
Post-Quantum Cryptosystems based on Elliptic Curve Isogenies

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ITASEC18 - Milan, 8th February 2018

NIST - Call for Proposals

SIKE: Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation

Azarderakhsh, Campagna,
Costello, De Feo, Hess, Jalali,
Koziel, LaMacchia, Longa,
Naehirng, Renes, Spoukharev,
Urbani

Finite Fields

Let p be a prime integer.

With \mathbb{F}_p we denote the finite field with p elements:

$$\mathbb{F}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$$

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If $p = 4k - 1$, then the equation $x^2 + 1 = 0$ has not solutions in \mathbb{F}_p and

$$\mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \{s_0 + s_1 \cdot i \mid s_0, s_1 \in \mathbb{F}_p\}$$

is a quadratic extension of \mathbb{F}_p , with $i^2 = -1$.

Elliptic curves

A Montgomery curve (a special form of an elliptic curve) E , defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , is described by an equation:

$$By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x \quad \text{with } A, B \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$$

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Given an extension field \mathbb{K} of \mathbb{F}_{p^2} , the set

$$E(\mathbb{K}) = \{(x_0, y_0) \in \mathbb{K} \times \mathbb{K} \mid By_0^2 = x_0^3 + Ax_0^2 + x_0\} \cup \{\infty\}$$

is an additive group. In particular, $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ is a finite group.

Elliptic Curves

The elliptic curve E is
supersingular if:

$$p \mid (p^2 + 1 - \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}))$$


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The j - invariant of E is:

$$j(E) = \frac{256(A^2 - 3)^3}{A^2 - 4}$$



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
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For a given integer m by $E[m]$ we denote the set:

$$E[m] = \{P \in E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}}) \mid mP = \infty\}$$

If $p \nmid m$, then:

$$E[m] \simeq \mathbb{Z}_m \times \mathbb{Z}_m$$



Two elliptic curves are isomorphic if and only if they have the same j - invariant

Isogenies

Let us consider the set of all supersingular elliptic curves defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

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Two of them, E_1 and E_2 , are **isogenous** if there exists a rational map

$$\begin{aligned} \phi : \quad E_1 &\longrightarrow E_2 \\ (x, y) &\longmapsto \left(\frac{p_1(x)}{q_1(x)}, y \frac{p_2(x)}{q_2(x)} \right) \end{aligned}$$

such that:

- $p_1(x), q_1(x), p_2(x), q_2(x) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}[x]$
- $\phi : E_1(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \rightarrow E_2(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ **is a group homomorphism**

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❖ E_1 and E_2 are isogenous if and only if

$$\#E_1(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = \#E_2(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$$

❖ $\text{Ker}(\phi) = \{P \in E_1 \mid \phi(P) = \infty\}$

❖ $|\text{Ker}(\phi)| = \deg(\phi)$

❖ for any subgroup $H \subset E_1(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$, there is a unique isogeny $\phi : E_1 \rightarrow E'$ with kernel H (and degree $|H|$)

❖ velu's formula to find $\phi : E_1 \rightarrow E'$

Isogenies

$S_{p^2} = \#\{j \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \mid j \text{ is the } j\text{-invariant of a supersingular curve}\}$

$$S_{p^2} = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{12} \right\rfloor + r, \quad r \in \{0, 1, 2\}$$

**ALL SUPERSINGULAR ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
ARE IN THE SAME ISOGENY CLASS.**

KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL: Public Parameters


- ❖ two positive integers e_2 and e_3
- ❖ a prime $p = 2^{e_2} 3^{e_3} - 1$
- ❖ the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \mathbb{F}_p(i)$
- ❖ a supersingular elliptic curve E_0 over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} :

$$E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x \qquad j(E_0) = 1728$$

- ❖ $\#E_0(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (2^{e_2} 3^{e_3})^2$
- ❖ P_2, Q_2 s.t. $E_0[2^{e_2}] = \langle P_2, Q_2 \rangle$
- ❖ P_3, Q_3 s.t. $E_0[3^{e_3}] = \langle P_3, Q_3 \rangle$

Public and private keys

Public parameters: $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}, E_0, P_2, Q_2, P_3, Q_3$



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
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Selects a private $sk_B \in [1, \dots, 2^{e_2} - 1]$

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


🔑 **Selects a private** $sk_B \in [1, \dots, 2^{e_2} - 1]$

🔑 **Computes** $P_2 + sk_B Q_2$

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
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
🔑 **$\langle P_2 + sk_B Q_2 \rangle \subset E_0[2^{e_2}]$ is a subgroup of order 2^{e_2}**

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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$$P_2 + sk_B Q_2$$



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Computes the unique isogeny

$$\phi_B : E_0 \rightarrow E_B$$


having kernel

$$H_B = \langle P_2 + sk_B Q_2 \rangle$$

Public and private keys

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$$P_2 + sk_B Q_2$$



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
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$$P_3 + sk_A Q_3$$



Computes the unique isogeny

$$\phi_A : E_0 \rightarrow E_A$$

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Public and private keys

Public parameters: $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}, E_0, P_2, Q_2, P_3, Q_3$



Public key: E_B

Private key: $sk_B,$
 ϕ_B



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 Computes $\phi_B(P_3), \phi_B(Q_3)$ and sends        

Public and private keys

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Public key: E_B



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Computes $\phi_A(P_2), \phi_A(Q_2)$ and sends 

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Private key: $sk_B,$
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🔑 Computes $\phi_{AB} : E_A \rightarrow E_{AB}$ with
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














Private key: sk_B, ϕ_B






Public key: E_A

Private key: sk_A, ϕ_A

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








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Computes $\phi_A(P_2), \phi_A(Q_2)$ **and sends**

- 
Computes $\phi_{AB} : E_A \rightarrow E_{AB}$ **with**

kernel $< \phi_A(P_2) + sk_B \phi_A(Q_2) >$
- Computes** $\phi_{BA} : E_B \rightarrow E_{BA}$ **with**


kernel $< \phi_B(P_3) + sk_A \phi_B(Q_3) >$

The shared secret key



E_{AB}



E_{BA}

The two curves obtained by Alice and Bob have the **same j - invariant:**

THEY ARE ISOMORPHIC!

Efficiency

Montgomery curves are used in order to **speed up computations** among points of the curves.

Isogenies are computed **composing**:

- isogenies of **degree 2** (by Bob)
- isogenies of **degree 3** (by Alice)

Security

The **hard problem** is:

*given two supersingular **isogenous** curves, E and $E' = \phi(E)$, find ϕ*

Best (known) attack: Claw Algorithm

Complexity: classical $O(p^{1/4})$ and quantum $O(p^{1/6})$

Thank you for your attention!

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