

## CHAPTER IX: NATURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE STORM TROOPS

The strength of the old state rested on three pillars: the monarchical form of government, the civil service, and the Army.

The Revolution of 1918 abolished the form of government, disbanded the Army and abandoned the civil service to the corruption of party politics.

Thus the essential supports of the so-called authority of the State were shattered. This authority nearly always depends on three elements, which are the essential foundations of all authority.

Popular support is the first element which is necessary for the creation of authority, but an authority resting on that foundation alone is still quite frail, uncertain and vacillating.

Hence, everyone who finds himself vested with an authority that is based only on popular support must take measures to improve and consolidate the foundations of that authority by the acquisition of power.

Accordingly, we must look upon power, that is to say the capacity to use force, as the second foundation on which all authority is based. This foundation is more stable and secure, but not always stronger, than the first.

If popular support and power are united and can endure for a certain time, then an authority may evolve which is based on a still stronger foundation, namely, the authority of tradition.

Finally, if popular support, power, and tradition are united together, then the authority based on them may be looked upon as invincible.

In Germany the Revolution abolished this last foundation. There was no longer even a traditional authority. With the collapse of the old Reich, the abolition of the monarchical form of government, the destruction of all the old insignia of greatness and the imperial symbols, tradition was shattered at a blow.

The result was that the authority of the State was shaken to its foundations.

The second pillar of state authority, namely power, also ceased to exist. In order to carry through the Revolution it was necessary to disband that body which had hitherto incorporated the organised force and power of the State, namely, the Army. Indeed some decimated fragments of the Army itself had to be employed as fighting elements in the Revolution.

The armies at the front were not subjected in the same measure to this process of disruption, but as they gradually left farther behind them the fields of glory on which they had fought heroically for four and a half years they were attacked by the corrosive acid that was destroying the discipline of the home front. When they arrived at the demobilizing centres, they fell into that state of confusion which was styled 'voluntary obedience,' at the time of the Soldiers' Councils.

Of course it was out of the question to think of founding any kind of authority on this crowd of mutineering soldiers, who looked upon military service as a job of eight hours per day.

Therefore, the second element, that which guarantees the stability of authority, was also abolished and the Revolution had only the original element, popular support, on which to build up its authority, but this basis was extraordinarily insecure.

With one mighty blow, the Revolution had shattered the old state edifice, but only because the normal equilibrium within the social structure of the nation had already been destroyed by the war.

Every national body is made up of three main classes. At one extreme we have the best of the people, taking the word 'best' as indicating those who are highly endowed with the civic virtues and are noted for their courage and their readiness to sacrifice their private interests.

At the other extreme are the worst dregs of humanity, in whom vice and egotistic interests prevail. Between these two extremes stands the third class, which is made up of the broad middle stratum, which does not incorporate either radiant heroism or vulgar vice.

Those eras which mark the rise of a State are characterized and indeed made possible only by the fact that they occur under the exclusive leadership of that section belonging to the best extreme of the population.

Times of normal and steady development, or of stable conditions, owe

their existence and outwardly visible characteristics to the preponderating influence of the middle stratum.

In this stage the two extreme classes counterbalance each other, or in other words; they cancel each other. Times of national collapse are determined by the preponderating influence of the worst elements.

It must be noted here, however, that the broad masses, which constitute what I have called the middle section, come forward and make their influence felt only when the two extreme sections are engaged in mutual strife, in case one of the extreme sections comes out victorious, the middle section will readily submit to its domination.

If the best dominate, the broad masses will follow it. Should the worst extreme prove triumphant, then the middle section will at least offer no opposition to it, for the masses that constitute the middle stratum never fight their own battles. The bloodshed which continued for four and a half years during the War destroyed the inner equilibrium between these three sections in so far as it can be said (with all due respect for the sacrifices made by the middle section) that it nearly led to the best extreme being bled white, because the total amount of irreplaceable and heroic German lives lost during these four and a half years was really tremendous.

Just think of the hundreds of thousands of instances when there was a call for volunteers for the front, volunteers for patrol duty, volunteer dispatch carriers, volunteers to go out and rig up a telephone, volunteers for bridge building, volunteers for the submarines, volunteers for the air service, volunteers for the storm battalions, and so on.

During four and a half years, and on thousands of occasions, there was always the cry for volunteers and again for volunteers, and the result was always the same.

Beardless young fellows or fully developed men, all filled with an ardent love for their country; urged on by their own courageous spirit or by a lofty sense of their duty—it was always such men who answered the call for volunteers.

There were tens of thousands, indeed hundreds of thousands, of such cases, so that that kind of human material steadily grew scarcer and scarcer.

Those who were not killed were either maimed on the field of battle or

disappeared gradually owing to the steady decrease in the number of survivors.

Let us remember, above all, that in 1914 whole armies were composed of volunteers who, owing to a criminal lack of conscience on the part of our feckless parliamentarians, had not received a regulation peace-time training and were consequently defenceless cannon-fodder at the mercy of the enemy.

The four hundred thousand who fell or were permanently maimed on the battlefields of Flanders were irreplaceable. Their loss was something far more than a numerical loss.

With their death the scales, being too lightly weighted at the best end, tipped rapidly upwards and the vulgar, infamous and cowardly elements, in short, those who constituted the worst extreme of our population, weighed heavier in the balance than previously.

In addition to this, for four and a half years, our best human material was being thinned to an exceptional degree on the battlefields, while the worst extreme surpassed itself in the art of self-preservation.

For each heroic volunteer who made the supreme sacrifice and ascended the steps of Valhalla, there was a shirker who cunningly dodged death on the plea of being engaged in business that was of more or less national importance at home.

Thus, the state of affairs at the end of the war was as follows: The great middle stratum of the nation had fulfilled its duty and paid its toll of blood.

One extreme of the population, which was constituted of the best elements, had, with exemplary heroism, sacrificed itself almost to a man.

The other extreme, which was, constituted of the worst elements of the population, had preserved itself almost intact, through taking advantage of absurd laws and also because the authorities failed to enforce certain articles of the military code.

This carefully preserved scum of our nation then engineered the Revolution, and the reason why it could do so was that the extreme section composed of the best elements was no longer there to oppose it. It no longer existed.

Hence the German Revolution, from the very beginning, depended on only one section of the population. This act of Cain was not committed by the German people as such, but by an obscure rabble of deserters, hooligans, etc. The man at the front gladly welcomed the end of the strife in which so much blood had been shed. He was happy to be able to return home and be with his wife and children once again, but he had no moral connection with the Revolution. He did not like it, nor did he like those who had provoked and organised it.

During the four and a half years of that utter struggle at the front he had come to forget the party hyenas at home and all their wrangling had become alien to him.

The Revolution was really popular only with a small section of the German people, namely, that Class and their accomplices who had selected the rucksack as the hall-mark of all honorary citizens in this new State.

They did not like the Revolution for its own sake, as many people still erroneously believe, but for the consequences which followed in its train.

It was, however, very difficult to establish any abiding authority on the popular support given to these Marxist freebooters, and yet the young Republic stood in need of authority at any cost, unless it was prepared to be suddenly overthrown after a short period of chaos by an avenging force assembled from those last elements that still remained of the best extreme of the population.

The danger which those who were responsible for the Revolution feared most at that time was that, in the turmoil of the confusion which they themselves had created, the ground would suddenly give under their feet, that they might be abruptly seized and transported to another milieu by an iron hand, such as has often made itself felt at such junctures in the history of nations.

The Republic had to be consolidated at all costs. Hence, it was forced almost immediately after its foundation to erect another pillar beside that unstable pillar of its wavering popularity. Its promoters found that power must be organised once again in order to procure a firmer foundation for their authority.

When those who had been the matadors of the Revolution in December 1918, and January and February 1919, felt the ground trembling beneath their

feet they looked around them for men who would be prepared to support, by means of military force, the insecure position which their popularity with the public afforded them.

The 'anti-militarist' Republic had need of soldiers. Since, however, the first and only pillar on which the authority of the State rested, namely, its popularity, was grounded only on a conglomeration of rowdies, thieves, burglars, deserters, shirkers, etc., namely, on that section of the nation which we have called the evil extreme, it was useless to look to it to provide men who would be willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of a new ideal.

The section which had nourished the revolutionary idea and carried out the Revolution was neither able nor willing to provide the men to protect it, for that section had no wish whatsoever to organise a republican State, but to disorganise what already existed in order the better to satisfy its own instincts.

Their watchword was not the organisation and construction of the German Republic, but rather the pillaging of it.

Hence, the cry for help, sent out by the public representatives, who were beset by a thousand anxieties, did not find any response among this class of people, but rather provoked a feeling of bitterness and repudiation.

They looked upon this step as a breach of faith and trust, and in the building up of an authority which was no longer based on popular support, but also on force, they saw the beginning of a struggle against what was, for these elements, an essential factor of the Revolution, namely, the right to plunder and absolute domination by a horde of thieves and robbers in short, the worst rabble who had broken out of the convict prisons, leaving their chains behind.

The representatives of the people might cry out as much as they liked, but they could get no help from that rabble and only the answering cry, 'Traitors!' revealed the attitude of the very people on whose support the popularity of the regime was founded.

Then for the first time large numbers of young Germans were ready to don their military uniform once again in the service, as they believed, of 'law and order,' shouldering their rifles and donning their steel helmets, to defend the wreckers of the Fatherland.

Volunteer corps were assembled and, although hating the Revolution, they set to work to defend and to establish it firmly. In doing this they acted in

perfect good faith.

The real organiser of the Revolution and the actual wire-puller behind it, the international Jew, had sized up the situation correctly.

The German people were not yet ripe to be drawn into the bloody swamp of Bolshevism, as the Russian people had been drawn.

That was because there was a closer racial unity between the intellectual classes in Germany and the manual workers, and also because, as was also the case in the other States in Western Europe, broadly speaking, most classes of the community had their quota of cultured persons, whereas this was not the case in Russia.

In that country the intellectual classes were, for the most part, not of Russian nationality, or at least they did not have the racial characteristics of the Slav.

The thin upper layer of intellectuals which then existed in Russia could be abolished at any time, because there was no intermediate stratum connecting it organically with the great mass of the people. There the mental and moral level of the great mass of the people was extremely low.

In Russia, the moment the agitators were successful in inciting the broad masses of the people, who could neither read nor write, against the upper layer of intellectuals who were not in contact with the masses or permanently linked with them in any way, the fate of Russia was decided, the success of the Revolution assured.

Thereupon the analphabetic Russian became the slave of his Jewish dictators who, on their side, were shrewd enough to name their dictatorship 'the dictatorship of the people.'

In the case of Germany an additional factor must be taken into account. Here the Revolution could be carried into effect only if the Army could first be gradually dismembered.

The real author of the Revolution and of the process of disintegration in the Army was not the soldier who had fought at the front, but canaille who more or less shunned the light and were either quartered in the home garrisons or were officiating as 'indispensables' somewhere in the business world at home.

This canaille was reinforced by ten thousand deserters who, without running any particular risk, could turn their backs on the fighting front. At all times the real coward fears nothing so much as death, but at the front he had death before his eyes every day in a thousand different shapes.

There has always been one possible way, and one only, of making weak or wavering men, or even downright cowards, face their duty steadfastly and that is that the deserter be given to understand that his desertion will bring upon him just the very thing from which he is fleeing.

At the front a man may die, but the deserter must die. Only this draconian threat against every attempt to desert the flag can have an intimidating effect, not merely on the individual, but also on the mass. Therein lay the meaning and purpose of the military penal code.

It was a magnificent delusion, to believe that the great struggle for the life of a nation could be carried through if it were based solely on voluntary fidelity, arising from and sustained by the knowledge that such a struggle was necessary.

The voluntary fulfilment of one's duty is a motive that determines the actions of only the best men, but not of the average type of man.

Hence, special laws are necessary, just as, for instance, the law against stealing, which was not made for men who are honest on principle, but for the weak and unstable elements.

Such laws are meant to hinder the evil-doer by their deterrent effect and thus prevent a state of affairs from arising in which the honest man is considered stupid, and which would end in the belief that it is better to have a share in the robbery, than to stand by with empty hands or allow oneself to be robbed.

It was a mistake to believe that in a struggle which, according to all human reckoning, might last for several years it would be possible to dispense with those expedients which the experience of hundreds and even of thousands of years had proved to be effective in making weak and unstable men face and fulfil their duty in difficult times and at moments of great nervous stress.

For the voluntary war-hero it is, of course, not necessary to have the death-penalty in the military code, but it is necessary for the cowardly egotists who value their own lives above the existence of the community in the hour of



national need.

Such weak and characterless people can be deterred from surrendering to their cowardice only by the application of the heaviest penalties.

When men have to struggle with death every day and remain for weeks in trenches of mire, often very badly supplied with food, the man who is unsure of himself and begins to waver cannot be made to stick to his post by threats of imprisonment or even penal servitude.

Only by a ruthless enforcement of the death-penalty can this be effected, for experience shows that at such a time the weakling considers prison a thousand times preferable to the battlefield. In prison his precious life is not in danger.

The abolition of the death-penalty during the War, that is to say, the fact that the military penal code was, to all practical purposes, in abeyance, was a mistake for which we had to pay dearly.

An army of deserters poured into the stations at the rear or returned home, especially in 1918, and there began to form that huge criminal organisation with which we were suddenly faced, after November 7th, 1918, and which engineered the Revolution.

The front had nothing to do with all this. Naturally, the soldiers at the front were yearning for peace, but it was precisely that fact which represented a special danger for the Revolution, for when the German soldiers began to draw near home, after the Armistice, the revolutionaries, in trepidation, asked again and again, 'What will the troops from the front do? Will the men in field-grey stand for it?'

During those weeks the Revolution was forced to give itself at least an external appearance of moderation, if it were not to run the risk of being speedily wrecked by a few German divisions.

For at that time, had the commander of one single division made up his mind to rally the men of his command, who had always remained faithful to him, to participate in an onslaught, to tear down the red flag and put the 'councils' against the wall, or, if there was any resistance, to break in with trench-mortars and hand-grenades, that division would have grown into an army of sixty divisions in less than four weeks.

The Jewish wire-pullers were terrified by the prospect more than by anything else, and to forestall this particular danger they found it necessary to give the Revolution a certain aspect of moderation.

They dared not allow it to degenerate into Bolshevism, but, conditions being what they were, had to produce a semblance of 'law and order'—hence many important concessions, the appeal to the old civil service and to the leaders of the old Army.

They would be needed, at least for a certain time, and only when they had served their turn could they be dismissed with impunity and the Republic taken entirely out of the hands of the old servants of the State and delivered into the clutches of the revolutionaries.

They thought that this was the only means of duping the old generals and civil servants and of disarming beforehand any possible opposition through the apparently harmless and mild character of the new regime. Experience has shown to what extent the plot succeeded.

The Revolution, however, was not made by the peaceful and orderly elements of the nation but rather by rioters, thieves and robbers, and the way in which the Revolution was developing did not accord with the intentions of these latter elements.

Still, on tactical grounds, it was not possible to explain to them the reasons for the course things were taking and make that course acceptable.

As Social Democracy gradually gained power, it lost more and more the character of a crude revolutionary party. Of course in their inner hearts the Social Democrats wanted a revolution and their leaders had no other end in view.

The final result, however, was only a revolutionary programme and a body of men no longer capable of putting it into execution.

A revolution cannot be carried through by a party of million members. In such a movement there is no longer a climax of activity, but merely the broad masses of the middle stratum, that is to say, inertia.

Recognising all this, even during the War, the Jews brought about the famous split in the Social Democratic Party. While the Social Democratic Party, conforming to the inertia of its mass following, hung like a leaden weight

on the neck of the national defence, the actively radical elements were extracted from it and formed into a particularly efficient force for purposes of attack.

The Independent Party and the Spartacist League were the storm-battalions of revolutionary Marxism. The objective assigned to them was to create a *fait accompli*, on the basis of which the masses of the Social Democratic Party could take their stand, having been prepared for this event long beforehand.

The spineless bourgeoisie had been estimated at its just value by the Marxists and treated en canaille. Nobody bothered about it, knowing well that in their canine servility the representatives of an old and worn-out generation would not be able to offer any serious resistance.

When the Revolution had succeeded and its engineers believed that the main pillars of the old State had been broken down, the Army returning from the front began to appear in the light of a sinister sphinx and thus made it necessary to slow down the natural course of the Revolution.

The main body of the Social Democratic horde occupied the conquered positions, and the Independent and Spartacist storm-battalions were side-tracked. This was not, however, possible without a struggle.

Not only were the active assault formations that had started the Revolution dissatisfied and, feeling that they had been betrayed, eager to continue the fight on their own account, but their unchecked racketeering was even approved by the wire-pullers of the Revolution, for the Revolution itself had scarcely been accomplished when it appeared to be divided into two camps.

In the one camp were the elements of law and order; in the other, those of blood and terrorism. Was it not perfectly natural that our bourgeoisie should take up its stand with flying colours in the camp of law and order?

For once these pitiable, political organisations found it possible to act, inasmuch as, although not admitting it, they had gained a first foothold and thus to a certain extent they found themselves in coalition with that power which they hated but feared.

The German political bourgeoisie achieved the high honour of being able to associate itself with the accursed Marxist leaders for the purpose of

combating Bolshevism.

Thus as early as December 1918 and January 1919 the situation was as follows: A minority consisting of the worst elements had engineered the Revolution, and behind this minority all the Marxist parties immediately fell into step.

The Revolution itself had an outward appearance of moderation, which aroused the enmity of the fanatical extremists. These began to resort to the use of hand-grenades and machine-guns, occupying public buildings, and thus threatening to destroy the moderate trend of the Revolution.

To prevent this terrorism from developing further a truce was concluded between the representatives of the new regime and the adherents of the old order, for the purpose of waging a common fight against the extremists.

The result was that the enemies of the Republic ceased to oppose the Republic as such and helped to subjugate those who were also enemies of the Republic, though for quite different reasons, but a further consequence was that all danger of the adherents of the old State putting up a fight against the new was now definitely averted. This fact must always be borne in mind.

Only by remembering it, can we understand how it was possible that a nation in which nine-tenths of the people had not joined in a revolution, while seven-tenths repudiated it and six-tenths detested it, allowed the Revolution to be imposed upon it by the remaining one-tenth of the population.

Gradually the barricade heroes in the Spartacist camp petered out, and so did the nationalist patriots and idealists on the other side. As these two groups steadily dwindled, the masses of the middle stratum triumphed, as they always will.

The bourgeoisie and the Marxists met together on the basis of a fait accompli and the Republic began to be consolidated. At first, however, that did not prevent the bourgeois parties from continuing to propound their monarchist ideas for some time, especially at the elections, whereby they endeavoured to conjure up the spirit of the dead past to encourage and win over once more their own feeble-hearted followers.

It was not an honest proceeding. In their hearts they had broken with the monarchy long ago; but the foulness of the new regime had begun to extend its corruptive action and make itself felt in the camp of the bourgeois parties.

The common bourgeois politician now felt better in the slime of republican corruption than in the severe austerity of the defunct State, which still lived in his memory.

As I have already pointed out, after the destruction of the old Army the revolutionary leaders were forced to strengthen the authority of the State by creating a new factor of power.

In the conditions that existed they could do this only by winning over to their side the adherents of a *Weltanschauung* which was diametrically opposed to their own.

From those elements alone was it possible slowly to create a new Army, limited numerically by the peace treaties, whose spirit had to undergo a transformation, before it could become an instrument of the new regime. If, setting aside the very real defects of the old State, which undoubtedly constituted a contributory factor, we ask ourselves how it was possible for the revolutionary action to succeed, we arrive at the following conclusions:

Firstly, it was due to the petrification of our sense of duty and obedience.

Secondly, it was due also to the passive timidity of the parties who were supposed to uphold the State.

Moreover, it should be emphasised that the process of petrification of our sense of duty and obedience was fundamentally due to our wholly non-national and purely State education which resulted in a confusion of the conceptions 'means' and 'ends.'

Consciousness of duty, fulfilment of duty and obedience, are not ends in themselves any more than the State is an end in itself, but they all ought to be employed as means to facilitate and assure the existence of a community of people who are physically and mentally akin.

At a moment when a nation is manifestly collapsing and when all outward signs show that it is on the point of becoming the victim of ruthless oppression, thanks to the conduct of a few miscreants, to obey these people and fulfil one's appointed task is merely doctrinaire formalism, and indeed pure folly.

On the other hand, refusal to obey and to 'fulfil one's appointed task' in such a case might save the nation from collapse.

According to our current bourgeois idea of the State, a divisional general who received from his superior the order not to shoot fulfilled his duty and therefore acted rightly in not shooting, because, to the bourgeois mind blind obedience is more valuable than the life of a nation.

But, according to the National Socialist concept it is not a sense of obedience to weak superiors that should prevail at such moments. In such an hour the duty of assuming personal responsibility towards the whole nation arises.

The Revolution succeeded because that concept had ceased to be a vital force with our people, or rather with our governments, and had given place to something that was merely formal and doctrinaire.

As regards the second point, it may be said that the real reason for the cowardly attitude of the parties which supported the former State was that the most active and upright section of our people had been killed during the War.

Apart from that, the bourgeois parties, which may be considered as the only political formations that stood by the old State, were convinced that they ought to defend their principles only by intellectual ways and means, since the use of physical force was permitted only to the State. That outlook was a sign of the weakness and decadence which had been gradually developing, and it was also senseless at a period when there was a political adversary in the field who had long ago abandoned that standpoint and had instead openly declared that he meant to attain his political ends by force whenever possible.

When Marxism appeared in the world of bourgeois democracy, as a consequence of that democracy itself, the appeal sent out by the bourgeois democracy to fight Marxism with intellectual weapons was a piece of folly for which terrible expiation had to be made later on. Marxism always professed the doctrine that the choice of weapons was a matter which had to be decided from the standpoint of expediency and that success justified the choice of the weapon.

This idea was proved correct during the days from November 7th to 11th, 1918. At that time the Marxists did not bother themselves in the least about parliament or democracy, but gave the death-blow to both by turning loose their horde of criminals to shoot and raise hell.

It was, therefore, only natural that the long-winded bourgeois

organisations were forthwith rendered defenceless.

When the Revolution was over, the bourgeois parties changed the name of their firm and suddenly reappeared, the heroic leaders emerging from the dark cellars or more airy storehouses where they had sought refuge.

But, just as happens in the case of all representatives of antiquated institutions, they had not forgotten their errors or learned anything new.

Their political programme was grounded in the past, even though they themselves had become reconciled to the new regime.

Their aim was to secure, if possible, a share in the new institution, and so they continued to use words as their sole weapon.

Therefore, after the Revolution the bourgeois parties also capitulated to the mob in a miserable fashion.

When the Law for the Protection of the Republic was introduced the majority was not at first in favour of it, but, confronted with two hundred thousand Marxists demonstrating in the streets, the bourgeois 'statesmen' were so terror stricken that they voted for the law against their better judgment, for the edifying reason that they feared they might otherwise be beaten up by the enraged masses on leaving the Reichstag—something which unfortunately did not occur upon the law being passed.

Thus, the new State developed along its own lines, as if there had been no national opposition at all.

The only organisations which might at that time have had the strength and courage to face Marxism and its incited masses were, first of all, the *Freikorps* and subsequently the organisations for self-defence, the civic guards, and finally, the ex-servicemen's association. For the following reasons the existence of these bodies did not appreciably change the course of German history. Just as the so-called national parties were unable to take any steps since they lacked an efficient force to deal with the mob, the defence leagues were likewise unable to exert any influence because they had no political ideal and especially because they had no definite political aim in view.

The success which Marxism had scored was due to perfect co-operation between political determination and ruthless force.

What prevented nationalist Germany from taking a hand in shaping developments was the lack of determined co-operation between brute force and inspired political aims.

Whatever may have been the aspirations of the 'national' parties, they had no force whatsoever to fight for these aspiration least of all in the streets.

The power lay in the hands of the defence leagues. They were masters of the street and of the State, but they lacked political ideals and aims on behalf of which their forces could have been mobilised in the interests of the German nation.

In both cases, the cunning Jew was able by his astute powers of persuasion, to make this unfortunate state of affairs permanent or at least to aggravate it.

The Jew succeeded brilliantly in using his press for the purpose of spreading abroad the idea that the defence leagues were of a 'non-political character,' just as in politics he was always astute enough to praise the 'purely intellectual' character of the struggle and demand that it must always be kept on that plane.

Millions of German imbeciles then repeated this folly, without having the slightest suspicion that by so doing, they were, to all practical purposes, disarming themselves and delivering themselves defenceless into the hands of the Jew.

There is a natural explanation of this also. The lack of a great ideal capable of re-moulding conditions has always meant a limitation of fighting power.

The conviction of the right to employ even the most brutal weapons is always associated with an ardent faith in the necessity for the triumph of a new and revolutionary order of things on this earth.

A movement which does not fight for such high aims and ideals will never have recourse to extreme means. The appearance of a new and great ideal was the secret of the success of the French Revolution.

The Russian Revolution owes its triumph to an ideal, and it was only the ideal that enabled Fascism to bestow on a whole nation the blessing of a complete reformation.



Bourgeois parties are not capable of such an achievement, and it was not the bourgeois parties alone whose political aim was a restoration of the past.

This was also the aim of the defence leagues, in so far as they concerned themselves with political aims at all. The spirit of the old war legions and Kyffhäuser traditions lived on in them and thereby helped to blunt, from the political point of view, these, the sharpest weapons which nationalist Germany then possessed and to, allow them to degenerate to the level of slaves of the Republic.

The fact that these leagues were inspired by the best of intentions in so doing, and certainly acted in good faith, does not alter in the slightest degree the foolishness of the course they adopted.

In the consolidated Reichswehr, Marxism gradually acquired the support of force, which it needed for the exercise of its authority.

As a logical consequence it proceeded to abolish the defence leagues, which it considered dangerous, declaring that they were now no longer necessary. Some particularly bold leaders who were regarded with suspicion were tried and sent to prison, but even so, Fate dealt with them as they deserved.

With the founding of the National Socialist German Labour Party there came into being for the first time a movement whose aim, unlike that of the bourgeois parties, was not mechanically to restore the past, but to set up in place of the absurd State machinery of the present day an organic *völkisch* State.

From the outset the new Movement took its stand on the principle that its ideas had to be propagated by intellectual means but that, when necessary, force would be employed in support of its propaganda.

In accordance with their conviction of the paramount importance of the new doctrine, the leaders of the new Movement naturally believe that no sacrifice can be considered too great when it is a question of carrying out the purpose of the Movement.

I have emphasised that in certain circumstances a movement which is meant to win the hearts of the people must be ready to defend itself with its own forces against terrorist attempts on the part of its adversaries.

It has invariably happened in the history of the world that formal State authority has failed to break a reign of terror which was inspired by a *Weltanschauung*. It can only be overcome by a new and different *Weltanschauung* whose representatives are quite as bold and determined.

Recognition of this fact has always been very unpleasant for the bureaucrats who are the protectors of the State, but the fact remains nevertheless.

The rulers of the State can guarantee law and order only if the constitution coincides absolutely with the prevailing *Weltanschauung* so that disturbing elements merely assume the character of isolated criminals, instead of being considered as the champions of an ideal which is diametrically opposed to the State ideology.

In the latter case the State may employ the most violent measures for centuries against the terrorism that threatens it; but in the end all these measures will prove futile, and the State will have to succumb. The German State was systematically attacked by Marxism. In a struggle that went on for seventy years the State was not able to prevent the triumph of the Marxist idea.

Even though the sentences to penal servitude and imprisonment amounted in all to thousands of years, and even though the most sanguinary measures were, in innumerable instances, adopted against the champions of the Marxist *Weltanschauung*, which threatened its safety, in the end the State was forced to capitulate almost completely.

The ordinary bourgeois political leaders will deny all this, but in vain. The State which capitulated unconditionally to Marxism on November 9th, 1918, will not suddenly arise again tomorrow as the conqueror of Marxism—far from it!

Bourgeois simpletons sitting on office stools in the various ministries babble about the necessity of not governing against the wishes of the workers and by the word ‘workers’ they mean the Marxists.

By identifying the German worker with Marxism not only are they guilty of a vile distortion of the truth, but they are attempting to conceal the fact of their own collapse before the Marxist idea and the Marxist organisation.

In view of the complete subordination of the present State to Marxism, the National Socialist Movement feels all the more bound, not only to prepare

the way for the triumph of its ideal by appealing to the reason and understanding of the public, but also to take upon itself the responsibility of organising its own defence against the terrorism of the International, which is intoxicated with its own victory.

I have already described how the practical experience gained by our young Movement led us slowly to organise a system of defence at our meetings.

This gradually assumed the character of a military body specially trained for the maintenance of order and tended to develop into a service having its properly organised cadres.

This new formation might resemble the defence leagues externally, but in reality there were no grounds of comparison between the one and the other.

As I have already said, the German defence leagues had no definite political ideas of their own. They were really only associations formed for purposes of self-defence, their training and organisation being more or less efficient so that they were an illegal complement or auxiliary to the legal forces of the State.

Their *Freikorps* character arose only from the manner of their organisation and the situation in which the State found itself at that time, but they certainly could not claim to be *Freikorps* on the grounds that they were associations formed voluntarily and privately for the purpose of fighting for their own independent political convictions.

Such they were not, despite the fact that some of their leaders and some associations as such were definitely opposed to the Republic, for before we can speak of political convictions in the higher sense, we must be something more than merely convinced that the existing regime is defective.

Political convictions in the higher sense mean that a man has a clear conception and profound understanding of the form of a new regime and feels that the establishment of this regime is an absolute necessity and one which he regards as the aim of his life's work.

The body of men organised for the preservation of order, which was then formed under the National Socialist Movement, was fundamentally different from all the other defence associations.

This was by reason of the fact that our formations were not meant in any way to defend the state of things created by the Revolution, but rather that they were meant exclusively to support our struggle for the creation of a new Germany.

In the beginning this body was merely a guard to maintain order at our meetings. Its first task was limited to making it possible for us to hold our meetings, which our opponents would otherwise have made completely unfeasible.

These men were at that time trained to attack in blind obedience to orders but not, as was then pretended in stupid German patriotic circles, to revere the baton as the highest ideal, because they were aware that the highest ideals can be brought to naught if their champion is hit over the head with a club, since it has happened not infrequently in the course of history that great men have perished under the blows of the most insignificant helots.

Our body-guards did not look upon violence as an end in itself, but they protected the protagonists of ideal aims and purposes against hostile coercion by means of violence.

They also understood that there was no obligation to undertake the defence of a State which did not guarantee the defence of the nation, but that, on the contrary, they had to defend the nation against those who were threatening to destroy nation and State.

After the fight which took place at the meeting in the Münchener Hofbräuhaus, where the small number of our guards who were present won everlasting fame for themselves by the heroic manner in which they stormed their adversaries, these guards were called the Storm Detachment.

As the name itself indicates, they represent only a detachment of the Movement. They form one constituent element of it, as do the press, the propaganda, scientific institutes or other sections of the Party.

We learned how necessary was the formation of such a body, not only from our experience on the occasion of that memorable meeting, but also when we sought gradually to carry the Movement beyond Munich and extend it to the other parts of Germany. Once we had begun to appear as a danger to Marxism, the Marxists lost no opportunity of trying to quash beforehand all preparations for the holding of National Socialist meetings.

When they did not succeed in this they tried to break up the meeting itself. It goes without saying that all, the Marxist organisations, no matter of what grade, blindly supported every move and action of this nature taken by their representatives.

What can be said for the bourgeois parties which, when they had been reduced to silence by these same Marxists and in many places did not dare to let their speakers appear before the public, were, nevertheless, childish and incomprehensibly delighted, every time we received any kind of set-back in our fight against Marxism?

The bourgeois parties were happy to think that those whom they themselves could not oppose and to whom they had been forced to capitulate, could not be broken by us.

What can be said for those State officials, chief of police, and even cabinet ministers, who showed a scandalous lack of principle in presenting themselves to the public as ‘nationalists’ and yet unashamedly played the part of henchmen to the Marxists in the disputes which we, the National Socialists, had with the latter?

What can be said for persons who, for the sake of a little abject praise in the Jewish Press, debased themselves so far as to persecute those men to whose heroic courage and intervention, regardless of risk, they were partly indebted for not having been torn to pieces by the ‘Red’ mob a few years previously and strung up to the lamp-posts?

One day these lamentable phenomena forced the late but unforgotten Prefect Pöhner (a man whose unflinching honesty forced him to hate all twisters and to hate them as only an honourable man can hate) to say, ‘All my life I wished to be first a German and then an official, and I never wanted to be taken for one of those creatures who, like prostitutes, sold themselves body and soul to anybody who could play lord and master for the time being.’

It was extremely sad that gradually tens of thousands of honest and loyal servants of the State did not only come under the power of such people, but were also slowly contaminated by their unprincipled morals.

Moreover, men of this kind pursued honest officials with a furious hatred, hounding them out of their jobs, while passing themselves off as ‘nationalist’ with the aid of their lying hypocrisy.

From officials of that kind we could expect no support, and only in very rare instances was it given. Only by building up its own defence could our Movement become secure and attract that amount of public attention and general respect which is given to those who can defend themselves when attacked.

We decided that, as an underlying principle in the internal development of the Storm Detachment, it should not only be perfectly trained as regards physical fitness, but that the men should be so instructed as to make them indomitably convinced champions of the National Socialist ideals and, finally, that they should be schooled to observe the strictest discipline.

This body was to have nothing to do either with the defence organisations of the bourgeois type or with any secret organisation.

Even at that time my reasons for guarding strictly against allowing the Storm Detachment of the National Socialist German Labour Party, to be organised on the lines of a defence league were as follows:

On purely practical grounds it is impossible to build up a national defence organisation by means of private associations, unless the State makes an enormous contribution to it. Whoever thinks otherwise over-estimates his own powers.

Now, it is entirely out of the question to form organisations of any military value for a definite purpose on the principle of so-called 'voluntary discipline.'

Here the chief support for, the enforcement of orders, namely, the power to inflict punishment, is lacking. In the autumn, or rather in the spring, of 1919 it was still possible to raise so-called *Freikorps*, not only because most of the men who came forward at that time had been through the school of the old Army, but also because the kind of duty imposed there constrained the individual to absolute obedience, at least for a definite period of time.

That spirit is entirely lacking in the volunteer defence organisations of to-day. The larger the defence league grows, the weaker its discipline becomes and so much less can be demanded of the individual members.

Thus, the whole organisation will assume more and more the character of the old non-political associations of ex-servicemen and veterans.

To attempt to instruct in military duties a large number of men who have volunteered to undergo such training, is impossible without the backing of absolute power to issue commands.

There will always be very few men who will voluntarily and spontaneously submit to that kind of discipline which is considered natural and necessary in the Army.

Moreover, a proper system of military training cannot be developed where the funds available are as ridiculously scanty as those at the disposal of the defence leagues.

The principal task of such an institution must be to impart the best and most reliable kind of instruction. Eight years have passed since the end of the War, and during that time none of our German youth, at an age when formerly they would have had to do military service, have received any systematic training at all.

The aim of a defence league cannot be to enlist all those who have already received a military training, since in that case it could be reckoned with mathematical accuracy when the last member would leave the league.

Even the youngest soldier of 1918 will not be fit for front-line service twenty years later, and we are approaching that state of affairs with a rapidity that gives cause for anxiety.

Thus the defence leagues must assume more and more the aspect of the old ex-service men's association, but that cannot be the meaning and purpose of an institution which calls itself, not an association of ex-service men but a defence league.

By that title it considers its task to be to preserve the tradition of the old soldiers and hold them together, to propagate the idea of national defence, and be able to put this idea into practice—which means the creation of a body of men who are fit and trained for military defence.

In order to fulfil this condition, it is, however, necessary that those elements receive a military training which up to now have received none.

This is something that, in practice, is impossible for the defence leagues to accomplish. Real soldiers cannot be made by training men for one or two hours per week.

In view of the enormously increasing demands which modern warfare imposes on each individual soldier to-day a military service of two years is barely sufficient to transform a raw recruit into a trained soldier.

At the front during the War we all saw the fearful consequences which our young recruits had to suffer from their lack of a thorough military training.

Volunteer formations which had been drilled for fifteen to twenty weeks under iron discipline and shown unlimited self-sacrificing enthusiasm proved nevertheless to be no better than cannon-fodder at the front.

Only when distributed among the ranks of the old and experienced soldiers did the young recruits, who had been trained for four to six months, become useful members of a regiment. Guided by the 'old stagers,' they adapted themselves gradually to their task.

In the light of all this, how hopeless must be any attempt to create a body of fighting troops by a so-called training of one to two hours in the week, without any definite power to enforce commands and without sufficient means.

It might be possible to give old soldiers a 'refresher course' of this kind, but raw recruits cannot be turned into useful soldiers in this way.

How such a proceeding produces utterly worthless results may also be strikingly demonstrated by the fact that, while these so-called volunteer defence leagues, by dint of tremendous effort and after overcoming many difficulties, train, or attempt to train, a few thousand willing men (the others being beyond their reach) for national defence; the State, through its pacifist-cum-democratic education, perverts the natural instincts of millions of young men, poisons their logical sense of patriotism and gradually turns them into a herd of sheep who will patiently follow any arbitrary command.

In the face of all this how ridiculous are all the attempts made by defence leagues to inculcate their ideas upon the minds of the German youth!

Almost more important is the following consideration, which has always made me take up a stand against all attempts at a so-called military training on the basis of the volunteer associations.

Assuming that, in spite of all the difficulties just mentioned, a defence league were successful in training a certain number of Germans every year to be efficient soldiers, with regards to mental outlook, physical fitness and the



expert handling of arms; the result must necessarily be null and void in a State whose whole tendency makes it look upon such a defensive organisation as undesirable and even intolerable—because such an organisation would be in complete contradiction to the secret aims of the political leaders, who are the corruptors of this State.

Such a result would, in any case, be worthless under governments which have demonstrated by their own acts that they do not attach the slightest importance to the military power of the nation and are not disposed to have recourse to that power unless for the preservation of their own existence on earth.

That is the state of affairs to-day. Is it not ridiculous to think of training some ten thousand men in the use of arms, and to carry on that training surreptitiously, when a few years previously the State, having shamefully sacrificed eight and a half million highly trained soldiers, not merely did not require their services any longer but, as a mark of gratitude for their faithful service, held them up to public contumely?

Shall we train soldiers for a regime which besmirched and spat upon our most glorious soldiers, tore the medals and badges from their breasts, trampled on their flags and derided their achievements?

Has the present regime taken one step towards restoring the honour of the old Army and making those who destroyed and outraged it answer for their deeds? Not in the least.

On the contrary, the people I have just referred to may be seen enthroned in the highest governmental positions to-day, and yet it was said at Leipzig, ‘Right is might.’

Since, however, in our Republic to-day might is in the hands of the very men who started the Revolution, and since that Revolution represents a most despicable act of high treason against the nation yes the vilest act in German history—there can surely be no grounds for saying that the might of these men should be enhanced by the formation of a new young army. It is against all sound reason.

The importance which this State attached, after the Revolution of 1918, to the reinforcement of its position from the military point of view is clearly and unmistakably demonstrated by its attitude towards the large self-defence

organisations which existed at that period.

They were not unwelcome as long as they were of use for the protection of the miserable creatures who had come into power with the Revolution.

As soon as the danger threatening these creatures seemed to be on the decrease, thanks to the gradual debasement of our people, and the existence of the defence leagues represented a national-political strengthening factor, they became superfluous and every effort was made to disarm them and suppress them wherever that was possible.

History records but few examples of gratitude on the part of princes and only a patriot belonging to the new bourgeoisie would dream of counting on the gratitude of revolutionary incendiaries and assassins, who have enriched themselves by robbing the public and by betraying the nation.

On examining the problem as to the wisdom of forming these defence leagues, I could not refrain from asking: 'For whom shall I train these young men? For what purpose will they be employed and when are they to be called out?'

The answer to these questions provides the best rule for us to follow.

If the present State should one day call upon trained troops of this kind it would never be for the purpose of defending the interests of the nation against the foreigner, but rather to protect the oppressors of the nation within the country against the danger of a general outbreak of wrath on the part of a nation which has been deceived and betrayed and whose interests have been bartered away.

For this reason it was decided that the Storm Detachment of the National Socialist German Labour Party ought not to be in the nature of a military organisation.

It had to be an instrument of protection and education for the National Socialist Movement and its duties lay in quite a different sphere to those of the military defence association. Moreover, the Storm Detachment was not to be in the nature of a secret organisation.

Secret organisations are established only for purposes that are illegal, and the purpose of such an organisation is limited by its very nature.

Considering the loquacious propensities of the German people, it is not possible to build up any vast organisation, at the same time keeping it secret or disguising its purpose.

Every attempt of that kind is destined to turn out absolutely futile.

It is not merely that our political officials to-day have at their disposal a staff of informers and other such rabble who are ready to play traitor, like Judas, for thirty pieces of silver and will betray whatever secrets they can discover and will invent what they do not know, for the sake of having something to reveal, but one's own followers cannot be relied upon to maintain the silence necessary in such circumstances.

Only small groups can become really secret societies, and that only after long years of selective elimination, but the very smallness of such groups would deprive them of all value for the National Socialist Movement.

What we needed then, and need now, is not one or two hundred dare-devil conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of devoted champions of our *Weltanschauung*.

The work must not be done through secret conventicles, but through impressive mass demonstrations in public. Dagger and pistol and poison-vial cannot clear the way for the progress of the Movement; that can be done only by winning over the man in the street.

We must teach the Marxists that, in future, National Socialism will be master of the street, just as it will one day become master of the State.

There is another danger connected with secret societies, It lies in the fact that their members often completely misunderstand the greatness of the task in hand and are apt to believe that the destiny of the nation can be assured overnight by the assassination of a, single man.

Such a belief may find historical justification in cases where a nation had been suffering under the tyranny of some oppressor who at the same time was a man of genius and whose extraordinary personality was the sole guarantee for the continuance and frightfulness of his terrible oppression.

In such cases a man may suddenly arise from the ranks of the people who is ready to sacrifice himself and plunge his deadly steel into the heart of the hated individual.

In order to look upon such a deed with horror one must have the republican mentality of petty rogues conscious of their own crime, but Schiller, the greatest poet-champion of liberty that the German people have ever had, has glorified such a deed in his 'Wilhelm Tell.'

During 1919 and 1920 there was a danger that the members of secret organisations, under the influence of great historical examples and overcome by the immensity of the nations misfortunes, might attempt to wreak vengeance on the destroyers of their country, in the belief that this would end the miseries of the people.

All such attempts were sheer folly, by reason of the fact that the Marxist triumph was not due to the superior genius of one remarkable person, but rather to immeasurable incompetence and cowardly shirking on the part of the bourgeoisie.

The hardest criticism that can be uttered against our bourgeoisie is simply to state the fact that it submitted to the Revolution, even though the Revolution did not produce one single man of outstanding worth.

One can, after all, understand how it was possible to capitulate to a Robespierre, a Danton, or a Marat; but it was utterly scandalous to go down on all fours before the withered Scheidemann, the obese Herr Erzberger, Friedrich Ebert, and the innumerable other political pygmies of the Revolution.

There was not a single man of parts in whom one could see the revolutionary man of genius. Therein lay the country's misfortune, for they were only revolutionary Spartacist vermin wholesale and retail.

To put one of them out of the way was of little avail, as the only result was that another pair of blood-suckers, equally fat and thirsty, was ready to take his place. During those years we had to take up a determined stand against an attitude which had its origin and justification in genuinely great historical phenomena, but which did not, in the least, suit our present pigmy age.

The same holds good in cases where it is a question of 'bumping' a so-called traitor to his country.

It would be ridiculous and illogical to shoot a poor wretch who had betrayed the position of a gun to the enemy while the highest positions in the government are occupied by a rabble who bartered away a whole empire, who have on their consciences the deaths of two million men who were sacrificed

in vain, fellows who were responsible for the millions maimed in the war, but who, nevertheless, continue unperturbed to 'make a good thing' out of the republican regime without allowing their conscience to be disturbed in any way.

It would be absurd to do away with small traitors in a State whose government absolves traitors on a large scale from all punishment. For it might easily happen that one day an honest idealist, who, out of love for his country, had removed some miserable informer who had betrayed the whereabouts of secret stores of arms was called upon to answer for his act before the chief traitors of the country.

There is yet another important question, namely, is some petty traitorous wretch to meet death at the hands of another petty traitor, or of an idealist?

In the former case the result would be doubtful and the deed would almost surely be revealed later on.

In the second case an unworthy rascal is put out of the way, but the life of an idealist who may be irreplaceable is placed in jeopardy.

For my own part, I believe that small thieves should not be hanged while big thieves are allowed go free.

One day a national tribunal will have to judge and sentence some tens of thousands of organisers who were responsible for the criminal November betrayal and all the consequences that followed on it. Such an example will teach the necessary lesson, once, and for ever, to such as those paltry traitors who revealed to the enemy the places where arms were hidden.

On the grounds of these considerations I steadfastly forbade all participation in secret societies, and I took care that the Storm Detachment should not assume such a character.

During those years I prevented the National Socialist Movement from making experiments such as were being undertaken by young Germans who were, for the most part, inspired by a sublime idealism, but who became the victims of their own actions, without being able to ameliorate the lot of their Fatherland in the slightest degree.

If, then, the Storm Detachment must not be either a military defence organisation or a secret society, we arrive at the following conclusion:

Firstly, its training must not be organised from the military standpoint, but from the point of view of what is most practical for party purposes.

In so far as the members have to undergo a thorough physical training, attention must not be focussed mainly on military drill, but rather on the practice of sports.

I have always considered boxing and ju-jitsu more important than training in rifle shooting, which, if inadequate, is definitely bad.

If the German nation were presented with a body of six million young men who had been perfectly trained in athletic sports, who were imbued with an ardent love of their country and were ready to take the initiative in a fight, then the nationalist State could make an army out of that body within less than two years, if necessary, provided the cadres already existed.

The situation being what it is to-day, the cadres would be furnished only by the Reichswehr, and not by a defence league that was neither one thing nor the other.

Physical fitness must develop in the individual a conviction of his superiority and give him that confidence which is always based only on the consciousness of one's own prowess.

It must also develop that athletic agility which can be employed as a defensive weapon in the service of the Movement.

Secondly, in order to safeguard the Storm Detachment against acquiring a secret character, the uniform must not only be such that it can immediately be recognised by everybody, but the large number of its members must serve as an indication of a course of action which is of advantage to the Movement and is known to the general public.

The members of the Storm Detachment must not hold secret gatherings, but must march in the open and thus be employed in a manner which will put an end to all legends about a secret organisation in order to prevent them from finding an outlet for their mental energies in small conspiracies.

We had from the very beginning to inculcate upon their minds the great idea behind the Movement and to educate them so thoroughly in the task of defending this idea that their horizon became enlarged and the individual no longer considered it his mission to 'remove' some rascal or other, whether big

or small, but to devote himself entirely to the task of bringing about the establishment of a new National Socialist *völkisch* State.

In this way the struggle against the present State was placed on a higher plane than that of petty revenge and small conspiracies.

It was elevated to the level of a spiritual struggle on behalf of a *Weltanschauung*, for the destruction of Marxism in all its shapes and forms.

Thirdly, the form of organisation adopted for the Storm Detachment, as well as its uniform and equipment, had to be on a different model from those of the old Army.

They had to be specially adapted to the task that was assigned to the Storm Detachment.

These were the ideas I followed out in 1920 and 1921. I endeavoured to instil them gradually into the members of the young organisation, with the result that by the midsummer of 1922 we had a goodly number of formations each consisting of a hundred men.

By the late autumn of that year these formations received their distinctive uniforms. There were three events which turned out to be of supreme importance for the subsequent development of the Storm Detachment.

The first was the great mass demonstration against the Law for the Protection of the Republic held in the late summer of 1922 in the Königsplatz in Munich.

The patriotic associations of Munich had announced the holding of a gigantic mass demonstration as a protest against the introduction of the Law for the Protection of the Republic. The National Socialist Movement also participated.

Our Party marched into the Square, in serried ranks, led by six Munich Storm Detachment units followed by the political sections of the Party.

Two bands marched with us and about fifteen banners were carried. When the National Socialists arrived at the great square it was already half full, but no banners were displayed.

Our arrival aroused unbounded enthusiasm. I myself had the honour of being one of the speakers who addressed that crowd of about sixty thousand

people.

The demonstration was an overwhelming success, especially because it was proved for the first time that nationalist Munich could march through the streets, in spite of all threats from the Reds.

Members of the organisation for the defence of the Red Republic endeavoured to hinder the marching columns by their terrorist activities, but they were scattered by the companies of the Storm Detachment within a few minutes and sent packing. The National Socialist Movement then showed for the first time that in future it was determined to exercise its right to march through the streets and thus deprive the international traitors and enemies of the country of their monopoly of this privilege.

The events of that day provided incontestable proof that our views on the creation of the Storm Detachment were right, both from the psychological standpoint and from the point of view of organisation.

The principle having thus been proved correct we pushed on with the establishment of Storm Detachment units so that within a few weeks the number of Munich units was doubled.

The second event was the expedition to Coburg in October 1922. Certain so-called *völkisch* societies had decided to hold a German Rally at Coburg.

I was invited to take part, with the intimation that they wished me to bring a following along. This invitation, which I received at eleven o'clock in the morning, arrived just in time.

Within an hour the arrangements for our participation in the German Rally were completed. I picked eight hundred men of the Storm Detachment to accompany me.

These were divided into about fourteen companies and were to be conveyed by special train from Munich to Coburg, which had become a part of Bavaria. Corresponding orders were given to other groups of the National Socialist Storm Detachment which had meanwhile been formed in various other localities.

This was the first time that a special train for us was run in Germany. At all the places where the new units of the Storm Detachment joined us, our train caused a sensation.



Many of the people had never seen our banner and it created a very great impression.

When we arrived at the station in Coburg we were received by a deputation of the organising committee of the German Rally.

They announced that by order of the local trade-unions—that is to say, the Independent and Communist Parties—it had been ‘arranged’ that we should not enter the town with our banners unfurled and our band playing (we had a band consisting of forty-two musicians with us) and that we should not march in formation.

I immediately rejected these undignified conditions and did not fail to declare to the gentlemen who had arranged this ‘rally’ how astonished I was at the idea of their negotiating with such people and coming to an arrangement with them.

Then I announced that the Storm Troops would immediately march into the town in company formation, with flags flying and band playing—which we proceeded to do forthwith.

As we emerged in to the station square we were met by a hissing, yelling mob of several thousands, which greeted us with shouts of: ‘Assassins!’ ‘Bandits!’ ‘Robbers!’ ‘Criminals!’ These were the choice names which these exemplary founders of the German Republic showered on us.

The young Storm Detachment gave a fine exhibition of discipline. The companies fell into formation in the square in front of the station and at first took no notice of the insults hurled at them by the mob.

The police were anxious. They did not pilot us to the quarters assigned to us on the outskirts of Coburg, a city quite unknown to us, but to the Hofbräuhaus-Keller in the centre of the town.

To right and left of us as we marched the tumult raised by the accompanying mob steadily increased.

Scarcely had the last company entered the courtyard of the Hofbräuhaus when the huge mob made a rush to get in after them, shouting madly.

In order to prevent this, the police locked the gates. Seeing that the position was untenable I called the Storm Detachment to attention spoke a few

words to them and then asked the police to open the gates immediately.

After a good deal of hesitation; they consented.

We now marched back along the same route by which we had come, in the direction of our quarters and there we had to make a stand against the crowd.

As their cries and yells all along the route had failed to disturb the equanimity of our companies, the champions of true Socialism, Equality, and Fraternity, now took to throwing stones.

That brought our patience to an end. For ten minutes blows fell right and left, like a devastating shower of hail. Fifteen minutes later there were no Reds to be seen in the street.

After nightfall serious clashes occurred. Patrols of the Storm Detachment had discovered National Socialists who had been attacked singly and were in a dangerous condition.

Thereupon we made short work of the opponents. By the following morning the Red Terror, under which Coburg had been suffering for years, was definitely broken.

With typical Marxist and Jewish mendacity, an attempt was made by the distribution of leaflets to passers-by in the street to incite the ‘comrades of the International Proletariat’ to demonstrate, once more in the public streets.

Completely distorting the facts, they declared that our ‘bands of assassins’ had commenced ‘a war of extermination against the peaceful workers of Coburg.’

At half-past one that day there was to be a ‘great popular demonstration,’ at which it was hoped that thousands of workers from the whole district would turn up.

I was determined finally to crush this Red Terror and so I summoned the Storm Detachment to meet at midday.

Their number had now increased to fifteen hundred. I decided to march with these men to the Coburg citadel and to cross the big square where the Red demonstration was to take place.

I wanted to see if they would attempt to assault us again. When we entered the square we found that, instead of the thousands that had been advertised, there were only a few hundred people present.

As we approached, they remained silent for the most part, and some ran away. Only at certain points along the route some bodies, of Reds, who had arrived from outside the city and had not yet come to know us, attempted to start a row, but they were soon put to flight.

We could now observe how the town's people, who had for such a long time been so thoroughly intimidated, slowly woke up and recovered their courage.

They welcomed us openly, and in the evening, on our return march, spontaneous cheering broke out at several points along the route.

At the station the railway officials informed us all of a sudden that our train would not depart. Thereupon I had some of the ringleaders told that if this were the case I would arrest all the Red Party heroes on whom we could lay our hands, that we would drive the train ourselves, but that we would take away with us, in the locomotive, on the tender and in every carriage, a few dozen disciples of international solidarity.

I did not omit to let these gentry know that if we had to drive the train, the journey would undoubtedly be a very risky adventure and that we might all break our necks.

It would be a consolation, however, to know that we should not go to Eternity alone, but in equality and fraternity with the Red gentry.

Thereupon the train departed punctually and we arrived next morning safe and sound in Munich.

Thus at Coburg, for the first time since 1914, the equality of all citizens was re-established in the eye of the law, for even if some coxcomb of a higher official should presume to assert to-day that the State protects the lives of its citizens, in those days at least it was not so. At that time the citizens had to defend themselves against the representatives of the present State.

At first it was not possible fully to estimate the importance of the consequences of that day. The victorious Storm Troops had their confidence in themselves considerably reinforced and also their faith in the sagacity of their

leaders.

Our contemporaries began to pay us special attention and for the first time many recognised in the National Socialist Movement an institution which was in all probability destined to bring the Marxist folly to an end. Only the democrats lamented the fact that we had not had the complaisance to allow our skulls to be cracked and that, in a democratic Republic, we had dared to reply to a brutal assault with fisticuffs and cudgels rather than with pacifist chants.

The bourgeois press as a whole adopted, as usual, an attitude that was partly lachrymose and partly mean. Only a few decent newspapers expressed their satisfaction that in one locality at least, the Marxist street-bullies had been effectively dealt with.

In Coburg itself, at least a section of the Marxist workers who must be looked upon as misled, learned from the blows of National Socialist fists that they too, were workers fighting for ideals, because experience teaches that the human being fights only for something in which he believes and which he loves.

The Storm Detachment itself benefited most from the Coburg expedition. It grew so quickly in numbers that at the Party Congress in January 1923, six thousand men participated in the ceremony of consecrating the flags and the first companies appeared for the first time in the glory of their new uniform.

Our experience at Coburg proved how essential it was to introduce one distinctive uniform for the Storm Detachment, not only for the purpose of strengthening its *esprit de corps*, but also to avoid confusion and the danger of not recognising the opponent in a fight. Up to that time they had merely been distinguished by the armlet, but now the tunic and the well-known cap were added.

The experience gained at Coburg had also another important result. We now determined to break the Red Terror in all those localities in which it had for many years prevented men of other views from holding meetings.

We were determined to restore the right of free assembly. From that time onward we brought our battalions together in such places and little by little the Red citadels of Bavaria fell one after another before the National Socialist propaganda.

The Storm Troops became more and more adept at their task. Gradually,

they placed an increasingly wide gulf between themselves and the aimless defence movements and established themselves as an active militant organisation, fighting for the establishment of a new German State.

This logical development continued until March 1923. Then an event occurred which made me divert the Movement from the course hitherto followed and introduce certain fundamental formations.

The third event was that in the first months of 1923 the French occupied the Ruhr district. The consequence of this was of great importance in the development of the Storm Detachment.

It is no yet possible, nor would it be in the interests of the nation, to write or speak openly and freely on the subject. I shall speak of it only in so far as the matter has been dealt with in public discussions and thus brought to the knowledge of everybody. The occupation of the Ruhr district, which did not come as a surprise to us, gave grounds for hoping that Germany would at last abandon her cowardly policy of submission and thereby give the defence leagues a definite task to fulfil.

The Storm Detachment, which now numbered several thousand vigorous young men, would also have participated in this national service.

During the spring and summer of 1923 it was transformed into a fighting military organisation. It is to this reorganisation that we must in great part attribute the later developments that took place during 1923, in so far as these affected our Movement.

Elsewhere I shall deal in broad outline with the events of 1923. Here I wish only to state that the transformation of the Storm Detachment at that time was detrimental to the interests of the Movement, since the condition (namely, the adoption of a policy of active resistance against France) which had led to the change, was never realised.

The events which took place at the close of 1923, terrible as they may appear at first sight, were almost a necessity if looked at from a higher standpoint; because in view of the attitude taken by the Government of the German Reich, the conversion of the Storm Troops into a military force became meaningless and thus a transformation which would have proved harmful to the Movement was stopped forthwith.

Thereby it was made possible for us to set about the task of

reconstruction at the point at which we had been diverted from our proper course.

In the year 1925 the National Socialist German Labour Party was re-founded and had to organise and train its Storm Detachment once again according to the principles I had laid down.

It must revert, to its original sound views and must once more consider as its most essential function the establishment of its Storm Detachments as an instrument of defence and strength in the Movement's struggle to establish its *Weltanschauung* and once more it must consider it as its most essential task to function as the instrument of defence and reinforcement in the spiritual struggle to establish the ideals of the Movement.

The Storm Detachment must not be allowed to sink to the level of something in the nature of a defence league or a secret society. Steps must rather be taken to make it a force one hundred thousand strong to act as champion of the National Socialist, and thus of the genuinely *völkisch* ideal.



