

Code Security Assessment

# DODO LimitOrder -Addendum

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## Summary

DeHacker's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- . Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service/logical oversights
- Access control
- . Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting



# **Issue Categories**

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

### Critical severity issues

A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.

### Major severity issues

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

### Medium severity issues

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

### Minor severity issues

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

### Informational

A vulnerability that has informational character but is not affecting any of the code.



# Overview

### Project Summary

Project Name	DODO LimitOrder - Addendum
Platform	Ethereum
Website	https://dodoex.io/
Туре	DeFi
Language	Solidity

### Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	Mitigated	Declined	Acknowledged	Partially Resolved	Resolved
Critical	0	0	0	0	0	1
Major	1	0	0	1	0	0
Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0
Minor	1	0	0	1	0	0
Informational	3	0	0	1	0	2
Discussion	0	0	0	0	0	0



### Audit scope

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
		12691f7fce713501a478b529f73957f9710
DOD	DODOGaslessTrading.sol	8557e8d37437355b2cfafb551bb82



# **Findings**

ID	Category	Severity	Status
GLOBAL-01	Centralization /	Major	Acknowledged
DOD-01	Volatile Code	Minor	Acknowledged
DOD-02	Coding Style	Informational	Resolved
DOD-03	Coding Style	Informational	Resolved
DOD-04	Logical Issue	Informational	Acknowledged



### **MAJOR**

### GLOBAL-01 | CENTRALIZATION RELATED RISKS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization/	Major		Acknowledged
Privilege	Widjoi		Acknowledged

### Description

In the contract DODOGaslessTrading, the role admin has authority over the following functions:

function matchingRFQByPlatform()

In the contract DODOGaslessTrading, the role owner has authority over the following functions:

function addAdmin()

function removeAdmin()

function changeInsurance()

function renounceOwnership()

function transferOwnership()

Any compromise to the admin/owner account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority.

#### Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operationand level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage. We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multi-signature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:



### Recommendation

#### Short Term:

Timelock and Multi sign (2/3,3/5) combination mitigate by delaying the sensitive operation and avoiding a single point of key management failure.

Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., hours for awareness on privileged operations;

Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the privatekey compromised;

A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract and multi-signers addresses information with the publicaudience.

#### Long Term:

Timelock and DAO the combination mitigate by applying decentralization and transparency. Time-lock with reasonable latency eg hours for awareness on privileged operations; AND

Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement;

AND

A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract multi-signers addresses, and DAO information with the public audience.

#### Permanent

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered fully resolved. Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles;

Remove the risky functionality.



## **MINOR**

### RDR-05 | CENTRALIZATION RISKS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code		D0D0Gas1 essTrading. sol: 75~78	Acknowledged

### Description

The given input is missing the check for the non-zero address.

### Recommendation

We advise adding the check for the passed-in values to prevent unexpected errors as below:

```
75 require(address(0) != owner, "set owner to the zero address");
76 require(address(0) != insurance, "set insurance to the zero address");
77 require(address(0) != dodoApprove, "set dodo approve to the zero address");
78 require(address(0) != dodoApproveProxy, "set dodo approve proxy to the zero address");
79 _DODO_APPROVE_ = dodoApprove;
80 _DODO_APPROVE_PROXY_ = dodoApproveProxy;
```



# INFORMATIONAL

### DOD-02|BOOLEAN EQUALITY

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	Informational	DODOGaslessTrad ing.sol :97	Resolved

### Description

Detects the comparison to boolean constants. Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to becompare to true or false.

### Recommendation

We advise removing the equality to the boolean constant and referring to the following codes:

97 require(!\_IS\_FILLED\_[orderHash], "DLOP:ORDER\_FILLED");



# INFORMATIONAL

### DOD-03|MISSING ERROR MESSAGES

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	Informational	DODOGaslessTradi ng.sol :118	Resolved

### Description

The require can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met.It is better toprovide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.

### Recommendation

We advise refactoring the linked codes as below:

118 require(route != \_DODO\_APPROVE\_PROXY\_, "route cannot to be dodo approve
proxy");



# INFORMATIONAL

### DOD-04|fromToken IS NOT ENOUGH

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Informational	DODOGaslessTradin g.sol :143~149	Acknowledged

### Description

### Recommendation

Please provide us with more information about the design logic.



## **Disclaimer**

This report is based on the scope of materials and documentation provided for a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete nor inclusive of all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your sole risk. Blockchain technology remains under development and is subject to unknown risks and flaws. The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. A report does not indicate the endorsement of any particular project or team, nor guarantee its security. No third party should rely on the reports in any way, including for the purpose of making any decisions to buy or sell a product, service or any other asset. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we disclaim all warranties, expressed or implied, in connection with this report, its content, and the related services and products and your use thereof, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. We do not warrant, endorse, guarantee, or assume responsibility for any product or service advertised or offered by a third party through the product, any open source or third-party software, code, libraries, materials, or information linked to, called by, referenced by or accessible through the report, its content, and the related services and products, any hyperlinked websites, any websites or mobile applications appearing on any advertising, and we will not be a party to or in any way be responsible for monitoring any transaction between you and any third-party providers of products or services. As with the purchase or use of a product or service through any medium or in any environment, you should use your best judgment and exercise caution where appropriate.

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## **Appendix**

### **Finding Categories**

### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

#### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated bytecode but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

#### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

#### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block. timestamp works.

### Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.


The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



### **About**

DeHacker is a team of auditors and white hat hackers who perform security audits and assessments. With decades of experience in security and distributed systems, our experts focus on the ins and outs of system security. Our services follow clear and prudent industry standards. Whether it's reviewing the smallest modifications or a new platform, we'll provide an in-depth security survey at every stage of your company's project. We provide comprehensive vulnerability reports and identify structural inefficiencies in smart contract code, combining high-end security research with a real-world attacker mindset to reduce risk and harden code.

### BLOCKCHAIINS TECH STACK



#### **CONTACTS**

https://dehacker.io

https://twitter.com/dehackerio

https://github.com/dehacker/audits\_public

https://t.me/dehackerio

https://blog.dehacker.io/

