Emotions in context: Revolutionary accelerators, hope, moral outrage, and other emotions in the making of Nicaragua's revolution

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Abstract. Building on the social movement/revolutions and recent social movement emotions literature and using interviews and oral history from revolutionary Nicaragua, I make a case for recognizing the significance of emotions when studying revolutions. The essay aims for a contextual understanding of the role of emotions in the making of revolution during the insurrectionary period in Nicaragua. These are examined from the vantage point of "revolutionary accelerators," the conflictual event-contexts from which revolutionary actors emerge. Through the historical analysis of testimonies associated with a number of politically significant events that changed the course of political dynamics in 1970s Nicaragua, the piece illustrates: (1) how events function as generators of revolutionary action and (2) how event-related emotions such as anger and fear, but primarily moral outrage and hope, contribute to a transformation in consciousness that leads potential participants to define their circumstances as needing their revolutionary involvement. It also attempts to demonstrate how the latter two emotions – moral outrage and hope – are dominant under different event-contexts. Lastly, the relationships between these emotions and how these are connected to revolutionary accelerators are similarly explored.

> At the very centre of revolution lies an emotional upheaval of moral indignation, revulsion and fury with the powers-that-be, such that one cannot demur or remain silent, whatever the cost.
>
> —Theodor Shanin, *Revolution as a Moment of Truth*[1]

Political-conflict theorists have advanced our understanding of political action by focusing on the social phenomena that make up collective mobilization and by considering the socio-structural conditions such as polity-state relations under which political actors are constituted.[2] This effort has done much to reveal revolutionary action as rational, instrumental, or purposively motivated mobilization (as opposed to being driven by "irrational" motives or frustration – aggression mechanisms). The actual organizational mechanisms (e.g., social movement organizations, SMOs), political mechanisms (e.g., oppositional networking, coalition-making), and political opportunity structures through which

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fiscal and political resources are mobilized have been a hallmark of this focus on the political. This emphasis on the political resource-making and opportunity processes, however, has tended to bypass the subjective agent, especially in terms of how cultural, emotional, and interpretive processes constitute her or him. This convergence on the organizational and structural too often subsumes the meanings associated with revolutionary experience by both activists and non-activists alike.[3] The experience of participants – the blood and the tears, the joy and the horror, and the existential meaning inherent in class, political, and revolutionary struggle – more often than not are taken for granted. Or as James Jasper has noted, "There is a tendency to start explanations of protest with the networks of organizations already composing the movement, ignoring what happens at the level of biography and culture that might make people available and willing" to participate either as part of or alongside a movement trajectory.[4] This recognition has translated into an appreciation for how culture, biography, and subjectivity do matter in the analysis of politics. As such, the political processes, goals and interests, and strategies of action that make for contentious politics are now increasingly understood as culturally embedded, signified, and embodied, and ultimately as matters of subjectivity.

In the sociology of revolutions the concern with culture, subjectivity, and agency has assumed a central position in explanations of revolutionary mobilization. In the 1980s, for example, the theoretical concern with subjectivity as agentic fostered an interest in understanding the degree to which revolutionary mobilization was driven by ideological motives.[5] This focus on the relationship between ideology and mobilization was subsequently followed by one that touched on the role of the relationship among symbols, meanings, and networks in the making of revolutions.[6] While not displacing structural analysis as a mode of interpretation, the works that represent this latter venue increasingly "discovered" that "different social groups may embrace different versions" of contention or opposition.[7] This discovery opened the door to a complex universe of revolutionary meanings; one that revealed a spectrum of consciousness in the making of revolution. As a result, a focus on the effects of *discourse*, the relationship between popular culture and ideology, and language has gained momentum in the analysis of this semiotic complexity behind revolutionary mobilization.[8]

In this wave of subjectively focused inquiries on the meaning of political activism, recent studies have turned their attention to researching

the contingent as interpretive and interactive; and the temporal, spatial, emotional, and demographic in revolutionary and social movement contexts as a way of "going beyond" cultural interpretations of political contention.[9] Scholars of contentious politics, that is, have begun to consider those processes that reveal social change dynamics as less teleological in nature, in their more conditional, more fluid, and ultimately more *dynamic*, yet consequential, features. This is yet another way the classical tradition with its *disciplined* focus on rational calculus, the organizational, and structural has been challenged. One especially effective way to reveal revolutionary (or contentious) politics as more than "rational" or as a matter of subjectivity has been the specific focus on emotions as a significant component of political mobilization.[10] These latter works reveal the "political as emotional" by exposing the resource-making and opportunity processes that make political mobilization feasible as being made possible through the very emotions the conditions of the political evoke. This focus on emotions and the aforementioned new trends represent in part an attempt to capture the nature of contentious politics in less formulaic terms, in its more subjective features, and at a level of less abstraction.[11] They also signify an important challenge to the reificatory assumptions that come with classical dichotomies, including the reason/emotion one.

The present essay is an extension of previous work that sought to go beyond the political process model's tendency to prioritize a movement's ideology over popular culture.[12] While in this previous work the role of cultural idioms (religious and folkloric) are underscored in revolutionary mobilization with the latter purpose in mind, in this essay the critical evaluation of revolutionary events and emotions is considered another important way to challenge the political process model. Insurrectionary action is thus characterized here as being less about (but not to the exclusion of) a course of collective action organized and inspired according to the ideological pronouncements of revolutionary leaders. It is specifically analyzed, instead, as being more about the unfolding of a trajectory shaped by a series of actions and reactions and the pace of insurgency as participants and sympathizers alike encounter, interpret, and struggle to change their political reality.[13] In what follows, the prioritization of organization, ideology, and culture over and against contingency, spontaneity, and emotion that is often represented in paradigmatic expositions of revolutionary (political) activism is therefore challenged. The dynamics of revolution

are studied and careful attention is given to the events and emotional forces that constitute it.

How might revolutionary action be specifically a matter of emotions? What types of emotions play a role during insurrectionary conditions? Do variant kinds of revolutionary scenarios make a difference in the way revolution is experienced? Answering these questions requires one to do several things: (1) to examine the relationship that events and revolutionary testimonies have to the emotional study of revolutionary action as a matter of methodology; (2) to consider the specific types of emotions and events that (and how they) play a role in the making of revolution; and (3) to include the perspectives of revolutionary participants and observers as a way to ground the latter empirically.

The following is proposed. In addition to revolutionary ideology, popular culture, and organization, emotions matter in the making of revolution. These function as motors and evaluative components – narrative projects – of revolutionary involvement. Additionally, I here regard the different types of events that make for revolution – theorized here as *revolutionary accelerators* – as emotional climates through which revolutionary participation is coalesced. In this study, moral outrage and hope are examined as the typical dominant emotions connected to revolutionary accelerators. Briefly, moral outrage and hope played significant roles in the mobilization of revolutionary action respectively under conditions of state de-legitimation (governing accelerators) and when the potential of "popular power" showed promise (planned and contingent accelerators). Other emotions such as anger and fear are also considered in the analysis. These, however, while interpreted as playing a role in people's decision to become revolutionary participants, are evaluated in terms of how they helped mobilize dominant emotions. The above propositions, moreover, are studied in light of historical materials. The main source of data used to elaborate these is the volume *¡Y Se Armó La Runga!* As a record of revolutionary experiences for Nicaraguans, this volume contains choice testimonies of significant events that make possible an evaluation of revolutionary emotions during the insurrectionary period.

As a way to come to terms with the event-specific emotional dimensions of Nicaragua's insurrectionary period, therefore, this article focuses on testimonial accounts of key events that shaped the political climate and the trajectory of the insurrection. To accomplish the latter the following

objectives are explored: (1) a methodological approach that considers how events function as generators of revolutionary action, how event-related emotions are significant, and why testimonial accounts matter in the study of emotions; (2) an understanding of how emotions matter at the general level and in the context of revolution; (3) an evaluation of the role of some key emotions, dominant and otherwise, in the making of revolution; and (4) an understanding of the contexts under which revolutionary emotions take place and how these and the emotions in play respectively interact with each other.

Ultimately, the purpose of this article is not to provide the reader with a "new" social history of the insurrectionary struggle in Nicaragua. I instead endeavor to study the independent role of emotions under particular revolutionary contexts. This position does not discount the viable role of culture, ideology, and organizational ties in the making of revolution and how these connect to emotions. But it does privilege the independent effect of environmental (event) forces – including spontaneous and un-anticipated ones – and emotional responses as equally important dimensions of revolutionary mobilization. As such, key events and emotions are identified (and explored) below – while also considering the role of the FSLN – as constituents of revolutionary action.

Let us then begin with a commentary on the insurrection and the nature of the evidence at hand as a matter of historical contextualization before we proceed with the aforementioned analytic agenda.

The insurrectionary struggle in Nicaragua

The history of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua has received considerable attention. While the structural, political, and mobilizational circumstances that set apart Nicaragua's insurrectionary period from other political conflicts have been documented, revolution analysts still offer interpretations that remain at a level of analysis that does not really capture the texture of revolutionary action. For one, the picture that we are provided with, almost invariably, paints collective actors as operating harmoniously under the revolutionary hegemony of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) or as identifying with the formally articulated ideologies of the latter vanguard group, despite evidence to the contrary.[14] Additionally, little *systematic* sociological attention has been given to the emotional textures that accompanied the

revolutionary experience of Nicaraguans.[15] While the organizational efforts of the FSLN were an essential component of the revolutionary offensive, the challenge that culminated in the victorious overthrow of the Somoza regime Summer of 1979 was not primarily a matter of revolutionary vanguard undertaking.[16]

The rising and unfolding of revolution entailed much more than the active role revolutionary cadres played. It also was a matter of political contingency (the dynamics of revolution) and action-specific subjectivity (emotions). Many revolutionary participants carried on purposefully during the insurrectionary struggle, but this did not always mean that they acted with a vision in mind, according to an articulated philosophy, or with any specific conception of social change for the future (excepting, of course, a future without Somoza). A series of emotional moments, heated encounters with the state military, and desperate efforts to bring about change also define the revolutionary dynamics that culminated in the overthrow of the dictatorship. Many people often took arms against the state on their own, as part of the unfolding of the insurrection. Some people participated in the struggle out of ideological conviction (from the perspective of Marxist or liberation theology beliefs, with the emotions that this entailed); but many others as a matter of survival, because they were inspired by ongoing events to do so, or because they sought to reconcile a world turned asunder. The testimonies of revolutionary participants make this latter political and subjective reality explicitly clear, including the one by revolutionary leader Humberto Ortega, who admitted as much shortly after the overthrow when he acknowledged that "The mass movement was ahead of the vanguard's capacity to lead it" and the FSLN had to put itself "at the front of that current [popular momentum] in order to more or less direct and channel it."[17] The emotional responses that accompanied these "ideologically-neutral" actions were significant too, needless to say, if only because there was power in numbers. Yet, the image that we have of the revolution to this day is one that sees it as primarily a Sandinista phenomenon, despite evidence that underscores the independent role of political dynamics, emotions (mainly of a journalistic kind, though), and the complex heterogeneous nature of the revolutionary struggle.[18]

On the historical record(s)

While the historical analysis of Nicaragua's insurrectionary period here has roots in fieldwork excursions in Nicaragua during the 1990s

(interview data from the fieldwork are used here, although to a very limited extent), the major resource from which this piece draws its testimonial data is a collection of interviews conducted a year following the overthrow of the Somoza regime. These testimonies were collected and compiled in written form by members of the Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo (IES) from Institute of Nicaraguan and Central American History (IHNCA) materials. As a source developed to chronicle the experiences of Nicaraguans during the insurrectionary period, *¡Y Se Armó La Runga! Testimonios de la Insurrección Popular Sandinista en Masaya* [*And the Struggle Intensified: Testimonies from the Popular Insurrection in Masaya*] offers the revolutionary analyst fertile ground for analyzing revolutionary conditions.[19] This record of revolutionary legacy, 400-plus pages in length, reveals a gripping history of revolutionary battles and events in the district of Masaya, a hotbed of insurrectionary activity given its location as a corridor between the two major western cities of Managua (the Capital) and Grenada. The convergence on this *hot* region and the experience of revolutionary events therein are thus especially useful for reader and interpreter alike to appreciate revolution palpably, to "capture" revolutionary experience in its emotional dimensions. Although the testimonies from *¡Y Se Armó La Runga!* largely reflect the revolutionary experiences of Masaya residents, other available testimonial, ethnographic, and oral history sources project similar experiences, feelings, and thoughts about revolutionary action and involvement.[20]

In addition to the aforementioned reasons, I focus on the testimonies of this specific volume for other ones. For one, the volume is unique in that there is very little analysis of the testimonies. Unlike most testimony-based books on the Nicaraguan revolution *¡Y Se Armó La Runga!* contains virtually no commentary or analysis on revolutionary experience. Except for the one-and-a-half page introduction that calls to the reader's attention how the testimonies describe "the emotional, moral, and physical" dimensions of revolutionary experience and how the latter reveal a process of political consciousness formation and a challenge that culminated in revolutionary victory, and the fact that the narrative follows a chronological order, the volume is strictly a collection of testimonies.[21] Secondly, the testimonies from *¡Y Se Armó La Runga!* – contrary to paradigmatic scholarship claims on revolution that downplay social-psychological dynamics – underscore the role of spontaneous actions, emergent collectivities, and contingency in the generation and making of insurrectionary mobilization. Thirdly, the

events, emotions, and texture of revolutionary dynamics that the testimonies touch on made the volume an ideal point of departure for examining revolution in subjective terms. Fourthly, despite the partisan claim in the introduction that the revolution was a Sandinista phenomenon, a large number of the testimonies therein reveal a more complex reality that raises issues related to the political nature of revolutionary subjectivity. Lastly, while *¡Y Se Armó La Runga!* represents the commemoration of the insurrectionary struggle and symbolizes the revolutionary legacy for many Nicaraguans, it also shows how revolution unfolds independent of vanguardist coordination. This latter point was particularly attractive in light of the tendency within the discipline of the sociology of revolutions to focus on vanguardist-based (ideological) mobilization.

Before moving on to the empirical analysis of revolutionary emotions via testimonies, let us proceed with a discussion of the methodological bases upon which this study builds in the section that immediately follows and specifically consider the emotional and event dimensions of revolutionary action in the sections that come next.

A methodology for understanding revolutionary emotions: Considering significant events and stories of change

Understanding revolutionary action/mobilization is quite a different thing from making sense of revolution as a structural phenomenon. The social mechanisms that fuel the formation of revolutionary action are not always structural in nature, even though these mechanisms themselves share a relationship with the structures that "cause" revolution. The root causes of mobilizational contexts are more immediate than those of revolution as a "macro-event." This requires that we examine the actual "conditions of protest mobilization"[22] as "micro-events" with their own distinct "effect." For example, Rick Fantasia and François Furet have noted in their respective studies of political mobilization that political actors can "suddenly" assume a new and radical orientation under the dynamics of contention.[23] Studies that focus on strikes, riots, protests, collective action, political demonstrations, contentious claim-making, or other related categories of events have similarly called attention to an assumed logic of action during the course of political contention.[24] Revolutionary activism does not follow an irrational or "volcanic" impulse either – Rod Aya plainly

reveals the inadequacies of such a posture[25] – instead it takes on a different logic of action as political actors encounter, interpret, and respond to their social and political realities, to the dynamics of revolutionary struggle. Michael Mann regards this type of "situational context" as occasioning an "explosion of consciousness" that fosters popular action against existing institutional arrangements.[26] How do events specifically matter in the "sudden" undertaking of revolutionary orientation? How do event specific testimonies matter in the study of revolutionary emotions?

Environmental forces matter in the shaping and unfolding of a revolutionary trajectory. Significant historical episodes such as a revolution are transformative instances representing the impact of "subjective meaning" onto the historical stage.[27] Events, as Philip Abrams notes, are an "indispensable prism" through which social action may be understood.[28] The literature on social movements and revolutionary cases invariably centers its attention on events that threaten the quotidian, incite a citizenry's moral outrage, undermine the legitimation of polity structures, inspire people to protest or to partake in revolution, or embody the "political opportunities" through which social and revolutionary movements coalesce.[29] As "defining moments" of history, events are both key constitutive elements and the context (or "place") of a political trajectory. Revolutionary events are action-oriented contexts that open the political field to strategic interpretation by activists and non-activists alike. Events shape the political because they call attention to previously unseen problems, encourage or inspire people sitting on the bench to take sides, and make believable oppositional understandings.[30] These latter factors make them especially useful for understanding changes in consciousness and collective beliefs.

Referring to the taking of the Bastille in 1789, William Sewell notes that events "signify something new and surprising. They introduce new conceptions of what really exists (the violent crowd as the people's will in action), of what is good (the people in ecstatic union), and of what is possible (revolution, a new kind of regeneration of the state and nation)."[31] Historical events may thus be conceptualized "as dislocation and transformative rearticulations of structures."[32] That is, they represent instances of socio-psychological, cultural, and discursive signification in the shaping of political conditions.[33] This position has been echoed more recently by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, who have theorized events as contingent – i.e., environmental

(external) – mechanisms that have a unifying effect on the course of the political. They note that while such events as "opportunity spirals," "cascades of contention," historical precipitants, or "suddenly imposed grievances," do "*not* result from purposive human activity," they do "trigger" interpretive and interactive mechanisms that in turn engender the political meanings that shape the course of dynamics of contention and political trajectories.[34]

But how might events be connected to emotion? As Sewell notes, they "raise . . . the emotional intensity of life," but more significantly, event-related emotions are "a constitutive ingredient of many transformative actions."[35] Politically significant or revolutionary events not only give rise to hope and moral outrage, but they can also push people to overcome their fears.[36] In doing so, they make revolutionary mobilization possible. Also, inasmuch as events focus the attention of potential participants to particular problems, they provide a "cognitive space" for re-evaluating an existing political order according to political strategies, moral standards, or the exigencies of the social climate. Because dramatic or consequential events are also accompanied by collectively shared emotions,[37] they are in effect "emotional climates" that similarly help define the unfolding of the political.[38] As such, revolutionary events represent an "emotional space" through which actors define the political environment; a space that can clue us into the role emotions play in the making of revolutionary politics and the emergence of insurrectionary actors.

The perspective that is advanced in this piece also echoes Thomas Scheff's ideas about the dialectic between event and emotional response.[39] Scheff refers to two causal forces, *triggers* and *motors*, in his exploration of ethnic conflict. While triggers represent the macro-social in the form of events, motors are the "micro-systems," including the emotional responses associated with events, "which continuously maintain [intra-group] stability and [inter-group] conflict."[40] This dynamic, moreover, is not only driven by the actual emotions that are part of the conflict but it is also constituted through the very emotions that come into play (Scheff examines the role of shame and pride in conflict) during specific encounters. The present position on the role of emotions during revolutionary conditions speaks to Scheff's trigger-motor dynamic in a few key ways: (1) at a general level contexts matter, and it makes little sense to consider emotions independent of collective action dimensions, including the event-contexts within which they

emerge; (2) as immediate causes of revolution, revolutionary events are instances of signification that "change the way in which social actors think [and feel] about the meaning and importance they assign to modes of action;"[41] and (3) the emotional responses that emerge within these contexts set in motion or function as the motors that keep alive the signification processes that are associated with both the events and the actions undertaken to address the perceived effects events bring.

How are testimonies useful to the study of revolutionary emotions? Language, whether in speech (oral) or written form, has numerous communicative functions, including an emotive function that expresses subjective states.[42] As a form of speech, testimonies are an essential carrier of meaning, especially in terms of the context of activity.[43] For one, they convey information about situational and social contexts, and the events that constitute these. Secondly, as spoken declarations (as opposed to written ones) about remembered events, the individual that provides a testimony offers a more immediate access to an observed or experienced dimension of reality (that even after being recorded, transcribed, and used in a text, can remain an important primary historical source).[44] Thirdly, as speech, testimonies contain a variety of verbal markers that are "measurable."[45] These verbal markers are an indication of psychological, cognitive, and emotional states that are context and action specific. Hope, anger, fear, and a variety of other emotions may be ascertained through an individual's verbal behavior. As such, testimonies are a useful way to access and partially to "read" the very complex emotional dimensions connected to revolutionary action. While emotions are not entirely accessible to thought (and cannot be reduced to cognitive/interpretive practices), verbal markers do give us enough information about these to appreciate the emotional realities associated with revolution.

The stories people tell about their experience of revolution, additionally, reveal how subjective meanings are attached to the unfolding of historical events. These stories are "narratives of events" that convey much sociological information about the social and political climates.[46] In effect, such event narratives are "sociobiographical benchmarks" representing the intersection of biography and sociopolitical moments in time.[47] As "biographical reconstructions" of the political, revolutionary testimonies "allow us to observe the way in which history forms . . . individual consciousness, how public events intervene in private life, and how perceptions [of such events] shape

behavior."[48] They represent a "connective structure" to an experienced political past,[49] and as such allow us to appreciate the relation between motive and action. Because they allow the analyst to "bring people back in" to the study of revolutionary politics, they are a useful resource for deconstructing taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of revolutionary action and for adding insight to the interpretation of mobilizational dynamics.[50] As first-hand accounts of political participation or experience, they are especially significant for making sense of the role of emotions in protest cycles, movement emergence, and the upkeep of contention.[51] Revolutionary testimonies can similarly make a contextual (or historically situated) understanding of emotions possible.

Let us now consider how exactly emotions matter at the general level and in the context of revolution; the role of moral outrage, hope, fear, and anger in the making of revolution; the type of revolutionary events within which the latter emotions emerge; and how do these events and emotions interact to make revolutionary action possible.

Emotions, revolutionary contexts, and the making of revolution

Emotions permeate all dimensions of social existence. They are part of our responses to the environment and they shape our actions. While emotions can be pre-reflective and individuals may be "seized" by them on occasion, this does not mean that they *always* neutralize an individual's ability to pursue specific goals. Scholars who research emotions have discovered these do not always pose an obstacle to action. Contrary to received wisdom, emotions are *not* based on irrationality and they do *not* undermine reason. Emotion and reason are mutually constitutive of each other.[52] This means that emotions are "rational" insofar as they are understandable ways of responding to specific events or situations. For example, it is certainly "rational" for someone to feel happiness or jealousy when they are in love, just as it is "rational" to feel sadness or despair following the death of a significant-other.[53] As such, emotions are "evaluative responses" to the maintenance of and changes in social life.[54] Research similarly reveals emotional responses as context-specific.[55] Other studies on emotion also demonstrate its scripted and organizational role during interactional moments.[56] Emotions are also considered important constituents of social transactions and key components in the transformation of consciousness.[57] Contemporary scholarship, in fact, much like C. Wright Mill's "vocabulary of

motives," recognizes emotions as motives for action.[58] As motives, emotions energize, facilitate responses, and give direction, intensity, and persistence to action.

Emotions are also *embodied* by definition because they are a way of being-in-the-world, given the centrality of the body in the experiencing and knowing of the world, and precisely because of *where* actors are located. This to say that emotions follow a "socio-corporeal logic" that allows individuals to make sense of and act upon the social contexts in which they find themselves.[59] This way of being-in-the-world is a purposive and meaningful response to social-relational contexts. That is, emotions are a context-specific sensuous, embodied, meaningful, and engaged way of being-in-the-world-with-others; given how we inherently share more than a cognitively-driven inter-subjective world.[60] They are "*embodied* existential modes of being . . . that centrally involve self-feelings . . . and an active engagement with the world."[61]

According to Jack Katz, emotions are invisible forces that mediate the natural interdependence between *embodied* subjectivity (i.e., the bodied individual/self) and *perceived* objectivity (e.g., social environment, the "other," people). Emotions are situation-responsive and situation-transcendent narrative projects that allow an individual to navigate social situations or to establish ontological security when unforeseen, unexpected, or extra-ordinary circumstances violate an individual's *embodied* sense of social reality.[62] One's navigation of the social takes place as one *feels* the environment: As one *feels* how "one's actions are difficult or easy," how "the matter at hand is simple or densely complex," how what is being done follows a familiar or unfamiliar path; how what one is doing separates or connects one to others; and how encountered situations may call for a habitual or novel response.[63] When an individual's expectations of reality are violated, emotions help her *color* the "feeling" of a situation. As she negotiates an "unfamiliar" reality or social situation that violates her practical expectations, an emotional response does several things for her. It amplifies her sense that she is *in* an unknown social situation, as she is *stirred* by the emotion. The emotional response to the unfamiliar situation similarly allows her to recognize how her taken-for-granted (i.e., practical or unreflexive) embodied conduct is situated in a larger interactional context that confronts her as an *alien* social reality that shapes her experience. That is, the given emotion allows her to sense her-self "as taken by

and as part of forces that are beyond [her] subjective control."[64] This estranged encounter similarly functions as a referent in her re-definition and re-embodiment of *her* situation – it allows her to re-situate herself – and depending on the emotion that is in play, also functions as the basis for an active or passive project of situation-transcendence. The encounter represents an instance of embodied (and emotional) dissonance that allows her to re-define her situation emotionally. At each stage of embodied awareness – becoming acutely aware of one's place in an unfamiliar or unknown situation, of one's subjection and dependence to it, and ultimately working toward transcending it actively or passively – a given emotion reveals to the actor themes of transformation that help her along in her project of transcendence. The meaning of the situation is thus interpreted, constructed, and transcended through embodied emotions. This means emotions are narrative projects – or projects of transcendence – that give direction to action when an individual's sense of social reality is challenged or open to interpretation. Emotions, because they presuppose an historico-cultural context, therefore help diagnose the severity and urgency of a given "problem," facilitate understandings of the efficacy and feasibility of actions, and ultimately, help embody an active or otherwise course of transcendence.

While these emotional principles of orientation are often observed in everyday settings, this does not mean that they do not play a role in revolutionary situations. Emotions are "the 'link' between personal problems and broader public issues."[65] The charged atmosphere of revolutionary dynamics would, therefore, make "emotional scripts" and emotionally embodied responses necessary constituents of action and consciousness transformation.[66] In given political contexts emotions are transformative in their effect, important motives for political involvement,[67] and key constituents of political identity. Emotions, therefore, stand as existential "toolkits" that generally operate at the non-discursive level and function as narrative projects of transcendence in the immediacy of revolutionary situations. They shape revolutionary action directly. Under revolutionary conditions, people un-reflexively use them to evaluate and frame their sense of reality, to organize their experience, and to chart courses of action out of ontologically untenable conditions. Ultimately, emotions are individual and collective mediums of communication (sensuous and otherwise)[68] that embody the revolutionary-political; often in the absence of favorable opportunity contexts.[69]

What type of emotions might function as motives for revolutionary mobilization? Although revolution can encompass a wide variety of emotions, from shame, outrage, pride, and joy, to fear, hope, regret, and fatalism, the present article focuses on moral outrage and hope as reactive, "high order," and "dominant" emotions that function as motive for revolutionary action.[70] It also focuses on fear and anger (and considers the role of other emotions). The former emotions are evaluative, action-oriented, responses to encountered or ongoing events. They are similarly "dominant" insofar as they are the central emotions that define specific revolutionary events.[71] Fear and anger are similarly evaluative in nature and facilitate revolutionary involvement but they work to mobilize moral outrage and hope. What about moral outrage and hope?

- *Moral outrage* "can be a powerful motivation for protest when there is someone to blame for . . . injustice. . . . [and] is a logical reaction to . . . torture, disappearances, and assassinations."[72] It plays a significant role in the delegitimation of the polity and the engendering of collective action whenever state conduct is perceived as arbitrary, as violating willy-nilly what is socially accepted as "just," "allowable" punishment, and "bearable" suffering.[73] As such moral outrage is as much a reaction to specific events or objects as it is to "felt obligations and rights."[74] Because it provides "targets" it often leads people to confront state authority under revolutionary situations based on the perception of social injustice(s).
- *Hope* is the pleasure of empowerment, "a sense of 'flow' in protest and politics, or the anticipation of a better state of affairs in the future."[75] It is a mobilizational outlet for anger and moral outrage, and sometimes fear. Hope is mobilized by transformative events or shifts in the cultural and political climate that are favorable – symbolically, militarily, or otherwise – to political challengers.

Fear also plays a role in revolutionary mobilization. While fear can clearly function to thwart the emergence of political mobilization, it can also encourage people to take action. Fear "leads to actors' realization of where their interests lie, and points in the right direction at what might be done to achieve them."[76] This is especially the case when the political climate is perceived as a threat to ontological security.[77] Fear often leads to moral outrage and can be the foundation of hopeful outlooks in revolutionary contexts. Similarly, *anger* can help prospective revolutionary participants evaluate the political climate in oppositional ways. Although anger is a more "immediate" and "automatic"

emotional response to situational contexts, it often plays a role in the evaluation of circumstances or events as unacceptable when perceptions of violation against what is considered intuitively, morally, or socially righteous emerge. Anger is a behavioral form of expression that helps define a "target" by virtue of its "automatic" and "intuitive" response. "High order" emotions (evaluative emotions) such as hope and moral outrage, which require a greater degree of evaluation processing, are often fueled by such primary emotions as anger and fear. Anger is a key component of the "targeting" in moral outrage – the automatic/intuitive response that anger brings to a target is justified and expanded by the moral evaluation of the target – and it is a source of energy for hope when people sense that they are "winning" (especially against odds).

Let us now consider the event-contexts within which these and other revolutionary emotions emerged, before moving on to explore the relationship between events and emotions.

Revolutionary accelerators as the context of emotions

Revolutionary actors are transformed in the very dynamics of contention that define the political climate, and as such adopt a "situational logic" to navigate the political terrain.[78] They are constituted as much by their participation in social networks and oppositional organizations as by the contentious contexts, the dynamics of revolutionary trajectories, and the "emotional energy"[79] that promotes the unfolding of revolution. What kind of revolutionary contexts can facilitate the making of revolution? And how might these relate to emotions?

In Nicaragua, revolutionary events helped capture the popular imagination, provided an opportunity for the political climate to be re-evaluated, and made it possible for (potential) insurgents to appreciate and "paint" the state of the political as one in need of change, requiring their revolutionary involvement. These events "render[ed] the established political order more vulnerable and receptive to challenge."[80] The analysis of testimonies from those who experienced the dynamics of the revolutionary struggle, moreover, reveals how events shaped the revolutionary trajectory, and how the interpretive, interactive, and emotional dimensions therein played a significant role in the "making" of revolution. What type and combination of events ushered in this uncommon outcome? The conflictual event-contexts within which revolutionary

subjects emerge may be understood as being dynamically constituted through three types of revolutionary events:[81]

- *Governing accelerators*, state-driven events that delegitimate the government in people's minds and set in motion a revolutionary momentum. Arbitrary repression, political subterfuge, and social or economic policies that negatively affect the nation are emblematic of this type of event;[82]
- *Planned accelerators*, "riots, strikes, mutinies, assassinations, attacks, attempted coups, and so forth, which revolutionary activists instigate in the express hope of [setting in motion] a broader revolutionary response;"[83] and
- *Contingent accelerators*, events "whose revolutionary significance and consequences are almost completely unanticipated by the authorities, the revolutionaries, and the perpetrators of the deed,"[84] but whose seemingly "spontaneous" quality has deep historical as well as contemporaneous roots.

These events provided the necessary "inter-subjective contexts," including the emotional climates, for the making of a successful revolutionary trajectory. Revolutionary accelerators dislocated the existing social structures of the Somoza regime, and as such "precipitated a crisis of the very principles of the social and political order."[85] This resulted in the widespread belief that revolutionary participation was an indispensable course of action. The emotional responses to revolutionary accelerators gave rise to and expanded a (growing) desire for revolution.

On the one hand, governing accelerators usually functioned as "moral shocks;" that is, as events that violated deeply held taken-for-granted assumptions about how Nicaraguan society operated (even under conditions of dictatorship).[86] This type of events indicated that there were problems with the governing structures of society. They "triggered" high degrees of emotional responses – mainly moral outrage – against the state for violating willy-nilly "felt obligations and rights" and for transgressing perceptions of "allowable" punishment and "bearable" suffering. As a result, these events facilitated the de-legitimation of the state in civil society – the moral outrage incurred helped people see the state as an illegitimate governing structure – and prompted many to take action against it. Contingent and planned accelerators, on the other hand, mainly functioned as "models of success" that raised the level of collective hope for future popular victories against the state

military and ultimately the overthrow of the regime.[87] These types of events therefore mediated the potential for oppositional mobilization. Revolutionary accelerators frequently fed off of each other, moreover, during the course of the insurrection. This also meant that the dominant emotions in play often similarly interacted. This event – emotional interaction added to a growing (and already existent) emotional and cognitive embodiment of insurrectionary action. As instances of emotional signification, revolutionary accelerators thus helped move consciousness and action from mere liberatory potential to a powerful and successful liberatory force. The emotional responses to these events functioned as evaluative occasions of revolutionary situations and constituents of revolutionary involvement. They sustained intergroup conflict and revolutionary dispositions, and as a result helped cement popular determination to rid Nicaraguan society of the Somoza regime.

Other emotions such as fear, joy, love, hatred, and anger played a role during the course of insurrectionary events, but these generally worked to make moral outrage and hope the dominant emotions according to the specific context within which they emerged. Typically, fear, indignation, hatred, and anger mobilized moral outrage under conditions of state de-legitimation (governing accelerators); anger, fear, joy (happiness), sadness, trust, and love functioned as the basis for hope under situations where the potential of "popular power" showed promise (planned and contingent accelerators).

Revolutionary accelerators and emotions in the making of insurgent actors: The case of Nicaragua

While opposition against the Somoza regime may be traced from the beginning of the dynasty in the mid-1930s through the 1970s, we do not begin to see a more forcefully organized and articulated opposition until late 1974 with the formation of the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL), a diverse coalition opposed to the anti-democratic, personalized style, and exclusionary political practices the Somoza system represented. Most opposition to the regime up until then may be described as unsuccessful lobbying through conventional political channels. Inasmuch as grievances are structurally given,[88] what then facilitated the emergence of such a challenge and the subsequent revolutionary momentum that followed? A number of politically significant

events changed the course of political dynamics in 1970s. This shift in political dynamics "produce[d] rapid, and more or less dramatic, refocusing of feelings and ideas" about the political order.[89] These events, analyzed here as revolutionary accelerators: (1) delegitimated further an already politically unstable regime; (2) represented contexts of opportunity;[90] and (3) ultimately functioned as "triggers"[91] of popular mobilization as the revolutionary trajectory unfolded. The emotional responses that accompanied these revolutionary accelerators played a significant organizing role in the development of anti-state mobilization.

Governing accelerators

Focusing on the state as an actor allows us to understand one important way in which a revolutionary movement may gain momentum. Key scholars have in fact pointed to the usefulness of the concept of a "legitimation crisis" to interpret state and challenging group(s) dynamics during periods of intense political turmoil.[92] Although a statist approach does not sufficiently scrutinize collective action, it is especially useful in explaining why a revolutionary impetus gains popular momentum, and why and how revolutionary movements are "engendered." Jeff Goodwin distinguishes five state practices that potentially give rise to revolutionary crises: (1) state patronage of unpopular social and economic policies, (2) failure to include organized contenders in the political infrastructure, (3) indiscriminate state violence, (4) inadequate state policing, and (5) arbitrary rule that causes elite alienation.[93] The Somoza regime adopted all five of these practices. It implemented unpopular policies that alienated certain sectors of society at certain times; monopolized the political infrastructure and consequently "closed it off" from other political contenders; deployed massively indiscriminate state violence against the citizens; lost its military hold on society several months prior to revolutionary victory despite its mounting efforts to preserve it; and it governed arbitrarily, thereby alienating the elite (and I would add the middle and lower classes), with the post-earthquake reconstruction period being the most fitting example.

Two governing accelerators demonstrate how the state played a key part in its own demise by virtue of its arbitrary practices: its response to the earthquake of 1972 and the role it played in the assassination of

Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the state's most prominent liberal opponent, provided a context for fear and moral outrage to galvanize the opposition. Incidents of arbitrary state repression subsequent to Chamorro's assassination also played a role in people's decision to join the growing revolutionary momentum.

The 1972 earthquake

On December 23, 1972 Managua was hit by a devastating earthquake, which killed approximately 15,000 people in addition to leaving the urban center practically in rubble.[94] The United Nations estimated the cost of the natural disaster at $772 million. The tragedy proved to be an opportunity for the dynasty and its associates to enrich themselves through the monopolization of international aid and the rebuilding process that came after emergency measures. The dictator is actually remembered as saying that the earthquake represented a "revolution of possibilities."[95]

Somoza and those who were close to him pocketed much of the international financial and material donations that came into the country. Luis Palacios, a physician, recalls the time that "The Nicaraguan people received very little, compared to what reached" the country.[96] "They hoarded everything," he remembers: "The military filled warehouses with the best of everything."[97] The regime's machination also created a conflict of interest between the state and the traditional elite, given how the latter was excluded from the opportunities of investment and profitability that post-earthquake conditions offered. The elite, "who in the past had remained indifferent or rather content with Somocismo," reacted to the regime's earthquake-related exploitations, Palacios recalls. It was after this "that emerging resisting elements [within the elite] led to the formation of an industrial capitalist movement that was linked to some working class sectors."[98] A businessman recollects the social backlash against the regime that came after the earthquake.

> After the earthquake . . . [Somoza] began to want to be a bank owner, a construction company owner. His economic appetite grew to a higher level. . . he moved into the industry, banking, and construction sectors of the economy; he wanted to become a businessman beyond what he already controlled. All those sectors reacted . . . this led to an emotion that evoked an armed response and allowed for a popular insurrection. All those affected politically also reacted. It was a reaction of political parties, of working class confederations, of contractors, of everyone, and later of the international community.[99]

The earthquake worsened an already unstable economy. The wasted commercial and industrial landscape meant that 52,000 people – fifty-seven percent of Managua's economically active population – were left unemployed. This added pressure to an already precarious employment picture. Immediately following the earthquake, a young man, Ernesto Suarez Espinoza, remembers that

> there was an economic crisis in the country. There was no production because the factories were destroyed and so there was unemployment. Although I was young in age, I was aware of what was a tragedy and what was natural. Many Nicaraguans died; it was difficult to see so many children without their parents and suffering from the existing hunger. I was very upset by the whole thing.[100]

The disaster also arrived amidst a 2-year drought that devastated staple food yields. The drought introduced hunger to the rural areas and gave rise to a demographic rural outflow into the capital, compounding a troubled housing situation in Managua. The disaster, in some sense, proved to be much more of a social than a natural catastrophe. A woman relates the desperate position of Managuans at the time:

> After the catastrophe that took place, we witnessed a great number of dead people, children, mothers, the shortage of food and water. There was no protection forthcoming from the authorities, from the Somoza dictatorship. These persons [Somoza, the Guardia, and his associates] instead directed their attention to taking all that came in the form of aid to Nicaragua, while we were practically walking around naked; they left us without shelter. They would say that they were building houses for the victims, but it was only promises [as] they would only give houses to persons who were in bed with them. Somoza would feign before the world that he was doing something, but for us he was a brazen and shameless individual . . . [The Guardia] had a large mélange of usable [earthquake-relief] articles while the people were starving to death. One could [actually] hear the nation's lament. We lived a terrible situation, moving from place to place without a roof over our heads that lasted for almost a year . . . We were deceived . . . because nothing was ever done. This was a breeding place for cockroaches, for mice, for everything . . . There was great poverty.[101]

As a "moral shock" the 1972 earthquake started a sequence of events that gave shape to an anti-status quo movement. The post-earthquake conditions naturally made for difficult living and economic conditions. But the state's lack of social action exacerbated these, adding unnecessary deaths, pestilence, and humiliation to the experience of hunger, poverty, and homelessness. These realities were all the more painful given the recognition of the natural disaster as a social tragedy. The regime's selfish disregard for the welfare of the citizenry and Somoza's

monopolistic tendencies made it possible for Nicaraguans to begin reconsidering the state of the political in oppositional ways.

The assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro – "The spark that lit the spirit of the citizenry"

Another important but more "causally" significant governing accelerator, one that unquestionably confirmed the need to overcome the dictatorship in people's minds, was the assassination on January 10, 1978 of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, chief editor of *La Prensa* and the dictator's main symbolic political opponent. His murder broke the tense political situation wide open. Chamorro's death, recalls guerrilla commander, William Ramírez, "evidently awakened the people who were not aware of what was going on in Nicaragua. Many people who were more or less undecided, minding their own business, began to understand that the only alternative was the FSLN."[102] According to Jorge Gómez Taleno, a 50-year-old carpenter, it "was one more motive . . . for the people to finally enlighten their sentiments about the revolutionary struggle."[103] For revolutionary participant Miguel Maldonado Chamorro's assassination clearly

> helped people to integrate themselves [into the struggle] and tipped their hatred against the dictatorship; it unleashed their Sandinista disposition, their autonomous, sovereign, feeling that had been stored away within themselves for so many years. To my way of thinking, the death of P. J. Chamorro was not [itself] the banner of our people's struggle, but rather it was a medium through which people could bring to light their Sandinista, anti-imperialist, and anti-dictatorial feelings.[104]

The repression against the wakes, mass demonstrations, and general strikes that followed the moderate leader's funeral also demonstrated in people's minds the Guardia's terrorist capacity and "what Somoza was capable of."[105] These clashes between the state's military apparatus and ordinary citizens made it "apparent that the dictatorship did not mind killing people so that they could stay in power."[106] Instead of thwarting people's reactions, the deadly encounters with the Guardia functioned as a catalyst for "blaming the system." A 35-year-old shoemaker aptly captures this, through the use of a visceral metaphor:

> The repression during the wakes and manifestations was the fuse that aroused [popular] rancor. The nation projected its rancor and vomited what it had been storing [for years]. This was a point of departure [predisposing people into action].[107]

The violence against the public outcry outraged the population, and thus made possible the framing of state actions as unacceptable.

All social sectors in society reacted and "the resulting outrage coalesced all opposition to the regime into a single movement."[108] The elite, for one, ceased to perceive Somoza as "an ally, or an asset, or even [as] tolerable," but instead saw him as a threat, an "uncontrollable menace, not only to their vested interests but also to their lives."[109] This palpable life-threatening impression similarly engulfed the majority of people in society. Lazaro García, a pyro-technician, recalls thinking at the time that "If they killed a nationally and internationally known man, that must mean that Somoza is going to begin killing half of all humanity."[110] The assassination of Chamorro thus fomented and consolidated popular resistance. Seventy-year-old retired architect Héctor Meléndez recalls its dramatic impact on political dynamics:

> It was the spark that lit the spirit of the citizenry. At that time Sandinismo had not developed to its full extent. The people were always doubtful and afraid . . . With the death, that is, "The Assassination of Pedro Joaquín," the people took to the streets. And from there on Somoza signed his death sentence. The nation, all of the social classes supported the Sandinista revolutionary movement. There was not a stratum that did not participate in the process . . . From the death of Pedro Joaquín on . . . Somocismo began to fall. The people had made a decision that culminated with the triumph of July 19.[111]

Chamorro's assassination contributed to the belief that political amelioration via "formal" channels was an inadequate means of bringing about change. The event, to borrow Barrington Moore's words, made people's suffering "traceable to the acts of concrete, easily identifiable persons."[112] It may be noted that at this point in the insurrection the oppositional bourgeoisie, which had worked first through reformist channels, increasingly radicalized its posture, eventually slipping into union with the FSLN. To a leader of a left-of-center organization, the United People's Movement (MPU), Chamorro's assassination "went beyond Pedro Joaquín, it represented the death of the opposition by Somoza."[113] Affecting conservative, liberal, and revolutionary forces alike, the unexpected state action rendered the political climate ever more inauthentic and propelled many to adopt revolutionary involvement as a course of action.

The conduct of the Somoza state following the 1972 earthquake and Chamorro's assassination made transparent its illegitimate bases. As governing accelerators, the two events helped along the unfolding of an

emerging and mounting revolutionary trajectory. The events, to borrow Maldonado's words, were "a medium through which people could bring to light" their "anti-dictatorial revolutionary feelings." The unnecessary suffering that came with the negligence of the post-quake reconstruction process, coupled with the arbitrary violence leveled against popular demonstrations honoring Chamorro as a martyr also helped engender an oppositional evaluation of political conditions. The testimonies similarly reveal these transformative events as evoking strong emotional responses from a range of different people. The fear ("If they killed a nationally and internationally known man [Chamorro], that must mean that Somoza is going to begin killing half of all humanity"), hatred ("The nation projected its rancor and vomited what it had been storing [for years]"), indignation ("it was difficult to see so many children without their parents and suffering from the existing hunger"), perceived betrayal ("Somoza would feign before the world that he was doing something, but for us he was a brazen and shameless individual . . . We were deceived") and palpable anger ("Although I was young in age, I was aware of what was a tragedy and what was natural . . . I was very upset by the whole thing") associated with the events fed into a growing sense of moral outrage. This made it possible for people to blame the dictatorship for what they experienced, observed, or perceived as injustices; and ultimately played a role in the continued growth of an armed response and popular insurrection that eventually culminated in the overthrow of the Somoza regime.[114]

Planned accelerators and their consequences

Under revolutionary and repressive conditions, revolutionary vanguard groups confront the state forces head on in an effort to bring about changes in the socio-political climate. Sometimes guerilla-driven insurgencies, despite military weakness, achieve symbolic and political victories. These symbolic and political events can in turn fuel a liberatory potential in people's imagination or enable the growth of a collective belief that sees the state's governing and military apparatuses as vulnerable and as capable of being challenged. This type of episode can also help galvanize opposition against the state.

In the 1970s the FSLN managed to stay in the public eye through encounters with the Guardia, bank robberies, and student and worker protests as well as military offensives, generating and fueling ongoing revolutionary clashes. The hostage crises at the National Palace and

"Chema" Castillo's house and the October 1977 and September 1978 offensives were key guerrilla-driven events that captured the popular imagination and helped transform widespread disaffection into insurrections. The guerrilla strikes added to the unfolding conviction that the state's policing apparatus could be overcome through insurrectionary participation and that the FSLN, as the armed option to the anti-Somoza struggle, represented the interests of the vast majority. However, the orchestrated guerrilla offensives, given the already heightened state of political conflict, not only accelerated popular mobilization but also provoked the state to escalate its militaristic measures against perceived growing guerrilla and popular threats. The intense repressive periods that followed these events contributed to the expanding belief that Somoza needed to be overthrown simply because human existence had become progressively, arbitrarily, and perilously threatened. The state's repressive tactics, instead of diminishing popular contention, emboldened many to participate in the growing popular opposition against the regime. These tit-for-tat tactics attenuated the state's "hold" on civil society, expanded hope among many others to confront the state effectively, and ultimately contributed to the progressive course and eventual success of revolutionary action. We may thus deduce that in the case of Nicaragua the combination of governing and planned accelerators – i.e., state repression and guerilla-driven attacks – raised the potential success of revolutionary mobilizations, despite the fact that numerous FSLN offensives achieved symbolically as opposed to militarily favorable outcomes. Let us now consider the specified episodes of contention individually.

The hostage crisis at "Chema" Castillo's house and its repressive aftermath

On December 27, 1974, thirteen guerrillas raided a diplomatic reception for the American Ambassador at the house of José Maria "Chema" Castillo, a well-known and wealthy Somoza supporter who had also been a former minister of agriculture. Key national executives, relatives, and personal friends of Somoza were taken hostage following the Ambassador's departure. Although the daring assault did *not* expand into full-fledged insurrections, the spirited crowd at the airport that had come to see the Sandinistas off subsequent to hostage negotiations made it clear that the guerrilla maneuver was a popular victory against the dictator. A 20-year-old campesino recognized the moment as putting the FSLN on the map "as the only alternative to the Somocista

dictatorship, the only organization offering a liberatory armed struggle for our people."[115] Two years after the earthquake's social tragedy, the guerrilla assault became a significant factor in people's growing liberatory "awareness" simply because it "intensely reverberated" and created hope across the nation.[116]

Somoza, concerned over the guerrilla-spurred collective enthusiasm, tightened his grip on society and responded to the attack with a state of siege (Operation Aguila VI) of unparalleled indiscriminate state repression that lasted until September 1977. By late 1976, despite some successful Sandinista operations in the rural areas, the Guardia's efforts to eliminate the guerrillas were largely successful. The Sandinistas incurred a loss of many of their leaders and militants, including the death of Carlos Fonseca Amador, the key ideologue and one of the founders of the FSLN. The state's counterinsurgency measures proved to be a political mistake in favor of this and subsequent planned accelerators, however, since they made anti-Somoza sentiments and popular opposition grow even more. The long repressive period that followed the guerrilla's strategic maneuver turned into a costly measure as it facilitated the further identification of social misery with the Somoza regime, both in the eyes of political observers and the aggrieved population.

The October offensive of 1977

Following the end of Operation Aguila VI, the FSLN launched a series of attacks on National Guard stations throughout the country in mid-October of 1977, demonstrating that they were still alive and capable of engaging the regime militarily. Although a military defeat, the October offensive once again proved to be a political success. Militarily, "the FSLN incurred casualties, but that served the purpose of spurring people to join the struggle," recalled a 26-year-old silkscreen printer.[117] It "shocked" people into recognizing the need to take action, Luis Ernesto Gomez remembers.[118] The offensive similarly "contributed to deepening [the] political crisis at a moment when all outward signs indicated it was over."[119] But most importantly, the encounter "mirrored the liberatory movements and preparatory strategies" present in the popular struggle, giving "great hope" to many.[120] A 26-year-old serigrapher recollects that people "became increasingly mindful [of the fact] that there were true sons and daughters who loved Nicaragua as much as Sandino," and were willing to die for the motherland.[121]

The event made the revolutionary struggle a "palpable" reality in people's minds. It "lit a spark . . . which generated sympathy towards the FSLN."[122] Transportation worker Israel Ramirez Guevara vividly remembers the event's emotional impact as one leading to his enlistment with the guerrillas:

> The assaults on the Masaya garrison in October . . . motivated me to join the FSLN. When I saw it take place I was filled with joy and emotion, [and] it enraged me. I became convinced that the only way out for the nation was the armed struggle . . . The assault . . . drove me to participate in the struggle . . . I was inspired [to do so] because we could see the muchachos' desire to rid themselves of the dictatorship's repression, to free the people who were subject to an intensified daily repression.[123]

The hope brought on by the offensive elicited sympathy for the FSLN in various sectors of the population. This led many an undecided individual, as in the case of this subject, to project positive feelings and act on behalf of the group (the FSLN) they saw as promoting their personal and national interests. The planned accelerator generated (and broadened) their collective desire to change the political environment.

Once more the guerrilla offensive drew a fierce reaction from the regime, which in turn aggravated the political and social climates. Policing activities again assumed a brutal nature. But the offensive, recollects an observer, "initiated a chain of attacks which in the end came to mean the beginning of the end for the Somocista dictatorship."[124] After the October 1977 offensive in Masaya "the people assumed a degree of insurrectional participation beyond what the FSLN had anticipated."[125] It "established a modicum of trust between the people and the vanguard [the FSLN]," according to Maldonado, the revolutionary participant.[126]

Taking over the National Palace

Following the Monimbó uprising at the beginning of 1978 (discussed below), the FSLN was ready to reassert itself militarily by the summer of the same year. The leadership of the guerrilla group had been concerned since early July about the potential damage to the revolutionary political struggle from what appeared to have been a U.S. endorsement of the regime. Having made some human rights and political concessions to U.S. diplomatic pressure in June 1978, Somoza received a congratulatory letter from President Carter on his resolve to improve political circumstances. The diplomatic gesture surprised many Nicaraguans, radical and moderate alike. In an effort to avert a derailment of the political momentum and keenly aware "of the notable

increase in popular agitation," the FSLN felt "that it was urgent to categorically respond"[127]to a likely undesirable turn of events such as a coup d'état, and ordered an attack on the National Palace.

On August 22, twenty-five commandos posing as security guards to Somoza's eldest son took over the national palace, holding hostage approximately 2100 people, most of whom were government employees. Following the settlement of hostage negotiations, an FSLN caravan was once again cheered along the way to the airport. And, as in 1974, a jubilant crowd awaited them at the airport entrance, leaving no doubt that the FSLN had achieved another symbolic victory and that anti-Somoza sentiment visibly resonated in the popular gathering. The FSLN's bold strike unmistakably captured the pulse of the nation. The crowd at the airport overshadowed the one in 1974, proving the best barometer of the politically worsened climate and leaving no doubt that the personalistic regime had grown in disfavor.

One of the mission operatives, Israel Rámirez Guevara, recalls the operation as one of the most deeply emotional experiences of his life. In the guerrilla's eyes seeing the enthusiastic crowd en route to the airport, wanting to greet them and congratulating them for what they had done, confirmed the growing popular discontent, "the collective emotion," and massive "contempt" against the regime evident in the air.[128] A prospective revolutionary at the time, José Méndez, "La Tunga," recollects the occasion as a significant moment that helped him decide to enlist in the FSLN:

> I felt a great sense of happiness and at the same time some sadness because I knew I was leaving my family [to join the struggle]. Still, I knew that it was necessary for us to part ways, that I had to do it for everyone's welfare, not only the family's but also the nation's.[129]

The popular reaction to the assault translated into open collaboration with the FSLN. "A great number of people would openly mention that they wanted to collaborate with the FSLN, that they wanted to meet the Sandinistas," recalls Glaucio Robelo, a Sandinista army subcommandant.[130] In this participant's mind this meant that the FSLN "was making advances in the political as well as military terrain."[131]

The 1978 September insurrections

Anti-Somoza denunciations assumed a more forceful collective character following the National Palace incident – a *de facto* liberatory

movement was forged and multiple forms of political activity continued to play a notable role in the continuing delegitimation of the state. A "spontaneous" uprising in Matagalpa succeeded shortly after the National Palace offensive at the end of August. The rebellion prompted the FSLN to move forward strategically lest they risk falling behind the collective momentum. Eager to capitalize on the popular and liberatory upsurge, FSLN tactical teams embarked on an urban military offensive targeting Guardia stations in five cities on September 9.

The offensive incited violent uprisings in the major northern cities of Estelí, Chinandega, Chichigalpa, and León as well as in Masaya, demonstrating people's growing resolve to take on the state's military apparatus. The popular uprising was pushed back by state forces, however, due to the latter's strategic counter-resistance and superior military equipment. Despite this setback, the planned accelerator continued to facilitate the ongoing radicalization of the citizenry. People were animated to fight more determinedly and the eradication of the Guardia became a more widely believed-in collective goal. Thirty-eight-year-old mechanic Ernesto Rodríguez Celaya fittingly captures the meaning of the moment:

> It was the great repression that drove us to join the struggle, because we did not want to die. All the people embodied one voice: to join the struggle, to win or die, in order to remove the dictatorship from our country's soil.[132]

Driven by "humiliated fury," people took to insurrectionary action against overwhelming odds because of their need to regain their self-respect.[133] "The muchachos [insurrectionary participants] were anxious to remove the guards from the station because, really, they offended their dignity," recollects a 52-year-old shoemaker of the popular onslaught on a garrison station in the Masaya barrio of Monimbó.[134]

To the growing opposition, the September insurrection, just as with previous guerrilla attacks, demonstrated once again "that the Guardia was not that invincible nor as capable as it was believed."[135] People "began to feel the voice of the vanguard," and "came to understand that the only way out, the only way to destroy the dictatorship was the FSLN," judges Guillermo Sánchez, "Pancho," a guerrilla participant.[136] In the minds of some insurrectionary participants it indicated what was to follow in the future from popular collective efforts. "The mass mobilization and participation in September," according to Pancho, "made it all the more clear that people were going to participate in the final insurrection."[137]

At this point in the struggle, the threat of annihilation and corresponding survivalist inclination drove many Nicaraguans to join the armed struggle. This was reason enough for Justo Gonzáles Gómez, a 29-year-old shoemaker, to get involved in guerrilla operations:

> For me, the September insurrection came at the right time. The Guardia proceeded to end all human existence here in Monimbó and in all of Nicaragua. The greatest crime was to be young: The Guardia would find you and kill you. The FSLN, therefore, had to find a way to provoke an insurrection, to speed up and shorten the struggle. We were being brutally abused and assassinated, that is why we needed to make an insurrection.[138]

The perceived potential of collective mobilizations, which had been growing exponentially since the Chema Castillo offensive in 1974, also reflected the way in which enthusiasm for conflict reassured people's determination to take arms against the state.

On the whole, the planned accelerators mediated the growing aspiration for change in the environment by broadening and setting in motion revolutionary responses from people. These tended to grow in concert with the unfolding of a revolutionary dynamic favorable to regime challengers. Planned accelerators both mirrored and helped constitute an expanding sense of collective hope, which in turn fed the ever-growing agonistic dynamic that continued to inspire popular revolutionary drives. The collective drive to take arms against the state – partly set in motion by these types of events – increasingly created the perception that the state's hold on society was vulnerable and capable of being surmounted by righteous insurgents. Popular power under these revolutionary conditions "showed" promise. Planned accelerators therefore "enticed" potential revolutionaries with the sense that they were "winning" against the regime. The events depicted here lent themselves, as future political happenings would also register, to a growing forward "flow" as well as "the anticipation of a better state of affairs in the future."[139] They also helped establish bonds of trust among participants, would-be participants, and the vanguard. As the former two witnessed the righteous popular offensives against what was already widely understood as a "murderous dictatorship," they also encountered in themselves (and in those they saw struggle against overwhelming odds) a love for nation – a desire to defend the *people* and the motherland, and to fight for a future without Somoza and what he represented. This love for nation – i.e., the "happiness," "sadness," and anger that accompanied the longing and hope for a new future – their contempt for the system, and the successful exercise of

agency by those who "asserted their dignity" against state forces, in turn, inspired or motivated them to take action in the name of liberation. Ultimately, as models of success, planned accelerators broke "the sense of inevitability and inertia" that came with a legacy of oppression and the experience of acute repression.[140] They facilitated the growth of collective hope. This hope in turn energized popular action against the state, often times against overwhelming odds.

Fear similarly played a significant role in the expansion of revolutionary mobilization. The intense repressive episodes that followed the planned accelerators – just as those that followed contingent accelerators (see below for an example) – contributed to the escalation of fear and the perceived threat that human existence had simply become perilously unpredictable. Instead of diminishing popular contention, however, fear of repression emboldened the aggrieved population to join the revolutionary momentum. It drove many to "act *in order to act*"[141] or "to join the struggle," simply "because [they] did not want to die" or because they wanted to regain their self-respect. The more fear-induced actions proved successful over time and the more the challenges against the state revealed regime weaknesses, the greater the perception that the revolutionary struggle was working, and the more the revolutionary momentum was moved forward by hope. The very dynamics of insurrection, and the witnessed and experienced exercise of agency during encounters with the Guardia, moreover, facilitated the "management of fear."[142] This "management of fear" similarly helped move along revolutionary mobilization against the regime by proving hopeful expectations right.

Contingent accelerators

Sometimes sections of the population, attuned and historically conditioned to political and social developments in their society, "spontaneously" emerge and take to the streets in open rebellion, usually against the military state apparatus, "out of the universal indignation" in their lives, united by a shared hatred against the existing government.[143] Unlike popular responses to planned accelerators, contingent accelerators emerge on their own. This type of popularly driven charge, though, as with planned accelerators, frequently demonstrates to observers and participants alike that state security forces are less effective than previously thought; and either adds to or establishes the belief that protesters have a chance of overwhelming state forces and overthrowing a political system. In light of these perceptions "people on the fence" often

take the side against authorities.[144] Such was the case in the Matagalpa and especially Monimbó events of 1978. Monimbó's rebellion was a crucial mass-driven event that broadened the insurrectionary struggle against the regime. The Masayan barrio uprising, according to many testimonial accounts, served as a point of reference for subsequent encounters with the state's military.

The Monimbó uprising – a key contingent accelerator

The Monimbó uprising was precipitated on February 19, 1978 by a Guardia assault during a commemorative mass for Chamorro's death 40 days after his assassination.[145] While the mass was held inside the local church the Guardia dropped tear gas just outside its entrance and next to a nearby colegio where primary school children were attending class. This was not the first time that the community was harshly assailed and tear-gassed by the Guardia. The popular manifestations that followed Chamorro's death in January and the earlier part of February had been subject to attack as well in various areas of the country, including Monimbó. The tear-gassing of approximately 200 school children, who had been affected during the sudden strike, provoked the Masayan indigenous community into rebellion. This was their first active confrontation with the Guardia, as the whole barrio, driven by anger and hatred towards the military, "spontaneously" engaged it with the most rudimentary forms of defense, including boiling water. During the encounter, which lasted several days, it was apparent that the local population had reached its limits – as the 35-year-old shoemaker recounts, referring to the Guardia, "The beasts did not take notice of children, old people, [and] no one mattered to them."[146]

The abrupt but not unexpected death of some of its members – innocent bystanders and community defenders alike – not only motivated the barrio residents to partake in the defense of their community, but also contributed to the realization that "the FSLN was not an organization outside its [political] reality, out of touch with the people."[147] The uprising, moreover, was a logical response to the deteriorated political climate. It demonstrated to the nation the popular will to engage the Guardia, to confront the state. Guerrilla commander William Ramírez recollects the event with astonishment as "a lesson" for the FSLN. Seeing the collective "capacity of the masses at the time, even though they were not organized" impressed him.[148] Insurrectionary participant Armengol Mercado Castillo likewise remembers that:

> After February, people began to feel what a revolution was like. They began to understand on their own. People joined the war because of the idea that they needed to free themselves from the Guardia. They hated it [the Guardia] . . . People [simply] felt the revolution.[149]

Monimbó kept alive the insurrectionary impetus begun with the FSLN's October 1977 offensive. Like the offensive, it inspired many and contributed to the ongoing general sense of anger. People increasingly became convinced that they had the power to alter their circumstances. As a result, "From February on, the people truly gave their direct support to the FSLN."[150] This was in part due to the effect the collective fervor had on individuals as it spread to neighboring Masayan barrios – the way it was "enthusiastically received," channeled into "emotional energy,"[151] and defined in terms that justified action against the state – which left the impression that the Guardia and the state could be overcome. Personal identification with the observed insurrectionary behavior of fellow community members also played an important role in their willingness to participate. The testimonies below from an unemployed young man and physician, respectively, capture these effects:

> Immediately after the February insurrection, I felt that we would achieve victory because I was able to see how the people supported us . . . When I saw the total support that people offered us, I thought that we were going to achieve victory in a not so distant future.[152]

> The city [Masaya] was burning from north to south and from east to west. The whole of the city was ablaze: In every barrio there were bonfires, the rattle of striking frying pans; and the muchachos were constantly harassing the Guardia. This gave us the idea and the absolute conviction that the days of the dictatorship were numbered . . . [Although] the conditions were not present the most conscious people understood that this was the start of the overthrow of the shameful Somoza dictatorship.[153]

Just as with the October 1977 offensive, the Guardia's repressive reaction following the uprisings produced unintended consequences for the Somoza state. Instead of acting as a deterrent, people's resolve to engage the state's military apparatus grew. At this stage in the conflict people came "to define their situation as the consequence of human injustice: a situation that they need not, cannot, and ought not to endure" the state of the social.[154] Repression had obviously become an issue for the citizenry once more because of the Guardia's indiscriminate and unwarranted tactics against innocent bystanders and non-violent demonstrators during masses commemorating Chamorro's martyrdom. That repression had become an inadequate means of dealing with mass contention and partially contributed to the adoption of a liberatory

orientation is indicated in many a testimony, including the one below by "La Tunga":

> After February, the Guardia repressed very harshly because they were able to see that the people were rising . . . They then had to look for a way to intimidate the people. But . . . the repression enraged people even more; people's ways of thinking by then were different, people began to understand more and more why the FSLN was fighting.[155]

The events connected to Monimbó's spontaneous rebellion left 200 dead, including the massacre victims of nearby Las Sabogales, where a FSLN contingent sent to assist the popular undertaking was decimated and the local population was practically wiped out with it. Yet, Monimbó redeemed the revolutionary struggle. Those who participated in uprising and the ones that followed "set an example for" both the revolutionary leaders and would be insurgents.[156] Monimbó similarly confirmed the emotional reality of revolution. People, enraged by the terrorist capacity of the state, "began to feel what a revolution was like" and to appreciate "on their own" why people were joining the struggle against Somoza. Those who joined did so on principle, because of their hatred and felt indignation, and out of the hopeful conviction that their desperate longing for unburdening the nation from Somoza will ultimately be vindicated because of the struggle.

Conclusion: Emotions and revolutionary accelerators

Revolutions represent "sequences of rupture that effect transformations of [social] structure."[157] The ruptural sequences that define a revolutionary trajectory facilitate the dislocation of old structures and the articulation of new ones. When sequences of action give rise to more sequences of action across the social spectrum, these overlap and interpenetrate, making possible new interpretive networks, new political dynamics, and new political subjects. "The exaltation of imagination, the collective creativity, the superheated emotionality, and the spontaneous[ness]" that accompany insurrectionary events make revolution a political reality, if only because they facilitate the rise of an oppositional challenge.[158] In Nicaragua, a sequence of insurrectionary events cemented the more politically discernible popular anti-status quo sentiment that had been given birth following the earthquake of 1972. They transformed a pre-existing and growing political disaffection into an authentic revolutionary force. The emotional responses to arbitrary state repression and exploitation, and to the perceived potential of insurrectionaries during encounters with state forces made possible

the creation and expansion of a (growing) desire for revolution and the belief that the regime could be overcome. The experienced emotions that accompanied these events played a pivotal role in the making of a powerful oppositional challenge. They "set the agenda for beliefs and desires"[159] and functioned as intervening variables, bodied understandings, or narrative projects that allowed individuals to define and transcend revolutionary situations.

Governing accelerators plainly revealed the Somoza state as the root cause of Nicaragua's political and economic disorder. They dislocated existing social arrangements during the 1970s. Unprecedented arbitrary state repression and exclusionary autocratic rule either established or corroborated in people's minds the illegitimate basis through which the state operated. The state's transgressions violated widespread conceptions of how the polity "functioned," which in turn undermined its taken-for-granted authority. This social condition delegitimated the state in civil society such that many came to believe that they had no option but to seek remedy outside existing patterns of political and social organization. Contingent and planned accelerators for the most part led many others affected to believe that they could collectively overcome the state's means of military and social control. Together, revolutionary accelerators made possible (or caused) the embodiment and expansion of revolutionary motives. That is, people's growing desire to break free from the exploitative and repressive socio-political conditions the dictatorship represented was given form as these events were experienced.

The emotional responses that necessarily accompanied the reframing of the political climate, whether moral outrage or hope, also made it possible for participants in the struggle to "legitimate" their individual and collective courses of action – emotions thus served the important functions of channeling their energy into battles against the state and of transforming their consciousness. A number of emotions played a role during the course of insurrectionary events. For instance, fear, joy, sadness, happiness, and anger coexisted with moral outrage and hope. Yet testimonies seem to indicate moral outrage and hope for change as the dominant emotions under different event-contexts. On the one hand, governing accelerators mainly elicited moral outrage on the part of revolutionary actors. Planned and contingent accelerators, on the other hand, strengthened their collective hope within the context of an ongoing agonistic dynamic.

As motors and narrative projects, the dominant emotions of hope and moral outrage played a significant role in individual and collective responses. They functioned as embodied states, "frames of mind," "paradigm scenarios," or "action tendencies" that enabled a necessary referential focus for inter-group conflict and revolutionary solidarity. As the insurrectionary trajectory unfolded, revolutionary emotions made it possible for (potential) insurrectionaries to appreciate and "paint" the state of the political as one needing change and requiring their revolutionary involvement.[160] We may even go so far as to suggest that revolutionary emotions played as significant a role in people's interpretation of their circumstances as ideology, culture, and the social ties of revolutionary groups. They helped insurrectionaries interpret their own and other people's reactions during "decision-making" instances. Insurrectionary emotions in this sense embodied revolutionary action.

The emotional responses to revolutionary accelerators examined in this article, moreover, represent a "vocabulary of motives," with which the making and expansion of collective mobilizations was enabled through the final stages of the insurrection.[161] As communicative conduits, emotions not only made manifest and sustained insurgent actions against the state, but they also helped anticipate conduct among insurrectionary participants. For example, testimonies reveal how participants became "aware" of their future involvement in the struggle following their emotional understanding of events. For many individuals their revolutionary commitment was sealed either after witnessing the collective resolve of the people to take on the Guardia against overwhelming odds or after witnessing state violence against peaceful demonstrators. Key to these evaluative calculations were the negative or positive emotional interpretations given to the witnessed events. These event-specific emotional interpretations, to put it succinctly, guided the unfolding of revolution.

What lies ahead? I would like to conclude with a final comment on the role of emotions during insurrectionary conditions. While emotions do play a role in the making of revolution simply because they sustain, help define, and embody revolutionary situations, as Nicaragua's insurrectionary episode certainly indicates, it is important not to exaggerate their role as a factor of mobilization. Emotions are present in both successful and failed revolutionary scenarios, so if they are indeed an important causal factor in mobilization this is the case because other elements are in place. It would be somewhat ludicrous to

suggest, for example, that the revolutionary situation in El Salvador came to naught because people were not emotional enough or they did not have the right emotions. The emotional conditions for insurgency were indeed present in El Salvador.[162] Unlike Nicaragua, what contributed to this nation's failed revolution was in fact the absence of a multi-class coalition, a factor that can be appreciated with a serious reading of its historico-political reality.[163] Still, this paradoxical contrast should not prevent us from venturing into comparing similar and contrasting cases. Examining the role of emotions as they are related to vanguardist ideology, coalitional dynamics, the social ties of revolutionary groups, and popular culture, for instance, might prove to be a revealing and insightful endeavor in a contrasting analysis of revolutionary conditions. A comparative approach would therefore add even more to our understanding of revolutionary emotions. This is, indeed, the next step to be taken in order to arrive at a more general and complex understanding of *passionate politics* during revolutionary conditions.

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Notes

1. Teodor Shanin, *The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the Century, Volume 2: Russia, 1905–07: Revolution as a Moment of Truth* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 30–31.
2. See Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978); *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986); Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century: 1830–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); "Recruitment to High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom

Summer," *American Journal of Sociology* 92 (1986): 64–90; James Rule and Charles Tilly, "1830 and the Unnatural History of Revolution," *Journal of Social Issues* 28 (1972): 49–76; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

3. For example, see Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory," *Sociological Forum* 14 (1999): 27–54.
4. James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 179.
5. I am specifically referring to the Theda Skocpol and William Sewell debate on the role of ideas during the French revolution. Skocpol, the struturalist par excellence, who reconsiders her non-voluntarist (structural determination) position on revolution following her evaluation of the Iranian case, proposes that the key to understanding successful revolutionary mobilization is "cultural idioms," long-standing, anonymous, and local systems of meaning through which popular groups embody their actions. This is a position she espouses against the role of ideology (as championed by revolutionary groups) during revolutionary scenarios, yet by it she does not imply that ideologies are entirely irrelevant, but instead poses an alternative as to how the habitus of customs together with established networks of communication work as the central structuring structures of revolutionary mobilization. Sewell, a prominent cultural historian, calls for a dynamic and causal analysis of ideology. To counteract Skocpol's critical position on ideology as "voluntarist" and structurally bounded, he offers as an alternative the view of revolutionary ideology as an anonymous, transpersonal, and collective social force that constitutes revolutionary action and is a causal factor in "the replacement of one socio-political order by another." See William H. Sewell, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Revolution," in Theda Skocpol, editor, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1985]), 173; Theda Skocpol, "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell," *The Journal of Modern History* 57 (March 1985): 86–96.
6. See Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," *American Journal of Sociology* 99/6: (May 1994): 1411–1454; Emirbayer and Goodwin, "Symbols, Positions, Objects: Toward a New Theory of Revolutions and Collective Action," *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 35/3* (1996): 358–374; John Foran, "The Comparative-Historical Sociology of Third World Social Revolutions: Why a Few Succeed, Why Most Fail," 226–267, in John Foran, editor, *Theorizing Revolutions* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Foran, "Revolutionizing Theory/Revising Revolution: State, Culture, and Society in Recent Works on Revolutions," *Contention: Debates in Society, Culture, and Science 2/2* (Winter 1993): 65–88; Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?," *Sociological Theory* 11/1 (March 1993): 1–20; Jeffrey Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 731–803.
7. John Foran, "Discourses and Social Forces: The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions," 203–225, in John Foran, editor, *Theorizing Revolutions* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 208.

8. On discourse, see Foran, "Discourses and Social Forces," On the relationship between popular culture and ideology, see Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, *Revolutionary Demands*: *A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); John Markoff, *The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French Revolution* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996); and Tim MacDaniel, *Autocracy, Modernization and Revolution in Russian and Iran* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). On language, see Chik Collins, *Language, Ideology and Social Consciousness* (Adelshot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999); Marc Steinberg, *Fighting Words: Working-Class Formation, Collective Action and Discourse in Early Nineteenth-Century England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Mark D. Steinberg, *Voices of Revolution: 1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
9. See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) on the contingent as interpretive and interactive. On the temporal, spatial, emotional, and demographic, see Ron Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth Perry, William Sewell, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, editors, *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
10. See Jeff Goodwin, "The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement: Affectual Ties and Solidarity in the Huk Rebellion, 1946–54," *American Sociological Review* 62 (February 1997): 53–69; Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, editors, *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotions* (Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory," *Mobilization* 5/1 (2000): 65–84; Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, editors, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001); James Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest;* "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13 (1998): 397–424.
11. On a recent issue that emphasizes the importance of subjectivity in revolutions, see John Foran, editor, *Revolutions: Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2003).
12. This work specifically represents a direct challenge to interpretations that strictly focus on vanguard-driven mobilization, equate revolutionary action with ideological mobilization (as opposed to the radicalization of existing customs), and undermine the significance of spontaneity and contingency in the making of revolution. The following two main questions have been pursued in this type of research: (1) How is a desire for liberation, as manifested in revolutionary action, more than a matter of ideology and formal organization? (2) What role do events play in the unfolding of revolution and in the making of revolutionary subjectivities? See Jean-Pierre Reed, *Sandinista Narratives: Culture, Ideology, and Revolutionary Contexts in the Making of Insurgent Actors* (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming); Jean-Pierre Reed and John Foran, "Political Cultures of Opposition: Exploring Idioms, Ideologies, and Revolutionary Agency in the Case of Nicaragua," *Critical Sociology* 28 (2002): 335–370; Jean-Pierre Reed, "'Culture in Action': Nicaragua's Revolutionary Identities Reconsidered," *New Political Science* 24 (2002): 235–263; Jean-Pierre Reed, "Revolutionary Subjectivity: The

Cultural Logic of the Nicaraguan Revolution," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, June 2000.

13. On this political dynamic point that focuses on action/reaction, see Pamela Oliver, "Bringing the Crowd Back In: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 11 (1989): 1–30. On the related topics of spontaneity and diffusion in the emergence of political action, see also Anthony Oberschall, "The 1960s Sit-Ins: Protest Diffusion and Movement Take-Off," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* 11 (1989): 31–53; Oberschall, "Loosely Structured Collective Conflict," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* 3 (1980): 45–68; *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987); and Lewis Killian, "Organization, Rationality and Spontaneity in the Civil Rights Movement," *American Sociological Review* 49 (1984): 770–783.
14. See, for example, George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London: Zed Press, 1981); Amalia Z. Chamorro, *Los Rasgos Hegemónicos del Somocismo y la Revolución Sandinista* (Managua, Nicaragua: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, 1983); Forrest D. Colburn, *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Farideh Farhi, *States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, second edition, 1999); Harry E. Vanden, "The Ideology of the Insurrection," 41–62, in Thomas Walker, editor, *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); Carlos Vilas, *Perfiles de la Revolución Sandinista* (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1987); and Henri Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981).
15. I am not referring to journalistic accounts, which not unpredictably touched on the emotional dimensions of the revolution.
16. Mark Everingham, *Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996); Lynn Horton, *Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua*, 1979–1994 (Athens: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1998); Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions*: *A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
17. (Ortega, 1984), 33.
18. On the issues of cultural contention and heterogeneity, see Donald C. Hodges, *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Roger N. Lancaster, *Thanks to God and the Revolution: Popular Religion and Class Consciousness in the New Nicaragua* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); David E. Whisnant, *Rascally Signs in Sacred Places: The Politics of Culture in Nicaragua* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). On political dynamics, see John Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, second edition, 1985).
19. Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo [IES], *¡Y se armó la runga! testimonios de la insurreción popular sandinista en Masaya* (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1982). The author has done all translations.

20. Secondary testimonial/ethnographic sources, include Claribel Alegría and D. J. Flakoll, *Nicaragua: La Revolución Sandinista* (Mexico: Series Popular Era, 1982); Pilar Arias, *Nicaragua: Revolución, Relatos de Combatientes del Frente Sandinista* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980); Teófilo Cabestrero, *Revolutionaries for the Gospel*: *Testimonies of Fifteen Christians in the Nicaraguan Government* (New York: Orbis Books, 1986); Ernesto Cardenal, *The Gospel in Solentiname, Vol. 1* (New York: Orbis Books, 1976); Abdollah Dashti, "The Forbidden Revolution: Participatory Democracy and the Cultural Politics of Class, Community, and National Identity in Nicaragua," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1994; Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón, *The Contras: Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas* (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984); Jeffrey Gould, *To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua*, 1912–1979 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Denis Lynn Daly Heyck, *Life Stories of the Nicaraguan Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo (IES), *El Principio del Fin*. . . *1956, 23 años de lucha* . . .*El triunfo*. . . *1979* (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1981), and *Porque Viven Siempre Entre Nosotros: Heroes y Martires de la Insurrección Popular Sandinista en Masaya* (Managua, Nicaragua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1982); Carlos Nuñez, *Un pueblo en Armas: Informe del Frente Interno* (Managua: Secretaría Nacional de Propaganda y Educación Política del F.S.L.N., 1980); Margaret Randall, *Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Vancouver, B.C.: New Star Books, 1983); M. Randall, *Cristianos en la Revolución: Del Testimonio a la Lucha* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva América, 1985); Gary Ruchwarger, *People in Power: Forging a Grassroots Democracy in Nicaragua* (Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1987).
21. IES, 19.
22. See John Walton, *Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
23. See Rick Fantasia, *Cultures of Solidarity: Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
24. On collective action, see Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology* 15 (1989): 119–141; and Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Morning Demonstrations in Liepzig, East Germany, 1989–1991," *World Politics* 47 (1994): 42–101. On violence, see John W. Burton, *Violence Explained*: *The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). On strikes, riots, and protests respectively, see Roberto Franzosi, *The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Joe Feagin and Harlan Hahn, *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1975); and Dieter Rutch, Ruud Koopmans, and Freidhelm Neidhardt, *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest* (Berlin: Sigma Rainer Bohn Verlag, 1998); and Dieter Rucht and Ruud Koopmans, editors, "Special Issue: Protest Event Analysis," *Mobilization* (Fall 1999). On claim-making see Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, and Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow, editors,

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25. Rod Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1990), 21–50.
26. Michael Mann, *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class* (London: Macmillian Press, 1977).
27. See Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: Causal and Narrative Approaches," *Historical Methods* 23/24 (Fall 1990): 140–150; "From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism," *Sociological Methods and Research* 20/24 (May 1992): 428–455; Robin George Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Wilhem Dilthey, *Patterns and Meanings in History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York Basic Books, 1973); John R. Hall, "Temporality, Social Action, and the Problem of Quantification in Historical Analysis," *Historical Methods* 17/24 (Fall 1984): 206–218; William Sewell, "Historical Events as Transformations of Structure: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 841–881; Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
28. Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 192.
29. On the disruption of the quotidian and its consequences, see Richard Flacks, *Making History*: *The American Left and the American Mind* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Hank Johnston, *Tales of Nationalism*: *Catalonia*, 1939–1979 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991); Henri Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971); Ron E. Robertz and Robert March Kloss, *Social Movements: Between the Balcony and the Barricade* (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby and Company, 1979); and, on a most elucidating recent piece, David Snow, Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey, and Andrew W. Jones, "'Disrupting the Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action," *Mobilization* 3 (Spring 1998): 1–22. On political opportunities see Craig Jenkins, *The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Hanspeter Kriesi, *Political Mobilization and Social Change*: *The Dutch Case in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1993); Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 153–170; Tarrow, *Power in Movement.*
30. See Stephen Ellingson, "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati," *American Journal of Sociology* 101/1 (July 1995): 100–144:104. This is an insight that Ellingson derives from the works of Bert Klandermans, William Gamson, Eric Hirsh, Doug McAdam, and Sydney Tarrow. See Bert Klandermans, "The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, editors, *International Social Movement Research*, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1988), 173–96; "The Social Construction of Protest and Multi-Organizational Fields," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, editors, *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 77–103; William Gamson, "Political Discourse and Collective Action," in Klandermans et al., *International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, 219–244; Eric

I. Hirsh, "Sacrifice for the Cause: The Impact of Group Processes on Recruitment and Commitment in Protest Movements," *American Sociological Review* 55 (1990): 243–55; McAdam, *Political Process*; McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 735–754; Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy* and *Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

31. Sewell, "Historical Events as Transformations of Structure," 861.
32. Ibid.
33. See Edgar Morin, "Le retour de lévénement," *Communications* 18 (1972): 6–20; Marshall Sahlins, "The Return of the Event Again: With Reflections on the Beginnings of the Great Fijian War of 1843 to 1855 Between the Kingdoms of Bau and Rewa," in Aletta Biersack, editor, *Clio in Oceania: Toward a Historical Anthropology* (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), 37–100; Ellingson, "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action."
34. McAdam et al., *Dynamics of Contention*, 202 and 224.
35. Sewell, "Historical Events as Transformations of Structure," 845, 865.
36. Ron Aminzade and Doug McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics," in Aminzade et al., *Silence and Voice*, 33.
37. Randall Collins, "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention," in Goodwin et al., editors, *Passionate Politics*, 27–44.
38. J. M. Barbalet, *Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 157–161.
39. Thomas Scheff, "Emotions and Identity: A Theory of Ethnic Nationalism," in Craig Calhoun, editor, *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
40. Ibid., 268.
41. Ellingson, "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action," 103.
42. Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Dionysis Goutsos, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 14–21. See also Roman Jakobson, *On Language* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Jakobson, "Concluding Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," in Thomas Albert Sebeok, editor, *Style in Language* (Cambridge; The MIT Press, 1960), 350–377.
43. On the unique historical accessibility of oral communication (or orality) as opposed to written expression, see Anthony Giddens, "Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, and the Production of Culture," in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, editors, *Social Theory Today* (Standford: Standford University Press, 1987); Michele Foucault, *I Pierre Riviere: A Case of Patricide in the 19th Century* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1978); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (London: Allen Lane, 1963).
44. See references on memory below. On the issue of testimonies as a reliable historical source, see Louis Reichenthal Gottschalk, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Robert Angell, *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology, and Sociology* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945).
45. On the issue of measurability see Loius A. Gottschalk and Goldine C. Gleser, *The Measurement of Psychological States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Louis Gottschalk, editor, *The Content Analysis of Verbal Behavior: Further Issues* (New York: Spectrum Publications, 1979); Suzanne M. Retzinger,

Violent Emotions: *Shame and Rage in Marital Quarrels* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991); Thomas J Scheff and Suzanne M Retzinger, *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991).

46. Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 164.
47. I arrive at the term "sociobiographical benchmarks" by considering the collective memory, socio-psychological, and psychological dimensions of (political) events. On the collective memory dimensions of events, see Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Zerubavel, "Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past," *Qualitative Sociology* 19/3 (1996). On the socio-psychological dimensions of political events, see James W. Pennebaker, Dario Paez, and Bernard Rimé, editors, *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). On the psychological dimensions of events, see Robyn Fivush, "The Functions of Event Memory: Some Comments on Nelson and Barsalou," in Ulrich Neisser and E. Winnograd, editors, *Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 277–282; Ulric Neisser, "Snapshots or Benchmarks?" in Ulrich Neisser, editor, *Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts* (San Francisco: Fremman, 1982), 43–48.
48. Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 19.
49. Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: CH Beck, 1999).
50. On "Bringing People Back In," see Eric Selbin, "Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In," in Foran, *Theorizing Revolutions*, 123–136, and Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder: Westview, 1993, 1999). See also Jean-Pierre Reed, "Culture in Action"; Reed and Foran, "Political Cultures of Opposition."
51. See, respectively, Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movements, 1945 to the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Elisabeth Wood, "The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador," in Goodwin et al., *Passionate Politics*, 267–281; and Verta Taylor, "Watching for Vibes: Bringing Emotions into the Study of Feminist Organizations," in Myra Marx Ferree and Patricia Yancey Martin, editors, *Feminist Organizations: Harvest of the New Women's Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 223–233; Nancy Whittier, "Emotional Strategies: The Collective Reconstruction and Display of Oppositional Emotions in the Movement Against Child Sexual Abuse," *Passionate Politics* 233–250.
52. A growing number of scholars from a variety of disciplines recognize the illusory or false division the emotion/reason dichotomy represents and increasingly have come to see how thinking and feeling are mutually constitutive of each other. On this point, see Barbalet, *Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure*; Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow, "Introduction: Emotions in Social Life," in Gillian Bendelow and Simon J. Williams, editors, *Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary Issues* (London: Routlege, 1998), xv-xx;

Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994); Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow, *The Lived Body: Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues* (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," *Inquiry* 32 (1989): 161–176. On especially cogent and penetrating essays on the same point, see Margot L. Lyon, "The Limitations of Cultural Constructionism in the Study of Emotion," in Bendelow and Williams, editors, *Emotions in Social Life*, 39–59; Michelle Z. Rosaldo, "Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling," in Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine, editors, *Culture Theory*: *Essay on Mind, Self, and Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 137–157.

53. See Nick Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* (Open University Press, 2002), 48–51.
54. See Theodore D. Kemper, *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions* (New York: Wiley, 1978); Steven L. Gordon, "Social Structural Effects on Emotions," in Theodore D. Kemper, editor, *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990).
55. See James R. Averill, "A Constructivist View of Emotion," in Robert Plutchik and Henry Kellerman, editors, *Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience, Vol. 1, Theories of Emotion* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotions* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Russell, "Ideology and Emotion Management: A Perspective and Path for Future Research" in Kemper, editor, *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions*, 117–142.
56. See Nico Frijda, *The Emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); J. M. Mandler, *Stories, Scripts and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory* (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1984); R. Schank and R. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding* (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1977); Phillip Shaver, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson, and Cary O'Connor, "Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (1987): 1061–1086; Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1976).
57. On emotions as important constituents of social transactions, see Shaver et al., "Emotion Knowledge." On the role of emotions in the transformation of consciousness, see Keith Oatley, "Plans and the Communicative Function of Emotions," in Vernon Hamilton, Gordon H. Bower, and Nico Frijda, editors, *Cognitive Perspectives on Emotion and Motivation* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
58. See C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and the Vocabulary of Motives" in Irving Louis Horowitz, editor, *Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963 [1940]). On how emotions exhibit social orientation tendencies, see Randall Collins, "On the Micro-Foundations of Macro-Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (1981): 984–1014; Collins, "Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions" in Kemper, editor, *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions*, 27–57; Gordon, "Social Structural Effects on Emotions."
59. See Jack Katz, *How Emotions Work* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 340.

60. On how emotions are more than cognition, see Lyon, "The Limitations of Cultural Constructionism in the Study of Emotion"; Nick Crossley, "Emotion and Communicative Action: Habermas, Linguistic Philosophy and Existentialism," in Bendelow and Williams, editors, *Emotions in Social Life*, 16–38.
61. Williams and Bendelow, *The Lived Body*, 138.
62. Katz, *How Emotions Work*, 6–7.
63. Ibid., 332.
64. Ibid., 143.
65. Williams and Bendelow, *The Lived Body*, 13.
66. Social movement and revolution scholars have firmly established a connection between emotion and political mobilization. Much of this scholarship has focused on the role, the transformative effect, and types of emotion in the making of politics. On these points, see Deborah Gould, "Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into the Study of Social Movements," in Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, editors, *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* (Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Aminzade and McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics;" Helena Flam, "Emotional 'Man' I: The Emotional 'Man' and the Problem of Collective Action," *International Sociology* 5 (1990): 39–56; Foran, "Discourses and Social Forces;" Goodwin et al., "The Return of the Repressed"; Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*; Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest;" Jasper and Jane Poulsen, "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests, *Social Problems* 42 (1995): 493–512.
67. Feminist scholarship in particular has played a significant role in coming to terms with the emotional dimensions of political involvement. See Sandra Morgen, "It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: Emotional Discourse in the Work Cultures of Feminist Health Clinics," in Ferree and Martin, editors, *Feminist Organizations*, 234–247; Deborah A. Smith and Rebecca Eriksson, "For Love or Money? Work and Emotional Labor in a Social Movement Organization," *Social Perspectives on Emotions* 4 (1995): 317–346; Verta Taylor "Emotions and Identity in Women's Self-Help Movements," in Sheldon Sryker, Tim Owens, and Bob White, editors, *Self, Identity, and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
68. William M. Reddy, "Sentimentalism and its Erasure: The Role of Emotions in the Era of the French Revolution," *Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000): 109–153.
69. On this point, also see Gould, "Passionate Political Processes."
70. On reactive vs. affective emotions, see Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest;* and Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest." "High order" emotions are the emotions that require a modicum of cognitive processing; that is, an evaluation of situational/event contexts as part of the emotional definition of the latter.
71. For a more comprehensive definition of "dominant emotions" see John Lofland, *Protest: Studies of Collective Behavior and Social Movements* (New Brunswick: Transactions Books, 1985), 39–40.
72. Sharon Erikson Nepstad and Christian Smith, "The Social Structure of Moral Outrage in Recruitment to the U.S. Central America Peace Movement," in Goodwin et al., *Passionate Politics*, 171, 173.
73. See Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 490. Arbitrary state repression is an obvious case when punishment goes too far, incurring moral outrage responses that

function as a catalyst for "blaming the system." Repression, especially against non-violent protesters, produces moral uneasiness, system-wide alienation, and plays a role in the radicalization of collective mobilization. It tends to backfire because it provokes an anti-status-quo logic in protest mobilization, often resulting in "belief amplification" and a "natural progression" towards adopting violent means of contention. On the relationship between repression and moral uneasiness, societal alienation, and insurgent effect see respectively James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest," *Social Forces* 69 (1990): 521–547; Karl-Dieter Opp, "Repression and Revolutionary Action," *Rationality and Society* 6 (1994): 101–138. On the relationship between repression and non-violent protesters, see also T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 175–198; Dean Hoover and David Kowalewski, "Dynamic Models of Dissent and Repression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1992): 150–182; Ronald A. Francisco, "The Relationship Between Coercion and Protest," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (1995). On how repression results in "belief amplification" and a "natural progression" towards violence, see Robert White, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1989): 1277–1302.

74. Goodwin et al., "The Return of the Repressed," 80.
75. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 114.
76. Barbalet, *Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure*, 149.
77. On recent elaborations on the relations among fear, threat, and political mobilization, see Jack A. Goldstone and Charles Tilly, "Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action," in McAdam et al., *Silence and Voice*; Aminzade and McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics"; and Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff, "Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements: Managing Fear in the US and East German Civil Rights Movements," in Goodwin et al., editors, *Passionate Politics*, 282–302.
78. This is a point most aptly and lucidly made in the recent literature. See McAdam et al., *Dynamics of Contention*, and Aminzade et al., *Silence and Voice*, for illustrations.
79. Collins, "Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions." Randall Collins defines "emotional energy" as being similar to the psychological concept of "drive," but with the former exhibiting a social orientation tendency. He explains: "High emotional energy is a feeling of confidence and enthusiasm for social interaction [social action]. It is the personal side of having . . . ritual solidarity with a group. One gets pumped up with emotional strength from participating in the group's interaction . . . Emotional energy. . . includes feelings of what is right and wrong, moral and immoral. Individuals, who are full of emotional energy, feel like good persons; they feel righteous about what they are doing . . . They are pumped up with energy because of a successful interaction; this energy gets attached to ideas, and thinking those ideas allows these individuals to feel a renewed surge of socially-based enthusiasm . . . EE [Emotional Energy] [moreover] has some cognitive component; it is an expectation of being able to dominate particular kinds of situations . . . [especially when] certain

symbols come to mind, or appear in the external environment spark[ing] off propensities . . . (positive or negative) for social action. "The expectation" may work on a subconscious level. It is an anticipation of being able to coordinate with someone else's responses, of anticipating the build-up of emotional force that goes on [during episodes of social action]" (32–40).

80. Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives in Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.
81. I also consider organized accelerators in my work, but for the sake of brevity I focus on only three in this piece. I define the latter as protest events made by pre-existing political and civic organizations (initially unconnected to revolutionary groups) that are ultimately met with state intransigence. Organized accelerators add to the belief that a regime has no legitimate basis for governing by reinforcing the growing understanding during the course of political dynamics that "conventional" politics is an inadequate way of dealing with a corrupt state that repeatedly fails to meet peaceful demands for change.
82. My position on governing accelerators and their relationship to emotions has roots in social contract theories, which have demonstrated how political action on the part of citizens, subjects, and representatives of government during intense periods of social change, including revolution, may be seen as a (conflictual) process of redefining taken-for-granted political obligations and roles. Social contract theorists convincingly make a connection between the violation of social and political norms and moral outrage as a fundamental basis for political action. For them, episodes of political conflict project responses of moral outrage to the "disorder" that follows the violation of the political and social conventions that make for their sociopolitical "order," which is to say that political or revolutionary conflict arises from a clash of definitions and perceptions regarding the political. Governing accelerators thus represent instances when the taken-for-grantedness of the political and social order is re-evaluated. On social-contract based work, see Moore, *Injustice*; Gerrit Huizer, *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972); James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasantry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture* (New York: The New Press, 1993); Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).
83. See Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975), 167. Research on the civil rights movement similarly demonstrates how movement leaders' tactical mobilizations, as opposed to (just) extra-movement contingencies, played a key role in generating the necessary popular impulses to achieve movement goals – See, for example, Aldon D. Morris, "Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered: An Analysis of the Dynamics and Tactics of Mobilization," *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993): 621–636. On the relationship between movement-initiated actions and insurgent activities at the collective level, see Doug McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of

Insurgency" and "Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism," *International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1 (1988): 125–154.

84. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, 167.
85. Sewell, "Historical Events as Transformations of Structure," 845.
86. Goodwin et al., "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," 14.
87. Ellingson, "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action," 104.
88. See Craig J. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527–553; Craig J. Jenkins and Charles Perrow, "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972)," *America Sociological Review* 42 (1977): 249–268; Moore, *Injustice*; Anthony Oberschall, "Theories of Social Conflict," *Annual Review of Sociology* 4 (1978): 291–315; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution;* Wolf, *Peasant Wars*.
89. Colin Barker, "Fear , Laughter, and Collective Power: The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980," in Goodwin et al., editors, *Passionate Politics*, 177.
90. McAdam, *Political Process;* David Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Morris and McClurg Mueller, editors, *Frontiers of Social Movements Theory;* Tarrow, *Power in Movement.*
91. Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 82.
92. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon, 1976); Moore, *Injustice*; and Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions.*
93. Jeff Goodwin, "State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strenghts and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition," in Foran, editor, *Theorizing Revolutions*, 17–21.
94. For comprehensive accounts of earthquake-related damages, see George Black, "The 1972 Earthquake and After: Somocismo in Crisis," in Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer, editors, *The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under Fire* (New York: Grover Press, 1983); Edmundo Jarquín and Pablo Emilio Barreto, "Dictatorship 'Made in the USA'," in Rosset and Vandermeer, editors, *The Nicaragua Reader*; Vilas, *Perfiles de la Revolución Sandinista*, 158–167.
95. Aníbal Ortiz, author interview, Winter 1990.
96. ¡Y se armó la runga!, IES, 1982, 34.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 36. On this coalitional fact, see Black, "The 1972 Earthquake and After"; Booth, *The End and the Beginning;* Jarquín and Barreto, "Dictatorship 'Made in the USA'."
99. Aníbal Ortiz, author interview, Winter 1990.
100. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 32.
101. Elizabeth Maeir, *Nicaragua, La Mujer en la Revolución* (México: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1980), 31–32.
102. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 86–87.
103. Ibid., 84.
104. Ibid., 86, Miguel Maldonado, Revolutionary participant.
105. Ibid., 93, Constantino Tapia Rojas.

106. Ibid, 86, 26-year-old serigrapher.
107. Ibid., 109.
108. Henri Weber, "The Struggle for Power," in Rosset and Vandermeer, editors, *The Nicaragua Reader*, 153.
109. Booth, *The End and the Beginning*, 220.
110. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 85.
111. Héctor Meléndez, author interview, Winter 1990.
112. Moore, *Injustice*, 473.
113. Vilas, *Perfiles*, 188.
114. In this context popular means across class, racial, gender, and political lines. On this point see John Foran, Linda Klouzal, and Jean Pierre Rivera (now Reed), "Who Makes Revolutions? Class, Gender, and Race in the Mexican, Cuban and Nicaraguan Revolutions," *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change* 20 (1997): 1–60.
115. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 45.
116. Ibid., 45, TELCOR [the Telephone and Postal Services company] messenger.
117. Ibid., 73.
118. Ibid., 77.
119. Hodges, *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*, 247.
120. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 73, Rolando Ñamendí Caldera.
121. Ibid.,73.
122. Ibid.,76, Juanita Bermudez, secretary.
123. Ibid., 76–77.
124. Ibid., anonymous.
125. Ibid., Julio César José Ruiz, twenty-three-year-old artisan.
126. Ibid.,76.
127. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "Crónica del asalto a la 'Casa de los Chanchos'," in Gabriel Garcia Marquez, editor, *Los Sandinistas* (Bogota: Editorial La Oveja Negra, 1980), 32.
128. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 186.
129. Ibid., 187.
130. Ibid., 259.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., 249.
133. Helen B. Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971).
134. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 207.
135. Ibid., 154, Carlos Brenes.
136. Ibid., 247.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid., 200.
139. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 406.
140. Juan Corradi, "Towards Societies without Fear," in Juan E. Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, editors, *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 282.
141. Wood, "The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador," 268. The parallels between El Salvador and Nicaragua in terms of the experience of repression make the use of this quote possible.

142. On the relationship between the "management of fear" and political agency, see Goodwin and Pfaff, "Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements."
143. Leon Trotsky, *The History of The Russian Revolution, Vol. 3* (New York: Path Finder Press, 1987), 168.
144. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, 167.
145. Monimbó, a Masayan Indian barrio with a history of contention going back to nineteenth-century colonial struggles, is known locally as a community with a culture of resistance. Monimbó's uprising was not only a logical response to the circumstances of the time but it also spoke to a legacy of rebellion against government forces.
146. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 109.
147. Ibid., 73, Constantino Tapia Rojas.
148. Ibid., 165.
149. Ibid., 164.
150. Ibid.
151. Collins, "Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions."
152. IES ¡Y se armó la runga!, IES,1982, 164, Reynaldo López García.
153. Ibid., 124, Rommel Martínez Cabeza.
154. Moore, *Injustice*, 459.
155. IES, ¡Y se armó la runga!, 167.
156. Ibid., 164, Manuel Aléman.
157. Sewell, "Historical Events as Transformations of Structure," 871.
158. Ibid.
159. de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotions*, 196.
160. On "frames of mind," see Gerald L. Clore and Andrew Ortony, "The Semantics of the Affective Lexicon," in Vernon Hamilton, Gordon H. Bower, and Nico Frijda, editors, *Cognitive Perspectives on Emotion and Motivation* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988); and Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Mark A. Foss, "The Referential Structure of the Affective Lexicon," *Cognitive Science* 11 (1987): 341–364. On "paradigm scenarios," see de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotions.* On "action tendencies," see Frijda, *The Emotions*.
161. Mills, "Situated Actions and the Vocabulary of Motives."
162. See Wood, "The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador."
163. See John Foran, "A Theory of Third World Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador Compared," *Critical Sociology* 19/2 (1992): 3–27; Foran, "Discourses and Social Forces."