

Technology Capital Transfer

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This Paper

- ▶ **Transfer of technology capital** through FDI
 - ▶ China
- ▶ New in the theory
 - ▶ MP(09,10): M_i ;
 - ▶ HMP(12): $M_{ij} = q_{ij} M_i$
 - ▶ technology transfer: $(1 - h(q_{ij}))M_i$, $h'(\cdot) \geq 0$
- ▶ New in the calibration
 - ▶ match *bilateral* FDI inflows (as % of host country's GDP)
- ▶ Micro evidence on patents (for foreign, JV, and domestic firms) in the Chinese car industry
 - ▶ support the choice of technology transfer parameters

Calibration: Aggregate and Bilateral FDI inflows (2007)

FDI Inflows (% of GDP)				
Origin	Host			
	USA	EU	JPN	CHT
Data				
USA+EU+JPN	0.97	1.08	0.34	0.55
CHT+BRI	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
ROW	0.59	0.37	0.10	1.00
Total	1.58	1.46	0.45	1.55
Model without Transfers				
USA+EU+JPN	0.78	0.77	0.25	1.22
CHT+BRI	0.68	0.59	0.17	0.23
ROW	0.11	0.10	0.03	0.11
Total	1.58	1.46	0.45	1.55
Model with Transfers				
USA+EU+JPN	1.07	1.02	0.32	0.58
CHT+BRI	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ROW	0.51	0.44	0.13	0.97
Total	1.58	1.46	0.45	1.55

The Mechanics of the Calibration

- ▶ Model w/o technology transfer (MP, 09; MP, 10)
 - ▶ FDI frictions calibrated to FDI inflows (over GDP)
- ▶ Model w/ technology transfer (HMP, 12)
 - ▶ $h_i(q) = \min\{\bar{h}_i q e^{-\eta(1-q)}, 1\}$
 - ▶ $FDI(ROW, CHT)$ to match $\bar{h}_{CHT} = \bar{h}_{BRI} > 0$
 - ▶ impose $h_{USA} = h_{EU} = h_{JPN} = 0$
 - ▶ calibrated FDI frictions are lower
 - ▶ model fits with zero indigenous (Chinese) technology capital

Counterfactuals: Have Chinese Policies been Successful?

- ▶ Yes! Welfare and growth would decrease under stronger IPR policies, *in a world with technology transfers*
- ▶ No... Technology capital in China increased due to MNEs, but not due to indigenous innovation
 - ▶ imitation versus innovation

HMP(12) Story: Sleeping with the Enemy

- ▶ Joint Ventures in China (early 90s)
 - ▶ market access for technology transfer
 - ▶ weak intellectual property rights
 - ▶ goal conflicts (e.g. profitability vs growth), and lack of cooperation among partners
 - ▶ ownership restrictions did not promote technology transfer (like in counterfactuals)
- ▶ Evidence on technology transfers
 - ▶ ownership restrictions for final car assembly (83% of MNEs are JV)

	Patent Counts in Car Industry	
	China (00-10)	WIPO (78-11)
Multinational Firms	13,721	55,258
JV Chinese Firms	1,076	17
Independent Chinese firms	3,602	577

My Comments

- ▶ Reinterpreting the theory
 - ▶ why is a JV formed?
- ▶ The empirical evidence in perspective
 - ▶ JV, foreign firms, and R&D in China
- ▶ The role of spill-overs

Reinterpreting the Theory

- ▶ MNEs entry choice: JV versus wholly-owned affiliate
- ▶ JV formed to exploit complementarities
 - ▶ better foreign technology capital coupled with knowledge of local networks/business-work practices/consumer base
- ▶ Re-interpret $1 - h(q_{ij})$
 - ▶ the cost of forming the JV
 - ▶ the bargaining share of the MNEs (constrained by the strength of IPR and Gov policies)
- ▶ Wholly-owned affiliate
 - ▶ $q_{ij} = 1$, higher σ_i —cannot access that easily the domestic market

Chinese Joint-Ventures (JV): Lessons from the Past

- ▶ Most ownerships restrictions have been lifted and we still observe the formation of JV
- ▶ McKinsey Quarterly Report (Dec. 10): renew interest in forming JV with Chinese firms
 - ▶ bring only older technology to China
 - ▶ leave blueprints at home
 - ▶ limit JV to steps in the value chain that involve limited IP (e.g. assembly, packaging, tailoring)
 - ▶ sell IP to the JV (e.g., up-front cash payments, license fees)

FDI Trends in China

	FDI Stocks, as % of GDP				
	1990	1995	2000	2007	2011
inward	5.1	13.4	16.2	9.4	10.1
outward	1.1	2.3	2.3	2.7	5.2

- ▶ Slow shift from developing to developed countries as main FDI source
 - ▶ in 2000, around 50% of foreign firms were owned by investors from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan
 - ▶ “round-tripping”
- ▶ Changes in regulations (specially, since 2001)
 - ▶ shift from export-oriented activities to domestic market activities

What do Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs) Do in China?

- ▶ Defever-Riano (12): comprehensive firm-level data, 2000-06
 - ▶ more than 50% of FIEs are JV (more than 30% of foreign PTEs)
 - ▶ more than 30% of FIEs export more than 90% of output
 - ▶ **84% of all FIEs are located in a FTZ** (87% if FIEs exporters only)
 - ▶ FIEs also include foreign Processing Trade Enterprises (PTEs)
- ▶ Export-oriented foreign firms
 - ▶ isolated from the domestic market
 - ▶ enormous tax benefits and other preferential treatments
 - ▶ very little R&D, labor-intensive activities (“processing trade”)
- ▶ Regulation: Till 2001, FIEs *had to* be exporters

R&D Trends in China

- ▶ R&D spending in China triplicated between 96 and 02
 - ▶ Preferential treatment to either technology-intensive or pure-exporter foreign firms
 - e.g., 2002 Provisions on Guiding FDI
 - ▶ Off-shoring of R&D activities by MNEs (00s)
 - vertical chains in R&D activities
- ▶ Main industries: ICT, automotive, chemicals
 - ▶ JV like Lenovo and Intel
 - ▶ wholly-owned affiliates like Motorola

Multinational Activity and R&D in China (UNCTAD WIR, 05)

- ▶ Share of foreign affiliates in (business) R&D (03)
 - ▶ China 24%; Ireland 72%; UK 45%; Avg 16%; USA 14%
- ▶ UNCTAD Survey of 700 largest R&D MNEs spenders (04)
 - ▶ USA 59%, China 35%, France 35%, India 25%, Taiwan 6%
 - ▶ 2/3 named China as the most attractive location for R&D-based affiliates (05-09)
- ▶ Japanese MNEs
 - ▶ from 13 to 67 R&D bases in China (20% of total) in 00-04
- ▶ US majority-owned affiliates
 - ▶ R&D expenditures in China raised from 0.1% to 3.1% in 94-02
 - ▶ adaptive innovations for the Chinese market
 - ▶ low costs, large supply of talent, good universities, research centers, high-tech parks, change in Gov policies
- ▶ New trend: China seeks technology capital abroad
 - ▶ M&A's in developed countries
 - ▶ Chinese MNEs operate R&D centers abroad (2/3 in USA+EU) for product design

Spill-overs?

- ▶ Suggestion: Leave them out!
 - ▶ very similar to “appropriation ” in the theory
technology transfers, imitation, worker training, ...
 - ▶ no empirical evidence (Hale and Long, 11)
 - ▶ not clear how they can be disciplined in the data
 - ▶ they do not improve the fit of the model