MISP OPEN SOURCE THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND SHARING PLAFORM

MILITARY USE CASES

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MISP PROJECT https://www.misp-project.org/



MISP AND STARTING FROM A PRACTICAL USE-CASE

- In 2012, during a malware analysis workgroup, we realized that multiple analysts were working independently on the same malware.
- To streamline our efforts and avoid redundancy, we sought a method for easy and automated information sharing.
- Christophe Vandeplas, then employed at the Belgian Ministry of Defense, presented his preliminary work on what would eventually evolve into the MISP platform.
- An initial version of the MISP platform was adopted by the MALWG, and the valuable feedback from users fueled further development and enhancements.
- Today, MISP has grown into a platform driven by **community development**.

ABOUT CIRCL

The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic response facility to computer security threats and incidents. CIRCL is the CERT for the private sector, communes and non-governmental entities in Luxembourg and is operated by securitymadein.lu g.i.e.

MISP AND CIRCL

- CIRCL is mandated by the Ministry of Economy and acting as the Luxembourg National CERT for private sector (under the NIS directive).
- CIRCL leads the development of the Open Source MISP threat intelligence platform which is used by many military or intelligence communities, private companies, financial sector, National CERTs and LEAs globally.
- CIRCL runs multiple large MISP communities performing active daily threat-intelligence sharing.



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
WHAT IS MISP?

- MISP is a **threat information sharing** platform that is free & open source software
- A tool that **collects** information from partners, your analysts, vour tools, feeds
- Normalises, correlates, enriches the data
- Allows teams and communities to collaborate
- **Feeds** automated protective tools and analyst tools with the output

DEVELOPMENT BASED ON PRACTICAL USER FEEDBACK

- There are many different types of users of an information sharing platform like MISP:
 - ► Malware reversers willing to share indicators of analysis with respective colleagues.
 - Security analysts searching, validating and using indicators in operational security.
 - Intelligence analysts gathering information about specific adversary groups.
 - ► Law-enforcement relying on indicators to support or bootstrap their DFIR cases.
 - Risk analysis teams willing to know about the new threats, likelyhood and occurences.
 - ► Fraud analysts willing to share financial indicators to detect financial frauds.

MISP MODEL OF GOVERNANCE



MANY OBJECTIVES FROM DIFFERENT USER-GROUPS


- Sharing indicators/selectors for a **detection** matter.
 - 'Do I have infected systems in my infrastructure or the ones I operate?'
- Sharing indicators to **block**.
 - ▶ 'I use these attributes to block, sinkhole or divert traffic.'
- Sharing indicators to **perform intelligence**.
 - ► 'Gathering information about campaigns and attacks. Are they related? Who is targeting me? Who are the adversaries?'
- → These objectives can be conflicting (e.g. False-positives have different impacts)

COMMUNITIES USING MISP

- Communities are groups of users sharing within a set of common objectives/values.
- CIRCL operates multiple MISP instances with a significant user base (more than 1200 organizations with more than 4000 users).
- **Trusted groups** running MISP communities in island mode (air gapped system) or partially connected mode.
- **Financial sector** (banks, ISACs, payment processing organizations) use MISP as a sharing mechanism.
- Military and international organizations (NATO, military CSIRTs, n/g CERTs,...).
- **Security vendors** running their own communities (e.g. Fidelis) or interfacing with MISP communities (e.g. OTX).
- **Topical communities** set up to tackle individual specific issues (COVID-19 MISP)

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MISP PROJECT OVERVIEW



SHARING IN MISP

- Sharing via distribution lists Sharing groups
- **Delegation** for pseudo-anonymised information sharing
- Proposals and Extended events for collaborated information sharing
- Synchronisation, Feed system, air-gapped sharing
- User defined **filtered sharing** for all the above mentioned methods
- Cross-instance information caching for quick lookups of large data-sets
- Support for multi-MISP internal enclaves

INFORMATION QUALITY MANAGEMENT

- Correlating data
- Feedback loop from detections via **Sightings**
- False positive management via the warninglist system
- Enrichment system via MISP-modules
- workflow system to review and control information publication
- Integrations with a plethora of tools and formats
- Flexible API and support libraries such as PyMISP to ease integration
- **Timelines** and giving information a temporal context
- Full chain for indicator life-cycle management

CONCLUSION

- Information sharing practices come from usage and by example (e.g. learning by imitation from the shared information).
- MISP is just a tool. What matters is your sharing practices. The tool should be as transparent as possible to support you.
- Enable users to customize MISP to meet their community's use-cases.
- MISP project combines open source software, open standards, best practices and communities to make information sharing a reality.