# DeHacker

Code Security Assessment

SpaceN

Jan **10**th, 2023





# Contents

CONTENTS	1
SUMMARY	2
ISSUE CATEGORIES	3
OVERVIEW	4
PROJECT SUMMARY	4
Vulnerability Summary	4
AUDIT SCOPE	5
FINDINGS	6
MAJOR	7
SNC-01   Initial Token Distribution	7
Description	7
RECOMMENDATION	7
INFORMATIONAL	8
SNC-02   Unlocked Compiler Version	8
Description	8
RECOMMENDATION	8
INFORMATIONAL	9
SNC-03   Use unchecked Block	9
Description	9
RECOMMENDATION	9
DISCLAIMER	10
APPENDIX	11
ABOUT	12



# Summary

DeHacker's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- . Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service/logical oversights
- Access control
- . Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting



# **Issue Categories**

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

#### Critical severity issues

A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.

#### Major severity issues

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

#### Medium severity issues

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

#### Minor severity issues

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

#### Informational

A vulnerability that has informational character but is not affecting any of the code.



# Overview

### Project Summary

Project Name	SpaceN
Platform	BSC
Website	https://spacen.xyz/
Туре	NFT
Language	Solidity

### Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	Pending	Mitigated	Acknowledged	Partially Resolved	Resolved
Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
Major	0	0	0	1	0	0
Medium	1	0	0	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0	0	0	0
Informational	2	0	0	0	0	2
Discussion	0	0	0	0	0	0



## Audit scope

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum		
SNC	SpaceN.sol	0e6204b359c5711a8d5b79793d1b90f18d8ec3 c2658ecae8ba9caa69a90cc581		



# Findings

ID	Category	Severity	Status
SNC-01	Centralization / Privilege	Medium	Acknowleged
SNC-02	Language Specific	Informational	Resolved
SNC-03	Gas Optimization	Informational	Resolved



## **MEDIUM**

#### SNC-01 | Initial Token Distribution

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	Medium	SpaceN.sol: 421	Acknowledged

#### Description

All of the SpaceN tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be acentralization risk as the deployer can distribute SpaceN tokens without obtaining the consensus of thecommunity.

#### Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the securityoperation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the presentstage. We advise the team to be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process, and the teamshall make enough efforts to restrict the access of the private key. In general, we strongly recommendentralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multisignature wallets. Indicatively, here are somefeasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term,long-term and permanent:

Short Term:

Timelock and Multi sign ( $\frac{2}{3}$ ,  $\frac{3}{5}$ ) combination mitigate by delaying the sensitive operation and avoiding asingle point of key management failure.

Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations; AND

Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the the private key compromised;

**AND** 

A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract and multi-signers addresses information with thepublic audience.

Long Term:

Timelock and DAO, the combination, mitigate by applying decentralization and transparency.

Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations; Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement. AND

A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract, multi-signers addresses, and DAO informationwith the public audience.



# INFORMATIOMAL

#### SNC-02 | Unlocked Compiler Version

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Language Specific	Informational	SpaceN.sol: 3	Resolved

#### Description

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

#### Recommendation

We advise that the compiler version is instead locked at the lowest version possible that the contract can becompiled at. For example, for version v0.8.0 the contract should contain the following line:

pragma solidity 0.8.0;



# INFORMATIOMAL

#### SNC-03 | Use unchecked Block

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	Informational	SpaceN.sol: 266, 305, 332 , 375	Resolved

#### Description

Since Solidity versions >= 0.8.0, overflows and underflows are checked by default by the compiler. Thisleaves some space for gas optimization using unchecked blocks to perform operations without thesechecks if one is certain that this scenario won't happen. On functions decreaseAllowance(), \_ transfer(), transferFrom() and burn(), prior doing a subtraction, the right require statements where used to checkthat it won't cause an underflow. So, in these cases, the highlighted functions could be performed inside anunchecked block to avoid making these checks again and thus, save gas.

#### Recommendation

We recommend putting the highlighted statements inside an unchecked block.



# **Disclaimer**

This report is based on the scope of materials and documentation provided for a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete nor inclusive of all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your sole risk. Blockchain technology remains under development and is subject to unknown risks and flaws. The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. A report does not indicate the endorsement of any particular project or team, nor guarantee its security. No third party should rely on the reports in any way, including for the purpose of making any decisions to buy or sell a product, service or any other asset. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we disclaim all warranties, expressed or implied, in connection with this report, its content, and the related services and products and your use thereof, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. We do not warrant, endorse, guarantee, or assume responsibility for any product or service advertised or offered by a third party through the product, any open source or third-party software, code, libraries, materials, or information linked to, called by, referenced by or accessible through the report, its content, and the related services and products, any hyperlinked websites, any websites or mobile applications appearing on any advertising, and we will not be a party to or in any way be responsible for monitoring any transaction between you and any third-party providers of products or services. As with the purchase or use of a product or service through any medium or in any environment, you should use your best judgment and exercise caution where appropriate.

FOR AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THE REPORT, ITS CONTENT, ACCESS, AND/OR USAGE THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY ASSOCIATED SERVICES OR MATERIALS, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED OR RELIED UPON AS ANY FORM OF FINANCIAL, INVESTMENT, TAX, LEGAL, REGULATORY, OR OTHER ADVICE.



# **Appendix**

#### **Finding Categories**

#### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

#### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated bytecode but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

#### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

#### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block. timestamp works.

#### Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



# **About**

DeHacker is a team of auditors and white hat hackers who perform security audits and assessments. With decades of experience in security and distributed systems, our experts focus on the ins and outs of system security. Our services follow clear and prudent industry standards. Whether it's reviewing the smallest modifications or a new platform, we'll provide an in-depth security survey at every stage of your company's project. We provide comprehensive vulnerability reports and identify structural inefficiencies in smart contract code, combining high-end security research with a real-world attacker mindset to reduce risk and harden code.

#### **BLOCKCHAIINS**



Ethereum



Cosmos



Substrate



Python

**TECH STACK** 



Solidity



Rust



#### **CONTACTS**

https://dehacker.io

https://twitter.com/dehackerio

https://github.com/dehacker/audits\_public

https://t.me/dehackerio

https://blog.dehacker.io/

