

CHAPTER XIII: THE GERMAN POLICY OF ALLIANCES

The erratic manner in which the foreign affairs of the Reich were conducted was due to a lack of sound guiding principles in the formation of practical and useful alliances.

Not only did this state of affairs continue after the Revolution, but it became even worse. If the confused state of our political ideas in general before the War may be looked upon as the chief cause of our defective foreign policy, in the post-war period this must be attributed to a lack of honest intentions.

It was natural that those parties which had finally achieved their destructive purpose by means of the Revolution were not interested in the adoption of a policy of alliances which must ultimately result in the restoration of a free German State.

A development in this direction would not have been in conformity with the purposes of the November crime; it would have interrupted, or even put an end to, the internationalisation of German national economy and German labour. Above all, it would put an end to the political repercussions within the country resulting from a foreign policy which aimed at liberating Germany, which would, in the long run, have been fatal to those who now wield the power in the Reich.

One cannot imagine the revival of a nation unless that revival be preceded by a process of nationalisation. Conversely, every important success in the field of foreign politics must call forth a favourable reaction at home.

Experience proves that every struggle for liberty increases national sentiment and national self-confidence and thereby gives rise to a keener awareness of anti-national elements and tendencies.

Conditions and persons that may be tolerated and even pass unnoticed in times of peace will not only become the object of aversion when national enthusiasm is aroused, but will even provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns out disastrous for them.

In this connection we may recall the spy-scare that became prevalent

when the war broke out, when human passion suddenly manifested itself to such a heightened degree as to lead to the most brutal persecutions, often without justifiable grounds, although everybody knows that the spy danger is greater during long periods of peace. Yet, for obvious reasons, it does not then attract a similar amount of public attention.

For this reason the subtle instinct of those parasites of the State who came to the surface of the national body as a result of the events which took place in November 1918 makes them feel at once that a movement to restore the freedom of our people, supported by a wise foreign policy and the consequent awakening of national feeling—which would possibly mean the end of their own criminal existence.

Thus we may explain the fact that, since 1918, the competent government departments have failed as regards foreign policy and the Government of the country has practically always worked systematically against the interests of the German nation, for that which at first sight seemed a matter of chance proved, on closer examination, to be a logical advance along the lines first openly followed by those responsible for the November Revolution of 1918.

Undoubtedly a distinction ought to be made between, (1) the responsible administrators of our affairs of State, or rather those who ought to be responsible; (2) the average run of our parliamentary ‘politicians,’ and (3) the bulk of our people, whose sheepish docility corresponds to their want of intelligence.

The first know what they want.

The second fall into line with them, either because they know what is afoot, or because they have not the courage to take an uncompromising stand against a course which they know and feel to be detrimental.

The third just submit because they are too stupid to understand. While the National Socialist German Labour Party was only a small and practically unknown society, problems of foreign policy could have only a secondary importance in the eyes of many of its members.

This was the case especially because our Movement has always proclaimed, and must proclaim, the principle, that the freedom of the country in its foreign relations is not a gift that will be bestowed upon us by Heaven or by any earthly powers, but can only be the fruit of a development of our inner

strength.

Only by first rooting out the causes which led to our collapse and by eliminating all those who are profiting by that collapse can we establish the conditions necessary for the struggle for freedom abroad.

It will be easily understood, therefore, why during the early stages of our young Movement's development, we preferred to concentrate on the problem of internal reform rather than on foreign policy.

But, when the small and insignificant society expanded and finally outgrew its first framework, and the young organisation assumed the importance of a great association, we then felt it incumbent upon us to take a definite stand on problems regarding the development of a foreign policy.

It was necessary to lay down fundamental principles which would not only be in accord with the basic ideas of our *Weltanschauung*, but would actually be an outcome of it.

Just because our people have had no political education in matters concerning our relations abroad, it is necessary for the youthful Movement to teach its leaders and also the masses of the people, the guiding principles governing our foreign political attitude. This is the prerequisite for the practical execution of any measures adopted in our foreign policy of the future with the object of regaining the freedom of our people and of re-establishing the genuine sovereignty of the Reich.

The fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in mind when studying this question are, that foreign policy is only a means to an end and that the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own people.

Every problem in foreign politics must be considered solely from the following point of view: Will such and such a solution prove advantageous to our people now or in the future, or will it injure their interests?

That is the only question which must be considered in dealing with any problem. Party politics, religious considerations, humanitarian ideals—all such and all other preoccupations must, without compromise, give way to this.

Before the War, the purpose to which German foreign policy should have been directed was to ensure the supply of material necessities for the maintenance of our people and their children, to prepare means for the

attainment of this end and the gaining of the necessary support in the shape of advantageous alliances.

The task to be accomplished is the same to-day, but with this difference, that in pre-war times it was a question of caring for the maintenance of the German people, with the help of the power which a strong and independent State then possessed, but our task to-day is to make our nation powerful once again by re-establishing a strong and independent State.

The re-establishment of such a State is the prerequisite and necessary condition which must be fulfilled in order that we may be able subsequently to put into practice a foreign policy which will serve to guarantee the existence, welfare and subsistence of our people in the future.

In other words, the aim which Germany ought to pursue to-day in her foreign policy is to prepare the way for the recovery of her liberty to-morrow.

In this connection there is a fundamental principle which we must bear in mind, namely, that the possibility of winning back the independence of a nation is not absolutely bound up with territorial integrity.

It will suffice if a remnant, no matter how small, of a nation and State still exists, provided it possesses the necessary independence to become not only the vehicle of the common spirit of the whole people, but also to prepare the way for the military fight for the nation's liberty. If a people numbering a hundred million souls tolerates the yoke of common slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to its State from being broken up and divided, that is worse than if such a State and such a people were dismembered, and only one fragment still retained its complete independence.

Of course, the proviso here is that this fragment is inspired with a consciousness of the solemn duty that devolves upon it, not only persistently to proclaim its spiritual and cultural unity, but also to make the necessary preparations for the military conflict which will finally liberate and re-unite the fragments suffering under oppression.

One must also bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost territories which were formerly part of the State, both ethnologically and politically, must, in the first instance, be a question of winning back political power and independence for the mother-country itself.

In such cases, the special interests of the lost territories must be

uncompromisingly regarded as a matter of secondary importance in the face of the one main task, which is to win back the freedom of the mother-country.

The liberation of oppressed or detached fragments of the population, or provinces of an empire, cannot be accomplished by reason of the wishes of the oppressed or the protests of the bereaved mother-country, but only by resort to force on the part of those sections of the one-time united parent-country which have still more or less retained their sovereign rights.

Therefore, the first condition for the reconquest of lost territories is intensive promotion of the welfare, and reinforcement of the strength, of that portion of the State which remained intact after the partition. It must be allied to a cherished and indestructible determination to consecrate the fresh strength thus being developed to the cause of liberating and uniting the entire nation when the time is ripe.

That is to say, the interests of the separated territories must be subordinated to a single purpose, namely, to gain for the remaining portion of the original State that degree of political strength and power necessary to oppose the will of the hostile victor.

Oppressed territories are not returned to the bosom of their common parent-country as a result of heated protests, but only by the power of the sword.

The forging of this sword must be the aim of the domestic policy adopted by a country's government, whereas it is the object of foreign policy to safeguard the forging process and to gain allies.

In the first volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our policy of alliances before the War. There were four possible ways of securing the necessary foodstuffs for the maintenance of our people. Of these ways, the fourth, which was the most unfavourable, was chosen: Instead of a sound policy of territorial expansion in Europe, our rulers embarked on a policy of colonial and trade expansion.

Their policy was the more mistaken, inasmuch as they presumed that in this way the danger of an armed conflict would be averted.

The result of their attempt to sit on two stools at the same time might have been foreseen, they fell between them, and the World War was only the final reckoning which the Reich had to pay for the failure of its foreign policy.

The course that should have been adopted in those days was the third, which I indicated, namely, to increase the strength of the Reich as a continental Power by the acquisition of new territory in Europe.

At the same time, a further expansion through the subsequent acquisition of colonial territory, might thus have been brought within the range of possibility.

Of course, this policy could not have been carried through except in alliance with Britain, or by making such an abnormal effort to increase the country's military strength and armament that, for forty or fifty years, all cultural undertakings would have had to be completely relegated to the background.

This would have been justifiable, for the cultural importance of a nation is almost always dependent on its political freedom and independence.

Political freedom is a prerequisite condition for the existence, or rather the growth, of culture. Accordingly, no sacrifice can be too great when there is a question of securing the political freedom of a nation.

The sacrifices which have to be made in the sphere of general culture, in favour of an intensive strengthening of the military power of the State will be richly rewarded later on.

Indeed, it may be asserted that such a concentrated effort to preserve the independence of the State is usually succeeded by a certain easing of tension or is counterbalanced by a sudden blossoming forth of the hitherto neglected cultural spirit of the nation.

Thus Greece flourished during the great Periclean era after the miseries she had suffered during the Persian Wars, and the Roman Republic turned its energies to the cultivation of a higher civilisation when it was freed from the stress and troubles of the Punic Wars.

Of course, it is not to be expected that a parliamentary majority of cowardly and stupid people would ever be capable of deciding on such a resolute policy entailing the absolute subordination of all other national interests to the one sole task of preparing for a future conflict of arms which would result in establishing the security of the State.

The father of Frederick the Great sacrificed everything in order to be

ready for such a conflict; but the fathers of our absurd parliamentary democracy, with the Jewish hall-mark, could not do so. That is why, in pre-war times, the military preparations necessary to enable us to conquer new territory in Europe were only very mediocre, so that it was difficult to dispense with the support of really useful allies.

Those who directed our foreign affairs would not entertain the bare idea of systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan for the acquisition of territory in Europe and, by preferring a policy of colonial and trade expansion, they sacrificed the alliance with England, which was then possible.

At the same time, they neglected to seek the support of Russia, which would have been a logical proceeding. Finally, they stumbled into the World War, abandoned by all except the ill-starred Habsburgs.

The characteristic of our present foreign policy is that it follows no discernible or even intelligible line of action.

Whereas before the War, a mistake was made in taking the fourth way that I have mentioned, and in pursuing it in a half-hearted manner, since the Revolution not even the then keenest observer can detect any attempt to pursue a definite course.

Even more than before the War, there is absolutely no such thing as a systematic plan, except systematic attempts to destroy the last possibility of a national revival.

If we make an impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe to-day as far as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one another, we can establish the following facts.

For the past three hundred years the history of our Continent has been definitely determined by Britain's efforts to preserve the balance of power in Europe, thus ensuring the necessary protection of her own rear while she pursued the great aims of British world-policy.

The traditional tendency of British diplomacy ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every possible means to prevent any one Power from attaining a preponderant position over the other European Powers and, if necessary, to break that preponderance by means of armed intervention.

The only German parallel to this has been the tradition of the Prussian Army. Throughout the centuries Britain has adopted various methods to achieve her ends, choosing them according to the actual situation or the task to be faced; but the will and determination to use them has always been the same.

The more difficult Britain's position became in the course of history, the more did the British Imperial Government consider it necessary to maintain a condition of political paralysis among the various European States, as a result of their mutual rivalries.

When the North American colonies obtained their political independence, it became still more necessary for Britain to make every effort to establish and maintain the defence of her flank in Europe.

In accordance with this policy, Britain, after having crushed the great naval Powers, Spain and Holland, concentrated all her forces against the increasing strength of France, until she brought about the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte and thereby destroyed the military hegemony of France, her most dangerous rival.

The change in the attitude of British statesmen towards Germany took place only very slowly, because the German nation did not represent an obvious danger for Britain as long as it lacked national unification, and because the current of public opinion in Britain—long moulded along certain lines for political purposes—could be directed into a fresh channel only by slow degrees.

In this case the calm reflections of the statesman are transformed into sentimental values which are not only more telling in effect, but also more permanent.

When the statesman has attained one of his ends he immediately turns his thoughts to others; but only by degrees and by the slow process of propaganda, can the sentiment of the masses be shaped into an instrument for the attainment of the new aims which their leaders have chosen.

As early as 1870/71, Britain had, however, decided on the new stand she would take. On certain occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused by the growing influence of America on the commercial markets of the world and also by the increasing political power of Russia. Unfortunately, Germany did not take advantage of these and, therefore, the original tendency of British

diplomacy was reinforced.

Britain looked upon Germany as a Power which was of importance commercially and politically and which, partly because of its enormous industrial development, was assuming such threatening proportions that the two countries were already contending against one another in the same sphere.

The so-called peaceful conquest of the world by commercial enterprise, which, in the eyes of those who governed our public affairs at that time, represented the highest peak of human wisdom, was just the thing that led British statesmen to adopt a policy of resistance.

That this resistance assumed the form of organised aggression on a vast scale was in full conformity with a type of statesmanship which did not aim at the maintenance of a dubious world peace, but aimed at the consolidation of British world-mastery.

In carrying out this policy, Britain allied herself with all those countries which were of any military importance and this was in keeping with her traditional caution in estimating the power of her adversary and also in recognising her own temporary weakness.

That line of conduct cannot be called unscrupulous, because such a comprehensive organisation for war purposes must not be judged from the heroic point of view, but from that of expediency.

The object of a diplomatic policy is not to see that a nation perishes heroically, but rather that it survives. Hence, every road that leads to this goal is justifiable and failure to take it must be looked upon as criminal neglect of duty.

When the German Revolution took place, Britain's fears of German world-hegemony were laid to rest. From that time onward Britain has not been interested in erasing Germany from the map of Europe.

On the contrary, the astounding collapse which took place in November 1918, found British diplomacy confronted with a situation which at first appeared incredible.

For four and a half years the British Empire had fought to break the presumed preponderance of a continental Power. A sudden collapse then occurred which apparently removed this Power from the foreground of

European affairs.

Germany betrayed such a lack of even the primordial instinct of self-preservation, that European equilibrium was destroyed within forty-eight hours. Germany was annihilated and France became the first political Power on the continent of Europe.

The tremendous propaganda which was carried on during the War for the purpose of encouraging the British public to 'stick it out' to the end aroused all the primitive instincts and passions of the populace and was bound eventually to act as a drag on the decisions of British statesmen.

With the colonial, economic and commercial destruction of Germany, Britain's war aims were realised. Anything in excess of these aims was an obstacle to the furtherance of British interests.

Only the enemies of Britain could profit by the disappearance of Germany as a great continental Power in Europe.

In November 1918, however, and up to the summer of 1919, it was not possible for Britain to change her diplomatic attitude, because during the long war she had appealed, more than ever before, to the feelings of the populace. In view of the feeling prevalent among her own people, Britain could not change her foreign policy.

Another reason which rendered this impossible was the military strength to which other European Powers had now attained.

France had taken the direction of affairs into her own hands and could impose her law upon the others. During those months of negotiation and bargaining the only Power that could have altered the course which things were taking was Germany herself but Germany was torn asunder by a civil war, and had declared through the medium of her so-called statesmen that she was ready to accept any and every dictate imposed on her.

Now, in the history of nations, when a nation loses its instinct for self-preservation and ceases to be a possible active ally, it sinks to the level of an enslaved nation and its territory is fated to deteriorate into a colony.

The only possible course which Britain could adopt in order to prevent France from becoming too powerful was to participate in her lust for aggrandisement.

Actually, Britain had not realised her war aims. Not only had she failed to prevent a continental Power from predominating and thus upsetting the balance of power in Europe, but she had helped to bring about this very situation and in an acute degree. In 1914, Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between two countries, one of which equalled, while the other excelled her in military strength.

Then there was Britain's supremacy at sea. France and Russia alone hindered and opposed the excessive aggrandisement of Germany.

The unfavourable geographical situation of the Reich, from the military point of view, might be looked upon as another coefficient of security against an exaggerated increase of German power.

In the event of a conflict with Britain, Germany's seaboard, being short and cramped, was unfavourable from the military point of view, whilst her frontiers on land were too extensive and open to attack.

France's position is different to-day. She is the foremost military Power, without a serious rival on the Continent. Her southern frontiers are practically secure from attack by Spain and Italy, she is safeguarded against Germany by the prostrate condition of our country.

A long stretch of her coast-line faces the vital nerve-centre of the British Empire. Not only could French aeroplanes and long-range batteries attack the vital industrial, commercial and administrative, centres in Great Britain, but submarines could threaten the great British commercial routes.

A submarine campaign based on France's long Atlantic coast and on the European and North African coasts of the Mediterranean, would have disastrous consequences for Britain. Thus the political results of the war to prevent the development of German power was the creation of French hegemony on the Continent.

The military result was the consolidation of France as the first continental Power and the recognition of American equality at sea. The economic result was the cession of great spheres of British interests to her former allies and associates. Just as Britain's traditional policy renders the Balkanisation of Europe desirable and necessary up to a certain point, France aims at the Balkanisation of Germany.

What Britain has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to

prevent any one continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of world-importance. Therefore, Britain wishes to maintain the balance of power in Europe, for this appears to be the prerequisite of British world hegemony.

What France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent Germany from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore, France wants to maintain a system of small German States, whose forces would balance one another and over which there would be no central government.

This, in conjunction with the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, would furnish the conditions necessary for the establishment and guarantee of French hegemony in Europe.

The final aims of French diplomacy will inevitably be in perpetual opposition to the ultimate tendencies of British statesmanship.

Taking these considerations as a starting-point, anyone who investigates the possible alliances which Germany could form to-day, is forced to the conclusion that the only course open to Germany is a rapprochement with Great Britain.

Although the consequences of Britain's war policy were, and are, disastrous for Germany, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things stand to-day, Britain's vital interests no longer demand the destruction of Germany.

On the contrary, British policy must tend more and more, from year to year, towards curbing France's unbridled lust for hegemony.

Now, a policy of alliances cannot be pursued by bearing past grievances in mind, but it can be rendered fruitful by taking account of past experiences.

Experience should have taught us that alliances formed for negative purposes are intrinsically weak. The destinies of nations can be welded together only by the prospect of a common success, of common gain and conquest, in short, a common extension of power for both contracting parties.

Our people's lack of insight in questions of foreign politics is clearly demonstrated by the reports in the daily press, which talk about the 'pro-German attitude' of one or the other foreign statesman, this assumed pro-German attitude being taken as a special guarantee that such persons will champion a policy that will be advantageous to our people.

That kind of talk is absurd to an incredible degree and reckons with the unparalleled simplicity of the average German Philistine when he comes to talking politics.

There is no British, American, or Italian statesman who could ever be described as 'pro-German.' Every British statesman is, first and foremost, a Britisher, the American statesman, an American, and no Italian statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not pro-Italian.

Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances with foreign nations on the basis of a pro-German feeling among the statesmen of other countries is either a fool or a deceiver.

The necessary condition for linking together the destinies of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual sympathy, but rather the prospect of advantages accruing to the contracting parties.

Although it is true that a British statesman will always follow a pro-British and not a pro-German policy, it is also true that certain definite interests involved in this pro-British policy may, for various reasons, coincide with German interests.

Naturally, that can be so only to a certain degree and the situation may one day be completely reversed. But the art of the statesman consists in finding at the crucial moment, for the execution of his own vital policy, those allies who must, in their own interests, adopt a similar course.

The practical application of these principles at the present time must depend on the answers to the following questions: What States are not vitally interested in the fact that, by the complete abolition of a German Central Europe, the economic and military power of France has reached a position of absolute hegemony?

Which are the States that, in consideration of the conditions which are essential to their own existence and in view of the tradition that has hitherto been followed in conducting their foreign policy, envisage such a development as a menace to their own future?

One point on which we must be clear is that France is, and will remain, the implacable enemy of Germany.

It does not matter what governments have ruled or will rule in France,

whether Bourbon or Jacobin, Napoleonist or bourgeois-democratic, clerical Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign policy will always be directed towards acquiring possession of the Rhine frontier and consolidating France's position on this river by disuniting and dismembering Germany.

Britain did not want Germany to be a world-power, but France did not want Germany as a Power to exist at all—a very different matter!

To-day we are not fighting for our position as a world-power, but only for the existence of our country, for national unity and our children's daily bread.

Taking this point of view into consideration, only two States remain to us as possible allies in Europe, namely, Britain and Italy.

Britain is by no means desirous of having a France on whose military power there is no check in Europe, with the result that she might one day pursue a policy which, in some way or other, would inevitably conflict with British interests. Nor can Britain be pleased to see France in possession of such enormous coal and iron fields in Western Europe, which might make it possible for her one day to play a role in world-commerce which might endanger British interests.

Moreover, Britain will never be desirous of having a France whose political position on the Continent, owing to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so absolutely assured that she is not only able to resume a French world-policy on a large scale, but even finds herself compelled to do so.

It would be possible for an enemy to drop nightly a thousand times as many bombs as the Zeppelins did in the past. The military predominance of France weighs heavily on the minds of the British.

Italy is another Power which cannot, and surely will not, welcome any further strengthening of France's power in Europe.

The future of Italy will be conditioned by developments in the territories bordering on the Mediterranean. The reason that made Italy come into the War was not a desire to contribute towards the aggrandisement of France, but rather to deal her hated Adriatic rival a mortal blow.

Any further increase of France's power on the Continent would hamper

the development of Italy's future, and Italy does not deceive herself into thinking that racial kinship between the nations will in any way eliminate rivalries.

Serious and impartial consideration proves that it is these two Powers, Great Britain and Italy, whose natural interests not only do not run counter to the conditions essential to the existence of the German nation, but are to a certain extent identical with them.

When we consider the possibility of alliances we must be careful not to lose sight of three factors.

The first factor concerns ourselves; the other two concern the States in question.

Is it at all possible to conclude an alliance with Germany as she is to-day?

Can a Power which would enter into an alliance for the purpose of securing assistance in the execution of its own offensive aims form an alliance with a State, whose rulers have, for years, presented a spectacle of deplorable incompetence and pacifist cowardice? A State where the majority of the nation, blinded by democratic and Marxist teachings, betrays the interests of its own people and country in a manner that cries to Heaven for vengeance?

As things stand to-day, can any Power hope to establish useful relations with a State and hope to fight together for the furtherance of their common interests, if this State has neither the will nor the courage to lift a finger in defence of its bare existence?

Can a Power for which an alliance must be much more than a pact to guarantee a state of slow decomposition on the lines of the old and disastrous Triple Alliance, associate itself for life or death with a State whose most characteristic signs of activity consist in an abject servility in external relations and a scandalous repression of the national spirit at home?

Can such a Power be associated with a State in which there is nothing of greatness, because its whole policy does not deserve it?

Or can alliances be made with governments which are in the hands of men who are despised by their own fellow-citizens and are consequently not respected abroad?

Never!

A self-respecting Power which expects something more from alliances than commissions for greedy parliamentarians will not, and cannot, enter into an alliance with our present-day Germany.

Our present inability to form alliances furnishes the principal and most profound reason for the solidarity of the enemies who are robbing us.

Because Germany does not defend herself in any way apart from the flamboyant protests of our parliamentarian elect; because there is no reason why the rest of the world should take up the fight in our defence; and because God does not follow the principle of granting freedom to a nation of cowards, despite all the blubbing prayers addressed to Him by our 'patriotic' associations; even those States which have not a direct interest in our annihilation cannot do otherwise than participate in France's campaign of plunder—if for no other reason than that, by their participation, they at least prevent France from being the sole country to be aggrandised thereby.

In the second place, we must not underestimate the difficulty of changing the opinion of the bulk of the population in former enemy countries, which had been influenced in a certain direction by means of propaganda.

When a foreign nation has for years been presented to the public as a horde of 'Huns,' 'robbers,' 'Vandals,' etc., it cannot suddenly be presented as something different, and the enemy of yesterday cannot be recommended as the ally of to-morrow.

A third factor, however, deserves greater attention, since it is of essential importance for the establishment of future alliances in Europe.

From the political point of view it is not in the interests of Great Britain that Germany should be ruined still more, but such a development would be very much in the interests of the Jews who manipulate the international money-markets.

The cleavage between official, or rather traditional, British statesmanship and the controlling influence of the Jew on the money-markets is nowhere so clearly manifested as in the various attitudes adopted towards problems of British foreign policy.

Contrary to the interests and welfare of Great Britain, Jewish finance

demands not only the absolute economic destruction of Germany, but its complete political enslavement.

The internationalisation of our German economic system, that is to say, the transference of our productive forces to the control of Jewish international finance, can be completely carried out only in a State that has been politically Bolshevised.

But the Marxist fighting forces of international and Jewish stock-exchange capital cannot finally smash the German national State without friendly, help from outside.

To this end the armies of France will have to attack Germany until the Reich, inwardly cowed, succumbs to the Bolshevist storm-troops of international money-grubbing Jewry.

Hence it is that, at the present time, the Jew is the chief agitator for the complete destruction of Germany.

Whenever we read of Germany being attacked in any part of the world the Jew is always the instigator.

In peace-time as well as during the War the Jewish-Marxist stock-exchange press systematically stirred up hatred against Germany, until one State after another abandoned its neutrality and placed itself at the service of the Allies in the World War, even against the real interests of its own people.

The Jewish way of reasoning is quite clear. The Bolshevisation of Germany, that is to say, the extermination of the *völkisch* and national German intellectuals, and the resultant exploitation of German labour under the yoke of Jewish international finance, is only the overture to the movement for expanding Jewish power on a wider scale and finally subjugating the world to its rule.

As has so often happened in the course of history, Germany is the chief pivot of this formidable struggle. If our people and our State fall victims to these oppressors of the nations, who lust after blood and gold, the whole earth will become the prey of that hydra-headed monster.

If Germany succeeds in freeing herself, from its grip, this great menace to the nations of the world will thereby be eliminated.

It is certain that Jewry will resort to every possible underhand device in order not only to keep alive the old anti-German feeling among other nations, but to intensify it if possible.

It is no less certain that these activities are only very partially in keeping with the true interests of the nations among whom the poison is being spread.

As a general principle, Jewry carries on its campaign in the various countries by the use of arguments that are best calculated to appeal to the mentality of the respective nations and are most likely to produce the desired results.

Our nation has been so torn asunder racially that it is easy for Jewry in its fight for power to make use of the more or less 'cosmopolitan' and pacifist ideas, in short, the international tendencies, which are the result of this disruption. In France, the Jews exploit the well-known and accurately estimated chauvinistic spirit. In England, they exploit the commercial and world political outlook. In short, they always work upon the essential characteristics peculiar to the mentality of each nation.

When they have by this means achieved a decisive influence in the political and economic spheres, they can drop the pretence which their former tactics necessitated, now disclosing their real intentions and the ends for which they are fighting.

Their work of destruction now goes ahead more quickly, reducing one State after another to a mass of ruins on which they will erect the everlasting and sovereign Jewish Empire.

In England, and also in Italy, the contrast between the better kind of native statesmanship and the policy of the Jewish financiers often becomes strikingly evident.

Only in France does there exist to-day, in a greater degree than ever before, a profound harmony between the aims of the Stock Exchange, of the Jews who control it and those of a chauvinistic national policy.

This identity of purpose constitutes an immense danger for Germany and it is for this very reason that France is, and will remain, by far her most dangerous enemy.

The French nation, which is becoming more and more polluted by Negro

blood, represents a menace to the existence of the white race in Europe, because it is bound up with the Jewish campaign for world domination.

The contamination caused by the influx of Negroid blood on the Rhine, in the very heart of Europe, is in accord with the sadistic and perverse lust for vengeance on the part of the hereditary enemy of our people.

This suits the purpose of the cool, calculating Jew, who would use this means of beginning a process of bastardisation in the very centre of the European continent and, by infecting the white race with the blood of an inferior stock, destroy the foundations of its independent existence.

France's activities in Europe to-day, spurred on by the French lust for vengeance and systematically directed by the Jew, are a criminal attack upon the existence of the white races and will one day arouse against the French people a spirit of vengeance among a generation which will recognise racial pollution as the original sin of mankind.

As far as Germany is concerned, the danger which France represents, makes it her duty to relegate all sentiment to a subordinate plane and to extend a hand to those who are threatened with the same menace and who are not willing to suffer or tolerate France's lust for hegemony.

For a long time to come there will be only two Powers in Europe with which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance. These Powers are Great Britain and Italy.

If we take the trouble to review the way in which German foreign policy has been conducted since the Revolution we must, in view of the constant and incomprehensible failure of our governments, either lose heart or be overcome with rage and take up the cudgels against such a regime.

Their way of acting cannot be attributed to a want of understanding, because what seemed to every thinking man to be inconceivable was accomplished by the leaders of the November parties, with their Cyclopean intellects.

They wooed France and begged her favour. Indeed, throughout these past years, they have, with the touching simplicity of incorrigible visionaries, gone on their knees to France again and again, they have grovelled before the Grande Nation, and thought they recognised in each successive wily trick performed by the French hangmen the first signs of a change of feeling.

Our real political wire-pullers never shared this absurd credulity. The idea of establishing a friendship with France was for them only a means of thwarting every attempt on Germany's part to adopt a practical policy of alliances.

They had no illusions about French aims or those of the men behind the scenes in France. What induced them to take up such an attitude and to act as if they honestly believed that the fate of Germany could possibly be changed in this way, was the cool calculation that otherwise our people might take the reins into their own hands and choose another road.

Of course, it is difficult for us, even within the framework of our own Movement, to propose Britain as our possible ally in the future.

Our Jewish press has been adept in concentrating hatred against Britain, in particular, and many of our good German simpletons perched on the branches which the Jews had lined to fool them.

They babbled about a restoration of German sea-power and protested against the robbery of our colonies. Thus they furnished material which the contriving Jew transmitted to his clansmen in England, to be used there for purposes of practical propaganda.

It is high time that even our easily duped bourgeoisie, which loves to dabble in politics, realised that to-day we have not to fight for 'sea-power' and the like.

Even before the War it was absurd to direct the national energies of Germany towards this end without first having secured our position in Europe.

Such an aspiration today reaches that peak of absurdity which may be called criminal in the domain of politics.

The success of the Jewish wire-pullers in concentrating the attention of the people on things which are only of secondary importance to-day was often calculated to, drive one to despair.

They incited the people to demonstrations and protests while at the same time France was tearing our nation asunder bit by bit and systematically removing the very foundations of our national independence.

In this connection I have in mind one particular bone of contention of

which the Jew has made extraordinarily skilful use in recent years, namely, South Tyrol.

The reason why I take up this question here is that I want to call to account that shameless canaille, who, relying on the ignorance and short memory of a large section of our people, simulate a national indignation which is as foreign to the real character of our parliamentary imposters as the idea of respect for private property is to a jackdaw.

I should like to state here that I was one of those who, at the time when the fate of South Tyrol was being decided—that is to say, from August 1914 to November 1918—took their place where that country could be most effectively defended, namely, in the Army.

I did my share of the fighting during those years, not merely to save South Tyrol from being lost, but also to save every other German province for the Fatherland. The parliamentary highwaymen, the whole gang of party politicians, did not take part in that combat. On the contrary, while we carried on the fight in the belief that a victorious issue to the War would enable the German nation to keep South Tyrol, along with other frontier provinces, these traitors carried on a seditious agitation against such a victorious issue, until the fighting Siegfried succumbed to the dagger-thrust in his back.

The inflammatory and hypocritical speeches of the elegantly dressed parliamentarians in the Vienna Rathaus Plat or in front of the Feldherrnhalle in Munich could not save South Tyrol for Germany.

That could have been done only by the battalions fighting at the front. Those who broke up that fighting front betrayed South Tyrol, together with all the other provinces of Germany.

Anyone who thinks that the South Tyrolean question can be solved to-day by protests, declarations and processions organised by various associations, is either a humbug or merely a German Philistine.

It must be quite clearly understood that we shall not get back the territories we have lost if we depend on solemn prayers addressed to Almighty God or on pious faith in a League of Nations, but only by the force of arms.

The only question is, therefore: Who is ready to take up arms for the restoration of the lost territories?

As far as I myself am concerned, I can state with a good conscience, that I would have courage enough to take part in a campaign for the reconquest of South Tyrol, at the head of parliamentary storm battalions consisting of parliamentary gasconaders, other party leaders and various Councillors of State.

How I should enjoy seeing the shrapnel burst above the heads of those taking part in an 'enthusiastic' protest demonstration!

I think that if a fox were to break into a poultry-yard his presence would not provoke such a helter-skelter and rush for cover as we should witness in the case of such a fine assembly of 'protesters.'

The vilest part of it all is, that these talkers themselves do not believe that anything can be achieved in this way. Each one of them knows very well how harmless and ineffectual their whole play-acting is.

They do it only because it is easier to babble about the restoration of South Tyrol now, than it was to fight for its preservation in days gone by.

Each one plays the part that he is best suited to play in life. In those days we sacrificed our lives. To-day these people are engaged in shouting themselves hoarse.

It is particularly interesting to note to-day how Legitimist circles in Vienna preen themselves on their work for the restoration of South Tyrol.

Seven years ago their august and illustrious dynasty helped, by an act of perjury and treason, to make it possible for the victorious world-coalition to take away South Tyrol.

At that time these circles supported the perfidious policy adopted by their dynasty and did not trouble themselves in the least about the fate of South Tyrol or any other province.

Naturally, it is easier to-day to take up the fight for this territory, since the present struggle is waged with 'the weapons of the mind.'

Anyhow it is easier to join in a 'meeting of protest' and talk yourself hoarse in giving vent to the righteous indignation that fills your breast, or stain your finger with the writing of a newspaper article, than to blow up a bridge, for instance, during the occupation of the Ruhr.

The reason why certain circles have made the question of South Tyrol the pivot of German-Italian relations during the past few years is quite evident.

Jews and Habsburg Legitimists are greatly interested in preventing Germany from pursuing a policy of alliance which might one day lead to the resurgence of a free German Fatherland.

It is not out of love for South Tyrol that they play this role to-day—for their policy would turn out detrimental rather than helpful to the interests of that province—but through fear of an agreement being established between Germany and Italy.

A tendency towards lying and calumny is inborn in these people, and that explains how they can calmly and brazenly attempt to twist things in such a way as to make it appear that we have ‘betrayed’ South Tyrol.

One thing must be made clear to these gentlemen, namely, that South Tyrol was betrayed, in the first place, by every German who was sound in wind and limb and was not at the front during the years 1914–1918 to do his duty to his country. In the second place, South Tyrol was betrayed by every man who, during those years, did not help to reinforce the national spirit and the national powers of resistance, so as to enable the country to carry on the war and keep up the fight to the very end.

In the third place, South Tyrol was betrayed by everyone who took part in the November Revolution, either directly by co-operation, or indirectly by a cowardly toleration of it, and thus destroyed the sole weapon that could have saved South Tyrol.

In the fourth place, South Tyrol was betrayed by those parties and their adherents who put their signatures to the disgraceful treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.

Thus the matter stands, my brave gentlemen, who make your protests only in words.

To-day I am guided by a calm and cool recognition of the fact that the lost territories cannot be won back by the glib tongues of parliamentary speechifiers, but only by the whetted sword; in other words, through a fight in which blood will be shed.

I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that now the die is cast, it is

impossible to win back South Tyrol through a war. In fact, I would definitely take my stand against such a move, because I am convinced that it would not be possible to arouse the national enthusiasm of the German people to the pitch necessary to carry such a war to a successful issue.

On the contrary, I believe that if we have to shed German blood once again it would be criminal to do so for the sake of liberating two hundred thousand Germans, when close at hand more than seven million Germans are suffering under a foreign yoke, while a life-line of the German nation has become a playground for hordes of African Negroes.

If the German nation is to put an end to a state of things which threatens to wipe it off the map of Europe, it must not fall into the error of the pre-war period and make the whole world its enemy.

It must ascertain who is its most dangerous enemy, so that it can concentrate all its forces in a struggle to rout him, and if, in order to gain the victory in this struggle, sacrifices have to be made elsewhere, future generations will not condemn us on that account.

The more brilliant the resulting victory, the better will they be able to appreciate the dire necessity and the deep anxiety which led us to make that bitter decision.

We must always be guided by the fundamental principle that, as a preliminary to winning back lost provinces, the political independence and strength of the mother-country must first be restored.

The first task which a strong government must accomplish in the sphere of foreign politics is to make that independence possible and to secure it by a wise policy of alliances, but it is just on this point that we National Socialists have to guard against being dragged along in tow by our ranting bourgeois patriots who take their cue from the Jew.

It would be a disaster if, instead of preparing for the coming struggle, our Movement, too, were to content itself with mere protests by word of mouth.

It was the fantastic idea of a Nibelungen alliance with the rotting body of the Habsburg State that brought about Germany's ruin.

Fantastic sentimentality in dealing with the possibilities arising in the

field of foreign politics to-day would be the best means of preventing our revival for innumerable years to come.

Here I must briefly answer the objections which may be raised in connection with the three questions I have put.

1. Is it possible to form an alliance with present-day Germany whose weakness is obvious to all?

2. Can the enemy nations change their attitude towards Germany?

3. Is not the influence of Jewry stronger than the recognition of facts, and does not this influence thwart all good intentions and render all plans futile?

I think that I have already dealt adequately with one aspect of the first question.

Of course nobody will enter into an alliance with present-day Germany. No Power in the world would link its fortunes with those of a State whose government does not afford grounds for the slightest confidence.

I strongly object to the attempt which has been made by many of our compatriots to explain and excuse the conduct of the government by referring to the woeful state of public feeling.

The lack of character which our people have shown during the last six years is indeed deeply distressing. The indifference with which they have treated the crying needs of our nation is depressing in the extreme and their cowardice is often revolting, but one must never forget that we are dealing with a people who gave the world, a few years previously, an admirable example of the highest human qualities.

From the first days of August 1914 to the end of the tremendous struggle between the nations, no people in the world gave a better proof of manly courage, tenacity and patient endurance, than this people which is so cast down and dispirited to-day.

Nobody dare assert that our humiliating position to-day is in keeping with the true character of our nation. What we have to endure to-day, physically and spiritually, is due only to the appalling, soul destroying influence of the act of high treason committed on November 9th, 1918.

More than ever before the poet is right when he says that evil must

inevitably continue to breed evil. But even to-day, the fundamentally sound qualities of our nation are not dead, they are only dormant in the depths of the national conscience, and sometimes in the clouded firmament we see the gleam of qualities which Germany will one day remember as the first symptoms of a revival.

More than once thousands of young Germans have rallied to a call, resolved, as in 1914, freely and willingly to offer themselves as a sacrifice on the altar of their beloved Fatherland.

Millions of men have resumed work, whole-heartedly and zealously, as if no revolution had ever affected them. The smith is at his anvil once again, the farmer is driving his plough and the scientist is in his laboratory—all doing their duty, with the same zeal and devotion as formerly.

The oppression which we suffer at the hands of our enemies is no longer accepted, as formerly, with a laugh and a shrug, but is resented with bitterness and anger.

There can be no doubt that a great change of attitude has taken place.

This change has not yet taken the shape of a conscious intention and urge to restore the political power and independence of our nation, but the blame for this must be attributed to those who, less in response to a heaven-sent call than in order to satisfy their own ambition, have been governing our nation since 1918 and leading it to ruin.

If any man seeks to sit in judgment upon our nation to-day he must ask himself, ‘What has been done to help it?’

Was the poor support which the nation gave the resolutions passed by our governments (which were of a shadowy nature) a sign of our nation’s lack of vitality or was it not rather a sign of the complete failure of the methods employed in administering this valuable trust?

What have our governments done to reawaken in this nation a spirit of proud self-assertion, courageous defiance and righteous hatred?

In 1919, when the Peace Treaty was imposed on the German nation, these were grounds for hoping that this instrument of unrestricted oppression would help to reinforce the outcry for the freedom of Germany.

Peace treaties which make demands that fall like a whip-lash on the people turn out not infrequently to be the signal for a future revival.

How could the Treaty of Versailles have been exploited!

How, in the hands of a willing government, could this instrument of unlimited blackmail and shameful humiliation have been applied for the purpose of rousing national sentiment to fever-pitch!

How could a well-directed system of propaganda have utilised the sadistic cruelty of that treaty in order to change the indifference of the people into a feeling of indignation and transform that indignation into a spirit of dauntless resistance!

Every clause of that treaty should have been branded upon the hearts and minds of the German people until, in the souls of sixty million men and women, a common sense of shame and a hatred shared in common burst into flame like a torrent of fire, in the heat of which were forged an inflexible resolve and the cry, 'We must have arms!'

A treaty of that kind can be used for such a purpose. Its unbounded oppression and its impudent demands were an excellent propaganda weapon to arouse the sluggish spirit of the nation and restore its vitality.

Then, every type of reading-matter from the child's story-book to the last newspaper in the country, every theatre and cinema, every pillar where placards are posted and every free space on the hoardings should be utilised in the service of this one great mission; until the faint-hearted cry of 'Lord, deliver us,' which our patriotic associations send up to Heaven to-day was transformed, even in the mind of the smallest child, into the ardent prayer, 'Almighty God, bless our arms when the hour comes. Be just, as Thou hast always been just. Judge now if we deserve our freedom. Lord, bless our struggle.'

All opportunities were neglected and nothing was done. Who can be surprised if our people are not such as they should be or might be, when the rest of the world looks upon us only as its valet, or as an obedient dog that will lick his master's hand after he has been whipped.

Of course the possibility of forming alliances with other nations is hampered by the indifference of our own people, but much more by our government. Their corrupting influence is to blame for the fact that now, after

eight years of indescribable oppression, there exists only a faint desire for liberty.

Before our nation can embark upon a policy of alliances, it must restore its prestige among other nations, and it must have an authoritative government that is not a drudge in the service of foreign States and the taskmaster of its own people, but rather the herald of the national will.

If our people had a government which looked upon this as its mission, a courageous foreign policy pursued by the Reich government would, before six years had elapsed, enjoy the equally courageous support of a people yearning for freedom.

The second objection referred to the difficulty of changing ex-enemy nations into friendly allies. That objection may be answered as follows: The general anti-German psychosis which has developed in other countries through war-propaganda must of necessity continue to exist as long as there is no renaissance of the national instinct of self-preservation among the German people.

The appearance of such an instinct will transform the German Reich once more into a State able to play its part on the chess-board of European politics and one which the others regard as a worthy partner. Only when the government and the people give evidence of their fitness to enter into an alliance will some Power, whose interests coincide with ours, set about instituting a system of propaganda for the purpose of changing public opinion among its own people.

Naturally, it will take several years of persevering and ably directed work to achieve such a result.

Just because a long period is needed in order to change the public opinion of a country, it is necessary to reflect calmly before such an enterprise be undertaken.

This means that one must not enter upon this kind of work unless one is absolutely convinced that it is worth the trouble and that it will bring results which will bear good fruit in the future.

One must not try to change the opinions and feelings of a people by basing one's actions on the vain cajolery of a more or less brilliant Foreign Minister, but only if there be a tangible guarantee that the new orientation will

be really useful. Otherwise, public opinion in the country concerned would be plunged into a state of complete confusion.

The most reliable guarantee that can be given for the possibility of subsequently entering into an alliance with a certain State is not to be found in the loquacious suavity of some individual member of the government, but in the manifest stability of a definite and practical policy on the part of the government as a whole, and in public opinion which is solidly of the same mind.

Universal faith in this policy will be strengthened in the same measure in which the government give tangible evidence of their activity through the medium of preparatory and supporting propaganda and in the measure in which the trend of public opinion is reflected in the government's policy.

Therefore, a nation in such a position as ours will be looked upon as a possible ally only when public opinion and the government are united in the same enthusiastic and openly avowed determination to carry through the fight for national freedom.

That condition of affairs must be firmly established before any attempt can be made to change public opinion in other countries which, for the sake of defending their own interests, are disposed to take the road shoulder-to-shoulder with a companion who seems able to play his part in defending those interests—in other words, they are ready to establish an alliance.

For this purpose, however, one thing is necessary. Seeing that the task of bringing about a radical change in the public opinion of a country calls for hard work—and many will at first not understand what that means—it would be both foolish and criminal to commit mistakes which could be used as weapons in the hands of those who are opposed to such a change.

One must recognise the fact that it takes a long time for a people to understand completely the inner purposes which a government has in view, because it is not possible to explain the ultimate aims of the preliminary steps undertaken with a view to pursuing a certain policy.

The government has to count on the blind faith of the masses or the intuitive instinct of the more intellectually developed ruling caste—but since many people lack this insight and political acumen, and since political considerations forbid a public explanation of why such and such a course is

being followed—a certain number of leaders in intellectual circles will always oppose new tendencies which, because they are not easily grasped, can easily be regarded in the light of mere experiments.

It is in this way that the opposition of over-anxious conservative circles is aroused.

For this reason it is our bounden duty not to allow any weapon to fall into the hands of those who would interfere with the work of bringing about a mutual understanding with other nations.

This is especially so when, as in our case, we have to deal with the pretensions and unpractical talk of our patriotic associations and our small bourgeoisie who air their political opinions in the cafés.

That the cry for a new navy, the restoration of our colonies, etc., is just silly talk which is not based on any plan for its practical execution, cannot be denied by anyone who thinks over the matter calmly and seriously.

At the same time the manner in which Britain exploits the foolish tirades of these champions of the policy of protest who are in reality playing into the hands of our mortal enemies cannot be considered advantageous to Germany.

These people dissipate their energies in futile demonstrations against everything and everybody which is harmful to our interests and those who indulge in them forget the fundamental principle which is a preliminary condition of all success, namely, that if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing well.

Because they keep on grumbling against five or ten States, they fail to concentrate all the forces of our national will and our physical strength for a blow at the heart of our most bitter enemy and in this way they sacrifice the possibility of securing an alliance which would reinforce our strength for that decisive conflict.

Here, too, there is a mission for National Socialism to fulfil. It must teach our people not to fix their attention on the little things, but rather on major issues, not to exhaust their energies on questions of secondary importance and not to forget that the object for which we have to fight to-day is the bare existence of our people and that the sole enemy at whom we must strike, is the Power which is robbing us of that existence.

It may be that we shall have to swallow many a bitter pill, but this is by no means an excuse for refusing to listen to reason or for raising a stupid and useless outcry against the rest of the world, instead of concentrating all our forces against our most deadly enemy.

Moreover, the German people will have no moral right to complain of the manner in which the rest of the world acts towards them, as long as they themselves have not called to account those criminals who sold and betrayed their country.

We are not acting sincerely if we indulge in long-range abuse and protests against Britain and Italy and then allow those scoundrels to go scot-free, who, acting in the pay of the enemy, wrested the weapons out of our hands, broke the backbone of our resistance and bartered away the paralysed Reich for thirty pieces of silver.

Our enemies are acting in the only way in which they could be expected to act, and we ought to learn a lesson from their behaviour.

Anyone who cannot rise to the level of this outlook must reflect that otherwise there would be nothing for us to do except to resign ourselves to our lot, since a policy of alliances would be impossible for all time. For if we cannot form an alliance with Britain because she has robbed us of our colonies, or with Italy because she has taken possession of South Tyrol, or with Poland or Czechoslovakia, then there remains no other possibility of an alliance in Europe except with France which, *inter alia*, has robbed us of Alsace and Lorraine.

There can scarcely be any doubt as to whether this last alternative would be advantageous to the German people; the only matter for doubt is whether he who upholds such opinions is merely a simpleton or an astute rogue.

As far as the leaders are concerned, I think the latter hypothesis is true.

A change in public feeling among those nations which have hitherto been enemies and whose true interests will, in the future, coincide with ours could be effected, as far as one can foresee, if the internal strength of our State and our manifest determination to secure our own existence made it clear that we should prove valuable allies.

Moreover, it is essential that incompetence or even criminal bungling should not furnish grounds which may be utilised for purposes of propaganda

by those who would oppose our projects for establishing an alliance with one or other of our former enemies.

The answer to the third question is the most difficult. Is it conceivable that those who represent the true interests of those nations which may possibly form an alliance with us could put their views into practice against the will of the Jew, who is the mortal enemy of national and independent States?

For instance, could the motive forces of Great Britain's traditional statesmanship smash the disastrous influence of the Jew, or could they not?

This question, as I have already said, is very difficult to answer. The answer depends on so many factors that it is impossible to form a conclusive judgment. One thing, at least, is certain: There is, at the present time, one State in which the regime is so firmly established and so absolutely at the service of the country's interests that the forces of international Jewry could not possibly organise a real and effective obstruction of measures considered to be politically necessary.

The fight which Fascist Italy waged against Jewry's three principal weapons, even if it be to a great extent subconscious (though I do not believe this myself), furnishes the best proof that the poison-fangs of that power which transcends all State boundaries are being drawn, even though in an indirect way.

The prohibition of freemasonry and secret societies, the suppression of the international press and the definite abolition of Marxism, together with the steadily increasing consolidation of the Fascist concept of the State—all this will enable the Italian Government, in the course of years, to advance more and more the interests of the Italian people without paying any attention to the hissing of the Jewish world-hydra.

The situation in Britain is not so favourable. In that country of 'freest democracy' it is the Jew who, even to-day, can impose his will practically without let or hindrance, through his hold on public opinion.

And yet there is a perpetual struggle in Britain between those who are entrusted with the defence of state interests and the protagonists of Jewish world-dictatorship.

To what extent these two tendencies run counter to one another became obvious for the first time when, after the War, British statesmen adopted one

attitude with regard to the Japanese problem, while the press took up a different one.

Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the old mutual antipathy between America and Japan began to reappear.

Naturally, the great European Powers could not remain indifferent to this new war menace. In Britain, despite the ties of kinship, there was a certain amount of jealousy and anxiety over the growing importance of the United States in all spheres of international economics and politics.

What was formerly a colonial territory, the daughter of a great mother, seemed about to become the new mistress of the world.

It is quite understandable that to-day Britain should re-examine her old alliances and that British statesmen should look anxiously ahead to a day when the cry will no longer be, 'Britannia rules the waves', but rather, 'The seas belong to the United States.'

The gigantic North American State, with the enormous resources of its virgin soil, is much more invulnerable than the encircled German Reich.

Should a day come when the fate of the nations will have to be decided, Britain would be doomed, if she stood alone. Therefore she eagerly reaches out her hand to a yellow race and enters upon an alliance which, from the racial point of view is perhaps unpardonable; but from the political standpoint it represents the sole possibility of reinforcing Britain's world position in face of the tremendous developments taking place on the American continent.

Thus, despite the fact that Britain and America fought side by side on the battlefields of Europe, the British Government could not decide to break off the alliance with their Asiatic partner, yet the whole Jewish press opposed the idea of a Japanese alliance.

How can we explain the fact that up to 1918, the Jewish press championed the policy of the British Government against the German Reich and then suddenly veered round and began to go its own way.

It was not in the interests of Great Britain to have Germany annihilated, but primarily a Jewish interest, and to-day the destruction of Japan would serve British political interests less than it would serve the far-reaching intentions of those who are leading the movement that hopes to establish a

Jewish world-empire.

While Britain is making every effort to maintain her position in the world, the Jew is laying his plans for its conquest. He already sees the present European States as pliant instruments in his hands, whether indirectly through the power of so-called Western Democracy or in the form of direct domination through Russian Bolshevism.

But it is not only the Old World that he holds in his snare; alike fate threatens the New World. Jews control the financial forces of America on the Stock Exchange.

Year after year the Jew increases his hold on labour in a nation of one hundred and twenty million souls, but a very small section still remains quite independent and is thus a cause of chagrin to the Jew.

The Jews show consummate skill in manipulating public opinion and forge from it a weapon to be wielded in the struggle for their own future.

The great leaders of Jewry are confident that the day is near at hand when the promise given in the Old Testament will be fulfilled and the Jews will rule the other nations of the earth.

Among this great mass of de-nationalised countries which have become Jewish colonies one independent State could bring about the ruin of the whole structure at the last moment, the reason being that Bolshevism as a world-system cannot continue to exist unless it encompasses the whole earth.

Should one State alone preserve its national strength and its national greatness the empire of the Jewish satraps, like every other form of tyranny, would succumb to the force of the national idea.

As a result of his millennial experience in accommodating himself to surrounding circumstances, the Jew knows very well that he can undermine the existence of European nations by a process of racial bastardisation, but that he could hardly do the same to an Asiatic national State like Japan.

To-day he can ape the ways of the German and the Englishman, the American and the Frenchman, but he has no means of approach to the yellow Asiatic.

Therefore, he seeks to destroy the Japanese national State by using other

national States as his instruments, so that he may rid himself of a dangerous opponent before he takes over supreme control of the last existing national State and transforms that control into a tyranny for the oppression of the defenceless.

He does not want to have a national Japanese State in existence when he founds his millennial Jewish empire of the future and therefore he wants to destroy the former before establishing his own dictatorship.

That is why he is busy to-day stirring up antipathy towards Japan among the other nations, as he once stirred it up against Germany.

Thus it may happen that even while British statesmanship is still endeavouring to base its policy on an alliance with Japan, the Anglo-Jewish press is clamouring for war against the prospective ally and, to the accompaniment of the slogans, 'Democracy!' and 'Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!' actually preparing for a way of annihilation.

Thus, in Britain to-day the Jew is becoming refractory and so the struggle against the Jewish world-menace is bound to commence there, too.

In this field, too, the National Socialist Movement has a tremendous task before it. It must open the eyes of our people in regard to foreign nations and it must continually remind them of the real enemy who menaces the world to-day.

Instead of preaching hatred against Aryans from whom we may be separated on almost every other count, but with whom the bond of kindred blood and the main features of a common civilisation unite us, we must arouse general indignation against the malevolent enemy of humanity and the real author of all our sufferings.

The National Socialist Movement must see to it that at least in our own country the mortal enemy is recognised and that the fight against him may be the beacon-light of a happier era, and show other nations, too, the way of salvation for struggling Aryan humanity.

Moreover, may reason be our guide and our strength be in our indomitable will. May the sacred duty of acting thus grant us perseverance and our faith prove our supreme protection.

