:3–4 (1991); reprinted in *Intimate Autonomy: Autonomous Intimacy,* edited by B. J. Brothers (Philadelphia, PA: Haworth Press, 1991).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 40:2 (1977).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: iUNiverse, 3rd edition, 2012).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Marx and Engels on Materialism and Idealism," *Journal of Thought,* 9:3 (1974).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Metaphysical Dualism, Subjective Idealism, and Existential Loneliness* (London: Routledge, 2021).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Organic Communities, Atomistic Societies, and Loneliness," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare,* 19:2 (1992).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "A Reinterpretation of Being in Hegel's *Science of Logic,*" *Telos,* Volume 6 (1970).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Role of Empathy as a Path to Intimacy," in *Paedagogia Christiana,* 2:46 (2020).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Simplicity Argument and the Unconscious*:* Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant," *Philosophy and Theology,* 20:1–2 (2008–09);
Mijuskovic, Ben. "Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Human Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness: Coping, Prevention and Clinical Interventions*, edited by Ami Sha'ked and Ami Rokach (London: Routledge 2015).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Sociology and Psychology of Loneliness," *International Journal of Sociology,* 21:1–2 (1984).
Mill, John Stuart, *On Liberty* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947).
Plamenatz, John, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
Stace, W. T. *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition* (London: Dover, 1955), 411–422.
Taylor, Charles, *Hegel* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Tonnies, Ferdinand, *Community and Society,* translated by C. Loomis (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1957).
Weber, Max, *The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation,"* translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Hackett, 2004), 17.

CHAPTER 5

Ethical Responsibility, Spontaneity, and the Problem of Evil

How It All Began

I was unsure and concerned about writing this chapter at all. Generally, my articles and books try to assume what might be described as a scholarly and impersonal style. This chapter is anything but that. It is both autobiographical and personal. As my professional career evolved and traversed back and forth, it led toward two parallel directions, both as a social worker and a therapist, as well as a teacher of philosophy and the humanities. This was not by choice but rather by the exigencies of a variety of circumstances. But it opened importantly to the possibility that I could study loneliness and intimacy theoretically as well as clinically.

I completed my BA and MA in Philosophy in 1964 and 1965 and my first job after graduation was as a caseworker for the Chicago welfare department. My caseload was on 63rd Street and Blackstone and my office, the Midway District Office, was located four blocks way. There was even a second office, the Southern District Office on 63rd Street and Cottage Grove, more affectionately referred to as Sin Corner. My caseload consisted of several slum buildings housing some 500 children and adolescents, none of whom had much of an expectation—or a chance—of completing high school. There was also a high school senior who could have graduated, but she got pregnant. All the tenants were Black; in fact the entire Woodlawn district was overwhelmingly Black. There had been a single Hispanic mother, but she had moved after delivering her own baby in the middle of the night alone because she "didn't want to bother anybody." The El train tracks ran above the street and the "port of entry" for

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_5

Southern Blacks was 63rd Street and Stony Island, the Greyhound bus depot. Poverty and unemployment ruled. The funding designated for children and their mothers was initially titled Aid to Dependent Children, ADC. Technically, the mothers were caretakers; the funding was for the children, not the mothers, although obviously this was a vacuous distinction in conception, but fortunately not in practice. Fathers were not allowed to live in the rundown apartments. Since they were unemployed, if they lived in the home, it was considered fraud. Later, live-in fathers were permitted but only under certain closely circumscribed circumstances. At a certain point, the unfairness was acknowledged and then the funding was reprogramed and renamed AFDC, Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

The University of Chicago was situated close by, just across the Midway, some six blocks away, and the Administration's goal was to move the Woodlawn residents out. The University, to the best of my knowledge, was a large landowner and an active landlord. In response to the threat, the Black community hired Saul Alinsky, a Labor Union organizer, and he helped to both form and forge The Woodlawn Organization, TWO, into a political power to fight back against the housing dislocations. A young coed, Hillary Rodham, wrote her BA dissertation at Wellesley College on Alinsky. Many years later, Mr. Trump criticized President Obama for being an Alinsky supporter. The University was basically isolated, like an island, with Lake Michigan on the east, Woodlawn on the south, and Oakland on the North. For three years I lived in a basement apartment, with iron bars on the windows, on 61st Street. Later, I also lived in the Oakland district. The parents of one of my friends had sold their home to Elijah Mohammed. I lived in a small apartment two blocks away from Temple No. 2 of Islam. Malcolm X frequently visited. The Black Muslim community, with all their women dressed in white, were valiantly trying to establish an independent social and commercial environment. Jesse Jackson lived there as well.

During the same period, a book by Michel Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (1962), had recently been published and it produced a crushing effect on how we viewed ourselves as a nation, as well as politically. It became enormously significant because it brought about a veritable sea change and response from the American public, as well as from President Johnson, which in turn led to the War on Poverty. The concept was genuinely creative and promising. It sought to empower the Black community to help themselves, to become empowered by giving them jobs, the poor helping the poor, rather than being "helped" by

external forces thus providing them with the dignity of sharing in a political and economic independence. In a word, *it was a coherent and comprehensive attack on the shackles of poverty.* It qualitatively shifted away from an external dependency on an anonymous public agency, as it promised to lead to a concentrated autochthonous, multipronged attack from within, powered by the strengths of the residents own abilities. Meanwhile, the city's massive Federal housing projects, Robert Taylor Homes, comprised of twenty square blocks of housing on the South Side of Chicago, and Cabrini Green close to downtown, were struggling as they compounded social problems by confining people together who shared the same disadvantages. The "solution" was tragically one-dimensional and only made the situation worse.

The War on Poverty strategy envisioned a comprehensive and coordinated approach: employment, health, education, a unified political organization, a shared identity, and a common concerted goal. It was to begin with the youngest beneficiaries, preschool children. The Headstart program hired neighborhood women as well as the mothers of the young children, whenever possible, and volunteers. The churches, always the spiritual and social backbone of the Black community, freely offered their facilities. The early education was critical, and I believe it is the only intervention that has continued until even today. The early indoctrination of two-year-old children exposed to readings and stories, engaging in peer social relationships, was assigned to the management and purview of the Urban Progress Center on 63rd Street. In 1966, I was hired as a Headstart social worker and assigned to the Center pretty much across the street from the Midway District welfare office where I had worked the previous year. Unfortunately all the work and hopes vanished a few years later when another war intervened, the Viet Nam conflict.

One day, a social work friend had arranged a blind date for me. We were to meet at Jimmy's bar on Woodlawn and 55th Street. Her name was Ruth, and we drank heavily for the next four nights. On the fourth night, I asked her to marry me, and she said yes. I would have asked her on the first night, but I was afraid she might think I was rushing it. Actually, in existential terms, decisions are not hard. It is making them work that is the most important part. Ruth encouraged me to continue my studies in graduate school and in 1967, I was admitted to the University of California system to pursue my studies in philosophy. As a graduate student, in 1970, I was fortunate enough to have several journal articles published, including "The Synthetic *A Priori* in Plato" (*Dialogue, 1970*), "A Reinterpretation

of Hegel's *Science of Logic"* (*Telos, 1970*), which was followed by "Descartes Bridge to the External World: The Piece of Wax," *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia* (1971), "Hume and Shaftesbury on the Self" (1971) and "The Premise of Kant's Transcendental Analytic" (1973), both published in *The Philosophical Quarterly.* I became absolutely fascinated by the complexity and depth of the varying approaches to the issues of selfhood and personal identity and more specifically the opposing theories of consciousness, between idealism against materialism and rationalism against empiricism. In 1972, having completed my PhD, I was hired by Southern Illinois University and soon thereafter my dissertation, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Soul and Thought from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant,* was published (1974). It traced a Platonic argument from Plato into Kant. At the center of all philosophical thought is the thoroughly Platonic question: "Whether senseless matter *alone* can think?" Strategically I followed Plato's prescient emblazoned flag as it heralded the perennial "Battle between the Gods and the Giants," the metaphysical conflict between "Materialism and Idealism," as my study explored the themes of the active immaterial nature of the human soul, its immortality, the unity of consciousness, personal identity, its immanent temporality, and the embattled realities of matter versus mind, the latter grounded in the premise of idealism, as discussed in Chap. 2. In 1975, I was awarded tenure.

In 1976, while a postdoctoral student at Yale, I read Thomas Wolfe's four novels in rapid succession, as Wolfe thematically tied his life into knots of loneliness. At Yale, I attended John Smith's seminar on Royce and learned about his principle of a voluntaristic idealism, I met Brand Blanshard, and became interested in *The Nature of Thought.* The dye was cast, I knew the themes I wished to pursue. Loneliness apparently had something important to do with individual consciousness and selfhood. Ensconced in a nook in Sterling Library, I feverishly penned an essay and sent it on its lonely way—my little intellectual offspring—to a journal.

In 1977, *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* published my article, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach." It was based on Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's posthumously published paper, "Loneliness," in which she *identified* loneliness and anxiety (1959) and enjoined others in studying the intrinsic connection. In turn, she impressively drew heavily on Gregory Zilboorg's groundbreaking article, "Loneliness," appearing in the *Atlantic Monthly* magazine in 1938, and his *identification of an intrinsic relation between narcissism, loneliness, and sadism.* And it clearly

had Hitler and German Nazism in its sights. Two years later, my study, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* saw the light of day. Whereas both the *Achilles* was essentially a history of ideas effort, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology and Literature* was an attempt combine and fuse a philosophical theory of self-consciousness with the psychological primacy of loneliness. Loneliness became a metaphor of life for me, like a river, at times turbulent and deep, full of voyaging travelers and commerce, and at other times flowing serenely and sadly alone. I began to travel on the river, I became joined to it; it became my life, and it has continued to hold my devoted interest, my anxieties, my hostilities, and my hopes to this day.

Ruth graduated first in her class at SIU's law school, and her choice was to pursue her career as an attorney either in Chicago or San Diego. We chose the latter. For a while, I was able to get part-time employment at various campuses, the University of California at San Diego and later several campuses of the California State University system, but I was I never fortunate enough to land another tenure track position again. From 1978–2018, I taught evening classes in philosophy and the humanities. The result was that, at a certain point, I was forced to return to full-time social work and later I became a practicing clinical therapist from 1976 until 2014. My assignments included a wide variety of publicly funded agencies, including both child and adult protective services. I worked in locked psychiatric facilities, including San Diego Psychiatric Hospital and Loma Portal Psychiatric Child and Adolescent Hospital, Oceanside Mental Health Clinic, all in San Diego County; Westminster Therapeutic Center for Severe Mental Diseases in Orange County, Harbor-UCLA Hospital, LA County Department of Mental Health, the Child and Adolescent Clinic in Long Beach, a couple of adult mental health clinics, all in LA County, and Fairview State Hospital in Costa Mesa. At one point, I was awarded a grant to devise a reading program for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patients. It is a terminal and heart wrenching disease, progressively paralyzing the body, while the mind remains cruelly aware of all that is happening. In the end I found something that helped a little. The sufferers enjoyed purely liberating fictional novels, like *Jonathon Livingston Seagull* by Bach and *The Little Prince* by St. Exupéry. But there was a remarkable 45-minute movie, without any dialogue except for one word, "balloon," *The Red Balloon,* that was so special. It tells the story of a little French schoolboy, befriended by a red balloon, who ceaselessly follows him around, waits for him in the morning, waits for him after school, and

so on. As you can imagine, this leads to the notice of a bunch of bullies who, one day, chase the boy and the balloon through the streets and alleys of Paris until they finally corner him in an open field and begin to throw rocks at the balloon, which in its turn tries to evade the stones. Finally, it is struck and falls to the earth, losing its vital air and expires. The gang retreats and the devastated boy is left all alone in the empty field, when suddenly, all the windows in Paris open wide and hundreds, thousands of balloons come and lift the stricken balloon and as the boy grabs the strings of the balloons, he is carried into the sky and away—free.

I mention all this because as my life went forward, my fascination with theories of consciousness was forced to evolve along with daily exposures to clients suffering from deep-seated issues of loneliness and depression. Friends have told me that my writing is too theoretical and too removed from life. Admittedly, I have conceptualized loneliness and intimacy, but I have also learned to "read" it at a very basic level. Most of us tend not to peer below the surface. But below, consciously, unconsciously, and even subconsciously, there is a dangerous rage and desperation that threatens the lives of both the self and others, intimates as well as strangers.

As a psychotherapist, every subject you see—I won't say "treat"—requires a mental health assessment for depression and suicidality. We recall Bergson's concept of spontaneity, the durational moment, and the existential choice, the decision of either committing suicide or putting it off for perhaps another time. Each moment is unique. To be or not to be? There is no way to predict it. The past is absolutely irrelevant. All that "led up" to the decision is irrelevant. The prior thoughts are not quantitively cumulative. Each holds its own qualitative despair and intensity. One can do it today or tomorrow or never. Do you hospitalize the subject or not? Is s/he exaggerating? Reticent but serious? Has she already decided? Is she merely saying goodbye?

I desperately tried to learn from my experiences. It is quite a challenge to gain insight and understanding into your own loneliness, as well as that of others. Cognitive behavioral therapists are trained to inquire, "And how did that make you feel?," to ask open-ended questions. However, the problem is not how you feel but what you are going to do about it.

During the many years, the assessments began to weigh me down. I was exposed to wide varieties and severities of loneliness; situations involving child abandonment issues, children's physical and emotional abuse, neglect, incest, torture, domestic violence, adulterous situations; elderly widows and widowers living alone in trailer parks, forgotten by their adult

children; suicide attempts and suicide successes; drug addictions, psychoses, bipolar disorders, major depressive disorders, schizophrenia; dealing with entrenched Paranoid Personality Disorders (301.0), Antisocial Personality Disorders (301.7), Borderline Personality Disorders (301.83), Narcissistic Personality Disorders (301.83), and Dependent Personality Disorders (301.6), as well as Intermittent Explosive Disorders (312.34), etc. As a Child Protective Services worker, you have both the legal and the "moral" obligation to remove children from parental custody, but the moral uncertainty is frightening; what if you make a mistake, either in removing them or leaving them? I remember multiple wrenching cases. I remember a little four-year old girl, an incest "survivor," looking like a burn victim, grabbing my thigh.

In other settings, I recall a young discharged prisoner, who was placed in solitary confinement for five years; a 20-year-old female, who had been subjected to paternal incest from the ages of 8 to 16 years, whose father was imprisoned for 8 years, and who upon his release returned to Mexico to start a second family; and a gentle quiet woman in our day treatment program who benefited so much when the group went to the beach to help the pelicans and seabirds, as they were coated with oil. How pleased she was to help other creatures. When she didn't return to the clinic, we learned that she had gone to court about her divorce case, and it had been awarded against her hopes. That night she hung herself.

The experience of my daily exposures to the loneliness of *subjects–not* patients–as manifested by their powerful dynamic feelings of fear and hostility, which often exposed me helplessly to witnessing outbursts of both self-destructive and other-destructive behaviors, dug well below any of my abstract conceptualizations. And then there was the lingering uncertainty, the awesome responsibility of ensuring each child's safety and welfare. Should I have removed the child from her parental custody? If there was a "saving grace" for me, it rested on the insight and understanding it has afforded me in learning things about my self, as well as other selves. Qualitatively it is all about universal truths, about "human nature," truths as opposed to single contingent psychological facts.

Today, currently there are massive killings in the US conducted on a daily basis, and all that the demanding public and all that the reporters want to know is "the motive" of the assailants; the "why." I can tell you "why." The motive is the anger at being lonely, of "being left out," "being rejected," "being "disrespected." The consequence is the murdering of intimates and the indiscriminate killing of strangers, relieving the despair

by punishing others, and discharging the freedom of "nothing left to lose" by wreaking vengeance on the world at large.

On January 6, 2021, why did thousands of Trump followers attack the Capitol? Again, there is a phrase in that song, "freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose." But unpack the deeper meaning, and one will discover the specter of Freud's dynamical conceptions of narcissism and sadism. Many desperately impaired lonely individuals feel that they are "free" to do whatever they damn well please simply because they have been denied their desired and cherished values whatever they may be, which is to be narcissistically recognized above others.

At a certain point, Nietzsche's concept of "resentment" comes into play. People feel left out and "disrespected," and jealousy overwhelms them. They believe people look down on them. Indeed, they are "free" in the very worst way; they have nothing left to lose. Narcissistically, sadistically they want to indiscriminately vent their rage, to hurt others even at the price of giving away their own lives.

Freedom and Evil

In the first chapter, I emphasized the role of epistemic spontaneity in relation to human time-consciousness. In the following I shall primarily connect it to its cognitive as well as ethical implications.

The Homeric myths cite various gods and goddesses and their respective reigns and spheres of influence: Aphrodite as the goddess of Love, Ares as the god of War, Apollo as the god of Truth, Poseidon as the god of the Sea, Zeus as the god of the Sky and Nature, and so on. But they do not cite a god of Evil. In Plato's Myth of Er, there is an element of choice, as the dead choose their next lives but not a free choice in terms of specific acts of good and evil. There is *hybris,* of human thoughts too great for man, as in the case of Oedipus, but not in the sense of creating specific acts of evil, but rather perhaps in the sense of a domineering pride–later the Christian sin of pride. But the connection of evil and sin is a later Christian embellishment.

A common interpretation of the Old Testament is that God created the world, or more grandly the universe, *ex nihilo,* out of nothing, instantaneously, although, of course, the predicate of time is not directly applicable to God; that He created space, time, matter, and each individual soul in accordance with a special metaphysical *and* qualitative order known only to God. Now, none of the ancient Greeks, the Pre-Socratics,

Democritus, Plato, or Aristotle believed in creation out of nothing, nor in freedom of the will, nor in faith, nor in paradoxical truths. Concerning ethical contexts, Aristotle posited man's ability to *voluntarily* strive to choose the mean, moderation, a balance between virtue and vice, good and evil, and common sense and stupidity. He didn't use the term "spontaneity," but that is what he meant. He intended practical, i.e., ethical acts to be grounded in voluntary *choices.*[1] But Hegel deepens the discussion by introducing four Aristotelian forces: *dynamis* (a potentiality), *energeia* (an actuality), *entelecheia* (a completion as a final end is concluded), with all three expressing a "purely spontaneous activity."[2]

By contrast, according to Augustine, God has endowed man with an ethical freedom of the will, the will as distinct from his intellect, as either willing to love God or to deny Him; either to will a surplus of goodness above and beyond the evil in the world; and by choosing and doing so, humans, in their own limited fashion, are able to add to the creation of the substance of goodness in the world. Following Augustine, Descartes separates the will and the intellect. Man can consider a proposition as either true or false, but it is the will that must pronounce the judgment as good or evil. Thus, following Augustine, Descartes essentially defines two roles for the will, an ethical and an epistemic one (Fourth Meditation).

The entire metaphysical issue between materialism and idealism unceasingly spins around on the point of a needle: Can senseless matter *alone* think? Leibniz's conception of the freedom of the will has close affinities to his forerunner, Descartes, in the sense that he posits both an ethical role for the will, as well as an epistemic one in judging truth from falsity. But it is his metaphysical idealism that distinguishes him from his predecessor. According to Leibniz, the monadic soul is both immaterial and active. Each soul Monad expresses a unity of consciousness as it undergoes a continuous and constant altering of perceptual, i.e., temporal changes within its self, within its reflexive field of self-consciousness. Further, we recall,

[1] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1106a ff. Cf., Lloyd, G. E. R. Lloyd, *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 216, 227–229, 230–231; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of His Works & Thought* (New York: Meridian, 1961), 189 ff., 194–196; John Herman Randall, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965) 267–268; Phillip Wheelwright, *Aristotle* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1951), 185–191; and Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford University Press, 1962), 417.

[2] *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), II, 138–139.

that each indivisible "spiritual atom" is "windowless;" nothing enters from without and nothing escapes from within. It follows that all activity must be self-generated, self-caused, i.e., uncaused, *causa sui, sui generis,* independently of any antecedent *external* event. In the *Monadology,* Leibniz follows this theme with its analytic distinctions (Chap. 1).

> There is, then, in the system of monadic substances, a perfectly continuous and infinite gradation of intentions, that is to say, of [changing] perception, or representation, combined with apperception [i.e., the unity of self-consciousness] or spontaneous change.[3]

In his commentary on the text, Professor Latta offers the following interpretation. Leibniz is following Aristotle in regarding freedom as consisting essentially in both spontaneity and intelligence. But the intelligence is not intended as merely an intellectual enterprise but also as a choosing of good over evil.

> And all Monads alike have spontaneity (for they unfold the whole of their life from within themselves), the degrees of freedom belonging to any [soul] Monad depends on the degree of its intelligence, that is to say, on the degrees of [clarity in] its perceptions. Similarly in human beings, an action is free in proportion to the clearness and distinctness [Descartes] of the reasons which determine it. (145)

Ideally for Leibniz, what will spiritually follow is the victory of goodness over evil. Science is powerless in this battle.

> The conclusion of the *Monadology* is one of the triumphant achievements of the philosophical spirit. Augustine's *City of God,* which is there presented is free from every theological and ecclesiastical prejudice. It is the consummation of universal creative activity, the final cause of existence, the supreme manifestation of wisdom revealed in the emergence of a moral order based upon and continuous with God's natural order. In whatever light we regard this conception today, with our widened outlook and newer science, in retrospect it stands out as a great emancipation of the human spirit. *The City of*

[3] *Leibniz: The Monadology,* translated and Introduction by Robert Latta (Oxford University Press, 1968), 39. The concept of spontaneity in philosophy and dynamics in psychiatry are closely related; they are both defined in terms of interior sources of origination within consciousness as opposed to materialism and empiricism both of which ground perception in the external motions of material objects.

> *God,* which Leibniz extols, "this truly universal monarchy," as far excels the ideal of St. Augustine, who provided its prototype.[4]

By the same token, existential freedom is graced by Christianity and Judaism, by Blaise Pascal, Soren Kierkegaard, Feodor Dostoyevsky, Gabriele Marcel, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber, as Professor Carr's quotation underscores in supplanting our contemporary sciences, as well as by the pessimistic atheisms of Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Leibniz's principle of spontaneity is perfectly consistent with existential philosophy. And interestingly, Leibniz's dynamic principle is also compatible with psychoanalysis for, as we have seen, Leibniz is also interpreted as an early forerunner of dynamic psychiatry and the unconscious (Chap. 1).[5] In many ways, Kant's version of subjective idealism is also indebted to Leibniz's paradigm of monadic self-consciousness. "It is not unreasonable to suppose that Kant, under the influence of Leibniz, continued to regard reality as composed of monads, although he became convinced that the proofs advanced by Leibniz were fallacious and indeed that knowledge of ultimate realty is unattainable by man."[6] The role of spontaneity is also critical in Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative in his response to the existence of human evil. Again, it is the act of spontaneity that triggers the processes of reflexive self-consciousness by initiating "a spontaneity of knowledge in distinction from the receptivity of thought" (*Critique,* A 126), as well as the constitutive acts responsible for his categorical imperative in terms of doing good or evil.[7] Kant's

[4] Carr, Herbert Wildon, *Leibniz* (New York: 1960), 127.

[5] Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 312, 624, 628.

[6] Paton, H. J., *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), I, 183; cf., G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), "It is most plausibly suggested by Professor Paton that Kant, under the influence of Leibniz, still conceived the individual mind as a monad" (99–100).

[7] Kant also offers a remark on Leibniz's concept of evil in the *Critique* (A 273–B 329). On Kant's comments concerning human spontaneity in relation to evil, confer H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (New York: Dover, 1967), 60, 142–143, 213 ff.; and Lewis White Beck, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 136, 177, 184, 194–195, 203, 227; and cf., T. C. Williams' discussion "of the ethical as employed in the spontaneous activity of practical reason," and *passim* in *The Concept of the Categorical Imperative: A Study of the Place of the Categorical Imperative in Kant's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 97.

principle of spontaneity also rules in his ethical writings, as it is underscored in the following passage.

> It is the conception that we have a direct experience of our own spontaneous activity as a substance. This experience is neither a sensuous intuition nor an abstract thought. Kant never tells us what its epistemic character is, but that it occurs is a fact to which the *Critique of Pure Reason* does scant justice. Such awareness of one's spontaneity and the attendant presupposition of freedom is found even in the act of theoretical thinking, though we can use this conception of the self as a thinking substance in no theoretical explanation of the inner life. But the clearest evidence of one's spontaneous freedom—sometimes said to be the only evidence—is one's awareness of obligation. (Beck, 194–195)

And:

> THE SPONTANEITY OF MIND. *Intellectual spontaneity.* Kant's ethical doctrine maintains that pure practical reason can spontaneously order and regulate, in accordance with its own principle, the human maxims and actions which are based ultimately on desire. This doctrine can be best understood when we have grouped similar doctrines which he propounds in regard to the spontaneity of mind as manifested in other spheres of activity. In the sphere of knowledge, we should, according to Kant, know nothing either of objects or of ourselves apart from the spontaneous activity of imagination and understanding. Mere sensations passively received, and in that sense as given, have in themselves no [reflexive nor intentional] reference either to objects or to a self; nor could knowledge either of self or of objects ever arise from any loose association of images or even from memory of successive associations [contra Hume]. The imagination must spontaneously unify sensations in one time and space and in so doing give rise to transcendental schemata corresponding to certain principles of combination inherent the understanding. (Paton, 142–143)

And he concludes the passage by citing Kant's aesthetic spontaneity: "Kant also recognizes a further spontaneity of the imagination in the experience of beauty" (ibid).

> If we seek the result of the preceding analysis, we find that everything runs up to the concept of taste [i.e., aesthetic feeling]—that it is a faculty for judging an object in reference to the imagination's *free conformity to law.* Now, if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its

> freedom, it is in the first place not regarded as [empirically] reproductive, as it is subject to the laws of association, but as [creatively] productive and spontaneous as the arbitrary forms of possible intuition. (Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* Section 22)

I mention these judgments of value because I wish to emphasize the richness of human values over the paucity of the neurosciences.

By contrast, for materialism, mechanism, determinism, empiricism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences, the required initiating motion for human *perception* is *external* to the brain. *The consequence is that there is no evil! Or, for that matter, beauty either.*

Similarly, Fichte borrows Kant's spontaneity of self-consciousness in order to ground his principle of an *ethical* metaphysical voluntarism throughout his *Science of Knowledge*.[8]

Hegel, in the *Science of Logic,* seeks to distinguish his principle of a *dialectical* spontaneity from Kant's premise of a *transcendental* spontaneity. The critical issue between them is the ultimate determination of what is the *absolute initiating factor* for their contrasting systems. What is it that initiates the "movement of thought" required for Kant's reflexive self-consciousness? In criticizing Kant, Hegel enlists the aid of Friedrich Jacoby, a major critic of Kant, who is an advocate for the immediacy of feeling and faith, as he rejects the assumption that Kant's *prima facie* mediate self-conscious thinking is the primary force in man. Specifically, he is objecting to Kant's effort to advance s*ynthetically* from abstractions, i.e., pure empty categories to something "concrete" and "determinate" beyond the self by invoking the *a priori syntheses* of self-consciousness *alone* as epistemically self-sufficient.

> The most eloquent, perhaps most forgotten accounts of the impossibility of advancing from an [empty] abstraction to something beyond it, and of uniting the two, are given by Jacoby in support of his polemic against the

[8] Fichte, J. G., *Science of Knowledge,* translated Peter Heath (New York: Meredith, 1970), 49; cf., 97, 135. Fichte cites Leibniz throughout the text. Cf., Jon Mills, who describes "Fichte's notion of the absolute I (*Ich*), that posits itself into existence and declares its being ex nihilo." This declaration demonstrates the godlike quality of spontaneity as the 'I' creates its very self"; Jon Mills, *Origins: On the Genesis of Psychic Reality* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 8; and consult also, Jon Mills, *The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 32–45; and cf. Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review,* 66:4 (1979–80), which discusses Fichte.

> Kantian *a priori synthesis* of self-consciousness. He defines the task as one of demonstrating the originating of the producing of a synthesis in a *pure somewhat* be it consciousness, space, or time. Let space be a *one;* time be a *one* [Kant's intuitions]; consciousness a *pure somewhat, a pure one*. Now do say, how any of these three 'ones' *purely* turns itself internally into a [discrete, determinate] manifold: each is a one and no *other,* an-all-the sameness; just *selfhood* in general without a he-hood, she-hood, for these slumber together with the *he, she, it* in the infinite zero indeterminate from each and every determinate being and has yet to proceed! (*Science of Logic,* 21:83)[9]

Basically, Hegel is challenging Kant's theory of consciousness as impotently abstract and empty, whereas his is both concrete and full. Nevertheless, like Kant before him, he also recruits the element, the act of spontaneity.

> It is after this fashion that I have tried to present consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Consciousness is Spirit as knowing which is concrete and engrossed in externality; but the schema *of movement* of this concrete knowing (like the development of all physical and intellectual life) depends entirely on the nature of the pure essentialities which make up the content of Logic. Consciousness, as manifested Spirit, which as it develops frees itself from its immediacy and external conditions, becomes Pure Knowing, which takes as object its knowing those pure essentialities as they are in and for themselves. They are pure thought. Spirit thinking its own *mediate* [i.e., relational] essence. Their spontaneous [dialectical] movement is their spiritual life: by this movement philosophy constitutes itself; and philosophy is just this exhibition of the movement (Johnston and Struthers translation: "self-movement" in the Di Giovanni translation (21.8; cf., "the connection contained within a concrete something, within a synthetic unity, is necessary only in so far as it is not to be found already given but is produced [i.e., created] rather by the spontaneous return of the [temporal] moments back into this unity"). (*Science of Logic,* 21.62; brackets mine)

Most simply put, thought moves itself; for neuroscience, the brain is moved by the physical motions of external material objects. In this fashion, Hegel tries to separate himself from Kant's subjective idealism by criticizing it as abstract and empty, whereas (presumably) his objective

[9] Hegel, G. W. F., *Science of Logic,* translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York: Macmillan, 1951); George Wilhelm Hegel, *The Science of Logic,* translated by George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

idealism is empirically concrete in some (presumably) different way. It is true, however, that Kant ushers in his philosophy of mind with the pure intuitions of space and time in the Aesthetic, whereas Hegel commences with Sense-Certainty. In any case, all forms of rationalism, idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism are collectively grounded, constituted in acts of pure uncaused spontaneity.

Both Kant and Hegel endorse the epistemic concept of spontaneity, for Kant it is the source for his transcendental idealism, whereas for Hegel it is the origin for his dialectical idealism, but the greater difference is that Kant recruits it for his ethical principle and Hegel completely ignores it.

In the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique,* Kant proposes a line of inquiry that is both seductive and provocative when he confesses how difficult his intellectual labors had been in forging his Transcendental Analytic under the title of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. The term Deduction is not intended as a mathematical deduction but rather as a justification executed by his transcendental approach, as it relies on his "Copernican Revolution" whereby the external, phenomenal world is compelled to conform to the innate structures of the active mind. But then he proceeds to distinguish *two possible* Deductions, an "objective" and a "subjective" one, the first one is already accomplished but the second is pending for future explorations and explications.

> The one [already presently accomplished] refers to [the conceptual, formal] objects of pure understanding [i.e., the categories] and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its *a priori* [synthetic] concepts. It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so it deals with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it. For the chief [transcendental] question is always simply this:—what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not:—*how is the faculty of thought itself possible?* The latter is, as it were the search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent somewhat hypothetical in character (though as I shall show elsewhere, it is not so); and I would appear to be taking the liberty simply of expressing an *opinion*. (first *Critique,* A xvi–xvii)

Empiricism assumes that external motions directly cause our brains to react to physical stimuli. But Kant's transcendental methodology asks,

how is self-consciousness itself—*not merely perception*—possible? And he answers, in no uncertain voice, that it is possible if, and only if, the mind *already* has *both* spontaneity *and* pure pre-existent innate forms, relational structures to fit and order the incoming sensations. But now, quite suddenly and dramatically, there is the possibility that there may be something even more basic and primitive: "thought itself" without structures (?). What Kant is suggesting is that there is a source, a force of consciousness *below, hidden, and inaccessible which undergirds* his formal transcendental and logical categories *both* below *and* before they have become activated. This would involve a completely foreign investigation into an unfathomable subconscious and not simply an unconscious in Leibniz and Freud's retrievable sense.[10] Kant's promise to investigate how "thought itself is possible" was never fulfilled. But *if* such thought(s) exist, what would be its (their?) relation(s)—if any—to spontaneity?

Schopenhauer not only seized upon this theoretical possibility of a *subconscious,* a reality well below the level of the Leibnizian and Freudian mnemonic unconscious, and accordingly he promoted it—or rather more properly sunk it—into an absolutely cosmic, inaccessible, unknowable, irretrievable, and irrational Will, one which is totally immune and protected and safely hidden from the peering, myopic eyes of a scientific determinism, as he elaborately systematized it into the cornerstone of his metaphysics. It was his "solution" to the problem of the existence of human evil. The individual does not "perceive," does not "know" the essence of this noumenal reality, which is (presumably) one, but only its dualistic appearance, its masquerading manifestations, which he falsely beholds as separating his self from the world and the good from the bad. The evil that one does is in mankind, the roots of the evil that one inflicts on others, as well as the evil that one condemns as if in the hands of others, the envy, the yearnings, the sexual lust, the desires, the egoistic and narcissistic cravings, all these delusions, including the false belief that the self is separate from the world, that he is not the world, and the world is not him, all this comes from the illusion of Maya, from the illusory separation between the I from reality. Trapped in the *principium individuationis,* shrouded in the veil of Maya, the ego sees all other forms of life as masks and phantoms, and the self is simply incapable of ascribing anything like

[10] Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 263–265; according to Kemp Smith, Kant, throughout the *Critique,* juggles the distinction between subjective idealism and phenomenalism.

the same importance or seriousness to others as to his own self. Are you not the only thing that matters? You are the navel of the world. Such is the conviction of his native, unbroken, and unenlightened egoism and narcissism.

Both Kant and Schopenhauer posit a noumenal reality, in principle an unknowable realm of super-sensuous existence. Kant invokes it for ethical purposes, as he postulates the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, which leaves untouched our empirical and phenomenal realm of Newtonian science and ordinary human consciousness. But Schopenhauer seizes the noumenal possibility and transforms it into an intrinsically unknowable force, an irrational Will. It is not only metaphysically "responsible" for all the evil in the world but "It" also noumenally "grounds"—*not causes,* causes imply control and predictability—all the phenomenal appearances of nature, including space, time, matter, gravity, and even human behavior. This is a form of metaphysical spontaneity which *appears* to human consciousness as scientifically deterministic to us, but it is only a cruel illusion. For Schopenhauer, "our world," instead of being the best of all possible worlds, is the very worst of all conceivable worlds.

> But against the palpably sophistical proofs of Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds, we may even oppose seriously and honestly the proof that it is the worst of all possible worlds. Now this world is arranged as it had to be if it were capable of continuing with great difficulty to exist; if it were a little worse, it would be no longer capable of continuing to exist. Consequently, since a worse world could not continue to exist, it is absolutely impossible; and so this world itself is the worst of all possible worlds.[11]

In place of Freud's narcissism and sadism, Schopenhauer cites the innate egoism of human beings.

> Since the Id stands for the untamed passions and is the seat of instincts, it is similar in its basic irrationality to the imperious Will in Schopenhauer. Jung points out this crucial similarity. In suggesting that the unconscious strives for boundless and immediate satisfaction without regard for others, and Freud agrees, says Jung, with Schopenhauer, 'who says of the egoism of the

[11] Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation,* translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958), II, 583.

> blind World-Will that it is so strong that a man could slay his brother merely to grease his boots with his brother's fat.'[12]

But this is precisely the problem. If the irrational Will is the ultimate unknowable reality and all natural phenomenal appearances, including material motion and universal gravity, as well as all human behavior, are *indirectly* "influenced" by the Will, then no one is ethically responsible for their behavior. In effect, Schopenhauer wishes both to have his metaphysical cake and eat is as well.

In the same anthology of commentary essays on Schopenhauer just cited, Wayne Sheeks highlights the noumenal internal inconsistencies in Schopenhauer's thinking, in "Schopenhauer's Solution of the Intellect-Will Problem."

> Since according to Schopenhauer, the Will is the Thing-in-Itself or the essence of the [noumenal] World and the visible world is the phenomenon or Idea or mirror of the Will and all types of human knowledge of the intellect relate to the phenomenal world and are only possible through the [causal] principle of sufficient reason, then how is any knowledge of the Will possible? How can the intellect affirm a Will which pervades all, yet is not cognizable by the usual method [of science]? In other words, in what sense can an intellect affirm or deny a Will when the Will Itself seems to stand in the noumenal World outside the realm of the intellect? (op. cit., Sheeks, 68–69)

And the answer is simply Schopenhauer cannot; his five distinct theses are self-contradictory and irreconcilable. Consider.

1. The intellect cannot know the Will as the Thing-in-Itself by the usual method [of science] in acquiring knowledge.
2. The intellect can know the Will as the Thing-in-Itself.
3. The intellect is the servant of the Will.
4. The intellect can function free from the service to the Will.
5. The intellect can quiet and stifle the Will (Sheeks, 70–71).

Augustine offered a much simpler answer. The evil is in man. The original sin is lain at man's doorstep.

[12] Gupta, R. K., "Freud and Schopenhauer," in *Schopenhauer: His Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 227–228.

To be sure, the freedom of the will continues to function in its primary role in epistemic and ethical contexts, but as we have repeatedly emphasized, the act of spontaneity is, *in its essence,* unpredictable. In Kant, we recall, the will fosters the transcendental forms, whereas in Hegel it grounds his dialectical forms. But beyond that, theoretically it is multidimensional, offering itself in various theological, metaphysical, aesthetic, phenomenological, and existential contexts, as well as others. And consider, for a moment, Thomas Kuhn's study describing scientific revolutions, as a new way of "looking" at nature, or man, through "paradigm shifts." The shift to a new *intellectual* theoretical system, always involves a *qualitative* shift, a switch, which is much more than simply a quantitative addition of more facts. It is a *qualitative vision* (76).[13]

Often, the facts are the same, but the "picture," the imagery, and the conceptualization exhibits a completely novel meaning or essence. For example, we can cite the shift from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican system of astronomy, as described and executed in Alexandre Koyre's *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*.[14] Spontaneously, quite suddenly and inexplicably we "see" astronomical reality in a completely different "light." It is similar to the shift in Gestalt psychology when we look at a silhouetted figure and at first see the outlines of a duck and then suddenly it looks like a rabbit; or it looks like the outlines of a vase and suddenly it appears as a profile of a woman's visage (85). It is not a factual change, but rather a qualitative revelation. As Kuhn reflects, "Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change" (90–91). But paradigms and first principles are radically important in how they affect our lives and forge our decisions. They are revolutionary conversions, and we recall Augustine in his garden when he hears the voice of a child beckoning him to read a wind-blown passage in his Bible and suddenly, he realizes the limitations of Manichean materialism and determinism, as in the same moment he spontaneously espouses the existence of an all-consuming and pervasive spiritual reality, while denying his previous metaphysical dualism of a co-equal-evil-goodness "view" of reality.

[13] Kuhn, Thomas, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago Press, 1962), 76.

[14] Koyre, Alexandre, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 19–20, 68–69.

In Husserl's case, we recall his invocation of spontaneity in Sections 23 and 28 in *Ideas,* which we covered in the first chapter, all of which brings us up to Sartre's contribution to the freedom-value discussion. Again, we can avail ourselves by citing his many references in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, as he combines it in promoting his defining principle in *Being and Nothingness.*

> It follows that my freedom is the unique foundation of my values and that *nothing,* absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while itself without values, without foundation. It is anguished in addition because values, due to the fact that they are essentially revealed to a freedom, cannot disclose themselves without being at the same time "put into question" for the possibility of overturning the scale of values appear complimentarily as *my* possibility. It is anguish before values which is the recognition of the ideality of values.[15]

"I am condemned to freedom." This *principle* echoes Sartre's insistence, in *Existentialism Is a Humanism,* when he defines the three *existential*—as opposed to epistemic, ethical, aesthetic, etc.—categories of human existence, as consisting of and constituting a threefold dynamic: *anguish* because we are "condemned to freedom"; *forlornness* because we are absolutely and singularly alone; and *despair* because both the universe and man are fundamentally meaningless. Whatever meaning exists, it is simply because an individual has contingently affirmed it and it only lasts and exists so long as s/he asserts it.

Let me conclude my discussion of epistemic spontaneity, as opposed to ethical free will—with Bergson's concept of duration. Unlike Sartre's empty, vacuous field of an "open" consciousness, not dissimilar to the Cartesian metaphor of a translucent awareness, according to Bergson, self-consciousness is chock-full, a plenum of immediate sensory qualia. As Bergson states:

[15] Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness,* translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 47. Sartre's discussion of spontaneity is fully treated in *The Transcendence of the Ego;* whereas his consciousness is vacuous, we shall see that Bergson's is more in the nature of a plenum.

> We know force only through the witness of consciousness, and consciousness does not assert, does not even understand, the absolute determination, now, of actions that are still to come: that is all experience teaches us. And if we hold by experience, we should say that we feel ourselves free, that we perceive force, rightly or wrongly, as free spontaneity.[16]

This is *pure* temporal *duration*. It is temporal but not extended, not continuous; it can even be the *instant* of a decision.

> The relation of inner causality is purely *dynamic* and has no analogy with the relation of two external phenomena which [empirically, causally] condition one another. For as the latter are capable of recurring in a homogeneous [external] space, their relation can be expressed in terms of a [causal] law, whereas deep-seated psychic states occur once in consciousness and will never occur again…Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs. This relation is indefinable, just because we *are* free. For we can analyze a [physical] thing [or an event because it has parts], but not a process; we can break up extensity, but not duration. Or, if we persist in analyzing it, we unconsciously transform the process into a thing and duration into extensity. By the very fact of breaking up concrete [instantaneous, momentary] time, we set out its moments in homogeneous space; in place of the doing, we put the already done; by stereotyping the activity of the self, we see spontaneity settle down into inertia [and determinism] and freedom into necessity. (219–220; italics mine)

We recall Ellenberger's provision that Leibniz's conception of dynamism issues directly from the self (*opus cit.,* 289–291; 312, 624, 628). Each *decisional* moment of self-consciousness, each *durational* moment is temporally unextended and therefore absolutely unique, unrelated, and unrepeatable. Imagine a person contemplating suicide. "To be or not to be." They have considered it often before. At each past moment, it could have been done. But it was not. The history of those past moments has absolutely no relevance to the immediacy of the present situation. Each moment of past duration is unique and gone forever and unrepeatable. And each new moment is unpredictable. The new decision can be singly but never "redone." Its qualitative existence is discontinuously postponed; that opportunity is gone forever. It can only be done absolutely anew and

[16] Bergson, Henri, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness,* translated by F. L. Pogson (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 216–217.

when (if) done, then it is perforce eternally free and done forever. But be advised; the durational moment is "full" with the texture of reality and the freely acting "whole self."

I have worked in both multiple psychiatric outpatient clinics and inpatient hospitals. I was assigned to do mental health evaluations, assessments. The most serious critical symptom of a major depressive disorder is suicidal ideation. Over many years I have worked in a number of mental health facilities and with fellow workers, where we performed endless suicidal assessments and post-treatment failure briefings. Just as there had been failures in prior Child Protective Services settings. Predictions are frequently uncertain and hence unfortunately often dangerous. Depressed and psychotic individuals may need to be involuntarily hospitalized, or a child removed from parental custody. When subjects are hospitalized, their confidence in their coping skills is weakened. When a child is removed from the home, the family is weakened. The worker continuously lives with the anxiety that whispers to him or her, should I have removed the child from his mother? And there other are times when children have died, and lawsuits are filed when an "egregious" mistake has been made. And I have known social workers who have quit simply because a child died on their caseload.

Once more, science per se has no values. It merely deals with facts and the decisions; the measurements, the computations are merely neutral and pragmatically instrumental. But we can also rejoin and regain Hume's positive empiricist outlook on *human nature*, his declaration concerning the "ought" and the "is" distinction (*Treatise,* 469); we can also reaffirm Kant's categorical imperative (*Critique of Practical Reason*); and even Weber's scientific and political admonition by defining his schismatic chasm between science and ethics; fact and value; and the Is and the Ought.

The History of Ideas Approach

In proceeding, it is important to distinguish three scholarly disciplines and see wherein ours fits. Intellectual history studies a particular historical period, as for example, the eighteenth century, and it discusses the prevailing sciences, the ethics, the politics, the literature, the art, the culture, the conflicts, the wars, the aspirations, etc. of the times. By contrast, the history of philosophy treats individual thinkers separately and consecutively, their thoughts and systems, as for example the rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz versus the empiricism of Locke and Hume. Currently, I

happen to be reading a well-written and researched study by Dennis Schulting, *Kant's Radical Subjectivism*.[17] His goal is to demonstrate that spontaneity is the key to understanding Kant's principle of reflexive self-consciousness. And I agree. But it goes "nowhere." It concentrates on contemporary interpretations offered by a variety of noted scholars, and it is well argued and persuasive. But it is too much of a "family affair." Virtually incestuous. By contrast, the "Republic of Letters" in the seventeenth century, before Kant, who was the first professional philosopher, philosophical issues were wide open discussions and arguments spanned an enormous range of interests, methodologies, principles, paradigms, and talents. However, since the 1950s, with the progressive advent of "professionalism," philosophy is currently dominated by a "publish or perish" rule. By contrast, my adopted discipline pursues a history of ideas format. Certain critical and highly pivotal Ideas—like materialism and idealism, good and evil, and loneliness and intimacy—have a life of their own independent of their adherents. The history of ideas, by its very essence, is interdisciplinary; it intrinsically concentrates on a single Idea, Lovejoy's "unit idea," a concept, principle, argument, paradigm, etc., as it develops through time. One can erroneously claim that science, *as a whole,* is interdisciplinary, but each *particular* Aristotelian science stands isolated and alone, astronomy and biology share no common ground and science is not interdisciplinary.

The discipline of the history of ideas was virtually created out of whole cloth by A. O. Lovejoy, the author of the *Great Chain of Being*. As he emphasizes, the "unit idea" must remain the same. For instance, the concept of God in Aristotle, Augustine, and Spinoza are so varied and diverse that it would be futile to treat their works as conforming to Lovejoy's criterion requiring a "unit idea." But it is precisely because of this latitude that my study, starting with loneliness and intimacy, has been able to concentrate on the issues of loneliness and intimacy as historically continuous. Both continue as singularly unique *unit ideas*; as identifiable motivational

[17] Schulting, Dennis, *Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), *passim;* cf. Ben Mijuskovic, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, Praeger, ABC-Clio, 2015), discussion of spontaneity in regard to Kant's transcendental categories, time-consciousness and the unity of consciousness, 62–63, 99, 155–156, 158; and *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* Leiden: Brill, 2018), on spontaneity and reflexive self-consciousness, *passim,* which sets the discussion in a History of Ideas setting as opposed to history of philosophy context.

passions, as well as *universal* conceptual meanings. In the *Symposium* of Plato, in Aristophanes' discourse on the essence, on the universal nature of loneliness and intimacy, he poignantly describes our longing when we are separated from our "other half," and each half alone, both feels and knows what Plato is expressing in the dialogue (*Symposium*, 189d ff.). It is manifestly clear that he speaks for all ages and times. And when Aristotle, in the *Politics,* utters the phrase that a man who does not need fellowship and society is either a beast or a god, we immediately concur in the universality of his expression (*Politics,* 125a).

Although I admire the scholarship, the detail, the discipline, the depth, and the intensity required when the practice of the history of philosophy is competently pursued, and I have certainly sought to practice it myself, often it seems parochially constrained among a seclusive group of theoretical intimates.

But in returning to our history of ideas discipline, from the very beginning, it was clear that in Western culture, there were two opposing metaphysical viewpoints. Plato in his dialogue, the *Sophist,* presciently describes what he foresees as a perennial Battle between the Gods and the Giants, the Materialists and the Idealists, and it continues to serve as the dividing line between the theoreticians who seek to penetrate the origins of loneliness and intimacy by turning to human consciousness rather than to human behavior.

246A. Stranger: What we shall see is something like a battle of Gods and Giants going on between them over their quarrel about reality.

Theaetetus: How so?

Stranger: One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands; for they lay hold of every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the touch. They define reality as the same thing as body, and as soon as one of the opposite party asserts that anything without a body is real, they are utterly contemptuous and will not listen to another word.

Theaetetus: The people you describe are certainly a formidable crew. I have met quite a number of them before now.

Stranger: Yes, and accordingly their adversaries are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, while maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in certain intelligible and bodily Forms. In the clash of argument, they shatter and pulverize those bodies which their opponents wield, and what those others allege to be true reality they call, not real being, but a sort of moving process of becoming. On this issue an interminable battle is always going on between the two camps. (*Sophist,* 245E–246E)

This is the conflict between values and science; between the idealism of Parmenides and the dualism of Plato against the materialism and the void of Democritus and the flux of Heraclitus; and between Hegel's being, nothing, and becoming. But more essentially and simply, the battle reduces to a conflict between materialism and idealism, as the two camps argue about a single principle: *Can senseless matter alone think?* Philosophically and historically, it pits Plato against Democritus; Plotinus against Epicurus; Augustine and Aquinas against Skeptics and Atheists; Ficino against Valla; Jakob Boehme against Francis Bacon; Descartes against Hobbes; Leibniz against Locke; Kant against Hume; Hegel against Marx; Sartre against Ayer; Copleston against Russell; and so on.

Consider for a moment, that in order for the human psyche, soul, cogito, monad, self, mind, or ego to be *self*-aware of loneliness, self-consciousness must possess and exhibit the ability to achieve reflexive judgmental acts. This principle is already present in Plato, and it is the necessary and universal foundation for both subjective (and objective) idealism. And the same principle is repeated later in Descartes: "I think=I am lonely"; and in Kant, "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations or otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me."

Plato's version follows.

Socrates: And do you accept my description of the process of thinking?
Theaetetus: How do you describe it?
Socrates: As a discourse the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering…but I have a notion that, when the mind is [actively, spontaneously] thinking, it is simply talk-

> ing [reflexively, self-consciously] to itself, asking questions and answering them, and saying [i.e., judging] Yes or No. When it reaches a decision—which may come slowly or in a sudden rush—when doubt is over and the two voices affirm the same thing, that we call its judgement. So I should describe thinking as [a reflexive] discourse, and as a statement pronounced, but not aloud to someone else, but silently to oneself. (*Theaetetus*, 189E–190)

And:

Theaet: Your description could not be better, Socrates.
Socr: We are to conclude, then, that false judgements do exist in us?
Theaet: Most Certainly.
Socr: And true ones also, I suppose?
Theaet: True ones also.
Socr: At last, then, we believe we have reached a satisfactory agreement that both these kinds of judgments exist?
Theaet: Emphatically. (*Theaetetus*, 195B)

And again.

Stranger: And next, what of thinking and judgment and appearing? Is it not now clear that all these things occur in our minds both as true and false?
Theaetetus: How so?
Stranger: You will see more easily if you begin by letting me give you an account of their nature and how each differs from the others.
Theaetetus: Let me have it.
Stranger: Well thinking and discourse are the same thing except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind [spontaneously reflexively] with itself without a spoken word.
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: Whereas the[temporal] stream which flows from the mind to the lips with sound is called discourse.
Theaetetus: True.

Stranger: And further there is a thing which we know occurs in discourse.
Theaetetus: Namely.
Stranger: Assertion and denial. (*Sophist*, 263D-E)[18]

Obviously, In Plato's description, the entire activity is *temporally* transpiring within an immaterial psyche. There are two judgments clashing against each other, and the mind must choose between them. It must be a mind that has the ability to hold the two opposing statements, first the yea and second the nay apart, but then thirdly act and judge between them. During the process, all four acts, concepts, and judgments must be synthetically bound, held together, unified in the same identical self-consciousness. But then try accounting for this cognitive activity by employing an empirical principle and operating solely with distinct and passive sensations alone, or with separate neurons and electrical synapses. *As for Plato, similarly for Descartes and Kant, all reflexive self-consciousness is judgmental. And judgment can apply to facts as well as values.*

So how does this apply to the statement, "I am alone and lonely"?

> There is another element, however, which makes the need to belong so compelling; the fact of subjective self-consciousness, of the faculty of thinking by which man is aware of himself as an individual entity, different from nature and other people. His existence confronts man with a problem which is essentially human: by being aware of himself as distinct from nature and other people–by being aware of death, sickness, aging, he necessarily feels his insignificance and smallness in comparison with the universe and all others that are not "he." Unless he belonged somewhere, unless his life had some meaning and direction, he would be like a particle of dust and overcome by his individual insignificance. *He would be unable to relate himself to any system which would give him meaning and direction to his life, he would be filled with doubt and this doubt would eventually paralyze his ability to act–that is to live*.[19]

What Fromm is saying is that the human being is the only animal creature that can meaningfully create a value system that can make one's life either meaningful or meaningless.

[18] *Plato's Theory of Knowledge; The Theaetetus and the Sophist,* edited by F. M. Cornford (Percy Lund, Humphries, & Co., 1964), 228–232.

[19] Fromm, Erich, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Avon Books, 1969), 36, italics mine.

Conclusion

I have tried to the best of my ability to convince you, the reader, that the ideas, principles, and arguments I have presented have been current from the very inception of Western thought and culture, from Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle on through and now past the "scientific revolution." Presently, the empirical sciences, especially the behavioral and neuroscientific, are not only morally bankrupt but dangerous. If all natural and human events are predictable, then it follows that all events are controllable as well, either by force or by propaganda and indoctrination.

Each of us is constantly, continuously left with three metaphysical or theological choices: either (a) materialism, science, determinism, prediction; (b) religion, ethical freedom of the will; or (c) humanism and epistemic spontaneity. If we choose (a), then there is nothing left to choose. But if we choose (b) or (c), we must go on and choose either good or evil and always unfortunately the possibility of both.

Bibliography

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* in *Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard Peter McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

Beck, Lewis White, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Bergson, Henri, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness,* translated by F. L. Pogson (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

Carr, Herbert Wildon, *Leibniz* (New York: Dover 1960), 60, 94.

Cornford, F. M., ed., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge; The Theaetetus and the Sophist* (Percy Lund, Humphries, & Co., 1964), 228–232.

Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Fichte, J. G., *Science of Knowledge,* translated Peter Heath (New York: Meredith, 1970)

Fromm, Erich, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Avon Books, 1969).

Gupta, R. K., "Freud and Schopenhauer," in *Schopenhauer: His Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980).

Hegel, G. W. F., *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).

Hegel, G. W. F., *Science of Logic,* translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York: Macmillan, 1951).

Hegel, G. W. F., *Science of Logic,* translated by George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Jaeger, Werner, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
Kemp Smith, Norman, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).
Koyre, Alexandre, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
Kuhn, Thomas, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Leibniz: The Monadology,* translated and Introduction by Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
Lloyd, G. E. R., *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 216, 227–229, 230–231.
Lovejoy, A. O., *The Great Chain of Being* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, ABC-Clio, 2015).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review,* 66:4 (1979–80).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis* (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
Mills, Jon, *The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002).
Mills, Jon, *Origins: On the Genesis of Psychic Reality* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).
Mure, G. R. G., *An Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
Paton, H. J., *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965).
Paton, H. J., *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (New York: Dover, 1967).
Plato, *Sophist,* in *Plato: The Collected Works*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon, 1966).
Plato, *Symposium,* in *Plato: The Collected Works*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon, 1966).
Plato, *Theaetetus,* in *Plato: The Collected Works*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon, 1966).
Randall, John Herman, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
Ross, W. D., *Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of His Works & Thought* (New York: Meridian, 1961).
Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness,* translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).
Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation,* translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958).

Schulting, Dennis, *Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Sheeks, Wayne. "Schopenhauer's Solution of the Intellect-Will Problem," in *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex, UK: Harvester Press), 70–71.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existential Theory of Consciousness,* translated by Forrest William (New York: Noonday Press, 1962).

Wheelwright, Phillip, *Aristotle* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1951).

Williams, T. C., *The Concept of the Categorical Imperative: A Study of the Place of the Categorical Imperative in Kant's Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 97.

CHAPTER 6

Ethical Principles, Criteria, and the Meaning of Human Values

In Western thought, ever since the scriptures of Zoroaster, we have been confronted with ethical choices. Science may disregard and dismiss them, but it does so by devaluing all values and merely tending to facts. Ethics, as a formal discipline, involves the study of varying competitive principles and judgments concerning moral values. In Western thought, as early as Aristotle, he addresses ethical issues as a subject matter in its own right. It is Aristotle who first initiates the idea of "a science." In his logical treatises, he uses the word "organon" as an instrument of thought leading to a complete system. But used as a tool, it can also be applied to moral issues, to a systematic study of ethical values. But Aristotle's conception of "science" allows for *both* voluntary choices *and* distinctions of value. His normative assertion is that our criterion of ethical correction is given by the immediacy of perception, by a feeling of pleasure, which depends on the individual's ability to *voluntarily* choose the mean between two extremes, the two "vices," is an example of a criterion embedded in human nature: "All men desire happiness," which is directly felt and known. For example, the morally brave person is the one able to choose, after reflection and deliberation, the mean between foolhardiness and cowardice; the one who exhibits practical, i.e., ethical wisdom. But the certainty that one has chosen wisely is provided by an immediate sensation of pleasure, a mood of well-being. When this feeling of pleasure becomes customary throughout the agent's character, then the moral disposition has been secured and human happiness has been achieved (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6). Aristotle

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_6

further proposes that we become good by practice and training, by *doing* good acts, as we develop our potentially virtuous character. Human beings are born neither good nor bad. Intellectual deliberation is a condition for acting well but the test of success rests on immediate feeling. Thus, choice is the result of *both* desire *and* deliberation: "The intellect alone moves nothing." Moral choice is the result of a combination of ratiocinative desire and desiderative reason, as W. D. Ross describes it. Nevertheless, the assurance that the choice and the chosen mean are correct lies with perception. For Aristotle, the term science connotes knowledge in general. There are three branches of "science": productive, *making* useful or beautiful objects; practical, *choosing* moral actions; and theoretical, *thinking reflexively.* The second allows of voluntary deliberations.

After Aristotle, I think it is fair to say that in terms of Western philosophy, it is Augustine who initiates the conceptual "engagement" between the *freedom* of the will and the problem of evil. But the underlying dynamical and constitutive structures of consciousness, the issues, the questions, the possible resolutions, and the answers are all grounded in the realization that ethical knowledge exhibits *both* a *cognitive* and an *intentional* "dimension." To say that the will is free is only half the story. But it is the will's *intentionality* that captures its meaningfulness, its purposiveness; that is the critical factor. The study of ethical values can be conducted as a formal exercise, but the implicit or explicit goal is centered on its values, on guiding us toward either relativist or absolutist principles, either in the direction of the neutrality of science or toward genuine distinctions between good and evil. Man is the only higher order animal who can choose to disregard or decide to adopt the distinction between fact and value, science, and ethics.

But it is Augustine who first ethically defines and intrinsically connects the two interrelated primary concepts, *both* freedom *and* moral values, as well as setting their boundaries for meaningful ethical discussions.

For Plato, although clearly evil is an issue, nevertheless he is uncertain even if there is a Form of evil. Basically, evil is an absence of goodness because the latter is grounded in knowledge. And he puzzles whether a judge of good and evil must *know* evil "in-itself" (The Myth of Er). For Plato, the conceptual clarity of the concept of "evil" is confused or compromised by its negative conceptualization, namely, that it essentially consists in the absence of goodness, that it is nothing "in itself," non-being. Plato thus leaves unresolved the issue of positively defining *evil as a value.* And Augustine likewise is cautiously persuaded in offering that evil is

merely a negation, an absence of the Good, as darkness is simply the absence of light. But in his *Confessions,* clearly evil is an existing force when he describes two infants suckling at their mother's breast and when the first has sufficiently imbibed, it still tries to prevent its twin from partaking. Or when as a boy, he and several other children stole into an orchard and willfully and wantonly destroyed the fruit. Malice is doing evil for its own sake.

But the problem is not only in doing evil but what does it mean to *will* it. Freud, for example, as we have remarked, clearly sees evil as an unconsciously driven *psychological* desire to enjoy the sadistic implementation of pain on another sensing creature or being. But if all our desires are determined, and dependent upon our upbringing, then presumably, the *quality* of the evil vanishes. But our critical question centers on *ethically willing* evil. As such, to be sure, it represents a *value,* unquestioningly a terrible one, but one which *exists as a free, spontaneous choice*. No other higher order animal can intentionally pursue hurting others with nothing else to gain.

For example, consider the dynamics of (a) a free will, (b) the *value* of goodness, and (c) the *value* of evil viewed through the prism of Albert Camus' novel *The Plague,* as the reality of both human goodness and evil come to the fore. As the story unfolds, on an unusual day, the villagers of Oran, a town in Algeria, are astonished when dying rats begin to emerge in increasing numbers from the sewers. Soon it becomes clear that it is the visitation of a deadly plague. Some commentators have correctly suggested that symbolically this plague represents the occupation of France by the Nazis during the Second World War. In any case, the question is *why* this has happened. In response, Father Paneloux, an Augustinian priest, gives a sermon in which he states, "My brethren, this has happened because in some fashion you have displeased God, you have sinned." As the plague's virulence increases and its suffering and deadly course continue unabatedly, one of the main characters, a doctor, Rieux, develops a serum, which is to be tested as an antidote. The patient selected is a ten-year-old boy, innocent in the eyes of man, but not necessarily, of course, in the eyes of God. For Augustine, man is born in original sin. In any case, the serum is administered but instead of improving, the child dies an agonizing death unduly prolonged by the strength of the serum. In response, Paneloux offers a second sermon, sparsely attended, in which he declares that as believers, our duty is not to understand the ways of God to man,

that is well beyond our comprehension, but rather to *will* the evil; either to accept God or to reject Him; either to love God or to hate Him.

> This had a lesson for us all; we must convince ourselves that there is no island of escape in time of plague. No, there is no middle course. We must accept the dilemma and choose either to hate God or to love God… My brothers…the love of God is a hard love. It demands total self-surrender, disdain for our human personality. And yet it alone can reconcile us to suffering and the deaths of children. It alone can justify them, since we cannot understand them, and we can only make God's will ours. That is the hard lesson I would share with you today. That is faith, cruel in men's eyes, and crucial in God's, which we must ever strive to encompass. We must aspire beyond ourselves toward that high painful vision. And on that lofty plane all will fall into place, all discord will be resolved, and truth flash forth from the dark cloud of seeming injustice.

It is said that Dostoyevsky suggested that even God cannot compensate for the suffering of an undeserving innocent child. Both Camus and Dostoyevsky are existentialists, the first atheistic and the second Christian. But it is the paradoxical freedom of the will that chooses—not determines—our values. But leaving God aside, throughout my text, I have argued in supporting an epistemic spontaneity, as well as an ethical and even an aesthetic one. If this theme has plausibility, it follows that there is also a spontaneity of evil, that there are human beings who are gratuitously, maliciously evil, and unrepentant. If so, then suddenly and quite unexpectedly, the issue of naked evil stands before us; confronts us: to will evil or not to will evil. I offer this ethical reality because each of us chooses our values, both cognitively and purposively. Each of us is alone and responsible for evil, whether or not God exists.

In a history of ideas context, ethical values, principles, and judgments have been open to philosophical discussions since the dialogues of Plato and the treatises of Aristotle. They can be studied objectively, discussed, criticized, and defended precisely because they are grounded in an underlying presupposition, namely, that the ruling principle, the controlling premise in human consciousness is that human beings *alone* are capable of either asserting or denying the reality of cognitive judgments of value. No "higher order" animal has that ability, that responsibility. That is why for over 2500 years, many of us have struggled ethically to justify ourselves—those of us who are not entrapped by the evasive denials of science and

politics. We have been existentially forced ethically to travel forward for better or for worse.

Ethical Principles and Criteria

Before addressing the general subject matter of ethics, allow me to emphasize that my goal going forward is not simply to offer a compendium on ethical principles in Western philosophy, but rather to impress upon readers that whatever one's orientation may be in terms of relevance, pro or contra, in regard to genuine ethical principles, it is unavoidable and impossible not to judge whether values are meaningful or meaningless because in point of fact the latter option is itself a value decision, as we shall see on William James' account. Either you accept moral values, or you deny that they exist, that they have no meaning or bearing in your life, but inescapably that latter decision is also a value choice. Enthralled by the apparent factual nature of science, one chooses it over moral reflections.

After many years of teaching courses in Western ethics and using Paul Taylor's *Problems of Moral Philosophy,* as well as Oliver Johnson's *Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers,* I developed a matrix of exhaustive ethical principles, at least in Western thought. The schema is initially generated from an ancient traditional distinction between relativism and absolutism, the arguments promoted between the Sophists and Plato. More recently, a second critical distinction has been drawn to lie between deontological principles, which define the criterion as grounded in the concept of intrinsic *duties,* in doing good regardless of the consequences (e.g., Kant's universal rule never to lie), while by contrast, teleological principles seek to formulate ethical judgements by invoking the criterion of values in terms of desirable human *consequences,* and more specifically by the standard of the amount of positive value gained by achieving physical pleasure (Jeremy Bentham, hedonistic utilitarianism) or mental happiness (J. S. Mill, eudaemonistic utilitarianism).

Throughout the text, I have been guided by Plato's timeless original perspective on philosophical disputations, as displaying an eternal Battle between the Gods against the Giants, the idealists against the materialists, and now the ethicists and against the scientists.[1] And I have sought to expand the original dichotomy into three variations regarding ethical

[1] Cornford, F. M., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The* Theaetetus *and the* Sophist *of Plato* (London: Percy, Lund, Humphrey's & Co., 1964), 245E–246E; 228–232.

relativism (as opposed to epistemic relativism): descriptive or scientific relativism; normative ethical relativism; and metaethical relativism.

The first is characterized as factual in the respect that it essentially assumes an anthropological or sociological perspective while maintaining that no absolute moral standard exists (and not merely that none has yet been found). Hence it denies the conceivability of an objective, universal criterion, a standard, which would exist independently of any particular person or society, who or which might happen to hold it. Rather, in this interpretation, ethical *statements*—as opposed to ethical *judgments*—are merely issues concerning empirical facts, either psychologically or sociologically induced, i.e., *causal* facts conditioned by external cultural factors. And according to the unprejudiced and uninvolved eye of the scientific observer, all these allegedly "moral values" are merely derivative, contingent, and dependent on external environmental causes. Ethical mores simply represent anthropological, cultural, and historical data, which makes it impossible for anyone to conclude that an independent moral law could conceivably serve as a regulative maxim for human conduct or action. In philosophy, this position dates as far back as Herodotus, Democritus, and Protagoras and only later to be codified in the skeptical writings of Sextus Empiricus, who argued that the premises of knowledge either lead to circularity or to an infinite regress but never to truth. Nevertheless, W. T. Stace, in *The Concept of Morals* (1937), claims this argument is a *non-sequitur* and only shows, at most, that the ultimate principle has not been found *as yet*.

The second species of relativism is called normative ethical relativism. In this context, normative means ethical *oughtness*. And it states that there is indeed a valid meaning to the terms "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," but these moral epithets are only significant within the context of a particular society. Thus, although two (or more) societies may disagree about what is praiseworthy or blameworthy, nevertheless, within a given social order, there is a "meaningful" right even though this specific right may be inconsistent or even in contradiction to the virtue of some other culture. For example, it is a vice for an individual to hoard goods and resources in a Marxist system, whereas in a Capitalist system it is both expedient and laudable to manipulate goods and resources. Or put differently, both societies are "right" even though their "values," i.e., the facts are diametrically opposed and contradictory. Representatives of normative ethical relativism would include Hegel, F. H. Bradley, and William Graham Sumner, among others. Possibly the earliest expression of the principle is

to be found in Glaucon's speech in the *Republic,* which Cornford characterizes as implied in the doctrine of the social contract (Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau).

The weakness of this particular viewpoint is that every social group is essentially composed of smaller and smaller subgroups (mere aggregates) and that these, in turn, are further reducible to their ultimate constituent components, to the "parts," i.e., individual persons. At which point, normative ethical relativism becomes indistinguishable—and degenerates into—non-ethical subjectivism. As Protagoras maintains, "Each man is a measure unto himself. Of what is that it is, and of what is not, that it is not" (Plato, *Theaetetus,* 125A).

Finally, the third variety of relativism is titled metaethical relativism. It originates in G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), which concentrates on the definitions, the language, and the "validity" of arguments used in moral discourse, as opposed to the confirmation of any underlying substantive and normative principle. It is accordingly a "second order" study, which asks the question, "what does the word 'good' mean?" rather than "What is 'goodness,'" or "What is the Good?" Further, metaethical relativism proposes that moral terms, e.g., obligation, duty, etc. not only vary from culture to culture but rather and more specifically, they only have validity and meaning within the context of a particular linguistic usage or "language game." Wittgenstein has been a strong proponent of this viewpoint. Moore himself, however, is generally categorized as an agathistic utilitarian, who maintains that the *meaning* of "good" is a "simple" indefinable quality, like the color "yellow." It is defined by its social use.

In addition, I would include A. J. Ayer's radically subjectivist "emotive theory," as formulated in *Language, Truth, and Logic,* which advocates that all metaphysical, philosophical, theological, ethical, and aesthetic pronouncements of "value" are epistemically meaningless because they are merely expression of *feelings, of emotions* of pleasure or pain, and since feelings are non-cognitive, the study of ethics is valueless. Hobbes' principle of egoism is a good example of such a non-ethical position.

A far different criterion is offered by the proponents of a positive empirical principle as awarded to judgments of value, who assume the stability of a common human nature. Philosophers—including Aristotle, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hume, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill—agree that the criterion of value is *discovered* through experience, that it is factual and objective. Again, all our knowledge is derived from precedent sensations and experience. The mind is like a blank tablet. Since the

opposite of a "matter of fact or a sensation" is always conceivable, possible, or imaginable, it follows that at best all we can attain are varying degrees of *belief*—but not knowledge—grounded in empirical probabilities and culminating in feelings of psychological anticipation (Hume). For instance, one could argue that given human nature, all mothers *should* love their children. Actually, as we have seen all three relativisms—scientific, normative, and metaethical—are similarly based on empirical facts and/or linguistic usages. And, although normative ethical empiricism is likewise established in experience, the difference between empirical relativism and empirical absolutism is that the latter principle assumes an unchanging human nature, which commands us in what we *ought* to do; and unlike subjective relativism, it is not grounded in constantly varying sensations, in personal feelings. It is a normative principle as opposed to a descriptive one. Thus, the tradition from Aristotle to Hume and into Bentham and Mill believes that human beings have ever been the same, that the same virtues of friendship, loyalty, gratitude, generosity, benevolence, etc., have prevailed. It is not until the writings of Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx that the possibility of a "changing" human nature arises.

But the foremost theoretician supporting the principle of empirical ethical values is David Hume. His criticisms and his responses are powerfully leveled against moral skepticism, by insisting that judgments of *oughtness* and *factness* are qualitatively distinct, that there is a *meaningful* distinction between the "ought" and the "is," values and facts, and therefore between morality and science.

> In every system of morality, in which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulation of propositions, *is,* and *is not,* I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought,* or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but it is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought,* or *ought not,* expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shoul'd be observ'd or explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (*Treatise,* III, I, I, p. 469)

This passage confirms the chasm between primary propositions relating to facts, ultimately involving matter and motion and tertiary judgments relating to values.

For Hume it follows:

> Now since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but *particular* pains or pleasures; it follows that, in all enquiries concerning these moral distinctions, it will be sufficient to shew the principles, which make us feel a satisfaction or uneasiness from the survey of any character, in order to satisfy us why the character is laudable and . An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or the uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to *feel* a satisfaction of a particular [qualitative] kind from the contemplation of a character. The very *feeling* constitutes our praise or admiration. (*Treatise*, Book III, Part I, Section II, p. 471)

Hume's point here is simply that we naturally feel repugnance when a bully abuses a child and admiration when a mother is solicitous for her babe.

When we disinterestedly, i.e., objectively view a moral action, when we are not directly party to the action, we immediately sense, feel its virtue or vice. In Hume's time, this criterion is similarly adopted by Shaftesbury and Edmund Burke as well. Hume, of course, assumes, as Aristotle did before him and as Mill will after him, that human nature does not change, that it has ever been the same. The confirmation of this empirical assumption is also demonstrated by the fact that we experience past values, for example, loyalty, gratitude, honesty, honor, etc. with the same approbation as they were in ancient times, as well as today. Thus, according to Hume, the propositional fact that "Helen is five feet tall" is *qualitatively* different in kind from the valuative judgments that "Helen is good" or "Helen is beautiful."

We are so constituted that nature has determined us to judge as well as to breathe. Even in Hume's empirical doctrine, sensation appears in the guise of a complete judgement of value. Analogous to our five senses, the moral sense pronounces directly when it is confronted by a moral situation, although of course unlike the other five sense it is devoid of a physical organ and Hume also indicates that the moral sense can be corrupted, or even destroyed, just as the eye can be damaged and perverted by adverse

circumstances. Although mothers naturally love their children, it is possible to find women who have suffered so greatly at the hands of a brutal and uncompromising environment that they have lost the capacity for natural affection toward their offspring. (I recall attending a thirty-seven-year-old woman on the prenatal unit at Harbor-UCLA Hospital, who was delivering her seventh baby and putting it up for adoption along with the previous half-dozen.)

Further:

> The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object [i.e., moral action] to general approbation and makes every man…agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, accruing as they agree or disagree with the rule of right, which is established. These two requisites [namely generality and comprehensiveness] belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted upon. The other passions produce in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation. When a man denominates another his *enemy,* his *rival,* his antagonist, his *adversary,* he is understood to speak the language of self-love and to express sentiments peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious,* or *odious* or *depraved,* he then speaks another language and expresses sentiments in which he expects his audience to concur with him. He must here, therefore depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony…The humanity of one man is the humanity of every one and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures. (*An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* Section IX)

Hume is convinced that his science of human nature is empirically analogous to Newtonian physics and that his psychological principle of the association of ideas complements Newton's natural law of gravity. Correspondingly, the moral sense functions in the domain of ethics in a similar manner that the principle of the association of ideas serves in the cognitive realm. The moral sense, accordingly, is grounded in human

feeling, in sentiment rather than reason, although unlike "matters of facts," which are also derived from experience, the moral sense is a non-cognitive apprehension, which is not based on *rational* causal connections.

Hume is also classified as a "soft determinist." The "hard determinist" contends that our motives and desires are implacably caused by external conditions beyond our control, namely by genetic, familial, environmental, cultural factors, etc., in which case any issue concerning moral responsibility is completely ruled out. By contrast, Hume believes (a) that we are "free" when our actions are the result of our own internal motives, e.g., desires; (b) that our actions are predictable because they issue from a stable character; and therefore (c) that we are morally responsible. Thus, Hume holds that not only are we both "free" and determined, at the same time and in the same act, but also that we are responsible as well precisely because others can count on their character as either doing good or harm.

But it is worth repeating that first principles are mutually exclusive. One cannot hold that (1) *all* human behavior is causally determined ("hard determinism," Democritus to Freud to Hospers) *and* also maintain that (2) there are *some* human actions that are free ("soft determinism," Hobbes, Hume, and Mill); one simply cannot maintain that both antithetical propositions are true. One may wish to maintain that there is truth and that it is knowable (epistemological dogmatism) or that there is no truth (epistemological skepticism). However, if one opts for truth, then several "lower level" optional principles present themselves. Either (a) truth can be grounded in rationalism (either in intuitions or inferences), which holds that there are *some* ideas or arguments, which are known independently of sensation and experience, and that these truths are discovered by pure non-sensuous reason; or (b) empirically, that *all* our ideas are derived from precedent sensations and experience; or (c) fideism, which maintains that truth is the result of transcending revelations. Based on these epistemic distinctions, ethical principles are either relative or absolute; if they fall in the second category, then they are either grounded rationally, empirically, fideistically, or existentially. They are either one or the other but never more than one. In addition, the assumption of a specific ethical first principle commits one in adopting a criterion, an *objective* standard for testing and evaluating the morality of individual actions, other persons, and even social, political, and national entities, while in the same moment committing to the meaning (or the meaninglessness) of

human life in general, and/or to one's own individual existence in particular.

Different from Hume, Joseph Butler states that the normative criterion is *conscience,* as embedded in human nature. And yet he obviously believes that it is God who implanted this faculty within us. So, should we say that his position is fideistic or empiricist? In addition, he frequently speaks as if it is a cognitive reflection that *judges* and not the immediacy of conscience. We must remember, that in Protestantism, the individual's subjective conscience is the criterion; each soul is capable of divining the truth as opposed to consulting the scriptures of Catholicism, in which ultimately its infallibility rests in the Pope.

By contrast, empirical and yet relational and calculative in its orientation, are Bentham's, Mill's, and G. E. Moore's normative brands of hedonistic, eudaemonistic, and agathistic utilitarianism, respectively. It is the *consequences,* not the intentions, that determine the moral worth of an action. Bentham thus instructs us to *quantitatively* measure, add, and calculate our physical pleasures against our pains with the end in view of reaching an objective determination as to what *ought* to be done. By the same token, Mill advises us instead that we should *qualitatively* sum up the consequences in terms of human happiness in deciding what we *should* do. For Moore, as we have seen, the *good* is known by its immediate simple quality, just as the color yellow is known. For all three, however, the underlying principle is self-evident: "All human beings by nature desire to be happy." By the way, Hume was also an early advocate of utilitarianism.

This now brings us to a triad of absolutist principles, including rationalism, fideism, and existentialism, thus completing all the possible *value* options available to humanity, at least in Western thought.

Starting with Plato, "Virtue is Knowledge (of the Good)." It consists in a synthetic a priori unification of several individual ethical Forms, including Justice, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage, and others. But unlike Aristotle's sensory perception, Plato's criterion is rationally intuitive. The soul's eye sees the Good. By contrast, Augustine and Anselm's ethical principle is grounded in both faith and revelation, "I believe so that I may understand": first faith, then understanding. It is a truth *beyond* and *transcendent* to reason. In Tertullian it is Christ's resurrection and in Kierkegaard, it is also a truth *against* reason; it is paradoxical, e.g., Abraham's belief that he will both sacrifice and retain Isaac. By contrast, in traditional scholastic fashion, Aquinas turns to *demonstrating* the existence of God by using rational arguments and begins with the premise he

intends to disprove: "If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore, God does not exist." Essentially Aquinas, in his five arguments, first turns to two Aristotelian versions, the cosmological argument, that God is the First Cause of both the creation of the world *and* its and motion, as well as the teleological inference, that God is the purposive intellect guiding the moral universe. The Augustinian ontological intuition for the existence of God, predicated primarily on the love of God, and by identifying essence and existence in the case of God, and God alone, is an example of the first mode of intuitive cognition, while the cosmological and teleological arguments are examples of inferential arguments. Ultimately, the difference between intellectual intuition and discursive understanding is again reflected in Plato's Divided Line as formulated in his third and fourth levels. It is also important to remember that Plato's developing system is both comprehensive and coherent. Along with Kant and Hegel, he is a supporter of the coherence theory of truth. Augustine's views are Platonic while Aquinas' are predominantly Aristotelian.

By contrast, Protestant theologians tend to stress the subjective inner illumination provided by the light of individual consciousness, i.e., conscience, as the infallible criterion for moral judgment and action, as we have seen in Butler's criterion above. In either case, however, whether the emphasis is on the word of God or the voice of conscience, both serve as the final authority for the religiously minded moralist. What is virtuous or vicious is to be decided by consulting the testimony of the Holy Scriptures or through the voice of one's subjective conscience. Whether Christian faith, for instance, invokes the "objective authority" of the Catholic Church, with its hierarchy of monks, priests, bishops, and cardinals, or whether it is the Protestant touchstone of individual conscience that is invoked, or even an appeal to a mystical and esoteric inner illumination, all three criteria hearken back in a significant way to a religious commitment, a willingness to believe in a transcending theistic reality. It speaks of a truth, which is presumably manifestly and directly present to the deliberating soul, as it commands in no uncertain voice.

In rationalism, we have already offered some remarks concerning Kant's categorical imperative, but it is instructive to know that he was anticipated by the Stoic philosophers. Both the Stoics and Kant share the conviction that the ultimate standard of morality is rationally, intentionally directed toward our fellow man. Accordingly, the Stoics maintain that the eternal laws of nature are known cognitively through reason, through the faculty

which understands the necessary causal interconnections governing the universe, as dictated by the principle of a divine order. Everything is as it *must* be and thus everything is as it *should* be. Virtue or happiness consists in actively affirming this natural, divine, and eternal world order and the virtuous need of adjusting one's thoughts, feelings, and actions in conformity to the order of the universe, to positively acquiesce in the foreordained order of events. It is in this *attitude* that our moral duty lies.

> Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen and your life will be serene. (Epictetus)

Christian Garve, in his commentary on Cicero's *De Officiis,* emphasizes the Stoic notion of a law of nature, and the intrinsic value of human beings, partnered with a universal society of rational beings. The Stoics universally aspired to be "cosmopolitans," citizen of world. "In his reply in the *Groundwork,* Kant sought to show that these principles of Stoic ethics were also based in his own formulation of the categorical imperative. For the Stoics, the laws of nature and reason are identical; that no man is *born* a slave; that all men are brothers (and we assume that all women are sisters); and every human being has an ethical duty to help others. Contra Hobbes, there are natural, rational laws, even in the state of nature, prior to the formation of a contractual civil society and government. The origin of rational law as intrinsically ethical begins with Plato but it receives its unique emblematic stamp by way of the Stoic conception of duty, which counsels that the subject's affirmation of his "will" shall conform to an objectively existing moral order. This principle is the same one that was summoned during the Nazi war crimes trial in Nuremburg, when the accused were found "guilty of all crimes against humanity," universally!

According to Kant, the criteria required for establishing the moral *quality* of an act is constituted by three synthetic a priori subprinciples. First, the categorical imperative, his rational command, states, "Always act so that the subjective maxim [i.e., the *intentional* will] of your action can become [an objective] universal moral law legislating for all rational beings in any conceivable universe." It constitutes a necessary and universal relation between two distinct concepts, the subjective will and the objective law. Interestingly, Kant believed that there may be other forms of rational life in the universe. Second, "One should always treat other rational beings as ends-in-themselves as having infinite worth and dignity and never as a

means of furthering one's own egotistic and utilitarian ends." And third, "Man is free when he wills his own law and obeys it, for then he is both sovereign and subject. His principle of autonomy" (Rousseau).

Kant also enlists the categorical imperative in his condemnation of suicide. He argues that it is intrinsically irrational to kill oneself because it is contrary to reason that reason should command its own destruction. To universally counsel suicide in moments of despair is logically against reason because it entails the elimination of reason itself. The will is free but not free to terminate itself. Oddly enough, even Schopenhauer counsels against it—even though human existence transpires in the "very worst of all possible worlds."

> Man is a mere spectator and observer. In respect of this withdrawal, he is like an actor who has played his part in one scene and takes his place in the audience until he must appear again. In the audience, he quietly looks on at whatever may happen, even though it be the preparation of his own death in the play; but then he goes on the stage, and acts and suffers as he must. (*The World as Will and Representation,* I, Section 16)

By contrast, it seems to me, that strictly speaking, in existentialism, suicide is a legitimate, moral optional decision. Often a lifelong sentence of continuous physical pain is legally permitted in some states and countries but not psychological distress. But I fail to see the distinction between a lifetime prospect of interminable physical pain or psychological loneliness. I would argue that it is the self's value judgment that *should* be the controlling principle of choice.

In ethical absolutism, in all three variants—whether empirical, fideistic, or rationalist—the "pre-existing" or "independent" principle, as well as its criterion, is cognitively *discovered*. In empiricism the principle is *contingently* "general," common to all mankind; in fideism it is divinely instituted as "universal"; and also in rationalism within self-consciousness' "universal," whereas in existentialism, the principle is spontaneously *created*—not discovered—by the individual.

In existentialism, the ethical choice is actively *individual,* as opposed to passively *particular* in relativism, and it can change over time but nevertheless it continues as an absolute command or criterion during those specific moments that it is willed, or until a new choice of values is freely chosen. But, again, existentialism differs in that the moral worth of a decision, or an action, is grounded in the radical spontaneity of the

self-conscious subject and not in an independent reality, as either based in a general or a universal consensus. Thus, whereas ethical relativism implies subjectivism and skepticism, in direct opposition, moral absolutism commits to objective validities, and certainties. The criterion is conceived to be independent of any possible attitudes held by particular persons or in different times and climes. And when it is asserted, it is beyond all skeptical doubt or further disputation. In existentialism, however, the *value in-itself, qua* a *principle and a criterion,* cannot *exist,* i.e., cannot be *meaningful apart from the individual.* Existential choices and values are inherently solitary. They are unshared; that is a condition of their freedom. They are not validated by others, and they are frighteningly vulnerable within the individual. Why so? Because existential values are intrinsically solipsistic. The value freely chosen and expressed exists only so long as the individual stands committed to it and expresses it. Sartre's insistence that human values are "subjective" does not negate that they are absolute so long as they are posited with eidetic *intentionality* (*Existentialism Is a Humanism*).

Kant's synthetic a priori categories are transcendental. But in existentialism, the relation is intentional. In Plato's dialogue, the *Meno,* the intrinsic connection between virtue and knowledge is an a priori synthetic one analogous to the relationship between "shape," i.e., *extension* and color, i.e., unextended quality.

> Socrates: Well now, let's try to tell you what shape is. See if you accept this definition. Let us define it as the only thing which always [universally and necessarily] accompanies color. Does that satisfy you, or do you want it in some other way? I should be content if your definition of virtue were on similar lines. (*Meno,* 75b–c)

In existential choice, the relation between the will and its value is radically free.

Consider, Plato's example of an a priori synthetic unity between extension and color, which is also given prominence by Husserl and Sartre, although, of course, it would be rejected by Kant. Plato's noetic insight into the meanings of the moral Forms, the Universals, is both intuitive (immediate) and relational (a priori synthetic), with the latter unifying all the individual ethical definitions of the Forms as comprehensively and coherently unified in the intellectual vision of the Good. Relational thoughts and cognitive judgments "move" themselves by an a priori synthesizing, a unification of constitutively separate concepts, meanings, and

judgments, e.g., Plato's Virtue and Knowledge; or Kant's subjective duty and the objective law. But also by choosing an existential principle, the choice directly leads to an entire programmatic system of supporting values and actions. When Kierkegaard and Nietzsche choose their extreme paths of individualism, it commits each of them to their radical expressions of singular values. It isn't only the moment of decision that is free, but also all the commitments and decisions that subsequently follow from it (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre).

To repeat: *Kant's synthetic* a priori *categories are transcendental. But in existentialism, the relation is intentional.* That is why Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre—like Plato—could so elaborately and extravagantly express their philosophies.

Basically, Western philosophy exhibits two very different conceptions of value regarding freedom that in turn split into four subprinciples.

Conceptions of Freedom			
Doing as you should		Doing as you please	
Knowledge (Plato)	Law (Aristotle)	Power (Sophists)	Individual Nature (Democritus)

In each of the three preceding absolutist principles—the fideistic, rationalist, and empiricist—the ethical criterion is *discovered* and it both determines and commands universally (Kant) or "generally" (Hume). This is radically different from the principle underlying existentialism. According to existentialist thinkers, the criterion is *created* and although it obligates *individually,* rather than universally; it directs as an absolute truth. This latter consideration is important because existentialists are not relativists. Each criterion is absolute, but it only applies to the individual who posits it. Relativism is grounded in the particular, the external, the causally conditioned. For the empirical absolutist, although the value is contingent to human nature, nevertheless the assumption remains that human nature itself is unchanging and therefore as objective as the laws of astronomy and physics. But for the existentialist, although human existence, as an abstract conception is meaningless, "each of us is thrown into the world without rhyme or reason." The individual is forced, condemned, to be free, to create values for himself alone. But as Sartre emphasizes, the individual is morally responsible for his values, decisions, and actions.

Freedom? Imagine for a moment the field of aesthetic creativity and artistic paintings. Each painting is a unique interpretation of one's singular perspective; an expressive creation of a human value, of beauty or truth or

reality. As Sartre indicates in his essay, "Existentialism Is a Humanism," neither God nor a priori reason nor human nature nor conventional and artificial societal mores nor customs can possibly guide us in what each of us *ought* to think and do. For Nietzsche, freedom is based on an aesthetic "will to power," a call to artistically express one's creative values and stand absolutely alone. For Nietzsche, the key ruling conceptions in *the Birth of Tragedy* are the controlling Apollonian and Dionysian conflicts within the soul seeking the expression and the strength to shape one's own character through one's artistic creations, one's works of art while forming a unique principle of individuation. By the same token, in Homer's *Iliad,* Achilles creates values for himself alone. He does not follow any pre-existing rules. When he withdraws from the battle because of Agamemnon's insult, he is noble in doing so; when he allows Patroclus to fight with his armor, it is the right thing to do; when his friend is slain, he weeps from strength and anger; when he returns to the fighting, it is the virtuous thing to do, because he is great, because he is noble, and he chooses to do these acts. And when he slays Hector and drags his body behind his chariot three times circling the besieged city of Troy, he is great because Achilles sets the standard, the criterion. The early Greeks recognized the intrinsic spontaneity of creating values for the self alone. When Augustine and Anselm pronounce, "I believe so that I may understand," first faith before knowledge, they posit a truth "beyond" reason; but when Kierkegaard announces, following Tertullian, "I believe because it is absurd," he is asserting a paradoxical truth *against* reason. In *Fear and Trembling,* Abraham believes a contradiction that he will *both* sacrifice Isaac and that his son will be saved. For Sartre, it is a radically free choice whether to collaborate with the Nazis or to fight in the Resistance. In each case, the act, the choice creates an objective value against which the individual judges the self. The self and the value stand apart and the self chooses to unify them synthetically and a priori.

What do values have to do with anyone's life? What do moral principles—or their absence—have to do with the meaning of life? Everything. Whether one lives in a society or on a desert island Kant believed we had a duty to perfect our selves independently of society. The meaning—or meaninglessness—of one's life is guided—not determined—by one's ethical and non-ethical value choices. In Jamesian terms, the looming critical choice is either a living or a dead option, either a forced or an avoidable option, either a momentous or a trivial option. As James points out, a man who delays forever the decision to marry his sweetheart has actually

chosen not to marry. And anyone who elects to remain scientifically uncommitted in choosing an ethical or aesthetic value has actually decided for a meaningless factual existence. And that is also a value. I have met many individuals whose addiction to narcotics is their existential value.

Qualitative Values and Scientific Quantities

I would define intelligence as a qualitative value; something that is often desired as intrinsically worth possessing, and one that can also be quantitatively, i.e., scientifically measured. For example, the science of psychology has formulated the following chart of Intelligence Quotients in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders*. As impaired.

317. Mild Mental Retardation: IQ level 50–55 to approximately 70
318.0 Moderate Mental Retardation: IQ level 35–40 to 50–55
318.1 Severe Mental Retardation: IQ level 20–25 to 35–40
318.2 Profound Mental Retardation: IQ level below 20 or 25

By contrast, in the more positive tabulation of the Intelligence Quotients, the following values are listed.

70–79 Cognitively Impaired
80–89 Below Average
90–110 Average Intelligence
111–120 *Above* Average intelligence
121–130 *Gifted*
Above 130 *Very Gifted*

Obviously, the designations of "Average," "Gifted," and "Very Gifted" are *qualitative* judgments. Now we can consider these two charts objectively, scientifically assigning quantitative quotients to a field of qualitative values. Following the medical and psychological sciences, I believe it is possible to assign quantitative measures to qualitative values of evil. Significantly for Freud, the *dynamics* of narcissism and sadism, the tendency in certain individuals to gain pleasure and satisfaction in injuring others physically and/or psychologically can be measured and evaluated in terms of desirable and undesirable *qualities*. Thus, for example, I would rate Hitler as profoundly sadistic, as an individual who actively sought to affirm his power in displaying human cruelty.

But in the end, existential spontaneity prevails in epistemic, ethical, aesthetic, contexts but not in the sciences.

Concluding Remarks

When we think about the discipline of literature, we realize how many varying genres constitute its fields of expression: myths, legends, poems, biographies, autobiographies, romances, novels, mysteries, and so on *ad infinitum*. When we consider certain the scientific genres of psychology, such as phrenology, mesmerism, physiology, hypnosis, behaviorism, cognitive behavioral psychology, pharmacological medications, and the current neurosciences, each applies, superimposes their paradigm on the patient, independently of the patient, and consequently the patient appears one-dimensional. The emphasis is on the method rather than the passive patient. By contrast, psychoanalysis has multiple dynamical depths. It is comprehensive, coherent, and essentially philosophical. It engages the subject from the *inside;* the subject controls the treatment, is the "center," rather than merely an object for the method. My issue with psychoanalysis is twofold. I assume freedom—as opposed to determinism—and I place a higher *value* on the crises surrounding loneliness and intimacy rather than on sexual expression and satisfaction.

Bibliography

Aristotle, *Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard Peter McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

Augustine, *Confessions* Augustine, *The Confessions of St. Augustine* translated by Edward Pusey (New York: Collier-Macmillan).

Camus, Albert, *The Plague,* Stuart Gilbert (New York: Random House, 1975).

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, *The Brothers Karamazov,* translated by Constance Garnet (New York: Random House, 1950).

Ayer, A.J., *Language Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1935), 104.

Camus, Albert, *The Plague,* translated by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Random House, 1975).

Cornford, F. M., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The* Theaetetus *and the* Sophist *of Plato* (London: Percy, Lund, Humphrey's & Co., 1964).

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: 1994).

Epictetus, *On the Nature of Things, The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers,* edited by Whitney J. Oates (New York: Modern Library, 1940).

Garve, Christian, "Cicero *De Officiis:* The Microscope of Experience: Christina Garve's Translation of Cicero's *De Officiis* 1783," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 59:1 (1998).

Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, Chapter XIII (London: Collier, 1967).

Hume, David, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955).

Johnson, Oliver, ed., *Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers,* 7th ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1994).

Kant, Immanuel, "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals," in *Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy,* 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1978).

Kierkegaard, Soren, *Fear and Trembling,* translated by Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1985).

Moore, G. E., *Principia Ethica* (New York: Dover, 2004).

Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Case of Wagner,* translated by Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1967).

Plato, *Theaetetus,* in *Plato: The Collected Works,* edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon, 1966).

Ross, W. D. "Prima Facie Duties," in *Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy,* 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1978).

Sartre, Jean-Paul, "The Humanism of Existentialism," translated by Bernard Frechtman, in *Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy,* 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1978).

Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation,* translated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), I, Section 16).

Stace, W. T. *The Concept of Morals,* in *Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction*, edited by Paul Taylor (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1978).

Taylor, Paul, ed., *Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy,* 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1978).

CHAPTER 7

Loneliness and Political Narcissism

After the biological needs for air, water, nourishment, and sleep are met, both the drive to avoid loneliness, as well as the need to secure intimacy, are the dual most powerful desires in mankind. Loneliness results from a deep *sense of separation, both* emotionally *and* cognitively, as it is constituted—not caused—within various forms of consciousness throughout our lives. Dynamically, there are six distinguishable forms of human separation in human consciousness: (1) object–object separation during birth; (2) self–object separation, which is intrapsychic; (3) self-versus other-self separation, which is interpersonal; (4) internal self/self-separation, which is a psychotic reaction in response to intense or unduly prolonged periods of loneliness; (5) self–value separation, which includes cherished losses of friends, conjugal relations, religious estrangement (e.g. Kierkegaard), occupational alienation (Marx), etc.; and finally (6) the separation of the self from life in death.

As previously argued, subjective idealism derives directly from Leibniz's *Monadology.* If the soul Monad is absolutely self-enclosed, then it necessarily follows that the activity of self-consciousness, as well as the act of perceptual consciousness, must both emanate from within the immaterial psyche/soul/self (Chapter V, "The Simplicity Argument and Its Role in the History of Idealism" in *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments*). Further, *both* the reflexive cognition of the self *and* the *concept,* the *meaning* of the "object," must be constituted, i.e., synthetically a priori related *within consciousness.* In Kant's first *Critique,* this act is described as deriving from

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3_7

a "pure original unchangeable consciousness," from the *transcendental unity of apperception,* as it bonds with "the non-empirical transcendental object=x (A 107–109)." This same, but this time *dialectical* synthetic a priori constitutive unification is similarly executed in Hegel's discussion of Perception in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

> Immediate Sense-Certainty does not take over the truth, for its truth is the universal, whereas certainty wants to apprehend the This. Perception, on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating moments within perception are universal: 'I' is a universal and the object is a universal. That principle has arisen for us, and therefore the way we take in perception is no longer something that just happens to us like Sense-Certainty; on the contrary, it is logically necessitated. With the emergence of the principle, the two moments which in their appearing merely occur, also come into being; one being the movement of pointing-out [intentionality?] or their [spontaneous] act of perceiving, the other being the same movement as a simple event or the object [reflexively] perceived. (Section 111)

For Hegel, this is still only consciousness and not yet self-consciousness, that will have to await the Lordship and Bondage dialectic, but relationally it is both a necessary and sufficient condition in establishing the principle for all idealisms, both subjective and objective.

In Husserl, as for Kant, the "transcendental clue" is secured through the immanent unity of the synthetic stream of time-consciousness (Section 14), with its "*pole of identity*," as it introduces and discloses a threefold Cartesian distinction and relation between *ego-cogito-cogitatum* that critically deepens Husserl's commitment to a subjective idealism essentially based on the same schema of internal subject-object dualism as his predecessors had wrought (Section 18). Husserl's debt to Leibniz's monadic paradigm runs throughout Meditations Four and Five.

> *The Ego as identical goal of the subjective processes.* Now, however, we must call attention to a great gap in our exposition. The ego is himself *existent for himself* in continuous [temporal] evidence; thus, in himself, he is *continuously constituting himself as existing.* Heretofore we have only touched on only one side of this self-constitution, we have only looked at the *flowing cogito.* The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as *I,* who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that cogito, *as the same I.* Since we were busied up to now with the intentional relation

> of consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum, only that synthesis stood out for us which "polarizes" the multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, accordingly in relation to *objects as poles, synthetic unities.* Now we encounter a second polarization, *a second kind of synthesis,* which embraces all the particular multiplicities of *cogitations* collectively and in its own manner, namely as belonging [and unified within and] to the identical ego, who, as the *active and affected subject of consciousness,* lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, *through* them, to all object poles. (Section 31)

In materialism, there is no hiatus or separation between the brain and the external object; both are immediately material. There is no polarity. And in Hume's empiricism, the "self" and the "object" reduce to an amorphous "bundle of impressions." In subjective idealism, for a "meaning" to exist, the relation between self and the object known must be present, universal, and necessary, i.e., a priori.

What we shall see in a moment is how Freud *conceptually* "moves" from Kant's immediacy of the *Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition* (*Critique,* A 99); through Hegel's immediacy of Sense-Certainty; and Husserl's bipolarity of subject and object pole; and into his "oceanic feeling," as the infant progresses from a feeling state to a cognitive state, to the mediate relation of its ego to his mother's breast. All self-consciousness requires an internal dynamic of psychological *narcissism* to a *desired* object.

To the best of my knowledge, the first article on loneliness as a subject matter in its own right, is authored by Gregory Zilboorg, a psychoanalyst. In the essay, Zilboorg conceptualizes a Kantian, a synthetic a priori relation connecting the subjectivity of narcissism first with loneliness and then aggression, beginning with infancy, with the baby in its crib:

> ego/narcissism<>loneliness<>hostility/sadism.

The article appears in 1938, on the eve of the Second World War and it was clear that Zilboorg had Hitler in mind. Indeed, as early as 1933, it was obvious that Nazism was gaining both political and military power, which it clearly planned to use against its neighboring nations.[1]

As early as infancy, loneliness can engender and display four interrelated emotional responses, including anger, anxiety, depression, and social

[1] Zilboorg, Gregory, "Loneliness," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1938; cf., Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review,* 66:4 (1979–80).

withdrawal. Most seriously, it can begin with an unconscious form of desperation, consumed by a non-cognitive feeling of depression tending toward an involuntary withdrawal from life. The phenomenon was first historically observed during a period of unusual circumstances regarding cases of required maternal "neglect." During the Second World War in England, the mothers of children under the age of one were required to work in factories so that they could help in the war effort. Mothers were separated from their natural duties of providing nurturance to their infants, and the children were placed in hospitals, basically institutionalized in the sense that their individuality was denied. Although they were amply physically cared for, emotionally they were left completely unattended. Without the supporting nurturance needed for normal development, there was a general "wasting away" in the infants, while the disorder progressed with no apparent organic basis. The children became apathetic and listless, manifesting a considerable degree of functional disorientation. They were not held, or cooed, or conversed with. The children were left unattended for extended periods of time, deprived of emotional nurturance, and severe developmental regressions involving biological, emotional, and cognitive deficiencies followed. The first problems were reported by Rene Spitz, a psychoanalyst, who variously termed the condition as a form of anaclitic depression, marasmus, or hospitalism, or, as we often call it nowadays, "failure to thrive" cf., *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* Separation Anxiety Disorder (309.21) and Reactive Attachment Disorder of Infancy or Early Childhood (313.89). Spitz's psychoanalytic studies essentially confirmed the fact that the feeling of psychological abandonment and neglect in infants can result in devastating consequences in early childhood development.[2]

Theoretically, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's posthumously published paper, in turn, concentrated on two other significant dynamics universally connected to loneliness, both to a sense of being unable to communicate, as well as to a sense of anxiety. She began her article by describing an

[2] Spitz, Rene, *No and Yes: On the Genesis of Human Communication* (New York: International Universities Press, 1957); and *The First Year of Life: A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965). In 2008, *The Tampa Bay Times* ran a feature, "The Girl in the Window," by Lane DeGregory, on what was essentially determined to be the case of a six-year-old "feral child" with a ten-year follow-up describing the devastating consequences of severe maternal neglect and abandonment as irreparable and irredeemably lost even after she was lovingly adopted.

interview with a catatonic patient, who was unable to talk. At a certain point in the interview, Fromm-Reichmann lifted a single finger and asked, "That lonely?" to which the patient responded with an outburst of speech. What intrigued me about her groundbreaking article was first her recruitment of an interdisciplinary approach in addressing loneliness.[3] And, it also started me thinking that perhaps other dynamics, both affective and cognitive—including hostility, incommunicability, anxiety, depression, and quite possibly others as well—were also intrinsically a priori synthetically involved in experiencing loneliness. Following her lead, I sought to institute her interdisciplinary methodology in forging my own views on loneliness.[4]

Loneliness and the Dynamics of Narcissism

Freud's interest in the concept of loneliness is relatively weak. In *Mourning and Melancholia,* Freud distinguishes mourning as an empirical state of consciousness caused by the *conscious* loss of a *specific,* external love object with the grieving process taking place in the fully conscious mind, whereas in melancholy, in loneliness, the loss takes place when the person grieves for the loss in the *unconscious* mind, but is unable to fully connect or identify the process with a specific object, event, or person. Importantly, the subject–object relation is not present. In other words, loneliness is not a cognitive state for Freud; it is an undefined feeling state with a weak *unspecified* attachment. By contrast, for me, loneliness is *both* a motivational *and* a cognitive state, both a feeling and a meaning. It presents images and memories that are related to painful events. Beyond that, following Zilboorg and Fromm-Reichmann, I have sought to describe loneliness as a genus with its various species constituting mixed feelings and

[3] Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda, "Loneliness," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 26:2 (1959). I patterned my article after her essay; Ben Mijuskovic, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 40:2 (1977).

[4] Mijuskovic, Ben, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012, 3rd edition); *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA:, 2015); "Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness: Coping, Prevention, and Clinical Interventions,* edited by Ami Sha'ked and Ami Rokach (London: Routledge, 2015), 20–33; and "The Role of Empathy as the Path to Intimacy," *Paedagogia Christiana,* 2/46 (2020); and *Metaphysical Dualism, Subjective Idealism, and Existential Loneliness* (London: Routledge, 2021).

cognitive states, including hostility, anxiety, abandonment, rejection, estrangement, neglect, jealousy, revenge, etc.

But Freud's contributions concerning the dynamics of narcissism plumb the very depths of a much deeper nether region of the unconscious mind, one with much more dangerous consequences than the three psychoanalysts so far cited. In this regard, Freud's reflections on the dynamics of narcissism offer considerable insight into loneliness, to which we will now turn.

The journey from narcissism, as it initially constitutes the ego and moves forward toward loneliness starts very early in life. The first sense, i.e., *feeling* of separation begins with birth, when the fetus is physically removed from the mother's womb (biological object–object separation).

> The ego sees itself deserted by all protective forces and lets itself die. Here is the same situation as that which underlay the first great anxiety-state of birth and the infantile anxiety of longing—the anxiety due to separation from the protective mother.[5]

The second stage of separation is reminiscent of Kant's *epistemic* transcendental subjective idealism and his analysis of self-consciousness, which distinguishes an innate synthetic a priori relation between the concept of the self, the active subject, and the imaged conceptual "object" *within* consciousness as indicated above (*Critique*, A 107–110). But Kant's philosophy assumes a mature adult ego. Freud's concern, however, begins much earlier, although he also provides a comparably matching *psychological* description of the second stage of *separation*.

> Further reflection tells us the adult's ego-feeling [not yet cognitive state] cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have gone through a [dynamic] process of development, which cannot be demonstrated but which admits of being reconstructed with a fair degree of probability. An infant at the breast does not yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the [immediate] sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in various promptings. He must be very strongly impressed by the fact that some sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time—among them

[5] Freud, Sigmund, *The Ego and the Id*, translated by Joan Riviere (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), 48.

> what he *desires* most of all, his mother's breast—and only reappear as a result of his [angry] screaming for help. In this way, there is for the first time set over an [imaged] 'object' in the form of something [it desires] which exists 'outside' [i.e., independently of the ego] and which is only forced to appear by a special action…Originally the ego includes everything, later it *separates* off an external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-embracing feeling, which corresponds to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it. If we assume that there are many people in whose mental life the primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or lesser degree, it would exist in them side by side like a counterpart to it. In that case the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of a limitless bond with the entire universe—the same idea with which my friend elucidates as the 'oceanic feeling.'[6]

Several critical comments are in order. In Kant, following the immediacies of *imaged* "sensory" intuitions as "found," as "discovered" in the subject's appearances of "space and time," the second stage is subjectively *intrapsychic;* the ego feels a sense of separation between its self in relation to an *imaged* object within consciousness, the desirable breast. For Freud, there is the nascent realization that the desired object is other than the self. And it begins to realize it is prevented from physically gaining access to the desired object. This is a cognitive relation. It leads it to a cognitive act that the image represents an *intentional* object, an intentionality desired; *it points to a specific intended, independent external object.* In Freud, the ego and its libidinal object of desire are *empirically separated, as opposed to transcendentally* (Kant) *or dialectically* (Hegel). But the critical *psychoanalytic* factor is the resulting intrapsychic sense of separation.

[6] Freud, Sigmund, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* translated by James, Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 13–14. Hegel's version of the immediacy of the "oceanic feeling," the "now" and "this" of consciousness, is given in his description of Sense-Certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), Sections 90–110. Hegel's following concept, the category of Perception, posits the mediacy of a relation between self-and object (Sections 111–131). Subsequently, William James' similar rendition, "The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion," is offered in his *Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950), I, 488. Kant's version is subjectively idealistic, it spontaneously relates the self to the concept of the object, whereas Freud begins with consciousness but similarly to Kant's self-consciousness, Freud's ego dynamically *intends, means* the mother's breast as an object in the external world.

Third, the infantile ego realizes the breast not only belongs to an independent other self but that it is also in the *control* of the other self, the mother, who can either offer her breast or withhold it. This internally *constitutes—not* externally causes—an *interpersonal* conflict; a self-versus-other-self dynamic. It signals and initiates a cognitive battle between two separate selves. The *separation* between (a) the self-conscious subject and (b) its desired object produces anger, screaming, and fussing. In Hegel's *Phenomenology,* it is dialectically, developmentally described in the Lordship and Bondage passages in the *Phenomenology,* already alluded to above, and in note 4 (*Phenomenology,* Sections 166–196). It consists in a "fight to the death" fueled by the infant's egoistic, narcissistic desire for unilateral *self-recognition* gained at the expense and domination of the other self.

Fourth, the cognitive self-realization of separation is *dynamic,* the *source* of the *active* force is *internal,* not external. Empirical external causes are behavioral; they are grounded in physical stimuli and responses. Behavioral psychology offers a causal and deterministic paradigm. The breast as a physical object serves as a stimulus and the child's desiderative response is the effect. The neuroscientific paradigm functions no better. Discrete neuronal compounds and electrical synapses are woefully insufficient in "explaining" the *meaning,* i.e., the reflexivity, the intentionality of the ego's desires. Behavioral "explanations" are superficial *empirical* analyses, which fail to appreciate—even acknowledge—the Freudian psychological impetus of narcissism. Accordingly, this first *dynamic* account is extremely important because it anticipates the egoistic tendency toward aggression in the child. The conflict between selves is *now* clearly "out there" and openly in the world.

A major difference between Freud and Jung is that Freud is convinced that originally unconscious and repressed anxieties and traumatic experiences are retrievable by therapeutic interventions, by an unraveling of the unconscious, by a concentration on the interpretation of dreams and free association, as the subject circles closer and more deeply into the submerged issues. But Jung's concept of the narcissistic "shadow" self is less forgiving and far less attainable.

> The *shadow* is the sum of those personal characteristics that the individual wishes to hide from others and from himself. But the more the individual tries to hide it from himself, the more the shadow might become active and evil-doing. An example from literature was "The Dark Monk," which accompanied the monk Medardus in Hoffman's novel *The Devil's Elixir.*

> This was a literary example of the "shadow" emancipating itself from the control of the conscious personality to commit evil actions behind its back. But the shadow can also be projected; then the individual chooses his own dark features reflected in another person whom he may choose as a scapegoat. At times too, owing to the influence of alcohol or some other cause, the shadow can take hold of an individual who later is surprised that he was capable of such evil behavior. The Jungian concept of the shadow should not be confused with the Freudian concept of the repressed; it is related to the phenomenon of *unawareness* [i.e., Schopenhauer's irretrievable subconscious], as opposed to unconsciousness. To unawareness belong those aspects of the world and oneself that an individual does not see, although he could if he honestly wanted to. A man can visualize himself as a good husband and father, who is liked by his subordinates and respected by his fellow citizens, and yet this ignores the fact that he is a selfish husband, a tyrannical father, hated by his subordinates, and more feared than respected by his fellow men. This negative side of which this man is unaware is precisely what Jung calls the shadow.[7]

The child has learned to fuss, scream, and complain when it is not pampered, tended to, and indulged. This is the origination of entitlement issues emanating from the ego. Whereas in the first separation, the infant unconsciously regressed back toward death, this older child will attack the mother and its siblings with ferocity and anger when it fails in achieving its desired end, the control of the recalcitrant object. Infants soon learn that when they scream in anger, certain demands are often readily met. This constitutes the stage of primary narcissism. In this third developmental stage, the infant cognitively realizes that the breast "belongs" to another self-conscious being; it is under the control of the *other self's power; it is an opposing self that has the power, i.e., the freedom either to offer or to deny what the infant desires most,* her *breast*. This is an *interpersonal*, as opposed to an intrapsychic, stage. As Hegel dialectically describes this process in the *Phenomenology,* in these early stages of self-conscious development, consciousness systematically progresses through three cognitive stages: first, Sense-Certainty, the simple, immediacy of consciousness (Section

[7] Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 707. On Freud's gleaned influence gathered through knowledge of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation,* and his discussions of the unconscious, the Id, the existence of human evil, egoism, and narcissism, consult *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), essay by R. K. Gupta, *Freud and Schopenhauer,* 226–235.

90–110); second, this is then followed by Perception, the relational unification of self-consciousness with its own conceptual object, in this case, the desired object (Section 111–131); and third, by reaching the Lordship and Bondage stage, which consists in a dialectical conflict between two separate egos, as self-consciousness fully exhibits its native primordial *quality* of a narcissistic and egoistic desire for a unilateral, for an unequal *recognition* and a singular *freedom* at the other's expense, at the other's loss of their freedom, which is punctuated by the denial of the other's desires. Literally, as Hegel describes, "It is a battle to the death" (Sections 166–196). In terms of the dynamics of loneliness, both selves realize that they are engaged in a struggle of wills. And fifth, the original ubiquity of the 'oceanic feeling,' with its identification of consciousness as a "limitless bond with the entire universe," which early spawned the illusion and source of the ego's narcissism, that it alone exists, with its unrelenting demand for endless entitlements, has finally gained supremacy. The 'oceanic feeling' promotes the delusional fantasy that the infant is omnipotent, completely self-sufficient; that s/he is the sum total of reality; and that its ego *is* the universe. "We have said that the ego is the heir of the original narcissism in which the childish ego enjoyed self-sufficiency." As Freud proposes:

> We have given it the name of 'narcissism.' The subject behaves as though he were in love with himself; his egoistic instincts and his libidinal desires are not yet separable under our analysis…We suspect already that this narcissistic organization is never wholly abandoned. A human being remains to some extent narcissistic even after he has found external objects for his sexual instincts.[8]

[8] On the relation of the "oceanic feeling" to narcissism, see Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* translated by James Strachey (New York: W, W. Norton, 1959), 42. Freud connects narcissism and sadism in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* translated by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 59,66, 73–74, 76; *The Ego and the Id,* translated by Joan Riviere (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960), 30–31, 36, 43; and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), translated by James Strachey with an Introduction by Gregory Zilboorg, 47–48. On childhood sadism, cf. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams,* translated by James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965); 288, note, in which Freud cites "An observation made by a parent who had a knowledge of psycho-analysis caught the actual moment at which his highly intelligent four-year-old daughter perceived the distinction between being 'gone' and being 'dead.' The little girl had been troublesome at mealtime and noticed that one of the maids was looking at her askance. 'I wish Justine was dead,' was the child's comment to her father. 'Why dead?' inquired her

The connection between narcissism and sadism runs not only throughout Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* but it is also discussed in *Civilization and Its Discontents, The Ego and the Id,* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

The Two World Wars

It has always been incomprehensible to me how Kant's three-pronged synthetic a priori categorical imperative, Always act so that the *subjective maxim* of your action, namely your *will*, can become an *objective law* for all rational beings in any conceivable universe; secondly, always treat other rational beings, as if they were ends-in-themselves endowed with infinite worth and never as a means for your own selfish ends; and thirdly, rational beings are free when they give the law to themselves and follow their own law (Rousseau), when they do as they should rather than as they please, his principle of autonomy. I cannot understand how Kant's ethical reflexive/intentional principle could be so systematically violated and even turned into the cruelties perpetrated by Hitler's brand of German Nazism. Tragically, as both Gregory Zilboorg and Hannah Arendt have asserted, nations and political groups can be equally narcissistic as well as individuals.

Indeed, Hegel's sense of pride in "the Spirit of the German nation" displays some strongly disturbing themes by treating German nationalism as the (relative) culmination of World History, as the "final" political justification for his entire historical, dialectical, and developmental "spiritual" process.

> Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a Theodicaea—a justification of the ways of God—which Leibnitz attempted metaphysically, in his method, *i.e.,* in indefinite abstract categories—so that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil.[9]

And he further declares that:

father soothingly; wouldn't it do if she went away?" 'No' replied the child, 'then she'd come back again.' The unbounded self-love, the narcissism of children regards any interference as an act of *lèse majesté,* and their feelings demand (like the Draconian code) that any such crime shall receive the one form of punishment which admits of no degrees.

[9] Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of History,* translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 15.

> [W]e may affirm absolutely that *nothing great in the World* has been accomplished without *passion*. Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation; the first the Idea; the second the complex of human passions; the one the warp, the other the woof of the vast arras-web of Universal History. (23)

By passion, he intends a national *narcissistic* passion of supremacy, and he offers as prime examples of transformational world historical individuals Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon.

> It is even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests, inconsiderably; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form [as the Absolute Idea] must trample down many an innocent flower in the interest of *"the cunning of reason"* and crush to pieces many an object in its path. (32)

To bring the matter home, there is a powerful passage regarding good and evil in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov,* between Alyosha, the religious brother and his intellectual but atheistic brother, Ivan.

> "By the way, a Bulgarian I met in Moscow," Ivan went on, seeming not to hear his brother's words, "told me about the crimes committed by Turks and Circassians in all parts of Bulgaria through fear of a general uprising of the Slavs. They burn villages, murder, outrage women and children, they nail their prisoners by the ears to the fences, leave them so till morning and in the morning, they hang them—all sorts of things you can't imagine. People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult to the beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel. The tiger only tears and gnaws, that's all he is able to do. He would never think of nailing people by their ears even if he were able to do it. These Turks took a pleasure in torturing children too; cutting the unborn child from the mother's womb, and tossing the babies up in the air and catching them on the points of their bayonets before their mother's eyes. Doing it before the mother's eyes was what gave zest to the amusement. Here is another scene that I thought very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in her arms, a circle of invading Turks around her. They've planned a diversion; they pet the baby, laugh to make it laugh. They succeed, the baby laughs. At that moment a Turk points a pistol four inches from the baby's face. The baby laughs with glee, holds out its little hands to the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby's face and blows out its brain.

> Artistic, wasn't it? By the way, Turks are particularly fond of sweet things, they say. (*The Brothers Karamazov,* Book V, Chapter IV, Rebellion)

The term malice means evil done for its own sake, gratuitous evil.

In 1914, the First World War engaged the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and unofficially the Turkish Ottoman Empire, against the Entente Powers of France (and her colonies), Great Britain (including Canada, Australia, and South Africa), Russia, Belgium (and her colonies), Japan, and the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and later Italy, Greece, Romania, and in 1917, the United States entered on the Entente side.

King Nikola I of Montenegro (1910–1918), who was rather famously known as the "father-in-law" of European nobility, had nine daughters, princesses of the realm. His goal was to secure his newly attained title by forming marriage alliances with the royal powers of Europe. Two daughters, Milica and Anastasia, married Russian nobility and were befriended by the Czarina, Alexandra. In turn, they introduced the Queen to the "mad" mystic monk, Rasputin, who had the uncanny ability of stemming the queen's young son, Alexei, the heir to the Russian throne, of his hemophiliac bouts of bloodletting. But Rasputin's political power went deep as he counseled the Czarina and through her influenced Czar Nicholas' dismissal of no less than three Prime Ministers and several lesser ministers. This both alarmed and angered the Bolsheviks to the extent that they murdered Rasputin in 1917 and assassinated the entire Royal family in 1918. A third daughter of King Nikola, the beautiful Princess Jelena, married the king of Italy, Viktor Emmanuel III, whose first act at the start of the Second World War was to appoint Benito Mussolini as the Prime Minister of Italy.

But in 1916, during the First World War, following the German Austro-Hungarian military advance into Serbia, both King Nikola and my grandfather, Lazar Mijuskovic, who was the Prime Minister, fled Montenegro, first to Italy and then to France where a Montenegrin government in exile was established. Quite likely, John Plamenatz's father, Peter, who was also residing there, knew my grandfather, and both men were ardent advocates on behalf of the democratic Free People's Party, which sought union with Serbia, against the wishes of King Nikola.[10]

[10] Mitrovic, Andrej, *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), 156–157, 191; cf., John Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and*

The Second World War was a very different affair in terms of its magnitude, intensity, cruelty, and devastation, if those descriptions can be meaningfully applied in capturing man's increasing inhumanity to his fellow man.

I was born in Budapest, in 1937, a year after my grandfather, Lazar, died. I remained an only child because obviously it was a time when having children was not only unwise but dangerous. My father, from Cetinje, the old capital of Montenegro, was both a soldier and a diplomat, attached to the Yugoslavian Embassy as Secretary. In 1939, with the German lightening military advance into neighboring countries, their *blitzkrieg,* starting with Czechoslovakia, and then their forward push toward Yugoslavia, the Embassy transferred my parents and I to Jerusalem and then Tel Aviv, where British Intelligence recruited my father, who was fluent in Serbo-Croatian, French (at the time, the international diplomatic language), and Italian, as a cryptographer to decipher intercepted Fascist communiques. Meanwhile, my only male cousin had been killed by the Germans while trying to escape Montenegro and my three paternal uncles were castrated and consequently remained childless. My mother was from a small seaside village on the Dalmatian seacoast, Makarska. There is even a photograph of me playing on the beach with a companion in 1939.

My mother's family was wealthy and Catholic, and my parents were married on the Isle of Brac in Croatia. I even acquired a copy of their marriage certificate in 2008, when Ruth and I first visited Croatia and Montenegro. We also met with a Franciscan ninety-two-year-old priest, Fra Karlo Jurisic, who remembered my mother's family and walked us over to the old three-story stone house in the *Stari Grad,* the Old Town. But my parents had never told me the history of my dual ethnicities even as I grew into adulthood. It was something I had to learn-—if I wished—on my own. I now—and very belatedly believe—that it was their way of protecting me and I guess I still do. I knew that my father could not return to Montenegro, but I didn't know why—and frankly, to my shame, I never bothered to ask.

It was only then, on that first visit, that sadly enough I learned that during the Second World War, Croatia sided with the Nazis and the Axis Powers while operating one of the most sadistic of all the Nazi concentration camps, Jasenovac, infamous for its cruelty, atrocities, and tortures, as

Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914 (West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 1983), *passim;* and the biography of *Lazar Mijuskovic: Uspomene* (Niksic, Montenegro: Montenegrin Academy of the Arts and Sciences, 2016) and Wikipedia.

it targeted Serbs, Jews, and gypsies (Wikipedia). I shudder to imagine what would have happened if we had been trapped in Makarska during the war.

After the rapid submission of Montenegro at the hands the Germans, the occupation of Montenegro was turned over to the Italian Fascists as a Protectorate, as it fell under the rule of King Emmanuel and Queen Jelena of Italy, the former Princess of Montenegro.

In 1940, the British ruled Palestine and Egypt, as well as the strategically vital Suez Canal critically needed for military supplies, and the Yugoslavian Embassy reassigned my father to Cairo, whereupon he promptly volunteered to serve as a cavalry officer in the British Eighth Army under the generalships of both Claude Auchinleck and Bernard Montgomery, as they were engaged in desert warfare against Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's elite Afrika Korps and Panzer Divisions. The British Eighth Army was a compilation of troops from many countries, including Australia, British India, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Free French forces, Greece, New Zealand, Poland, Rhodesia, South Africa, Scotland, the United Kingdom, but only a few scatterings of Yugoslavs.

In late 1944, as the war was coming to a close, the Embassy transferred us first to Ankara (Turkey had been neutral during the war) and shortly thereafter we were reassigned to Washington where we were flown in a B-29 bomber. I remember President Roosevelt's death. By 1947, Tito had consolidated his political power in Yugoslavia and supported the Stalinist Communists, until he broke with them in 1948. But before the break, the Embassy had tried to transfer us to Bucharest, behind the Iron Curtain. My father resigned and applied for refuge in the United States, and we became politically Displaced Persons.

Looking back historically on what transpired from 1914 to 1947, after the First World War, Germany was humiliated and regarded itself as unfairly punished. As noted, as early as 1938, Zilboorg had formulated a strong conceptual connection between loneliness and hostility—basically a synthetic a priori dynamic between the self's narcissism <>loneliness<>and hostility, while emphasizing that not only individuals but groups as well as nations can experience loneliness. After the First World War, the proudest nation in the world, Germany, had been reduced to ignominy, humiliation, and a thirst for revenge, and in 1933 it began its program for a systematic retribution against the European nations, as it became an outlet for international sadism. Basically, sadism served as a concerted drive for revenge against the world, anger for the political isolation of Germany,

and a vengeful weapon of reprisal in delivering its punishment against the transgressors and the world at large.

We can now analyze more clearly the *dynamic* political forces involved in what ensued, as we benefit from Hannah Arendt's penetrating retrospective analysis written after the war in 1948 and the tragic interplay between Germany's national loneliness, anger, and willful recourse to destruction and evil.

> What kind of basic experience in the living together of men permeates a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking. That such a combination was never used before in the varied forms of political domination is obvious…It has frequently been observed that terror can rule absolutely only over men that are isolated against each other and that one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical governments is to bring this isolation about. What we call isolation in the political sphere is called loneliness in the sphere of social intercourse. Isolation and loneliness are not the same. I can be isolated—that is in a situation in which I cannot act because there is nobody who will act with me—without being lonely; and I can be lonely—that is in a situation in which I as a person feel myself deserted by all human companionship—without being isolated…While isolation only concerns the political realm of life, loneliness concerns human life as a whole. Totalitarian governments, like all tyrannies, certainly could not exist without destroying the public realm…But totalitarian domination as a form of government is new in that it is not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well [e.g., the family degenerating to the Hitler Youth movement]….Loneliness, the common ground of terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology, the preparation of its executioners and its victims, is closely connected to uprootedness, which have been the curse of the modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution…To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to be recognized at all.[11]

The sadistic goal of Nazism was to isolate humanity from itself.

Replacing Hegel's world historical individuals, Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, Arendt posits in their place, Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin during the Second World War in her compelling study. The underlying

[11] Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt, 1968; originally published in 1948), 474–475. Importantly, the author distinguishes Hegelian Marxism from totalitarian Communism.

dynamic shows how Germany's national isolation, its loneliness in the early 1930s, evolved into the desire to punish the offending nations by the implementation of an extensive international network of Nazi concentration camps in order to appease the original misery of Germany's national isolation as it led to its own consequent imputations of loneliness and separation against its enemies, first as it narcissistically suffered loneliness and then turned it into a sadistic weapon against others.

Hegel's conception of civil society as atomistic is basically Hobbesian, as Arendt indicates.

> Hobbes, indeed, is the only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim, even if his principles were not recognized by the bourgeois class for a long time. Hobbes' *Leviathan* exposed the only political theory according to which the state is based not on some kind of constituting law—whether of divine law, the law of nature, or the law of the social contract—which determines the rights and wrongs of the individual's interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves, so that the egoistic "private interest is the same with the publique". (Arendt, 139–147)

Indeed, during Hegel's time there was a strong desire for Pan-Germanism as well (Arendt, 238–239).

In addition, the Nazi propaganda machine encouraged the Hitler Youth to shift their loyalty and allegiance from their own families to their own supervening national interest (Arendt, 399, note 30).

And we recall the political expanse of Hobbes' vision, wherein the natural state of man is nothing short of a state war and the life man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. And with a certain attitude of dismay, we can repeat Weber's warning trespass into the spheres of science and politics:

> Science is meaningless because it has no answer to the only questions that matter to us. 'What should we [morally] do? How shall we live?' The fact that science cannot give us this answer is absolutely indisputable. The question is only in what sense does it give "no" answer, and whether or not it might after all prove useful for somebody who is able to ask the right question. (Weber, *The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation"; "Politics as a Vocation"*)

Politics is not the answer; it is the dilemma. Whether we choose to grasp Hobbes' political atomistic paradigm of civil society or, instead we endorse

Hegel's organic principle of community in which the "cunning of reason" is impelled "to crush many an innocent flower," makes little—actually no—difference, neither system bonds us humanely.

Meanwhile in Yugoslavia, an intense guerilla war was raging as it consumed the countryside. It was the only country that engaged in active guerilla warfare, the other Allied European countries instead were reduced to operating with underground resistance movements. In Serbia, initially two forces battled the Nazis. The Royalist Chetnik faction, under the leadership of Draza Mihailovic, who had been a schoolteacher, and supported the exiled Royalist party of King Peter of Yugoslavia, while the Partisan Communist party, under the directorship of Josip Broz, whose *nom de guerre* was Tito, supported the anticipated takeover by Stalinist Russian Communists at the end of the war. Initially both factions, Chetnik and Partisan, fought against the invading Nazi forces, with the Chetniks initially militarily supported and armed by the British government under Churchill, but at a certain point in the hostilities, it became clear that the deadly Nazi reprisals, consisting of a hundred villagers executed for every German soldier killed, became a price too costly to continue. Meanwhile, the Partisans continued their attacks while the Chetniks, in anticipation of a Russian Communist takeover after the war, attacked the Partisans. At that point, Churchill and the British government accordingly decided to withdraw their support of the Chetniks and turned instead to arming the Communists. Thus, as the tides of battle turned against the Chetniks and Mihailovic, and meanwhile the Partisans turned more in favor of Russian Communism, the Partisans at the close of the war accused of Mihailovic of being a traitor. As we shall see, the pre-history of the affair was complex and tragic in a number of unanticipated ways.

During the First World War, the Serbian Army was admired for its exceptional bravery and sacrifice against the Austro-Hungarian attackers. Among the most heroic participants and leaders was Mihailovic, as recounted in a book by Marcia Kurapovna.

> Mihailovic himself would participate in one of the great counter offensives against the Germans in September 1916, one that military historians would later call the first stage in the ultimate downfall of the Central powers in the

> Balkans…Now about to join the Allied victory on the Salonika Front, Mihailovic would receive the highest honors in the Serbian Army.[12]

In addition:

> In May 1916, Draza Mihailovic joined as platoon leader in the Twenty-Third Infantry Regimen of the Royal Serbian Army's Vardar Division, after being transferred to the Salonika front assigned to positions in the area of the Ostrovo Lakes in Northern Greece. (23)

Earlier, in 1912, the author describes how Mihailovic, though terribly wounded during the brief decisive Serb victory against the Ottoman Turks, arrived at the Ostrovo region with the Vardar Division as part of a machine-gun company that reinforced the French and Serbian armies (25).

And further:

> Mihailovic, after more than five years of war and maintaining positions at Lake Ostrovo with the Vardar Division, was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant and awarded one of the highest honors in the Serbian military, the Order of the White Eagle, for outstanding service in the battle. He was the only one in his division (the Vardar) to receive the Victoria Cross, the highest honor of the British military. Yet "the race to victory and the lost laurel," as the British press dubbed the Balkan triumph, would return with catastrophic force in the life of Mihailovic less than three decades later. The victory in Europe was announced on November 11, 1918. The Allied tragedy of the Balkans was only about to begin. (Kurapovna, p. 31)

But that was the First World War. The second conflict was vastly different.

> In September of 1943, a violent civil war in Yugoslavia was tearing the country apart.
>
> It pitted the Communist Partisan forces of the country and the Royalist-nationalist Chetniks against each other and both of these groups against the Axis terror of the Croatian Ustase. (Kurapovna, 33)

Again:

[12] Kurapovna, Marcia Christoff, *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia* (San Diego: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 21; hereafter cited as Kurapovna. Cf., Zafranovic, Lordan, "The Cruelest Death Camp of All Times" (1983). Youtube.

> It is one of the more depressing facts of modern Balkan history that genuine efforts at harmonious coexistence between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox nations should have resulted in events such as the day in autumn of 1942 when a notice was put out on the streets of Belgrade that Serbians were to avoid contact with the waters of the Sava because the number of Serbian corpses killed by the Ustase was more overwhelming than the Axis-run Yugoslav state could deal with. Such gruesome anecdotes only got worse during these bitter years of the Yugoslav civil war…The violence was directed toward Serb Orthodox and Jewish citizens as well. Women and children among 1,500 Jewish inmates at Djakova, a Croatian concentration camp, were crammed into vans one day in the summer of 1942 with water pouring through a hose that was fitted from the exhaust pipe to the interior of the vans, which drove around until half the passengers were dead. (Kurapovna, 64 ff.)

But the worst concentration camp in the Nazi system was Jasenovac operated by the Ustase.

> The worst was yet to come. One of the most demoralizing symbols of the entire war—in the Balkans or anywhere else—was that concentration camp, Jasenovac, a complex established in a field near the Sava River and surrounded by three rows of barbed wire. The camp became notorious, with its roads strewn with the corpses of prisoners…Even the women of the Ustase, very often married to or the girlfriends of male commanders in that organization, were themselves known to be among the most brutal of idealogues. (Kurapovna, 65)

And the text continues to describe the prevailing misery for the next five pages. The number of estimated killed rises as high as 700,000. The targets of the tortures and atrocities were Serbs, Jews, and Romas or gypsies (Wikipedia). The cruelties were so intense and pervasive that even the German Nazis were appalled.

> Even the Germans themselves were disgusted by the actions of the Ustase. An SS report on the killings noted. "The Ustasa units have carried out their atrocities not only against male [Serb] Orthodox of military age, but in particular in the most bestial fashion against unarmed old men, women and children…Because of these atrocities innumerable Orthodox have fled to [central] Serbia." (Kurapovna, 68)

As previously stated, distressingly sad for me, Croatia and my mother's principality, Dalmatia, on the Adriatic seacoast, sympathized with Nazism and to a significant extent were also supported by the Roman Catholic Church.

In conclusion, we should heed Lord Action's pro My parents never told me any of this, of the tragic and depressing history of my dual ethnicity. Basically, I believe their motive was to protect me. I only learned it when Ruth and I first visited Croatia and Montenegro in 2008. I vividly recall visiting Dubrovnik, sitting in the ancient fabulously wonderful town square and drinking beers when I noticed a huge banner being displayed against a building and the word "rat" on it jumped out at me and I asked our waiter about the advertisement, and he informed us that it was for a documentary about the 1991–1992 Balkan War when Montenegro bombed Dubrovnik. A war of ethnic cleansing by Serbia. Madness!

During the remainder of the Second World War, Mihailovic's role primarily consisted in rescuing Allied bomber pilots, who were forced to parachute down into Axis held territory in Yugoslavia. Incidentally, the town of Titograd—now converted back to its original name, Podgorica—was bombed eighty-seven times by the Allies because of the Fascist presence there. In any event, with the political and military tides turned against the Chetniks, at the end of the war, Mihailovic was captured and charged by the Partisans with being a traitor and brought to trial. On March 24, 1946, the Communist Government in Belgrade announced that it would put Mihailovic on trial on charges of collaborating with the enemy and other war crimes. David Martin, a Canadian author, organized a powerful legal and political counteroffensive and in effect it was directed against the "tyranny of the Soviet regime" (Kurapovna). Similarly, The National Committee of American Airman rose to Mihailovic's aid (pp. 221–222 ff.). The *Washington Post* editorial reaction to the trial was fiercely condemnatory.

Further:

> Both the British and American governments have a certain moral responsibility in seeing that "full justice" according to our own understanding of that word, is done…The failure of Great Britain and the United States to insist upon an impartial justice for General Mihailovic would vastly increase existing bitterness and suspicion among Communists and non-Communists everywhere in the world and would make all the future statements, promises or pledges by either of these two powers open to the deepest skepticism.

> This being so, the case of General Mihailovic contains a serious threat to world amity and peace. As such it may properly be brought before the Security Council of the United Nations. (Kurapovna, 223)

But the most impassioned, elegant, moral, and poignant defense was by a Montenegrin-born Oxford University philosophy professor, John Plamenatz, titled *The Case of General Mihailovic*.[13]

On July 17, 1946, Mihailovic and several of his followers were executed by a firing squad in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

> In 2015, a Serbian court rehabilitated Mihailovic and overturned his conviction ruling that it was a Communist political show trial that was fundamentally and inherently unfair. (Wikipedia)

As already mentioned, sadly, in 1991–1992, during the "ethnically cleansing" Balkan War, the Montenegrins bombed Dubrovnik, one of the oldest and most beautiful towns on the Adriatic coast. Madness! Will it never end? In conclusion, we should heed Lord Action's prophetic political warning: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." And sadism corrupts and absolute sadism corrupts absolutely; there are no barriers or limits.

A Case Study of Political Narcissism

The classic film, *Citizen Kane,* starts with a boy of about ten years of age playing with a sled in the snow when he is called into the modest house by his mother, as she is engaged with planning for his future with a solicitor,

[13] Plamenatz, John Petrov, Appendix, *The Case of General Mihailovic,* private edition, Printed by John Bellows, Ltd., (Gloucester, June 1944) 1–27. In the treatise, Professor Plamenatz defends Mihailovic against Churchill in recounting the history of the affair between the Croatian Ustashi's massacre of the Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies as "The Germans, inevitably victorious, soon let the world know which section of the Yugoslav people it was, which had in their opinion, 'found its soul.' Pavelic, the head of the Axis Croation Ustashi terrorist organization, was made the ruler of the independent state, which included not only the Croatian territories of Habsburg times, but the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.…The Serbs, on the other hand, were not granted an independent state. They had to support the German army of occupation, to cede considerable territories to the Hungarians as well as to see Montenegro occupied by the Italians (2–3)…. At the time these two guerilla movements [Partisan and Chetnik] were being organized, there occurred the terrible Ustashi massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian districts" (p. 9). In effect, Professor Plamenatz recapitulates the entire horrors and atrocities covered by Kurapovna's documentary study. With a historian's talent, he prosecutes *The Case of General Mihailovic* against the Partisans (p. 14 ff.). And he praises Mihailovic's military prowess and courage throughout his pamphlet.

since he is being mysteriously and unexpectedly awarded a considerable sum of wealth when he reaches maturity. The father weakly protests his son leaving home and it is clear the child is unhappy about the situation as well. But the mother is adamant that the boy will be privileged with a better education and a finer way of life well beyond what his parents can provide for him given their economic situation. The scene then dramatically shifts to the maturity of our protagonist and his plans for the establishment of a powerful newspaper empire that will not only provide him with the opportunity to craft the opinions of the masses but also to propel him to greater political influences as he becomes a candidate for public office. His supporters are many and powerful as he manipulates his massive propagandistic enterprise. But it begins to unravel as his expectations become increasingly narcissistic and demanding at the expense of his friends, his wife, and his mistress as he engages in an adulterous affair with a devoted but pathetically compliant woman, which leads to divorce, and in the uncoiling of their lives as both his power and his wealth grow until public scandal ruins him. His best friend becomes disenchanted with him, and his second wife finally abandons him. By report, as he is dying in his fabulous mansion, he is overheard uttering a single word, "Rosebud," and an ambitious reporter becomes intrigued in determining its significance in vain. The last scene in the movie shows him alone and lonely expiring in a chair with his arm extended as a glass paperweight depicting a snowy scene falls from his hand and the scene shifts to the mansion's massive underground storage rooms, stuffed with collected antiques, as the camera pans all the overbought furnishings and treasures he had amassed as a fiery blaze progressively consumes the interior. But on a pile of burning furniture, a sled has just started burning and our eyes perceive an emblem on the sled decorated with an image of a rose.

Currently, our own time has its own Hegelian World Historical Individuals, who must crush innocent flowers in order to exhibit their greatness: Vladimir Putin of Russia, Kim Jung Un of South Korea, and Donald Trump of the United States. Unfortunately for Mr. Trump, he has lacked the opportunity for controlling US military power—"my generals" as he referred to them—that is so essential in terms of manifesting his political power to its fullest extent. But it is interesting to observe the twin narcissistic dynamics of his political situation, as it has played out. His ensconced political supporters, congressional leaders, share both his narcissistic desire and his methods of securing and maintaining their power and influence. Meanwhile, his masses bristle at their sense of being

disrespected and have elected both to indiscriminately and selectively punish others who they feel have upstaged and belittled them.

On September 18, 2020, I gave a lecture, "Loneliness and Narcissism," at the University of Szczecin in Poland, at an international conference, participated by seventeen nations, "Alone Together Again," where I availed myself of the opportunity to warn about the consequences of human separation and political narcissism and loneliness. And three months later the ensuing assault of Mr. Trump's army of assailants, as they stormed the US Capitol on his orders on January 6, 2021, has been seared in my memory. For me, the saddest circumstances deeply embedded in the violence was the aftermath in the suicidal death of the two valiant Capitol policemen. In their undeserved sense of misplaced shame and guilt, they took their own lives, while the narcissistic figure responsible for the tragedy is a man completely incapable of feeling either any semblance of responsibility, guilt, or shame.

Conclusion

At the close of *Cartesian Meditations,* quite interestingly, Husserl adds a short paragraph pronouncing on his own principle of value, which is very much in line with Max Weber's concern about the impersonal nature of science and politics.

> The Delphic motto, "Know thyself" has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the [scientific] world by epoche, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. *"Noli foras ire,"* says Augustine, *"in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas."*[14]

I think it is accurate to say that for the most part that it is also a true appraisal of my own philosophical goal. But regarding the passional direction of my existence, I would rather defer to the valuative expression offered by Socrates in the *Republic,* which is consistent with his parting words at his trial regarding an eternal dreamless sleep.

> I have watched the frenzy of the multitude and seen that there is no soundness in the conduct of public life, nowhere an ally at whose side a champion

[14] Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 157.

> of justice could hope to escape destruction; but that, like a man fallen among wild beasts, if he should refuse to take part in their misdeeds and could not hold out alone against the fury of all, he would be destined, before he could be of any service to his country or his friends, to perish, having done no good to himself or to anyone else—one who has weighed all this, keeps quiet and goes his own way, like the traveler who takes shelter under a wall from a driving storm of wind and hail; and seeing lawlessness on all sides, is content if he can keep his hands clean from iniquity, while this life lasts, and when the end comes take his departure, with good hopes, in serenity and peace. (VI, 204)[15]

I greatly admire Kant's sense of duty toward our fellow man, his categorical imperative. But it is justly tempered by Hume's common sense.

> Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children.[16]

The incredible elegance of his style almost masks the truth of his evaluation of mankind in general.

> This book is about loneliness. But it is also about intimacy and friendship.
>
> In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them and cannot find it again. If you press me to tell you why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was I…[W]e found ourselves so taken with each other, so well acquainted, so bound together, that from that time on nothing was so close to us as each other. (Montaigne, *Of Friendship*)

[15] *The Republic of Plato,* translated by F. M. Cornford (Oxford University Press, 1957), VI, 496 (204).

[16] Quoted by Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of Davis Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1964), 564.

But long ago, Aristophanes, "the friend of man," tells it first and tells it best in his myth in Plato's *Symposium,* as it seeks to define the nature, the essence of human love.

> The original race of mankind was divided into three, besides the two sexes, male and female, there was a third, whose name is now forgotten. Each human was globular in shape, with a rounded back and sides, with four arms and legs, one head but with two faces looking in different directions, four ears, and two sets of private parts. They were very powerful, boisterous, and troublesome creatures responsible for creating much havoc.
>
> At this, Zeus took counsel with the other gods as to what was to be done…At last, after racking his brains, Zeus offered a solution. I can see my way, he said, to put an end to this disturbance by weakening these people without destroying them. What I propose to do is to cut them in half just as you and I might chop up sorb apples. Now when the work of bisection was complete, it left each half with a desperate yearning for its other half; and they ran together and flung their arms around each other's necks and asked for nothing more than to be rolled into one. So much so, that they began to die of hunger and general inertia, for neither could do anything without the other. And whenever one half was left alone by the death of its mate, it wandered around questing and clasping in the hope of finding a spare half-woman—or a whole woman nowadays—or half a man. And so, the race was dying out. Fortunately, however, Zeus felt so sorry for them that he devised another scheme for them…So you see, gentlemen, how far back we can trace our innate love for one another, and how this love is always trying to reintegrate our former nature, to make two into one, and to bridge the gulf between one human and another. (Plato, *Symposium,* 189e–192)[17]

Intimacy is the search *and* the finding of your other half.

Conclusion

For me, it is manifestly clear that the history of ideas is tending strongly in a self-destructive direction.

Personal Disclaimer As a self-declaration, I am not political—I've never voted—nationalistic, ethnic, or religious. My chief social value lies in searching for friendship.

[17] Quoted by Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of Davis Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1964), 564.

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt, 1968; originally published in 1948).

DeGregory, Lane, "The Girl in the Window," *Tampa Bay Times* (2008).

Ellenberger, Henri, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Freud, Sigmund, *The Ego and the Id,* translated by Joan Riviere (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960).

Freud, Sigmund, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* translated by James Strachey with an Introduction by Gregory Zilboorg (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961).

Freud, Sigmund, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* translated by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).

Freud, Sigmund, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* translated by James Strachey (New York: W, W. Norton, 1959).

Freud, Sigmund, *The Ego and the Id,* translated by Joan Riviere (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960).

Freud, Sigmund, *The Interpretation of Dreams,* translated by James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965).

Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda, "Loneliness," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 26:2 (1959).

Gupta, R. K., "Freud and Schopenhauer," in *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement,* edited by Michael Fox (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 226–235.

Hegel, G. W. F., *Phenomenology of Spirit,* translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of History,* translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 15.

Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology,* translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

James, William, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: Dover, 1950).

Kemp Smith, Norman, *The Philosophy of Davis Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1964).

Kurapovna, Marcia Christoff, *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia* (San Diego: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

Mijuskovic, Ben, "The Role of Empathy as the Path to Intimacy," *Paedagogia Christiana,* 2/46 (2020).

Mijuskovic, Ben, "Cognitive and Motivational Roots of Loneliness," in *Addressing Loneliness: Coping, Prevention, and Clinical Interventions,* edited by Ami Sha'ked and Ami Rokach (London: Routledge, 2015).

Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Review,* 66:4 (1979–80).
Mijuskovic, Ben, "Loneliness: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Psychiatry: A Journal for Interpersonal Processes,* 40:2 (1977).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness* (Santa Barbara, CA:, 2015).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012, 3rd edition).
Mijuskovic, Ben, *Metaphysical Dualism, Subjective Idealism, and Existential Loneliness* (London: Routledge, 2021).
Mitrovic, Andrej, *Serbia's Great War, 1914–1918* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007).
Montaigne, *Of Friendship*
Plamenatz, John Petrov, Appendix, *The Case of General Mihailovic,* private edition, Printed by John Bellows, Ltd., (Gloucester, June 1944), 1–27.
Plato, *The Republic of Plato,* translated by F. M. Cornford (Oxford University Press, 1957), VI, 496 (204).
Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation.*
Spitz, Rene, *No and Yes: On the Genesis of Human Communication* (New York: International Universities Press, 1957).
Spitz, Rene, *The First Year of Life: A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965).
Treadway, John, *Lazar Mijuskovic: Uspomene* (Niksic, Montenegro: Montenegrin Academy of the Arts and Sciences, 2016).
Treadway, John, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914* (West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 1983).
Zilboorg, Gregory, "Loneliness," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1938.

Index

B. L. Mijuskovic, *The Philosophical Roots of Loneliness and Intimacy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90602-3