


De Cifris Trends in *Cryptographic Protocols*

University of Trento and De Componendis Cifris

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Sigma Protocols

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Sigma protocols

- Completeness
- Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge


$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}_{\text{Sim}}(x) \Rightarrow$

- Special Soundness


a'

c'

z'



Thm: x






Sigma protocol for Discrete Logarithm

Let G be a group of order q ,
with generator g

$$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$
$$x = g^y$$



$$\text{Prob}[y' = y] = \text{negl}(q)$$



$$x = g^y$$

$$a = g^r$$

$$c$$

$$z = r + cy$$



Accept iff $g^z = ax^c$

$$g^z = g^{r+cy}$$

$$ax^c = g^r g^{yc} = g^{r+cy}$$

Let G be a group of order q ,
with generator g

Special-soundness

$$a$$

$$c$$

$$z$$


$$c'$$

$$z'$$


$$\begin{cases} z = r + cy \\ z' = r + c'y \end{cases} \xrightarrow{c \neq c'} y$$



Schnorr protocol



HVZK





Sigma Protocol for Diffie-Hellman tuples

$x = (g, h, u, v)$

Is a DH tuple if

$u = g^y, v = h^y$

Let G be a group of order q ,
with generators g and h

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

if $b=0$ then

$T = (g, h, u = g^y, v = h^y)$

else


$T = (g, h, u = g^y, v = h^w)$ with $y \neq w$


\xrightarrow{T}






Sigma Protocol for Diffie-Hellman tuples





Sigma Protocol for Diffie-Hellman tuples



$$x=(g, h, u, v)$$



Accept iff $g^z=Au^c$
and $h^z=Hv^c$

\mathcal{HVZK}_{sim}

$$c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$A=g^z/u^c$$

$$H=h^z/v^c$$

$$a=(A, H)$$


$$C$$

$$Z$$

HVZK



Sigma Protocol for Diffie-Hellman tuples



Exactly the same as the one for the Dlog protocol




OR-Composition

$$\Sigma_0 = (P_{\Sigma_0}, V_{\Sigma_0})$$


x_0 or x_1

$$\Sigma_1 = (P_{\Sigma_1}, V_{\Sigma_1})$$



$$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}^0_{sim}(x_0) \rightarrow a_0, c_0, z_0$$

$$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}^1_{sim}(x_1) \rightarrow a_1, c_1, z_1$$




$$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}^1_{sim}(x_1) \rightarrow a_1, c_1, z_1$$

$$a_0 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, w_0)$$

$$c_0 \leftarrow c \oplus c_1$$

$$z_0 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, w_0, c_0)$$



$$V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c_0, z_0) = 1$$

and

$$V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c_1, z_1) = 1$$

and


$$c = c_0 \oplus c_1$$



OR-Composition

x_0 or x_1

Special Soundness



$$V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c_0, z_0) = 1 \quad V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c'_0, z'_0) = 1$$

and

and

$$V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c_1, z_1) = 1 \quad V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c'_1, z'_1) = 1$$

and

and

$$c = c_0 \oplus c_1$$

$$c' = c'_0 \oplus c'_1$$

$$c \neq c'$$

$$c_0 \neq c'_0$$

$$\text{or} \\ c_1 \neq c'_1$$

$$\text{e.g. } c_0 \neq c'_0$$

by s-soundness
of Σ_0

w_0




AND-Composition

$$\Sigma_0 = (P_{\Sigma_0}, V_{\Sigma_0})$$



x_0 AND x_1

$$\Sigma_1 = (P_{\Sigma_1}, V_{\Sigma_1})$$



$$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}^o_{sim}(x_0) \rightarrow a_0, c_0, z_0$$

$$\mathcal{H}\mathcal{V}\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{K}^1_{sim}(x_1) \rightarrow a_1, c_1, z_1$$




$$a_0 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, w_0)$$

$$a_1 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, w_1)$$

$$z_0 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, w_0, c)$$

$$z_1 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_1, w_1, c)$$



$$V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c, z_0) = 1$$

and

$$V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c, z_1) = 1$$



AND-Composition


x_0 AND x_1

Special Soundness



$a_0 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, w_0)$

$a_1 \leftarrow P_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, w_1)$



$V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c, z_0) = 1$ $V_{\Sigma_0}(x_0, a_0, c', z'_0) = 1$

and

and

$V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c, z_1) = 1$ $V_{\Sigma_1}(x_1, a_1, c', z'_1) = 1$


$c \neq c'$
and
s-soundness of
 Σ_0 and Σ_1

w_0, w_1



Commitments from Sigma-Protocols


Commitment scheme



- Hiding
- Binding
 $\nexists \text{dec}', m', \text{ with } m \neq m' \text{ s.t.}$
 $\text{Decommit}(\text{com}, m, \text{dec})=1$ and
 $\text{Decommit}(\text{com}, m', \text{dec}')=1$

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Instance-dependent commitment scheme NP-Language L




- if $x \in L$ Hiding
- If $x \notin L$ Binding
 $\nexists \text{dec}', m', \text{ with } m \neq m' \text{ s.t.}$
 $\text{Decommit}(x, \text{com}, m, \text{dec})=1$ and
 $\text{Decommit}(x, \text{com}, m', \text{dec}')=1$



Commitments from Sigma-Protocols

$$\Sigma = (P_\Sigma, V_\Sigma)$$





$$SHVZK_{sim}(\mathbf{x}, c) \rightarrow a, z$$

Binding ($x \notin L$)

$$\begin{aligned} V_\Sigma(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{com}, m, \mathbf{dec}) &\rightarrow 1 \\ V_\Sigma(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{com}, m', \mathbf{dec}') &\rightarrow 1 \end{aligned}$$

$m' \neq m$

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s-soundness of Σ

w : witness for \mathbf{x}



Commitments from Sigma-Protocols

Hiding ($x \in L$)

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

x

m_b

$\text{SHVZK}_{\text{sim}}(x, m_b) \rightarrow a, z$

com $\leftarrow a$

dec $\leftarrow z$

com, dec

$\text{SHVZK}_{\text{sim}}(x, m_0) \rightarrow$

$a_0 = \mathbf{com}$

z_0

\equiv

$a \leftarrow P_{\Sigma}(x, w)$

$z \leftarrow P_{\Sigma}(x, w, m_0)$

\equiv

$a_1 = \mathbf{com}$

z_1

$\leftarrow \text{SHVZK}_{\text{sim}}(x, m_1)$

m_0, m_1

com

b'




By contradiction $b = b'$



Conclusions

- Sigma protocols exist for a variety of NP languages
- Practical efficiency
- Building blocks for efficient zero-knowledge protocols
 - Interactive
 - Non-interactive (Fiat-Shamir Transform)

De Componendis Cifris



<https://www.decifris.it>

Reference: On Sigma-Protocols. Ivan Damgaard. <https://www.cs.au.dk/~ivan/Sigma.pdf>