

# Code Security Assessment

# KATANA INU

Oct 16 th, 2023





# Contents

CONTENTS	1
SUMMARY	
OVERVIEW	
PROJECT SUMMARY	
Vulnerability Summary	
AUDIT SCOPE	
FINDINGS	
INFORMATIONAL	
·	
DESCRIPTION	
RECOMMENDATION	
INFORMATIONAL	
KAT-02   Set constant to Variables	
DESCRIPTION	8
RECOMMENDATION	8
MAJOR	9
KAT-03   Initial Token Distribution	9
DESCRIPTION	9
RECOMMENDATION	9
INFORMATIONAL	10
KAT-04   Function Visibility Optimization	
DESCRIPTION	
RECOMMENDATION	
DISCLAIMER	
APPENDIX	
APPENUIX	12



## Summary

DeHacker's objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- . Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service/logical oversights
- Access control
- . Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting



# **Issue Categories**

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

### Critical severity issues

A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.

### Major severity issues

A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.

### Medium severity issues

A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.

### Minor severity issues

A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.

#### Informational

A vulnerability that has informational character but is not affecting any of the code.



# Overview

### Project Summary

Project Name	KATANA INU		
Platform	Ethereum		
Website	https://www.katanainu.com/		
Туре	NFT		
Language	Solidity		

### Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	Mitigated	Declined	Acknowledged	Partially Resolved	Resolved
Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
Major	1	0	0	0	1	0
Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0	0	0	0
Informational	3	0	0	1	0	2
Discussion	0	0	0	0	0	0



## Audit scope

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
		81c0831f366724074be460ae35ba65ae3ec246c
KAT	katacoin/KATA.sol	109fe639463170da56d878342



# **Findings**

ID	Category	Severity	Status
KAT-O1	Language Specific	Informational	Acknowledged
KAT-02	Gas Optimization	Informational	Resolved
KAT-03	Centralization / Privilege	Major	Partially Resolved
KAT-04	Gas Optimization	Informational	Resolved



## INFORMATIONAL

### KAT-01 | Unlocked Compiler Version

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Language	Informational	katacoin/KATA.sol:	Acknowledged
Specific		2	

### Description

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

#### Recommendation

It is a general practice to instead lock the compiler at a specific version rather than allow a range ofcompiler versions to be utilized to avoid compiler-specific bugs and be able to identify ones more easily. We recommend locking the compiler at the lowest possible version that supports all the capabilities wished by the codebase. This will ensure that the project utilizes a compiler version that has been in usefor the longest time and as such is less likely to contain yet-undiscovered bugs.



# INFORMATIONAL

### KAT-02 | Set constant to Variables

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	Informational	katacoin/KATA.sol:	Resolved
		35, 37, 38	

### Description

The variables \_name , \_symbol and \_totalSupply are unchanged throughout the contract.

### Recommendation

We advise the client to set \_name , \_symbol and \_totalSupply as constant variables.



# **MAJOR**

### KAT-03 | Initial Token Distribution

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization	Major	katacoin/KATA.sol:	Partially Resolved
/ Privilege	<b>.</b>	64	

### Description

\_totalSupply tokens were sent to the msg.sender when deploying the contract. This could be acentralization risk as the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

### Recommendation

We recommend the team to be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process.



# INFORMATIONAL

### KAT-O4 | Function Visibility Optimization

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	Informational	katacoin/KATA.sol: 72, 80, 97, 104, 111 , 123, 131, 142, 160 , 188, 207	

### Description

public functions that are never called by the contract could be declared external . When the inputs arearrays, external functions are more efficient than public functions.

#### Recommendation

We advise that the functions' visibility specifiers are set to external and the array-based argumentschange their data location from memory to calldata, optimizing the gas cost of the function.



## **Disclaimer**

This report is based on the scope of materials and documentation provided for a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete nor inclusive of all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your sole risk. Blockchain technology remains under development and is subject to unknown risks and flaws. The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. A report does not indicate the endorsement of any particular project or team, nor guarantee its security. No third party should rely on the reports in any way, including for the purpose of making any decisions to buy or sell a product, service or any other asset. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we disclaim all warranties, expressed or implied, in connection with this report, its content, and the related services and products and your use thereof, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. We do not warrant, endorse, guarantee, or assume responsibility for any product or service advertised or offered by a third party through the product, any open source or third-party software, code, libraries, materials, or information linked to, called by, referenced by or accessible through the report, its content, and the related services and products, any hyperlinked websites, any websites or mobile applications appearing on any advertising, and we will not be a party to or in any way be responsible for monitoring any transaction between you and any third-party providers of products or services. As with the purchase or use of a product or service through any medium or in any environment, you should use your best judgment and exercise caution where appropriate.

FOR AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT, THE REPORT, ITS CONTENT, ACCESS, AND/OR USAGE THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY ASSOCIATED SERVICES OR MATERIALS, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED OR RELIED UPON AS ANY FORM OF FINANCIAL, INVESTMENT, TAX, LEGAL, REGULATORY, OR OTHER ADVICE.



# **Appendix**

### **Finding Categories**

#### **Centralization / Privilege**

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

#### **Coding Style**

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated bytecode but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

#### **Volatile Code**

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

#### **Logical Issue**

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block. timestamp works.

#### Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



## **About**

DeHacker is a team of auditors and white hat hackers who perform security audits and assessments. With decades of experience in security and distributed systems, our experts focus on the ins and outs of system security. Our services follow clear and prudent industry standards. Whether it's reviewing the smallest modifications or a new platform, we'll provide an in-depth security survey at every stage of your company's project. We provide comprehensive vulnerability reports and identify structural inefficiencies in smart contract code, combining high-end security research with a real-world attacker mindset to reduce risk and harden code.

### BLOCKCHAIINS TECH STACK











C++

#### **CONTACTS**

https://dehacker.io

https://twitter.com/dehackerio

https://github.com/dehacker/audits\_public

https://t.me/dehackerio

https://blog.dehacker.io/

