

# Rodin / Event-B and V&V Activities

Systerel, Aix-en-Provence

December 5<sup>th</sup>, 2013


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
# Event-B — System Level B-Method

- ▶ **System Level Specifications** states, invariants, observable events, guards, actions. . .
- ▶ **Refinement** iterative modeling, from abstract to detailed
- ▶ **Proof** automatic generation of proof obligations, tool support for proofs
- ▶ **Tool** Rodin — open source tool, developed in RODIN, DEPLOY, ADVANCE EU-projects, several universities and industrial partners

# Event-B in openETCS



# Event-B in openETCS



# Event-B in V&V

## Why ?

Event-B allows for reasoning on a high level view of a system. A formalized specification is connected to a (formal) functional system behavior.

**Goal :** Increase the confidence in the correctness and completeness of safety requirements by formalizing them and providing a formally proven link to a functional system model.

# Event-B in V&V

## Event-B in V&V for Safety :

- ▶ Ensures non-contradicting safety requirements
- ▶ Provides a proven correct integration of safety requirements in the model
- ▶ Allows to observe the behavior of the system model (simulation)
- ▶ Allows for validation of intended effects of safety requirements on the functional behavior
- ▶ Provides strong arguments and evidence for certification bodies

# Starting Point

## Formal Model of Section 3.5.3 (MorC)




FIGURE: Formal Model Functional Behavior

# Starting Point

## Requirements with ProR




FIGURE: ProR Integration in Rodin



# Starting Point

## Tracing Requirements in Model using ProR

The screenshot displays the ProR software interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, Navigate, Search, Project, Run, ProR, ProB, BMotion Studio, Window, and Help. The toolbar contains various icons for file operations and navigation. The main window shows a table with requirements, and a diagram is visible in the background.

| Section | Description   | Type | WRSPM | Source | Ta |
|---------|---|------|-------|--------|----|
| 1.3.4.  | a) If one of its supported system versions is compatible with the one sent by trackside, it shall send a session established report, including its telephone numbers, to the trackside.   |      |       |        |    |
| 1.3.4.  | b) If none of its supported system versions is compatible with the one sent by trackside, it shall send a version independent message indicating "No compatible version supported". It shall inform the driver and shall terminate the communication session. |      |       |        |    |
| 1.3.4.  | When the trackside receives the session established report or the information that no compatible system version is supported by the on-board, it shall consider the communication session established.  |      |       |        |    |
| 1.3.4.  | intentionally deleted.  |      |       |        |    |

The diagram in the background shows a sequence of events: "On-Board" and "Trackside". The "On-Board" box contains the text "Set-up of the safe connection According to EURORADIO specifications". The "Trackside" box contains the text "Initiation of a communication session". Arrows indicate the flow of communication between the two components.

The Properties window at the bottom shows the following details for the selected requirement:

| Property                | Value                          |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Requirement Type</b> |                                |
| Description             | intentionally deleted.         |
| Section                 | 3.5.3.9.1                      |
| TableType               | TableNone                      |
| WRSPM                   |                                |
| <b>Spec Object</b>      |                                |
| Type                    | Requirement Type (Spec Object) |

# Proposed Approach in Safety Verification

- ▶ Capture requirements from Safety Analysis
- ▶ Classify requirements for low / high (implementation / system) level
- ▶ Formalize safety requirements
- ▶ Adapt model if necessary
- ▶ Validate functionality of the model

# Prepare Safety Requirements

- ▶ Capture safety requirements from safety analysis
- ▶ Classify low / high level requirements

Example :

## REQ\_FMEA\_ID\_005

If a communication with trackside equipment is active, set-up of safe radio connection with another trackside equipment mustn't be performed. Exception in case of handover with RBC.

# Prepare Safety Requirements

| R *subset-final.reqif W m5_safe_radio R *Safety Criteria |                 |   |        |           |                         |
|--|-----------------|---|--------|-----------|-------------------------|
|  | Name            | Description   | Source | Target    | Link                    |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.5.6                 |
| 4  | REQ_FMEA_ID_004 | A safety protocol shall be used to performed communication between the Mobile Terminal and the Radio Network.   |        | 0 ▷ ④ ▷ 2 |                         |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.1.1                 |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.2.2                 |
| 5  | REQ_FMEA_ID_005 | If a communication with trackside equipment is active, set-up of safe radio connection with another trackside equipment mustn't beformed. Exception in case of handover with RBC. |        | 0 ▷ ④ ▷ 4 |                         |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.3.5.2               |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | inv6 (m6_hand_over_RBC) |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | inv7 (m6_hand_over_RBC) |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | inv8 (m6_hand_over_RBC) |
| 6  | REQ_FMEA_ID_006 | Communication session with trackside equipment shall be safely established.   |        | 0 ▷ ④ ▷ 6 |                         |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.3.8                 |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.3.7                 |
|  | ▷               |   |        |           | 3.5.3.5.2               |
|  | ▷               | Link to general function.   |        |           | 3.5.3                   |

**FIGURE:** Safet Requirements in ReqIf (ProR)

# Formalize Requirements

REQ\_FMEA\_ID\_005 breakdown :

- ▶ At most 2 communication connections at the same time.
- ▶ If an active connection exists, only an accepting RBC can establish a new connection.
- ▶ If a new connection must be established, then the existing connection is with a handing-over RBC.

```

• inv6:  card(ER_connections) ≤ 2 not theorem ›at most 2 connections at the same time
• inv7:  ∃x.ER_connections = {x}
        ⇒
        (establish_ER_connection ≤ accepting) not theorem ›if an established connection exists, then only
                                                                an accepting RBC for hand_over is accepted for
                                                                a new connection
• inv8:  ∃x.ER_connections = {x} ∧ establish_ER_connection ≠ ∅
        ⇒
        x ∈ hand_over_RBC not theorem ›if an additional connection should be established,
                                        then the existing one is a handing over RBC
    
```

FIGURE: Formalized Safety Requirements

# Proof / Adapt Model

- ▶ Safety Requirements not fulfilled on initial model  
(**Reason** Limits on simultaneous connections not completely specified in SS 026)
- ▶ Formal Proofs give insight into Reasons  
(**Feedback** for model adaptation)
- ▶ Model Refinement  
(**Restriction** of behavior to respect safety requirements)

```

establish_ER_connection: internal extended ordinary ›
REFINES
  ◦ establish_ER_connection
ANY
  ◦ l_partner ›
WHERE
  ◦ grd1: l_partner ∈ contacted not theorem ›
  ◦ grd2: l_partner ∈ establish_ER_connection not theorem ›
  ◦ grd3: current_status ≠ SOM not theorem ›
  ◦ grd4: ER_connections = ∅ ∨ (card(ER_connections) = 1 ∧ ER_connections ⊆ RBC ∧ l_partner ∈ hand_over_RBC)
THEN
  ◦ act1: establish_ER_connection = establish_ER_connection \ {l_partner} ›
  ◦ act2: ER_connections = ER_connections ∪ {l_partner} ›
END

```

FIGURE: Model Refinement for Safety Requirements

# Validate Functionality

Is the refined model still functional ?




FIGURE: Formal Model Animation with ProB

# Conclusion

- ▶ Formalized safety (or other additional) requirements
  - ▶ derive properties for later implementation
  - ▶ proof completeness of these properties
  - ▶ detection of contradictions / missing elements in specification
- ▶ Validation of functional requirements after safety requirements integration
- ▶ Technical Point of View
  - ▶ Excellent integration of Rodin with ProR (both based on Eclipse)
  - ▶ Requirements in standardized ReqIf format