

EMOTIONAL 'MAN': I. THE EMOTIONAL 'MAN' AND THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION*

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Abstract The rational and normative man models have predominated in the social sciences. This paper proposes an emotional 'man' model as an alternative point of departure for analyses of individual, but also of collective and corporate, action. The overall argument is developed in two steps. First, the concepts of 'pure' and 'constrained' emotional 'man' are introduced and developed. Then an emotional interaction model addressing the theme of cooperation is presented. After engaging the cooperative interaction model of 'love' to highlight certain aspects of collective action, the author engages the concepts of 'pure' and 'constrained' emotional action to provide a new perspective on corporate actors. The conclusion proposes how the construction of a 3-dimensional – normative, emotional and rational – action model could be approached.

The major purpose of this paper is to propose a model of the emotional 'man' as a *complement* to the models of rational and normative man. It is not its intention to argue that the model of emotional action should replace either of the other two. Rather it is to advocate model pluralism in lieu of the present model duopoly. The model of the emotional 'man' is useful because it helps to explain some aspects of collective action which the rational and normative man models cannot handle. It also offers a new perspective on corporate actors and suggests the many different ways in which corporate actors, usually considered from a rationalistic or a normative perspective, are in fact emotion-motivated emotion managers.

The rational man model and its limits

In classical and neo-classical economics, rational man is posited as a free man and a free decision-maker. He is free in the sense that he can undisturbedly set up his preference order. While the generation of preferences is taken for granted in the classical model, the problem posed is that of a choice among means.¹

Yet, the freedom of rational man is constrained in this model of rational decision-making because he is obliged or compelled to follow certain rules in making his choices.² First, he is constrained by his own cost-conscious, calculating rationality – the fact that he holds the criteria of relative cost and benefit (and *has to*) compare marginal utilities attached to each good in order to maximise his overall utility) as sovereign guidelines for choosing among

*I would like to thank Jens Alber, Jürgen Feick, Atle Midttun, Andreas Ryll, Brigitte Schenkluhn and Volker Schneider for valuable bibliographical suggestions and comments on the ideas for this paper. Constructive criticism of the first drafts of this paper came from Renate Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Uwe Schimank and Helmut Wiesenthal, whose contribution I gratefully acknowledge. Finally, I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the Editor of this journal for their useful additional comments.

different options and in rank-ordering his preferences. The freedom of rational man is also constrained by the pursuit of internal consistency of choice. He is not to have contradictory desires or beliefs. He is to be exacting and careful in his comparisons, exercising the utmost effort to comply with the rule of consistency (Sen 1985 : 109). Finally, rational man of classical economics is selfish. The final constraint on his action is exercised by his unrelenting pursuit of self-interest which informs all his choices (Sen 1985 : 109–111). In sum, rational man of the classical economics is desirous, calculating, consistent and selfish. And, the three criteria of rationality – calculus, consistency, selfishness – organise his desires.

Now, this model of action has managed to usurp a monopolistic, exclusive position not only in economics and decision theory, but also in much of organisational sociology. The model has captured the scientific imagination to such an extent that even its critics have often defined their views in terms of deviations from this model, but not in their own terms.³ Let me briefly illustrate this point.

Simon's model of bounded rationality rejects the assumption of complete information, certainty and perfect calculability.⁴ Simon's man is defined as limited in his capacity to handle either complexity or uncertainty. Yet he remains rational even in this model – (sub)goal-oriented, cost-conscious, calculating and (under)informed – although his capacities have been considerably reduced.

If Simon removes the assumptions of complete information, certainty and calculability, Schelling and Elster considerably weaken that of consistency (Elster 1986, 1987, 1988; Schelling 1984). They argue that individuals have cognitive coordination problems and experience some motivational conflicts, and that they are engaged in a constant battle to remain rational and to maintain self-control: human reason and/or human will often cave in under the weight of contradictory desires, momentary impulses or norms.⁵ Schelling even speaks of a passionate self as one possible type of self which is sometimes alone in charge and alternates with rational self.⁶ Both Elster and Schelling try to improve the concept of rationality by evoking the image of multiple selves – individual and organisational – but stay with the model.

Finally, Elster and Sen, for example, reject the monopolistic assumption of selfishness and replace it with a duopolistic assumption of motives. The argument is that the classical economic model is too restrictive in proposing that only self-interestedness can affect the choices of rational man. In fact, normative, other-oriented logic constitutes an alternative to that of selfishness, and helps to understand certain types of preference-ordering (Elster 1987; Sen 1982 : 84–106).⁷ Again, as was the case in previous arguments, they seek not to reject but to refine and improve the model of rational man.

In effect, all these criticisms taken together justify why one should not just explore the soft edges of rationality or its boundaries, but actually ask what other models of man should be constructed, or used if already available. Yet, as I have emphasised several times, most critics⁸ do not dare to go beyond the exploration of the limits of rationality.⁹

The argument that we should entertain alternative models of action rather than look for facilitators or disturbers of rationality is also supported by another type of criticism directed at the rational man model – one that points to a very important area of reality which the model cannot adequately address. Namely, it cannot explain either voluntary collective behaviour or the voluntary creation of public goods. Mancur Olson's theory, which relies on the rational man model, makes a strong argument for why neither cooperation nor public goods should exist in the absence of selective incentives and/or coercion.¹⁰

Olson's well-known argument is that the rational man model implies 'rational' free-riding when it is applied to collective action. Each rational actor is a potential free-rider who is concerned about not wasting his contribution, so that he always calculates whether his individual contribution is likely to be futile. Since for many types of collective action this indeed would be the case, it either does not come about at all or, when it does, all potential free-riders turn into actual free-riders. The reason why collective action does sometimes come about is that the association between calculus, sense of futility and free-riding can and is at times broken. For example, either the presence of selective incentives or a measure of coercion can persuade the individual on rational grounds that his cooperative effort would not be futile and, thus, motivate him to contribute to collective action.

In Olson's own view, however, when this sort of 'rational' calculation is not made at all, that is, when individuals are 'irrational' or, in my terms, when a sense of futility¹¹ is absent altogether, there is no defensible reason to apply the rational man model. The rational man model is not useful when ideological inspiration and altruism counter the sense of futility or when self-disciplined commitment and heightened emotional resources accomplish the same task (Olson 1965 : 1, 61, 64–65, 87, 106–108, 160–162).

In other words, not only coercion and selective incentives can solve the free-rider problem and motivate participation on 'rational' grounds. Ideological inspiration, altruism, commitment or high emotional resources also solve the free-rider problem and motivate participation, albeit on 'irrational' grounds.

Although Olson's own remarks suggest that both normative and emotional resources firmly belong to the residual category of 'irrational', prototypical explanations of cooperation focus exclusively on the normative reasons for contributing to collective action. It is argued that in the realm of public and joint goods a rational individual may switch to another logic of action out of a sense of interdependence and duty.¹² The shift in the action logic occurs when incentive-based, calculating rationality does not suffice to guarantee production of or access to desired non-divisible goods and when individuals realise that they are dependent on others for their own welfare. Under these circumstances, rational individuals will operate under a different logic, that of norms or commitment to the welfare of others, even if it may mean a reduced expected welfare for their own selves.

As this prototypical explanation shows, but also as the current state of the art indicates, sociologists, political scientists, but even some economists, have already devoted so much attention to the normative action logics and

dynamics, that I would argue there is no need to focus on them here (see, for example, Parsons 1951; Luhmann 1985; Burns and Flam 1987; Etzioni 1985, 1988; but also Sen 1982 and Elster 1987). Instead, in what follows, the focus will be on the emotional 'man' model, proposed as a complement to those of rational and normative man.

As I argue elsewhere, the unique attribute of emotional action, which sets it apart equally strongly from both rational and normative action, is its very unpredictability (see Table 1). It represents the volte-face potential in, or outer limits of, everyday normative and calculating behaviour. As an angered participant in collective protest, emotional 'man' is a source of social change and political instability. Understood in this fashion, emotions, anger in particular, are a very important source of the unexpected and unpredictable in social life (Flam 1988).

Table 1
Typology of Action Logics: Rational, * Normative, Emotional**

	Rational	Normative	Emotional
Point of reference	self	self or other	other-oriented self
Freedom to pursue desires	resource-constrained	value-constrained	contradiction-strained
Cost	cost-conscious	cost-indifferent	cost-oblivious
Consistency	obligatory	desirable	non-obligatory
Self-control	utility-bound	norm-bound	unbound
Determinacy	predictable	predictable	unpredictable

*Rational = classical and neo-classical

**Emotional = pure emotional

In contrast to my earlier effort, this paper emphasises what makes emotions, love in particular, a source of the expected and predictable, and emotional 'man' a contributor to social order. As a 'loving' participant in collective action, emotional 'man' contributes to the creation of public goods, and as a creator of corporate actors, to the stabilisation and regulation of otherwise intermittent and fleeting feelings, but also to a general emotional restraint, even though these feelings, when intensified and reinforced by group support, issue at times in actions which question and restructure the very corporate order by which we live.

'Pure' and 'constrained' emotional 'man'

It has to be noted that the model construction undertaken here is made more difficult by the fact that contemporary sociologists of emotion have

developed their theories in considerable disciplinary isolation¹³ and that only one classical sociologist explicitly dealt with emotions.¹⁴

It also should be emphasised at the outset that after presenting a 'pure' emotional 'man' model, I will consider the constraints under which it operates. The distinction between a 'pure' and a 'constrained' emotional 'man' is necessary to reflect the fact that feelings are rarely expressed in a direct and spontaneous fashion. On the contrary, normative, social and strategic expectations combine to compel 'pure' emotional 'man' to manage his own feelings.

In fact, it could be argued that if for the rational man the ultimate selector and reducer of the broad array of his preferences are the limited economic means at his disposal, for 'constrained', but not for 'pure', emotional 'man' the ultimate selector and reducer of the broad array of feelings¹⁵ are the limited cultural and social means at the disposal which prescribe, proscribe and permit the expression of certain emotions.¹⁶ In both cases, there is a built-in tension between the goals and the means. There is a certain cost attached to achieving a goal – whether it is to produce/consume or express something in socially, culturally and strategically legitimate terms, and *homo sentiens* just like *homo economicus* cannot ignore this cost. The one is compelled to sort out preferences and manage resources, the other sorts out and manages feelings. Both are much more rule-bound than is 'pure' emotional 'man'.

A. 'Pure' emotional 'man'. If rational man is defined as free, consistent, cost-conscious, calculating and selfish, the 'pure' emotional 'man', in contrast, is unfree, inconsistent, cost-indifferent and other-oriented.

As noted earlier, rational man is self-interested and self-referential. In contrast, 'pure' emotional 'man' may be self-interested, but the very crux with feelings is that they orient and attach the emotional self to others.¹⁷ Such feelings as love, loyalty or respect bind individuals together, whereas such feelings as anger, fear or envy separate individuals from each other (Kemper 1984 : 374). Feelings relate individuals to others and make these individuals develop concern for the negative or positive welfare of others.¹⁸

In contrast to rational man, who is free and whose choices are voluntary, 'pure' emotional 'man' is unfree. Feelings have an involuntary character. They cannot be produced at will. Feelings invade or overwhelm. They connect or separate individuals against their will. In this sense feelings are spontaneous and generative – they generate a sympathetic or antipathetic charge which informs the substance of a relationship. Thus, one falls in or out of love, or feels sympathy or antipathy towards somebody for reasons that often defy rational analysis or one's own will (Kemper 1978, 1981, 1984 : 374; Simmel 1955; Rorty 1982).

A 'pure' emotional 'man' is cost-indifferent – what matters is that feelings can be expressed. And, these feelings themselves are unquantifiable and non-calculating as a matter of principle. Positive feelings, such as romantic or fraternal love (solidarity), generate a willingness to share. One gives without an expectation of compensation.¹⁹ Similarly, pure negative feelings, such as hostility, whose objects are the characteristics of the other(s), defy calculability

– the purpose is to destroy at any cost (Kemper 1978, 1981; Simmel 1955; Davis 1973).

Feelings have a logic of their own. First, they are multiple or multi-layered. Secondly, they can be, roughly speaking, compatible or incompatible. Thirdly, they resist attempts at ordering or hierarchisation (Nedelmann 1988 : 28; Simmel 1955 : 22–28, 35–55). This means that ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ can be either consistent or inconsistent in mind and actions. *Consistency* refers to the fact that some feelings are complementary, such as, for example, insecurity and shame. Others are mutually reinforcing, for example, love and admiration. *Inconsistency*²⁰ refers to the fact that incompatible, antagonistic or contradictory feelings, such as, for example, love and hate, often coexist in one and the same person.²¹ Even the most extreme and contrary feelings can coexist within a single individual and be felt simultaneously in relation to a single person or an object. And the most contrary emotions can issue from each other, such as, for example, friendship from animosity.²²

So far, the attributes of ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ paralleled and contrasted with those of rational man. The following two – inconstancy and indeterminacy – underscore even more the crux of the matter with ‘pure’ emotional action: the fact that it is often unpredictable. The point with a rational man, after all, is that he exercises self-control and follows ‘rational’ rules of decision-making. These characteristics make him predictable and, one could say, socially accountable. In contrast, the predictability of a ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ is considerably more problematic. In ‘pure’ emotional action, individuals follow only their own feelings in choosing a course of action, which, since these feelings may be inconstant if not inconsistent and indeterminate, makes the course of action unpredictable.

Inconstancy refers to the fact that even the most passionate or the most routinised feelings may come to an end. Feelings are beyond self-control and, therefore, may be in a constant flux. Love turns into hate, hate into love, friendship into hostility, and so on. This follows from what was said above about the nature of emotions – they overwhelm and invade, they are involuntary. Neither can feelings be stopped or extended at will nor, once there, can they be changed without a long-term effort of the will.

Indeterminacy is at its peak when the ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ experiences strong, contrary and inconsistent feelings, and when actions are purely expressive in Weber’s sense. In such a case, neither the ‘man’ nor others can predict the course of action.²³ It is uncertain on which of the contrary feelings ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ will in fact act, since neither norms nor calculus nor status-power relations weigh in favour of any particular feeling. Indeed, one may act on one ‘stronger’ feeling or, consecutively, on two or more contrary feelings.²⁴

To summarise, ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ is unfree, other-oriented, non-calculating and inconstant. ‘Pure’ emotional action is either consistent, or inconsistent and indeterminate – in the latter case, it is also unpredictable. When it is unpredictable, but also when (intense and other-oriented) feelings escape individual and outside control, ‘pure’ emotional action may disregard and upset the elements of the social order. And ‘pure’ emotional ‘man’ lurks

even behind socialised and constrained emotional 'man' – 'feelings, while quite plastic, can be culturally manipulated only within a certain range' (Shott 1979 : 1320, fn. 4).

This lack of predictability and of social accountability gains even more importance from the fact that feelings are very powerful motives of individual action which defy standardisation – they vary in range and intensity from individual to individual and, thus, cannot constitute a basis of social order (see Notes 15 and 16). On the contrary, it is both the subjectivity and the unpredictability of 'pure' emotional action that makes it the foe of the social order and, consequently, turns individual feelings into objects of attempts at regulation, neutralisation and suppression.

B. *'Constrained' emotional 'man'*. In general, it can be said that specific cultural sensitivities, status and power relations, as well as strategic considerations, constrain the feelings of 'pure' emotional 'man'. 'Constrained' emotional 'man' is not free to either feel or emote. Individuals are expected to manage both their actual feelings and their emotional expression. They have to suppress the expression of and neutralise proscribed feelings, but to evoke and display prescribed emotions. They have to follow social guidelines, so-called 'feeling rules' and 'expression rules', which entail a set of cognitive-normative expectations specifying not only the context-bound expected, idealised or obligatory feelings but also the appropriate quality and quantity of emotional display (Hochschild 1975 : 302; Hochschild 1979 : 563–566; Harré 1986).

Individuals who realise or are made to realise that they are defying any of the feeling or expression rules can resort to 'emotion work' or 'emotion management' (Hochschild 1979). They can sort out and manage their feelings in order to reduce the discrepancy between what and how they actually feel and what and how they should feel. Apart from suppressing, re-working and neutralising the undesired feelings, they should also engage in manufacturing and manifesting the desired emotions. The individual ability and willingness to do so is a measure of moral, social and strategic competence, and often involves cooperation: 'emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself' (Hochschild 1979 : 562; Armon-Jones 1986 : 33–34; cf. Schelling 1984 and Elster 1986).

Put succinctly, the control of feelings and the construction of emotions presupposes three distinct types of control mechanisms: individual, group and institutional-organisational.²⁵ But, as the present-day theories state, neither institutional-organisational nor group control are possible without self-control. This internalised, willed, intentional mechanism of control, which entails cognitive processes, such as self-reflection, self-criticism and self-correction, but also feelings of trust, respect, shame, embarrassment and guilt, is at the basis of any social order.²⁶

The construction of social order entails in part the manufacturing of expectational structures which decrease complexity, contingency and uncertainty and which, when fulfilled, although not specifically meant to prevent the expression of proscribed emotions, nevertheless minimise the likelihood of

undesired emotional agitation and of resulting unpredictability. However, when unmet, the very same normative-cognitive expectational structures define the realm of the unexpected, surprising or disappointing which causes a display of *proscribed*, strong, positive or negative, feelings, such as fear, embarrassment, anger or joy. The shock caused by disappointed expectations may lead the individual to lose self-control and to act 'unpredictably in a state of agitation . . . [H]e may lose his temper in his agitation and forget himself, thus disrupting the continuity and reliability of his presentation of self and risking the loss of the social identity of his personality . . . ' (Luhmann 1985 : 41). Feeling and expression rules, shaping both emotional behaviour and expectational structures concerned with this behaviour, play an important contributory role in the construction of a predictable social reality, not least because they also provide blueprints for handling the unexpected. They provide behavioural guidance even when normative-cognitive expectations are violated (see below).

In general, individuals manufacture *prescribed emotions* to meet *expectations* formed on the basis of the prevalent *rules*. Already Durkheim's classical contribution stressed this obligatory-coercive, routine aspect of emotional self-control associated with the presence of cultural norms. Cultures have their specific emotional profiles and sensibilities – they encourage some and discourage other emotions, grant similar emotions inverse or simply different moral status, or call for a similar emotion but require that it be more or less intensely felt. Norms concerning emotions – what Goffman calls expression rules – reflect these cultural sensibilities which are obligatory, and are experienced and expected as a system of rights, duties and sanctions. These rules specify the time and place at which the encouraged emotions should be displayed as well as their intensity, direction and duration (Hochschild 1975, 1979; Schott 1979; Harré 1986).

Not only *normative*, but also *hierarchical orders* and *strategic considerations* issue in rules which make for emotional self-control. Status and power structures are embodied in a system of feeling and expression rules. Positive emotions are supposed to flow up and negative emotions are supposed to flow down in the affirmation of the social hierarchy. The exercise of self-control is a necessary prerequisite of these flows, in particular when these flows ignore and defy individual status and power aspirations (Kemper 1981; Hochschild 1975).²⁷ Similarly, an appropriate control of emotional expressions and of displayed sensitivities (rules of etiquette) confirms one's own social and cultural competence but also affirms the social order. Finally, strategic considerations, formed on the basis of normative or instrumental goals, motivate the specifics of individual self-control – the display of unfelt emotions and the suppression of felt feelings – desired for the sake of impression management. Strategic considerations also inform individual calculations concerning the choice of techniques (discretion, concealment, feigned indifference, emotional blackmail, etc.) by which desired emotions as expected outcomes can be produced or neutralised in oneself or others (Hochschild 1979; Nedelmann 1988 : 30; Goffman 1975).

Durkheim also stressed another important social cause of intended emotional construction: norm violations. When normative expectations are

not met, and deeply felt values are violated, a collectivity is supposed to react by directing strong, negative emotions against the deviating individual(s).²⁸ Violations of norms should cause a prescribed production of emotional outbursts. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the emotional reactions against the violations of feeling rules attached to a hierarchical order. These emotional reactions are prescribed and contrast with the emotions involved in the violations themselves which entail (not necessarily intentional) acts of defiant, proscribed emotional display (Kemper 1978; Hochschild 1979: 567).²⁹

In contrast to a socialised actor and a rebel who, respectively, follow or defy the established rules for emotional construction, a strategist is a professional manipulator of these rules. Strategists not only distance themselves but also thrive on and exploit these feeling rules as techniques which will help them to achieve their goals. By the same token, a strategist's greatest foe is his or her own normative socialisation which may jeopardise 'professional' efforts and cause the revelation of 'socialised' but at the moment unwelcome feelings, and, thus, strategic goals.³⁰

When considering 'pure' emotional action, I emphasised that it is unfree, cost-indifferent and non-calculating, other-oriented, uncontrolled as well as inconstant and unpredictable when subject to inconsistent feelings. 'Constrained' emotional action is still other-oriented, but differs in its other attributes from 'pure' emotional action. Through emotion work and emotion management, individuals achieve a considerable degree of control over and freedom from (some of) their feelings. They do not allow the feelings to overwhelm them. If they are contradictory or incompatible, they work to achieve consistency by suppressing or neutralising some, while cultivating others. They are not necessarily completely free or in control, but neither are they emotional slaves. Instead, and this is an important point, they very well may be slaves of socio-cultural norms entailed in the feeling and expression rules, unless they are either strategists who exploit them or rebels who adopt a critical stand towards them and engage in their conscious redefinition.³¹

Moreover, 'constrained' emotional 'man' is also much more normative, cost-conscious and calculating than 'pure' emotional 'man', either because of respect for norms, for example, for feeling rules defining a time limit for non-reciprocal feelings or a social-status limit for reciprocal feelings, or because of greater awareness of the costs of socio-cultural deviance. In extreme cases, it is precisely the awareness of the costs of deviance – the expected negative sanctions – that is the sole ground for emotion management and emotion work in which individuals engage to manufacture prescribed emotions and to neutralise and suppress the proscribed feelings.

In sum, 'constrained' emotional 'man' approximates either rational or normative man. As a construct, it is much more consistent, constant and predictable than 'pure' emotional 'man', since it mixes the alternative logics of action which together constitute actual individual behaviour. It can be argued indeed that individuals combine the normative, rational and emotional action logics when they try to express their feelings but exercise self-control, become cost-conscious, pursue consistency and also engage in emotion work and emotion management in order to comply with norms. The success of their

self-expressive efforts is predicated upon the presence of a stable system which not only produces internally consistent and predictable expectational structures, but also provides the means for their realisation.

Collective action reconsidered in the light of an emotional interaction model

So far I have briefly referred to prescribed and proscribed emotional expression, and contrasted the logic of 'pure' with that of 'constrained' emotional action. In the following, I return to an objection raised earlier against the rational man model – that it cannot explain adequately voluntary cooperation and public goods – in order to argue that the emotional 'man' model *can* explain them, at least partially.

Of all emotional inter-individual interaction models developed by sociologists, I select a model of 'love' because it addresses the theme of cooperation and therefore is the most relevant to my overall argument. But it must be noted that the presentation of this model is also meant to convince the reader that *emotional interaction models can and have been constructed*,³² and that they can handle both self-reinforcing and contradictory emotions or a mixture of both.³³

The model of an 'emotional unity-discord' presented below pertains not only to dyadic intimate relationships, but also to individuals who voluntarily join a collectivity. The model pinpoints contradictory emotions at work and periodises a typical emotional sequence in which interacting individuals move between emotional indifference and emotional engagement. Over time, but also structurally speaking, there are two distinct developmental trajectories possible in a dyad or a collectivity: isolation–unity–isolation or isolation–unity–consolidation. Taking the first trajectory into account, the model pinpoints the phase-contingent emergence of emotion stabilisers, whose application issues in the second trajectory.

Individuals, whether forming dyads or collectivities, experience contradictory emotions, which in the long run *may* undermine the very intention they have of merging with the other(s). There is an inherent ambivalence built into this type of a relationship due to the contradictory emotional needs which the individuals bring into the relationship. On the one hand, they want to love, to experience communion – the merger of souls and minds. On the other hand, they fear that love and communion may deprive them of their autonomy.

Individuals want to merge – lose their selves in the others' – in part because of the transformative nature of communion: in the 'nascent' stage, the past retreats, the present is an expanding universe, the future is open and unconstrained. An individual self loses its contours and becomes united and enlarged by others. Joy and pleasure stem from giving for its own sake and from sharing the joys and sorrows of the other(s). Love and/or solidarity are at this point still near non-volitional and non-instrumental – neither meant to stimulate reciprocity nor cognizant of the costs attached (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; Kemper 1978). The members of a collectivity experience the intensified emotional state and emotional group-contagion,³⁴ wherein the entire group shares the same emotions, whether gaiety, joyful agitation,

sadness mixed with anger, or sorrow: '... human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collectively. Sorrow, like joy, becomes exalted and amplified when leaping from mind to mind ...' (Durkheim 1915 : 446). In the nascent state, solidarity and a sense of powerful potentiality reinforce each other: 'Together, we can change the world'.

The very same individuals, however, may come to fear that they will suffer a loss of their own emotional make-up, distinctive individuality, sense of judgement – in short, autonomy. They may come to fear that their vital interests or status and power may have to be sacrificed too much. These fears may mitigate their willingness to merge with the other(s). Here we deal with an 'emotional constellation', containing emotions which are contradictory and, therefore, account for inconstancy. While at first, individuals may act upon their willingness to merge, subsequently they may act upon their fear of a merger.

For this kind of relationship, typical relation- and phase-contingent institutional developments have been identified. Individuals engaged in a unifying relationship often recognise its fragility and seek to solidify it. Those more interested in the stability of the relationship compromise their interests and identities more, but, eventually, press for commitment and for establishing compliance-insuring mechanisms. In response to this pressure, the other(s) may terminate the relationship. However, if the commitment is made and compliance-insuring mechanisms are accepted, avoidance strategies contrary to the spirit of the commitment can be punished. But, if these mechanisms fail, first persuasion attempts and then conflict escalation can be expected. If conflict does not settle the issues, separation (ostracism in groups) ensues.

The periodisation of this unity-discord relationship includes the first positive encounter(s), the emergence and the cognitive-emotional experience of communion, a development of a sense of common identity which sets one unit apart from the others, commitment, routinisation of the relationship, definition, detection and destruction of the sources of discord, confession-forgiveness mechanisms, unity-reviving ceremonies, threat-persuasion negotiations, and, if these mechanisms, ceremonies and strategies do not work, conflict and separation (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; Zablocki 1980).

Let me now propose that the model presented above directly answers the concern of the critical economists that the rational man model cannot account for the emergence of voluntary collective action or that of joint or public goods. Note that this model emphasises the attractiveness of an inter-individual merger to isolated individuals. A rationalist could argue that this merger could be seen as a selective incentive to participation in the Olsonian sense, comparable to socialising, for example. The merger, however, cannot be unequally distributed and, therefore, is not at all selective. Moreover, merging with a collectivity is not a means to some (rational) end. It is an end of action all in its own right. And it implies a near-complete dissolution of the rationalistic self and its conversion into a purely emotional self – indifferent to both cost and consequences.³⁵

Nor can the feelings of love or compassionate solidarity, which motivate 'participation', be seen as outcomes of a premeditated decision and explained

in terms of the rational man model. After all, the point with both love and compassionate solidarity is that they are non-volitional and spontaneous. They overwhelm and, thus, leave no time for information collection, comparisons, deliberated choice, or bargaining. Here we deal with Schelling's 'passionate self', which sometimes is alone in charge and alternates with the rational self. And it is of great significance that this passionate self can remain in charge for months, even for years. Many movements, intentional communities and forms of collective action last for at least a year before the absence of normative-instrumental stabilisers finally makes for their demise (Kanter 1972; Alberoni 1984). This is so because interacting positive feelings can reinforce each other's self-perpetuation.³⁶

Those who see this 'passionate' account of the reasons for joining collective action as too romantic should consider a more rational, yet related, argument which the model also suggests. Aside from emotions, the model stresses the importance of intentions, commitment, norms, compromises and persuasion for the initiation and stabilisation of collective action. These elements complement Olson's dyad of selective incentives and coercion. They point to the importance of not only the intentions behind joining, which may very well involve a rational and pre-meditated decision to switch from a 'rationalist' to an 'emotional' action context offered by a collectivity, but also of *negotiated-consensual*, processual-interactional stabilisers of collective action, which Olson ignores and which emerge as a matter of contingency, i.e. only when the participants in a collective undertaking intentionally seek to stabilise it (on this very point, see Kanter 1972 : 133, 189).

As important as the intentions and the processual-interactional stabilisers of collective action are, they should not be allowed to overshadow the importance of the initial emotional charge generated by a sense of unity among individuals engaged in a merger. This emotional charge is *prior* to the emergence of norms meant to stabilise the collectivity as well as to the formation of interests in or against this stabilisation. And, most importantly, it is this initial emotional charge which suggests why a 'threshold to collective action' may be easier to overcome than the rational man model suggests (Granovetter 1978; Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985).³⁷ 'Emotional', non-calculating individuals or charismatic leaders, whose importance Mancur Olson recognises, often initiate collective action, since, for them, participation is costless. Their participation, in turn, lowers the cost of joining for the rational, calculating individuals. Along with those who join compelled by their sense of duty, these two types of individuals combine in collective action. In this sense, the emotional charge, capable of overcoming the sense of futility, provides a straightforward complement/alternative to self-interest or a sense of duty, which are evoked by economists as the reasons behind collective action aimed at the provision of public or joint goods.³⁸ It is important to note that, in contrast to both normative and rational collective action models, the emotional model implies that the production of public or joint goods is an *unintended consequence* of an intended successful merger on the part of 'emotional', non-calculating individuals.

Let me now switch the perspective on collective action for a moment to round off the stabilisation argument. So far I have mostly focused on 'positive' emotional elements inherent in collective action. But collective action, as a purely emotional phenomenon, is also associated with 'negative' emotions. Fear, anxiety and anger precede, while hate and hostility often accompany collective action.³⁹ In fact, until recently, most sociological studies of collective behaviour and social movements have focused on these emotions (Smelser 1971; Gurr 1970; Cohen 1985). While positive emotions are directed inwards and reserved for the members of the collectivity, these negative emotions are directed outwards, towards the group(s) defined as the foe. What is of the utmost significance for the argument developed here is that these negative feelings help to consolidate and stabilise many different types of collectivities and collective actions (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Douglas 1986). Thus, not only can collective action be stabilised by the self-reinforcing character of mutual positive feelings within a solidaristic group, but also by the negative feelings directed outwards.

As I stated in the introduction, I see the emotional action model not as a substitute, but as a complement to both rational and normative models – as a first step towards a 3-dimensional perspective on human action. This is because the other two models are needed to explain what the emotional action model cannot explain in its own terms, such phenomena as, for example, non-emotional factors involved in the formation of a collectivity, in the emergence of discord, or in the stabilisation and consolidation of a collectivity. In short, I advocate model pluralism instead of the present normative-rationalistic model duopoly.

Notes

1. Rational man has definite preferences about what he wants to achieve, but his problem is his limited resources which constrain his choices. His decision-making problem, then, consists, first of all, in the disposition or allocation problem – how to distribute scarce resources among the multiple, desirable goals (Hogarth and Reder 1987 : 1–3).

2. Not in the terms of the classical model, which sees only the actual resources as a constraint, but rather from the point of view of the model-generated 'logic of action'.

3. See also Etzioni for this point in Etzioni (1988 : 93).

4. 'The classical model calls for knowledge of all the alternatives that are open to choice. It calls for complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the consequences that will follow on each of the alternatives. It calls for certainty in the decision-maker's present and future evaluation of these consequences. It calls for the ability to compare consequences, no matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent measure of utility' (Simon 1978 : 285).

5. Once before the concept of interest denoted prudent reflection, efficient calculation and peace from contradictory passions and momentary impulses. But, those who advanced this concept simply did not manage the task of demonstrating that it actually constrained aspirations and passions or generated a normative framework. In this sense, interest joined both morality and reason as yet another aspiring but ineffectual tamer of desires (Hirschmann 1977 : 32–35, 40–45).

6. Passionate self acts upon ' . . . passion, or infatuation . . . all of those transient overwhelming moods that elevate certain values to absolute domination . . . ' (Schelling 1984 : 89).

7. Sociologists and political scientists have stressed what the rational man model omits – the normative shaping of individual preferences. A sociological argument is that norms are constitutive of the rational man's means-and-ends schema (Durkheim 1951; Douglas 1986; Etzioni 1988 : 67–113). A parallel political science argument is that institutions select, rank-order

and vest 'interests' with normative power, and that therefore these interests (revealed preferences) can neither be seen as the actual individual needs and desires nor have any primary explanatory power (Schmitter 1981; Connolly 1972; Ball 1979; Willms 1973; Balbus 1971).

8. See Elster (1987) for an exception to this rule.

9. See Etzioni (1988) for an extended discussion of how normative-emotional action logic functions and how it influences rational decision-making and the processes of (a) information selection, processing and inference-making, and (b) the selection of means in structured ways through exclusion, infusion and indifference (Etzioni 1988 : 93–193). This approach shows how this 'mixed' logic structures action, economic regimes and economic and corporate decisions in particular, but also how it facilitates or disturbs rational decision-making. However, it does not treat emotional 'logic' in its own right.

10. Axelrod (1984) provides a game-theoretical solution to the problems of voluntary cooperation and provision of public goods: repeated interactions and the use of a tit-for-tat strategy.

11. A sense of futility is 'effective' when free-riders effectively benefit from the collective action undertaken by others who are more interested in the provision of a given public good, although they themselves do not contribute. This situation only strengthens free-riders' feelings that their own individual contribution does not matter. If all individuals were 'rational' in this way and considered their potential contributions futile, public goods would be produced only by those 'more interested'.

12. The differing arguments in support of this view are: 1) normativist: norms are already in place, but become activated only when imperative, for example, in situations where individuals know their welfare is interdependent – Prisoner's Dilemma; 2) functionalist: norms emerge when self-interest alone is not enough to safeguard or guarantee social order (which is often itself necessary to promote self-interested rationality); 3) rationalist: individuals create norms in self-interest, to protect themselves from free-riding (Elster 1987; Sen 1982; Johansen cited in Sen 1982 : 96; Etzioni 1985; Hechter 1987).

13. The war that they wage is against the overemphasis on a cognitive-normative man model which still dominates sociology and anthropology.

14. Among classical sociologists, Max Weber conceived of affective-expressive action as devoid of rules or logical constraints, and Durkheim pointed out normative emotions, but it was only Simmel who dealt with emotions in their own right.

15. Drawing on the traditional philosophical view I reserve the term feeling for an incomparable 'subjective' experience of an affective-cognitive state, and contrast it with the term emotion which draws attention to the 'intersubjective' experience, and socially accessible, and behavioural and circumstantial attributes of the affective state (cf. (Farrell 1988 : 73; Rorty 1982 : 159; Bedford 1986; Armon-Jones 1986). Some sociologists focus on the management and construction of emotions, thus, in effect, recognising the distinction between private and socialised aspects of affect (Hochschild 1979; Shott 1979). Kemper also distinguishes between real and displayed emotions but treats the latter as epiphenomenal (Kemper 1981; Kemper 1978 : 41).

16. To philosophers, an emotion stands for an affect – a state of bodily agitation *accompanied* by or *interwoven with* a contemporaneous cognition or belief and/or *caused* by an evaluative judgement or by a belief or a desire or their combination (Farrell 1988 : 73, 79, 81–85). To sociologists, emotions are evoked by 'real, anticipated, imagined, or recollected outcomes of social relationships' (Kemper, cited in Shott 1979 : 1318).

17. Aesthetic feelings and emotions are of no concern here.

18. Emotions have an intricate relationship to empathy, but I omit this topic to simplify the exposition. Post World War II social scientists have mostly stressed the cognitive nature of empathy, but see Shott (1979 : 1328) for an analytical distinction between cognitive and affective empathy.

19. Disappointed or unrequited positive feelings may issue in attempts to convert the relationship in a calculable exchange relationship, but these attempts fail because it is very difficult to measure respective, from the outset incommensurate, contributions to an emotional relationship (Deutsch 1985; Davis 1973).

20. Compare to Schelling's and Elster's arguments that an individual's desires may be contradictory, and to Hirschmann's account of the history of the idea of contradictory desires. See also Etzioni (1988 : 70), where he points out that psychologists, but not economists, assume a mix of motives and emotions that are at least in part incompatible.

21. Simmel identified many, what I would like to call, 'emotional constellations' of this type, such as sympathy–antipathy, love–fear, loyalty–opposition–competition, hate–guilt, accord–discord, dominance–submission–defiance, etc.

22. Simmel also identified many typical 'emotional strings', such as love–indifference, love–hate, respect–contempt, loyalty–opposition–competition, etc., which differ from emotional constellations in that the emotions are not felt simultaneously but one precedes the other. The term 'emotional strings' is mine.

23. The theme of unpredictability has its own intellectual history. Hirschman reminds us that past attempts to make passions a predictor of action turned around the attempts to decide which passions are stronger than others and, therefore, which can be said to countervail and dominate the others. However, this method failed. Instead, interest, first as a countervailing and second as a mild passion, emerged as a concept as a result of these attempts. But, very quickly, the concept left the emotional realm as it came to include reason and even moral precepts (Hirschman 1977).

24. There is, of course, the possibility that contradictory emotions will block each other and paralyse the individual. This is even more likely when one of the emotions is backed by norms, but not the other.

25. The institutional-organisational presupposes the presence of rules, staff, selective incentives and coercion. The group presupposes opinion-forming and expression as well as the availability of sanctions. The individual presupposes a sense of expressive-normative integrity, a will and a measure of self-esteem.

26. Among historical predecessors of these alleged individual self-control mechanisms, we find virtues, mild (or benevolent) passions, interest as a mild passion, other-oriented, sympathetic sentiments, reason. See Hirschman (1977) and Rorty (1982).

27. Kemper argues that 'feeling rules', which Shott and Hochschild describe, are a function of and should be reduced to rules attached to status-power structures. He does not grant any autonomy to culture.

28. See Nedelmann (1986 : 407) on '*Dieser Durkheimsche zirkulare Prozess zwischen Wertverletzung – öffentliche Empörung – Sanktionierung – Wertstabilisierung . . .*'.

29. Proscribed emotions are seen as being caused by two simultaneous processes: (a) negative deployment of power and/or insufficient deference on the part of the power-status holders, and (b) unmet expectations concerning social acceptance and rejection on the part of the power-status-less. Proscribed emotions presuppose positive self-esteem on the part of the powerless (Kemper 1978). See also Morton Deutsch for an extended argument that it takes positive self-esteem, supportive environment, and a sense that redress is probable, for individuals and groups to begin to feel that they are treated unjustly and to turn self-assertive (Deutsch 1985). This is a fairly standard argument. See, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978) or Alexandra Ålund (1988).

30. ' . . . [o]nce norms are incorporated, their infraction is likely to lead the actor to display uncontrollable minor signs of guilt, shame and embarrassment . . . these giveaway signs . . . ' (Goffman 1968 : 57). Similarly, 'professional' strategists can experience a disappointment caused by their *unmet cognitive expectations*, which prompt undesired, yet bursting feelings which, if displayed, could uncover their true reactions and intentions. Whether this disappointment will in fact cause any emotional display on their part depends ultimately on skills in self-presentation and emotion management.

31. Students of emotions, even when they work from an explicit constructivist perspective, provide no general theory about why and how social actors interpret, communicate about, and modify feeling and expression rules (see Hochschild 1975; Scheff 1988; Shott 1979; Harré 1986).

32. See Conclusion, but also, for example, the article on the escalation of anger in a two-actor interaction in Harré (1986). See also Sarbin's article in the same volume which suggests that a cultural repertoire contains stereotypic emotional roles, role interactions and plots on which actors can draw in staging their 'emotional-dramaturgical', identity-asserting performances.

33. For a model of self-perpetuating negative emotional contagion, involving shame and anger, see Scheff (1988 : 396–397).

34. Note that in contrast to a two-person 'emotional contagion' with several different emotions, which Scheff proposes, this classical Durkheimian model posits an emotional group-contagion with shared emotion(s).

35. My argument draws on Pizzorno's, except that I emphasise the near-absorption of the individual self in the collective self, while he emphasises the integration and the reinforcement of the individual self resulting from the individual participating in a collective action. His is a

life-long, dynamic perspective on an individual self, mine is a duration-limited, structural perspective focused on what happens to the self in a particular collective action, social movement or collectivity (Pizzorno 1986).

36. A cognitive-emotional merger is very likely not only to occur but also to perpetuate itself without any serious obstacles if certain preconditions for it are met, such as: (a) rough equality of power and status, (b) a perceived similarity in beliefs and goals, (c) open communication, (d) relations of trust, friendliness and helpfulness. If these preconditions are met, then 'Deutsch's crude law of social relations' applies (Deutsch 1985 : 69–70). See also Scheff (1988 : 397) on 'a system that seems virtually automatic'.

37. Says Jean Cohen, drawing on Pizzorno: '... only if one sees solidarity and identity as goals of group formation ... can one see that, with respect to these goals, collective action is costless' (Cohen 1985 : 687). Say Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira: '... an "irrational" contributor may well find that, instead of being a "patsy", he or she is a role model or organiser whose action sets off others' actions and, in the end, vindicates the original contribution' (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985 : 547).

38. It seems like a minor point of contention, so I leave it out of the text, but individuals engaged in a collectivity may shirk their duties not because of a sense of effective futility, but because of: emotional-cognitive discord; routinised emotional indifference or defiance; intention to leave, kept in check by commitment, etc.

39. See Cohen (1985 : 672) for a brief recent account of this perspective on collective behaviour.

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'Emotional "Man": II. Corporate Actors as Emotion-Motivated Managers' by the same author will appear in the next issue of *International Sociology*.