

## Windows Memory Analysis Using Volatility

1. Run `vol.py -f zeus.vmem imageinfo` using volatility's plugin "imageinfo." What is the suggested type of OS of zeus.vmem and when was the sample was collected? Provide screenshots as your supporting data.

⇒ suggested type of OS: WINXPSP2X86 / WINXPSP3X86

⇒ collected on: 2010-08-15 19:17:56 or 15:17:56

### Results of imageinfo:



```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
      Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
      AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/sansforensics/Desktop/DVD/17/1/zeus.vmem)
      PAE type : PAE
      DTB : 0x319000L
      KDBG : 0x80544ce0L
      Number of Processors : 1
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 2
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdf000L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf000L
      Image date and time : 2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
      Image local date and time : 2010-08-15 15:17:56 -0400
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$
```

2. Run `vol.py -f zeus.vmem pslist` and `vol.py -f zeus.vmem psscan`.

Which one walks through the doubly-linked list of EPROCESS pointed by PsActiveProcessHead?

⇒ **pslist**

- To enumerate processes using pool tag scanning (`_POOL_HEADER`)
- does not detect hidden or unlinked processes

Which one does not rely on the doubly-list of EPROCESS and can detect unlinked (hidden) processes?

Show the hidden processes in a screenshot.

⇒ **psscan**

- can find terminated/inactive processes
- can find processes that have been hidden or unlinked by a rootkit !

## Psscan results:

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem psscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P) Name PID PPID PDB Time created Time exited
-----
0x00000000010c3da0 wuauclt.exe 1732 1028 0x06cc02c0 2010-08-11 06:07:44 UTC+0000
0x00000000010f7588 wuauclt.exe 468 1028 0x06cc0180 2010-08-11 06:09:37 UTC+0000
0x0000000001122910 svchost.exe 1028 676 0x06cc0120 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x000000000115b8d8 svchost.exe 856 676 0x06cc00e0 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x0000000001214660 System 4 0 0x00319000
0x000000000211ab28 TPAutoConnSvc.e 1968 676 0x06cc0260 2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000
0x00000000049c15f8 TPAutoConnect.e 1084 1968 0x06cc0220 2010-08-11 06:06:52 UTC+0000
0x0000000004a065d0 explorer.exe 1724 1708 0x06cc0280 2010-08-11 06:09:29 UTC+0000
0x0000000004b5a980 VMwareUser.exe 452 1724 0x06cc0300 2010-08-11 06:09:32 UTC+0000
0x0000000004be97e8 VMwareTray.exe 432 1724 0x06cc02e0 2010-08-11 06:09:31 UTC+0000
0x0000000004c2b310 wscntfy.exe 888 1028 0x06cc0200 2010-08-11 06:06:49 UTC+0000
0x0000000005471020 smss.exe 544 4 0x06cc0020 2010-08-11 06:06:21 UTC+0000
0x0000000005f027e0 alg.exe 216 676 0x06cc0240 2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000
0x0000000005f47020 lsass.exe 688 632 0x06cc00a0 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x0000000006015020 services.exe 676 632 0x06cc0080 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x00000000061ef558 svchost.exe 1088 676 0x06cc0140 2010-08-11 06:06:25 UTC+0000
0x0000000006238020 cmd.exe 124 1668 0x06cc02a0 2010-08-15 19:17:55 UTC+0000
0x0000000006384230 vmacthlp.exe 844 676 0x06cc00c0 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x00000000063c5560 svchost.exe 936 676 0x06cc0100 2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000
0x0000000006499b80 svchost.exe 1148 676 0x06cc0160 2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000
0x000000000655fc88 VMUpgradeHelper 1788 676 0x06cc01e0 2010-08-11 06:06:38 UTC+0000
0x00000000066f0978 winlogon.exe 632 544 0x06cc0060 2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000
0x00000000066f0da0 csrss.exe 608 544 0x06cc0040 2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000
0x0000000006945da0 spoolsv.exe 1432 676 0x06cc01a0 2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000
0x00000000069a7328 VMip.exe 1944 124 0x06cc0320 2010-08-15 19:17:55 UTC+0000 2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
0x00000000069d5b28 vmtolstd.exe 1668 676 0x06cc01c0 2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000
```

## Hidden processes (present in psscan but not in pslist)

**\*\*Vmip.exe** [psscan pid# 1944 | offset 0x00000000069a7328]

**NOTE:** This Doesn't show up in a DLL scan and offset commands as suggested in volatility wiki is ineffective [ex: vol.py -f zeus.vmem psscan --offset=0x00000000069a7328]

## Alternative: psxview can provide more metrics on the suspected malware

NOTE: Vmip.exe returns nearly all falses [this indicates that most processes are missing]

See image below:

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem psxview
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P) Name PID pslist psscan thrdproc pspcid csrss session deskthrd ExitTime
-----
0x04be97e8 VMwareTray.exe 432 True True True True True True True
0x0211ab28 TPAutoConnSvc.e 1968 True True True True True True True
0x06945da0 spoolsv.exe 1432 True True True True True True True
0x066f0978 winlogon.exe 632 True True True True True True True
0x0655fc88 VMUpgradeHelper 1788 True True True True True True True
0x061ef558 svchost.exe 1088 True True True True True True True
0x06238020 cmd.exe 124 True True False True False False False 2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
0x066f0da0 csrss.exe 608 True True True True False True True
0x05471020 smss.exe 544 True True True True False False False
0x01214660 System 4 True True True True False False False
0x069a7328 VMip.exe 1944 False True False False False False False 2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
```

3. Run *vol.py -f zeus.vmem connections* and *vol.py -f zeus.vmem connscan*. Do you see any active TCP connections or previous connections? Provide screenshots as your supporting data. (Note: both *connections* and *connscan* do not work for Windows Vista and later version memory image. You will use plugin *netscan* instead)

**connections ⇒ vol.py -f zeus.vmem connections [no connections present]**

- used to see TCP connections that were active at the time of the memory acquisition
- walks the singly-linked list of connection structures
- pointed to by a non-exported symbol in the tcpip.sys module

Results of connections [vol.py -f zeus.vmem connections]:

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem connections
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)  Local Address      Remote Address      Pid
-----
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$
```

**connscan ⇒ vol.py -f zeus.vmem connscan [2 connections present]**

- Looks for `_TCPT_OBJECT` structures using pool scanning.
- Can find both active and terminated connections.

Results of connections [vol.py -f zeus.vmem connscan]:

offset	local address	remote address	pid
0x02214988	172.16.176.143.1054	193.104.41.75:80	856
0x06015ab0	0.0.0.1056	193.104.41.75:80	856

4. Run *vol.py -f zeus.vmem hivelist*, *vol.py -f zeus.vmem hivescan*, and *vol.py -f zeus.vmem printkey -K "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"*.

**hivelist ⇒ vol.py -f zeus.vmem hivelist**

- Locates virtual addresses of registry hives in memory
- locates full path of the corresponding hive on disk

**hivescan ⇒ vol.py -f zeus.vmem hivescan**

- finds the physical address of register hives in memory
- works together with hivelist

**printkey ⇒ vol.py -f zeus.vmem printkey -K "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"**

- searches all hives and prints the key information
- this includes printing a key each time a hive contains it

Which plugin displays the subkeys, values, and data types contained within a specified registry key?  
Provide screenshots as your supporting data.

⇒ **printkey**

### results of printkey

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem printkey -K "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile
-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
Key name: Winlogon (S)
Last updated: 2010-08-15 19:17:23 UTC+0000
Subkeys:
(S) GPEExtensions
(S) Notify
(S) SpecialAccounts
(V) Credentials
Values:
REG_DWORD AutoRestartShell : (S) 1
REG_SZ DefaultDomainName : (S) BILLY-DB5B96DD3
REG_SZ DefaultUserName : (S) Administrator
REG_SZ LegalNoticeCaption : (S)
REG_SZ LegalNoticeText : (S)
REG_SZ PowerdownAfterShutdown : (S) 0
REG_SZ ReportBootOk : (S) 1
REG_SZ Shell : (S) Explorer.exe
REG_SZ ShutdownWithoutLogon : (S) 0
REG_SZ System : (S)
REG_SZ Userinit : (S) C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe,C:\WINDOWS\system32\sdra64.exe,
REG_SZ VmApplet : (S) rundll32 shell32,Control_RunDLL "sysdm.cpl"
REG_DWORD SfcQuota : (S) 4294967295
REG_SZ allocatedcdroms : (S) 0
REG_SZ allocateddads : (S) 0
REG_SZ allocatedfloppies : (S) 0
REG_SZ cachedlogonscount : (S) 10
REG_DWORD forceunlocklogon : (S) 0
REG_DWORD passwordexpirywarning : (S) 14
REG_SZ scremoveoption : (S) 0
REG_DWORD AllowMultipleTSSessions : (S) 1
REG_EXPAND_SZ UIHost : (S) logonui.exe
REG_DWORD LogonType : (S) 1
REG_SZ Background : (S) 0 0 0
REG_SZ AutoAdminLogon : (S) 0
REG_SZ DebugServerCommand : (S) no
REG_DWORD SFCDisable : (S) 0
REG_SZ WinStationsDisabled : (S) 0
REG_DWORD HibernationPreviouslyEnabled : (S) 1
```

Which plugin shows the virtual addresses of registry hives in memory along with the full paths to the corresponding hive on disk? Provide screenshots as your supporting data.

⇒ **hivelist**



## results of hivelist

```
ransforensics@iftworkstation -> ~/D/0/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Virtual Physical Name
-----
0xe1c49008 0x036dc008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1c41b60 0x04010b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1a39638 0x021eb638 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1a33008 0x01f98008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe153ab60 0x06b7db60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
0xe1542008 0x06c48008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
0xe1537b60 0x06ae4b60 \SystemRoot\system32\config\SECURITY
0xe1544008 0x06c4b008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
0xe13ae580 0x01bdd580 [no name]
0xe101b008 0x01867008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
0xe1008978 0x01824978 [no name]
0xe1e158c0 0x009728c0 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1da4008 0x00f6e008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\NTUSER.DAT
ransforensics@iftworkstation -> ~/D/0/1/1
$
```

5. Try other plugins from the [Volatility Command Reference](#), show me one or two other plugins that provide you interesting results.

**dlllist** ⇒ **vol.py -f zeus.vmem dlllist**

displays loaded DLLs for a process  
walks doubly-linked-list for `_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` pointed to by `InLoadOrderModuleList`  
each time a process uses/loads a DLL, the process is added to the dlllist

## results of dlllist

```
*****
VMwareTray.exe pid: 432
Command line: "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe"
Service Pack 2
command
Base Size LoadCount Path
-----
0x00400000 0x21000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe
0x7c900000 0xb0000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
0x7c800000 0xf4000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
0x77d40000 0x90000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
0x77f10000 0x46000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
0x7c9c0000 0x81400 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x77c10000 0x58000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x77dd0000 0x9b000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77e70000 0x91000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
0x77f60000 0x76000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
0x10000000 0x8a000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMControlPanel.cpl
0x774e0000 0x13c000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
0x782e0000 0x10f000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.VC80.MFC_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.762_x-ww_3bf8fa05\MFC80U.DLL
0x78130000 0x9b000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.VC80.CRT_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.762_x-ww_6b128700\MSVCR80.dll
0x763b0000 0x49000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\COMDLG32.dll
0x773d0000 0x102000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.2180_x-ww_a84f1ff9\COMCTL32
0x00340000 0xb0000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\glib-2.0.dll
0x00440000 0x13000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\intl.dll
0x00470000 0x10b000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\iconv.dll
0x71ab0000 0x17000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2_32.dll
0x71aa0000 0x8000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\WS2HELP.dll
0x00590000 0x77000 0xffff C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtools.dll
0x7120000 0x8c000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
```

**handles** ⇒ **vol.py -f zeus.vmem handles**

displays open handles in a process  
files, registry keys, mutexes, named pipes, events, window stations, desktops, threads etc

## results of handles

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation -> ~/D/D/1/1
$ vol.py -f zeus.vmem handles
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V) Process PID Handle Access Type Details
-----
0x810b1660 4 0x4 0x1f0fff Process System(4)
0x810b0020 4 0x8 0x0 Thread TID 12 PID 4
0xe10192c0 4 0xc 0xf003f Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\SESSION MANAGER\MEMORY MANAGEMENT\PREFETCHPARAMETER
0xe1019880 4 0x10 0x0 Key
0xe13b4578 4 0x14 0x2001f Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\SETUP
0xe101d140 4 0x18 0x20019 Key MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM\MULTIFUNCTIONADAPTER
0xe13b46e0 4 0x1c 0x20019 Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\MEDIACENTER
0xe13b4748 4 0x20 0x20019 Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\KEY-CJ2733P2XV9J9JCPB4DVT
0xe13b4678 4 0x24 0x20019 Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\PNP
0xe13b45e0 4 0x28 0x20019 Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\SIGNINGHASH-6KCM6KFTX6MD62
0xe13be4a8 4 0x2c 0x2001f Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\PRODUCTOPTIONS
0xe13be308 4 0x30 0x20019 Key MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\EVENTLOG
0x810aa3a0 4 0x34 0x1f0003 Event TRKXKS_EVENT
0xff399588 4 0x38 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f95a78 4 0x3c 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f17570 4 0x40 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff161a90 4 0x44 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f75ef0 4 0x48 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f335f0 4 0x4c 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff399710 4 0x50 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff36c4c0 4 0x54 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff36c678 4 0x58 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff3a7340 4 0x5c 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff298478 4 0x60 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f5cb28 4 0x64 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0x80f5cce0 4 0x68 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff202ef0 4 0x6c 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff22ae70 4 0x70 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
0xff245260 4 0x74 0x12019f File \Device\Tcp
```