

## Davide Zufacchi

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[davidezufacchi.com](http://davidezufacchi.com)

### PRINCIPAL INTERESTS

Development Economics, Organized Crime, Political Economy

### EDUCATION

*MPhil/PhD Economics* September 2021- Present  
**University College London**, London  
Supervisors: Jonas Hjort, Imran Rasul, Gabriel Ulyssea

*Mres Economics* September 2020 - September 2021  
**University College London**, London

*MSc Economics* August 2017 - April 2020  
**Bocconi University**, Milan

*BSc Economics* August 2014 - June 2017  
**Bocconi University**, Milan

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

**University College London**  
*Teaching Assistant* January 2022 - May 2022  
MSc Topics in Economic Development - Instructor: Gabriel Ulyssea

*Teaching Assistant* January 2022 - May 2022  
MSc Advanced Microeconometrics - Instructor: Lars Nesheim

*Teaching Assistant* September 2021 - January 2022  
BSc Economics of Development - Instructor: Beatriz Armendariz

### EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

**Bocconi University**  
*Research Assistant* September 2019 - September 2020  
BAFFI CAREFIN - Supervisor: Carlo Altomonte, Gianmarco Ottaviano

*Research Assistant* October 2018 - April 2019  
IGIER - Supervisor: Eliana La Ferrara

**Alma mater studiorum - University of Bologna**  
*Research Assistant* September 2019 - September 2020  
Supervisor: Tommaso Sonno

**Tortuga**  
*Senior Associate* April 2017 - September 2020  
Tortuga is a think-tank of economics students that writes articles and reports about current economic and political issues and collaborates and offers consulting services to policy makers and economists.

### AWARDS GRANTS

**Unicredit Foundation** - Young Economist Best Presentation September 2022  
**Institute of Fiscal Studies** - ESRC PhD Studentship (3 years) April 2022

**WORKING  
PAPERS**

**Epidemics and rapacity of multinational companies.** With Tommaso Sonno.

In this paper we study rapacity behaviours of multinational companies in fragile countries, and their interaction with health crises, focusing on the palm oil sector in Liberia. We show that the Ebola outbreak exogenously weakened multinationals' *rapacity constraint* in 2014. With a difference in discontinuity approach, we document a sharp increase in deforestation, which produced a dramatic growth in newly planted palm oil trees and a 1428% increase in palm oil exports. We show that the probability of forest fire – the fastest way to clear forests and start new production – increased by 125% in the same period. Both effects are amplified in areas populated by ethnic minorities.

**Mining Companies and Armed Bands: A story of win-win relationships in Democratic Republic of Congo.** With Eliana La Ferrara.

Using geo-referenced data in the Democratic Republic of Congo over fifteen years, this paper investigates the relationship between organized armed groups and large-scale, often multinationals, mining firms. Without strategic interaction between these two actors, one should expect the closest armed band to have the highest probability of being observed in the concession's proximity. However, this happens only 30% of the time. In the remaining 70% of the cases, the majority of interactions are characterized by a previous contact between the armed group and the concession owner. We analyze these interactions exploiting both their geographical dimension and their timing, on the assumption that, if a relation exist, this should be prolonged over time. Results shows that if an armed group had a previous contact with a firm, there is a 33 times higher probability of observing it close to the concessions of the latter. Finally, we investigate how these results change with firms' incentives.

**Informality trap: Social capital and Informal labour supply in a population of migrants.**

This paper investigates the relationship between social capital and informal labor supply in a population of migrants. One standard deviation increase in the measure of trust is associated with a 22% decrease in the probability of working informally. This relationship is justified by the idea of tax morale: the moral cost of supplying labor in the informal sector. Depending on whether the individual chooses to supply labor in the formal or the shadow sector at the time of arrival in the host country, decisions about the country-specific human capital accumulation of migrants differ. This process creates a market failure in the economy. Indeed, migrants with both low tax morale and productivity may experience informality traps, given that they have no incentives to accumulate human capital.

**SOFTWARE**

Stata, Matlab, Latex, QGIS, Python, R

**LANGUAGES**

Italian (Native), English (Fluent), French (Beginner)