

Timeline Summary and Findings:

Instinct-mde-te was found failing several connection requests against itself and another host on the same network

```
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where DeviceName startswith "instinct"
| where ActionType == "ConnectionFailed"
Reshape ConnectionCount = count() by DeviceName, ActionType, LocalIP,
| order by ConnectionCount
```

Filters: Add filter

<input type="checkbox"/>	DeviceName	ActionType	LocalIP	RemoteIP	ConnectionCount
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	10.0.0.5	23
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	168.63.129.16	11
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	::1	::1	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	169.254.169.254	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	52.123.129.14	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	23.54.127.164	2
<input type="checkbox"/>	> instinct-mde-te	ConnectionFailed	10.1.0.147	208.89.73.147	2

After observing failed connection requests from a suspected host (10.1.0.147) in chronological order, I noticed a port scan was taking place due to the sequential order of the ports. There were several port scan being concluded:

```
// Observe all failed connections for the IP in question. Notice anything?
let IPInQuestion = "10.1.0.147";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType == "ConnectionFailed"
| where LocalIP == IPInQuestion
| order by Timestamp desc
```

I pivoted to the DeviceProcessEvents table to see if I could see anything that was suspicious around the time the port scan started. I noticed a PowerShell named portscan.ps1 launch at 2025-08-11T10:48:10.0834279Z

```

40 | Observe DeviceProcessEvents for the past 10 minutes of the unusual
41 | activity
42 | found
let VMName = "instinct-mde-te";
let specificTime = datetime(2025-08-11T10:48:27.8362168Z);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp between ((specificTime - 10m) .. (specificTime + 10m))
| where DeviceName == VMName
| order by Timestamp desc
| project Timestamp, FileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

```

I logged into the suspect computer and observed the PoweerShell script that was used to conduct the port scan:

```

1  # Define the log file path
2  $LogFile = "C:\ProgramData\entropygorilla.log"
3  $ScriptName = "portscan.ps1"
4
5  # Function to log messages
6  function Log-Message {
7      param (
8          [string]$message,
9          [string]$level = "INFO"
10     )
11     $Timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
12     $LogEntry = "$Timestamp [$level] [$ScriptName] $message"
13     Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $LogEntry
14 }
15
16 # Define the range of IP addresses to scan
17 $startIP = 4
18 $endIP = 10
19 $baseIP = "10.0.0."
20
21 # Expanded list of common ports (well-known port numbers 0-1023 + some higher)
22 $commonPorts = @(21, 22, 23, 25, 53, 69, 80, 110, 123, 135, 137, 138, 139, 143, 161, 194, 443, 445, 465, 587, 993, 995, 3306, 3389, 5900, 8080, 8443)
23
24 # Log the start of the scan
25 Log-Message "Starting port scan on IP range $baseIP$startIP to $baseIP$endIP."
26
27 # Function to test a single IP and all its common ports
28 function Test-Ports {

```

We observed the port scan script was launched by the SYSTEM account, this is not expected behaviour and is not something that was setup by the admins, so I isolated the device and ran a malware scan

The malware scan produced no result, so out of caution, I kept the device isolated and put in a ticket to have it reimaged/rebuilt

MITRE ATT&CK Framework Related TTPs:

- T1046: Network Service Discovery – Port scanning activity across sequential ports.
- T1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – Execution of "portscan.ps1".

- T1078: Valid Accounts – Use of SYSTEM account to execute malicious script.
- T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer – Presence of a custom port scanning script on host.
- T1569.002: System Services: Service Execution – Script executed in a system-level context.