

# BTI Codebook for Stata

Country ratings are based on 49 questions that require numerical rating. The rating scale for each question ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst). Exempt are questions 13.1, 13.2 and 13.3 in the criterion 13 (Level of difficulty), which range from 10 (worst) to 1 (best).

Four response options relate to the scoring levels of 10 – 7 – 4 – 1, each of which describes an empirical assessment that corresponds to a respective rating.

country	Country
(categorical)	
<b>unique values:</b>	137
<b>notes:</b>	<p>The set of countries surveyed by the BTI has expanded from its original 119 (2006<sup>1</sup>) to 125 (2008), to 128 (2010, 2012), to 129 ( 2014) to its current 137 (since BTI 2020).</p> <p>The following countries were added<sup>2</sup>:</p> <p>2008: Bhutan, Republic of the Congo, Kuwait, Mauritania, Montenegro and Oman</p> <p>2010: Qatar, Kosovo and Lesotho</p> <p>2014: South Sudan<sup>2</sup></p> <p>2020: Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste and Trinidad and Tobago</p>

<sup>1</sup> For the BTI 2006 there are no country ratings on Governance for Iraq.

<sup>2</sup> In three instances, the survey sample grew as a result of state partitions: first Montenegro and then Kosovo split from Serbia, as did South Sudan from Sudan. Time-series data for Serbia and Sudan are available beginning with the year 2006, whereas time-series data for Kosovo, Montenegro and South Sudan are available beginning with the year each of these countries entered the BTI sample as a sovereign state.

country_code	Country Code
(categorical)	
<b>unique values:</b>	129
<b>notes:</b>	Three digit ISO Code

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<b>year</b>	<b>Year</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>unique values:</b>	8
<b>scale:</b>	2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
<b>region</b>	<b>Region</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>unique values:</b>	7
<b>scale:</b>	1= East Central and Southeast Europe 2= Latin America and the Caribbean 3= West and Central Africa 4= Middle East and North Africa 5= Southern and Eastern Africa 6= Post-Soviet Eurasia 7= Asia and Oceania
<b>rank_stat_ind</b>	<b>Ranking Status Index</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>unique values:</b>	Depending on the respective BTI sample size.
<b>notes:</b>	The Status Index ranks the countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy.
<b>stat_ind</b>	<b>Status Index</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
	see cat_stat_ind
	1 – 3.99 Failed
	4 – 5.49 Very limited
	5.5 – 6.99 Limited
	7 – 8.49 Advanced
	8.5 – 10 Highly advanced

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<b>rank_dem_stat</b>	Ranking Democracy Status
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>unique values:</b>	Depending on the respective BTI sample size.
<b>notes:</b>	The Democracy Status Index ranks the countries according to the state of their democracy. The state of democracy is measured in terms of five criteria, which in turn are derived from assessments made in response to 18 questions.

<b>dem_stat</b>	<b>Democracy Status</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see cat_dem_stat 1 – 3.99 Hard-line autocracies 4 – 10 Moderate autocracies
	autocracies
	1 – 5.99 Highly defective democracies
	6 – 7.99 Defective democracies
	8 - 10 Democracies in consolidation
	For threshold values for autocracy and democracy see pol_sys.

<b>stateness</b>	<b>Q1 Stateness</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.01
<b>notes:</b>	see stateness_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent

<b>monopoly</b> <i>(numeric)</i>	<b>Q1.1 Monopoly on the use of force</b>
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      There is no state monopoly on the use of force. 2 3 4      The state's monopoly on the use of force is established only in key parts of the country. Large areas of the country are controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries or clans. 5 6 7      The state's monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but it is challenged by guerrillas, mafias or clans in territorial enclaves. 8 9 10     There is no competition with the state's monopoly on the use of force throughout the entire territory.
<b>identity</b> <i>(numeric)</i>	<b>Q1.2 State identity</b>
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The legitimacy of the nation-state is questioned fundamentally. Different population groups compete for hegemony and deny citizenship to others. 2 3 4      The legitimacy of the nation-state is frequently challenged. Significant aspects of citizenship are withheld from entire population groups. 5 6 7      The legitimacy of the nation-state is rarely questioned. Some groups are denied full citizenship rights. 8 9 10     The large majority of the population accepts the nation-state as legitimate. All individuals and groups enjoy the right to acquire citizenship without discrimination.

<b>no_dogmas</b>	<b>Q1.3 No interference of religious dogmas</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The state is theocratic. Religious dogmas define legal order and political institutions. 2 3 4      Secular and religious norms are in conflict about the basic constitution of the state or are forming a hybrid system. 5 6 7      The state is largely secular. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions. 8 9 10     The state is secular. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on legal order or political institutions.
 <b>admin</b>	 <b>Q1.4 Basic administration</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The administrative structures of the state are limited to keeping the peace and maintaining law and order. Their territorial scope is very limited, and broad segments of the population are not covered. 2 3 4      The administrative structures of the state are extending beyond maintaining law and order, but their territorial scope and effectiveness are limited. 5 6 7      The administrative structures of the state provide most basic public services throughout the country, but their operation is to some extent deficient. 8 9 10     The state has a differentiated administrative structure throughout the country which provides all basic public services.

<b>pol_part</b>	<b>Q2 Political Participation</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.01
<b>notes:</b>	see pol_part_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent
 <b>elect</b>	 <b>Q2.1 Free and fair elections</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1 National elections, if held at all, are entirely unfree and unfair. 2 3 4 General elections are held, but serious irregularities during voting process and ballot count occur. The rights to vote, campaign and run for office are restricted, and elections have de facto only limited influence over who governs. 5 6 7 General, multi-party elections are held, conducted properly and accepted as the means of filling political posts. However, there are some constraints on the fairness of the elections with regard to registration, campaigning or media access. 8 9 10 There are no constraints on free and fair elections.

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<b>power</b>	<b>Q2.2 Effective power to govern</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Political decision-makers are not elected. Or: Elected bodies have no influence at all. 2 3 4      Democratically elected political representatives have limited power to govern. Strong veto groups are able to undermine fundamental elements of democratic procedures. 5 6 7      Democratically elected political representatives have considerable power to govern. However, individual power groups can set their own domains apart or enforce special-interest policies. 8 9 10     Democratically elected political representatives have the effective power to govern. No individual or group is holding any de facto veto power.
<b>assembly</b>	<b>Q2.3 Association / assembly rights</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Association and assembly rights are denied. Independent civic groups do not exist or are prohibited. 2 3 4      Association and assembly rights are often subject to interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups that do not support the government often cannot exercise these rights. 5 6 7      Association and assembly rights are occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but generally there are no outright prohibitions of independent political or civic groups. 8 9 10     Association and assembly rights are guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups can fully exercise these rights.

<b>express</b>	<b>Q2.4 Freedom of expression</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Freedom of expression is denied. Independent media do not exist or are prohibited. 2 3 4      Freedom of expression is often subject to interference or government restrictions. Distortion and manipulation shape matters of public debate. 5 6 7      Freedom of expression is occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but there are generally no incidents of blatant intrusions like outright state censorship or media shutdowns. 8 9 10     Freedom of expression is guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Individuals, groups and the press can fully exercise these rights.

<b>ruleoflaw</b>	<b>Q3 Rule of Law</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.01
<b>notes:</b>	see ruleoflaw_cat 1 – 2.49    Poor 2.5 – 4.49    Flawed 4.5 – 6.49    Fair 6.5 – 8.49    Sound 8.5 – 10    Excellent

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<b>separation</b>	<b>Q3.1 Separation of powers</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 There is no separation of powers, neither de jure nor de facto.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 The separation of powers is formally established but weak in practice. One branch, generally the executive, has largely undermined checks and balances.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 The separation of powers is in place and functioning. Checks and balances are occasionally subject to interference, but a restoration of balance is sought.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 There is a clear separation of powers with mutual checks and balances.</p>
<b>judiciary</b>	<b>Q3.2 Independent judiciary</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 The judiciary is not independent and not institutionally differentiated.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 The independence of the judiciary is heavily impaired by political authorities and high levels of corruption. It is to some extent institutionally differentiated, but severely restricted by functional deficits, insufficient territorial operability and scarce resources.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 The judiciary is largely independent, even though occasionally its decisions are subordinated to political authorities or influenced by corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, but partially restricted by insufficient territorial or functional operability.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 The judiciary is independent and free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, and there are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.</p>

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<b>prosecution</b>	<b>Q3.3 Prosecution of office abuse</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption can do so without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are not adequately prosecuted, but occasionally attract adverse publicity.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption generally are prosecuted under established laws and often attract adverse publicity, but occasionally slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under established laws and always attract adverse publicity.</p>
<b>civ_rights</b>	<b>Q3.4 Civil rights</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 Civil rights are systematically violated. There are no mechanisms and institutions to protect residents against violations of their rights.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Civil rights are codified by law, but even the most fundamental rights (i.e., to life, liberty and physical integrity) are violated in practice. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are largely ineffective.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Civil rights are codified by law, but are not properly respected and protected. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are in place, but are not consistently effective.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Civil rights are codified by law and respected by all state institutions, which actively prevent discrimination. Residents are effectively protected by mechanisms and institutions established to prosecute, punish and redress violations of their rights.</p>

<b>stab_dem</b>	<b>Q4 Stability of Democratic Institutions</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.1
<b>notes:</b>	see stab_dem_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent
 <b>perf_dem</b>	 <b>Q4.1 Performance of democratic institutions</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1 There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). 2 3 4 Democratic institutions exist, but they are unstable and ineffective. 5 6 7 Democratic institutions perform their functions in principle, but often are inefficient due to friction between institutions. 8 9 10 The ensemble of democratic institutions is effective and efficient. As a rule, political decisions are prepared, made, implemented and reviewed in legitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities.

<b>com_dem</b>	<b>Q4.2 Commitment to democratic institutions</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime).
	2
	3
	4      Only individual institutions are accepted, while influential actors hold vetoes. Acceptance remains unstable over time.
	5
	6
	7      Most democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by most relevant actors.
	8
	9
	10     All democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by all relevant actors.
 <b>integ</b>	 <b>Q5 Political and Social Integration</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see integ_cat
	1 – 2.49   Poor
	2.5 – 4.49   Flawed
	4.5 – 6.49   Fair
	6.5 – 8.49   Sound
	8.5 – 10   Excellent

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<b>part_sys</b>	<b>Q5.1 Party system</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      There is no party system to articulate and aggregate societal interest.
	2
	3
	4      The party system is unstable with shallow roots in society: high fragmentation, high voter volatility and high polarization.
	5
	6
	7      The party system is fairly stable and socially rooted: moderate fragmentation, moderate voter volatility and moderate polarization.
	8
	9
	10     The party system is stable and socially rooted: it is able to articulate and aggregate societal interest with low fragmentation, low voter volatility and low polarization.
<b>int_group</b>	<b>Q5.2 Interest groups</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, are on the whole poorly balanced and cooperate little. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented.
	2
	3
	4      There is a narrow range of interest groups, in which important social interests are underrepresented. Only a few players dominate, and there is a risk of polarization.
	5
	6
	7      There is an average range of interest groups, which reflect most social interests. However, a few strong interests dominate, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts.
	8
	9
	10     There is a broad range of interest groups that reflect competing social interests, tend to balance one another and are cooperative.

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<b>approv_dem</b>	<b>Q5.3 Approval of democracy</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>range:</b>	1 - 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>notes:</b>	<p>1 Approval of democratic norms and procedures is very low.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Approval of democratic norms and procedures is fairly low.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Approval of democratic norms and procedures is fairly high.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Approval of democratic norms and procedures is very high.</p> <p>n/a No survey data available. And/or: Authoritarian regime.</p> <p>.</p>
<b>soc_cap</b>	<b>Q5.4 Social capital</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 There is a very low level of trust among the population, and civic self-organization is rudimentary.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 There is a fairly low level of trust among the population. The small number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations is unevenly distributed or spontaneous and temporary.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 There is a fairly high level of trust among the population and a substantial number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 There is a very high level of trust among the population and a large number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations.</p>

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<b>rank_econ_stat</b>	Ranking Economy Status										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>unique values:</b>	Depending on the respective BTI sample size.										
<b>units:</b>	1										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>The Economy Status Index ranks the countries according to the state of their market economy.</p> <p>The state of the economy is measured in terms of seven criteria, which are based on a total of 14 indicators.</p>										
<b>econ_stat</b>	<b>Economy Status</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10										
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see cat_econ_stat</p> <table> <tr><td>1 – 2.99</td><td>Rudimentary</td></tr> <tr><td>3 – 4.99</td><td>Very limited</td></tr> <tr><td>5 – 6.99</td><td>Limited</td></tr> <tr><td>7 – 7.99</td><td>Advanced</td></tr> <tr><td>8 – 10</td><td>Highly advanced</td></tr> </table>	1 – 2.99	Rudimentary	3 – 4.99	Very limited	5 – 6.99	Limited	7 – 7.99	Advanced	8 – 10	Highly advanced
1 – 2.99	Rudimentary										
3 – 4.99	Very limited										
5 – 6.99	Limited										
7 – 7.99	Advanced										
8 – 10	Highly advanced										
<b>level_development</b>	<b>Q6 Level of Socioeconomic Development</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10										
<b>units:</b>	1										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see level_development_cat</p> <table> <tr><td>1 – 2</td><td>Poor</td></tr> <tr><td>3 – 4</td><td>Flawed</td></tr> <tr><td>5 – 6</td><td>Fair</td></tr> <tr><td>7 – 8</td><td>Sound</td></tr> <tr><td>9 – 10</td><td>Excellent</td></tr> </table>	1 – 2	Poor	3 – 4	Flawed	5 – 6	Fair	7 – 8	Sound	9 – 10	Excellent
1 – 2	Poor										
3 – 4	Flawed										
5 – 6	Fair										
7 – 8	Sound										
9 – 10	Excellent										

<b>barriers</b>	<b>Q6.1 Socioeconomic barriers</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Poverty and inequality are extensive and structurally ingrained. 2 3 4      Poverty and inequality are pronounced and partly structurally ingrained. 5 6 7      Poverty and inequality are limited and barely structurally ingrained. 8 9 10     Poverty and inequality are minor and not structurally ingrained.
 <b>market</b>	<b>Q7 Organization of the Market and Competition</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.01
<b>notes:</b>	see market_cat 1 – 2.49    Poor 2.5 – 4.49   Flawed 4.5 – 6.49   Fair 6.5 – 8.49   Sound 8.5 – 10    Excellent

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<b>compet</b>	<b>Q7.1 Market-based competition</b> Im Excel-File heißt diese Variable “Market organization”
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 Market competition is present only in small segments of the economy and its institutional framework is rudimentary. Rules for market participants are unreliable and frequently set arbitrarily. The informal sector is large.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Market competition operates under a weak institutional framework, with uneven rules for market participants. The informal sector is significant.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Market competition has a strong institutional framework, but the rules for market competition are not consistent or always uniform for all market participants. The informal sector is small.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Market competition is consistently defined and implemented both macroeconomically and microeconomically. There are state-guaranteed rules for market competition with equal opportunities for all market participants. The informal sector is very small.</p>
<b>comp_pol</b>	<b>Q7.2 Competition policy</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 No legal or political measures are taken to prevent monopolistic structures and conduct.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Some regulation to prevent monopolistic structures and conduct exists, but is rarely enforced.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Competition laws to prevent monopolistic structures and conduct exist, but are enforced inconsistently.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Comprehensive competition laws to prevent monopolistic structures and conduct exist and are strictly enforced.</p>

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<b>for_trade</b>	<b>Q7.3 Liberalization of foreign trade</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1 Foreign trade is largely state-supervised or controlled. The economy is decoupled from the world market.
	2
	3
	4 Foreign trade follows non-discrimination principles in form, but is significantly distorted by state interference, special rules, tariff and non-tariff barriers, etc. The economy is integrated selectively into the world market.
	5
	6
	7 Foreign trade is liberalized in principle, but significant exceptions remain, including differentiated tariffs and privileged treatment for domestic sectors or industries.
	8
	9
	10 Foreign trade is widely liberalized, with uniform, low tariffs and few non-tariff barriers.
<b>bank</b>	<b>Q7.4 Banking system</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1 Banks are largely state-owned or state-controlled; there is no capital market.
	2
	3
	4 The banking system and capital market are poorly differentiated; regulation and supervision requirements are inadequate.
	5
	6
	7 The banking system and capital market are differentiated and oriented in principle to international standards. However, there is a de facto lack of supervision, which contributes to increased vulnerability to sudden stops and capital flow reversals.
	8
	9
	10 The banking system is solid and oriented toward international standards with functional banking supervision and minimum capital equity requirements. Capital markets are open to domestic and foreign capital with sufficient resilience to cope with sudden stops and capital flow reversals.

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<b>stab_econ</b>	<b>Q8 Monetary and Fiscal Stability</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.1
<b>notes:</b>	see stab_econ_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent
<b>infl</b>	<b>Q8.1 Monetary stability</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government is not willing or able to pursue monetary stabilization. 2 3 4      Monetary stability is a component of the economic policy mix in principle, but it is subordinated to other objectives. The monetary authority is not capable to pursue monetary stabilization independently of the government. 5 6 7      Monetary stability is a recognized objective of economic policy, but has not been consistently pursued over time. The monetary authority's institutional independence is at times compromised, and it is prone to political influence. 8 9 10     Policies of monetary stabilization are harmonized with other objectives of economic policy and are institutionalized in a de facto independent monetary authority, which consistently communicates with other economic actors.

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<b>macro_stab</b>	<b>Q8.2 Fiscal stability</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government does not implement any budgetary measures to promote fiscal stability.
	2
	3
	4      The government's budgetary policies are inconsistent and insufficient to promote fiscal stability.
	5
	6
	7      The government's budgetary policies generally promote fiscal stability, but lack institutional safeguards and are prone to ad hoc permissive policy changes.
	8
	9
	10     The government's budgetary policies promote fiscal stability, supported in part by institutional (self-) constraints.
 <b>priv_prop</b>	 <b>Q9 Private Property</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.1
<b>notes:</b>	see priv_prop_cat
	1 – 2.49   Poor
	2.5 – 4.49   Flawed
	4.5 – 6.49   Fair
	6.5 – 8.49   Sound
	8.5 – 10   Excellent

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<b>prop_rights</b>	<b>Q9.1 Property rights</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1      Property rights and regulations on acquisition, benefits, use and sale are not defined in law. Private property is not protected.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4      Property rights and regulations on acquisition, benefits, use and sale are defined formally in law, but they are not implemented and enforced consistently nor safeguarded adequately by law against arbitrary state intervention or illegal infringements.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7      Property rights and regulations on acquisition, benefits, use and sale are well defined, but occasionally there are problems with implementation and enforcement under the rule of law.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10     Property rights and regulations on acquisition, benefits, use and sale are well defined and enforced. Property rights are limited, solely and rarely, by overriding rights of constitutionally defined public interest.</p>
<b>priv_ent</b>	<b>Q9.2 Private enterprise</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1      Private companies are not protected or permitted by the state.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4      Private companies are viewed institutionally as negligible for economic production. Though they can act freely in principle, they are not adequately protected by legal safeguards. The privatization of state companies serves clientelistic purposes.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7      Private companies are viewed institutionally as important engines of economic production, but are at times insufficiently protected by existing legal safeguards. The privatization of state companies does not always proceed consistently with market principles.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10     Private companies are viewed institutionally as primary engines of economic production and are given functioning legal safeguards. The privatization of state companies proceeds consistently with market principles.</p>

<b>welfare</b>	<b>Q10 Welfare Regime</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.1
<b>notes:</b>	see welfare_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent
 <b>safety_nets</b>	<b>Q10.1 Social safety nets</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1 Social safety nets do not exist. Poverty is combated hardly at all, or only ad hoc. 2 3 4 Social safety nets are rudimentary and cover only few risks for a limited number of beneficiaries. The majority of the population is at risk of poverty. 5 6 7 Social safety nets are well developed, but do not cover all risks for all strata of the population. A significant part of the population is still at risk of poverty. 8 9 10 Social safety nets are comprehensive and compensate for social risks, especially nationwide health care and a well-focused prevention of poverty.

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<b>equal</b>	<b>Q10.2 Equal opportunity</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 Equality of opportunity is not achieved. Women and/or members of ethnic, religious and other groups have only very limited access to education, public office and employment. There are no legal provisions against discrimination.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Equality of opportunity is largely achieved. Women and members of ethnic, religious and other groups have near-equal access to education, public office and employment. There are a number of legal provisions against discrimination, but their implementation is at times insufficient.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Equality of opportunity is largely achieved. Women and members of ethnic, religious and other groups have near-equal access to education, public office and employment. There are a number of legal provisions against discrimination, but their implementation is at times insufficient.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Equality of opportunity is achieved. Women and members of ethnic, religious and other groups have equal access to education, public office and employment. There is a comprehensive and effective legal and institutional framework for the protection against discrimination.</p>

<b>perf_econ</b>	<b>Q11 Economic Performance</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10										
<b>units:</b>	1										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see perf_econ_cat</p> <table> <tr> <td>1 – 2</td> <td>Poor</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3 – 4</td> <td>Flawed</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5 – 6</td> <td>Fair</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7 – 8</td> <td>Sound</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9 – 10</td> <td>Excellent</td> </tr> </table>	1 – 2	Poor	3 – 4	Flawed	5 – 6	Fair	7 – 8	Sound	9 – 10	Excellent
1 – 2	Poor										
3 – 4	Flawed										
5 – 6	Fair										
7 – 8	Sound										
9 – 10	Excellent										

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<b>output</b>	<b>Q11.1 Output strength</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1      The economic performance is very poor. Strongly negative macroeconomic data may include negative GDP per capita growth rates, very high unemployment levels, high inflation, large budget deficits, unreasonably high debt and an increasingly unsustainable current account position.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4      The economic performance is poor. Continuing negative macroeconomic data may include stagnant GDP per capita levels, relatively high unemployment levels, low price stability, an unbalanced budget, rising debt and a volatile current account position.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7      The economic performance is good. Moderately positive macroeconomic data may include low GDP per capita growth rates, only moderate unemployment levels, relative price stability, a slightly unbalanced budget, a tendency toward debt and a manageable current account position.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10     The economic performance is very good. Positive macroeconomic data may include relatively high GDP per capita growth rates, relatively high employment levels, price stability, balanced budget, reasonable debt and a sustainable current account position.</p>

<b>sustain</b>	<b>Q12 Sustainability</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10										
<b>units:</b>	.1										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see sustain_cat</p> <table> <tr> <td>1 – 2.49</td> <td>Poor</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2.5 – 4.49</td> <td>Flawed</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4.5 – 6.49</td> <td>Fair</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6.5 – 8.49</td> <td>Sound</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8.5 – 10</td> <td>Excellent</td> </tr> </table>	1 – 2.49	Poor	2.5 – 4.49	Flawed	4.5 – 6.49	Fair	6.5 – 8.49	Sound	8.5 – 10	Excellent
1 – 2.49	Poor										
2.5 – 4.49	Flawed										
4.5 – 6.49	Fair										
6.5 – 8.49	Sound										
8.5 – 10	Excellent										

<b>envir</b>	<b>Q12.1 Environmental policy</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1    Environmental concerns receive no consideration and are entirely subordinated to growth efforts. There is no environmental regulation.
2	
3	
4	Environmental concerns receive only sporadic consideration and are often subordinated to growth efforts. Environmental regulation is weak and hardly enforced.
5	
6	
7	Environmental concerns are taken into account but are occasionally subordinated to growth efforts. Environmental regulation and incentives are in place, but their enforcement at times is deficient.
8	
9	
10	Environmental concerns are effectively taken into account and are carefully balanced with growth efforts. Environmental regulation and incentives are in place and enforced.

<b>edu</b>	<b>Q12.2 Education policy / R&amp;D</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      There are only basic levels of institutions for education, training and R&D. School enrollment is low, and the illiteracy rate is high. Investment in education and training is very low (below 2% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (below 0.5% of GDP). 2 3 4      Education policy contributes to a system of education and training which is sub-standard, with qualitative deficits in secondary and tertiary education and insufficient school enrollment. Research and development is deficient. Investment in education and training is rather low (from 2% to 4% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (less than 1.5% of GDP). 5 6 7      Education policy ensures a nationwide system of sound education and training, and the research and technology sector is fairly advanced. Investment in education and training is average (from 4% to 6% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (1.5% to 2.0% of GDP). 8 9 10     Education policy ensures a nationwide system of high-quality education and training, and the re-search and technology sector is dynamic and competitive. Investment in education and training is clearly above average (more than 6% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (more than 2.0% of GDP).

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<b>rank_gov_ind</b>	<b>Ranking Governance Index</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>unique values:</b>	Depending on the respective BTI sample size.
<b>notes:</b>	The Governance Index ranks the countries according to the state of their respective leadership's governance. The governance performance is comprised of four criteria, which are based on a total of 14 indicators. For calculating the Governance Index, the governance performance is weighted with the level of difficulty, which is derived from three qualitative and three quantitative indicators.
<b>gov_ind</b>	<b>Governance Index</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 - 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see cat_gov_ind 1 – 2.99 Failed 3 – 4.29 Weak 4.3 – 5.59 Moderate 5.6 – 6.99 Good 7 – 10 Very good
<b>level_diff</b>	<b>Q13 Level of Difficulty</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see level_diff_cat 1 – 2.49 Negligible constraints 2.5 – 4.49 Minor 4.5 – 6.49 Moderate 6.5 – 8.49 Substantial 8.5 – 10 Massive constraints

<b>constr</b>	<b>Q13.1 Structural constraints</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The structural constraints on governance are very low. 2 3 4      The structural constraints on governance are fairly low. 5 6 7      The structural constraints on governance are fairly high. 8 9 10     The structural constraints on governance are very high.

<b>civil_trad</b>	<b>Q13.2 Civil society traditions</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      Traditions of civil society are very strong. 2 3 4      Traditions of civil society are fairly strong. 5 6 7      Traditions of civil society are fairly weak. 8 9 10     Traditions of civil society are very weak.

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<b>conflict_intens</b>	<b>Q13.3 Conflict intensity</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      There are no violent incidents based on social, ethnic or religious differences.
	2
	3
	4      There are only few violent incidents. Radical political actors have limited success in mobilizing along existing cleavages. Society and the political elite, however, are divided along social, ethnic or religious lines.
	5
	6
	7      There are violent incidents. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics. Society and the political elite are deeply split into social classes, ethnic or religious communities.
	8
	9
	10     There is civil war or a widespread violent conflict based on social, ethnic or religious differences.
 <b>GNI</b>	 <b>Q13.4 GNI p.c. Atlas method rescaled</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>source:</b>	World Bank
<b>notes:</b>	Data is rescaled to scores 1-10.
 <b>UN_edu</b>	 <b>Q13.5 UN Educ. Index rescaled</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>source:</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>notes:</b>	Data is rescaled to scores 1-10.
 <b>state_rol</b>	 <b>Q13.6 BTI Stateness &amp; Rule of Law</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.001
<b>notes:</b>	Arithmetic mean of scores for criteria 1 “Stateness” and 3 “Rule of Law”.

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<b>gov_perf</b>	<b>Governance Performance</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 - 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	Arithmetic mean of scores for criteria 14 “Steering Capability”, 15 “Resource Efficiency”, “16 “Consensus-Building” and 17 “International Cooperation”.
<b>steering</b>	<b>Q14 Steering Capability</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see steering_cat 1 – 2.49 Poor 2.5 – 4.49 Flawed 4.5 – 6.49 Fair 6.5 – 8.49 Sound 8.5 – 10 Excellent
<b>priority</b>	<b>Q14.1 Prioritization</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government does not set strategic priorities. It relies on ad hoc measures, lacks guiding concepts and reaps the maximum short-term political benefit. 2 3 4      The government claims to be setting strategic priorities, but replaces them regularly with short-term interests of political bargaining and office seeking. Policy measures are rarely prioritized and organized. 5 6 7      The government sets strategic priorities, but sometimes postpones them in favor of short-term political benefits. It shows deficits in prioritizing and organizing its policy measures accordingly. 8 9 10     The government sets strategic priorities and maintains them over extended periods of time. It has the capacity to prioritize and organize its policy measures accordingly.

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<b>implement</b>	<b>Q14.2 Implementation</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government is not able to implement any of its policies.
	2
	3
	4      The government fails to implement many of its policies.
	5
	6
	7      The government fails to implement some of its policies.
	8
	9
	10     The government is able to implement its policies effectively.
 <b>learning</b>	<b>Q14.3 Policy learning</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government demonstrates no willingness or ability in policy learning.
	2
	3
	4      The government demonstrates little willingness or ability in policy learning. Policies are rigidly enforced, and the routines of policymaking do not enable innovative approaches.
	5
	6
	7      The government demonstrates a general ability of policy learning, but its flexibility is limited. Learning processes inconsistently affect the routines and the knowledge foundation on which policies are based.
	8
	9
	10     The government demonstrates a pronounced ability of complex learning. It acts flexibly and replaces failed policies with innovative ones.
 <b>efficiency</b>	<b>Q15 Resource efficiency</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see efficiency_cat
	1 – 2.49   Poor
	2.5 – 4.49   Flawed
	4.5 – 6.49   Fair
	6.5 – 8.49   Sound
	8.5 – 10   Excellent

<b>assets</b>	<b>Q15.1 Efficient use of assets</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1     The government wastes all available human, financial and organizational resources.
	2
	3
	4     The government makes efficient use of only some of the available human, financial and organizational resources.
	5
	6
	7     The government makes efficient use of most available human, financial and organizational resources.
	8
	9
	10    The government makes efficient use of all available human, financial and organizational resources.
 <b>coord</b>	 <b>Q15.2 Policy coordination</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1     The government fails to coordinate conflicting objectives. Its policies thwart and damage each other. The executive is fragmented into rival fiefdoms that counteract each other.
	2
	3
	4     The government often fails to coordinate between conflicting objectives. Different parts of the government tend to compete among each other, and some policies have counterproductive effects on other policies.
	5
	6
	7     The government tries to coordinate conflicting objectives, but friction, redundancies and gaps in task assignment are significant.
	8
	9
	10    The government coordinates conflicting objectives effectively and acts in a coherent manner.

<b>anti_corrupt</b>	<b>Q15.3 Anti-corruption policy</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The government fails to contain corruption, and there are no integrity mechanisms in place.
2	
3	
4	The government is only partly willing and able to contain corruption, while the few integrity mechanisms implemented are mostly ineffective.
5	
6	
7	The government is often successful in containing corruption. Most integrity mechanisms are in place, but some are functioning only with limited effectiveness.
8	
9	
10	The government is successful in containing corruption, and all integrity mechanisms are in place and effective.
 <b>consens</b>	 <b>Q16 Consensus-Building</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.01
<b>notes:</b>	see consens_cat
	1 – 2.49 Poor
	2.5 – 4.49 Flawed
	4.5 – 6.49 Fair
	6.5 – 8.49 Sound
	8.5 – 10 Excellent

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<b>goals</b>	<b>Q16.1 Consensus on goals</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 There are no major political actors who want to establish democracy or a market economy.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 The major political actors are in conflict over both democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals of transformation. Or: any proclaimed consensus on goals is rudimentary, very fragile and likely to be challenged by powerful actors.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 The major political actors agree on one of the goals (democracy or market economy) as a strategic, long-term goal of transformation. Or: there is a general consensus on both goals, which is weakened by significant controversy over strategic priorities.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 All major political actors agree on establishing or consolidating democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals of transformation.</p>
<b>veto</b>	<b>Q16.2 Anti-democratic actors</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 Reformers have no control over anti-democratic actors.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Reformers have little control over powerful anti-democratic actors, who can use their influence to severely disrupt the reform process.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 Reformers cannot completely control all powerful anti-democratic actors, but can limit their influence significantly.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 Reformers can successfully exclude or co-opt all actors with anti-democratic interests.</p>

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<b>cleavage</b>	<b>Q16.3 Cleavage / conflict management</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1      The political leadership exacerbates existing cleavages for populist or separatist purposes.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4      The political leadership does not prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7      The political leadership prevents cleavage-based conflicts from escalating.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10     The political leadership depolarizes cleavage-based conflict and expands consensus across the dividing lines.</p>
<b>civil_part</b>	<b>Q16.4 Civil society participation</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1      The political leadership obstructs civil society participation. It suppresses civil society organizations and excludes its representatives from the policy process.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4      The political leadership neglects civil society participation. It frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7      The political leadership permits civil society participation. It takes into account and accommodates the interests of most civil society actors.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10     The political leadership actively enables civil society participation. It assigns an important role to civil society actors in deliberating and determining policies.</p>

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<b>recon</b>	<b>Q16.5 Reconciliation</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The political leadership manipulates memories of historical injustices as a weapon against political opponents.
	2
	3
	4      The political leadership does not address historical acts of injustice and does not initiate a process of reconciliation.
	5
	6
	7      The political leadership recognizes the need to deal with historical acts of injustice, but its attempts for reconciliation encounter difficulties.
	8
	9
	10     The political leadership achieves reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators of past injustices.
n/a	There have been no major historical injustices committed, or reconciliation processes have been completed.

<b>int_coop</b>	<b>Q17 International Cooperation</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1.000e-07
<b>notes:</b>	see int_coop_cat
	1 – 2.49   Poor
	2.5 – 4.49   Flawed
	4.5 – 6.49   Fair
	6.5 – 8.49   Sound
	8.5 – 10   Excellent

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<b>use_support</b>	<b>Q17.1 Effective use of support</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 The political leadership either uses international assistance for rent-seeking or considers any form of international cooperation as undesired political interference. There is no viable long-term development strategy.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 The political leadership uses international assistance for short-term expediencies and fails to devise a consistent long-term strategy..</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 The political leadership uses international assistance for its own development agenda, but falters in devising a consistent long-term strategy capable of integrating this support effectively.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 The political leadership makes well-focused use of international assistance in order to implement its long-term strategy of development.</p>
<b>cred</b>	<b>Q17.2 Credibility</b>
<i>(numeric)</i>	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	<p>1 The government repeatedly acts unreliably, and cooperating with the state entails major risks. The government does not contribute (and often undermines) international cooperation efforts.</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 The government rarely acts as a credible and reliable partner. It shows little engagement in international cooperation efforts.</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7 For the most part, the government acts as a credible and reliable partner. It shows notable engagement in international cooperation efforts.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 The government acts as a credible and reliable partner. It frequently demonstrates initiative in advancing international cooperation efforts and actively contributes to them.</p>

<b>reg_coop</b>	<b>Q17.3 Regional cooperation</b>
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	1
<b>range:</b>	1      The political leadership is uncooperative. It does not seek to build relations with neighbors and obstructs regional or international organizations.
	2
	3
	4      The political leadership cooperates selectively or sporadically with individual neighboring states and is reluctant to accept the rules set by regional and international organizations.
	5
	6
	7      The political leadership cooperates with many neighboring states and complies with the rules set by regional and international organizations.
	8
	9
	10     The political leadership actively and successfully builds and expands cooperative neighborly and international relationships. It promotes regional and international integration.
<b>units:</b>	1

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<b>trend_dem</b>	<b>Trend Democracy</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	-9 – 9										
<b>units:</b>	.01										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see cat_trend_dem</p> <table> <tr><td><math>\leq -1</math></td><td>Strong deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\leq -0.5</math></td><td>Deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>-0.49 - 0.49</math></td><td>No significant changes</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 0.5</math></td><td>Improvement</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 1</math></td><td>Strong improvement</td></tr> </table> <p>Trend Democracy shows changes in political development. It is calculated as the difference between the current and the preceding Democracy Status scores.</p>	$\leq -1$	Strong deterioration	$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration	$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes	$\geq 0.5$	Improvement	$\geq 1$	Strong improvement
$\leq -1$	Strong deterioration										
$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration										
$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes										
$\geq 0.5$	Improvement										
$\geq 1$	Strong improvement										
<b>trend_econ</b>	<b>Trend Economy</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	-9 – 9										
<b>units:</b>	.01										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see cat_trend_dem</p> <table> <tr><td><math>\leq -1</math></td><td>Strong deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\leq -0.5</math></td><td>Deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>-0.49 - 0.49</math></td><td>No significant changes</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 0.5</math></td><td>Improvement</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 1</math></td><td>Strong improvement</td></tr> </table> <p>Trend Economy shows changes in economic development. It is calculated as the difference between the current and the preceding Economy Status scores.</p>	$\leq -1$	Strong deterioration	$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration	$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes	$\geq 0.5$	Improvement	$\geq 1$	Strong improvement
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$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration										
$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes										
$\geq 0.5$	Improvement										
$\geq 1$	Strong improvement										
<b>trend_gov</b>	<b>Trend Governance</b>										
<i>(numeric)</i>											
<b>range:</b>	-9 – 9										
<b>units:</b>	.01										
<b>notes:</b>	<p>see cat_trend_gov</p> <table> <tr><td><math>\leq -1</math></td><td>Strong deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\leq -0.5</math></td><td>Deterioration</td></tr> <tr><td><math>-0.49 - 0.49</math></td><td>No significant changes</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 0.5</math></td><td>Improvement</td></tr> <tr><td><math>\geq 1</math></td><td>Strong improvement</td></tr> </table> <p>Trend Governance shows changes in governance performance. It is calculated as the difference between the current and the preceding Governance Index scores.</p>	$\leq -1$	Strong deterioration	$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration	$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes	$\geq 0.5$	Improvement	$\geq 1$	Strong improvement
$\leq -1$	Strong deterioration										
$\leq -0.5$	Deterioration										
$-0.49 - 0.49$	No significant changes										
$\geq 0.5$	Improvement										
$\geq 1$	Strong improvement										

<b>core_stateness</b>	Core stateness
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>range:</b>	1 – 10
<b>units:</b>	.1
<b>notes:</b>	Arithmetic mean of scores given for 1.1 “monopoly on the use of force” and 1.4 “basic administration”.  < 3.0 stateness is eroded, resulting in a failing state (see state_failure)
 <b>state_failure</b>	State failure
( <i>numeric</i> )	
<b>unique values:</b>	2
<b>range:</b>	0 stable state 1 failing state
<b>notes:</b>	Failing states are defined as countries in which the state’s monopoly on the use of force and basic administrative structures are lacking to such an extent that the government is severely limited in its capacity to act (the average of scores given for questions 1.1 and 1.4 is less than three).

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<b>pol_sys</b>	Political System	
( <i>numeric</i> )		
<b>unique values:</b>	2	
<b>range:</b>	0 autocracy 1 democracy	
<b>notes:</b>	Seven threshold values marking minimum requirements are considered. The country is classified as an autocracy if even one score falls short of the relevant threshold.	
	threshold values:	
2.1 Free and fair elections	< 6	Free elections are not held or are marked by serious irregularities and restrictions.
2.2 Effective power to govern	< 4	Democratically elected leaders de facto lack the power to govern.
2.3 Association / assembly rights	< 4	The freedom of association or assembly does not exist, or civil society organizations are suppressed.
2.4 Freedom of expression	< 4	Freedom of expression or media freedom does not exist, or severe restrictions are in place.
3.1 Separation of powers	< 4	Constitutional oversight of the executive, legislature or judiciary does not exist, or exists only on paper.
3.4 Civil rights	< 4	Civil rights are systematically violated.
1.1 Monopoly on the use of force and	< 3.0	The state has no control over large parts of the country and fails to fulfil basic public functions.
1.4. Basic administration	(arithmetic mean)	

**cat\_stat\_ind** **Category Status Index***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Failed
- 2 Very Limited
- 3 Limited
- 4 Advanced
- 5 Highly advanced

**cat\_dem\_stat** **Category Democracy Status***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Hard-line autocracies
- 2 Moderate autocracies
- 3 Highly defective democracies
- 4 Defective democracies
- 5 Democracies in consolidation

**cat\_trend\_dem** **Category Trend Democracy***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Strong deterioration
- 2 Deterioration
- 3 No significant changes
- 4 Improvement
- 5 Strong improvement

**cat\_econ\_stat** **Category Economy Status***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Rudimentary
- 2 Very limited
- 3 Limited
- 4 Advanced
- 5 Highly advanced

**cat\_trend\_econ** **Category Trend Economy***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Strong deterioration
- 2 Deterioration
- 3 No significant changes
- 4 Improvement
- 5 Strong improvement

**cat\_gov\_ind** **Category Governance Index***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Failed
- 2 Weak
- 3 Moderate
- 4 Good
- 5 Very Good

**cat\_trend\_gov** **Category Trend Governance***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Strong deterioration
- 2 Deterioration
- 3 No significant changes
- 4 Improvement
- 5 Strong improvement

**cat\_level\_diff** **Category Level of Difficulty***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Massive
- 2 Substantial
- 3 Moderate
- 4 Minor
- 5 Negligible

**stateness\_cat** **Q1 Stateness Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Poor
- 2 Flawed
- 3 Fair
- 4 Sound
- 5 Excellent

**pol\_part\_cat**      **Q2 Political Participation Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**ruleoflaw\_cat**      **Q3 Rule of Law Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**stab\_dem\_cat**      **Q4 Stability of Democratic Institutions Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**integ\_cat**      **Q5 Political and Social Integration Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**level\_development\_cat Q6 Level of Socioeconomic Development Categories***(numeric)***unique values:** 5**range:**  
1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent**market\_cat Q7 Organization of the Market and Competition Categories***(numeric)***unique values:** 5**range:**  
1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent**stab\_econ\_cat Q8 Monetary and Fiscal Stability Categories***(numeric)***unique values:** 5**range:**  
1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent**priv\_prop\_cat Q9 Private Property Categories***(numeric)***unique values:** 5**range:**  
1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**welfare\_cat**                   **Q10 Welfare Regime Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Poor
- 2 Flawed
- 3 Fair
- 4 Sound
- 5 Excellent

**perf\_econ\_cat**                   **Q11 Economic Performance Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Poor
- 2 Flawed
- 3 Fair
- 4 Sound
- 5 Excellent

**sustain\_cat**                   **Q12 Sustainability Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Poor
- 2 Flawed
- 3 Fair
- 4 Sound
- 5 Excellent

**level\_diff\_cat**                   **Q13 Level of Difficulty Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

- 1 Massive constraints
- 2 Substantial
- 3 Moderate
- 4 Minor
- 5 Negligible constraints

**steering\_cat**      **Q14 Steering Capability Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**efficiency\_cat**      **Q15 Resource Efficiency Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**consens\_cat**      **Q16 Consensus-Building Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent

**int\_coop\_cat**      **Q17 International Cooperation Categories***(numeric)***unique values:**

5

**range:**

1 Poor  
2 Flawed  
3 Fair  
4 Sound  
5 Excellent