

INTRODUCTION TO MISP AND ISACs

THE IMPORTANCE OF SHARING COMMUNITIES

TEAM CIRCL
TLP:CLEAR

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MISP
Threat Sharing

- CIRCL, MISP and ISACs
- Motivations for sharing communities
- How to get going?
- Managing information sharing communities
- The importance of contextualisation
- False-positive handling
- Features for analysts

CIRCL, MISP AND ISACs

- CIRCL is mandated by the Ministry of Economy and acting as the Luxembourg National CERT for private sector
- **CIRCL leads the development** of the Open Source MISP threat intelligence platform which is used by many military or intelligence communities, private companies, financial sector, National CERTs and LEAs globally
- **CIRCL runs multiple large MISP communities performing active daily threat-intelligence sharing**
- We use MISP as an **internal tool** to cover various day-to-day activities
- Whilst being the main driving force behind the development, we're also one of the largest consumers

■ Private sector community

- ▶ Our largest sharing community
- ▶ Over **1900 organisations**
- ▶ Over **4800 users**
- ▶ Functions as a central hub for a lot of sharing communities
- ▶ Private organisations, Researchers, Various SoCs, some CSIRTs, etc

■ CSIRT community

- ▶ Tighter community
- ▶ National CSIRTs, connections to international organisations, etc

■ Financial sector community

- ▶ Banks, payment processors, etc.
- ▶ Sharing of **mule accounts** and **non-cyber threat information**

- ISACs / specialised community MISPs
 - ▶ Topical or community specific instances hosted or co-managed by CIRCL
 - ▶ Examples, CIISI, GSMA, FIRST.org, CSIRT network, etc
 - ▶ Often come with their **own taxonomies and domain specific object definitions**
- Various ad-hoc communities for exercises
 - ▶ The ENISA exercise
 - ▶ Locked Shields exercise

WHY CREATING A SHARING COMMUNITY?

- There are many different types of users of an information sharing platform like MISP:
 - ▶ **Malware reversers** willing to share indicators of analysis with respective colleagues
 - ▶ **Security analysts** searching, validating and using indicators in operational security
 - ▶ **Intelligence analysts** gathering information about specific adversary groups
 - ▶ **Law-enforcement** relying on indicators to support or bootstrap their DFIR cases
 - ▶ **Risk analysis teams** willing to know about the new threats, likelihood and occurrences
 - ▶ **Fraud analysts** willing to share financial indicators to detect financial frauds

USUAL SHARING SCENARIOS FOR ISACs

- Exchange of **IOCs** and **TTPs**
- Sharing the outcomes of **incidents**
- Information on the **attackers, techniques used**
- **Remediation** information / **prevention** information
- **Vulnerability** pre-disclosure
- Supporting **tools** / **scripts**

EXAMPLES OF SHARING SCENARIOS FOR SECTORIAL ISACs

- **Financial fraud** information sharing
- **Law enforcement** / Border control specific sharing
- **Disinformation** sharing
- **Health** related information sharing
- **Telecommunication** threat sharing

OBJECTIVES CAN BE MIXED

- Different use-cases have conflicting requirements for the data shared
 - ▶ **False positive** appetite
 - ▶ **Capability/Maturity** levels
 - ▶ **Topical** interests
 - ▶ **Detection rules** vs **threat intel** vs **remediation/prevention** support

RECONCILING THE DIFFERENT USE-CASES

- For inclusiveness, be lenient with what you allow
- Make **contextualisation** a requirement
- Users can then **filter** based on their needs
- Encourage the sharing of **supporting materials, scripts, guidance**
- Raise awareness about the benefits of well modelled, graph based information sharing

- Getting your community to be active takes **time and effort**, but with persistence your chances are great
- We generally all **end up sharing with peers that face similar threats**
- Division is either **sectorial or geographical**
- So why even bother with trying to bridge these communities?

ADVANTAGES OF CROSS SECTORIAL SHARING

- **Reuse of TTPs** across sectors
- Being hit by something that **another sector has faced before**
- **Hybrid threats** - how seemingly unrelated things may be interesting to correlate
- Prepare other communities for the capability and **culture of sharing** for when the need arises for them to reach out to CSIRT
- Generally our field is ahead of several other sectors when it comes to information sharing, might as well **spread the love**



HOW TO GET GOING WITH YOUR SHARING COMMUNITY?

GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

- When you are starting out - you are in a unique position to drive the community and set best practices...



GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

- Starting a sharing community is **both easy and difficult** at the same time
- Many moving parts and most importantly, you'll be dealing with a **diverse group of people**
- Understanding and working with your constituents to help them face their challenges is key

RUNNING A SHARING COMMUNITY USING MISP - HOW TO GET GOING?

■ Planning ahead for future growth

- ▶ Estimating requirements
- ▶ Deciding early on common vocabularies
- ▶ Offering services through MISP

■ Different models for constituents

- ▶ **Connecting to** a MISP instance hosted by the ISAC
- ▶ **Hosting** their own instance and connecting to ISAC's MISP
- ▶ **Becoming member** of a sectorial MISP community that is connected to ISAC's community

RELY ON OUR INSTINCTS TO IMITATE OVER EXPECTING ADHERENCE TO RULES

- **Lead by example** - the power of imitation
- Encourage **improving by doing** instead of blocking sharing with unrealistic quality controls
 - ▶ What should the information look like?
 - ▶ How should it be contextualised?
 - ▶ What do you consider as useful information?
 - ▶ What tools did you use to get your conclusions?
 - ▶ How the information could be used by the ISAC members?
- Side effect is that you will end up **raising the capabilities of your constituents**

MANAGING YOUR SHARING COMMUNITY

WHAT COUNTS AS VALUABLE DATA?

- Sharing comes in many shapes and sizes
 - ▶ Sharing results / reports is the classical example
 - ▶ Sighting of indicators
 - ▶ Sharing enhancements to existing data
 - ▶ Validating data / flagging false positives
 - ▶ Asking for support from the community
- **Embrace all of them.** Even the ones that don't make sense right now, you never know when they come handy...

HOW TO DEAL WITH ORGANISATIONS THAT ONLY "LEECH"?

- From our own communities, only about **30%** of the organisations **actively share data**
- We have come across some communities with sharing requirements
- In our experience, this sets you up for failure because:
 - ▶ Organisations that want to stay above the thresholds will start sharing junk / fake data
 - ▶ Organisations losing access are the ones who would possibly benefit the most from it
 - ▶ You lose organisations that might turn into valuable contributors in the future
- Constituents have access to and can **use the data**

SO HOW DOES ONE CONVERT THE PASSIVE ORGANISATIONS INTO ACTIVELY SHARING ONES?

- Rely on **organic growth**
- **Help** them increase their capabilities
- As mentioned before, lead by example
- Rely on the inherent value to one's self when sharing information (validation, enrichments, correlations)
- **Give credit** where credit is due, never steal the contributions of your community (that is incredibly demotivating)

DISPELLING THE MYTHS AROUND BLOCKERS WHEN IT COMES TO INFORMATION SHARING

- Sharing difficulties are not really technical issues but often it's a matter of **social interactions** (e.g. **trust**)
 - ▶ You can play a role here: organise regular workshops, conferences, have face to face meetings
- Practical restrictions
 - ▶ "We don't have information to share."
 - ▶ "We don't have time to process or contribute indicators."
 - ▶ "Our model of classification doesn't fit your model."
 - ▶ "Tools for sharing information are tied to a specific format, we use a different one."
- Legal restrictions
 - ▶ "Our legal framework doesn't allow us to share information."
 - ▶ "Risk of information leak is too high and it's too risky for our organization or partners."

A QUICK NOTE ON COMPLIANCE...

- MISP project collaborated with legal advisory services
 - ▶ Information sharing and cooperation **enabled by GDPR**
 - ▶ **ISO/IEC 27010:2015** - Information security management for inter-sector and inter-organizational communications
 - ▶ How MISP enables stakeholders identified by the **NISD** to perform key activities
 - ▶ Guidelines to setting up an information sharing community such as an ISAC or ISAO
- For more information:
<https://www.misp-project.org/compliance/>

THE TOUGH CHOICE OF SEPARATING A COMMUNITY

- Often within a community **smaller bubbles of information sharing will form**
- For example: Within a national private sector sharing community, specific community for financial institutions
- Sharing groups serve this purpose mainly
- As an ISAC running a national community, consider bootstrapping these sharing communities
- Organisations can of course self-organise, but you are the ones with the know-how to get them started

- Consider compartmentalisation - does it make sense to move a secret squirrel club to their own sharing hub to avoid accidental leaks?
- Use your **best judgement** to decide which communities should be separated from one another
- Create sharing hubs with **manual data transfer** if needed
- Some organisations will even have their data air-gapped - Feed system
- **Create guidance** on what should be shared outside of their bubbles - organisations often lack the insight / experience to decide how to get going. Take the initiative!

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUALISATION

- Sharing **technical information** is a **great start**
- However, to truly create valuable information for your community, always consider the context:
 - ▶ Your IDS might not care why it should alert on a rule
 - ▶ But your analysts will be interested in the threat landscape and the "big picture"
- Classify data to make sure your partners understand why it is **important for you**, so they can see why it could be **useful to them**
- Massively important once an organisation has the maturity to filter the most critical **subsets of information for their own defense**

- MISP has a verify **versatile system** (taxonomies) for classifying and marking data
- However, this includes different vocabularies with obvious overlaps
- MISP allows you to **pick and choose vocabularies** to use and enforce in a community
- Good idea to start with this process early
- If you don't find what you're looking for:
 - ▶ Create your own (JSON format, no coding skills required)
 - ▶ If it makes sense, share it with us via a pull request for redistribution

SHARED LIBRARIES OF META-INFORMATION (GALAXIES)

- The MISPPProject in co-operation with partners provides a **curated list of galaxy information**
- Can include information packages of different types, for example:
 - ▶ Threat actor information
 - ▶ Specialised information such as Ransomware, Exploit kits, etc
 - ▶ Methodology information such as preventative actions
 - ▶ Classification systems for methodologies used by adversaries
 - ATT&CK
- Consider improving the default libraries or contributing your own (simple JSON format)
- If there is something you cannot share, run your own galaxies and **share it out of bound** with partners
- Pull requests are always welcome

FALSE-POSITIVE HANDLING

MANY OBJECTIVES FROM DIFFERENT USER-GROUPS

- Sharing indicators for a **detection** matter
 - ▶ 'Do I have infected systems in my infrastructure or the ones I operate?'
- Sharing indicators to **block**
 - ▶ 'I use these attributes to block, sinkhole or divert traffic'
- Sharing indicators to **perform intelligence**
 - ▶ 'Gathering information about campaigns and attacks. Are they related? Who is targeting me? Who are the adversaries?'
- → These objectives can be conflicting (e.g. False-positives have different impacts)

- You might often fall into the trap of discarding seemingly "junk" data
- Besides volume limitations (which are absolutely valid, fear of false-positives is the most common reason why people discard data) - Our recommendation:
 - ▶ Be lenient when considering what to keep
 - ▶ Be strict when you are feeding tools
- MISP allows you to **filter out the relevant data on demand** when feeding protective tools
- What may seem like **junk to you may** be absolutely **critical to other users**

- **Analysts** will often be interested in the **modus operandi** of threat actors over **long periods of time**
- Even cleaned up infected hosts might become interesting again (embedded in code, recurring reuse)
- Use the tools provided to eliminate obvious false positives instead and limit your data-set to the most relevant sets


Warning: Potential false positives

List of known IPv4 public DNS resolvers

INTERESTING VISUAL FEATURES FOR ANALYSTS


MISP FEATURE - CORRELATION

- MISP includes a **powerful engine for correlation** which allows analysts to discover correlating values between attributes
- Getting a direct benefit from shared information by other ISAC members



MISP FEATURE - EVENT GRAPH

- **Analysts can create stories** based on graph relationships between objects, attributes
- ISACs users can directly understand the information shared



CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION AND ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

- MISP is a complete and advanced tool ...
- ... but also **just one part of the puzzle** in any sharing community
- Information sharing presumes knowledge of **contacts**
- Member to Member direct **exchanges between MISPs and other tools** requires some know how
- Creating reusable community-specific **distribution lists** need to be maintained
- Maintaining common **community specific information knowledgebases** can be challenging
- **Fleet management** for larger organisations needs additional work

GET IN TOUCH IF YOU NEED SOME HELP TO GET STARTED

- Getting started with building a new community can be daunting. Feel free to get in touch with us if you have any questions!
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- <https://www.circl.lu/>
- <https://github.com/MISP>
<https://gitter.im/MISP/MISP>
<https://twitter.com/MISPProject>