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Emotions and Social Change

Historical and Sociological Perspectives

Edited by
David Lemmings and Ann Brooks

ROUTLEDGE

Emotions and Social Change

This edited collection takes a critical perspective on Norbert Elias's theory of the "civilizing process," through historical essays and contemporary analysis from sociologists and cultural theorists. It focuses on changes in emotional regimes or styles and considers the intersection of emotions and social change, historically and contemporaneously. The book is set in the context of increasing interest among humanities and social science scholars in reconsidering the significance of emotion and affect in society, and the development of empirical research and theorizing around these subjects. Some have labeled this interest as an "affective turn" or a "turn to affect," which suggests a profound and wide-ranging reshaping of disciplines. Building upon complex theoretical models of emotions and social change, the chapters exemplify this shift in analysis of emotions and affect, and suggest different approaches to investigation which may help to shape the direction of sociological and historical thinking and research.

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Ann Brooks and David Lemmings, October 2013

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Introduction

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1 The Emotional Turn in the Humanities and Social Sciences

David Lemmings and Ann Brooks

THE EMOTIONAL TURN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Scholars working in the humanities and social sciences have recently developed a range of concepts and frameworks broadly related to the study of human emotions. Some have gone so far as to label this as a "turn to emotions," or an "affective turn," thereby suggesting a profound and wide-ranging reshaping of disciplines and approaches similar to that wrought by the textual or linguistic turn that began in the 1970s.[1] Indeed if the linguistic turn represents our acknowledgment that language helps to constitute reality, then an affective turn implies that emotions have a similarly fundamental role in human experience. Accordingly, this collection of scholarly essays responds to the multidisciplinary shift in focus towards the emotions.

What then, is the turn to emotions, and what are its implications for scholarship, especially in the practice of history and sociology, the two disciplines that frame this book, and among those most obviously influenced? To pose this question is to ask about the place of the emotions in relation to social change, which is the subject of this introduction. It also requires a working definition of emotions. For this second question, Thomas Dixon's characterization of emotions as "felt judgements"—bodily sensations signaling that one's current personal situation is or is not in accordance with hopes, values, and well-being—is useful shorthand from the perspective of the individual, because it captures contemporary understandings of emotions as a combination of thought and embodied feeling.[2] Certainly, fundamental to contemporary humanities and social science approaches to emotions is the shared idea that the emotional life of human beings is not "hardwired," or wholly determined by biology, as was previously believed by many psychologists, but rather has a cognitive element, constructing meaning in regard to intentions and plans. This recognition of thinking in feeling has important consequences, for if emotional expressions are influenced by cognitive reflection, then the social context that has informed that thinking is important; and since societies and cultures vary, emotions

are implicated in social and historical *change*. Moreover, it is now believed that among individuals emotions help to constitute ideas about the self, for scholars working in the field of the emotions are increasingly rejecting absolute social or cultural constructionism in favor of an element of individual agency or effort by which the performance of affect informs subjective experience.[3]

Having outlined very broadly the foundations of recent scholarly interest in emotions and the individual self, it is important to understand that some scholars attend rather to "discourse about emotions" (that is writing or speaking about emotions) or "emotional discourses" (meaning communication practices with affective content) because of their utility as a means of explicating social life and power relations, rather than to reveal some presumed interiority, according to more traditional approaches derived from psychology.[4] For example, the anthropologists Lutz and Abu-Lughod advocate the study of ideas about and interactive expressions of emotions because they reveal norms of social hierarchy and control, competing valuations of morality, and changing patterns of cultural exchange and reproduction. They also insist that in social interactions of all kinds, ranging from everyday life to public affairs, emotion discourses are always in the process of being contested, and as social performance they help to constitute embodied experience. Indeed, from this perspective emotional styles and expressions are not only informed by the cultures that they inhabit; as "operators" in society they can be more than merely epiphenomenal.[5]

According to Sarah Ahmed's relational analysis of emotions in society, emotion words circulate in "emotional economies." In other words, as feelings are named and renamed by words in different social contexts but in relation to particular figures they generate affective value by constituting shared "objects of feeling." Thus in contemporary Western politics the habitual reiteration of negative statements about "illegal immigrants" attracts expressions of rage and generates affect-saturated ideas about the threat that such others pose to "the nation."[6] Alternatively, emotional expressions fail to adhere to their subjects because they are not shaped and learned by repetitive experience; or they are successfully contested by different affective systems. In this collection Claire McClisky demonstrates that missionaries in late nineteenth-century Australia sought to inculcate their notions of Christian love and sympathy among the Indigenous people whom they accommodated. Their charges sometimes responded with anger when these affective values offended against their traditional emotional attachment to land, however: or with frustration at the missionaries' failure to follow through and treat them as equals upon the proper demonstration of Christian emotions. As McClisky comments, far from representing linear transmission of an emotional system, in this case "both missionaries and Aboriginal mission residents were participants (though perhaps not always willing ones) in complex systems of emotional circulation and exchange." Moreover, as "performatives," or words that act by constituting the objects

of their attention, reiterated emotional utterances are potentially productive of the human agency essential for social change.[7]

Conceived in these discursive, culturally contingent, and existentially political ways, the study of emotions is rich territory for investigating social practice and change. As suggested, since cultural context influences emotional expressions, emotional styles are always developed interactively in societies; as embodied expressions they are also often presumed to provide signals to others about interior attitudes and character; and among witnesses they may inspire corresponding feelings of compassion or disgust, love or anger. Moreover, different societies and subgroups invariably have "feeling rules," which serve to channel the expression of affect in a range of contexts, and thereby help to constitute "emotional communities."[8] And conforming to these rules inevitably requires "emotional labour." Thus Arlie Hochschild famously showed how twentieth-century flight attendants were trained to smile at passengers even if they were rude, in conformity with the cheerful service culture of the airline industry.[9] Moreover, studies of moral panics have revealed the competing deployment of discourses around fear and disgust about others to inscribe or reinscribe social boundaries and legitimize elites.[10] On the other hand, analyses of hate campaigns show that their subjects are interpellated as disempowered objects of disgust, thrust out from the community.[11] Indeed, as William Reddy has argued, the management of emotions in communities is the business of power and politics, broadly conceived, and change occurs as individuals and groups challenge and seek to modify dominant emotional regimes that do not allow their selves sufficient "emotional liberty."[12] Finally, the study of emotional communities is not confined to their features which may be characterized as highly "emotional," such as love or anger; for if affect is influenced by thinking about goals and ideals, the study of emotions can illuminate everyday social life.

NORBERT ELIAS AND THE CIVILIZING PROCESS

The historical sociologist Norbert Elias studied emotion discourse in medieval and early modern Europe extensively, and his *Civilizing Process* (originally published in 1939) is the most substantial example to date of a historical grand narrative that relates changes in emotional styles and rules to changing social and political contexts. Moreover, because the principal source material of this seminal work was conduct manuals prescribing behavior by regulating the expression of anger and proper application of disgust and shame, Elias's book also reveals the importance of managing affect as a form of social politics. The *Civilizing Process* has been attractive to cultural historians as a model for critically analyzing the history of emotions in Europe, principally because it articulated a trajectory of development from early medieval to modern times that built upon the insights of

Freudian psychoanalysis to suggest the gradual repression of cruelty, anger, and violence and the advance of shame.[13] Sociologists too have built upon Elias's insights about emotional regimes and historical change, while critiquing them significantly. For example, in drawing distinctions between the different types of emotional styles associated with long-term historical change, Turner (in this volume) makes the distinction, raised elsewhere by van Krieken, between the kinds of emotions regulated by medieval society, which were fundamentally prescribed by social control structures and crude disciplinary techniques (typically found today in societies advocating *shar'ia law*), and those expressed in contemporary societies where the sophistication and relative openness of social relationships is characterized by a very different set of emotional styles.[14]

Considered as a contribution to scholarship, it has been argued that Elias's scheme of the "civilising process" works best as a "history of manners" rather than a history of emotions, as has been shown by a number of social theorists.[15] His discussion concentrates on "courtly manners" and the emergence of the role of the state in the context of a fairly conservative model of social class. Certainly, in attempting to reject the critical class analysis of Marx and particularly the Frankfurt School, from which he parted company after a period as an assistant to Karl Mannheim in the Sociology Department at the University of Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933, Elias attempted to present an alternative developmental trajectory, through an analysis of class within courtly European society.[16] As Turner (in this volume) notes: "[he] described the habitus associated with each class. . . . [as] constituted by the dispositions, norms, and practices that were relevant to the various strata. The control of emotions was an important part of the habitus of bourgeois culture." Indeed, Ahmed has noted that Elias's scheme for developing civilization in Europe depended ultimately on an evolutionary model that represented particular emotional styles as attributes of superior beings. By relating emotions to social hierarchy, however, Elias recognized that the dominant emotional culture, or "emotional regime" of a community depended on relations of power.[17] Despite its flaws, the work of Norbert Elias therefore remains important for scholars who are interested in evaluating the role of emotions in historical change.

There are several other reasons for reaching this conclusion. Firstly, as Stephen Mennell has remarked, Elias understood the poverty of ideas about relating the "individual" to society. Even if we accept that his primary concern was with quotidian "manners," it remains the case that his analysis was preoccupied with people whose ideas and habits were informed by processes of social interaction.[18] This means that however flawed his work was, nevertheless it retains the cardinal virtue of discussing collective human relations and their mutual interdependence. And (secondly), he believed that these dynamic interactive processes contributed to historical change. Thus he saw medieval conduct manuals as elements in a discursive formation derived from the Renaissance court: a process whereby the

manners of the aristocracy were internalized by an ambitious bourgeois readership. Thirdly, this particular historical event depended on emotions also conceptualized as socially interactive—shame and honor—insofar as he believed that readers who wished to survive and prosper in society feared the shame attendant on exposing themselves to ridicule by behaving badly and rather sought the honor they associated with perfect manners.[19] While Elias's formulation of the shifts in affective life he discerned in Europe is perhaps overly simplistic and skewed by the need to treat Germany as emotionally backward; by considering emotions seriously he at least touched the pulse of change for conceptualizing increasingly complex and interdependent societies. Although they adopt various approaches, the chapters in this book all recognize the importance of emotions in social relations and change; and in doing so they consider Elias's work as a useful starting point. It is therefore important at this point to consider the contribution of his ideas more critically.

ELIAS'S CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION AND HISTORICAL CHANGE

The Elias scholar Robert van Krieken considers the strengths and weaknesses of Elias's ideas generally in relation to understanding human emotions and demonstrates their ultimate utility for the study of emotions and historical change. Van Krieken argues that there has been a tendency to parody Elias's ideas about the civilizing process as teleological history, a simplification that neglects the full corpus of his work. He insists on the contrary that by studying civilization Elias was working to understand a sophisticated long-term historical process, rather than crudely constructing an ideal condition achieved in mid-twentieth-century Europe. Moreover, as suggested above, at the center of this scholarly project was a desire to connect microscopic studies of human emotions with observations about social structures and their development over time. Thus van Krieken explicates Elias's *Court Society* to show how Elias revealed that aristocratic society was associated with rules of individual emotional expression subtly different from those of the bourgeois culture that replaced it, and comments on their persistence in modern bureaucratic institutions.

As identified by van Krieken, then, Elias's concept of civilization was a process by which the self-reflexive management of emotions governed people's chances of success as they navigated increasingly complex and interrelated societies. Emotional regimes rose and fell over time as they served the ends of power, whether it was achieved by the aggrandizement of status, as at the Renaissance court, or the accumulation of capital, as in modern bourgeois society. But Elias isolated two constants: the gradual rise of the state, with its increasing monopoly of violence and, with this, increasingly extensive webs of interdependence among people. These, for him, were the motors of civilization: for as villages, towns, and principalities morphed

into states, individuals became dependent on more and more people and had to take care as to how they appeared before them. At the same time, as the boundaries of mutual identification were extended to include all the state's subjects, it was essential to manage the expression of emotions so as to be seen to care about one's fellow citizens. That said, as van Krieken shows, Elias ultimately acknowledged that civilization might well be accompanied by the development of brutality and callousness toward out-groups and other nations in the bureaucratic state itself, representing a form of "de-civilisation."

Despite its emphasis on the potential contributions of Elias's body of work for understanding the role of emotions in social change, van Krieken's chapter admits it manifests some theoretical problems and not a few empirical errors. For example, his characterization of medieval aggression as "natural" and the deployment of the Middle Ages as a presocial conceptual ground zero are both wrong and theoretically unsophisticated. Indeed these mistakes may largely account for the hostility of medieval historians toward his work. Anthropological studies also suggest that Elias may also have exaggerated the role of the state in the growth of emotional self-management, as opposed to the family and other forms of human organization. Despite his stress on the regulation of emotions in social interaction he was also somewhat contradictory in his account of the relative malleability of human psychology, thereby leaving readers unclear as to the psychological endurance of particular emotional cultures. Overall, Elias's studies are inconclusive as to his conception of the dialectical relations between psychological states, emotional expression, and social change. As van Krieken shows clearly, however, Elias's theoretical positions on the social production of human behavior, the centrality of emotions to social life, and, above all, the evident shifts in emotional cultures and discourses over time, are potentially very fertile contributions to the study of emotions and historical change.

BUILDING UPON ELIAS: AGENCY, PASSIVITY, GENDER, AND MODERN EMOTIONS

Despite the heuristic utility of his ideas, as van Krieken acknowledges, Elias's sociohistorical work is now somewhat dated and could hardly be comprehensive in its coverage. For example, both at an individual and collective level, Elias's practical representation of the "civilising process" appears to be one of a dominant regime meeting inherent passivity. In his contribution to this volume van Krieken has pointed out that it has been easily misrepresented as a "civilising offensive." Certainly, as Turner (in this volume) shows, there is no recognition in *The Civilizing Process* of peasants' revolts or workers taking industrial action against the disciplines enforced against them (although one should acknowledge Elias's later, collaborative work

on the survival of alternative emotional regimes associated with popular sport). As Turner comments: "These inferiors in the hierarchy of privilege and good manners never exhibit any indignation or resentment with respect to any sense of injustice."

Yet as many of the papers in this collection show, individuals and communities have shown considerable agency, resistance, and fortitude when faced with injustice, state control, undemocratic leadership, and repression. The chapters by McLisky, Eustace, Woods, Turner, Millar, Johnson, and Crozier-De Rosa all highlight collective emotional resistance to emotional regimes that sought to dominate. These studies therefore suggest more complex theoretical models of emotions and historical change, whereby coexisting emotional communities formed around different styles of self-expression competed in a dialectical struggle for dominance, thereby decisively shaping the direction of history. Moreover, they also raise a fundamental question about the place of emotions in relation to historical change: are emotional styles simply epiphenomenal upon larger social and cultural change, as the studies of "*emotionology*" by the Stearns imply; or as suggested previously, do emotions rather constitute fundamental motivating forces for action and collective change in themselves?[20] It appears that Elias's *Civilizing Process* is ambivalent about this important issue.

As several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, Elias's studies of emotional change also neglect gender. It may be significant that he was never married and appeared to have never had any long-term relationships, either heterosexual or homosexual. Certainly his ideas about emotions and historical change are not nuanced by the differential experiences of women and men, which is surprising given the growth of the suffragist and women's movement in Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States at the time he was writing. Crozier-De Rosa (in this volume) refers to these complications in developing her argument around conceptions of gender and shame. Indeed, as van Krieken has shown, in Elias's conception the individual selves contemplating their roles and calculating the need for restraint in the context of growing chains of dependency with social and economic development were clearly gendered male; by contrast women were constructed as the personification of emotion, and therefore not amenable to the civilizing process.[21]

More prosaically, as it stands, Elias's corpus of empirical work on the history of emotions neglects a range of emotions, which, whatever its theoretical potential, clearly makes his model of "process sociology" deeply flawed. The neglect of emotions and contexts covered here, such as modern resentment and rage (Turner), jealousy (Woods), feminine shame (Crozier-De Rosa), and grief (Duffy and Yell), as well as modern sites for emotional conflict, such as same-sex marriage (Johnson), abortion (Millar), and other allied trajectories, such as postcolonialism (Eustace, Woods) and reflexivity (Brooks), leaves Elias somewhat dated as a social commentator, and limited in his analysis of emotional styles and historical change.

One particular area of major interest to many theorists and writers in the field of emotional styles and historical change is the "dark side" of emotional life, including violence and emotional aggression. Certainly, some of this work has been influenced by Elias's observations in the field. Again however, the range of his empirical studies in this area was strictly limited, because it failed to consider the management of personal behavior when expressed as violence either against oneself or as sublimated aggression toward others. Moreover, Elias was unable to take full account of changing emotional cultures in late modern Europe, and largely ignored America and Asia. By contrast, Turner's chapter on *resentment* shows how it is central as an emotional style of the contemporary era in the West. Mayer's paper on "emotional aggression" and suicide also highlights the Eurocentric limitations of Elias's work, as well as its somewhat short-sighted chronology.[22] Similarly, but from a feminist perspective, Millar's and Johnson's essays show how for Elias positive emotions and the promise of happiness were based around an outdated culture of heteronormativity in regard to gender and sexuality.

It is true that the author himself revisited some of these positions as taken by his classic text. For example, as Johnson points out, in a 1974 interview revisiting his magnum opus, Elias admitted that the recent moderation of sexual taboos, such as female sexual abstinence before marriage, was part of the ongoing civilizing process. Taking their cue from his retrospective flexibility, the chapters in this book interrogate some of the assumptions and limitations of Elias's pioneering studies in the history of emotions, and indicate where his work can be utilized and developed further, both theoretically and empirically. The book is divided into four parts, which consider in turn substantive examples of emotional communities; histories of contested emotions; the modern politics of emotions; and finally, civilization and decivilization in modern societies, both Asian and European. First, however, Ann Brooks places Elias in the broader context of modern sociological theorizing.

EMOTIONS, GENDER, AND THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Ann Brooks's chapter makes the important point that a gendered interpretation of emotions was structurally implicated in classical sociological theorization about modern society, insofar as modernization was regarded as a departure from the allegedly unrestrained emotionality of premodern times. Moreover, emotion was associated with the body and with women, by contrast with entrenched presumptions about male rationality. Indeed her analysis of writings by some early female social scientists shows that their interest in the realm of the family, love, and compassion contrasted with the focus of male scholars on the public sphere of the state and economic

relations. She argues that it is only in more recent times, with the turn to affect, that emotions have been regarded as more centrally significant to the social sciences.

Brooks also considers Norbert Elias's intellectual debt to Freud, and agrees with Mennell in arguing that the connection with Freudian theory may help to account for the relative marginalization of his work in social science theorizing, especially among feminist scholars. Moreover, she suggests that in developing a neo-Freudian conceptualization of self-restraint Elias neglected the study of the complex emotions associated with everyday life, especially the realm of intimacy studied by feminist scholars. In this connection Brooks cites van Krieken, who (as mentioned previously) argues that the self supposedly disciplined by the Eliasian "civilising process" was clearly masculine, and by contrast, women were constructed simply as the embodiment of emotion. As she shows, it was not until the late twentieth century, with the development in the United States of ideas about social constructionism and symbolic interactionism, that the role of emotions in everyday life was fully recognized, particularly with the seminal work of Arlie Hochschild on the psychological costs and gendered differentiation of emotion management.

Finally, Brooks's chapter builds on the contributions of Hochschild, among others, to suggest that by locating intimacy, identity, and the self at the center of theoretical studies in the social sciences the "turn to affect has had a substantial impact on scholarship. Certainly recent work on the intimate sphere and the demand for fulfilling relationships has contributed to the seminal concept of reflexivity, which may be regarded as a much more complex rendering of self-management, taking full account of gender difference and the emotional expectations of life in late modernity. She concludes by assessing recent theoretical work on emotion and identity in the context of globalization and the commercialization of intimacy among highly mobile professionals. This broad-ranging theoretical survey thereby suggests that in late modern times emotions formerly grounded in territorial or national communities have been fractured, a development that might lead ultimately to the growth of the "post-emotional" individual.

IDENTIFYING EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES

The construction and development of emotional communities is a theme addressed by three chapters that consider emotions in quite different contexts. Melissa Raine's essay discusses emotional communities by innovatively considering John Lydgate's "Dietary," a poem little known today but very popular in the latter part of the Middle Ages. The poem was a Middle English translation of a Latin text concerned with preventing illness by maintaining humoral balance. In explaining her method Raine appeals directly to Norbert Elias as a scholar who was aware that the formation

of the self and affective standards depends on social context, with the implication for his own work that modern readers of conduct books must approach them with an understanding of contemporary values. She applies this insight to Lydgate's text, deftly explicating the positive emotional responses available to medieval readers, which might have grounded the formation of a community summoned to a sense of selfhood by their reading and reflection. Moreover, Raine also subtly echoes Elias's insight that there is continuity as well as change in the history of emotions, insofar as every culture requires some medium—in this case reading—that facilitates reflection about the self and relative conformity to its standards. Her innovative work successfully combines anthropological understanding with substantive literary-historical detail to frame a rich and detailed example of the critical approach necessary to "read" past emotions.

Claire McLisky's study of emotional economies in Aboriginal missions provides an analysis that deals with postcolonial overtones of the emotional relationship between the Protestant missionaries and their Indigenous charges in two nineteenth-century communities. McLisky shows that the missionaries, like Elias, identified emotional self-control with social and intellectual development; and in their practice as community leaders they encouraged discipline, as well as sympathy for the unfortunate and the proper love of God, as routes toward the achievement of Christian civilization. As mentioned previously, their efforts at affective control met setbacks when they conflicted with deep-seated Aboriginal values, however. For this reason she believes the emotional history of these communities approximated to a complex "economy" of a changing and open-ended balance between supply and demand, one where an Elisian model of top-down civilization did not fit the circumstances. For McLisky, like Elias, elites certainly attempted to govern the emotions of inferiors, but in this particular historical case their efforts at repression were not simply predetermined by increasing social exchange. Moreover, as the missionaries understood very well, for elites and inferiors alike, affective utterances impacted on human behavior.

The third chapter in this section, Michelle Duffy and Susan Yell's study of a series of traumatic bushfires in Australia over the period of 1939 to 2009, discusses changes in media reportage and emotional regimes in relation to expressions of collective grief over the period. Longstanding models of media representation and amplification—as in conceptualizations around "moral panics"—are drawn on here to present an interesting analysis of how emotional communities may be created partly by the media. Duffy and Yell argue that the shifting technologies and modes of media representation have both transmitted and contributed to important transformations in the norms of emotional expression, especially a marked change toward more intense and intrusive expression of raw personal feelings. In the process, they suggest, readers are invited to identify with the suffering and endurance of those affected by the disasters, thereby making the public complicit in the business of news making as interactive emotional connection and exchange.

They conclude that, contrary to Elias, analysis of this disaster reportage over a period of sixty years shows that the history of emotions in modern times is not a story of uniform repression; rather emotional communities can equally well be constituted by bonds formed through affective display.

HISTORIES OF CONTESTED EMOTIONS

Emotional communities compete for dominance, and Reddy has demonstrated that such struggles are sometimes not so subtle; indeed in eighteenth-century France they helped to cause revolution and counter-revolution.[23] Three chapters in this collection consider the role of emotions as valorized and contested in the Anglo-American world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lisa Hill discusses the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson, who regarded the passions as fundamental drivers of human progress. She shows that Ferguson believed that mutual resentment, covetousness, and envy are the wellsprings of government, while interpersonal affection is the basis of the family and the nation-state. Ferguson thought these emotions operated at a subrational level in individuals, and while he believed they were beneficial in the aggregate, he also recognized the need for catharsis as both a biological and social necessity to discharge potentially hazardous emotions in individuals. For Hill, therefore, the sociology of Ferguson provides a useful point of contrast with Elias's repressive trajectory of the civilizing process, since the former recognized emotional expression as a constant in human life, and saw outbreaks of passionate competition as much more than epiphenomena.

In her chapter for this volume Nicole Eustace considers Elias's blueprint for civilizing emotions with historical development against the context of the Anglo-American War of 1812, which the Americans conceptualized as a war of liberation from the "libidinal" emotional regime they identified with the British Empire. She points out that while the Americans' hegemonic self-consciousness about the superior virtues of their own emotional community against the British might seem to conform to Elias's historical scheme, in their relations with Native Americans they departed quite significantly from his idea that colonization involved a process by which conquered peoples were assimilated into emotional conformity with the dominant group. Nevertheless Eustace fruitfully applies Elias's insights about the role of emotions in colonization to the particular case of the United States in the nineteenth century, and her chapter constitutes a major step forward in analysis of the affective dynamics inseparable from neocolonial domination.

Michael Woods also identifies competing emotional regimes in nineteenth-century America, but his subject is the North against South struggle over black slavery. Woods draws attention to a little-known emotional

dimension that was present in this bitter contest: a developing division over the two sides' attitudes toward jealousy. In his chapter Woods shows that criticism of jealousy became a feature of antislavery propaganda, whereas Southern white males continued to regard jealousy as a feature of virtuous citizenship. Like Eustace, he considers these affective divisions against the work of Norbert Elias and shows how attention to historical change requires some revision of his classic model of affective development. As with Eustace's chapter, moreover, Woods is able to show that in this historical case changing emotional regimes were both cause and consequence of political conflict.

"HAPPINESS" AND THE MODERN POLITICS OF EMOTIONS

Just as competing emotional regimes and the passions of individuals contributed to the development of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Anglo-American government, politics, and imperialism, so they are also implicated in modern cultural politics. Three quite different essays, two of which concentrate on the gender politics of late modern Australia, illustrate this theme. First, in an essay that ranges temporally from medieval to late modern times, and spatially across Europe and America, Bryan Turner revisits Norbert Elias's long history of civilization. While endorsing Elias's observation that increasing mutual dependence in western European society led to the repression of strong emotional expression, he notes that the author of *The Civilizing Process* largely ignored social conflict and overlooked the role of the Christian church in ameliorating violence and legitimating government. More positively, he argues that the social groups "disprivileged" by the growing dominance of elites nurtured resentment toward their betters, and he outlines a sociology of resentment as an emotion that is central to the history of late modern Europe. In a wide-reaching analysis of sociological theory, he highlights the absence of any sociology of resentment in both the classical and contemporary theoretical canon in sociology. Indeed, for Turner, some of the quintessential elements of late modern society in the West are the vogue for status display and conspicuous consumption, the rise of the celebrity, and the disjunction between personal merit and success. These, he suggests, are perfect conditions for the spread of bottled-up resentment and the development of negative politics, as epitomized ultimately in the American Tea Party movement.

Like Turner, in her chapter Erica Millar adapts Elias's observations about self-restraint to late modern political developments, in this case public discourse around abortion law and gender in contemporary Australia. In an essay that also invites comparison between Elias's "civilization" and Foucault's ideas about "governmentality," Millar highlights an important area largely ignored by Elias, the gendered nature of emotions, and the heteronormativity of legislation in determining choice. Indeed she

shows how even feminist parliamentarians who advocated the easing of restrictions on abortion subscribed implicitly to the normal discourse of motherhood as the natural and happy life choice for women. She argues that liberalization of abortion law represented just one aspect of a general shift from external regulation of women's bodies to "self-surveillance," via the promise of ultimate happiness in a normative and strictly defined script of femininity. Millar's interesting essay confirms the broad point made by several scholars of emotions in society: that government necessarily involves the regulation of emotional expression. She further extends it by developing Elias's argument about self-restraint to show that while in modern times emotional scripts are subtly constructed and their subjects variously interpellated by public discourse and popular media, they are normally policed by the self, rather than by some external agency such as the church or the state.

The third chapter in this section also focuses on the heteronormativity of contemporary legislation and politics, this time in relation to same-sex marriage. Drawing on Elias's later qualifications to the apparently linear trajectory of emotional regulation around sex and marriage, Carol Johnson suggests that his acknowledgment that nation-states legitimated certain forms of affective relations over others can be applied to develop critical analysis of citizenship in the late modern West. For Johnson, insofar as citizens are recognized traditionally as men and women in monogamous, intimate, heterosexual unions, states have constructed forms of "affective citizenship" that discriminate against homosexual couples by rejecting their chosen emotional attachments as illegitimate. She cites the later Elias's comments for evidence that such narrow regulation of marriage and legal rights was most appropriate to developing countries, whereby the stigmatization of homosexuality was a useful form of nation building. Like Turner's essay, however, her attention to the history of religion suggests that the focus in the *Civilizing Process* on the role of the state tends to underestimate more discursive cultural controls over affective relations, especially the media and public opinion.

TRAJECTORIES OF VIOLENCE, SHAMING, AND "DE-CIVILISATION"

The final section of the book considers relationships between social change, the incidence of violence, and the fear of shame as emotional regulation, therefore attending to "the dark side" of emotional life and connecting with Elias's ideas and later writings about "de-civilisation." The two chapters included here are again wide-ranging in their emphasis, but both focus on histories of emotional regulation that are characterized by contested conceptions of honor and shaming, as well as collective self-degradation, or individual self-harm, and discuss their relation to social development.

Discussing India, Europe, and the United States, Peter Mayer's chapter provides both anthropological and political evidence for a substantial critique of Elias's history of declining interpersonal aggression with the growth of the state and its monopoly over violence. For example, Mayer shows that while early Indian cultures had a sophisticated appreciation of emotions as the key to the self and attempted to regulate manners by the attribution of shame, the development of the central state after Independence was associated with growing intercaste and intercommunal violence. Thus India hardly fitted the Eliasian trajectory of civilization, and neither did Japan or Suriname, according to Mayer's further analysis. Moreover, he also notes that in Europe declining rates of interpersonal violence were accompanied by rising levels of suicide, and in an argument that echoes Putnam's analysis of declining social capital in the United States, attributes this to the rise of the state and the individual at the expense of the community and its traditional emphasis on honor and external constraint. For Mayer, therefore, the civilizing process may be associated with the growth of self-identity and self-blame in a context where humanitarianism and the state prohibited cathartic violence toward others.

Finally, Sharon Crozier-De Rosa's chapter examines the use of shaming as deployed in the popular writings of the turn of the century celebrity Marie Corelli, and discusses their synergies with the theory of the civilizing process outlined by Elias. Corelli felt that the achievements of western civilization were threatened by contemporary feminism, and Crozier-De Rosa shows that she attempted to shame women into adhering to what she regarded was their natural role as guardians of morality, home, and Christian faith. In trying "to evoke a fear of social exclusion," and thereby reimposing the "frontier of shame and repugnance" against feminists, Crozier-De Rosa suggests that Corelli was fulfilling the role Elias allotted to shame in the civilizing process by attempting to internalize it in the minds of her readers. Like Ann Brooks in her chapter, however, this author adds a gender dimension to Elias by pointing out that Corelli and her contemporaries considered that women were particularly susceptible to accusations of shameful conduct. Moreover, in her criticism that *fin de siecle* Britain was overmaterialistic and spiritually decadent, Corelli appealed to women to set an example by returning to what she regarded as the high point of civilization in the early Victorian period. According to Crozier-De Rosa, therefore, Corelli evinced a particularly gendered version of the civilizing process, whereby women's sense of shame at their departure from the ideals of faith, family, and chivalry was the appropriate vehicle for a return to national self-respect.

CONCLUSION: EMOTIONS AND SOCIOGENESIS

In *The Civilizing Process*, Norbert Elias argued that "civilisation" and its relations of power were constructed around the progressive regulation of

emotions in European society. Certainly, many have disagreed with the scope of his sociological theory and the direction and accuracy of his history. But by drawing attention to the "sociogenetic" importance of feelings like honor and shame, as well as their "psychogenetic" aspects, his work has helped to inspire studies of emotions in society that have confirmed their central role; and many have suggested that affect was not wholly epiphenomenal. Rather, for contemporary scholars, interpersonal emotional exchanges are in the mix of factors making for social continuity or change, along with other forces, such as (for example) shifts in political economy. While they do not necessarily accept his particular historical model of emotional regulation, and largely do not attend to the individual self, many of the chapters in this volume also demonstrate clearly that the constitution and control of affective relations in society is the essence of cultural reproduction and power.

NOTES

1. M. Greco and P. Stenner, *Emotions: A Social Science Reader* (London: Routledge, 2008), 3; J. Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Sterns," *History and Theory* 49 (2010): 237.
2. "A Question of Emotion pt3: Dr. Thomas Dixon," accessed 20 Oct. 2013, http://scotinexile.blogspot.co.uk/2009/05/question-of-emotion-pt3-dr-thomas-dixon.html; see also B. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13–14.
3. W. M. Reddy, "Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnograpy of Emotions," *Current Anthropology* 38 (1997): 327–351; W. M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Compare A. Appadurai, "Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India," in *Language and the Politics of Emotion,* ed. C. A. Lutz and L. Abu-Lughod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 92–112.
4. Lutz and Abu-Lughod, "Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life," *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, esp. 10, 13; S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 8–9, 83.
5. Lutz and Abu-Lughod, "Introduction," esp. 11.
6. Ahmed, *Cultural Politics*, 13–14, 45–47.
7. Ahmed, *Cultural Politics*, 13, 93–94, 114; Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, chap. 3.
8. See A. R. Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), esp. chap. 4; Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Middle Ages*.
9. Hochschild, *Managed Heart*, 76 and chap. 6.
10. S. Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972); C. Critcher, *Moral Panics and the Media* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2004); K. Thompson, *Moral Panics* (London: Routledge, 1998); D. Lemmings and C. Walker, eds., *Moral Panics, the Media and the Law in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

11. Ahmed, *Cultural Politics*, 54, 57, 94–95.
12. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling.*
13. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 7–10; R. J. Evans, *Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany, 1600–1987* (London: Penguin, 1996), 12–18, 891–897.
14. See R. van Krieken, "The Organisation of the Soul: Elias and Foucault on Discipline and the Self," in *Norbert Elias,* vol. 1, ed. E. Dunning and S. Mennell (London and California: Sage, 2003), 135–153.
15. G. Ritzer, *Contemporary Sociological Theory and its Classical Roots* (2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2nd ed. 2007).
16. See Dunning and Mennell, "Editors' Introduction," *Norbert Elias*, 1:xiv–xv.
17. Ahmed, *Cultural Politics*, 3–4.
18. Mennell, "Parsons and Elias," *Norbert Elias,* 1:185–187.
19. Mennell, "Parsons and Elias," *Norbert Elias,* 1: 194.
20. Compare P. N. Sterns and C. Z. Sterns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards," *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 813–836; Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling.*
21. Van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 145–146.
22. On Elias's Eurocentricism see also Jack Goody, "Elias and the Anthropological Tradition," *Anthropological Theory* 2 (2002): 401–412.
23. *Navigation of Feeling*, part 3.

2 Norbert Elias and Emotions in History

Robert van Krieken

INTRODUCTION

The work of Norbert Elias[1] has played an important role in the scholarship on the history of emotions, sensibilities, and mentalities, either as an inspiration or as a point of departure, inspiring some and irritating others. Along with Johan Huizinga and Lucien Febvre, he argued vigorously for the importance in social science of taking sufficient account of human psychology and subjective experience, and one way or another it is difficult to engage in the history of emotions without at least referring to his ideas and arguments.[2] For many cultural historians his work on court society and the civilising process is a useful stimulus to their own particular concerns.[3]

Lately, however, the references to Norbert Elias's work in the writing on the history of emotions frequently assume, more or less, the following form: "Hitherto the history of emotions has been held under the conceptual sway of Elias's theory of the 'civilising process'. Elias saw emotions as primitive and irrational, and regarded the process of 'civilisation' (read: 'modernization') in teleological terms as a one-directional mechanism revolving around the triumph of increased rational control over supposedly 'primitive' human emotions. For Elias the Middle Ages were populated by emotion-driven savages, to be gradually replaced, as 'progress' unfolds, by the modern, civilised, rational subject. What a fool! We all know that medieval people controlled their emotions and had their own particular forms of rationality, and how highly emotionally-driven us moderns can and have been. What about the Holocaust! Let us dispense with Elias's old-fashioned way of thinking about the history of emotions, and discuss the much more sophisticated understanding that I would like to put before you, to take the history of emotions to a new level of conceptual sophistication."

Elias often functions, then, as a convenient straw man, the essentially misguided establishment figure from which we all, naturally, want to distinguish ourselves. Not everyone refers to Elias in this way, but it is a strong enough tendency to constitute an obstacle to understanding the possible contribution that Elias can make to research on the history of emotions.[4] The aim of this chapter is to move beyond the concern with patricide to

sketch a more precise picture not just of what Elias wrote and thought, but also of the difference between a more or less productive critical orientation toward his work.

This is not an argument to side-step the critiques of Elias's ideas. There are good reasons to retain a critical sensibility in relation to Elias's arguments and how they are formulated. His core books, *The Court Society* and *The Civilising Process,* were written in the 1930s, and a great deal of scholarship has taken place since. Sometimes he drew a long bow in his reading of the sources, he could have paid more attention to how historical sources should be read, and many commentators have developed alternative explanations that are at least as persuasive, and often more so. However, if Elias is to be chastised at times for not being thorough enough in his reading of the available sources, the same point applies to our reading of Elias—he wrote quite a lot, and what is a legitimate object of criticism in one part of his writing will be often be approached quite differently, sometimes in a contradictory way, in another. The same rigor one applies to the reading of historical sources needs to be applied to the reading of Elias's writings, and basing one's understanding of Elias's work on a two-line, perhaps two paragraph, summary of his 1939, two-volume book *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* is simply not good enough. The points of criticism will often align perfectly with theoretical arguments that Elias made himself in other places, so that one is frequently, in fact, arguing with Elias against Elias.[5] There is also now a very considerable secondary literature that engages with many of the problems and lacunae in his work in ways that constitute a significant development of the manner in which his ideas and arguments can be read and understood, finding ways to address the problems in his arguments by reworking rather than simply rejecting them, and finding new salience in his ideas when applied to different sets of problems. This ever-expanding body of writing also needs to be taken into consideration in thinking about the role that Elias can play in the history of emotions.

A lot also depends on how one understands the field of "the history of emotions." Elias himself would never have seen himself as a "historian of emotions;" he was a sociologist who thought that sociology could only be undertaken properly by looking at long-term processes (hence the occasional use of the term "process sociology" to refer to his style of sociological thought),[6] and that a central aspect of that historical sociology had to be a grasp of how human psychology—he used the term *habitus*—had changed in relation to changes in social structures. I suspect he would have regarded the strong version of history of emotions, such as the Stearns' "emotionology,"[7] where one looks at the history of particular emotions—anger, fear, and so on—as a rather odd exercise, or at least a very constrained one. Elias was more concerned to frame his research questions in broader terms. But if by "history of emotions" one means "history that takes emotions seriously," his work is highly relevant and very productive

in working through the ways in which particular emotional communities are the products of changing social structures, as I will try to explain.

WHAT DOES ELIAS MEAN BY "THE PROCESS OF CIVILISATION"?

Elias's starting point is to assert that human psychology and emotional disposition has a history, changing as social conditions change rather than remaining the same over time, and it is probably in this sense that he can be regarded as one of the founders of the history of emotions. When he started looking at etiquette books in the 1930s, he felt that they revealed something about human psychology—its changeability—that was alien to most contemporary psychology. He said that he pursued his research "with a clear awareness that it would be an implicit attack on the wave of studies of attitudes and behaviour by contemporary psychologists."[8] With the exception of Freud and his followers, academic psychologists at the time "believed that one had to have someone in front of one here and now,"[9] in order to measure their behavior and psychological processes, without any conception of how human behavior might have changed over time. "The whole process of the transformation of people is hidden from view,"[10] wrote Elias, and that was what he set out to correct. In this respect his concerns paralleled precisely those of Lucien Febvre, who also felt that the discipline of psychology as it stood in the 1930s was of little use in understanding the emotional disposition and cognitive categories of people in the past.[11]

When Elias began writing, he thought that Europeans saw themselves as being at the pinnacle of the world, as exemplars of civilisation. As Elias put it civilisation had become a crucial part of Europeans' sense of superiority over all other peoples in the world:

> . . . the consciousness of their own superiority, the consciousness of this "civilisation," from now on served at least those nations which became colonial conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of the non-European world, as a justification of their rule, to the same degree that earlier the ancestors of the concept of civilisation, *politesse* and *civilité*, had served the courtly-aristocratic upper class as a justification of theirs.[12]

He titled his book "the process of civilisation" precisely in order to say that whatever could be said to be the character or *habitus* of people today had to be seen as the outcome of a long-term historical process, rather than the natural constitution of a nation or cultural group. A large part of his motivation in writing *On the Process of Civilisation* was precisely to come to a better understanding of the brutality of the Nazi regime, since "one cannot understand the breakdown of civilised behaviour and feeling as long as one

cannot understand and explain how civilised behaviour and feeling came to be constructed and developed in European societies in the first place."[13]

To use the Foucauldian term, he was interested in the *genealogy* of what we now understand, experience, and feel, either consciously or unconsciously, as not being barbarians, as being "civilised", proper human beings deserving of recognition and respect, not just for its own sake, but also in order to understand how and under what conditions human beings satisfy their individual or group needs "without reciprocally destroying, frustrating, demeaning or in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search for this satisfaction."[14] He wanted to treat the modes and norms of conduct and emotional disposition that we are familiar with today as social rather than natural or biological, to reveal their history and their intimate connections with broader social, political, and economic lines of development. It was this assemblage of developments linking the macrolevel of social, political, and economic structures with the microlevel of psychological and emotional orientation that he called "the process of civilisation."

For Elias this self-perception of "being civilised" could only be explained in terms of the linked development of social structures and our psychological and emotional makeup, or *habitus*. He rejected the idea that one could distinguish between "society" and "the individual" and then talk about the relationship between them; this was the understanding in Talcott Parson's *The Structure of Social Action*[15] and its distinction between "personality" and "the social system." For Elias, society could only be a "society of individuals,"[16] and individuals only existed in their relationships with each other in more or less complex social figurations characterized by shorter or longer, more or less dense "chains of interdependency."

It is worth pausing briefly beside the concept of *habitus*, these days often incorrectly attributed to Pierre Bourdieu.[17] It was a central concept in Elias's writings, but also more generally in early sociological thinkers like Durkheim and Weber, who had an appreciation of the importance of the psychological formation of individuals in explaining social life.[18] Durkheim, for example, argued that "it is not enough to direct our attention to the superficial portion of our consciousness; for the sentiments, the ideas which come to the surface are not, by far, those which have the most influence on our conduct. What must be reached are the habits . . . these are the real forces which govern us."[19] One can just as usefully use the term "habit," of which *habitus* is simply the Latin form, and Charles Camic points out that a major defect in post-classical sociological thought is to reduce all individual conduct to reflective action, discounting the possibility of *unreflective*, that is, habitual action, which the early sociologists saw a central aspect of how human beings actually conduct themselves in social life.[20] The simplest version of habit would be the movements of a trained dancer or an experienced footballer—the success of their engagement with their physical tasks depends precisely on the "automation" of

most of their elements, the embedding of movements and responses in their physical and psychic memory banks. A dancer who reflects on the mechanics of how to do a pirouette will do a very poor one—that's what beginners do. More generally, as Camic remarks, habit refers to "the durable and generalized disposition that suffuses a person's action throughout an entire domain of life or, in the extreme instance, throughout all of life—in which case the term comes to mean the whole manner, turn, cast, or mold of the personality."[21] This is what Elias meant by the term *habitus,* which he also referred to with the term "second nature" (i.e., socially developed orientations, inclinations, and dispositions that are so deeply embedded that they are experienced "as if" they were rooted in nature), which was "an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control."[22]

COURT SOCIETY

A central element of Elias's understanding of the civilising process is his account of court society and the particular model of emotional regulation that it elicited from its participants, and which he argues eventually spread throughout the rest of society, albeit alongside other models. For the purposes of identifying how Elias's ideas can be drawn upon in the history of emotions, *The Court Society*[23]—his *Habilitationsschrift*, written in 1933—might in fact be a better place to start than *On the Civilising Process*. The Western European aristocratic elite were being buffeted by a variety of political, social, and economic forces from the sixteenth century onward, the opportunities to exercise violence as a competitive strategy were disappearing, requiring new techniques to establish distinction and one's place in the social hierarchy. Clothing, gesture, manners, taste, verbal expression, wit, and dancing skill were all utilized to express distinction and status. As Stefan Breuer put it, "Observation of self and others attained a previously unknown intensity, psychological warfare became indispensable weapons in the competition for prestige."[24] It was not a matter of emotion giving way to rationality, but of regulating emotions, carefully considering when, where, and how the passions would be satisfied.[25] This was for Elias a corrective to Max Weber's account of the Protestant ethic, which was essentially concerned with the moral orientation and affective disposition of the bourgeoisie, which Elias felt could not be properly understood without taking into consideration the emotional sensibility that was being opposed, that of the aristocracy. In addition, Elias felt it was a mistake to see the psychological orientation developed in court society as having been left behind in the process of modernization, and that it continued to place a role in contemporary society. As he put it, "aristocratic court society developed a civilising and cultural physiognomy which was taken over by professional-bourgeois society partly as a heritage and partly as an antithesis and, preserved in this way, was further developed."[26]

For Elias, as for Weber, "rationality" refers to the calculation of the balance between short-term desires and emotional inclinations and the longer-term consequences of human action. The more the balance is weighted toward the latter, the more "rational" the behavior, but there remain a wide variety of ways in which that relationship can be calculated,[27] and for Elias there was a significant difference between the rationality of court society and that of the world occupied by the bourgeoisie. The first difference revolved around the question of "authenticity"—the extent to which the outward display of one's feelings and thoughts was meant to correspond to one's inner emotional and cognitive state. In court society, it was acceptable, indeed a requirement, that they did not correspond to each other; emotional expression was to be harnessed to the pursuit of strategic aims, the rules of politeness and civility. In bourgeois society, in contrast, such a disposition was denounced as hypocrisy, and a high moral value was placed on the authenticity of one's emotional communications.

The second difference concerned what was regarded as the kind of long-term interest to which one ought to be orientated. For the bourgeoisie, it was the acquisition of economic capital, so that emotional expression was regulated in terms of longer-term financial gains and losses. Time is money, and thus so is time expended ("wasted") on emotional expression that gets in the way of accumulating economic capital. In court society, however, the concern is with the acquisition, accumulation, and retention of *symbolic* capital, making identity and existence deeply representational, depending on constant display, exhibition, and ongoing performance of one's status. In Elias's words:

> Bourgeois-industrial rationality is generated by the constraint of the economic mesh; by it power-opportunities founded on private or public capital are made calculable. Court rationality is generated by the constraint of the elite social mesh; by it people and prestige are made calculable as instruments of power.[28]

In court society social relationships and emotional dispositions were thus organized around competitive struggles for distinction and the symbolic representation of one's status and prestige. Elias observed that the deliberate management of one's emotions was crucial to success in such struggles. The ability to conceal one's "real" feelings was a key element of power relations in court society, because:

> . . . affective outbursts are difficult to control and calculate. They reveal the true feelings of the person concerned to a degree that, because not calculated, can be damaging; they hand over trump cards to rivals for favour and prestige. Above all, they are a sign of weakness; and that is the position the court person fears most of all. *In this way the competition of court life enforces a curbing of the affects in favour of calculating and finely shaded behaviour in dealing with people*.[29]

One could say that court society was marked by an absence of a distinction between the public and the private, making all one's "private" feelings grist for the mill of one's public life, whereas the middle-class professional was able to keep the two spheres separated.

Elias's analysis of court society also has a contribution to make to a "history of the present," in the sense of an understanding of the historical roots of the emotional dimension of contemporary social life. Although the self-image of modern individuals may be that they are rational and good at controlling their emotions, perhaps to excess, the organization of power relations around the representation of social prestige still plays an important role in contemporary societies. As Elias put it:

> Despite their formal organisational framework based on written contracts and documents, which was developed only in rudimentary form in the state of Louis XIV, in many organizations of our time, even industrial and commercial ones, there are rivalries for status, fluctuations in the balance between groups, exploitation of internal rivalries by superiors, and other phenomena that have emerged in the study of court society. But as the main regulation of human relationships in large organisations is formalised in a highly impersonal manner, such phenomena usually have a more or less unofficial and informal character today. In court society we therefore find quite openly and on a large scale many phenomena that exist below the surface of highly bureaucratized organisations.[30]

Elias's analysis of court society can thus be approached as revealing the historical foundations of the emotional underbelly of overtly instrumentally-rational organizational life.

He saw the structure of social life among the European elite, in court society, as the institutional core of the process of civilisation, with the dynamics of court society producing a particular kind of psychological and emotional disposition and code of conduct. The basic psychological principle of court society was that one's conduct and emotional expression need to be regulated in the service of maximizing one's competitive position in an increasingly complex and volatile network of social relations. For Elias court society displayed the emergence of a form of mutual and self-observation, which he referred to as a specifically "psychological" form of perception, and which we would today refer to as reflexive self-awareness. As he put it:

> The new stage of courtesy and its representation, summed up in the concept of *civilite*, was very closely bound up with this manner of seeing, and gradually became more so. In order to be really "courteous" by the standards of *civilite*, one was to some extent obliged to observe, to look about oneself and pay attention to people and their motives. . . .

> The increased tendency of people to observe themselves and others is one sign of how the whole question of behaviour was now taking on a different character: people moulded themselves and others more deliberately than in the Middle Ages.[31]

Other observers of early modernity have come to like-minded interpretations. Stephen Greenblatt, for example, drawing on different sources, makes a similar comment about the Renaissance using the concept of "self-fashioning," referring to "an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process"[32] in the sixteenth century. He emphasizes that this kind of attitude toward the self had been present among the elite in the Ancient world, but that Christianity leaned more toward imitation of Christ and regarded an engagement with the shaping of identity with suspicion. The behavioral change accompanying the Renaissance had self-fashioning at its heart, and "it describes the practice of parents and teachers; it is linked to manners or demeanour, particularly that of the elite; it may suggest hypocrisy or deception, an adherence to mere outward ceremony; it suggests representation of one's nature or intention in speech or actions."[33]

THE PROCESS OF CIVILISATION

Elias's underlying argument in *On the Process of Civilisation* is that the web of relationships and interdependencies within which people are located has, to begin with in Western European societies like Germany, France, and England, gradually become increasing complex and dense, and that one can observe the effect this has had on people's relationship to their emotions, on what it means to be a "person." The broad formula that he articulates is that the balance between external and internal constraint can be seen to move, gradually but not necessarily evenly, toward the latter, that the unconscious internal mechanisms of self-regulation come to take on greater and greater salience in comparison to the external mechanisms of social control. Elias referred to this increasing self-regulation as a process of "psychologization" and "rationalization," because it revolved around the growing reflexive understanding of our own actions, those of others, their interrelationships, and their consequences. "The web of actions grows so complex and extensive," wrote Elias, and "the effort required to behave 'correctly' within it becomes so great, that beside the individual's conscious self-control an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established."[34] Although one can say that individuals in all societies and cultures internalize a certain set of habitual behavior patterns, or an ethical disposition toward drives and emotions that remains in place in the absence of external controls, Elias's argument is that as social structures become more complex

and differentiated, this will be reflected in the complexity of individuals' apparatus of self-management.

When Elias looked at successive French etiquette manuals, he observed a gradual shift in their content over time. The concerns characterizing early etiquette manuals either disappeared from view, suggesting that they had become culturally and psychologically self-evident, and new concerns appeared in later editions. Gradually more and more aspects of human behavior become regarded as "distasteful" and "removed behind the scenes of social life," and the standard applied to emotional expression, bodily functions, table manners, forms of speech, and, above all, violence and aggression became slowly more sophisticated, and Elias speaks of increasing thresholds of shame, embarrassment, and repugnance. Erasmus's *De civilitate morum puerilium* (1530)[35] was especially important for Elias's account, a book that enjoyed very wide readership, with more than one hundred thirty editions, thirty in the first six years after publication.[36] For Elias the telling characteristic of the portrayal of everyday life and behavior was how alien it was to a modern reader. It portrayed concerns—how to manage snot, how to eat from a common bowl, whether to put one's whole hands into the dish of water presented to wash one's hands before a meal, whether one licks one's fingers, whether to offer a half-eaten piece of meat to someone else—which today are either self-evidently something all children learn how to address, or simply disgusting. The emotional reaction of a modern person to Erasmus's book was exactly what Elias wanted to explain—what transformations in our "emotional economy" (*Affektenhaushault*) had taken place in the intervening period, how should they be explained, and what relationship did they have with broader social, political, and economic changes?

Two forces are of specific concern for Elias: state-formation, in particular the rise of monarchic absolutism and gradually increasing differentiation, complexity, and size characterized by lengthening chains of interdependence. The monopolization of the means of violence characterizing European state formation generated a requirement to exercise power in a variety of nonviolent ways. Social success, he wrote, became increasingly dependent on "continuous reflection, foresight, and calculation, self-control, precise and articulate regulation of one's own affects, knowledge of the whole terrain, human and non-human, in which one acted."[37]An important aspect of the state-formation process—the organization of disparate villages, towns, principalities, and so on into the larger units that became nation-states and the lengthening of the chains of interdependence has been what the Dutch sociologist Abram de Swaan, in his development of Elias's account, has called "widening circles of identification."[38] The capacity for mutual identification is a crucial aspect of the emotional makeup of any group of human beings and their emotional relationships with each other, because the boundary between "us" and "them" tends to constitute the boundary for the exercise of violence and aggression, with humans feeling freer to

exercise violence on those they regard as "other." Identification also determines whether one is concerned about and thus emotionally affected by what happens to other people, or whether one remains indifferent. As de Swaan put it, citing Nico Frijda,[39] "No concern, no emotion."[40]

Second, as European societies increased in social density, produced by a combination of population growth and urbanization, the networks of people that individuals would be interdependent with, no matter how fleetingly, become correspondingly wider and denser. He spoke of the "conveyor belts" running through individuals' lives growing "longer and more complex," requiring people to "attune" their conduct to the actions of others, and becoming the dominant influence on their existence, so that they are less "prisoners of their passions" and instead more captive to the requirements of an increasingly complex "web of actions," particularly a demand for "constant hindsight and foresight in interpreting the actions and intentions of others."[41]

The "civilising" (Elias's quotation marks) of behavior means "the moderation of spontaneous emotions," the extension of one's temporal consciousness beyond the immediate present, the payment of greater attention to the chain of effects set in motion by one's actions requiring greater self-reflection, and is part and parcel of the concentration of power and the means of violence in the state on the one hand, and the "lengthening chains of social action and interdependence" on the other.[42] These two developmental processes produce particular kinds of pressures on individuals, which "tend to produce a transformation of the whole drive and affect-economy in the direction of a more continuous, stable and even regulation of drives and affects in all areas of conduct, in all sectors of life."[43]

PROCESSES OF DECIVILISATION

On the Process of Civilisation was published in 1939, and it has often been remarked that this was not a particularly good time to be talking about civilisation, when Western Europe was on the brink of descending into one of its more barbaric periods. Alvin Gouldner once remarked, for example, drawing on the work of Randall Collins,[44] that while it may be true that European societies became more internally pacified with the emergence of centralized nation-states, with a reduction in what he calls "privately undertaken ferocity,"[45] that type of violence "comes to be succeeded by other forms of violence, new forms of bureaucratic domination and of asceticism. Passionless, impersonal callousness, in which more persons than ever before in history are now killed or mutilated with the flick of a switch." For Gouldner, this is what the civilising process amounts to, "where there is guilt about personal ferocity yet an intensification of callousness; where killing occurs without personal rancour and the massacre of nations may be ordered without a frown."[46] Ian Burkitt has similarly

argued that civilisation should be seen as "an inherently ambivalent process, containing within itself the potential to unleash the forces it would label 'barbaric' on an unprecedented scale."[47]

However Elias was not unaware of this problem: his own mother perished, he thought, in Auschwitz, and in the preface to *On the Process of Civilisation* he notes that the issues he was dealing were rooted not in scholarly concerns, but in "the experiences in whose shadow we all live, experiences of the crisis and transformation of Western civilisation as it had existed hitherto, and the simple need to understand what this 'civilisation' really amounts to."[48] He noted that there had been a shift in the emotional response to mass killings over the course of human history, from regarding it as normal and more or less acceptable to experiencing it as abhorrent.[49]

This is where it is important to read beyond *On the Process of Civilisation* and include his later thinking, especially in his book *Studies on the Germans*, where he deals directly with the Nazi regime. Elias had always allowed for the possibility that civilisation might break down or temporarily reverse its long-term direction, and in *Studies on the Germans* he goes on to discuss the possibility that specific processes of state-formation produce either a "deficient" process of civilisation, or result in a clear process of decivilisation encouraging the more widespread manifestation of brutal and violent conduct.

He also raised the possibility that civilisation and decivilisation can occur simultaneously, making precisely Gouldner's point that the monopolization of physical force by the state, through the military and the police, cuts in two directions and has a Janus-faced character.[50] He argued for the reversibility of social processes, and suggested that "shifts in one direction can give way to shifts in the opposite direction," so that "a dominant process directed towards greater integration may go hand in hand with partial disintegration."[51] The Hitler regime showed "processes of growth and decay go hand in hand and that the latter may outweigh the former."[52]

Elias himself pointed to the problem of how social structural conditions generating the emotions anxiety and insecurity would underpin decivilising processes:

> The armour of civilised conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break in upon us again, and if danger became as incalculable as it once was. Corresponding fears would soon burst the limits set to them today.[53]

This question is an important aspect of the way in which the structuring of emotional dispositions operates in particular contexts, in relationships between specific groups in any given society. For example, in my own discussion of the treatment of Australian Aboriginal families and children by European Australians,[54] I drew attention to the way in which the anxiety

surrounding cultural and racial hybridity constituted, and still constitutes, a barrier to mutual identification, making possible the coexistence of civilised and barbaric behavior. This is the dynamic underpinning many of the current reassessments of past practices such as the removal for adoption of the children of unmarried mothers, the treatment of children in institutional care, the displacement of British children to outposts of empire like Australia and Canada. All of these practices and policies relied on a lack of mutual identification with the categories of persons being regulated and managed, and they appear questionable and "uncivilised" today precisely because the capacity for identification has changed in the broader population, and we now "feel the pain" experienced by those individuals, whether it be through reading about their experience, seeing a visual portrayal of it on film or in television, or hearing the testimony of those individuals themselves.

PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

The first concern with Elias's analysis of the history of emotions relates to his account of how expressions of aggression and violence changed over time. I have written about this before,[55] so here I will just outline a selection of the arguments. There is little disagreement that the Middle Ages was a violent period, and that interpersonal violence decreased subsequently, but there are a number of problems with how Elias portrayed this change. The basic problem seems to be that he leaned toward a portrayal of medieval violence as somehow "natural," despite his own theoretical principle that human behavior, including emotions and psychological drives, should be understood primarily as socially produced. He spoke of the "aggressive impulse" being "confined and tamed by innumerable rules and prohibitions that have become self-constraints," the "cruelty and joy in the destruction and torment of others" only "breaking out" during "times of social upheaval or where social control is looser."[56]

The objection that almost all commentators have to this presentation of the question is that it overlooks the ways in which violence and aggression are socially produced by historically specific social, political, and economic conditions. Johan Arnason suggests that the violence that dominated life in the early Middle Ages should be seen as the outcome of a specific interaction between the declining Roman Empire and the surrounding regions, "not simply the normal condition of a society which lacks both a complex division of labour and a centralized monopoly of violence."[57] The social framework for medieval ferocity was to a large extent that of a particular structuring of vengeance, feud, and the settlement of disputes. The violence that was progressively monopolized by the state was not simply, perhaps not even largely, that of knights, but more of the ordinary populace.[58] Indeed it might have been knights who were the most self-disciplined in the expression of their aggression, in comparison with the rest of the population.

In relation to knightly violence, the Dutch historian Benjo Maso has argued that aggressiveness among knights increased precisely with state-formation and the initial stages of the monopolization of violence.[59] Before the twelfth century the primary sources appear to indicate more respect for those who temper their courage with foresight and planning,[60] but with the spread of a money economy, mercenaries were increasingly being used in the conduct of war, and this seriously threatened the position of knights. In the ensuing conflicts the knights were aided by the Church, which threatened mercenaries and those who employed them with excommunication, and this in turn gave knights even more excuse to kill any they came into conflict with. As Maso puts it:

> The impulsiveness which medieval knights appear to display to our eyes did not derive in general from a lack of self-discipline, but was a carefully cultivated characteristic with which aristocratic warriors tried to distinguish themselves from the lower classes they saw as threatening them. What Elias calls a desire for aggression could with equal justification be called a pressure towards aggression.[61]

Knightly violence was thus itself a product of a specific set of social conditions. We should note that Elias does say as much himself when he remarks that "violence was inscribed in the structure of society itself,"[62] and that "to a certain extent, the social structure even pushed its members in this direction, making it seem necessary and practically advantageous to behave in this way."[63] However, this runs contrary to the terms he otherwise used to portray medieval violence as being characterized by a positive desire for violent cruelty awaiting domestication through state-formation and the monopolization of physical force. This is why critics of Elias have regarded it as necessary to emphasize that human violence is a product of specific social conditions, and state-formation itself can and does encourage the controlled expression of sadism, cruelty, and aggression.[64]

Most of the problems with Elias's portrayal of the Middle Ages, and the source of most of the irritation among medieval historians, can be traced back to the step he took of treating the Middle Ages as his empirical and conceptual starting point, saying, for example, that "it is necessary first to obtain a clearer picture of how the behaviour and emotional life of Western peoples slowly changed after the Middle Ages."[65] This almost inevitably locked him into framing medieval emotional expression as somehow "natural" and "pre-social," making it harder to conceive of human behavior at that time as itself the product of particular social conditions.

HOW DIFFERENT ARE WE?

A second question concerning how Elias can be read concerns a fundamental opposition running through much of Western social, cultural, and

political thought, between those who lean toward seeing all human beings as more or less similar to each other, and those who emphasize the differences between distinct groups. The latter orientation can relate either to differences at a particular point in time, say between cultural groups, or differences across history.

In his five-volume critique of the "myth of the civilising process," one of Elias's strongest critics, the German anthropologist Hans-Peter Duerr,[66] suggests that although Elias set out to critically analyze the European self-perception of what it means and feels like to be civilised, in fact he ends up sharing the same presumption of superiority and progress, and that the concept of the process of civilisation is a *myth*, in the strongest sense of that term. Duerr argues that if we agree that human sexual relations are always socially regulated and subjected to some patterned set of rules and norms, then this will universally produce some sort of division between public and private bodily domains, with the private domain constituting the focus of social regulation. For Duerr the kind of lack of restraint of sexual impulses that Elias seems to observe in the Middle Ages is simply impossible, because the patterned family relations that existed at the time required at least some set of rules governing what one could or could not do in the sexual realm.

Duerr's arguments draw our attention to the fact that Elias was actually pursuing two distinct kinds of argument that get conflated. On the one hand, Elias pointed to the change in the *form* of the restraint exercised over our psychological and emotional dispositions, in shifting from external to internal constraint. But he also suggested that the restraint became more effective, in that individual impulses and desires became more *effectively* subordinated to the requirements of ever more complex and differentiated social relations characterized by lengthened chains of social interdependency. Duerr has no problem with the first, but he disputes vehemently the second. On the contrary, he argues that since "the people in small, easy to survey 'traditional' societies were far more closely interwoven with the members of their own group than is the case with us today," this means that "the direct social control to which people were subjected was more unavoidable and air-tight."[67]

Duerr's critique chimes with Reinhard Bendix's "fallacy of attributing to character structure what may be part of the social environment," as well as "the temptation of attributing to the people of another culture a psychological uniformity which we are unable to discover in our own."[68] For Bendix there was no necessary or essential congruity between prevailing social institutions and cultural forms on the one hand, and "the psychological habitus of a people" on the other, arguing that people may behave in particular ways "in spite of as well as because of, their psychological disposition," for a range of reasons including fear and apathy.[69] In Bendix's view,[70] discussing Elias in particular, specific historical conditions may favor one type of emotional disposition over another, but without reaching

very deeply into those emotional dispositions, so that all that really matters is the history of the social conditions eliciting particular kinds of emotional dispositions, rather than the history of those dispositions themselves. Similarly, writers like Nikolas Rose argue that the important topic is not the history of human psychology itself, but "the intellectual and practical instruments and devices enjoined upon human beings to shape and guide their ways of 'being human.'"[71]

The issue has been summarized usefully in Craig Pritchard's sketch of the differences between theorists of "governmentality" influenced by Foucault, like Rose, and post-Marxists more influenced by psychoanalysis.[72] He points out that writers like Stuart Hall[73] are critical of Foucault's "flat" or "thin" ontology in which people are inserted relatively smoothly into whatever regime of governance happens to have emerged, whereas Hall would rather treat human psychology as relatively "thick," constituting less malleable "material" that is more stable over time and resistant to changes in social context. In general terms Elias saw human emotional orientations in relatively "thick" terms—how they have changed over time is precisely what he wanted to examine. However, we are also left dangling by his observations about decivilising processes and the ease with which "the armour of civilised conduct" would "crumble" under particular social conditions, leaving the actual stability and depth of psychological and emotional orientations a still unresolved open question.

DECIVILISATION: DOES THE ANALYSIS WORK?

A third central criticism of Elias has always been his neglect of the possibility of simultaneous but contradictory social processes. Until he started analyzing processes of decivilisation, it was fair to say that he neglected the "dark" side of civilisation, and his inclination toward elegant simplicity made it difficult to see the *dialectical* nature of civilisation and the possibility of different, perhaps opposing, processes developing at different levels of any given social figuration. Stefan Breuer, for example, draws attention to the "negative side of functional differentiation," including the effects of the organization of capitalist societies around the logic of the market.[74] Although longer chains of interdependence may demand greater foresight and calculation as Elias suggests, markets also display "a dimension of coincidence and anarchy, which undermines the calculability of individual action."[75] Market competition does not simply produce ever-larger and better integrated "survival units," argues Breuer, it also generates "the atomization of the social, the increasing density and negation of all ties—asocial sociability."[76] Ian Burkitt remarks along similar lines that lengthening networks of interdependence can in fact *reduce* mutual identification and that "sections of the population can then be persecuted, discriminated against, or even killed, while the central features of 'civilisation' remain intact."[77]

The concept of decivilisation does respond in some ways to this criticism, but Breuer finds that it does not go far enough, because he believes that Elias still sees processes of decivilisation as *distinct* from civilising processes. Following Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of the "dialectic of enlightenment,"[78] Breuer suggests a more dialectical conception of civilisation as *itself* producing its own dark side, of civilisation and decivilisation as different sides of the same coin, always developing hand in hand.[79] There still seems to be a need for a more *dialectical* understanding of social relations and historical development, one which grasps the often contradictory character of social and psychic life. This applies both in relation to social relations and the conflicting consequences of state societies organized around the logic of the market, as well as in relation to psychic processes and the contradictory dynamics between our affects, desires, and impulses and the requirements of social life.

STATE-FORMATION AND BEYOND

Fourth, Elias's concentration on the connections between state-formation and civilising processes suggests two alternative modes of analysis, the first of which reflects on different aspects of social organization—other than state-formation—which might also support processes of civilisation. These can include the form taken by family life and religious belief systems, and broaden our view of the "changes in social structure" to include features of social life beyond the formation of particular types of political regimes. Studies of stateless societies such the Dutch anthropologist H.U.E. van Velzen's of the Djuka in Surinam,[80] for example, tend to find similarly "self-constrained" forms of emotional management. The Aucaners themselves are convinced of the sophistication of their own civilisation, regarding *Bakaa* (Whites, but really all outsiders) as generally barbaric: "rude, childish, subject to bouts of passion." They refer to "the *Bakaa's* indiscretion, but also their inability to suppress emotions and the inept way in which they conduct human relationships."[81] In Djuka society one regulates and manages feelings and emotions in a quite stable and precise manner, and for van Velzen the absence of a central state means that Elias's explanatory relationship between state formation and civility cannot be sustained. My own argument[82] is that this can be approached as a rejection of the strong version of Elias's argument—stable self-control is closely tied to state-formation—while still supporting a weaker version of it—stable self-control is closely tied to particular social conditions—when one expands the field of vision to include the structure and dynamics of family life and the institutions put in place for the education of children. Self-restraint develops in the course of every individual's lifetime, particularly their early childhood, making family life and child-rearing precisely the arena in which the linkage between social conditions and personality structure takes place.[83]

Dilwyn Knox has also pointed out the problems attached to overlooking the sources of changed forms of emotion management in religious institutions and practices, arguing that one of the key texts upon which Elias relies for his understanding of how behavioral norms shifted, Erasmus's *De civilitate,* was anchored not in court society, but in the codes of comportment written by clerics and religious since the thirteenth century, which Erasmus was essentially adapting for a secular reading by the laity.[84] The important development in Erasmus's thinking was that he based his arguments on reason and the importance of rationality in distinguishing humans, and their piety, from animals, and urban citizens from peasants, rather than on the authority of scripture.

From this perspective the foundations of the increasing internalization of self-constraint were much broader than Elias's emphasis on the interpersonal dynamics of court society would suggest. This is not necessarily fatal to Elias's account: court society did have its role to play, but Knox's analysis highlights how it was only one source of change among many, and she is right to say that "whereas Elias portrayed religious and clerics as passive disseminators of courtly norms," it is more accurate to say that "clerics and religious promoted rules rooted in their own traditions."[85]

CIVILISING OFFENSIVES VERSUS CIVILISING PROCESSES

Finally, Elias places a strong emphasis on the *unplanned* nature of social change, the independence of processes of social development from organized and deliberate human action. Even though he said "what is interesting is the interweaving of an unplanned process and human planning", the weight of his analysis lies on the former. When Roger Chartier speaks of self-discipline and emotional management as having been "instituted" by the state,[86] he is actually using a logic that is very different from Elias's, where the emphasis is placed on the requirements of particular types of social figuration. This has the effect of placing in the background the organized interventions of powerful social groups into the form and direction of civilising processes. Most social historians, for example, paint a picture of European history in which diverse groups of lawyers, inquisitors, clergy, judges, entrepreneurs, military leaders, and so on, played an active and constitutive role on shaping history, in addition to being driven in particular directions by abstract social forces.[87] A central concern for those drawing on Elias's social theory is thus an understanding of how to engage with the distinction between civilising *processes* and civilising *offensives*.[88] When Arthur Mitzman says, then, that the concept of "the civilising offensive" is "of course, derived from Norbert Elias,"[89] this is a misapprehension—in Elias's conception of the *process* of civilisation, a much heavier emphasis is placed on requirements emanating from increased competition and social interdependency. Kitty Verrips has also pointed out that Elias's argument

is more inclined toward seeing elite groups precisely as *not* wanting lower social groups to imitate their behavior, since it would undermine their status and distinction, and that the force leading toward the spread of emotional and behavioral codes were more "bottom-up" with aspiring social groups wanting to improve their social status.[90] "After all," wrote Verrips, "why should people in power go to any trouble to bridge the gap with people with less power by imposing their own behavioural standards on them?"[91]

A useful way to frame this issue is to reflect on the body of work that in the first place confirms Elias's portrayal of the overall transformation of *habitus* and emotional orientation, the writings on the history of discipline. Foucault and Weber, for example, agree that one can trace a developmental trend toward increasing self- discipline, a regularization and routinization of the psyche, so that one's inner "economy of the soul" coordinates with the outer economy of an increasingly bureaucratized, rationalized, and individualized social world. Their work converges on the notion that there has been "societalization of the self," a transition in European history from a social order based on external constraint to one increasingly dependent on the internalization of constraint, in the development of what the German historian Gerhard Oestreich called "social discipline."[92] E. P. Thompson, for example, shows how self-restraint came to be internalized in the development of time-discipline among English workers, so that "the transition to mature industrial society entailed a severe restructuring of working habits—new disciplines, new incentives, and a new human nature upon which these incentives could bite effectively."[93]

For these writers there is a "translation" of Elias's "requirements" of lengthening chains of interdependency into specific institutional forms and practices: Protestant asceticism, rational bureaucracy, regulatory mechanisms, and disciplinary techniques. It is the very particular, disciplinary nature of this translation process from the sixteenth century onwards that Weber and Foucault consider so important, and which Elias deemphasizes in favor of the notion of a civilising *process*. Both share Elias's sense of self-discipline emerging as a strategy of self-advancement for ruling social groups, the court aristocracy, the administrative and legal elite, and the bourgeoisie, but they move in a quite different direction when it comes to the question of its emergence among the working class. At that point it becomes more a matter of a coercive *imposition* of discipline through either human agency or historically specific social institutions—state intervention, religious ideology, bureaucracy, work organization, and disciplinary techniques—that *defined* what constitutes the proper organization of the soul, and constituted the mediating instance between the "requirements" of the social figuration and changes in individual behavior and social interaction. From this perspective, the civilising process can thus be regarded more accurately as a project, as "a conscious proselytizing crusade waged by men of knowledge and aimed at extirpating the vestiges of wild cultures—local, tradition-bound ways of life and patterns of cohabitation."[94]

Against this one can raise questions about the effectiveness of such strategies and institutions, which will lead one full circle back to Elias, who would say that it is only when people's *habitus* has changed so that people are sufficiently responsive to such strategies that they really take hold. One can return to E. P. Thompson's analysis of time-discipline as an example—all the attempts to eliminate "Saint Monday" and get workers to pay attention to the clock only really began to take hold, one could argue from Elias's perspective, once a range of other elements of workers' lives had fallen into place and exerted their own distinctive pressures on workers' everyday lives.[95]

CONCLUSION—THINKING WITH ELIAS

Elias's work is complex and multilayered, sometimes expressing deeply suggestive ideas that can serve as foundations for a variety of studies of numerous related topics, and at other times relying on simplified formulations that drive the specialist, especially in medieval history, to distraction, only to become ever-more irritating at some other point by declaring adherence to a theoretical principle that ought to have made the original formulation impossible. In this respect he is much like most of the "classical" sociologists—Durkheim, Weber, Marx, Simmel—as well as Freud and more recently Foucault. Despite having significant reservations about the accuracy of their accounts, and being able to identify innumerable counter-examples, the basic conceptual framework remains extremely useful.

The ideas that human emotional expression is a central aspect of social life; that it changes over time; that these changes can usefully be connected with broader changes at the level of social, political, and economic structures; that it is important to think in terms of very long-term processes, in terms of centuries rather than decades; that court society stimulated the emergence of a distinctive emotional style and psychological orientation that continues to the present day; and that emotional life is significantly shaped by the varying ways in which humans are linked together in webs of interdependencies are all ideas worth pursuing and developing in the history of emotions. For example, his account of how the emotional dynamics of parent-child relations has been transformed over time, to bring about the "civilising of parents," provides a range of insights into the history of familial emotions.[96] One could argue that the appearance of fields like the sociology and history of emotions is itself a product of the civilising process, a manifestation of the increased importance of emotion management as an outcome of increased competition and social differentiation.[97]

This does not mean that one should regard Elias as any sort of final authority, he often breaks his own theoretical rules, there are many alternative explanations possible, there is a lot of scope for reworking his analysis in the light of how it works in relation to new topics. This is exactly what

is exciting and stimulating about his possible contribution. Our efforts are better expended pushing Elias's analysis in new directions rather than focusing on proving him to be "wrong." For example, Barbara Rosenwein's criticisms[98] are either easily deflected, often simply by referring to some other part of Elias's work, or mere flesh wounds, nothing fatal. But what is interesting is her concept of "emotional communities," because it highlights a different problem in Elias, his tendency toward a generalized and relatively homogenous view of *habitus* in any given historical period, despite his own sensitivity to the importance of group tensions and differences[99] and the actual reliance of the logic of the civilising process on intergroup dynamics. It would be a significant and useful revision of how the problems he was concerned with can be addressed to place more overt emphasis on the multiplicity of emotional dispositions in any historical period.

Peter Burke once said of Elias's reception in cultural history that "[o]ne might sum up the reaction of cultural historians to the ideas of Elias by saying that they are often critical of his interpretation of history, but have come to find his social and cultural theory very good to think with.[100] This is equally true of Elias and the history of emotions—his formulations will be more or less appropriate and useful for any particular topic in the field, but a critical engagement with them remains likely to be "good to think with."

NOTES

1. The work with which historians of emotions are most familiar, as *The Civilizing Process*, has had a convoluted history. It was first published in German in 1939, in two volumes, as *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation: soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen* (Haus zum Falken). It was reprinted in 1969 (Francke Verlag), in 1976 (Suhrkamp), and a revised German edition was published in 1997 (Suhrkamp, as volume 3/I + II of the *Norbert Elias Gesammelte Schriften)*. In English translation, it first appeared in separate volumes. Volume 1, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (Blackwell) was published in 1978. Volume 2 was published in 1982 as *The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization* (Blackwell) and as *The Civilizing Process: Power and Civility* (Pantheon). The one-volume edition was published in 1994 (Blackwell) and a revised edition in 2000 (Blackwell). The final revised edition constituting volume 3 of *The Collected Works of Norbert Elias* (CW) was published in 2012 by University College Dublin Press; it was titled *On the Process of Civilisation: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, which is a more precise translation of the original German, and the edition that is referred to here. Equally important are *The Court Society*, written in 1933 but first published in German in 1969 and in English in 1983, CW edition in 2006, *Studies on the Germans*, published in German in 1989 and English in 1996, CW edition in 2013, and *The Society of Individuals*, published in German in 1987 and English in 1991, CW edition in 2010.
2. Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (London: Arnold, 1924); Lucien Febvre, "Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past," in *A New Kind of History,* trans. K. Folca, ed. Peter Burke (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996), 12–26.

3. e.g., Peter Burke, Brian Harrison, and Paul Slack, eds., *Civil Histories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
4. J. Carter Wood outlines nicely the problems with this sort of approach to Elias: Wood, "Evolution, Civilization and History: A Response to Wiener and Rosenwein," *Cultural & Social History* 4, no. 4 (2007): 559–565.
5. Johan P. Arnason first drew attention to "the scope for 'arguing with Elias against Elias'": Arnason, "Civilization, Culture and Power: Reflections on Norbert Elias' Genealogy of the West," *Thesis Eleven* 24 (1989): 50.
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3 "The Affective Turn"[1] in the Social Sciences and the Gendered Nature of Emotions

Theorizing Emotions in the Social Sciences from 1800 to the Present

Ann Brooks

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on charting the history of emotions in sociological theorizing drawing on European and American traditions from 1800 to the present. When classical sociologists began offering models of modern society, they described modernity as a move away from the alleged emotionality of "traditional societies." Max Weber (1864–1920) described the spread of a bureaucratic form of rationality linked with capitalism, and Norbert Elias (1897–1990) wrote about the encroachment of a "civilizing process" that included forms of affective restraint and self-control. Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was alone among early male theorists in developing a theory of gender relations, modernity, and rationality, providing a gender differentiated thesis on the relationship between cognition and emotion. Women theorists in the early social sciences, for example, Marianne Weber (1870–1954), challenged these traditional models of rationality and "value neutrality" and offered a critique of the binary established between cognition and emotion. Their work provided early interventions into debates on affect and the emotions in the social sciences, which were later developed by feminist and gender theorists into epistemological challenges to conventional theories of emotion and cognition. Theoretical development in this area became part of "the turn to affect" movement in the social sciences.

Moving beyond early social science, this chapter also shows how sociological theorizing in the United States and Europe has been influenced by debates between cognition and emotion, and in particular how the focus on the emotions has had an impact on sociological theories. In fact, a number of theories have addressed the sociology of emotions either directly or indirectly, including interactionist theory, social constructionist theory, social psychological theory and figurational sociology.

Late modernity has become conspicuously engaged with debates around the creation of subjectivity and the significance of emotions and reflexivity

in that process. The "turn to affect"[2] in the social sciences, and particularly in social theorizing, is a response to a wider set of historical and cultural changes in the social science disciplines. It has also had broader theoretical implications in the transformation of ways of thinking about the self, identity, and reflexivity (see below). In fact it is claimed that the model of "an affective society"[3] is now the predominant one in the social sciences.[4] The chapter reviews the work of a number of social theorists in the United States and Europe who have contributed to theorizing the emotions in the social sciences.

The chapter also draws on the work of some of the early women social scientists, including Marianne Weber, Harriet Martineau (1802–1876), and Jenny d'Héricourt (1809–1875) as part of a broader interest concerned with what Elaine Yeo[5] describes as "the social domain" that was established within the British tradition of social science, where "social" was seen as a counterpoint to the economic and political spheres of modernity. The focus here is on the gendered theorization of emotions, and for these early sociologists the social realm concerned itself with love, compassion, caring, and service. As Yeo maintains: "They also made a devastating analysis of the bourgeois family as a key site for the creation of competitive values and habits of gender domination and subordination."[6]

EMOTION AND AFFECT

The so called emotionalization of the social sciences, particularly within contemporary social theorizing, can be seen as part of a broader shift toward reconceptualizing "the social" in social scientific analysis. Monica Greco and Paul Stenner describe "the affective turn" in the social sciences as follows: " . . . what is at stake in this 'turn' is not only the incorporation of a novel subject matter into an existing disciplinary framework . . . we might say that the social sciences themselves are being *moved* or *affected*."[7] Perhaps the conceptual significance of the term "emotion" and the distinction between emotion and affect is best shown in the way it provides synergy between scientific and social scientific discourses as follows:

> The term "emotion" entered into circulation as part of a medico-scientific discourse associated with the early development of scientific psychology. In calling affective life "emotion," these novel scientific discourses also transformed the ways in which people thought about their affective life. Specifically, the emotions came to be thought of as quasi-mechanical biological processes.[8]

These discussions about differentiating emotion and affect have been traditionally conceptualized within an emotion/cognition dichotomy. This binary has a long history in the social sciences and stretches back

to conceptions of "Enlightenment modernity" and of modern scientific knowledge. The dichotomy between emotion and cognition was often reflected in the distinction around mind and body and frequently related to gender distinctions. In fact when "emotion was directly addressed by the early social scientists it was typically associated with the primitive, the embodied, the female."[9] Emotion continued to be conceptualized as a sphere of the self that needed to be restrained and managed within a structural-functional model of society. Thus some of the theorists of emotion reflect two major strands around the self and social structure, for example: "Elias wrote of the gradual encroachments of a 'civilizing process' entailing ever increasing forms of affective restraint and disciplined self-control. . . . [Talcott] Parsons . . . wrote of a trend towards 'affective neutrality' as society differentiates itself into functional sub-systems."[10] By contrast the work of more contemporary social scientists has placed the study of emotions centrally within their analysis. Barbalet outlines the significance of "emotions" to sociological analysis: "once the importance of emotions to social processes becomes clear, the intellectual constitution of sociology, and therefore the history of sociology and those who have contributed to it, have to be rethought."[11]

The distinction between emotion and affect has been approached in different ways by different scholars and theorists. Greco and Stenner maintain that the terms can be used synonymously; other theorists, such as Robert Seyfert,[12] draws the following distinction:

> Both approaches differ in their empirical focus, but share similar concepts and subsequently similar conceptual problems. While Sociology of Emotions relates affects exclusively to human bodies, Affect Studies tends to posit the potential social relevance of all sorts of bodies (organic, inorganic, artificial imaginary, etc). Thus, the difference in the focus concerns the question of *who or what is the proper body* in relation to what affect is posited.

Perhaps more succinctly Elspeth Probyn[13] suggests: "A basic distinction is that emotion refers to cultural and social expression, whereas affects are of a biological and physiological nature." There is of course not unanimity on Probyn's characterization of affect.[14]

This conceptual tension between affect and emotion has had implications for the "affective turn" in the social sciences, as shown in the work of a number of social theorists. These theorists argued for a new subject matter in the social sciences around the emotions, which recognized a social and cultural context, rather than a pseudoscientific one, as the basis for the new subject matter. The emphasis of the debates stressed the way in which emotions resonated across social and cultural communities and how different historical periods have engaged with and made sense of the emotions.

EMOTION AND GENDER IN THE WORK OF EARLY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

A significant element of this chapter is how gender inflects theorizing on emotion and affect. In charting the role of emotions in the work of the early social scientists, the key element for women theorists was how *men* were addressing the new, challenging conditions of modernity. Rosalind Sydie[15] shows that the interest in, and analysis of, "the social" "diverged or converged during the nineteenth and early twentieth century" around the terms of "the public sphere," with which men were engaged. The work of women theorists, such as Marianne Weber,[16] Jenny d'Hèricourt,[17] and Harriet Martineau,[18] in the early social sciences made important interventions in these debates. I focus here on the significance of the work of these early women social theorists in contributing to intellectual discourse on the cognition/emotion debate in the social sciences.

One key issue recognized by many women theorists and sociologists is the traditional masculinity of sociological theory.[19] Victor Seidler has traced the masculinity of social theory to the emphasis on cognition (reason) over emotion within Enlightenment modernity:

> Within an Enlightenment vision of modernity, to lack reason is to lack humanity . . . As reason is defined in fundamental opposition to nature within our moral lives, so culture is set up in opposition to nature. . . . The relationship of masculinity to modernity becomes a crucial point of investigation because of the identification of masculinity with reason.[20]

This association of reason and civilization with masculinity determined the dominance of a theoretical tradition by men that remained until the last few decades. Seidler comments: "It is men who think. It is men who are conceived of in our Western philosophical tradition as the rational sex, for they alone can take their reason for granted and so can escape from the demands of nature."[21]

In addition to its denigration of emotion in relation to reason, sociological theorizing also derogated women through the way in which embodiment, sex, and sexuality were framed within early sociological discourse. Ann Witz and Barbara Marshall comment as follows:

> [The traditional canon in sociology] resulted in a problematic indeed, contradictory—understanding of embodiment and individualization which saw women anchored in a natural, pre-social sexuality which was nonetheless potentially threatening to the rational control over desire, demanded of the disciplined *male citizen*.[22]

Distinguishing male rationality and female emotionality is a fairly consistent theme throughout both classical and some later sociological theory.

This is not to argue that classical sociological theorists ignored the role of emotions and "affect" entirely. Comte recognized the importance of the "affective" over the "intellectual" and understood that the "affective faculties" were essential for the improvement of society. In fact Comte understood the need for the "affective faculties" to balance abstract reasoning. He saw "sexual love" as a positive influence on society but only when it was disciplined.[23] He also saw marriage as providing that positive discipline, and he went further in stating that divorce could not be considered, seeing the "'perpetuity of widowhood'" as a "moral duty."[24] Most of the classical theorists, including Durkheim, saw disfunctionality arising in society when individualistic and sexual desires were not controlled. Women were defined by their sexual, material, and familial function in society, and women's erotic gratification was not given consideration by the early male theorists.

Yeo makes distinctions between the European and British sociological traditions and maintains that within British social science the emergence of "the social" provided an opportunity for "affect" to become an important element in understanding social life: "From the early nineteenth century, the social realm made room for supposedly *feminine* qualities such as love, compassion, caring and service and for womanly objects of concern such as the family, the elderly and the young."[25] Yeo notes that the emergence in the nineteenth century of socialist and socialist feminist critique of "the bourgeois family" established an important platform for women sociologists in their early interventions into the discipline.[26] In the process they provided a critique of the association of "feminine qualities" with those of "emotional labour."

One of the early female sociologists was Harriet Martineau, who some saw as the "first sociologist."[27] Martineau was a successfully published feminist social scientist across a range of topics including religion,[28] education,[29] history,[30] and political economy.[31] Yeo maintains that her work amplified issues of gender and "the public sphere."

Martineau's writings challenged the crude binary established by the early male sociologists between rationality and emotion. While not specifically writing on the subject of emotions and "affect," her book *Society in America*[32] drew important parallels between theoretical claims of democratic systems and the social norms and cultural life of the United States. She was critical of political and legislative frameworks that provided democracy, but excluded women. While she recognized that the legal status of women in the United States was better than in Europe, women still occupied positions of "neo-slavery" in that they had no political voice and were invisible in public life. An important element of Martineau's observations was the recognition that inequality was the result of structural power relationships. The key factor that Martineau noted was the systematic exclusion of women from employment and particularly the professions. Critical in this analysis was the negative significance of the emotions in women's exclusion, based on masculinist conceptions of rationality and reason.

These challenges to masculinist conceptions of rationality were implicit in much of the work of the early women theorists. This was particularly true of Marianne Weber, a German academic and activist, who was married to Max Weber, one of the classical theorists in sociology. Her work was wide ranging and influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx, her husband Max Weber, their friend Georg Simmel, and by the feminist activist Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Intellectually she challenged the theoretical model of gender relations, modernity, and rationality put forward by Georg Simmel, whose work is discussed below. Her husband, Max Weber, was well known for his emphasis on value-neutrality, and she followed his position in adopting a historical-comparative methodology, but as a feminist and activist, she rejected his conceptualization of value-neutrality and offered a three-part model that included ideas, materiality, and human agency. Elements of all three can be seen in her work.

Marianne Weber held a number of positions in German feminist organizations and became the first German woman representative elected to the state assembly and was elected president of the Federation of German Women's Organizations. She had an interest in issues of women in work,[33] women and academia,[34] women and marriage,[35]and women and housework.[36] However, possibly her most important theoretical contribution was the critique she made of Simmel's analysis of gender and rationality, which was contained in her essay "Women and Objective Culture."[37] Lawrence Scaff maintains that

> . . . the central question for Marianne, . . . revolved essentially around two issues: "the uniqueness" of women as contributors to "objective culture" (meaning especially the institutions, practices and products of modern science), and the threat to individual personality and "subjective culture" stemming from the mechanisms of specialization and means of rational domination.[38]

It is these issues that most directly relate to debates concerning cognition and emotion and were a direct response by Weber to Simmel's thesis on gender, rationality, and modernity. Simmel's metaphysics of gender are captured in his essays "Female Culture" and "The Relative and the Absolute in the Problems of the Sexes," in his *On Women, Sexuality and Love*.[39] Simmel maintains that modernity had a significant impact on gender.

Simmel[40] claims that men experience a dissociation of objective and subjective culture as a result of the pressures of modernity, although he recognizes that men control access to rationality and thus to power. He contends that women, in contrast, have the capacity of transcending the division of objective and subjective culture; however, at the same time women exist outside the domain of objective culture and rationality. Simmel gives the example of how this has an impact on sexual relations and how women and men engage with sexual relationships differently. He maintains that men's

dualistic nature results in their partial involvement in sexual relationships, while for women, he claims, it is part of their intrinsic nature, and thus women have a total commitment to sexual relationships: "For the man there is a sense in which sexuality is something he does. For a woman, it is a mode of being."[41]

Weber shares Simmel's view of the impact of modernization on individuals and the schism between objective and subjective culture, but entirely disagrees with his characterization of objective culture as being a male domain. In addition she rejects his ideas about a metaphysical difference between women and men. Weber[42] argues that within objective culture, rationality, objectivity, and goal orientation are not simply male domains but human ones.

Weber is not as pessimistic as Simmel about modernization and sees opportunities for women in being employed outside the home, although she recognizes that domestic demands hold women back.[43] She also shows how class plays an important role in understanding women's position in modernity, and she offers a critically important intervention in the development of feminist sociology, the recognition of difference among women, which later feminist theorists developed more fully.

Around the same time, the French writer and medical practitioner Jenny d'Héricourt was also challenging traditional conceptions of equality in her book *Woman Affranchised* (1864). Karen Offen shows that

> *La femme affranchie* made a significant contribution to the debate on the woman question, which had become by the mid-nineteenth century a central theme in European political and intellectual discourse, especially in France where it focused on the importance of women to the material and moral regeneration of the nation. In this book Jenny P. d'hericourt asserted a woman's right to respond to a variety of theories on the social relation of the sexes put forward by major male writers of the 1840s and 1850s. She confronted and refuted the theories of women's intellectual inferiority advanced by socialist/anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, as well as the "woman on a pedestal" theories of the so called father of sociology, Auguste Comte, and the father of social history, Jules Michelet. In the second part of the book, she then developed with great intellectual rigor her own "philosophy of woman."[44]

D'Héricourt lived in America from 1863 to 1873 and was active in the women's movement there. For d'Héricourt it was the absence of women from the social that was the focus of her work. In fact she maintained that there was a deliberate "social annihilation" of women. For d'Héricourt the invisibility of women from social discourses was not a question of the intellectual dominance of men in theoretical and social discourse but the deliberate exclusion of women as subjects of and within intellectual discourse. As Caroline Arni and Charlotte Muller note: "this annihilation

was constitutive of a sociological discourse that conceptualized society as a 'code word for the interests and needs of men.'"[45] Thus while the work of the early women theorists did not provide a direct analysis of emotions, *per se*, they opened up discourse around rationality and emotions that later feminist theorists developed.

EMOTIONS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF NORBERT ELIAS

As indicated earlier, the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw an interest in emotions in the social sciences, developed in part through the growth in the natural, clinical, and psychological sciences. It is within this context of interest in psychological knowledge that we can position Norbert Elias's work on emotions and the self. Elias's view of European history is one that traces the development of personality structure, which he maintains shows a process of intensification "towards self-constraint." This process, which Elias defines as "a civilizing process," is one where impulses, desires, and drives become constrained, a process that Elias "explains in terms of the increasing monopolization of violence which accompanied the process of state formation. . . . as well as an accompanying historical tendency towards increasing social interdependency."[46]

Elias's commitment to psychoanalysis and his interest in self-repression comes from a deep association with Freudian theory.[47] Elias was profoundly influenced by Freud from the 1930s onward, and as Mennell[48] notes, Elias never made any secret of that fact. This is significant, and there is little doubt that Freudian theory influenced all aspects of Elias's work. Other sociological theorists had of course drawn on Freud, however van Krieken argues that the difference between Elias and Parsons was that Elias incorporated Freudian psychoanalysis into his work from the outset, whereas Parsons introduced psychoanalysis much later in the development of his sociological theory.[49]

Zygmunt Bauman[50] in a review article on Elias maintains that *The Civilizing Process* follows closely Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents,* and that Elias undertook much of the documentary fieldwork shortly after the publication of Freud's book in 1929. The thesis developed by Elias is that the development of social character and behavior relied on inhibition of drives through social restraint, which had close parallels with Freud's concept of sublimation. Thus Elias and Freud shared key concepts in their analysis of social and cultural development, and these concepts were repression and sublimation.

Mennell maintains that Elias "was never an uncritical and orthodox adherent of psychoanalysis."[51] However the association between Elias and Freud has been sufficiently pronounced to impact on how Elias's work is received. Mennell maintains that it is relevant " . . . to the reception of

Elias's work because, especially in the USA, the perception that Elias is 'a Freudian' *tout court* becomes an excuse not to read his works with the care and attention that is required."[52] This is an interesting point and possibly explains the marginality of Elias in theoretical debates in the social sciences. For example as will be shown below, Elias did share certain commonalities with Foucault and Weber, and there has been considerable theoretical engagement with Foucault by feminist theorists and scholars. However while many feminist and gender theorists have been engaged with debates on emotion and affect, there is little interest in engaging with Elias's work on the emotions, and his ideas remain marginal to mainstream theoretical development in the social sciences.[53]

Elias's work on social constraint of the self places him within well-established theoretical paradigms in sociology, including those of Michel Foucault and Max Weber. As Robert van Krieken shows:

> Foucault and Elias agree with Weber that one can trace a development trend towards increasing self-discipline, a regularization and routinization of the psyche, so that one's inner "economy of the soul" coordinates with the outer economy of an increasingly bureaucratised, rationalized and individualized social world.[54]

The emphasis of all three theorists converges around the transformation of the self in European history, from one reliant on external constraint to one dependent on internal constraint. However, clearly their modes of analysis differ profoundly.

Elias brings together social and psychological dimensions of the self in his analysis, which give his work commonalities with the sociological theories that emerged in the United States, in the 1970s and 1980s, such as social constructionism, which is explored below. He combines an emphasis on self-constraint with the need to understand the psychological impact of social change:

> For Elias this relative neglect of the impact of social changes on psychic life is a major obstacle to an adequate understanding of the development of self-discipline. . . . Elias's model of the historical development of personality structure is one of increasing "restraint" and "constraint" of drives, impulses and affect for the sake of foresight and one's tenuous position within and increasing complex web of social interdependency and competition.[55]

However, while Elias's focus on practices of self-constraint is insightful for superficial dimensions of affect and impulse, for example, bodily functions, physical violence, and table manners, the complexity of emotional states such as love, caring, honesty, jealousy, shame, guilt, and steadfastness, among others, are more challenging to his theory. In fact Elias's work

is very much a one-dimensional trajectory of social change and its impact on self-restraint and disciplinary constraints, and it lacks any analysis that recognizes gender differentiated conceptions of the self.

As van Krieken observes: " . . . if one recognizes that selves have genders as well as histories, it becomes clear that the 'individual' positioned in Elias's ever-longer chains of interdependency, planning and calculating the gains to be had from self-restraint, was *male,* [italics added] counterposed to women constructed as *species being* as mothers, nurturers, objects of desire, menstruators, the Other. . . ."[56]

The "disciplined-self" in Elias's work that achieves self-restraint through the subordination of emotion, is therefore a *masculine* self: " . . . femininity was perceived as the *embodiment* of emotion and physicality, its ultimate expression, rather than the product of the restraint of emotion."[57] The problem with Elias's conception of emotions and self-restraint is that, as van Krieken comments: "he overlooks the possibility of being 'civilized', as women undoubtedly were, both supposed and expected to be, through a very particular *integration* of emotions and the body with social identity, rather than their polar opposites."[58]

THE GENDERED NATURE OF EMOTIONS AND "THE AFFECTIVE TURN" IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The nature of the self and self-restraint in Elias's work are further amplified when his work is set in the context of the growth in the United States of theories of social constructionism and symbolic interactionism. Elias's work was influenced by a number of sociologists in the United States. He was critical of functionalist theorists such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, but more positive about Erving Goffman because of his emphasis on observation in everyday life. However, he criticized Goffman for his lack of historical perspective. It was left to a later generation of theorists including Arlie Hochschild, the Elisian scholar Cas Wouters, and others to theorize the emotions in the social sciences, to develop an understanding of the significance of emotions for everyday life, and to draw out the implications for the gendered nature of emotions.

In the 1970s and 1980s in US sociology, a range of theoretical models such as social constructionism and symbolic interactionism were developed by a number of theorists including Arlie Hochschild and Rom Harre.[59] Hochschild has made a significant contribution to debates in the area of gender, emotion, and affect. Hochschild's work attempts to mediate the relationship between individual personality structures and social structures through interaction. She extends an earlier focus around social norms into an organizational analysis of "emotion work" and "emotional labour." Drawing on interactional analysis Hochschild connects individual emotional structures with power and social structures. I give further consideration to her work below.

Wouters's[60] critique of Arlie Hochschild work has become a classic in sociological theory, particularly his criticism of the symbolic interactionist and social constructionist aspects of emotions in Hochschild's *The Managed Heart*.[61] Wouters criticizes Hochschild's model of the emotions developed in the concepts of: "emotional labour," emotion work, and "feeling rules," and is critical of Hochschild's model of the commercialization of the "real self" through the organizing and structuring of behavior. Wouters maintains that Hochschild's analysis is really a critique of capitalism, not specifically of the commercialization of emotion. In fact, Hochschild's *The Commercialization of Intimate Life*[62] focuses on the "costs" of emotion management and how the commercialization of feeling exacerbates such costs. While Wouters's model of the self and self-restraint is limited, he is more sharply political in his analysis than Elias, particularly in the area of "informalization" as shown below.

Hochschild's work has given impetus to the renaissance of the emotions in the social sciences. Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of Hochschild's work is in the area of political economy and the implications of emotional labour. As Greco and Stenner note: "Affect is central to contemporary economic processes, whether in the form of 'emotional labour' in the service industry, of 'emotional intelligence' in the context of organizational management, or of the increasing attention paid to *feeling* in developing marketing strategies for particular products."[63]

In addition, Hochschild highlights the gendered nature of emotional labor and the gendered assumptions operating in organizational contexts. Her work contributes to broader theoretical questions, including the emphasis on social norms and the importance of interaction as a mediating factor between individual personality and social structure. She provides detailed social insight into how norms become embedded into definitions of emotion via interpretive processes that include labeling and attribution. In showing how emotions are gendered in work and organizational contexts, she shows how power operates to disadvantage women in terms of dominant normative structures.

Hochschild's use of her now famous concepts of "emotion work" and "feeling rules" facilitate the connection between emotions and social and power structures. She raises the question of how emotions in the workplace are understood and defined. These insights also show how areas associated with caring (emotional labor) are defined in gendered terms and how management and organizational structures operate in relation to gender and emotions.[64]

The significance of Hochschild's work is the way in which she illustrates how the sociology of emotions operates as an intervention. As Greco and Stenner maintain: "theories of emotion do not simply hover above their subject matter. Rather they intervene in the affective life they scrutinize."[65] The emergence of the emotions in the social sciences and the "turn to affect" has led to profound transformations in the way

social relations are conducted at an individual level and more generally. Theoretically the "turn to affect" has also contributed to the relationship of intimacy, reflexivity, and identity, all important areas of understanding the self in late modernity. These theoretical developments are explored below.

THE "AFFECTIVE SOCIETY" AND LATE MODERNITY: REFLEXIVITY, EMOTIONS, AND IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY

Reflexivity is an important concept in contemporary social theorizing. The intersection of reflexivity with emotions and identity also has implications for understanding the embedding of emotions in identity formation. As Anthony Elliott and Charles Lemert comment: "The idea of 'reflexivity' may seem fairly abstract, the province of specialized sociological debate. But it becomes interesting when you see it opening a window onto psychological and political life, deeply private and significantly public at the same time."[66] I have noted elsewhere that late modernity has become conspicuously engaged with identity, reflexivity, and identity.[67] Contemporary social theory has been dominated for the last twenty years by attempts to understand social change in relation to global transformations and the growth of individualism. The "turn to affect" in the social sciences is part of a broader analysis of understanding "individualization" and society in late modernity.

The emergence of new identities as a result of social change can be traced back to earlier theoretical frameworks, particularly in George Simmel's work.[68] For Simmel the key concept was "metropolitanism," which resulted in an emphasis on rationalism and a displacement of emotion as motivating factors. Simmel described a sense of "valuelessness" in individuals and an instrumental orientation to society. As shown earlier, Simmel is, in fact, the only classical social theorist who considered the relationship between gender, rationality, and modernity. As Lisa Adkins comments " Simmel's social theory . . . offered a critique of the equation of masculinity with the modern."[69] However, she notes that he still excluded women from important constructions of the "social": " . . . in Simmel's social theory men are understood to suffer the misfortune of experiencing all of the fragmenting, alienating, individualizing and differentiating forces of modernity. . . ."[70] In addition, Adkins shows that Simmel's social theory "positions woman as the 'overt object of nostalgic desire',[71] a desire that locates woman as a symbol of pre–modernity and non-differentiation."[72] Thus, as noted earlier, classical sociological paradigms emphasized the association of rationality with masculinity and a "neutralizing" of the significance of affect and emotions. Elements of these theoretical debates can be seen in more recent theories as shown below.

INTIMACY, MANNERS, AND "THERAPEUTIC CULTURE"

There is an indirect relationship between the theoretical debates around reflexivity and individualization and Elias's "the civilizing process," which includes a number of processes including "individualization," "socialization," and "rationalization."[73] Elias charts a process of increased emotional restraint from medieval times to the end of the nineteenth century. He shows that the process of social change from the eleventh to the nineteenth century was characterized by a higher level of self-regulation. There is a move away from collective social patterns of living to a more individualized set of experiences linked to individual patterns of behavior, competitive individualism, and ownership of property. Emotions are linked to expressions of individual need and motivation, and it is the individual, not the family, that establishes professional sets of contracted relationships, which assume priority in terms of normative interaction between individuals. As stated there is little doubt that Elias's conception of historical change is both unilinear and teleological.[74]

Wouters builds on this model to chart a process of "informalization." In this process, he maintains that while "informalization" encouraged a greater diversity of emotions, it is accompanied by a higher degree of regulation.[75] While Elias's views are characterized by homogeneity and uniformity, Wouters captures the more highly differentiated nature of individualization related to global and national diversity. This model of change is typical of much social science theorizing, particularly linked to the expansion of reflexivity. There are parallels here between the expression of emotions more openly framed around changing regimes of manners and etiquette (Wouters)[76] and the changing nature of intimacy as outlined by Anthony Giddens[77] in late modernity. In this regard: "Giddens. . . . fabulously insists that therapeutic culture has emerged alongside a new type of reflexivity, characterised partly by the rise of the 'pure relationship' and 'confluent love,'[78] principally brought about by women."[79] By therapeutic culture, Giddens is referring to the range of "self-help" and personal growth products and services, which have supported the move toward increased reflexivity. These include the availability of psychoanalysis and counseling services, as well as self-help books.

While it is not possible to fully develop Giddens's well-established analysis here, he defines the notion of "the reflexive individual" whose expectations of relationships and intimacy are of a higher order to those whose lives have been defined by the obligations of the premodern society. Women's expectations as regards sex and relationships are significant here. Giddens links the development of the self with the "democratisation of daily life."[80] The diversification in the expression of intimate life in Giddens can be paralleled with Wouters's emphasis on "informalization." Giddens sees the process of democratization as central in the transformation of intimacy in "the creation of circumstances in which people can develop their potentialities and express their diverse quality."[81]

Despite the parallels in the work of Giddens and Wouters, there is a tendency in both theorists to oversimplify the significance of emotionalization. Likewise the individualization thesis as developed in the work of Zygmunt Bauman,[82] Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim,[83] and Anthony Giddens[84] does not fully capture the range of emotional change in later modernity or deal with the full range of relational complexity that individuals experience.[85] Additionally both Wouters and Giddens see the value of therapy and the development of "relationship manuals." In fact Hazelden comments that "[Giddens] . . . explicitly states that he views relationship manuals as significant social and cultural indicators, saying that 'they are texts of our time in a comparable sense to the medieval manuals of manners analysed by Norbert Elias. . . . '"[86]

As noted, these manuals are part of what Giddens identifies as an aspect of a "therapeutic culture," but there are limitations with Giddens's model of intimacy:

> Giddens argues that the "new intimacy" "implies a wholesale democratising of the interpersonal domain, in a manner wholly compatible with democracy in the public sphere,"[87] but his vision of democracy is a very particular and limited one, emphasising (neo)liberal values such as autonomy and self-actualisation over mutual support and commonality.[88]

In other words, not everyone has access to the higher order categories of reflexivity, and it is a development that is differentiated along the axes of gender, class, ethnicity, and nationality.

"POST-EMOTIONALISM" AND THE "COSMOPOLITAN IDENTITY"

More recently Elliott and Lemert argue that "a master idea of modernity" is individualism and a focus on "a new culture of narcissism" where the individual is dominant.[89] In relation to understanding and theorizing global change, Elliott and Lemert position individualism centrally within this process. They claim there is a need to understand "the complex and contradictory ways in which individuals constitute, reproduce and transform their sense of self-identity and individualism in relation to processes of globalization."[90] The significance of the growth of this new individualism has had particular implications for both personal and work life. Two theorists, Richard Sennett[91] and Arlie Hochschild,[92] have made significant contributions to this debate.

Sennett has discussed how globalization has resulted in the personal and work narratives of individuals becoming fragmented and particularly "on how today's brave new world of impermanent contract work sets the emotional inner life adrift."[93] Sennett shares with Beck the recognition that

both personal and work lives no longer share traditional linear and territorially based structures.[94] Beck has indicated that we are moving to a "second" and "risk-filled" modernity characterized by insecurity. As shown above, Hochschild's work offers a raft of concepts to analyze changes in emotional and intimate life linked to changes in work patterns. Like Sennett, Hochschild sees globalization and "the commercialisation of intimate life" as leading to the breakdown of private life. As shown earlier her work describes the significance of "emotional labour" and "emotion work" in understanding the importance of emotions in broader conceptions of work life in late modernity.

One of the key areas of recent theoretical debate in understanding change in relation to the emergence of new identities is the "cosmopolitan perspective." This is an important theoretical perspective and shows how identity, belonging, and solidarity have shifted from being defined by nation and territory to being more global and cosmopolitan. Bryan Turner describes the new "cosmopolitan citizen" as "post-emotional" and detached from a commitment to place or community.[95] He sees these new identities captured in the highly mobile global elite. Turner conceptualizes a sense of belonging and solidarity as either "hot" or "cool" and predicts that the close sense of solidarity and commitment, which he describes as "hot" solidarity, will be replaced with "cool" solidarity. In response to Turner's model, Craig Calhoun[96] maintains that globalization actually establishes new identities and solidarities. He argues that there is no reason to assume that the new sets of relations will be "thin" as Turner and Chris Rojek[97] contend but could still be "thick" in terms of synergies and interests.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has charted the significance of emotions in classical and contemporary social theory, drawing on European and American traditions. These debates have emerged from and built upon the traditional dichotomy between cognition (reason) and emotion. The importance of classical theorists such as Simmel and Elias in building upon and framing the significance of emotions in contemporary theory has also been assessed. This chapter has also reviewed the work of some of the early women social scientists and the critique they provided of the cognition/emotion binary. Their work paved the way for later theoretical interventions by feminist and gender theorists. This chapter has discussed how traditionally gendered understandings of emotional styles have been effectively disseminated against women. The "affective turn" in the social sciences can be traced through a number of areas of sociological theorizing, including interactional theory and social constructionism, and has been developed in the work of more contemporary theorists including Arlie Hochschild. Some of the key theoretical developments over the last twenty years, particularly in relation to the constitution of identity

and the growth of individualization and reflexivity (Bauman, Beck, and Giddens), have addressed the issue of intimacy and emotion in contemporary relationships and focus on the ongoing gendered responses to emotional life. These developments have led to a much greater consideration to emotions within the social sciences. Further development of the significance of emotions in these debates is required. The history of emotions within social theorizing offers a vibrant and dynamic area for the further development of the relationship between social change and emotions.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the relationship between affect and emotion, see *Emotions: A Social Science Reader*, ed. Monica Greco and Paul Stenner (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), and Victoria Henderson, "Is There Hope for Anger? The Politics of Spatializing and (Re)producing an Emotion," *Emotion, Space and Society* 1 (2008): 28–37.
2. The concept of "turn to affect" in the social sciences does not imply that previous approaches had nothing to say on the emotions. John Scott observes that "Parsons . . . drew extensively on psychoanalytic ideas for his understanding of motivation, and saw affectivity as a fundamental 'pattern variable' deriving this from his use of Weber's concept of 'affective action'. Rather than seeing a 'binary' of emotion and cognition, he saw a tripartite view of affect, cognition, and evaluation. Arguably, his understanding of values depends on ideas of both cognitive and affective factors." I am grateful to John Scott for these important observations emerging from discussion on this subject.
3. Sophie Watson, "Policing the Affective Society: Beyond Governmentality in the Theory of Social Control," *Social and Legal Studies* 8 (1999): 227–251.
4. This of course does not mean there is unanimity among social scientists regarding the impact of affect. Frederic Jameson talked about "the waning" of affect, while members of the Frankfurt School, including Horkeimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, were all pessimistic about the authenticity of affect. More recently Patricia Clough, among others, has discussed how affect involves the subsumption of life to capital. I am grateful to Purnima Mankekar for these observations emerging from discussion on the subject.
5. Elaine Yeo, "Feminizing the Citizen; British Sociology's Slight of Hand," in *Engendering the Social: Feminist Encounters with Sociological Theory,* ed. Barbara Marshall and Ann Witz (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2004).
6. Yeo, "Feminizing the Citizen," 100.
7. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions, 5.*
8. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions, 12.*
9. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions, 5.*
10. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions, 5.*
11. Jack Barbalet, ed., *Emotions and Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 3.
12. Robert Seyfert, "Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Towards a Theory of Social Affect," *Theory, Culture and Society* 29, no. 6 (2012): 27–46, 27–28
13. Elspeth Probyn, *Blush: Faces of Shame* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 11
14. Purnima Mankekar disagrees with Probyn and maintains that affects problematize the mind/body/heart or passion/corporeality/reason distinction. I am grateful to Mankekar for these comments emerging in discussion.

15. Rosalind A. Sydie, *Natural Women and Cultural Men: A Feminist Perspective on Sociological Theory* (Toronto: Methuen, 1987), quoted in "Introduction: Feminist Encounters with Sociological Theory," in *Engendering the Social,* Marshall and Witz, 3.
16. Marianne Weber, "Vocation and Marriage," in *Questions and Thoughts about Women: Collected Essays* (Tubingen: Mohr, 1919 [1905]); "The Participation of Women in Science," in *Der Internationale Frauenfragen in Berlin 1904,* ed. M. Stritt (Berlin: Verlag C. Habel, 1904); "Authority and Autonomy in Marriage," in *The Women Founders: Sociology and Social Theory,* 1803–1930, ed. Patricia Lengermann and Jill Niebrugge-Brantley (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998a [1912]); "On the Valuation of Housework," *Women Founders*, Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998b [1912]); "Women and Objective Culture," in *Questions and Thoughts about Women: Collected Essays* (Tubingen: Mohr, 1919 [1913]).
17. Jenny d' Héricourt, *A Woman's Philosophy or Women Affranchised: An Answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouve, Comte, and other Modern Innovators* (translator not named) (New York: Carleton, 1864).
18. Harriet Martineau (writing as Discipulus), "Female Writers on Practical Divinity," *Monthly Repository* 17 (1822): 593–596, 746–750; *Traditions of Palestine* (London: Longman, 1830); *Household Education* (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1849); *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte,* trans. and condensed by Harriett Martineau, 2 vols. (New York: Appleton, 1853); *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989 [1838]).
19. See Rita Felski, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Marshall and Witz, *Engendering,* 2004; David Morgan, *Discovering* Men (London: Routledge, 1992); and Janet Wolff, "The Feminine of Modern Art: Benjamin, Simmel and the Gender of Modernity," *Theory, Culture and Society* 17 (2000): 33–53.
20. Victor J. Seidler, *Unreasonable Men: Masculinity and Social Theory* (New York: Routledge, Chapman Hall, 1994), ix–x.
21. Seidler, *Unreasonable Men,* 14.
22. Witz and Marshall, "Introduction," 12 (italics added).
23. Auguste Comte quoted in *Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings,* ed. G. Lenzer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 377.
24. Quoted in Lenzer, *Auguste Comte,* 378.
25. Yeo, "Feminizing the Citizen," 98 (italics added).
26. Yeo, "Feminizing the Citizen," 100.
27. Caroline Arni and Charlotte Muller, "More Sociological than the Sociologist? Undisciplined and Undisciplinary Thinking about Society and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century," *Engendering the Social,* Marshall and Witz, 72.
28. Martineau (writing as Discipulus), "Female Writers," *Traditions of Palestine.*
29. Martineau, *Household.*
30. Harriet Martineau, *The History of England During the Thirty Years' Peace, 1816–1846*, 2 vols. (London: Charles Knight, 1849–1850).
31. Harriet Martineau, *Illustrations of Political Economy*, 9 vols. (London: Charles Fox, 1832–1834).
32. Harriet Martineau, *Society in America,* 2 vols. (Paris: Baudry's European Library, 1937).
33. Weber, "Vocation and Marriage."
34. Weber, "Participation of Women in Science."
35. Weber, "Authority and Autonomy in Marriage," *Women Founders*, Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998a [1912]).

36. Weber, "On the Valuation of Housework," *Women Founders*, Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998b [1912]).
37. Weber, "Women and Objective Culture," *Questions and Thoughts about Women* (1919 [1913]).
38. Lawrence Scaff, "'The Cool Objectivity of Sociation': Max Weber and Marianne Weber in America," *History of Human Sciences* no. 11 (1998): 61–82, 73.
39. Georg Simmel, *On Women, Sexuality and Love,* trans. G. Oakes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
40. Georg Simmel "Der Frauenkongref und die Sozialdemokratie," in Georg Simmel: Schriftenten zur Philosophie and Sociologie der Geschelter, eds H.J Dahme and K.C. Kohnke (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985 [1896]).
41. Simmel, *On Women*, 107.
42. Weber, "Women and Objective Culture," 101.
43. Weber, "Women and Objective Culture," 129.
44. Karen Offen, "A Nineteenth-Century French Feminist Rediscovered: Jenny P. D'Hericourt, 1809–1875," *Signs* 13, no. 1 (Autumn 1987): 144–158, 144–145.
45. Arni and Muller, "More Sociological," 95.
46. Robert van Krieken, "The Organisation of the Soul: Elias and Foucault on Discipline and the Self," in *Norbert Elias,* vol. 1, ed. Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell (London and California: Sage, 2003). [Source: *Archives Europeenes do Sociologie* 31, no. 2 (1990): 353–371].
47. The links between Elias and psychoanalysis can be traced to the early years of Elias's intellectual development. He was an associate of the psychoanalyst Foulkes, who had also fled to Britain from Germany, and who he collaborated with in developing the practice of Group Analysis.
48. Stephen Mennell, "Norbert Elias: Beyond Freud," Norbert Elias Foundation Blog, Norbert Elias Foundation, 9 January 2011, accessed 18 July 2013, http://norberteliasfoundation.nl/blog/?p=345.
49. Robert van Krieken, "Beyond the 'Parsonian Problem of Order': Elias, Habit and Contemporary Sociology," paper delivered at the 'How is Society Possible?' Workshop, Department of Sociology and Centre for Research in Social Inclusion, Macquarie University, 30 June 2003.
50. Zygmunt Bauman, "The Phenomenon of Norbert Elias," *Sociology* 13, no. 1 (1979): 497–501.
51. Mennell, "Norbert Elias."
52. Mennell, "Norbert Elias."
53. See Greco and Stenner, *Emotions,* for a discussion on Elias and emotions.
54. van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 137.
55. van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 138.
56. van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 145.
57. van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 145–6.
58. van Krieken, "Organisation of the Soul," 146.
59. Michael Rustin comments that "Elias's distinction between extensive and intensive methods of research is parallel to that made by Rom Harre in his advocacy of methodological realism in the sciences. Harre unfavourably contrasts the aggregative, atomistic and individualistic perspectives of mainstream psychology, with approaches based on an understanding of human behaviour as essentially relational and rule–governed." See Rustin, "Norbert Elias's Contribution to Psychoanalytical History," 2009, accessed 2 July 2013, http://oxfordseminar.org/ . . . /wp . . . /rustin-norbert-elias-background-paper2.doc.
60. Cas Wouters, "The Sociology of Emotions and Flight Attendants: Hochschild's *Managed Heart," Theory, Culture and Society* 6 (1989): 95–123.

61. Arlie R. Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
62. Arlie R. Hochschild, *The Commercialization of Intimate Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
63. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions* 16 (italics added).
64. Ann Brooks, "Reconceptualising Reflexivity and Dissonance in Professional and Personal Domains," *British Journal of Sociology* 59, no. 3 (2008): 539–559; Ann Brooks and Theresa Devasayaham, *Gender, Emotions and Labour Markets* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
65. Greco and Stenner, *Emotions,* 12–13.
66. Anthony Elliott and Charles Lemert, *The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 116.
67. Ann Brooks, *Social Theory in Contemporary Asia: Intimacy, Reflexivity and Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 2010). See also Brooks, "Reconceptualising;" Ann Brooks and Lionel Wee, "Reflexivity and the Transformation of Gender Identity: Reviewing the Potential for Change in a Cosmopolitan Society," *Sociology* 42, no. 3 (2008): 503–521.
68. Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel,* ed. K. Wolff (London: Free Press, 1978 [1907]).
69. Lisa Adkins, " Gender and the Post-structural Social," in *Engendering* the Social, Marshall and Witz, 141 ."
70. Adkins, " Gender," "" 141.
71. Felski, *The Gender of Modernity,* 37, cited in Adkins, "Reflexivity," 141.
72. Adkins, " Gender," 141.
73. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 [1939]).
74. I am grateful for Purnima Mankekar for her commentary in this regard emerging from discussion.
75. Wouters, "The Sociology of Emotions;" "Etiquette Books and Emotion Management in the 20th Century: Part One; The Integration of Social Classes," *Journal of Social History* 29, no. 1 (1995a): 107–124; "Etiquette Books and Emotion Management in the 20th Century: Part Two; The Integration of the Sexes," *Journal of Social History* 29, no. 2 (1995b): 325–340; "Changing Regimes of Manners and Emotions: From Disciplining to Informalizing," in *The Sociology of Norbert Elias,* ed. S. Loyal and S. Quilley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); *Informalization: Manners and Emotions Since 1890* (London: Sage, 2007).
76. Wouters, "Etiquette Books," Part One and Part Two.
77. Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
78. Giddens, *Transformation,* 61–62.
79. Rosemary Hazelden, "The Pathology of Love in Contemporary Relationship Manuals," *The Sociological Review* (2004): 201–217, 202.
80. Giddens, *Transformation,* 64.
81. Giddens, *Transformation,* 185.
82. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
83. Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim, *The Normal Chaos of Love* (Cambridge, Polity, 1996).
84. Giddens, *Transformation,* 3.
85. The thesis of individualization is not without its critics, and feminist and gender theorists have argued that it has limited applicability in terms of racial minority groups and women of color in the United States and elsewhere. I am grateful to Purnima Mankekar for raising this issue.

86. Giddens, *Transformation,* 61–62, quoted in Hazelden, "Pathology," 202.
87. Giddens, *Transformation,* 3.
88. Hazelden, "Pathology," 215.
89. Elliott and Lemert, *New Individualism*, 5, 7.
90. Elliott and Lemert, *New Individualism,* 91.
91. Richard Sennett, *The Corosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism* (New York: Norton, 1998).
92. Hochschild, *Managed Heart*; *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997); *Commercialization of Intimate Life*; "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure," extracted in *Emotions: A Social Science Reader.* ed. Greco and Stenner (London: Routledge, 2008) [source *American Journal of Sociology* 85 (1979): 551–575].
93. Elliott and Lemert, *New Individualism,* 6.
94. Ulrich Beck, *The Brave New World of Work* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 3.
95. Bryan Turner, "Cosmopolitan Virtue: Loyalty and the City," in *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City*, ed. E. F. Insin (London: Routledge, 2000).
96. Craig Calhoun, "Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitan, Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere," *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 147–171.
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Part I

Identifying Emotional Communities

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4 Searching for Emotional Communities in Late Medieval England

Melissa Raine

> It is sometimes said, "How far we have progressed beyond this standard," although it is not usually quite clear who is the "we" with whom the speaker identifies on such occasions, as if he or she deserved part of the credit.
>
> The opposite judgment is also possible: "What has *really* changed? A few customs, no more." (Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process,* 59: emphasis mine.)

INTRODUCTION

How might the experience of reading have participated in the formation of emotional communities in late medieval England? This question draws us into long-standing debates over whether "emotion" is "inherent" or "socially constituted,"[1] and more specifically, over the role of discourse in articulating or constructing self-experience.[2] These debates intersect with competing frameworks for understanding subjectivity as either an embodied or a cognitive phenomenon,[3] as well as for considering the extent to which selfhood is historically specific.[4] Norbert Elias's theory of social process provides a deceptively simple model of subject formation within which these issues are dynamically interrelated not only to each other, but also to the social and communal contexts within which the subject is actualized: "what changes in the course of the process which we call history are, to reiterate, the reciprocal relationships, the figurations, of people and the moulding the individual undergoes within them."[5] The centrality of reciprocity to Elias's theory of social process results in a conceptual structure for understanding community and society that is at once highly elastic, and grounded in a fundamental drive for connection among individuals.

The potential for texts to participate in the construction or maintenance of emotional communities in a specifically medieval context exemplifies this relationship. Certain genres and discourses participate intricately in the process of subject formation; the circulation of such texts in manuscript form potentially provides an opportunity to identify individual and shared affective engagements by readers with these materials, and through the materials, with each other. However, identifying possible figurations of emotional community related to medieval textuality relies not merely on the texts themselves. Roger Chartier argues that "there is no text apart

from the physical support that offers it for reading (or hearing), hence there is no comprehension of any written piece that does not at least in part depend upon the forms in which it reaches the reader."[6] Thus, the potential for affective responses by readers is located not exclusively in the text's content, but also in the reading practices employed and the material objects themselves: the manuscripts. As a result, "the historian's task is thus to reconstruct the variations that differentiate the *espaces lisibles*—that is, the texts in their discursive and material forms—and those that cover the circumstances of their *effectuation*—that is, the readings, understood as concrete practices and as procedures of interpretation."[7] Chartier's summation of the complex relationship of text, reader, and material object provides a salient enrichment of Elias's understanding of reciprocal relationships as the basis of social and communal figurations; effectively, Chartier's ideas expand Elias's flexible model to include relevant material supports.

The text chosen here for indications of shared affective engagement by readers must seem at first glance a most unpromising candidate, since it has defied rather than invited critical investigation; the Middle English "Dietary" by John Lydgate, a fifteenth-century guide, in verse, to maintaining health. This widely reproduced text apparently provided medieval readers with an emotional response that differs radically from the predominant responses of modern readers, which are boredom, irritation, and embarrassment, but Elias's theory of social process provides a productive alternative to the seemingly intransigent opposition between these two historically specific judgments. Of the Middle Ages, Elias writes, "such people stood in a different relationship to one another than we do. [. . .] Their affects were conditioned to forms of relationship and conduct which, by today's standard of conditioning, are embarrassing or at least unattractive."[8] Elias thus urges us to recognize that our own standards of behavior only seem "natural" or "reasonable" because they result from the internalization of generations of practices, a slow process that is effaced over long periods of time.[9] The criticism sometimes leveled at Elias by medievalists, that he offers a simplistic evolutionary model for cultural and social change, misses the point;[10] Elias is advising us to avoid the trap of using our own affective standards when attempting to understand the past. In other words, part of our task is to locate the forms of affective reciprocity offered by Lydgate's "Dietary" that were potentially meaningful to medieval readers, beginning with the sense of self that correlates with them.

Assuming that a positive affective response to Lydgate's "Dietary" was available to medieval readers, which I refer to, generically, as "satisfaction," I will consider the readable spaces of a few particularly eloquent manuscripts for ways in which emotional engagement between text and readers might have unfolded. Since the potential medieval effectuations of this text seem to have eluded modern readers, a review of the readable spaces of the "Dietary" manuscripts will also address Elias's question, "what has really changed?"

BACKGROUND

John Lydgate's "Dietary" is not an original composition, but a translation of part of the *Regimen Sanitatis Salernitanum*,[11] one of two *regimena* that were, from the twelfth century onwards, enormously popular throughout medieval Europe, the other being found in the *Secretum Secretorum*.[12] Both texts were concerned with the prevention of illness by maintenance of the body's humoral balance through its interaction with the six non-naturals (the forces affecting the well-being of the body), according to the precepts of Galenic medicine.[13] By the fifteenth century, these traditions had flourished to the point that relationships among their redactions are difficult to untangle; although the text is taken literally from the *Regimen Sanitatis Salernitanum*, the disparagement of professional medical practitioners in Lydgate's "Dietary" places the poem within the *Secretum Secretorum* tradition, which tends to shun formal professional medicine in favor of prudent self-governance, relying particularly strongly on natural philosophy for a very broad interpretation of what "medicine" and "health" are.[14] This is seen most clearly in the last three lines of the "Dietary":

> This receyte ys bogh̄t of non apothecary,
> Off mayster Antony nor of maister Hiew,
> But to alle, that it vse, it is a chief electuary [*medicine*].[15]

While there are several variants among the manuscripts, in most versions, the last line endorses the poem itself as a valuable source of wisdom, articulating the weighty authority of the *Secretum Secretorum* tradition with which the poem is discursively affiliated.

The "Dietary" occurs in fifty-seven medieval manuscripts, exceeded, among Middle English texts, only by *The Canterbury Tales* and *The Prick of Conscience*.[16] While the survival of manuscripts does not attest unequivocally to popularity, this text appears to have been one of the most widely circulating poems in Middle English, as well as being the most widely disseminated work of the hugely prolific poet John Lydgate (1370–1450), a Benedictine monk who numbered three kings among his many powerful patrons. By the twentieth century, however, Lydgate's name had become largely synonymous with literary mediocrity. Although there has been renewed critical interest in Lydgate's writing in recent decades, the little attention elicited by the "Dietary" tends to be apologetic about, perplexed by, or disdainful of the text. Derek Pearsall's generally unflattering yet sympathetic assessment of Lydgate's oeuvre includes this dismissive summation of his "Dietary":

> Literary criticism *has no part here*, except to say that what had to be done is well done, and with assurance, and that the manner is well suited to the matter.[17]

Pearsall's acknowledgment of the poem's popularity leads to the same conclusion; "no more, surely, need be said."[18] For Pearsall, the process of positive intellectual and affective engagement with this text is opaque, and he thus exhorts silence *as a critical response* to the "Dietary," excluding it from the valorized (but anachronistic) classification of the text as "literary." This failure, or refusal, to engage with the "Dietary" is in fact a useful articulation of twentieth-century dissatisfaction with the enthusiastic medieval reception of an apparently artless text, dealing with the seemingly banal topic of bodily care, cause enough for its significance to be overlooked by modern scholars seeking discursive constructions of *emotions*, as I will discuss below.

Fifteenth-century England was long dismissed by critics as a lackluster period for "literary" production, dominated by a taste for the moralistic and didactic, seemingly at the expense of the aesthetic and the timeless; and yet, availability of books and the acquisition of reading skills were on the increase.[19] Technological changes in the later Middle Ages permitted cheaper book production, promoting "a growth in reading for pleasure amongst those who had previously had little opportunity to employ their literate skills in areas other than those related to business."[20] Books were becoming cheaper and ownership more widespread, but manuscripts remained prized possessions: "books were always a luxury in the Middle Ages, but the production of cheaper books meant that they could become a luxury for poorer people."[21] The discursive and material contexts of Lydgate's "Dietary," especially the status of dietetic discourse, the rise (and refinement) of literacy, and the significance of book ownership, are inextricable from the "different" standards of affect conditioning that connected medieval readers with this text.

LITERACY, DISCOURSE, AND THE EMBODIED SELF

As the quote from Pearsall demonstrates, the "Dietary" displays an ethical investment in seemingly banal bodily processes such as sleeping arrangements, digestion, and personal hygiene that has been at best bemusing, and at worst embarrassing for modern scholars (outside the history of medicine) grappling with this work's popularity.[22] The potential space offered within such advice for something more contemplative becomes more clearly delineated in light of Jack Goody's argument that the basic workings of literacy within social development affect the extent and direction of concepts of selfhood through the availability of techniques such as re-presentation and reflection. These, Goody has argued, are processes encouraged by writing, "which creates an object outside oneself in a way that speech cannot do, at least in the same clear-cut fashion,"[23] a reflection of self that facilitates the development of interiority. The "object outside oneself" represented by the "Dietary" is consistently characterized by moderation, including emotional

moderation. There is one metaphorical reference to a slightly more complex form of emotional experience:

> Yff so be, that leches don the faile,
> Than take hede to vse thynges thre:
> Moderate diet, moderat trauayle,
> Not malicious for non aduersite;
> Meke in troubull, gladde in poverte,
> *Ryche with lityll*, content with suffisaunce,
> Neuer grucchyng, myry like thy degre.
> Yff phisik lakke, make thiis thi gouernaunce. (lines 9–16; emphasis mine)

This metaphor, the exception that proves the rule, meagerly evokes an interiorized emotional process of sorts, rather than a simple labeling of emotional states. Its presence serves to reinforce that there is little sense of complex interiority available in the text of the poem itself. Yet, the connection made by Goody between the inscription of ideas about self-experience and their encouragement of the elaboration of such experience suggests that the frequent appearance of the "Dietary" in the vernacular would, presumably, have provided a *space*, an *opportunity*, for thinking about one's own self. Despite Goody's antagonism toward what he perceives as Elias's "eurocentrism,"[24] his insistence on the importance of literacy to selfhood in fact complements Elias's work, as it also foregrounds a deep sense of process, or continuity, an emphasis that interrogates the notion of "change." Needless to say, this insight applies to the "change" in the reception of the "Dietary" between the medieval and modern periods. The space referred to by Goody as "literacy" in *Food and Love* can be further nuanced by considering discourses, material means of transmission, and reading practices; the *espaces lisibles* of Roger Chartier.[25]

The holistic nature of humoral dietetic advice gives scope for the kind of significance associated with "literary" texts, despite Pearsall's declaration to the contrary. In the humoral composition of every meal, the potential for balancing or unbalancing the entire self was a distinct possibility, as was understood not only in esoteric medical texts, but by household servants whose job was to care for the well-being of their lord or lady.[26] Hence the significance of "tempering" food, a medieval culinary process referring not merely to combining moist and dry ingredients, but to producing foods suited to the warm-moist composition of the average human being.[27] This is almost the inverse of the predominant modern, disembodied "emotional" resonance of "temper" as a loss of composure.[28] The connections offered by dietetic discourse to a readership that accepts the affective and physical integration of the self are not as readily apparent to a modern audience for whom medical and psychological discourses are much more sharply delineated. Furthermore, despite the thorough subordination of medical advice to Christian doctrine in the Middle Ages (so that care of the body

is ultimately in the service of the soul), the humoral view of the body in dietetic discourse provides just enough tension with Christian concerns to create a small space for considering the self as something approaching autonomous.[29] Nor is the orientation of the "Dietary" the same as that of conduct literature, which is much more directly concerned with the self as perceived and regulated by others. Concern with "the body" in dietetic discourse is in fact a concern for the person, and it exists somewhat independently of spiritual and social priorities.

THE COMMUNITIES: INSTRUCTION, AUTHORITY, AND AFFECT

Very little information has survived about the individual owners and readers of Lydgate's "Dietary." Nor is there anything about the surviving manuscripts to suggest a "typical" readership, but there are indications that the text's authoritative voice was a powerful determinant of a reader's affective engagement with the poem. This sense of authority would no doubt be appropriate where the "Dietary" circulated in medical collections;[30] it contains enough technical, theoretical information to satisfy a reader trained to search for it, and rubrics and prologues in some other manuscripts attest to its status as a medical text. The instances, however, where it was most likely considered a professional tool offer limited scope for identifying an affective connection by an owner/reader. Being also short, in the vernacular, and "free of heavy erudition,"[31] in combination with its instructive tone, the "Dietary" could be considered suitable for the instruction of women or children. Manuscript quality and content, which are often closely related to the social positions of the owner/readers, are also highly varied and potentially informative of the kind of readerly satisfaction to which medieval readers might have been drawn. But the location of potential affective communities turns out to be at once a very broad category as well as surprisingly specific: broad, in that this text encourages, along with many fifteenth-century *vernacular* texts, an affective relationship with the voice of authority, and specific, in the case of one single manuscript, the Rushall Psalter, where the potential for texts to promote affective communities is taken to something of an extreme.

There are few indications of female engagement with any "Dietary" manuscripts, and little from the text itself suggests a specifically female emotional community in relation to this poem.[32] The few explicitly gendered points in Lydgate's "Dietary" assume a male readership, such as the advice not to have sexual encounters with elderly women (line 5). "Man" is used in the universal sense: "Moderat fode gevyth to man his helth, / And all surfetys doth from him remewe" (lines 75–76). Nevertheless, the poem does little to *exclude* a female readership, or any other kind of readership; "Thus in two thinges standith all the welth | Of body and soule; *whoso* lust hem to siew" (lines 73–74; emphasis mine). The only "Dietary" manuscript

definitely owned by a woman offers tantalizing but confusing hints of affective connections, and deserves a brief mention; Margaret Beaufort (1443–1509), mother of Henry VII, owned a collection of plague tracts in Latin and English containing Lydgate's "Dietary."[33] Margaret's lifelong concern with plague arising from the death from the disease of Edmund Tudor, her second husband and the father of her son,[34] implies a strong affective component in her possession of this book. Her charitable activities relating to protection from plague may also suggest an affective community between donor and recipient, although the "Dietary" itself is not directly implicated.[35] The book in question is a mediocre-quality manuscript, probably purchased ready-made from a bookseller,[36] much of whose content she probably could not read;[37] apart from the identification of Margaret's arms on the manuscript, there is nothing to suggest that it is not a medical book such as a physician might have owned.[38] Given her rank, her financial circumstances, and her active role in many aspects of book production, Margaret's ownership of this undistinguished volume is, in many respects, mysterious.

The association of "Dietary" manuscripts with children is hardly easier to confirm, but the *concept* of the child is central to a search for emotional communities. There is little to suggest literal children as the audience, at least not exclusively, whereas, at a number of points, an adult would be the most sensible reader (e.g., "Within *thy* court suffir no devisioun" [line 29], and "Suffir no surfetis in *thyn* house at nyght" [line 49]). Nevertheless, Rossell Hope Robbins initially believed that

> the poem was used by school-children, for it is found along with other teaching poems in small collections to be used by children. In this respect it may be linked to the whole "Stans puer ad mensam" tradition.[39]

While I do not dispute that children were at times the intended audience for the text, many of the compilations that include teaching poems appear to be dominated by Lydgate's compositions; Robbins's characterization hardly encapsulates the scope, or the appeal, of these collections. As will be discussed further below, associating didactic texts with childhood during this period is unnecessarily reductive. In the case of one specific manuscript, British Library MS Additional 31042 (the Thornton Manuscript), Thompson considers a "didactic" sequence of Lydgate poems, including the "Dietary," to "reflect literary-didactic interests that are not unique to Thornton or Lydgate, but which seem the fundamental didactic preoccupations of the later Middle Ages."[40]

For any reader of the *Civilizing Process*, assertions about the concept of childhood and what is appropriate for children often indicate the process itself at work. For Elias, "the distance in their behaviour and whole psychical structure between children and adults increases in the course of the civilizing process," because "individuals, in their short history, pass once more through some of the processes that their society has traversed in its

long history."[41] The kinds of rules found in the "Dietary" are now taught to children and embodied by adults; the mere appearance of these guidelines in discourse suggests an unformed reader. Rather than conclude that Lydgate's "Dietary" is the product of a "childish" culture, Robbins associates it here with the children of that culture. The concept of the "child" can usefully be seen as an articulation of a self in process, offering insights into the standards of the society into which it is developing.

Many versions of the "Dietary" appear to be addressed to a "sone;" "To eury tale, sonn, gyff not credence."[42] Not surprisingly, Robbins, the editor in this case, has punctuated the line so that "sonn" reads unequivocally as "son" (Förster does the same).[43] (In some manuscripts, however, "sone" is clearly taken to mean "at once" or "straight away.") Assuming that at least some of the medieval audience of the "Dietary" read "sonn" as "son" along with Robbins, it is important to note that the concept of being a child, or at least, a son, did not necessarily evoke belittling connotations; none other than Alexander is addressed as "sone" in Burgh's and Lydgate's *Secrees of Old Philosoffres*.[44] Seth Lerer argues that the predilection for didactic writing during this period

> inculcate[d] in literary narrators the voice of the teacher. But another overall effect was quite simply, to render readers of such literature children. The paternalistic tone of much of the literature, combined with the growing cult of childhood in the visual and verbal arts, created a kind of writing preoccupied with the child in all his or her aspects.[45]

Tauno Mustanoja also suggests a general sentimentalization of the child, and at the same time, an intensified interest in a "childish" reading position in Middle English at this time; "English writers frequently use the expressions 'son' and 'my son' and even 'my dear son' simply as equivalents of the Latin vocative *puer*."[46] This trend suggests a form of reading satisfaction that is independent (at least to some extent) of actual age, where the affective pleasure in the transmission of ideas from text to reader resides in an authoritative, paternalistic "adult" text and a submissive and virtuous "child" reader.

This widespread power relationship suggests that readers of the "Dietary" implicitly experienced satisfaction from the act of instruction itself, and not just the content specifically. If so, then the reader's social status may give further shape to that response. At numerous points, Lydgate advises the reader to mold the advice given to his own degree ("Neuer gruchynge, myry like thy degre" [line 15]; "Be clenly cladde aftur Þine astate; | Passe not thy boundes" [lines 33–34]); thus, the poem is not directly aimed at any class of reader exclusively, although the poorest sections of society are implicitly excluded.[47] A less wealthy but literate audience might lack "fisijk," or doctors might "faile," because of financial restraints,[48] and thus the "Dietary" could contribute accordingly to a (specifically bourgeois)

emotional community by satisfying an obedient, attentive reader of his own progress toward maturation, or competence. The "Dietary" is indeed found in a number of manuscripts emanating from the professional book trade in London, often on paper, often in the form of an anthology whose contents have been put together on a speculative basis, some of which are known to have belonged to merchants and lesser gentry, and many of them demonstrating strong London connections.[49] (It is also found in home-made, commonplace books also suggesting a middle-class readership.) Placing Lydgate's "Dietary" firmly in this manuscript milieu, Claire Sponsler considers it to be redolent with emerging individualism, testifying to "a consumer revolution representing a shift in the tastes and buying habits of consumers as well as a cultural reorientation that changed a whole set of attitudes and social formations."[50] This reading, guided by the vague classification of "conduct literature," fails to come to grips with the dietetic discursive affiliations of "Dietary;" David Lawton's critique of E. P. Hammond's work on fifteenth-century writing is *à propos*: "overt in her claim is the fundamental assumption of the English literary canon—an assumption which has always doomed the English fifteenth century to be filed away as 'medieval' rather than 'Renaissance'—that what makes literature interesting is individualism, preferably bourgeois individualism."[51] This is not to deny a meaningful affective engagement between bourgeois readers and this text, but Sponsler's modernization of the satisfaction on offer in the "Dietary" is misleading.

Some readers may have identified more readily with the revered "voice of the teacher" to which Lerer refers. Book ownership might, in some circumstances, reinforce the authoritative connotations of this voice, perhaps encouraging owner-readers to identify more closely with the instructional voices of their texts, rather than the texts' addressees.[52] Two manuscripts associated with upper-class readerships project such an identification. Bodleian Library MS 686 may have belonged to Margaret Beauchamp, daughter of Richard, Earl of Warwick, both of whom commissioned poems from Lydgate.[53] On fine vellum with elaborate colored rulings, initials, and other decorations, it stands out among manuscripts containing the "Dietary" as an expensive and skillful piece of work. Its *espaces lisibles* suggest to David Boyd a readership that bespeaks entitlement; "even a cursory glance makes clear that the manuscript serves the socially symbolic function of making manifest the wealth and power of its owners."[54] Boyd views the mixture of Chaucer and Lydgate in the manuscript as "arranged, contained, and compiled to meet class-specific ethical and social pretexts,"[55] the "class" in question being either "the merchant patriciate or the nobility, each group to benefit from proper behaviour, both materially here on earth and in the afterlife."[56] The inclusion of the "Dietary" in such a collection emphasizes the authoritative voice of the text, suggesting a readerly custodianship of the poem's advice rather than an affectively humble reading position.

Nottingham Library MS MeLM1 (the Rushall Psalter) is perhaps the most striking of all versions of the "Dietary" in respect of the weightiness that is attributed to this text.[57] Large, illuminated, and on vellum rather than paper, this expensive, carefully conceived production was originally chained (a powerfully significant *espace lisible*) in Rushall church, the construction of which it commemorated.[58] The church was built by John Harpur (d. 1464), an attorney who prospered as a result of his connection with the Stafford family, and became, by the 1440s, "a figure of considerable importance in the North Midlands."[59] The estate of Rushall became his through marriage. Shorter, secular items inserted before the Latin devotional texts (a book of hours and a Psalter) seem to have been chosen very carefully with the family's secular standing in mind; Morgan points out that "each in its own way proffers a reflection on the sources of gentility and the regimes necessary for its maintenance in a fragile and changeable world, always endorsing a gentility by conduct rather than birth."[60]

Thorlac Turville-Petre argues that this volume, despite its largely devotional subject matter, "speaks of status, power, and stability in the face of change and decay."[61] Hence, his cringe when confronted with the presence of the "Dietary" therein:

> why were Chaucer's poems copied into a volume of Latin devotions in the first place? Furthermore—and this may be thought odder still—what sort of book of hours and Psalter is this that begins with the mundane advice "for helthe of body couere for colde Þin heed. / Ete no raw mete take goode hede therto"—that is to say, with the text of Lydgate's "Dietary"?[62]

As he points out with such exasperation, the "Dietary" is the first text in the Rushall Psalter. It is followed by texts preoccupied with power, conduct, and status; Lydgate's *Kings of England* to Henry VI, an excerpt from Lydgate's *Fall of Princes*, Chaucer's "Truth," a prose history of the Rushall family, beginning with the arrival of William the Conqueror and ending with John Harpur.[63] This is followed by a poem commemorating the new church, which stands opposite the family coat of arms at the beginning of the book of hours. (Chaucer's "Gentillesse" appears, with some proverbs, on the other side.[64])

The Commemorative Poem provides a compelling connection between the author/compiler, the reader, and the emotional bond that is supposed to connect them through the material object of the book itself:

> This present book legeble *[easily read]* in scripture *[handwriting]*,
> Here in this place thus tacched with a cheyn,
> Purposed *[intended]* of entent *[deliberately]* for to endure
> And here perpetuelli stylle *[undisturbed]* to remeyne
> Fro eyre to eyre; wherfore appone peyn
> Of Cryst is curs, of Fadres & of Moderes

Non of hem hens atempt it to *dereyne [contest]*
Whille ani leef may goodeli hange with oder.

But for as moche that noo thyng may endure
That urthely ys, alwey, y trowe, certeyn,
When so euer thys book here aftyr in scripture
Eyder in koueryng begynneth fause ayeyn,
All tho therto that diligence doth or peyn
Hit to reforme *[restore]*, be they on or other,
Haue they the pardon that Criste yafe Magdaleyn,
With daili blessyng of Fader and of Moder.

Gret reson wolde that euery creature,
Meued of corage[65] on hit to rede or seyn,
Shuld hym remembre in prayer, that so sure
Bothe preest and place and bokes lust ordeyn
At his gret cost, John Harpur, noght to leyn;
Wherfor in speciall his eires, wyth Aie oder,
Ar hyly bondon to pray the souereyn
Lord of all lordes present hym to hys Moder.[66]

The last stanza of this poem contains an overt claim to the formation of an emotional community: the act of reading or looking at the physical book *logically* ("gret reson wolde") mobilizes an emotional response ("meued of corage") that generates a desire for connection with its original owner, John Harpur. The secular power of Harpur and his clan are rhetorically suffused with the holiness represented in, and by, the devotional sections of the book. Lydgate's "Dietary," in its privileged position as the opening text of a book with the power to curse those who do not protect it, goes beyond a mere statement of values and becomes almost talismanic. The voice of authority and the nature of the advice give rise in this context to a powerful articulation of rectitude and entitlement. Indeed, without wishing to slide into glib plays on the relationship between text and body, Harpur's conflation of this manuscript with his own corporeality and the onerous charge upon his descendants to attend to its "health" also insinuate themselves into the advice provided by the "Dietary" on bodily care, investing the poem with an even more specific sacred role within the maintenance of this genealogical line. This conflation brings Harpur himself close to embodying the authority associated with the textual voice of the teacher. By exhorting his descendants to maintain this shared corporeality, he does not seem to be guiding them toward the submissive albeit virtuous position of the addressee of the "Dietary." They are to become custodians of that voice of rectitude and authority. The reverence for its contents demanded by the Rushall Psalter offers powerful support for claiming the "Dietary" as a meditation on selfhood. This declaration further frames

Lydgate's "Dietary" as an active participant in the maintenance of a highly specific emotional community; the Commemorative Poem makes clear the expectation that reading this manuscript will *move* the reader affectively, a response that will generate communal bonds between Harpur and the beneficiaries of his largesse, most obviously his heirs.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has set out to show that Lydgate's "Dietary" provided not merely advice on health, but participated in a more meaningful affective relationship between text and reader, one in which it is possible to contemplate a self. By virtue of its humoral discursive basis, in which the self was, conceptually, more embodied than it is now, the "Dietary" engages its readers at an appropriate level of elaboration for a society beginning to experience a surge in the availability of vernacular texts; book ownership was still a privilege, and the written word accordingly commanded considerable respect. The relationship between the reader and the text's authoritative voice encouraged readerly submission, although sometimes identification was the actual result, the latter position taken to an extreme and fetishized in the Rushall Psalter.

In response to Elias's question, "what has really changed?," the very act of reading Lydgate's "Dietary," or of presenting it to oneself, offered a kind of discursive mirror or portrait to medieval readers. The satisfaction derived from either receiving instruction or identifying with the voice of authority in the "Dietary" may look unsatisfying compared with the wealth of reading pleasures now available through a plethora of reading positions. Although this might appear to be a significant point of *difference* between medieval and modern cultures, Elias directs us toward the continuity between the two moments in time; the regulation of behavior over many generations, combined with the long-term process of refinement and internalization in *literacy* skills, obscures the points of connection between the medieval and modern searches for textual satisfaction, a perception that can be altered by drawing critical attention to our own affective standards. Although dismissed as banal according to "today's standard of conditioning," Lydgate's "Dietary" actually provided a potent space for reflection upon, and elaboration of, one's sense of self, upon which any emotional regime depends.

NOTES

1. Deborah Lupton, *The Emotional Self: A Sociocultural Exploration* (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 10.
2. Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge [England]; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Editions de la maison des sciences de l'homme, 1990).

3. Ian Burkitt, *Bodies of Thought: Embodiment, Identity, and Modernity* (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999); Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow, *The Lived Body Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
4. Lisa Zunshine, "Lying Bodies of the Enlightenment: Theory of Mind and Cultural Historicism," in *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies*, ed. Zunshine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 115–133.
5. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 [1939]), 403.
6. Roger Chartier, *The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe Between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 9.
7. Chartier, *Order of Books*, 2. Chartier takes the term *espaces lisibles* (readable spaces) from Certeau. The term emphasizes the subtle and dynamic relationship between the reader, his or her expectations, and the written object itself.
8. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 60.
9. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 107–109.
10. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 5–10.
11. Max Förster, "Kleinere mittelenglische texte," *Anglia—Zeitschrift für englische Philologie,* no. 42 (1918): 178–179.
12. Mahmoud Manzalaoui, *Secretum Secretorum: Nine English Versions* (Oxford: Published for the Early English Text Society by Oxford University Press, 1977); Melitta Weiss Adamson, *Medieval Dietetics: Food and Drink in Regimen Sanitatis Literature from 800 to 1400* (Frankfurt am Main; New York: P. Lang, 1995); Willy Louis Braekman, *Studies on Alchemy, Diet, Medecine, and Prognostication in Middle English* (Brussel: Omirel, UFSAL, 1986).
13. Owsei Temkin, *Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy*, 1973. The nonnaturals usually consist of contact with air; motion and rest of the body or its parts; food and drink; sleep and wakefulness; retention and excretion; and passions of the soul. The theory of the nonnaturals formed the basis of the concept of "hygiene" in later centuries.
14. Faye Getz, "To Prolong Life and Promote Health: Baconian Alchemy and Pharmacy in the English Learned Tradition," in *Health, Disease, and Healing in Medieval Culture*, ed. Sheila D. Campbell, Bert S. Hall, and David N. Klausner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 141–151.
15. All quotations of the poem are from Förster, "Kleinere mittelenglische Texte" (based on London, British Library MS Sloane 3534), unless otherwise indicated.
16. Carleton Brown, Rossell Hope Robbins, and John Levi Cutler, *The Index of Middle English Verse* (New York: Printed for the Society by Columbia University Press, 1943), lists forty-six manuscripts; nine are added in Robbins, Cutler, and Brown, *Supplement to the Index of Middle English Verse*, 95–96 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965). Alain Renoir and C. David Benson, "John Lydgate," adds one more, bringing the total to fifty-six (Albert E. Hartung ed., *A Manual of the Writings in Middle English Volume 6* [New Haven: Conneticut Academy of the Arts and Sciences, 1980]). Linda Voigts and Patricia Deery Kurtz, *Scientific and Medical Writings in Old and Middle English: An Electronic Reference* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), identify another manuscript (VK 1868), as well as a nineteenth-century version that has not been included in my total. There were also three printed versions between circa 1491 and circa 1510, which

are not included here. The "text" in some manuscripts is composed of extra, reduced, or rearranged stanzas.

17. Derek Pearsall, *John Lydgate* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 220 (emphasis mine).
18. Pearsall, *Lydgate*, 219.
19. For Elias, "the increased demand for books within a society is itself a sure sign of a pronounced spurt in the civilizing process" (*Civilizing Process*, 40).
20. Carol M. Meale, "'Gode Men / Wiues Maydnes and Alle Men': Romance and Its Audiences," in *Readings in Medieval English Romance* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY, US: D. S. Brewer, 1994), 216–217.
21. Malcolm B. Parkes, "The Literacy of the Laity," in *Literature and Western Civilization*, ed. David Daiches and Anthony Thorlby (London: Aldus, 1972), 564.
22. On the "Dietary" as medical advice, see Braekman, *Alchemy, Diet, Medecine*; Faye Marie Getz, *Medicine in the English Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Carole Rawcliffe, *Medicine & Society in Later Medieval England* (Stroud, England: Alan Sutton, 1995); Voigts and Kurtz, *Scientific and Medical Writings*.
23. Jack Goody, *Food and Love: A Cultural History of East and West* (London: Verso, 1998), 111.
24. Jack Goody, "Elias and the Anthropological Tradition," *Anthropological Theory* 2, no. 4 (December 2002): 401–412.
25. Jack Goody, *Food and Love*, 111.
26. See *John Russell's Book of Nurture* (in *Early English Meals and Manners*, ed. Frederick Furnivall *[London 1868])*, 139–140.
27. Terence Scully, "Tempering Medieval Food," in *Food in the Middle Ages: A Book of Essays*, ed. Melitta Weiss Adamson (New York: Garland, 1995), 3–24; Terence Scully, "The Sickdish in Early French Recipe Collections," in *Health, Disease, and Healing in Medieval Culture*, ed. Sheila D. Campbell, Bert S. Hall, and David N. Klausner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 132–140; Terence Scully, *The Art of Cookery in the Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK; Rochester, NY, US: Boydell, 1995), 30, 42.
28. One can still "lose one's temper," but one can also "have a temper," a child can throw a "temper tantrum," etc., illustrating a drift away from a holistically conceived condition to a specifically negative emotional state.
29. Rawcliffe, *Medicine*; Getz, *Medicine*.
30. The contents of as many as eighteen manuscripts contain significant quantities of medical and scientific material. For the characteristics of medieval scientific and medical manuscripts, see Linda Ehrsam Voigts, "Scientific and Medical Books," in *Book Production and Publishing in Britain, 1375–1475*, ed. Jeremy Griffiths and Derek Albert Pearsall, 345–402, Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Another four miscellaneous collections contain significant amounts of medical material.
31. Carol F. Heffernan, "The Wyse Boke of Maystyr Peers of Salerne: Edition and Study of a Fourteenth-century Treatise of Popular Medicine," *Manuscripta* 37 (1993): 294.
32. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS 686 might have been owned by Margaret Beauchamp; see John Matthews Manly and Edith Rickert, *The Text of the Canterbury Tales, Studied on the Basis of All Known Manuscripts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), 69. London, British Library MS Arundel 168, with its emphasis on female saints' lives, was likely made for a female reader. See also Meale on Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Ashmole 61 ("'Gode Men,'" 221–222). In the case of medical texts specifically, see Green, *Women's Healthcare*, 31, 45.

33. Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum MS 261.
34. Michael K. Jones and Malcolm G. Underwood, *The King's Mother: Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of Richmond and Derby* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 39.
35. She endowed a house for use as a refuge in times of plague by scholars of Christ's College Cambridge (Jones and Underwood, *The King's Mother*, 228).
36. Green, *Women's Healthcare*, 23n65.
37. Jones and Underwood, *King's Mother*, 184; John E. B. Mayor, *The English Works of John Fisher* (New York: Kraus, 1975), 292.
38. For Margaret's ownership of medical manuscripts, see Green (*Women's Healthcare*, 30n92 and 49–51). For further manuscript details, see Francis Wormald and Phyllis M Giles, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Additional Illuminated Manuscripts in the Fitzwilliam Museum Acquired Between 1895 and 1979 (excluding the McClean Collection)* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 194–196; see also S. Powell, "Lady Margaret Beaufort and Her Books," *The Library* 6th ser., 20, no. 3 (1 January 1998): 197–240, esp. 204n43. I am grateful to Stella Panayotova of the Fitzwilliam Museum for describing aspects of the manuscript in a private correspondence.
39. Rossell Hope Robbins, ed., *Secular Lyrics of the XIVth and XVth Centuries* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), 252. ("Stans puer ad mensam" ["the child at the table"], is a versified text instructing children on table conduct.) Pearsall somewhat hesitantly concurs (*Lydgate*, 220). Eighteen years after *Secular Lyrics* was published, Robbins noted that "Lydgate's versified 'Dietary' often occurs in medical manuscripts, and was thus regarded as a practical regimen" ("Medical Manuscripts in Middle English," *Speculum* 45, no. 3 (July 1970): 404.
40. John J. Thompson, *Robert Thornton and the London Thornton Manuscript: British Library MS Additional 31042* (Cambridge [England]; Wolfeboro, NH, US: D. S. Brewer, 1987), 43. See also David Lawton on the "dull fifteenth-century poet," Lawton, "Dullness and the Fifteenth Century," *ELH* 54, no. 4 (1987): 771.
41. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, xi; see also 109, 119–121.
42. Robbins, *Secular Lyrics*, 73 line 17. This edition of the poem is based on Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Rawlinson C.86.
43. In at least five manuscripts, "sone" is likely to have meant "at once" either because orthography indicates a long vowel, or the position of the word suggests its use as an adverb. Förster also notes that "sone" disrupts the meter, and he therefore considers it unlikely to have been part of the original translation ("Kleinere mittelenglische texte," 184. My thanks to Bernard Mees for his assistance in translating the German.)
44. Robert Steele, ed., *Lydgate and Burgh's Secrees of Old Philisoffres: A Version of the "Secreta Secretorum,"* Early English Text Society Publications Extra Series, no. 66 (London, 1894).
45. Seth Lerer, *Chaucer and His Readers: Imagining the Author in Late-medieval England* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 18.
46. Tauno F. Mustanoja, *The Good Wife Taught Her Daughter; The Good Wyfe Wold a Pylgremage; The Thewis of Gud Women* (Helsinki: Printed by the Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Scuran, 1948), 454. (*Puer* is Latin for boy.) The overlap between pedagogy and the training of the populace in conventions of confession is also potentially relevant; see Marjorie Curry Woods and Rita Copeland, "Classroom and Confession," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature*, ed. David Wallace (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 376–406.

47. While the reader is urged to be "glad in pouerte" (line 5), poverty is a relative condition. There are also two references to "the poor" in the poem that suggest that the audience does not belong to the lowest ranks;
    Visite the pore with intere dilligence,
    On all nedy haue compassioun (Robbins, *Secular Lyrics*, line 456).
48. *Failen* can mean both to fail and to lack.
49. See for instance Julia Boffey and Carol M. Meale, "Selecting the Text: Rawlinson C. 86 and Some Other Books for London Readers," in *Regionalism in Late Medieval Manuscripts and Texts: Essays Celebrating the Publication of A Linguistic Atlas of Late Mediaeval English*, ed. Felicity Riddy and Angus McIntosh, Proceedings, York Manuscripts Conferences (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1991).
50. Claire Sponsler, "Eating Lessons: Lydgate's 'Dietary' and Consumer Conduct," in *Medieval Conduct*, ed. Kathleen M. Ashley and Robert L. A. Clark (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 4. Sponsler erroneously claims that the manuscript upon which she bases much of her argument, London, British Library MS Additional 16165, "includes the 'Dietary' along with romance, history, treatises on etiquette and hunting, miscellaneous information, and gnomic verses" ("Eating Lessons," 12). For the manuscript's contents, see British Museum, Dept. of Manuscripts, *Catalogue of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum in the Years MDCCCXLVI–MDCCCXLVII*. ([London]: Printed by order of the Trustees, 1964), 155–156, and Margaret Connolly, *John Shirley: Book Production and the Noble Household in Fifteenth-century England* (Aldershot, England; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 31–32.
51. Lawton, "Dullness," 762.
52. Felicity Riddy's illuminating discussion of these issues in another medieval poem ("How the Good Wife Taught Her Daughter") can be found in "Mother Knows Best: Reading Social Change in a Courtesy Text," *Speculum* 71, no. 1 (January 1996): 66–86, especially 72–73.
53. Connolly, *John Shirley*, 115.
54. David Lorenzo Boyd, "Social Texts: Bodley 686 and the Politics of the Cook's Tale," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (January 1995): 85.
55. Boyd, "Social Texts," 88.
56. Boyd, "Social Texts," 88.
57. See J. W. Whiston, "The Rushall Psalter," *Transactions (South Staffordshire Archaeological and Historical Society)* 23 (February 1981): 89–91; Thorlac Turville-Petre, "Poems by Chaucer in John Harpur's Psalter," *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* (1979): 301–314; A. I. Doyle and George B. Pace, "Further Texts of Chaucer's Minor Poems," in *Studies in Bibliography: Papers of the Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia* (Charlottesville, VA: The Society, 1975), 28:41–61; Norman Davis, "Chaucer's *Gentilesse:* A Forgotten Manuscript, with Some Proverbs," in *The Review of English Studies*, N.S. (Oxford [etc.]: Clarendon [etc.], 1969), 20:43–50. The devotional section of the manuscript also contains Vigils of the Dead, a Liturgical Psalter with another family shield, litanies, and prayers, and *Originalia Doctorum* (Whiston, "The Rushall Psalter").
58. The chain can be seen at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/collectionsindepth/medievalliterarymanuscripts/rushallpsalter/therushallpsalter(melm1).aspx, accessed January 8, 2014.
59. See John S. Roskell, Carole Rawcliffe, and Linda Clark, *The House of Commons, 1386–1421, 3, Members E-O* (Stroud, England: Sutton for the History of Parliament Trust, 1992), 294.

60. Philip Morgan, "A Prose Narrative of the Lords of Rushall in John Harpur's Psalter," n.d. I wish to thank Morgan for sharing with me his unpublished transcript of this history.
61. Turville-Petre, "Poems by Chaucer," 309.
62. Turville-Petre, "Poems by Chaucer," 302. Immediately following his discussion of the "Dietary," he refers to Lydgate's *Kings of England* as "*another* text without literary qualities" ("Poems by Chaucer," 310; emphasis mine).
63. Morgan points out that the family history is actually that of Harpur's wife Eleanor. See Turville-Petre, "Poems by Chaucer," 314, for a complete list of the manuscript's contents.
64. Susan Crane's argument that "Gentillesse" "expresses the widespread conviction that status can be bequeathed, but virtuous conduct must compliment it before true gentility can be claimed" could well be extended to the "Dietary" in this manuscript; see *The Performance of Self: Ritual, Clothing, and Identity During the Hundred Years War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 107.
65. The *Middle English Dictionary* online gives the following definition of *corage*: "1(a): the heart as the seat of emotions, affection, attitudes and volition; heart, spirit, disposition, temperament," accessed January 8, 2014, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/med/.
66. Turville-Petre, "Poems by Chaucer," 307 (emphasis mine).

5 The Emotional Economies of Protestant Missions to Aboriginal People in Nineteenth-Century Australia

Claire McLisky

INTRODUCTION

In 1817, the *Sydney Gazette* carried a report on the annual "Congress" of the Parramatta Native Institution, established in 1814 by William and Elizabeth Shelley in the western reaches of Sydney, on the east coast of the Australian continent. The Congress was an annual event in which Aboriginal schoolchildren, dressed in white and led by Mrs. Shelley, were paraded around the grounds of the Institution. While the Shelleys had designed the ceremony primarily as a means of engagement with local Aboriginal people,[1] the event was also of interest to the local settlers who gathered to watch the spectacle. It was, the *Gazette* wrote,

> grateful to the bosom of sensibility to trace the degrees of pleasure which the chiefs manifested on this occasion . . . one in particular turning round towards the governor, with emotion, exclaimed "Governor—that will make a good Settler—that's my Pickaninny!"—and some of their females were observed to shed tears of sympathetic affection at seeing the infant and hapless offspring of their deceased friends so happily sheltered and protected by British benevolence.[2]

The writer's main focus here was on Aboriginal emotions, which were interpreted as signs of recognition of the benevolent intentions of settler society toward their people. The Aboriginal people of Parramatta were, in this reading, both aware of and intensely grateful for the efforts being made on their behalf.

It is tempting to try to read this source "against the grain" and interpret the reported actions of the Aboriginal men and women as embodiments of Aboriginal pragmatism or "accommodation" in the face of settler hegemony. We might even speculate that if the Aboriginal women did shed tears, they may well have been crying tears of sadness for the loss of their own and others' children rather than affection for settler benevolence. Or we might perceive that the reported behavior of the Aboriginal men and women present was in reality more likely to have been the product of mixed

emotions—feelings that we might call pleasure, sorrow, pride, and loss—all mixed together in a bittersweet brew. All of these speculations would be valid attempts to understand the emotional worlds of the Aboriginal people of Parramatta during the early decades of colonization. But at the same time such speculations, just like the *Gazette* article they are ostensibly reading "against," are somewhat anachronistic. By attaching particular European "emotion words" to what were most probably much more complex and culturally specific structures of feeling, they impose contemporary ideas about what would have been an "appropriate" display of emotion.

In fact, the *Gazette*'s reportage actually tells us very little about the emotions of the Aboriginal observers of the Congress. The real value of this passage for the historian of emotions lies in the insight it gives us into the emotional world of the *Gazette*'s writer and his or her assumed audience. In order to gain this insight, we need, as Ann Laura Stoler has suggested, to read our sources along as well as against the grain—to attempt to reconstruct their authors' intended meanings as well as their unintended ones.[3] In this piece, the writer linked his own feeling of gratefulness to Aboriginal "pleasure," "emotion," "sympathy," and "happiness." Indeed the report seems to have been designed, as Joanna Cruickshank has noted, to "warm the humanitarian settler's heart."[4] By writing (or reading) about the positive emotional responses of Aboriginal people to acts of settler benevolence, humanitarian settlers could reassure themselves that they were having an ameliorative effect on Aboriginal society. Colonization was thus (re)constructed as a virtuous rather than a purely materialistic undertaking. Here, settler humanitarians and missionaries such as the Shelleys were the agents of redemption for both Aboriginal and settler societies. The excerpt illustrates the extent to which, even early in the colony's history, settler-humanitarian and missionary emotions were caught up with Aboriginal ones.

This emotional exchange would continue to be true of settler-humanitarians and Protestant missionaries in the colony of New South Wales throughout the nineteenth century, although the particular circumstance of the mission setting is the focus of this chapter. For both missionaries and the Aboriginal people they proselytized, living in close quarters on mission stations meant having to come to terms with each other on a whole host of levels: physical, intellectual, and emotional. Indeed, the missionary imperative both "required and affirmed certain kinds of physical and emotional proximity between missionaries and those they evangelised."[5] Furthermore, the emphasis on the intimate in evangelical doctrine meant that Protestant missionaries were explicitly interested in emotion, which they saw as the cause and the symptom of Christian faith, but also suffering and vice.

Following on from the above discussion of the depiction of Aboriginal and settler-humanitarian emotions around the Parramatta Native Institution, this chapter focuses on two mid-nineteenth-century Protestant missions, also located in the southeast of New South Wales. The two missions are Maloga, located on the northern banks of the Murray River near

Echuca, and Warangesda, located on the south bank of the Murrumbidgee River near Darlington Point. Founded within six years of each other, they shared strong denominational, philosophical, and personal links. Maloga was established by the married couple Daniel and Janet Matthews in 1874 and existed for fourteen years before it was effectively closed down by the New South Wales Aborigines Protection Board. Warangesda, founded by the Matthews' friend John Gribble in 1880, ran for five years before stress and ill-health forced Gribble to close the mission. On both of these missions, the missionaries linked both their own, and Indigenous peoples', spiritual redemption with their ability (or lack thereof) to formulate and express emotions in particular ways. Like the sociologist Norbert Elias, who in his 1939 *The Civilizing Process* argued that "the development that led to more adequate knowledge and increasing control of nature was . . . also a development toward greater self-control by men,"[6] these missionaries conceived of social and spiritual development in terms of emotional control—the higher the level of emotional regulation, the more developed the society or the individual. As such, their efforts to convert, and "civilise," the Indigenous people they worked with were also efforts to transform their emotional worlds, promoting the expression of particular emotions while discouraging others. Yet missionaries were not the only agents of emotional change on the missions, and their emotional agendas were not always realized in the ways that they had anticipated.

This chapter thus proceeds as follows: Firstly, I survey several different theoretical models for explaining emotional change, and consider their usefulness and applicability for the history of Christian missions. Then, after a brief discussion of the importance of emotions in the Christian evangelical tradition, I examine the extent to which emotion was an explicit motivator for the missionaries considered here. Next, I investigate the ways in which missionaries' emotional expectations were confirmed or challenged by living on Christian missions, and the usefulness of terms like "emotional community," "emotional regime," and "emotional economy" in describing the emotional dynamics of mission life more broadly. Of course, Aboriginal mission residents also came to missions with specific expectations, and were active participants in defining the missions' emotional norms and values, and thus the next section deals with the question of Aboriginal emotional agency. Finally, I consider the emotional outcomes of mission for both the missionaries and the Aboriginal people of Maloga and Warangesda missions.

EMOTIONS AND RELIGIOUS/SOCIAL CHANGE

Over the past twenty years, historians and theorists of emotions have greatly elucidated the functions and mechanisms of emotions in history. Thanks to the work of scholars such as Barbara Rosenwein, William Reddy, and Sara

Ahmed, we know that while emotions "move" people,[7] they can also move from person to person, from group to group, circulating both as subconscious contagions and conscious exchanges.[8] I thus begin from the premise that emotions are not merely something individual, personal, or private; they have currency and power in social, political, and religious contexts. Emotions are historically created, and locally contingent: within particular communities, in particular places at particular times, emotions are ascribed certain qualities, and attributed certain values depending on who is expressing them, and to whom. Furthermore, emotions are not static: by extending an invitation for response or reciprocation, the expression of an emotion invites interaction and exchange between individuals; by allowing the protagonist to feel and claim certain personal moral qualities it can facilitate a shift in self-representation, or even spur him or her to action. Yet emotions can also alienate, exclude, or completely shut down exchange. At a group level, they are markers of community with the power to include or exclude—as Ahmed has argued, they can work to align individuals with collectives, and to align subjects with, or against, others.[9] Yet emotions and the discourses that employ them are not inherently oppressive or liberatory—they have, potentially, as much power to challenge as they do to establish, assert, or reinforce power or status differences.[10]

In a contested setting such as the Christian missions considered here, tracing the history of emotions is even more complicated. The emotional worlds of Christian missions were influenced by events and actors both on and off the mission, by events occurring contemporaneously but also by a long and troubled history of relationships between settlers and colonized people. In this sense both missionaries and Aboriginal mission residents were participants in systems of emotional circulation and exchange, which, following Ann Laura Stoler and Sara Ahmed, I like to think of as *emotional economies*, a term that allows us to take account of both in-person and remote emotional exchanges.[11] While Stoler has written of importance of the "emotional economy of empire" and the "emotional economy of the everyday," she is yet to define or develop the idea systematically. Ahmed, a postcolonial sociologist, has gone further toward this, using the term "affective economies" to "suggest that emotions circulate and are distributed across a social as well as a psychic field." Affect, she argues, "does not reside in an object or sign, but is produced only as an effect of the circulation between objects and signs;" the subject is "simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination."[12] These distinctions, as we shall see, are helpful when applying the concept of emotional economies to mission histories.

Like all economies, the emotional economies of nineteenth-century Christian missions were defined by dynamics of supply and demand, and marked by patterns of entitlement and obligation. They were conduits for emotions such as love, sympathy, anger, and shame, but were, inevitably, enmeshed in other, more traditional economies involving the exchange and

accumulation of social and material capital. Attempting to trace the links between these various economies, and the workings of emotional exchange within them, is no easy task. However, the richness of the historical sources in mission settings not only allows but compels us to go beyond analyses of emotional discourse.[13] In this chapter, then, I consider not just missionary ideas about emotion, but also their emotional practices. Furthermore, I am interested not just in missionary emotions, or Aboriginal emotions, but in the *dynamics* of emotional interaction on Christian missions, and the extent to which it is useful to think of missions as emotional communities, emotional regimes, or emotional economies—or all three.

A discussion of emotional change is not complete without considering the work of Norbert Elias. In his 1939 *The Civilizing Process* Elias surveyed changes in manners and behavior from the Middle Ages to the early twentieth century, arguing that changes in societal emotional norms took place as a result of changes in social structures.[14] As villages grew into towns and towns into cities, as feudal systems of government gave way to modern state-formations, Elias argued, the expression of emotions became more stringently, and more consistently, regulated, not just from without but also from within. The history of civilization, therefore, was the history of increasing emotional restraint. Elias's account of the "civilising process" is problematic for several reasons, among them its location of "civilisation" in the West and its depiction of nonmodern and non-Western subjects as emotionally childlike.[15] Interestingly, a similar logic informed the missionaries' views of "heathen" peoples as being emotionally uncontrolled and therefore not only "uncivilised" but also unchristian.[16] Indeed, Elias's depiction of people in the Middle Ages as "wild, cruel, prone to violent outbreaks and abandoned to the joy of the moment"[17] is not very far from the missionaries' perceptions of Indigenous Australians' lack of emotional regulation. Yet despite the many problems with his thinking, many of Elias's insights remain highly relevant to current day theorizations of emotions and emotional change, and, as we shall see, are particularly useful in the mission context.

"I WANT TO TELL THEM OF THE LOVING SAVIOUR": EMOTIONS AS EXPLICIT MOTIVATORS OF MISSIONARY WORK

An emphasis on emotion, specifically the idea of Christian love, had always been central to Christianity.[18] Jesus' "new commandment," "That you love one another; as I have loved you," formed the basis of New Testament philosophy, and was a key element in the development of an identifiably "Christian" theology.[19] But from the seventeenth century onward, Protestant evangelicals, in their emphasis on the personal and intimate nature of the relationship between man and God, took this preoccupation one step further. It was no longer the Church that was responsible for mediating between worshippers and the divine. Rather, it was each individual's

responsibility to commune directly with God. Divine communion was experienced as an emotion—love—which, it was believed, had the power to purify and sanctify those who felt it, readying them for a life of service to the Lord. Similarly, transgressions of behavior or thought were seen to result from "wrong feeling"—emotions like pride, greed, anger, or hatred—which could only be overcome by yet more feelings—shame, guilt, and contrition—which, it was hoped, would send the repenting sinner back into the arms of his or her loving Savior.

Thus the evangelical principle of freedom of expression—the right to love God in an intimate way—was tempered by a concept of discipline that could be both liberating and restrictive. Like Norbert Elias, they considered civilization to be a product of emotional self-repression; but the evangelicals went one step further, linking salvation to the ability to regulate the emotional self. The goal of the evangelical reformers, as Daniel Walker Howe writes, had been "to substitute for external constraint the inner discipline of responsible morality. Liberation and control were thus two sides of the same redemptive process."[20] Thus while the evangelicals sought and encouraged others to seek a newly intimate relationship with the divine, with their newfound spiritual freedoms came the responsibility to regulate the expression of certain emotions, and promote others. In the mission field, despite their efforts to inculcate the evangelical model of emotional self-discipline in potential converts, missionaries could also end up imposing it on them.

For the three missionaries considered in this chapter, the emotion that occurred most frequently in their discussions of the ideal Christian mission *before* they became missionaries was that of Christian love. In an 1872 letter to her suitor, then businessman Daniel Matthews, Janet wrote:

> I have long wished to become a missionary—ever since I was a child I have felt interested in missions and when I met missionarys [sic] or heard them speak my heart would burn with desire to work for Christ, though then I did not love Him at all. Now that I do love him & have given myself to him, I have felt that desire increase.[21]

Janet's burning desire was primarily to work for Christ, but her emotions were also directed to the Aboriginal people of the Murray River, whom Daniel told her about regularly in his letters. Despite having never met an Aboriginal person in her life, she later wrote: "I feel so much love for them; I want to tell them of the loving saviour." Seven years later the couple's friend John Gribble explained his determination to become a missionary in similar terms. "I am," he wrote, "well aware that the work will involve much self-denial and hardship, but 'the love of Christ constraineth me'."[22] Emotion was significant for aspiring missionaries like these not merely as the source of their own motivation, but also as one of the chief objects of their envisaged work with Aboriginal people. It was not enough for these missionaries to communicate their love of God; they also wanted to engender a similar love

in Aboriginal people, to reorientate the emotional worlds of nonbelievers—the first and crucial step in reorientating their belief systems.

While these expressions of emotion were largely private affairs, the missionaries also expressed their emotions in public documents. In his 1873 *Appeal on Behalf of the Australian Aborigines*, Daniel Matthews wrote:

> Touched with the deepest sorrow for their miserable state, and ardent with an irrepressible desire to reclaim their helpless little ones, for seven years I have raised my voice, and wielded my pen in endeavouring to awaken the sympathies of the public on their behalf.[23]

The emotions Daniel professed here were implicitly contrasted with the absence of sympathy on the part of the public. In this way Daniel was able to create an emotional hierarchy, in which he who *felt* most strongly about the plight of a group of people was able to claim expertise on, and responsibility for, them. Yet his purpose here was not to alienate, but rather to incite the same emotions he had expressed in the hearts of his readers. In this text, like the British missionary publications of which Margaret Allen and Jane Haggis have written, there is "a multidimensional flow of emotion, affective relations and social control inflected by race, class and gender." [24] Furthermore, the language of the *Appeal* suggests that Daniel was well aware of the power of emotions to create a community of mission supporters.

Does this then mean that, as a text intended for public consumption, we should treat the emotions expressed within it differently from those expressed in more "private" sources? In one sense the sympathy expressed by Matthews in his *Appeal* operated as a tactic of power,[25] distancing himself and his imagined community of humanitarians from the object of their concern. Yet it also had other effects. Writing in another context Danilyn Rutherford has described how the very act of sympathizing with the "other" can also propel the subject into a leap of imagination, forcing them to imagine "how [one's] polity might appear through foreign eyes."[26] Through their interest in Aboriginal people, missionaries like Daniel Matthews sometimes did catch a glimpse of what settler society might look like through "foreign eyes." A text like the *Appeal*, written for a public audience and with a specific emotional goal,[27] can provide glimpses of these ruptures in the missionaries' emotional worlds, giving insight into the missionaries' emotional norms and how they influenced their hopes for Christian mission.

"TRUE FEELING"? DEFINING COLLECTIVE EMOTION ON PROTESTANT MISSIONS

In what terms can we conceive of an "emotional collective" in the mission context? Were Protestant missions "emotional communities," "groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and

value—or devalue—the same or related emotions"[28]? Or were they "emotional regimes," contexts in which the correct expression of emotions was constantly policed by a ruling elite?[29] While the former term could certainly be argued to apply at certain times to different mission communities, the clash of emotional cultures that often took place in these contexts seems too far removed from Rosenwein's definition to make the term applicable without some rather important qualifications. Reddy's concept of the emotional regime, on the other hand, while suggesting the institutionalized nature of much emotional exchange on the missions, does not account for the messy and often transgressive nature of the emotional exchanges on Christian missions. Emotional regimes certainly existed on Christian missions, but the emotional life of the mission cannot be reduced to a description of the rules governing those regimes. Norbert Elias's conceptualization of the City, meanwhile, provides a useful parallel to mission spaces, where heightened contact between missionaries and their charges necessitated both the external and internal regulation of physical and behavioral expression.

One approach to the problem of how to think about emotional collectivity in the mission setting is to look at the way that mission residents conceptualized their collectivity themselves. For the missionaries considered in this paper, the answer is simple: both Gribble and the Matthews, like many of their contemporaries, conceptualized their feelings for their Aboriginal charges in terms of family configurations, with the missionaries envisaged as mother and father figures for "their" Aboriginal children. The missionaries' paternalism was evident in their tendency to refer to even adult Aboriginal people as their "own dear children," and to treat the needs and desires of Aboriginal adults as frivolous or unnecessary indulgences, for example by refusing them permission to visit family members outside the mission.[30]

However, the paternalistic institutional power that allowed them the "upper hand" in their relationships with Aboriginal people did not necessarily equate to emotional satisfaction for the missionaries, who sought a more intimate relationship with their charges and longed for the day when the Aboriginal residents of the mission would return the love and affection they offered through their work. In the early years at least, evidence of missionary emotions such as love being reciprocated was scarce. One example of the stress that this disjunct caused Janet Matthews can be found in her "special objects" for prayer for February 1876. These were chiefly directed toward the strengthening of faith on the mission—both her own, and that of Maloga's Aboriginal residents. Here, she asked "[t]hat we all might be filled with the Spirit," "[t]hat my speech may be always with grace & c," and "[t]hat we may be rooted and grounded in love filled with all the fullness of God."[31] Whereas her love for the heathen had previously been represented as spontaneous, the challenges of mission life meant that this was something Janet now had to work at sustaining.

The missionaries also sought to stimulate "true feeling" in the Aboriginal residents of their missions.[32] At Maloga in 1877 Daniel Matthews wrote in his diary that he had resolved to tell the mission's Aboriginal residents about the Great Famine in India, that they might feel moved to contribute something to the relief effort. When the missionary raised the subject, he reported that "They seemed to realise the sufferings, and gave expression to their feelings by using the word 'yukki' (Oh! Dear), frequently, as I endeavoured to describe the forlorn condition of men, women, and children." Here Daniel set out to inculcate not only a specific emotion (in this case pity), but also the act of charitable gift-giving. When the men, women, and children of Maloga decided to give up to half their weekly salaries to this cause for the next few months, Daniel could not contain his satisfaction.

But for every successful instance of Aboriginal "true feeling" there were many more of what the missionaries saw as "wrongful behaviour." One commonly described problem at Maloga was that of Aboriginal people from different groups fighting with each other. For this the missionaries had a novel method of discipline, explained by Daniel in his *Third Report*. If he or Janet came upon an altercation they would simply stand beside the offenders and sing the hymn "Angry Words Oh! Let Them Never From the Tongue Unbridled Slip" over and over again until the litigants were forced to cease. The missionary reported that "the reproof, though mild, is often effective," although sometimes it was "scarcely enough to pacify their rage."[33]

In general, Aboriginal "transgressions" were seen as an opportunity not for anger, but for saving souls. After inducing a feeling of shame in the transgressors, the missionaries would tempt them with the possibility of relief from that shame through the merciful, transformational, love of God. The missionary method of disciplining Aboriginal emotions is encapsulated in the lines that fourteen-year-old Maloga school student Jacky Wilberforce was in 1880 required to write as punishment for an unknown misdemeanour. They read "Our passions will subdue us if we do not subdue them," and "Vicious pleasures end in pain."[34] These lines illustrate, perhaps more than any other source, the extent to which missionaries like the Matthews associated emotional control with Christian piety and—like Norbert Elias—civilization. In the most serious cases, such as adultery or violence, they sometimes took the radical step of expelling residents from the mission for a period of time. By withdrawing their own affection by removing "recalcitrant" Aboriginal people from the mission's emotional economy, the missionaries hoped to engender in these "lost lambs" a feeling of sorrow and contrition, that they might later be reincorporated back into it.

Whether the missionaries had an impact on Aboriginal emotions is difficult to say. Writing in the early 1880s, the *Town and Country Journal* observed that due to Gribble's work at Warangesda, "attractive half-caste girls have [now] realised the sin and shame of acting as public house decoys."[35] Claims such as this were important ways for missionaries to demonstrate the impact of their work.

"HE CAN TAKE AWAY YOUR HEART OF STONE": EMOTIONS AND ABORIGINAL AGENCY

While Aboriginal "sin and shame" may have been one result of participation in the missions' emotional communities, many Aboriginal people seem to have embraced Christian emotional frameworks in more positive ways. The story of Eliza Nelson from Warangesda is an interesting case in point. Despite Gribble describing her as "a most pitiable object . . . when I found her in the camp," he later reported that Eliza had converted to Christianity while living on the mission.[36] In 1884, however, Eliza became sick, and on the night of her death she sent for her son, telling him "Harry, I am going away from you to Jesus; I want you to be a good boy. Give Jesus your heart; serve Him, and then when you die you will meet me in Heaven."[37] Gribble was clearly pleased to be able to report this—it showed both young and old being brought into the emotional community of the mission, with the Aboriginal parent taking responsibility for the spiritual life of her child in the same way that the missionary had taken responsibility for her own. It also demonstrated that Aboriginal people—for whatever reasons—were beginning to recognize the advantages for themselves and their kin of adopting Christianity and participating in the mission's emotional economy. Eliza's expressions of familial love and her hopes for the promise of reunion with her son are particularly poignant given how hard it was for Aboriginal families to stay together during this period.

Aboriginal mission residents' new emotional lexicon also included the more positive concepts of Christian love and universalism, a trend that is evident both in the appeals and petitions that they produced during this period and in the mission's records.[38] In 1879 an Aboriginal preacher named Johnny Phillips visited Maloga Mission from the Victorian station Coranderrk, and told the Maloga congregation that they "ought to believe in Jesus": "He can save you; He can take away your stony heart, and give you a heart of flesh. He loves you the same as white people; we are all of one blood."[39] By referring to the emotional components of conversion to Christianity Phillips invited his Aboriginal brothers and sisters into an experience of faith that could also be characterized as a *feeling*. And while Phillips's mention of color was intended not to enforce but to break down the distinctions between white and black, he also made it clear that the subjects of his invitation were not white, but black. Doing so constituted a special community of believers, who Jesus loved "just the same as white people," and who through Jesus's constraining love, could learn to love Him themselves. Bypassing the missionaries as spiritual mediators, and embracing the "true feeling" of Christian love as the love of Christ for their own people, Aboriginal converts were able to claim their faith as an important source of power, effectively taking control of the mission's emotional economy and instating themselves as the active instigators, rather than the passive recipients, of love, sympathy, and compassion.

The outcomes of this newfound spiritual and emotional exuberance were varied. Some residents (at least according to the missionaries' reports) directed their newfound "Christian" emotion toward the missionaries, expressing gratitude and love for the people who had taught them "to love Jesus."[40] Yet conversion also brought with it increased expectations. Once initiated into the faith, Aboriginal people expected to be treated as the spiritual and social equals of whites on the mission, and in wider society. In both cases they were not. This led to enormous frustration on the part of Aboriginal converts, to which the missionaries, themselves struggling to retain power in the face of threats from governmental bodies, reacted defensively.

EMOTIONAL OUTCOMES? EMOTIONS AND THE END OF MISSION

For many missionaries running a mission station was a complex emotional experience. One might anticipate that Aboriginal conversions to Christianity would have constituted the best possible "return" on their emotional investments. Yet in practice Aboriginal conversion was often an ambiguous emotional event for the missionaries, as evidenced by Daniel's response to the slew of Aboriginal conversions that occurred during the Maloga revival of 1883–1884. Three months after the revival, Daniel reflected, "I never felt my own nothingness more. It seemed as if these men and women possessed all the power, and God was answering their prayers direct."[41] In the tradition of evangelicalism, personal contact with the divine was considered a key component of spiritual life. Direct communion between Aboriginal converts and God, therefore, meant that the missionary was no longer the intermediary.

Yet Daniel also included another anecdote from that same night in which the new converts prayed for their benefactors:

> O Lord bless Mr. and Mrs. Matthews, and give them wisdom, grace, and strength to teach us right. We thank Thee for bringing us to this place to be taught to love Jesus, for we should never have known Him if we had not come.[42]

Whether fabricated or not, the relaying of such a statement was indisputably in the missionary's interests: despite the shifts in power relations that the revival had engendered, this testament of affection allowed Daniel to place the missionaries, and the mission itself, back at the center of this new spiritual economy.

However, difficulties remained. One of the most common causes for protest by Aboriginal mission residents was the strict conditions of mission life, especially the nature of punishments meted out by the missionaries.

Though cognizant to some degree of Aboriginal peoples' attachments to land, Gribble in particular seems to have failed to realize that his attempts to stop Aboriginal mission residents from visiting their own country were doomed to failure. The missionary's response when Aboriginal people left was to chase them, forcibly bring them back, and then flog them, a response that was understandably considered extreme by the mission's Aboriginal residents.[43]

The mental pressure of this constant vigilance took its toll on the missionary, who was sent to England in 1883 in order to recover from depression. In 1885, however, Gribble was again suffering, writing the following in a diary entry for March that year:

> Very ill at ease this morning. Mad with myself and everyone else. My nerves are in an awful condition. Must leave this place. It is a certainty that I can't stand it. I am all unhinged again, just as bad as I was before I went to England.[44]

Gribble blamed himself for the shortcomings of the mission and what he perceived as failures in Aboriginal people's conduct, and soon after departed New South Wales for Western Australia. He was only to visit the mission once again, in 1890.

Meanwhile at Maloga Daniel Matthews was so shaken by growing Aboriginal rebelliousness that on 1 October 1883 he wrote that "for the first time since we have been engaged in the mission, I felt my love for the Blacks declining."[45] Daniel complained particularly of Aboriginal "ingratitude;" the mission residents seemed "not rightly to appreciate the efforts we are making for their good."[46] Though ingratitude was, he believed, "a natural quality of the Australian Aboriginal," it was "strengthened and intensified by [their] intercourse with sinister white people, whose whole aim seems to be to inculcate and foster in the simple minds of the Blacks feelings of mistrust towards their benefactors."[47] The real source of conflict between missionaries and mission residents, however, seems to have been the very different expectations they had of each other, and what the relationship they had entered into together would bring.[48]

Of the three missionaries considered here it was Janet Matthews who was perhaps best able to manage the emotional challenges of mission life. After the demise of Maloga she set up a new mission in South Australia, which she ran on a modest scale for eleven years. Yet later developments throw an interesting light on the precise nature, and limits, of her Christian "love." When in 1905 her son John fell in love with an Aboriginal girl, Janet sent him to England.[49] Despite thirty-one years of close contact with Aboriginal people, and her continuing rhetorical insistence on their common humanity, Janet had managed to maintain the mental and emotional distance that had been implied in her 1872 statement of "love" for a group of people she had never met.

CONCLUSION

What can we learn about the emotional dynamics of Protestant missions from this brief foray into the histories of Maloga and Warangesda? As we have seen, the emotional dynamics of missions were heavily influenced by the emotional styles of the men and women who ran them. For missionaries like the Matthews and Gribble, emotions like love and sympathy were at the core of their identity: as evangelical Christians, they saw themselves as sanctified by Christian love, and duty bound to spread that love and sympathy to the downtrodden "heathen" of the world. Unlike many of their peers, they acted on these emotions, investing funds, energy, their whole lives even, in the mission project. At the same time, however, their emotions came with expectations of reciprocity and recognition.

This missionary need to be recognized by the Aboriginal objects of their emotion was a defining dynamic, which, I would argue, played a much greater causal role in the everyday decision-making processes on these missions than is generally allowed for. Changes in the emotional cultures of both Aboriginal mission residents and the missionaries themselves were the result, then, not merely of changes in governmental structures, but of interactions, engagements, and refusals of emotion. As such these changes were neither linear, teleological, nor one-sided; despite the formal power held by the missionaries. While the missionaries themselves may have agreed with Elias, the historical processes that actually took place on Christian missions were much more complex than a simple transformation of one culture from "uncivilised" to "civilised."

In the emotional economies of Protestant missions Aboriginal love was in demand and missionary love in excess. Having set themselves up as everloving saviors, missionaries were particularly vulnerable to criticism, and this made their whole project fragile, based as it was on a finely tuned emotional balance. Thus, while missionaries such as the Matthews and Gribble were happy to point out the "emotional incompetencies" of mission residents, treating Aboriginal emotions as "childlike" whims that only needed taming, when anger or frustration were directed at the missionaries themselves the stakes were much higher. The disappointment and despondency felt by missionaries during these periods could in turn have drastic effects on the lives of mission residents.

The cases of Maloga and Warangesda highlight just how important emotions were in the mission setting. For both missionaries and Aboriginal mission residents the ability to manage emotions—whether their own, or those of others—was a crucial factor in achieving both their material and their spiritual goals. It is important, in this context, not to forget that when missionaries offered their love (along with food, clothing, and shelter) to Aboriginal people, they were doing so in the context of a much greater Aboriginal dispossession of land and sovereignty. These missionaries all acknowledged this disparity explicitly, and sought actively to make up for

the conspicuous gap between levels of Aboriginal and settler "gift-giving" by offering colonized people the one thing they had in abundance—their love, their sympathy, and their faith. That this also happened to be an approach that would not challenge the material basis of settler society was perhaps convenient, but we should not assume that giving of themselves in this way did not "cost" missionaries anything.

Getting to the heart of Aboriginal emotions on Christian missions is a much more difficult matter. Yet the sources considered here emphasize the emotional agency of Aboriginal mission residents, suggesting that both missionaries and Aboriginal mission residents were participants (though perhaps not always willing ones) in complex systems of emotional circulation and exchange.

NOTES

1. Joanna Cruickshank, "'To Exercise a Beneficial Influence Over a Man': Marriage, Gender and the Native Institutions in Early Colonial Australia," in *Evangelists of Empire? Missionaries in Colonial History,* ed. Amanda Barry, Joanna Cruickshank, Andrew Brown-May, and Patricia Grimshaw (Melbourne: University of Melbourne eScholarship Research Centre, 2008), 116.
2. *The Sydney Gazette*, 4 January 1817. Quoted in J. Brook and J. L. Kohen, *The Parramatta Native Institution and the Black Town: A History* (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1991), 73.
3. Ann Laura Stoler writes that "reading along the archival grain draws our sensibilities to the archive's granular rather than seamless texture. . . . It calls on us to understand how unintelligibilities are sustained and why empires remain so uneasily invested in them." Following Stoler, I hope in this chapter to "explore the grain with care and read along it first," without resting "too comfortably on predictable stories with familiar plots." See Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Senses* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 53, 50.
4. Cruickshank, "To Exercise a Beneficial Influence Over a Man," 116.
5. Joanna Cruickshank, "'A most lowering thing for a lady': Aspiring to Respectable Whiteness on Ramahyuck Mission, 1885–1900," in *Creating White Australia*, ed. Jane Carey and Claire McLisky (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 2009), 85–86.
6. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners, Changes in the Code of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern Times*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen, 1978 [1939]), 225.
7. Indeed, as Sara Ahmed reminds us, the English word "emotion" comes from the Latin *emovere*, "to move" or "to move out." See Ahmed, "Collective Feelings; Or the Impressions Left by Others," *Theory, Culture Society* 21, no. 2 (2004): 25–42.
8. Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 842–843; William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Ahmed, "Collective Feelings." For some recent reflections on the field, see Jan Plamper, "The

History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein and Peter Stearns," *History and Theory* 49 (May 2010): 237–365.

9. Ahmed, "Collective Feelings," 25–26.
10. Lila Abu-Lughod and Catherine A. Lutz, "Introduction," *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, ed. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 14.
11. For Stoler's uses of the term, see Stoler and Karen Strassler, "Castings for the Colonial: Memory Work in 'New Order' Java," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (January 2000), 6; Ann Laura Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies," in *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, ed. Stoler (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 14; Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.
12. Sara Ahmed, "Affective Economies," *Social Text* 79, vol. 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 120–121.
13. This is a view that is considered controversial by some historians of emotion, who contend that we can only study emotions when historical actors (for example, the authors of etiquette books) discuss them explicitly. This particular type of historical enquiry has been dubbed "emotionology" by its originators, Peter and Carol Stearns.
14. Elias, *Civilizing Process*.
15. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," 827.
16. The question of where these similarities stem is difficult to answer—while it is possible that the missionaries were, like Elias, inspired by the neo-Freudian idea that suppressed emotional expression was necessary for civilization, it seems more likely that the similarities in their thinking derived more from general cultural trends than a specific intellectual movement; the primary source of their ideas about emotion seems to have been the New Testament.
17. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 319.
18. For a discussion of the "doctrine of love" in pre-Christian and Christian thought, see James R. Martel, *Love is a Sweet Chain: Desire, Autonomy and Friendship in Liberal Political Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 3–10.
19. The "new commandment" is from John 13:34, King James Bible.
20. Daniel Walker Howe, "The Evangelical Movement and Political Culture in the North during the Second Party System," *Journal of American History* 77 (March 1991): 1220.
21. Janet Johnston, letter to Daniel Matthews, 2 February 1872. PRG 422, Box 1, Norman Family Papers, Mortlock Library, South Australia.
22. John Gribble, *A Plea for the Aborigines of New South Wales* (Jerilderie: Samuel Gill, 1879), 3, 5.
23. Daniel Matthews, *An Appeal on Behalf of the Australian Aborigines* (Echuca: Riverine Herald, 1873), 3.
24. Jane Haggis and Margaret Allen, "Imperial Emotions: Affective Communities of Mission in British Protestant Women's Missionary Publications, c1880–1920," *Journal of Social History* (Spring 2008): 692–715.
25. In his thought-provoking work *Rule of Sympathy*, Amit Rai argues that sympathy has functioned in imperial settings as a tactic or strategy of power. See Rai, *Rule of Sympathy: Sentiment, Race and Power, 1750–1850* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 35.
26. See Danilyn Rutherford, "Sympathy, State Building and the Experience of Empire," *Cultural Anthropology* 24 (2009): 2.
27. It should be noted that the distinction between "public" and "private" texts, always problematic, is especially so in the case of missionary sources, as most

missionaries wrote their letters, and even their diaries, in the knowledge that they would some day be read by a wider audience.

28. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2.
29. Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, 129.
30. Sandra Smith, Elizabeth Nelson, and Patricia Grimshaw, *Letters from Aboriginal Women of Victoria, 1867–1926* (University of Melbourne History Department, 2002).
31. Janet Johnston, "Objects for Prayer," quoted in Alma Norman, "Extracts from Mother's Diaries," Box 1, PRG 422, Norman Papers, State Library of South Australia.
32. This desire was not limited to British Protestant missionaries. For example, in 1885 the Moravian missionary Friedrich Hagenauer wrote that mixed worship "creates a very good feeling in the hearts of the blacks, as they thereby observe that we can worship the same God and enjoy the blessings of salvation without respect of persons or colour," November 1885, "Aboriginal Mission Station Ramahyuck," VCA archives, xix. Quoted in Nadia Rhook, "Inventing Other Voices: Language and Power on Moravian Missions in Colonial Victoria" (Honors Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2007), 45.
33. Daniel Matthews, 4 May 1877, in the *Third Report of the Maloga Aboriginal Mission School* (Echuca: Riverine Herald, 1878), 5.
34. New South Wales State Records, CGS 3829 School Files 1876–1979, Cummeragunja 1876–1939. 5/15618.2 1889–1910.
35. Beverley (Gulumbali) Elphick and Don Elphick, *The Camp of Mercy: An Historical & Biographical Record of the Warangesda Aboriginal Mission/Station*, Darlington Point NSW (Canberra: self-published, 2003), 5.
36. John Gribble, "The Warangesda Mission (In the Newly Formed Diocese of Riverina, New South Wales)," 1884, National Library of Australia, 376.
37. Gribble, "The Warangesda Mission," 377.
38. See, for example, Robert Cooper et al., "Petition to the Right Hon Baron Carrington," reproduced in Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 52; Bobby Wilberforce et al., "Petition for Land," repr. in *Mister Maloga,* Nancy Cato (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1976), 387. See also Ravi De Costa, "Identity, Authority and the Moral Worlds of Indigenous Petitions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 148, no. 3 (July 2006): 669–698; Heather Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy: Land in Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 1770–1972* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 78; and Bain Attwood, *Rights for Aborigines* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 30.
39. Johnny Phillips, quoted in Matthews, *Fifth Report of the Maloga Aboriginal Mission School* (Echuca: Riverine Herald, 1880), 22.
40. Daniel Matthews, *Ninth Report of the Maloga Aboriginal Mission School* (Echuca: Riverine Herald, 1884), 31.
41. Matthews, *Ninth Report*, 31.
42. Matthews, *Ninth Report*, 31.
43. John Gribble, diary, 16 January 1882. Cited in Elphick and Elphick, *Camp of Mercy*, 5–6.
44. John Gribble, diary entry, March 1885. Cited in Elphick and Elphick, *Camp of Mercy*, 7.
45. Matthews, *Ninth Report*, 1 October 1883, 16.
46. Daniel Matthews, *Tenth Report of the Maloga Mission Aboriginal Station* (Echuca: Mackay & Foyster, 1885), 1 April 1884, 25 April 1884, 7.
47. Matthews, *Tenth Report*, 7.

48. Interestingly, recent work in cognitive psychology suggests that emotions are the result of congruencies and incongruencies between goals and realities—if expectations are interrupted by events or objects, emotions are the result. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 14.
49. This is reported by Nancy Cato, who was married to Janet's grandson Eldred de Bracton Norman, in her biography of Daniel Matthews, *Mister Maloga*. She does not give a reference to any sources which corroborate the claim, and thus we can assume that it was based on her personal knowledge of the family and interviews with her mother-in-law Alma Norman, who was also Janet and Daniel's daughter.

6 Mediated Public Emotion
Collective Grief and Australian Natural Disasters

Michelle Duffy and Susan Yell

INTRODUCTION

The Australian summer is framed by a narrative of bushfire. Southeastern Australia is recognized as one of the most highly bushfire-prone regions in the world, with fire very much part of the life cycle of the environment.[1] Large bushfire events, such as those dubbed Black Friday (1939), Ash Wednesday (1984), and the most recent, Black Saturday (2009), generate much media coverage, which records and narrates the stories of those caught by these firestorms. Depictions of devastation and ruin, as well as of grief, despair, hope, and courage, are very much part of a national iconography,[2] and are readily used to galvanize notions of mateship and community as a means to respond to those in need.

In this chapter we explore the collective sense of this narrative and the rhetoric activated and circulated in newspapers through image and text. Our specific interest lies in the historical shifts in the portrayal of emotions experienced in response to death and disaster. The reporting of natural disasters (in this case bushfires) offers a site for analyzing changes in the public expression of emotions. Our analysis stems from the work of Norbert Elias,[3] who theorizes a connection between changes in the behavior of people, including changes in their emotional practices and expressions, and changes in their societies. He argues that in Western Europe the "civilising" process involved the progressive internalizing of social standards of behavior, and the increasing self-regulation of emotions. While Elias's work on the civilizing process sought to understand the apparent changes in emotional development between different historical periods, a number of scholars have argued that this approach fails to acknowledge the significance of social and cultural contexts in which emotions are expressed. Barbara Rosenwein rejects the linear framework proposed by Elias,[4] stating that his "hydraulic theory" of emotions incorrectly reduces the range and subtlety of human emotions to a dichotomy of impulse and restraint. As she points out, "to assume that our emotions were also the emotions of the past is to be utterly unhistorical . . . it is important, therefore, to know what words signified emotions for the particular emotional community you are dealing

with."[5] Rosenwein argues that a more appropriate paradigm is one that captures the "fact that emotions are about things judged important to us" and offers the notion of "emotional communities."[6] She uses this concept to indicate how individuals engage with and inhabit different communities, each of which defines and assesses what is of value or harm to that community.[7] Such emotional communities range from the family, the village, or township, as well as imagined emotional communities including readers of print media.[8]

Elias traces how socially instilled emotions play a decisive role in gradual shifts in behavior over a number of centuries;[9] in our study, we are investigating a much shorter time span (seventy years). Nevertheless, within that time period we argue that significant transformations in the available repertoires for emotional behavior have occurred. These shifts are connected to social changes in the relationship between public and private forms of identity and community, changes accelerated by a rapidly evolving mediascape. The media play a significant role in capturing emotions and facilitating their transmission throughout a culture. Mervi Katriina Pantti and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen note that in the contemporary world "media work as a bridge between personal and public emotions: through the process of mediation, personal emotions become public, and public emotions in turn shape personal emotions."[10] This process has been accelerated by the increasingly pervasive (and invasive) reporting of emotions, influenced by media forms such as reality TV, accompanied by shifts in the boundaries between notions of public and private. The trend toward tabloidization and emotionalization of news and other media genres[11] means that the emotions of media subjects now receive greater emphasis, and can become news stories in their own right (for example, the reporting of the intensity of public grief expressed over Princess Diana's death, and public anger over the apparent lack of grief demonstrated by the British Royal Family).

Drawing on examples of media reports of Victorian bushfires in 1939, 1983, and 2009 in Victoria's principal newspaper, *The Age*, we explore the changes in the mediated expression of emotions such as grief, despair, hope, and courage.[12] Through an analysis of personal testimony and photographic images, we examine how these emotional states are transmitted from victims/survivors' bodies to the readers' bodies, so that individual emotions (such as those experienced by disaster victims) are brought into a relation with a wider public affect (of news audiences). Our chapter is structured as follows; we first provide an overview of our theoretical approach to defining and understanding emotion. This is followed by a critical discussion and analysis of the media material, starting with the bushfire event of 2009 and working back historically. We conclude by summarizing the cultural shifts in public emotions and suggesting the implications of tracking emotion discourse for theorizing the affective constitution of communities.

EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES AND MEDIA DISCOURSE

Critical media and social analysts have argued that there has been an increase in the circulation of emotional meanings in public life since the 1990s.[13] While some scholars (such as David Altheide and Frank Furedi) view this as a negative development, Barry Richards proposes that the rise in emotional expression is an opportunity to be reflexive about and responsible for our emotions: "the widespread increase in reflexive self-monitoring that a number of social theorists have taken to be an essential feature of contemporary society . . . is not just about feelings and their expression but also involves thinking about and managing feelings."[14] Derek Edwards argues that emotion discourse shapes political and ethical judgments, orienting us toward "normative and moral orders, to responsibility and blame, intentionality, and social evaluation."[15] This applies not only to private social discourse but also to public media discourse. Tony Walter, Jane Littlewood, and Michael Pickering, in their analysis of death in the news, suggest that the media have a role in what they call "emotional invigilation"—"the simultaneous arousal of, and keeping watch over, the affective dispositions and responses associated with death"[16]—and provide discursive resources for audiences to learn culturally appropriate emotional responses.

We are interested in the integrative capacity of the public expression of emotions. Emotions are a powerful force in drawing us into communities and shaping our social identities, as Sara Ahmed[17] and Barabra Rosenwein[18] argue. While mediated emotions circulating within the public sphere can polarize and divide they also have the potential to draw citizens together through their participation in shared feelings, such as empathy, grief, anger, or compassion.[19] News publics are interpellated into communities through the emotional address of disaster narratives. As our analysis below demonstrates, audiences can be drawn into an intimate identification with the emotions of disaster-affected communities, or positioned more distantly as witnessing from "outside" the immediate context, rather than grieving or suffering with those directly affected. Birgitta Höijer's work on audiences' responses to media reports of global suffering indicates that there are a variety of degrees of emotional commitment with which audience members can respond, ranging from compassion to indifference to cynicism.[20]

Before continuing it is important to clarify the different traditions informing our work. There are several research traditions which offer different understandings of emotions and affect. Whereas philosophers of the emotions conceptualize emotion as linked to judgment and cognition, a psychoanalytic perspective (which commonly informs cultural studies work on the emotions) is interested in affects as products of innate, embodied, and unconscious drives. On the other hand, work on the emotions within social theory argues that emotions are deeply rooted in cultural knowledge and are discursively produced and socially formed.[21] Within sociology, the dominant approach is one of social constructionism, holding

that "emotions are not subjective inner states but rather aspects of social relations."[22] Clarke et al. note that there is a second sociological approach that draws on both psychoanalytic and social constructionist insights, to theorize emotions as socially structured, embodied, and visceral, and not always under conscious control.[23] We align ourselves with this second approach, conceptualizing emotions as not entirely socially constructed. Rather, emotions are produced and circulated in contexts shaped by sociocultural "rules," which Rosenwein defines in terms of emotional communities. An emotional community, according to Rosenwein, is characterized by particular emotional styles and/or norms.[24] This understanding allows us to connect the discursive articulation of emotions in the media with potential audience responses, in the same way that media theorists (following Althusser[25]) argue that texts interpellate audiences into implied reading positions. News production processes involve story selection, formulating headlines, image selection and framing, and the deployment of narratives and eyewitness testimony. In this way, media discourse plays an active role in signaling to the audience what is important to them as an emotional community, and how they should respond emotionally. An examination of the kinds of emotions represented, and the ways in which these were articulated (using text and image) tells us "how the media constructs a particular model of the social and moral order."[26]

While we are not arguing that there is a radical shift in the spectrum of emotions experienced by bushfire victims from 1939 to 2009, we argue that in each period under examination the media represent what is important to that community at that time through different emotional "palettes."[27] In presenting these media constructions we begin by extracting and focusing on specific examples of text or image so as to explore the ways in which these affects are mediated. However, the juxtaposition of image and text within the newspaper is very much part of the ways in which these firestorms are narrated, and our analysis includes a critical examination of the overall reportage of these events.

BUSHFIRE COVERAGE 1: BLACK SATURDAY (2009)

Victoria's 2008–2009 summer resulted in extreme bushfire weather conditions. There had been very little rain in December and January, resulting in residents across the state being subject to high-level water restrictions. In the days leading up to February 7, southeastern Australia had experienced an unprecedented heat wave, with many localities across Victoria recording their highest temperatures on record (including Melbourne, which had three consecutive days above 43 C or 109 F). Underpinning these extreme conditions were concerns about climate change and its contribution to firestorms (and other extreme weather events), exacerbated by the spread of Melbourne's urban sprawl into high bushfire risk regions at the peri-urban edges.[28]

On 7 February 2009 a complex of fires in central and eastern Victoria escalated into a series of firestorms that ultimately claimed the lives of 173 people. These events received saturation coverage in the media for the next fortnight, coverage that was explicitly and intensely emotional.[29] While "straight" hard news stories presented the harsh facts of the fires—detailing the regions affected, the number of dead, the institutional responses of firefighters, police, hospitals, and the state government—these were accompanied by many more personalized and anecdotal stories. Numerous accounts of desperate and often unsuccessful battles to save homes and lives were reported, interviews were held with survivors, firefighters, politicians, and community members, and the emotional impact of the fires on people's lives was documented. Through the media's articulation of these emotional meanings, the public became caught up in vicarious affective relations with fire-affected individuals and communities.

Emotional meaning in news stories "positions us to feel, and through shared feelings, to belong."[30] However, in the initial coverage, which is our focus, the immediate emotions centered on the reactions to the trauma and loss experienced as a result of the fires. Fear, shock, and grief were expressed, as well as courage and stoicism. James Jasper argues that emotions can be distinguished as ranging along a continuum "from the more physiological . . . to the more cultural end."[31] Fear and shock can be considered "reflex emotions" at the physiological end of the continuum,[32] while grief is a more complex physiological and social response to loss. Courage and stoicism could be classified as "moral emotions," which are culturally formed,[33] since they imply some cognitive processing and also a value judgment. In the media reports each of these emotional meanings can be either directly named or indirectly evoked, with different consequences for the positioning of audiences and our affective responses.

Fear is an emotion directly attributed to survivors—in one story a shed was "a haven for terrified families," a woman "lay cowering in the bath with her son, her neighbour and her dog, shuddering as the cars outside exploded like fireworks," and "a motley crew of humans, dogs, goats and ducks . . . wait[ed] in dread as the fiery breath of hell scorched the town."[34] Fear and also despair are indirectly evoked through emotive descriptions of the brutal force of the fires and the devastated landscape: "exploding petrol pumps and gas bottles produced a nightmarish soundtrack;" the burnt-out towns were like "bomb sites;" the fire was an "inferno." Descriptions such as these draw the reader into the scene—they incite a direct emotional response to the event, rather than one mediated through the emotions of others. Many of these early stories clearly express the fear of those who survived, yet the accompanying images activate somewhat different strategies of engaging the media's readership.

In her examination of the trauma of war as captured by photojournalist Lee Miller, Paula Salvio talks of the relationship between trauma and photography as one that "summons and makes present . . . a profound gap

between experience and comprehension."[35] She suggests that photographs offer the possibility to express incoherent experiences, to make some sense of that which is beyond words. Central to this representation and communication of trauma is the role of emotion. As Salvio argues, "naming an experience is not enough; rather, representation must also be imbued with emotional significance."[36] In the days following Black Saturday, *The Age* included large colored photographs of those affected by the fires. In these images, the camera brings the viewer into the personal space of those depicted; the figures brought up close to the foreground of the photograph so that we can see in close-up detail faces expressing not so much fear, but grief, disbelief, shock, and relief. For example, in one photograph a mother tightly hugs her two children, the relief at their being together plain, while in another a woman carries her young child on her back, her face distorted by grief. In each of these images the viewer is brought into the scene as the camera positions each of us right there among those affected. Moreover, the camera serves to direct our gaze through those depicted in the photographs, their responses guiding our reading of what is happening right there in front of them/us. For example, in an image positioned over the headline, "Fire had a mind of its own, like a beast," we stand behind one man, hands held to his head in a position of disbelief and helplessness, as his gaze directs us to the remains of a home engulfed by fire. The viewer becomes present, and the affective processes that achieve this sense of connection to those in the photographs are significant as they emotionally connect us to those in the photograph. Even the more emotionally intimate images of family and friends holding each other in grief or while waiting for news include the viewer—we seem to be only a few meters away—something easily achieved by today's camera technology.

Portraying these emotions in both text and image invites an expected emotional reaction from the reader/public—as we witness these emotions from others within our community we are expected to respond with empathy and compassion—and perhaps also to share their grief, even for people we don't know, since they are presented as "our community": "Losing people you know like this is just awful. It's devastating. The whole community's in shock."[37].

While expressions of fear are limited to the written text, grief, anguish, and mourning are strongly present in these stories and images, both through explicit mention and indirect invocation. One woman mourns the loss of her dead husband's photograph, which "causes her more anguish than anything else." At the St Andrews pub "weary locals gathered to mourn their friends," and a "distraught" woman "can't believe [he's] gone." Grief and loss are powerfully evoked through the euphemistic accounts of finding the dead: "family members of two of the dead made the cruellest discovery of all;" "Her son found her in the car;" "His nephew found him yesterday morning;" "He was found near a ute [i.e., utility vehicle]."[38] A particularly poignant account is given of a firefighter who discovers the bodies of three

family members, one of whom is a ten-year-old boy: "He was lying on his back. His eyes were just wide open and he had the bluest, bluest eyes."[39] Telling of the discovery causes the man to "roar in pain." Such accounts of embodied pain (especially shock and grief) bring *Age* readers into an intimate relation with disaster sufferers. Emotions wrack the bodies of survivors, who "scream," "weep," "sit huddled, shell-shocked;" "Tears well in [one woman's] eyes; her hands are still shaking."[40]

While negative emotions such as fear, shock, despair, and grief were repeatedly expressed and evoked in the 2009 media coverage, the more positive emotions of courage and stoicism were also present. Courage and stoicism are qualities attributed to someone by another rather than "feelings" a person expresses; they are complex attributes that combine an emotional state with an outward behavior or demeanor. Calling someone "brave" or "stoic" expresses a value judgment approving of their behavior. A boy who obeys his mother's instructions and successfully escapes the fire is called a "hero"—"He was so brave, he did everything that was screamed at him to do." Courage is also invoked through descriptions of firefighters' efforts in saving others, and many of the images accompanying these stories are of often anonymous firemen attempting to control the fires or of exhausted men (and occasionally women) sleeping wherever they could. Stoicism is a less easily defined emotional state, but is manifested by survivors who display humor in the face of hardship (one woman "is still wearing the purple bikini she was saved in. 'I don't own any underwear,' she laughs, with gallows humour") or by the firefighter who is deeply affected by the traumatic sights he has seen, but insists he is fine and continues to do his job ("He's had '20 minutes worth of sleep here and there', yet he continues to work alongside his mates"). The normative response for the audience to such displays of courage and stoicism is admiration, respect, and perhaps sympathy (for the stoic who is suffering but tries to carry on for the sake of others). These are values that epitomize who "we" are or at least who we would like to be. The emotional community invoked at this time is one in which personal emotions of fear and grief can be openly displayed at times of crisis, without a sense of shame or judgment that the expression of such emotions is "inappropriate." On the other hand, a further "sociocultural rule" of this emotional community is that those traumatized by their experiences and who could be viewed as "heroes" should downplay the personal emotional cost of their actions during the crisis, displaying a form of stoicism that is also present in the two earlier periods, as we shall see.

The role of the media in this period, and the ways in which news events are conveyed as demonstrated in this discussion of the 2009 bushfires, is very much influenced by a shift in the boundaries between notions of publicness and privacy. The rise of the talk show and reality TV and the increasing prominence of formerly "private" issues in the public sphere have meant that the media is becoming an increasingly emotionalized space, concerned with the inner feelings of media subjects. Individuals have much greater

awareness of how media can be used, and the access and availability of technology have played an important role in the blurring of public and private domains. There is an increased agency and media literacy among individuals, who can readily participate in events as they unfold and communicate this to those not physically present. Hence, the media's audience are both users and producers, and not simply receivers of the media's messages. For example, individuals can and do readily supply images through the use of personal digital cameras and mobile phones, with the ability to upload images to online news sites, phone in reports to radio, or supply footage taken on personal mobile phones to TV news. This media literacy also mean individuals are more aware of their own media (self) presentation. Technology therefore has contributed to an emphasis on the therapeutic function of the media as a space in which to give expression to traumatic and other difficult feelings.

Yet we must be cautious in this. While we are much more self-conscious and perhaps complicit in media and news making, we need to consider if this is all suspended during a crisis such as a bushfire? In the contemporary world media produces rather than passively bears witness to emotions, and the aim of those working in media seems to be to incite emotional displays through probing questions, using high-powered zoom lenses to take shots of "private" moments of intense emotion while subjects are unaware of their presence. Camera technology enables the photographer to take a rapid sequence of shots and produce a clear image without requiring the subject to "pose" or remain still, and this results in images more integrated into the "flow" of everyday life. These changes in photographic practices are enabled by technology, by digital photography, camera phones/iPhones, and so on. Our increasingly emotionalized public space comes at a price; we may be more aware of our public selves but at the same time we seem less able to control how we are represented; the consequences are an emotional community that is driven as much by commercial media imperatives and technological change as it is by social and emotional values.

BUSHFIRE COVERAGE 2: ASH WEDNESDAY (1983)

In conditions very similar to those of 2009, in 1982 and early 1983 large areas of southeastern Australia had been subject to an extended period of drought, while the temperatures of February 1983 reached new records. Rainfall in many places was the lowest on record, and again Melbourne was under severe water restrictions. But this was also a federal election year in Australia following a double dissolution called by the then prime minister Malcolm Fraser, and a time of high inflation and unemployment. The Ash Wednesday fires (with a death toll of seventy-five people) were at the time the worst bushfire disaster to hit Australia, yet did not receive the degree of saturation coverage that the 2009 fires did, instead competing for

space with two other highly dramatic news stories (the Hawke-Fraser federal election campaign and the Azaria Chamberlain case).[41] As in 2009, the bushfire coverage in *The Age* presented a range of emotions experienced by survivors, yet with some significant differences in the discourses available and the subject positions these inscribe.

Emotions such as fear, shock, and grief were present in the news discourse, but with less explicitness and intensity than in the 2009 reporting. Fear was externalized by linking it to situations that inspired it ("it was frightening—the speed of the fire" and "Upper Beaconsfield's peril"), although there were also instances in which it was expressed primarily as a personal feeling ("I've never been so scared"). Fearful emotions were frequently implied on behalf of survivors (and evoked in the audience) through descriptions of the fire and the landscape, often using metaphors of battlefields and war:

> In its desolation, with charred trees on every side, the site at the end of St George's road seemed a cross between a cemetery and a battlefield.[42]

> The fire spread through the Dandenongs[43] like an invading army on a scorched-earth campaign. It started at Belgrave, was swept south as far as Officer by the northerly, and then veered north-east as the cool change came at 8.40pm. . . . The whole triangular area yesterday seemed like a war zone.[44]

Unlike the 2009 coverage, in 1983 grief was not foregrounded in the news reporting of the fires. Sadness could be expressed by children, but adults restrained their emotions in public (one child "sobbed" on learning of the death of her pets while older family members "maintained an air of stoic resignation"). The grief and shock of survivors who had just learned of the loss of family members was shielded from public view, as in the following restrained account:

> As the officer took stock, the dead couple's daughter walked up the drive. She had come to check that her parents were all right. The police took her to a neighbour's house.[45]

Unlike the 2009 coverage, personal commemoration of the lives of the dead was not a feature of the main news section. Mourning was a private or local community act, not one shared with the wider public. This sense of privacy is also found in the photographs in terms of what was depicted and also in the considerable lack of images incorporated into the reports (and far fewer images were printed than for the 2009 bushfire event). The photographs of individuals portray poignant images of very personal grief. For example, in one image the viewer is positioned almost as an intruder: a couple look at what we are told are the remains of their home, their bodies bent in toward

one another and heads bowed. We are excluded from what they are feeling although we can clearly read their anguish. However, there is some indication of a change in approaches to photographing trauma that prefigures the 2009 images—there is a more explicit presentation of emotion that interpellates the viewer as a witness. For example, a photograph of women and children taking refuge in a Board of Works tunnel clearly shows their fear and anxiety, yet the viewer remains positioned as an outsider looking into the scene, although we can now see raw emotion. The women anxiously looking up to the right-hand corner of the image do not acknowledge those of us beyond the frame; in the 1980s we were less complicit in news making, as technology has yet to open up individual engagement with what constitutes the public.

In contrast to the heightened emotions portrayed in the above image, the accompanying story was emotionally understated. The journalist reporting the story presented the group as calm and uncomplaining, apart from a few "fretful" children. Although the danger was clear ("Outside last night the air was hot with flame and cinders. The fire at one stage was less than two kilometres away, burning in a semi-circle that threatened to enter the dam property"[46]), any fear or anxiety the group might have been feeling was not expressed or reported on.

While personal emotions of survivors were not reported in detail, death was explicitly reported, not only in the form of death tolls but through accounts of the grim task of recovering the dead.

> The smoke was still drifting across the heights on Beaconsfield yesterday afternoon, as the police Disaster Victim Identification Team moved in to recover the bodies of the 12 firefighters who died by their trucks on Wednesday night. The unit's job is to identify unrecognisable bodies, aided by the skills of forensic science.[47]

The stark factual descriptions here directly invoke shock and pity from the readership, but do so unmediated by a sense of personal affective connection to those who mourn these deaths. In contrast, the affective impact of the 2009 deaths was overwhelmingly presented via the grieving bodies and testimony of surviving family members.

In other stories, the lack of explicit emotional expression was a signifier of survivors' strong feelings. A firefighter's "eyes were red with exhaustion, and he said little because he felt so much."[48] A woman described the "speed and cruelty of the fires" to a journalist, but "When words fail she simply shakes her head." Such understated responses contribute to an implied discourse of stoicism, also represented by those who express resilience in the face of their suffering, such as the woman recovering from her burns in hospital who lost her recently built house; "I didn't care. A house is nothing compared with our lives."[49] Understatement was also valued in relation to courage (as it was in 2009). Firefighters and survivors displayed

bravery through their actions in rescuing others or saving themselves and their animals:

> She rushed out to rescue them [her dogs], kicking in the fly-wire door of her house and unlatching the Labrador. They were saved but she was badly burned about the arms. "Don't make a hero out of me," she said. It is hard not to. Heroism, like grace, is courage under fire.[50]

> The firefighters had been caught in a death trap, after their bravery had carried them into a wooded slope in defence of a house at the top of the hill. They parked the trucks on the track running along the side of the hill and made their stand.[51]

Survivors downplayed their own courage; it was the journalists' function to make the attribution of bravery explicit, positioning audiences to recognize such behavior and admire it. The emotional community of the 1980's public sphere valued courage while minimizing the personal expression of its costs, but was much less expressive of "private emotions" concerning death and grief. There was not the same sense of the public's entitlement to share in the emotions of the survivors and heroes of a crisis—vicarious experience of others' emotions was not promoted as it was in 2009. This can be linked to some extent to the mediascape of the 1980s.

While in 2009 the news media was much more interactive, the media in the 1980s was still a centralized industry, with television, radio, and newspapers dominated by a few powerful proprietors. Correspondingly, the public expectation of the media was that the selection of images and stories was also a professionalized and centralized process, in which journalists and editors made the final decisions about what was presented. While it was expected that traumatic events involving ordinary people would be reported, those people did not expect to influence how their stories would be told (nor how their suffering or grief would be presented). At the same time, there was a shift occurring, with the media expected to report on the emotions of celebrities and news makers, a trend that was not yet extended to a significant degree to ordinary people.[52] Prior to this development, the exclusion of ordinary people from the process of news making seems linked to their corresponding exclusion from the ownership of the emotions of those in the news—in Rosenwein's terms, it was as if there was an emotional community who were the subject of disaster news, and then a wider public/audience, and the two communities did not overlap and merge as they do in 2009.

BUSHFIRE COVERAGE 3: BLACK FRIDAY (1939)

The late 1930s was a time of tension on the world stage; the Munich Pact was to be a failed attempt to appease Nazi Germany with World War II

finally breaking out in September 1939, and while the Great Depression was easing by this time, Australia's dependence on agriculture and industry meant it was one of the hardest-hit western countries. Much of what is now suburban Melbourne was bushland at this time, and, as with the previous bushfire events, Black Friday occurred after a long drought that had lasted several years and a severe, hot, dry summer. Bushfires had been burning throughout the summer months in the lead-up to the worst outbreak on 13 January 1939, and many deaths had already occurred as a result of the accompanying heat wave. Nevertheless the January 13 fires received considerable prominence in the press. *The Age*'s coverage of the fires was qualitatively different to that of the two later periods; unlike 1983 and 2009 there was no "front page" treatment of the story, since page one of the 1939 *Age* functioned as an index to news items and as a classified page, and key stories were scattered throughout the later pages. The fires did however receive a strongly pictorial treatment, the number of images exceeding that in 1983 although not 2009,[53] with several full-page montages of photographs of the story (showing the fires, the ravaged landscapes, and the survivors). The 1939 narratives of fire survivors were characterized by the use of emotional discourse, however the range of emotions articulated was not the same as that in 1983 or 2009. Fear, hope, and courage were feelings attributed to survivors and rescuers, but shock, despair, and grief were noticeably absent. As with the coverage in 1983 and 2009, death tolls were given, but the references to the dead in stories were few, and there were no accounts of finding bodies. Deaths were documented as a public fact rather than being narrated as part of the personal affective experience of the survivors or rescuers (as they were framed in the 1983 and 2009 reports).

The instinctive response to bushfire danger is fear, and this was so for 1939 as it was for 1983 and 2009. Articles attributed a feeling of terror to people ("Residents extremely fearful of fires," "three terrified children," "they watched, terror-stricken, as the fire struck") as well as narrating fearful events:

> At Manuel's quarry a Greek and a Maltese told of a terrifying night spent lying in the creek with the water becoming hotter every moment.[54]

> At No. 1 mill, where thirty men spent an awful night in a dugout 10 feet by 12, and saved themselves by throwing water over each other, the buildings and timber piles were completely destroyed.[55]

Descriptions of the fires and the landscape were also strongly imbued with affective qualities, positioning the public imaginatively within the scene, evoking the feelings of terror that survivors must have felt and corresponding sympathy for those involved. This was particularly emotionally powerful in a story composed of a series of telegraphs received from *The Age* representative at Erica:

> Erica now menaced all sides by 50 miles' hour gale; temperature 103; all available men fighting onrushing flames; continual calls here to P.O. for aid; some mills believed threatened; situation looks desperate many places; women and children leaving mills in attempt to reach safety.[56]

The negative emotions of fear and terror narrated in these stories were offset by the more positive ones of hope, bravery, and stoicism, and this was reinforced by the accompanying photographs. Unlike the images taken in 1983 and even more so in 2009, the 1939 images seem to lack the referencing of the fire event—many of the images of individuals and groups could be anywhere, appearing to our contemporary eyes as if taken on a casual outing in the bush. There are images of firefighting, but these position the viewer at a distance from the event and those involved seem completely unaware of the photographer's presence.

A distinctive feature of the 1939 coverage, hope was an emotion linked to the narrative journalistic style, in which the story unfolded progressively, telling of hopes for survivors, followed by fears or worries about their state. Courage was explicitly attributed to rescuers and survivors by journalists, while survivors in their own accounts downplayed their achievements.

> When it was reported that seven Warburton men were trapped at the mill, Constable Theobald courageously attempted to force his way through the Warburton end, but found that would have meant suicide, as the road was impassable.[57]

> Courage almost past belief was displayed by the four women who survived the disaster at Yelland's.[58]

Such stalwart demeanour can also be read into the images of women calmly pouring tea for groups of survivors at community refuges. Stoicism is also modeled by survivor Mr. George Unger, who makes light of his ordeal sheltering from the fires in a dugout, in his first-person account to a journalist:

> Apart from about an hour while the large wooden hut close to the dugout was burning fiercely, we managed along pretty well.[59]

This downplaying of the emotions that must have been experienced by Mr. Unger and the other men implies that stoicism is an orthodox response to telling one's own story of suffering and courage, and models for the public the expected demeanor within this emotional community.

Supporting this discourse of stoicism we find in the media reports of the 1930s were publicly circulating discourses around maintaining a cheerful attitude during difficult times. For example, in Lesley Johnson's analysis of radio discourse in the 1930s, she writes "readers were adjured to pull together, help each other, and smile in the face of the present economic malady;" also

that "private remedies should be sought for private troubles."[60] This suggests an explanation for the absence of a discourse of grief in the 1939 coverage. A further factor constraining the public presentation of emotions in the 1930s was the centralized nature of media institutions (as remained the case up to the 1980s). We can also add that operation of technology such as cameras required professional expertise. This structured the audience as passive in the sense that they had little control over media content. When the audience became the subjects of media a particular demeanor was expected and conformed with, clearly exemplified in the news photographs (posed, formal, static, and public). The emotional community of this time, as structured by these 1930s' media conventions and technologies, maintained a formal and respectful distance between disaster victims and the wider public. A stoic attitude to emotions was instilled through the exemplars of first-hand narratives (as for the two later periods) but also modeled through a restrained approach to the reporting of emotions, and in particular the absence of overt expressions or images of grief or death.

CONCLUSION

What we have attempted to do through this analysis of journalistic testimony and photographic images is to demonstrate how media coverage of bushfires brings individual emotions into a relation with those of a wider emotional community. In our tracking of the media discourses from 1939 to 2009, certain emotions have emerged as relatively stable responses to trauma/disaster, particularly fear, courage, and stoicism. Yet there are also some interesting shifts, particularly in the positioning of the reader/viewer as witness (and this is tied to drivers such as available media technologies and literacies). Fear is one of the emotional frameworks that has remained consistent across this period—fear is an instinctive response to the overwhelming threat to life posed by bushfires, and thus the public acknowledgment of fear by survivors and rescuers is not regarded as shameful. Similarly, the discourses of courage and stoicism persist as significant ways of structuring "appropriate" responses and judgments of actions.

Where the shift has been more marked is in relation to discourses of grief and death. This shift is important as it demonstrates how emotions are not entirely socially constructed but produced and circulated within emotional communities shaped by sociocultural "rules." While grief is a personal and private process in 1983, and is not portrayed at all in 1939, in 2009 it is not only acceptable but expected that private individuals will publicly display their grief. What is more, audiences are included in the grieving process. This is facilitated not only through the stories but through the prominent use of images of survivors' emotional responses. The witnessing of trauma through photography facilitates public responsiveness;[61] it requires of us an attentiveness to the event and its effects. In this process,

a collective response is generated so that "bearing witness moves individuals from the personal act of 'seeing' to the adoption of a public stance."[62] As Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen attest,[63] newspaper descriptions and representations of feeling "work to change emotions . . . play[ing] a role in the emotional dynamics involved in politics and societal change." Hence, the imagery captured in the photograph asks us to bear witness, acknowledge, and share the pain of others, linking individuals into a community based on shared emotions.

Our analysis demonstrates that while there is a "transformation of behaviour and the emotions"[64] in response to the trauma of a bushfire, it is not gradual and it is not characterized by progressively tighter controls over emotions. Instead, we have identified that in different periods what is presented in the media both reflects and constitutes the fluctuating values of a community in response to trauma. For example, in 1939 public sharing of what are deemed "private" emotions is not seen as an appropriate response; however, in 2009 this display of emotional control is loosened. In this respect, we concur with Barbara Rosenwein's critique of Elias in pointing out that societies do not necessarily follow a linear path of increasing emotional self-control.[65] Our analysis of the function of emotions in disaster news indicates that what is important in the construction of emotional communities is the nature of the emotional bonds that form these communities at various periods, and that these bonds may promote or privilege different emotional behavior (overt grief or stoicism or selfless courage) in moments of crisis. The media's role in amplifying and commodifying emotions has accelerated a shift toward public sharing of private emotions in the twenty-first century. Public emotional display—and the act of bearing witness to this—is becoming the new form of emotional regulation.

NOTES

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2. John Schauble, "Message in a Bottle: Culture, Bushfire and Community Understanding," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Queensland* 115 (2009): 93–99.
3. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization,* trans. Edmund Jephcott (Blackwell: Oxford, 1994 [1939]).
4. Barbara Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 821–845; Barbara Rosenwein,

Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

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8. Willemijn Ruberg, "Interdisciplinarity and the History of Emotions," *Cultural and Social History* 6, no. 4 (2009): 507–516.
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10. Mervi Katriina Pantti and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, "'Not an Act of God': Anger and Citizenship in Press Coverage of British Man-made Disasters," *Media, Culture & Society* 33, no. 1 (2011): 105–122.
11. Catherine Lumby, *Bad Girls: The Media, Sex and Feminism in the 90's* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997); Peter Lunt and Paul Stenner, "The Jerry Springer Show as an Emotional Public Sphere," *Media, Culture & Society* 27, no. 1 (2005): 59–81.
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13. Deborah Lupton, *The Emotional Self: A Sociocultural Exploration* (London: Sage, 1998); David Altheide, *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002); Frank Furedi, *Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age* (London: Routledge, 2004); Lunt and Stenner, "The Jerry Springer Show as an Emotional Public Sphere;" Barry Richards, *Emotional Governance: Politics, Media and Terror* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
14. Richards, *Emotional Governance*, 35.
15. Derek Edwards, "Emotion," in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader,* ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates (London: Sage, 2001), 242.
16. Tony Walter, Jane Littlewood, and Michael Pickering, "Death in the News: The Public Invigilation of Private Emotion," *Sociology* 29, no. 4 (1995): 586.
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27. Plamper "History of Emotions;" Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*.
28. Rachel Hughes and David Mercer, "Planning to Reduce Risk: The Wildfire Management Overlay in Victoria, Australia," *Geographical Research* 47, no. 2 (2009): 124–141.
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31. James Jasper, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of Politics: Rethinking Ends and Means" in *Emotion, Politics and Society*, ed. Simon Clarke et al. (London: Palgrave, 2006), 16.
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33. Jasper, "Emotions," 17.
34. Jewel Topsfield, "House Alight, Boy Told to Run for His Life," *The Age*, 9 February 2009, 5.
35. Paula M. Salvio, "Uncanny Exposures: A Study of the Wartime Photojournalism of Lee Miller," *Curriculum Inquiry* 39, no. 4 (2009): 529.
36. Salvio, "Uncanny Exposures," 528.
37. Selma Milovanovic, "St Andrews Reels as News of Four Deaths Hits Home," *The Age*, 9 February 2009, 5.
38. Milovanovic, "St Andrews Reels," 5; Selma Milovanovic, "Soldiers' Boots Break Silence of the Grave," *The Age*, 11 February 2009, 11.
39. Milovanovic, "Soldiers' Boots Break Silence," 11.
40. Topsfield, "House Alight," 5.
41. The Azaria Chamberlain case was a *cause célèbre* in Australia in 1980. A young baby was taken and killed by a dingo while her family was on a camping trip at Uluru in the Northern Territory. However, her mother, Lindy Chamberlain, was tried for murder and held in prison for over three years until new evidence was found. In 2012, the Chamberlains' version of events was officially confirmed by a coroner. Public opinion and media reports were polarized as to Lindy Chamberlain's guilt or innocence, and the case is now used to demonstrate how media bias can adversely impact on the judicial system.
42. Richard Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died on a Hillside," *The Age,* 18 February 1983, 1.
43. The Dandenongs refers to a mountain range located east of Melbourne.
44. Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died," 1, 6.
45. Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died," 1.
46. John Lahey, "Tunnel Shelters 83 Fire Refugees," *The Age,* 18 February 1983, 3.
47. Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died," 1.
48. Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died," 6.
49. Tom Duggan "Homeless and Hurt, but Still Lucky," *The Age,* 18 February 1983, 3.

50. Duggan, "Homeless and Hurt," 3.
51. Yallop, "How the Brave 12 Died," 1.
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56. No author, "Dramatic Messages," *The Age*, 14 January 1939, 25.
57. No author, "Rescue Party," 11.
58. No author, "Women's Epic Courage," *The Age*, 16 January 1939, 13.
59. No author, "Dugouts," *The Age*, 13 January, 1939, 11.
60. Lesley Johnson, *The Unseen Voice: A Cultural Study of Early Radio* (London: Routledge, 1988), 88.
61. Barbie Zelizer, "Photography, Journalism and Trauma," in *Journalism after September 11,* ed. Zelizer and Stuart Allan (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 48–68.
62. Zelizer, "Photography, Journalism and Trauma," 52.
63. Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, "'Not an Act of God,'" 106.
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65. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History." In Elias's defense, Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy, and Ivan Waddington argue that his model allows for this, in proposing that contradictory tendencies (civilizing and decivilizing) may coexist, although one generally predominates. See Eric Dunning et al., "Violence in the British Civilizing Process," in *Norbert Elias*, vol. 2, ed. Dunning and Stephen Mennell (London: Sage): 5–34.

Part II

Emotions and Enlightened Empires

Histories of Contested Emotions

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7 Adam Ferguson's Sociology of Emotion

Lisa Hill

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is about the role of emotions in the social science of a key figure of the Scottish Enlightenment: Adam Ferguson (1723–1815). Ferguson lived and wrote during the period of intense intellectual activity known as the Scottish Enlightenment.[1] He was a highly respected—indeed famous—figure in his day and exerted considerable intellectual influence in Britain and America as well as Europe.

Ferguson's work on emotions is intrinsic to his macrosociology of institutions—his theory of spontaneous order—which was the most complex and sophisticated rendering to date. In laying out his theory of spontaneous order, Ferguson was at the center of a Scottish movement that challenged the commonplace Enlightenment faith in reason to stress the importance of drives and affect in the maintenance of human life and the forging of human progress. In doing so, Ferguson, in particular, rehabilitated emotions hitherto regarded as negative, especially those that incited competition, conflict, social change, and even limited forms of destruction. In his focus on the relationship between conflict and order he is an important anticipator of the ideas of Norbert Elias (1897–1990) as well as other thinkers like Lewis Coser and Karl Marx. While there are points of divergence between Ferguson and Elias, both were alert to the sociological importance of human affect; in particular, both appreciated that the key to the flourishing, progressive society lay in understanding how best to harness, channel, and constrain human aggression.

Although Elias never cites Ferguson, there is a line of filiation between Elias and those Ferguson and his fellow Scots are known to have influenced with their notion of the "unintended consequences of human action," the idea that the motor of the human universe is found in the subrational, passionate side of human nature. Elias read G.W.F. Hegel and Marx, who, in turn, were influenced by Ferguson in his rendering of what Hegel would later refer to as the "cunning of reason." It is also possible that Elias read Ferguson while studying in London in the early 1930s.[2] But this chapter is not so much about Ferguson's relationship to Elias as about how an

eighteenth-century thinker, still held hostage by the design principle, sought to frame, arguably, the first coherent sociology of emotion.

Before continuing, it should be noted that the term "emotions" is a rather inadequate term for the topic under consideration in this chapter. Here it serves as a shorthand for any motivator of human activity that is inherent. Ferguson's preferred term was "passions," and by this he generally meant all the innate "drives," "instincts," affect, "sentiments," "appetites," "aversions," and even "dispositions" that galvanize human agents into action. But he often uses these more specific terms in a discourse intent on contrasting the whole range of subrational human experience with that of reason.

THE FIRST SOCIOLOGIST OR TRANSITIONAL THINKER?

It is often suggested that Ferguson is the "Father of Sociology."[3] Although he can be rightly claimed as one of its many parents, the attachment of the modern label "sociologist" should not obscure the theological and classical tendencies of Ferguson's project. Instead of reading Ferguson anachronistically as a thinker intent on forging a modern tradition in the spirit of Coser, Elias, Spencer, Hayek, Marx, or Durkheim, from his own perspective he was attempting to marry classical and theological sensibilities with a more modern approach to social science. From an intellectual historian's point of view, then, he is a transitional thinker rather than a completely modern one. Demonstrating this is a key aim of this chapter; the other aim is to outline the physics of Ferguson's sociology of emotion in light of aim one. The discussion commences by exploring the classical and theological context for Ferguson's social science, after which the model itself is laid out. Particular attention is paid to the role of conflict and aggression in Ferguson's theory of social order, change, and progress and his anticipation of twentieth-century conflict theory.

Classical Influence.

There are pronounced nostalgic tendencies in Ferguson: of his classical influences, the dominant were Stoic, specifically Roman Stoic. Except for its fatalistic aspects, he liked almost everything about Stoicism, from its religious and moral content to its practical advice for living. So much the Stoic was Ferguson that he commonly referred to himself as "the Old Roman" while the *Edinburgh Review* dubbed him "the Scottish Cato."[4] Ferguson adopted and reworked Stoicism's key concepts: its Deism, theodicy, belief in universal benevolence, moral cosmopolitanism, universalism, idea of civic virtue as active and martial, and focus on the virtues of *philanthropia* (benevolence) and *sympathia* (our affinity or organic relationship to one another). The idea of resignation to the will of the "mind-fire spirit" that is central to Stoic thought also became important to Ferguson's spontaneous order theory, while Stoic Deism and theodicy proved, paradoxically, to be important enablers of his attempts at an early social science.

Of course, Ferguson was not the only member of the Scottish literati to be influenced by Stoicism. Stoicism enjoyed a popular revival in eighteenth-century Scotland;[5] but none of Ferguson's contemporaries relied so heavily on Stoicism for interpreting social life, particularly where Nature's apparent evils and contradictions were concerned.

A PROVIDENTIALIST SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESIGN, THEODICY, AND TELEOLOGY

Ferguson was an early social scientist who also wanted to affirm the centrality of God's role in understanding the workings of society: he was a Deist in the mold of Stoicism, and the God he referred to works by General not Special Providence. The distinction between General and Special Providence is quite important in comprehending Ferguson's place in the intellectual history of social science, and it can be described as follows: General Providence refers to God's action in the original creation of nature. In the beginning God created the material frame of nature and structured it to function in obedience to the laws of nature that "He" also created. On this view, God is the "Great Clockmaker"[6] who creates the world and invests it with laws of nature to keep it in perpetual motion. The world, and all its components, is perfect, self-governing, and self-equilibrating, thereby permitting the Creator to retire, never to be seen or heard from again. This is the view of God favored by Deists and, in particular, the Stoics and Ferguson. In contrast to this original creative act of General Providence is "Special Providence," which refers to a creative God who is omniscient and omnipotent and remains a perpetual witness to—and presence in—human affairs. In this conception of Providence (favored by, for example, the Christian religion), after He has finished designing and creating the world, God continues to observe and intervene in human affairs: punishing sins; rewarding good deeds, listening to and sometimes answering prayers, as well as transmitting messages through miracles, visions, and even positive documents like the Bible. Unlike General Providence, which works by impersonal, immutable, and universal general laws, "His" interventions tend to cancel or contravene the normal course of "natural operations."[7] As a genuinely pious thinker, Ferguson could not take the atheistic Humean path to social science; further, such a path would not have been warmly received by either the authorities or the public. So he sought to unite the opposing universes of religion and science via his belief that God's will is expressed in the workings of efficient or secondary causes rather than through direct divine intervention: "[t]he author of nature, though himself omnipotent, acts in every department by the intervention of secondary causes."[8] The universe is designed but things happen because of impersonal, invariable, and self-regulating laws of nature, not because of God's special interventions. Like the Stoics, Ferguson disliked religious enthusiasm, superstition, and any religious belief that was based

on or incited fear. "True religion," said Ferguson, consists in the "study of nature, by which we are led to substitute a wise providence operating by physical causes" for "phantoms that terrify, or amuse the ignorant."[9] Understanding God's intentions for the world is a matter of calm and dispassionate natural science, not theological speculation or faith. Ferguson's theological social science is a form of Stoic theodicy. Convinced that society was "a system" benignly created and therefore governed by social laws that tended toward a positive equilibrium, Ferguson believed that all our inherent tendencies, even the apparently vicious ones, have a positive latent function. But what exactly is theodicy?

Theodicy.

All religions that insist on a God that is at once omniscient, omnipotent, and benign must confront the question: *If God is good, why evil?* Attempts to answer this question are referred to as theodicies, and any pious answer must avoid the heterodoxy of impugning the perfect beneficence and omnipotence of God. An orthodox Christian would not, for example, explain the world's apparent evils by referring to God's lack of interest in human welfare, "His" poor workmanship, or lapses in divine attention. Rather, the typical Christian response is to lay the blame at the feet of free will—and the multitude of vicious impulses and emotions it unleashes—in humans. The Stoics, by contrast, proposed a more elegant solution, which is to deny the existence of evil altogether. Instead, what we call evil is really misperception and misconception. Every feature of the created universe, even its seemingly harsh and maladaptive aspects, performs some positive role in the benign master plan and is actually a sign of God's beneficence. The most famous Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, was an incorrigible optimist who denied that any of our drives or passions is ultimately unworthy. He wrote that even "roguery" and "impudence" are "necessary to the world" just as "sickness, death, slander, intrigue, and all the other things that delight or trouble foolish men" are "normal."[10] Marcus admonished those who contemplate the apparent evils of life with "mistrust" to understand that this "is but Nature's way; and in the ways of Nature there is no evil to be found."[11] Ferguson likewise held to the perfection of God and all his works. In his attempt to "justify the ways of God to men"[12] he insisted that apparent evil does not negate the existence of God but rather manifestly attests to it.[13] He believed in a world created perfect, "sublime," and "beautiful,"[14] where every apparent inconvenience and obstacle is benign and, moreover, benignly *purposeful*, that is, teleological. Even the physical world fits adaptively within this scheme.

> [W]hat appears a war of the elements is the peace of that world they compose: The winds are instruments of beneficence; rain and snow are the gifts of bounty; what seems to be irregular is the perfection of order; the rugged crag and broken hill give a sheltered recess to many inhabitants, and, in all their asperity, fit up the residence of animals,

> and adorn the prospect of man . . . the movement of parts in nature conspires to the preservation and well-being of the whole.[15]

It might be thought that Ferguson's Providentialism disqualifies his theory as a significant forerunner of secular social science. However, the theological dimension does not drastically affect outcomes because the primary arena of activity is at the individuo-psychic, efficient-causes level. Generally,[16] Ferguson's explanations *depend* neither on First Causes nor on the Special interventions of Providence since Ferguson's "God" is a General rather than Special Providence: order is generated by efficient causes; therefore the model is effectively comparable with secular contemporary accounts like Hume's or twentieth-century accounts like those of F. A. Hayek or Norbert Elias. In fact, Ferguson's Deistic theology is what enables him to forge a secular type of social science. It allows him to push philosophy into the realm of secondary laws of nature and past discourses about the inherent sinfulness of "men" and their self-regarding drives, thereby aiding the emergence of (descriptive) social science proper. Rather than moralizing about or wishing away our apparently vicious drives, theorists—especially pious ones like Ferguson—could now focus on their adaptive *functions* or purposes in a morally neutral, social-scientific spirit of inquiry.

EMOTIONS AND ORDER

Despite the theological dimension, Ferguson's is a proper sociology of emotion: like the late modern sociologists of emotions he anticipated, Ferguson insists that our "passions," "sentiments," "appetites," "desires and aversions" are not epiphenomena, but independent variables, the efficient or secondary *causes* of order and progress, given by "God" for benign purposes. His approach is firmly grounded in the empirical world, and he used all the available anthropological sources[17] to produce a general explanation of humanity that revealed the unintended consequences of innate drives, sentiments, and passions. These passions are the source of all the order, progress, prosperity, and safety in the human universe. The list below covers most of them:

Basic

> —The sex instinct ("the mutual inclination of the sexes") leads to the propagation of the species.
> —The fight-or-flight response permits us to survive, flourish, and prosper.

More complicated

> —Class resentment, covetousness, and envy lead to formal government.

—Invidious comparison and avidity generate the quest for excellence and the pursuit of wealth. Both, in turn, generate progress.
—Self-interest inadvertently gives rise to a range of secondary, commercial virtues like probity, punctuality, industry, and frugality.
—Parental affection leads to the formation of the family and society.
—The herding instinct develops, over time, into nationalistic sentiments and thereafter leads to the emergence of sovereign states.
—Group altruism promotes survival.
—Moral progress springs from self-interest and "ambition," and is a combination of restlessness, activism, creativity, and a compulsive desire for improvement.
—Shame operates as a powerful means of social control; "esteem of merit" drives us to both self- and other-regarding acts with socially useful consequences.
—Habituality confirms our destiny to live by norms and mores and to preserve knowledge gained.
—Competition, belligerence, and hostility indirectly preserve social cohesion, enhance political efficacy, protect rights, and give rise to an organized state, positive law, and advances in defense technology and statecraft.
—Conflict between political factions preserves liberties and provides a valuable outlet for group and class conflict (catharsis).
—Conflict prevents social ossification.

As a thinker wedded to the Design argument and with no theory of evolution and open-ended adaptation to work from even if he'd wanted to, Ferguson offers a study of the human powers that is explicitly teleological.[18] The faculties are always defined in terms of their *purpose*: "Who ever doubted that the eye was made to see, the ear to hear, the mouth to receive, and the teeth to grind his food; that the foot was made to step on the ground; the hand to grasp, or enable him to seize and apply things proper for his use."[19] We are born vulnerable and in need of the assistance of others because we are *destined* to live in society[20] and desirous and capable of communication for the same reason;[21] ambitious because *destined* to advance;[22] discerning because "formed" to make moral distinctions; self-preserving because *destined* to survive, flourish, and prosper;[23] introspective and intelligent because *destined* to know ourselves;[24] magnanimous, tenacious, wise, and resilient because *destined* to struggle;[25] belligerent because *destined* to develop through conflict;[26] and habitual because "*destined*" to "improve by exercise."[27]

IRRATIONALISM AND SPONTANEOUS ORDER

Ferguson and his fellow Scots ran counter to the general Enlightenment faith in reason, arguing that most of what happens in human life is attributable to subrational forces. Deliberate planning plays only a minor role in the unfolding of history; instead, short-term goals pursued at the microlevel,

powered by drives and *short-term* rationality and reinforced by habit, achieve, in the long term, never-dreamed-of results. For humans, there can be no synoptic perspective on the totality of human affairs because everything important happens from the bottom up: events taking place at the social-systems or final-causes level are the exclusive concern of God and relate to the big picture, while the less demanding responsibilities associated with efficient causes are delegated to human agents. This is a two-tiered model: the first tier is represented by the individual goal level, the second by the social-systems level, an arrangement that could be described as "Providentialist functionalism." The human universe is a *designed, integrated* system whereby underlying mental structures give rise to a universal pattern of social, cultural, technological, and political structures.

Ferguson believed that our lives are governed by the law of unintended consequences or the "law of the heterogeneity of ends." In pursuit of our limited short-term goals as driven by our passions, we achieve unimagined and unintended social-systems effects.

> Mankind, in following the present sense of their minds, in striving to remove inconveniences, or to gain apparent and contiguous advantages, arrive at ends which even their imagination could not anticipate; and pass on, like other animals, in the track of their nature, without perceiving its end. . . . Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed the enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, *which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.*[28]

The social world therefore embodies an intelligence that transcends the intelligence of individuals apart. Social existence is a product, not of constructivist planning or the "projects of single men," but arises from "the situation and genius of the people."[29] Institutions develop insensibly and by degrees, the product of countless individual actions through time. Interference by individuals—and especially the state—in the social system's sphere of activity should be strictly avoided. Such attempts will be either disastrous, counterproductive, or farcical, akin to the deluded "fly in the fable, who admired its success, in turning the wheel, and in moving the carriage," whereas in fact "he has only accompanied what was already in motion . . . and waved with his fan, to give speed to the winds."[30] In Ferguson's thought there is very little faith in the ability of humans to secure their needs via reason; in fact, the more crucial to the success and prosperity of our species is the function or institution, the less likely it is to be left to the unreliable judgment of individual agents. A good example here is the perpetuation of the species. Propagation is "to the race, what the vital motion of the heart is to the individual," therefore the Creator wisely avoids consigning "the preservation of nature's works" to the precarious judgment "of those most clearly concerned."[31] Legislative attempts

at population control impugn the laws of spontaneous order and misguidedly treat procreation as a "kind of workhouse into which [people] must be driven by the goad and the whip" when they are already "powerfully led, by the most irresistible calls of affection, passion and desire."[32] Efficient causes are restricted to purely temporal desires and inclinations, whereas sustainable population levels, upon which the survival of the species depends, are the sole province of the Creator. That is to say, we can be trusted to "mate" and to pursue other limited functions relating to self-preservation, but we are not to be trusted to ensure the perpetuation and long-term prosperity of our species. The same goes for every other vital species function. As Ferguson puts it so neatly:

> Charged with the care of his preservation, admonished by a sense of pleasure or pain, and guarded by an instinctive fear of death, nature has not intrusted [humanity's] safety to the mere vigilance of his understanding, nor to the government of his uncertain reflections.[33]

Ferguson's spontaneous order theory targets rational constructivism and contractarianism, including any overreliance on the principle of system-level instrumental rationality to explain the maintenance of social life (there is, therefore, a strong conservative dimension to his thought). His approach is noteworthy for discarding traditional historiographies that dominated up until that time. These included notions of an original contract; great legislator myths or "Kings and Queens" accounts of history; and the diffusionist theory of civilization that was still popular among the French Encyclopedists.[34] Instead, social order and progress is a group process, generated by "the hidden wisdom immanent in a dispersed and evolutionary system."[35] Ferguson's alternative is a noncognitive, irrationalist theory of history and society that presages structural-functionalist explanations for the development and maintenance of social patterns, institutions, and mores. It therefore makes an important step in the direction of modern social science.

FERGUSON'S CONFLICT THEORY

The remainder of the discussion focuses on Ferguson's conflict theory because it is this aspect of his sociology of passions that best brings out Ferguson's place in intellectual history. Specifically, although his discourse on conflict and aggression strikes many modern and prescient notes, it also reflects his classical influences and provides the most extreme test case for his theodicy. At the same time, it highlights his originality as a thinker and as a progenitor of concepts often attributed to later thinkers like Ludwig Gumplowicz, Coser, and Elias.

Ferguson's exposition of conflict distanced him "from the conventional position of his century."[36] He opposed contemporaries like Smith and Hume by rejecting the prevailing attitude that progress, commerce, and civilization would (and should) bring tranquillity. He also disputed the Hobbesian premise that the key purpose of society is stability and social harmony, confronting the false dichotomy promulgated by contractarians of tranquil society, on the one hand, and violent, isolated chaos on the other. Rather, for Ferguson we are social beings with belligerent tendencies. In other words, we are neither just nasty nor just nice: our species has always been social and has always been motivated by two sets of drives, those of "union and opposition." In fact, they are two sides of the same coin. Ferguson lauded (in the same breath) the "simple passions" of "friendship, resentment, and love" and wrote nostalgically of those "[s]mall and simple tribes" whose conflicts with out-groups were "animated with the most implacable hatred." [37] Similar arguments are found in Cicero: what we might otherwise perceive as "brutality and savagery," when "restrained by the uniting bonds of society," become productive and praiseworthy "courage."[38]

Ferguson's attitude here contrasts with that of Elias, who, while equally interested in the sociological dimension of conflict, saw the violent society as essentially primitive and undeveloped. In such societies the unpredictability of social life is a significant constraint on progress. But once conflict has been "subject to stricter control" through the "formation of monopolies of force" (first by warrior elites and later by the state) life becomes more orderly, "calculable," and predictable and everyday life "freer of sudden reversals of fortune."[39] Whereas Ferguson opposed the professionalization and centralization of martial functions,[40] Elias saw civilization as secured by the "taming" of a dispersed castle warrior nobility and the accompanying centralization of martial functions within an organized modern state. In advanced societies "[p]hysical violence" is now "confined to barracks" and "breaks out only in extreme cases" such as times of war.[41] Ferguson was never as "modern" as Elias (or even Smith and Hume)[42] in his approach to the relationship between violence and development. On his account, violence must in some measure be allowed to stay dispersed and in the hands of the citizenry because we "appear to have in [our] minds the seeds of animosity, and to embrace the occasions of mutual opposition, with alacrity and pleasure."[43] These drives are both universal and innate, known as they are to "every savage" and "every boy . . . at his play." We even "exult in the midst of alarms that seem to threaten [our] being." Indeed, our possession of such respectable virtues as "magnanimity, fortitude, and wisdom" confirms our *destiny* to "struggle" in adversity,[44] opined Ferguson, waxing teleologically. Conflict is an authentic form of sociation, not something necessarily destructive, maladaptive, or to be avoided. Yet, despite the genuine originality of his approach, it is worth remembering that Ferguson found his inspiration in classical sources like the Stoics, Tacitus, and Machiavelli and his justification in Stoic theodicy.

Conflict generates many positive, unintended consequences: it prevents social ossification; stimulates the formation of the state, formal defense institutions, and large-scale communities; plays a pivotal role in the cultivation of virtue and the development of the moral personality (in men); preserves the balance of powers in government and prevents the encroachment of despotism; contributes to the maintenance of social stability and cohesion; and, when controlled, is beneficially cathartic, allowing people to discharge suppressed and potentially destructive hostilities. This, in turn, offsets the stifling effects of routinized social relations within increasingly ordered societies.

For Ferguson, humanity is at its most creative and progressive, not in solitary contemplation, but embroiled in all kinds of "ferments," wars, and factional disputes.[45] Conflict is thus fundamental to the flourishing of human societies and the march toward civilization. This contrasts with the dominant view among Ferguson's contemporaries that civilization was synonymous with the gradual extirpation of conflict.

But Ferguson was not wholly opposed to this perspective. While he stressed the positive function of conflict, he also observed and welcomed the fact that as cultures progress and "civilize" they get better at containing and productively channeling conflict. In "polished" nations, war is waged less brutally and more justly,[46] and violence is less ubiquitous and random now that an organized state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.[47] In fact, Ferguson agrees with Elias that societies fraught with unrestrained conflict are primitive and that a society cannot call itself civilized until violence has come to be regulated, channeled, and checked, where "[q]uarrelling" is regulated by "rules" rather than "the immediate dictates of passion" that end "in words of reproach, in violence, and blows."[48]

Anticipating Norbert Elias's theory of "parliamentarianization," Ferguson noted that the modern state is also superior to the extent that it has learned to constrain the brutality and destructiveness of pre-commercial party politics. Formerly when political rivals

> . . . took arms in the division of faction, the prevailing party supported itself by expelling their opponents, by proscriptions, and bloodshed. The usurper endeavoured to maintain his station by the most violent and prompt executions. He was opposed, in his turn, by conspiracies and assassinations, in which the most respectable citizens were ready to use the dagger.[49]

Elias and Dunning would later make a similar observation about the period in which Ferguson wrote: during the eighteenth century political rivals in Britain "gradually lost their distrust of each other and gave up relying on the violence and the skills connected with it." Instead, they sought to resolve conflicts via the institutions of representative democracy. They now had to learn "the new skills and strategies required by a non-violent type

of contest" such as were required by parliamentary contest. Military skills gave way to the verbal skills of debate, of rhetoric and persuasion, all of which required far greater restraint. Such a change furnished Britain with a significant "civilizing spurt."[50]

By the same token, Ferguson was clear that civilization can never—and should never—attempt to eradicate conflict altogether if it wants to stay strong, vital, and progressive. Conflict is primal and natural, not something we can ever transcend. Too much order will lead to inertia, loss of social cohesion, and therefore corruption, classically understood as a developmental reversal. Ferguson seems to have appreciated the importance of what were to become central tenets of twentieth-century conflict theory, namely, that excessive consensus can be detrimental by inhibiting "adaptation to change" and encouraging "maladjustive inertia," tendencies that could "precipitate the disintegration of a group"[51] To be—and stay—civilized societies had to contain and harness but never utterly *dispel* conflict.

War.

Ferguson was also alert to the problem of lack of excitement in societies that were becoming increasingly unexciting. In particular, how would a commercializing—and therefore "softening"—nation like Britain cope with the management of human aggression?[52] Ferguson was keenly aware of the role played by specialization in the transition from barbarism to civilization, from a warrior culture dominated by codes of chivalry to a market culture based on legal rules, "cool," commercial virtues (like probity, frugality, and punctuality), a strict division between work and leisure, and a new reliance on professional standing armies for defense. Could human boisterousness and belligerence be contained within the relative dullness of polite society?

Ferguson consciously emulated Tacitus's and Machiavelli's moral approach to war by emphasizing its positive aspects. It was Tacitus who taught that it was the love of "danger itself" rather than the material and social "rewards of courage" that inspired belligerent activism.[53] And following Machiavelli and the Stoics, Ferguson held that, because war was sometimes unavoidable, it could be an occasion for displays of martial virtue.[54] Just war (that is, war in defense of home territory) is not only virtuous activity but, for many, an avocation, even a form of recreation or play.[55] War provides the perfect occasion for the exercise of our active powers and is rated "the most illustrious career of human virtue": "Sentiments of affection and friendship mix with animosity; the active and strenuous become the guardians of their society; and violence itself is, in their case, an exertion of generosity as well as courage."[56] Ferguson recovered Tacitus's conviction that war is purgative and therefore beneficial.[57] He also anticipated the theory of repression by suggesting that the suppression of instinctive belligerence is not only damaging to the "passive sufferer" but may lead to still greater violence.[58]

There are times when war is unavoidable and even desirable. Indeed, wars can represent periods of intense productivity and creativity for those involved:[59] only a fool considers "the time of necessary war among nations as a period of misery, or the time of peace as, of course, a season of happiness."[60] War suggests the necessity of regular government or "departments of state" and ensures its ongoing survival by preserving solidarity between its members.[61] Endorsing Machiavelli's observation that war strengthens social bonds, Ferguson noted that the perception of external common enemies results in communities that are "faithful, disinterested (and) generous."[62] In prosperous nations, the constant threat of invasion leads to the formation of organized defense institutions, which entails the formation of larger communal units and, inevitably, the state. "Without the rivalship of nations, and the practice of war, civil society itself could scarcely have found an object, or a form."[63] We need our fellow "men" and the affection of those closest to us, but also, paradoxically, their rivalry.

CONFLICT PRESERVES FREE CONSTITUTIONS, FACTIONAL CONFLICT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

According to Hermann Strasser, Ferguson rates as "the single most important precursor of the theory of class conflict"[64] while Ludwig Gumplowicz identified Ferguson as the first significant exponent of the "group struggle" theory of social development.[65] Conflict is of particular service in helping to form and preserve free constitutions. The emergence of limited constitutional government is a function of "class" or factional conflict.[66] Factions clash over the efforts "to withstand the encroachments of sovereignty" upon the property and rights of individuals, which, in turn, gives rise to the necessity of government restrained by law. Out of this dialectical process Ferguson anticipated an exponential accumulation of "wise establishments" advantageous to "Liberty and Just Government."[67] Once "free" constitutions have been established, they must be preserved, and, again, this is achieved through conflict. Faction, motivated by self-interest, preserves liberty, which is "maintained by the continued differences and oppositions of numbers, not by their concurring zeal in behalf of equitable government."[68] Machiavelli made similar observations; there is even a section in the *Discourses* entitled "That Discord Between the Plebs and the Senate of Rome made this Republic both Free and Powerful" in which he argues that, provided that a people are uncorrupted, tumults are, at worst, harmless and may even help to preserve free constitutions.[69]

Ferguson's discussion of party faction and the perils of political harmony is a critical commentary on Hume and Smith, who saw factions as a burden in their tendency to exacerbate social conflict, undermine the rule of law, and "subvert government."[70] But, for Ferguson, faction and free government go hand in hand. Without the disputes arising from faction,

free government is threatened by the potential for despotism: "liberty is never in greater danger than it is when we measure national felicity . . . by the . . . mere tranquillity" that a ruler "may bestow."[71] Ferguson endorsed the argument first set out by Polybius in the *Rise of the Roman Empire* that the Romans maintained free constitutions "not . . . by means of abstract reasoning, but rather through the lessons learned from many struggles and difficulties" and through the adoption of reforms indicated by "the light of experience."[72] Far from being a sign of stability, political quiescence hides a sinister reality: "the turbulence of free states is contrasted with the seeming tranquillity of despotical government."[73] Public disturbances indicate the *existence*, rather than absence, of rule of law and the protection of such rights as free speech and right of protest. Ferguson admonished as misguided anyone who would seek to reconcile the "animosities" and "opinions of men" for "[n]othing . . . but corruption can suppress the debates that subsist among men of integrity." Indeed, "our very praise of unanimity" is "a danger to liberty."[74]

For Ferguson, faction was good because it is a preventative of that fatal precursor to political corruption: apathy, or to use Ferguson's terms (paraphrasing Plutarch), that "complaisance, by which men submit their opinions without examination."[75] We must guard against the erosion of our "refractory and turbulent zeal," our willingness to "resist indignities." Ferguson even endorsed Plutarch's suggestion that legislators should deliberately encourage factional dispute.[76]

SPORT AND PLAY

Sport, competition, and play serve a number of latent but vital social functions in Ferguson's theory of order and progress. He anticipated the process that Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning were to later refer to as "sportization" and agreed that it is a key mechanism in the civilizing process insofar as it compensates for "the control and restraint of overt emotionality" demanded of modern subjects by permitting a "more regulated expression of aggressive emotions and impulses."[77]

Ferguson's discourse on the subject embodies a rejection of the hedonistic (i.e., Epicurean) opposition of pleasure and pain: activities involving effort, struggle, even pain, are perfectly congenial to the active nature of "man," while boredom, inactivity, and respite from danger and "manly occupation" are actually forms of "suffering and pain."[78] Better that the idle men of Britain learn to "knit and sow [sic]" than remain idle[79] and subsequently "droop . . . and languish."[80]

For Ferguson our species is instinctively bellicose and competitive as indicated in our games and sports, which are often the very "image of war." Indeed, the natural urges at play are precisely the same for both sportsman and the soldier.[81] Sports such as "shooting at mark," gaming, even poaching

and other forms of "pursuit" are a rehearsal for martial competence.[82] This is reminiscent of Machiavelli's observation in the *Discourses* that the sport of hunting "teaches one a host of . . . things that are essential in warfare."[83] Sports also provide outlets for otherwise uncontrolled aggression in times of peace and for those left at home during times of war.[84] For Ferguson, as for Elias and Dunning, sport represents a "controlled decontrolling of restraints on emotions" whereby emotion is at once aroused and satisfied. Organized games serve to offset the "stifling effects of the routinized organisation of social relations" within developing and therefore increasingly ordered societies. Sport is a "mimetic" activity. Genuinely dangerous situations are enacted or imitated in order to arouse emotional responses associated with warfare but "in 'safe' forms without the risks attached to the real thing."[85] Sport domesticates potentially dangerous impulses and channels the need for physical aggression into a relatively benign but satisfying symbolic form, a "metaphor for otherwise unacknowledged aspects of experience . . . the chaotic, uninhibited and uncontrollable competition which lurks beneath the apparently co-operative surface."[86] There is much more to the human story than a rationalistic working out of the hedonistic calculus. As Ferguson says: "If we did nothing but what reason prescribes we should pass but a dull life."[87] Rather, we are driven by the same irresistible urges that drive other species.

> Every animal is made to delight in the exercise of his natural talents and forces: The lion and the tyger sport with the paw; the horse delights to commit his mane to the wind, and forgets his pasture to try his speed in the field; the bull even before his brow is armed, and the lamb while yet an emblem of innocence, have a disposition to strike with the forehead, and anticipate, in play, the conflicts they are doomed to sustain. Man too is disposed to opposition, and to employ the forces of his nature against an equal antagonist; he loves to bring his reason, his eloquence, his courage, even his bodily strength, to the proof. His sports are frequently an image of war; sweat and blood are freely expended in play; and fractures or death are often made to terminate the pastimes of idleness and festivity.[88]

Note Ferguson's stoic complacence here about the fact that dangerous sports often lead to death. This, for Ferguson, is no tragedy but a perfectly natural "exit," just as a premature death on the battlefield is simply another "distemper . . . by which the author of nature has appointed our exit from human life."[89]

THEODICY REVISITED

Ferguson took care to address anticipated complaints that his embrace of conflict and violence might contradict his other claims about the supreme

benevolence of Providence, conceding that "Nature, in this instance, appears to disregard the safety and peace of her works, and to adopt a destructive policy."[90] However, the awkward facts of human existence are readily reconciled within his theodicy: "The difficulties and hardships of human life, are supposed to detract from the goodness of God," yet, "the great inventor of the game of human life knew well how to accommodate the players" who thrive in the face of danger and difficulty and languish for lack of challenging diversion.[91]

Avoidance of danger and repression of our conflictual drives would amount to a kind of heresy: since all of our psychological apparatus is Providential, it would be presumptuous of us to find fault in it. "Man" has a "mixt nature," said Ferguson, and, since God has created us, no instincts are redundant, nor should any be repressed. Why should we attempt to "repress one sett (sic) of animal enjoyments, and authorize another"?[92] Further, it is the survival of our species, not the survival of individuals apart that really counts, and since conflict is beneficially cathartic, prevents inertia, preserves free constitutions, and causes us to form cooperative, nurturing society (which, in turn, hones the moral personality and preserves the species through time), its advantages far outweigh its defects.

CONCLUSION

Ferguson was a moral philosopher who helped shape the developing methodologies of social science in order to combat his atheistic, hedonistic, and revolutionary adversaries. He wanted to demonstrate that the world, even its most discordant aspects, is the result of design and beneficent purpose. Therefore, whenever we detect a sociological flavor in Ferguson's work, we need to be mindful of the theological context within which this agenda is framed. We should also be mindful of the classical background in order to locate him accurately within intellectual traditions. At the same time, Ferguson's approach genuinely foreshadowed many of the concerns of the much later social sciences and the insights of such important thinkers as Norbert Elias in drawing attention to emotions in general, and highlighting the social functions of conflict and its role in aiding and constraining order and progress, in particular. Ferguson's interest in comparative anthropology and his perception of universal, underlying social structure and function—as determined by the passions—allowed him to speak in terms of social laws and therefore as an early social scientist able to inspire nineteenth- and twentieth-century sociologists.

Despite the theological and classical constraints on Ferguson's thought, he is still able to bring us closer to modern sociology by: a) his focus on secondary laws of motion and their beneficent (i.e., adaptive) effects and b) the application of an antique diagnostic tradition to the novel and changing conditions of an increasingly mass market society. In doing so, he gave us a

genuinely prescient and influential account of the central role of subrational motives in maintaining social order and galvanizing progress. It was the passions, not reason or conscious deliberation, that held the key to understanding the complex and mysterious human world.

NOTES

1. Alexander Broadie, *The Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001), 5.
2. Robert van Krieken, "Norbert Elias and Process Sociology," in *The Handbook of Social Theory*, ed. George Ritzer and Barry Smart (London: Sage, 2001), 353–367.
3. For a fuller discussion of this issue see Lisa Hill, "Anticipations of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Social Thought in the Work of Adam Ferguson," *European Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 1 (1996): 203–228.
4. Jane B. Fagg, *Adam Ferguson, Scottish Cato*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1968), 264.
5. M. A. Stewart, "The Origins of the Scottish Greek Chairs," in *Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects*, ed. E. M. Craik (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 399.
6. Isaac Newton was the most influential promulgator of the idea of God as the Great Clockmaker, and it was a fashionable trope for eighteenth-century Deists. However, Newton differed from Ferguson in one important respect: Newton's Clockmaker occasionally had to intervene and wind up the clock whereas Ferguson's did not, the world having been created perfect. This distinction was the basis of Newton's infamous feud with G. W. Leibniz (with Samuel Clarke representing Newton's position).
7. J. E. Force, "Hume and the Relation of Science to Religion Among Certain Members of the Royal Society," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 45, no. 4 (1984): 519.
8. Adam Ferguson "Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design," in *Collection of Essay*s, Adam Ferguson, ed. and intro. Yasuo Amoh (Kyoto: Rinsen, 1996), 124
9. Adam Ferguson *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1767]), 89–90.
10. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, trans. and intro. Maxwell Staniforth (London: Penguin, 1964), bk. 4, 44, 73.
11. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations,* bk. 2, 17, 51.
12. Adam Ferguson, *Principles of Moral and Political Science: Being Chiefly a Retrospect of Lectures Delivered in the College of Edinburgh, in Two Volumes* (Edinburgh: Printed for A. Strahan and T. Cadell, London; and W. Creech, Edinburgh, 1792) (hereafter cited as *Principles I or Principles II*), 172.
13. *Principles I*, 172–203.
14. *Principles II*, 27.
15. *Principles I*, 19.
16. Excepting his claims about human defects being deliberately endued in order to secure order and progress.
17. Among his contemporary "anthropological" sources were: Buffon's *Natural History*, *Halley's Tables*, Lowthorp's *Abridgement of Philosophical Transactions,* Wallace's *Numbers of Mankind*, Hume's *Populousness of Nations*, Lafitau's *Moeurs des Sauvages Ameriquains*, Abulgaze's *Geneological*

History of the Tartars, Chardin's *Travels*, Marsden's *History of Sumatra*, Colden's *History of Five Nations*, Charlevoix's *History of New France*, D'Arvieux's *History of the Wild Arabs,* Rubruquis's *Travels*, Carceri's *Voyage Around the World,* Strahlenberg's *Historical-Geographical Description of the North and Eastern Part of Europe and Asia*, Jones's *Dissertations on Asia,* and Kolbe's *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope*.

18. An entity has a teleological function when it has use or contributes to the "attainment of some end or purpose of some system or user" (William G. Wimstatt "Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function Statements," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 3, no. 1 (1972): 4–5.
19. Ferguson, "Of Things that are or May Be" (Part 1), *Collection of Essays*, No. 27, 220. See also *Principles I*, 165.
20. *Principles I*, 29.
21. *Principles I,* 47.
22. Ferguson, "Of the Laws of Nature in the Department of Active Man," *Collection of Essays,* 258; *Essay*, 12–13.
23. Ferguson, *Essay*, 16.
24. *Principles I,* 9, 306. All of these faculties as teleologically conceived can be found in Stoic thought (Margaret Reesor, *The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1951), 32.
25. Ferguson, *Essay,* 45–48.
26. See, for example, *Essay*, 24–29, 62–63.
27. *Principles I,* 202.
28. Ferguson, *Essay,* 119 (emphasis added).
29. Ferguson, *Essay*, 121.
30. Ferguson, *Essay*, 137.
31. *Principles I,* 28, 201.
32. Adam Ferguson, *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* (London: Jones and Company, [1783] 1834), 419.
33. Ferguson, *Essay*, 48–49.
34. On this view, civilization was transmitted sequentially from nation to nation from its original source in Egypt (Forbes, "Introduction" to Ferguson, *Essay*, xxiv). It was a commonplace of seventeenth-century learning that the Greeks obtained much of their knowledge from the Egyptians, and this doctrine remained popular until the early part of the nineteenth century (Roger Emerson, "Peter Gay and the Heavenly City," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28, no. 3 (1967): 391.
35. Norman Barry, "The Tradition of Spontaneous Order," *Literature of Liberty* 5, no. 2 (1982): 9.
36. Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), 49.
37. Ferguson, *Essay*, 25.
38. Cicero, *De Officius*, trans. Walter Miller (London: Harvard University Press, 1990), 1. 44. 157, 161.
39. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), 450.
40. Ferguson, *Essay*, 230; Ferguson, *Principles II*, 492.
41. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 450.
42. For further discussion of the contrast between Ferguson, Hume, and Smith on the professionalization and centralization of security see L. Hill, "Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and Karl Marx on the Division of Labour," *Journal of Classical Sociology,* 7, no. 3 (2007): 339–366.
43. Ferguson, *Essay,* 25.
44. Ferguson, *Essay,* 48.

45. Ferguson, *Essay*, 170.
46. Ferguson, *Essay*, 189–190; Adam Ferguson, *Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia* (London: R. & J. Dodsley, 1756), 8.
47. Ferguson, *Essay*, 188.
48. Ferguson, *Essay*, 188.
49. Ferguson, *Essay*, 189; *Reflections*, 8.
50. Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 58.
51. Pierre L. Van Den Bergh, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis," in *Sociological Theory*, ed. W. L. Wallace (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), 210; *Essay*, 252.
52. For Ferguson's general concerns here see: *Essay*, 246–247, 43–50, 58, 104–105.
53. Ferguson, *Essay,* 47.
54. Ferguson, *Essay*, 23–24.
55. Ferguson, *Essay*, 47–48, 104.The "disciplined soldier . . . contends against an enemy with an alacrity and even gaiety of spirit" (*Principles II*, 503).
56. Ferguson, *Essay*, 29.
57. Tacitus is also a source for Ferguson's views on the socially binding effects of war (Tacitus, *The Agricola and the Germania,* trans. and intro. H. Mattingly [London: Penguin, 1970], passim).
58. *Principles II*, 502–503.
59. "Their wars, and their treaties, their mutual jealousies, and the establishments which they devise in view to each other, constitute more than half the occupations of mankind, and furnish materials for their greatest and most improving exertions" (Ferguson, *Essay,* 116).
60. *Principles II*, 502.
61. Ferguson, *Essay*, 26.
62. Ferguson, *Essay*, 99, 26–29.
63. Ferguson, *Essay*, 28.
64. Hermann Strasser, *The Normative Structure of Sociology: Conservative and Emancipatory Themes in Social Thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 56.
65. Harry Barnes, "Sociology before Comte: A Summary of Doctrines and an Introduction to the Literature," *American Journal of Sociology* 23 (1917): 235.
66. Ferguson, *Essay,* 124–125, 128.
67. Ferguson, *Reflections,* 2.
68. Ferguson, *Essay,* 124–124.
69. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, ed. and intro. Bernard Crick (Suffolk: Penguin, 1998), 1. 4. 113.
70. Hume, "Of Parties in General," *Essays, 55*; Adam Smith, *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, ed. E. C. Mossner and I. S. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 286.
71. Ferguson, *Essay,* 255.
72. Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire,* trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (London: Penguin, 1979), 6. 10. 311.
73. *Principles II*, 510.
74. Ferguson, *Essay,* 252.
75. Ferguson, *Essay*, 63.
76. Ferguson, *Essay,* 63.
77. Elias and Dunning, *Quest for Excitement*, 60–90.
78. Ferguson, *Essay*, 246–247.
79. Ferguson, *Essay*, 45.

80. Ferguson, *Essay*, 47.
81. Ferguson, *Essay*, 28, 45–47.
82. Ferguson, *Reflections,* 16–17.
83. Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 3. 39. 511. Machiavelli, in turn, cites his debt to Xenophon.
84. Ferguson, *Essay*, 43–50, 58, 104–105.
85. Robert van Krieken, *Norbert Elias* (London: Routledge, 1997), 129.
86. Jeremy MacClancy, *Sport, Identity and Ethnicity* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 3, 7. Note that Ferguson did not believe sports alone could perform this function: he believed that citizen militias, faction, and war would also serve this purpose (hence his opposition to the professionalization and centralization of military function) but he did perceive in sports a valuable outlet for our otherwise potentially destructive urges.
87. Adam Ferguson, "An Excursion in the Highlands: Discourse on Various Subjects," *Manuscripts of Adam Ferguson*, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2006), 49.
88. Ferguson, *Essay*, 28. See also *Reflections,* 17–18.
89. Ferguson, *Essay*, 29.
90. Ferguson, *Principles I*, 16–17.
91. Ferguson, *Essay*, 45.
92. *Principles II*, 383.

8 The Discontents of the Civilizing Process

"Beauty and Booty" and the Problem of Colonial Affect in the American War of 1812

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INTRODUCTION: ELIAS, EMPIRE, AND AMERICA

When American nationalists celebrated the end of the War of 1812 at the Battle of New Orleans, they claimed that virtuous US soldiers had saved the city from a licentious British soldiery bent on winning "booty" and "beauty." In February of 1815, as news arrived in Washington, DC, of General Andrew Jackson's victory over the British at New Orleans, the newspaper publisher and unofficial Republican Congressional mouthpiece Hezekiah Niles declared in the pages of his *Weekly Register:* "'BEAUTY AND BOOTY'—These words. Or, in other terms, RAPE AND ROBBERY, were the British watch-word and countersign on their attack of the defenses of *Orleans* on the ever-to-be-remembered 8th of January." For contemporaries, such definitions helped to fix the meaning of the war itself. In a contest to claim the mantle of liberty, American soldiers fought for romantic love of women and patriotic love of country, whereas British forces sought only sexual debauchery. With his report, Niles trumpeted a motto that would sound far and wide—not on the lips of British soldiers and officers, who unequivocally denied ever having uttered them at all, but from the mouths of triumphant American Republicans.[1]

Norbert Elias would hardly have been surprised to see the "self confidence and social power" these citizen-soldiers and former colonials claimed by critiquing the "libidinal life" of Britain's soldier-aristocrats. According to the ideas he laid out in *The Civilizing Process*, the regulation of sexuality and its associated emotions was a key element of social struggle, with subordinated peoples frequently contrasting their superior morals to the louche manners of the upper orders. In his reflections on "State Formation and Civilization," Elias made clear that "civilization" required the individual to "restrain his momentary affects and transform his libidinal energies." Elias harbored no doubt that control of amorous desires lay at the heart of the "civilizing process"—indeed was the basis of human progress.[2]

Yet Elias might have had greater difficulty accounting for the fact that these same postcolonial American subjects functioned simultaneously as neo-imperial aggressors, ones who took great delight in cultivating the

sexualized "patriotic ardor" that helped secure New Orleans as a base for ongoing territorial assaults on American Indians. Perhaps because he wrote as a German, and because he portrayed Germany as having entered the era of colonization only belatedly and then minimally, Elias lacked a strong analytical focus on empire. He was far more interested in the effect of civilized ideals on class relations within societies than on power differentials across societies. Nevertheless, these were analytical limitations that Elias himself ultimately recognized; in a note for the English translation of his work in 1968, he observed that "the class model is too narrow; one needs a broader overall concept to deal with the varieties of group oppression and group rise." For those hundreds of millions of us who live in postcolonial societies of the British imperial orbit, the question of the many varieties of oppression and rise, of civilization's role in colonization, is all the more pressing.[3]

To the degree that Elias concerned himself with colonization as an issue, he adopted a long-term perspective that portrayed the hegemonic elements of civilization as fleeting, the progressive ones as enduring. He advanced a hopeful vision for a world in which the "main line of civilizing movement" would result in the "amalgamation of the codes" of many people. He proposed a two-phase model of cultural change:

> a phase of colonization, or assimilation in which the lower and larger outside stratum is still clearly inferior and governed by the example of the established upper group . . . and a second phase of repulsion, differentiation or emancipation, in which the rising group gains perceptibly in social power and self-confidence.

Here, then, we have a view of the civilizing process in which colonization leads organically to emancipation. Elias specified how and why he thought this occurred.[4]

The key was the notion of "integration." He explained, "the old simple goals of most of the earlier expansionist movements, the expulsion of other peoples from their land, the acquisition of new soil for cultivation and settlement, doubtless play no small part in Western expansion." However, this outmoded kind of colonization was not what interested Elias. He insisted, "it is not only the land which is needed but the people; these must be integrated, whether as workers or consumers, into the web of the hegemonial upperclass country." And this process of integration, he concluded, "demands a 'civilization' of the colonized." In fact, he contended, it "became necessary, in maintaining an empire that went beyond mere plantation-land and plantation-labour, to rule people in part through themselves, through the molding of their super-egos." Since empires integrate population as well as land into the body politic, the process of molding the manners, emotions, and behaviors of colonized people becomes an "important instrument of power."[5]

Yet, even setting side the obvious objection that emancipation has not been the universal outcome of colonization, there is an eddy in the easy flow of Elias's analysis here. He implied that colonization, like civilization itself, proceeds in historical stages, that "early" expansion movements expelled native populations from conquered lands while later ones "integrated" them. Perhaps this trajectory makes sense in the case of the British Empire, when that nation's American (and Australian) colonization efforts are compared with its projects on the Indian subcontinent. Yet if we take a broader view of the Anglo-American empire in North America as one that included not only the colonization efforts of the United Kingdom, but also those of the new United States, we see that the so-called "old simple goals" of settlement-oriented empires did not fade rapidly away into irrelevance.

Far from believing that an American empire required the absorption of people as well as land, far from desiring to incorporate Indians into the "civilizing process," US expansionists of the 1812 era sought to encourage the deliberate increase of the white population at the direct expense of Indians. They wanted to avoid what Elias referred to as the "amalgamation" of social "codes" through prevention of literal racial "amalgamation." In fact, while the last two continental US states, the huge western territories of Arizona and New Mexico, were not admitted to the Union until 1912, the United States did not pass an "Indian Citizenship Act" for Native Americans until even later, in 1924. There was nothing "old" or "simple" about the over three-century long settler-empire that lost its formal legal underpinning only a dozen years before Elias published *The Civilizing Process* in 1936.

If Elias believed that the end point of the "civilizing process" would be a securely unified world in which the entire global population could be melded together by "common rules of conduct and sentiment," Michel Foucault's work on "Security, Territory, Population" challenged this possibility by pointing to the enduring countervailing influence of "the people" who both refuse, and are refused, membership in "the population" of the (colonizing) state.[6]

As this chapter will explore, Foucault's work helps to address the complications that arise in cases, like that of the early United States, when colonizing groups value population as a resource but do *not* incorporate rival populations within their own. The US legal system did not recognize Native Americans as what Elias would call "needed people" for a full dozen years after the last of their lands had been absorbed. For about a century and a half, Native Americans coexisted with US citizens without being politically "integrated" into the nation. Their outsider status was unique; unlike other inhabitants of the United States who also did not enjoy full citizenship rights for much of this period (i.e., all women and African-American men) Indians were not even assumed to have virtual representation in the United States.

The US case was greatly further complicated by the fact that, throughout the first decades of its existence, the American nation could be fairly said to be simultaneously both *postcolonial* (in the sense of the country's independence from and continuing reference to the British Empire) and *neocolonial* (in the sense of its ongoing expansionist designs on Native American lands across North America). Elias attributed one kind of affective code to colonizers, members of the "hegemonial upperclass country," another to the colonized whose superegos were to be molded by contact with the imperial class. What he did not consider was what would occur among a group that occupied both situations at once.[7]

Yet if we take seriously the double-position of the United States, and apply Elias's insights about the role of emotion in colonization with more precision than he did, we may find that there is still much that can be usefully refined from his theories. Discussing the notion of the "established" vs. those considered "outsiders," Elias observed explicitly that the "civilizing process" had hegemonic elements. "A strict code of manners for the upper class," as Elias explained, "is an instrument of prestige, but it is also—in a certain phase—an instrument of power. It is not a little characteristic of the structure of Western society that the watchword of its colonizing movement is 'civilization.'" In fact, with leading scholars of imperialism like Ann Laura Stoler now calling for the emergence of "intimate histories of empire," the time may be ripe now more than ever for a reconsideration of Elias's ideas on the role of affect in the work of colonization.[8]

Theoretically and historically the War of 1812 in North America—a conflict fought between Britain and its Native American and Canadian allies and the United States from 1812 to 1815—provides an ideal opportunity to analyze the emotional dynamics of imperial development. The United States in 1812 was a society emerging from the darkness of colonial domination even as it began in turn to cast its own long shadow over the continent.

POPULATION THEORY AND EMOTIONAL CODING

Elias developed his hopeful vision for a world in which the "main line of civilizing movement" would result in the "amalgamation of the codes" of many people in conversation with his contemporary Sigmund Freud. In 1930, in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* Freud had articulated a problem that he held to be the inescapable irony of the human condition. He observed:

> If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization. In fact, primitive man was better off in knowing no restriction of instinct. To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length of time were very

> slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities for happiness for a portion of security.

Happiness vs. security is the trade-off, as Freud understood it. Elias answered in 1939 with the wish that at some future date humans might find "*a more durable balance, a better attunement, between the overall demands of people's social existence on the one hand, and their personal needs and inclinations on the other.*" At this Utopian point, Elias imagined, "it may even be the rule that an individual person can attain the optimal balance between his or her imperative drives claiming satisfaction and fulfillment and the constraints imposed upon them (and without which humans would remain brutish animals and a danger as much to themselves as to others)." Whereas in Freud one detects wistfulness for the state of nature, Elias firmly rejected the appeal of living like "brutish animals." Instead, Elias believed that achieving the "ultimate pinnacle of 'civilized' conduct" required the integration of the manners and morals of members of different ranks of society.[9]

Once colonizing and colonized people at last achieved unity as a single population, then, and only then, would the world become truly civilized. However distant this end point, Elias portrayed it as something like inevitable. Just as class divisions would ultimately melt away when the rising bourgeoisie melded with the aristocracy, so would colonization lead to emancipation. This was so because of the pull of population, because the colonizers needed the population of the colonized, if only as "workers or consumers." Population integration held the key to Elias's optimistic hopes for the civilizing process; yet "population" as a concept was not something to which he devoted a great deal of attention.

To explain the milieu of the United States in the era of 1812, we need to delve further into theories of population. And here Michel Foucault's lectures *Security, Territory, Population* provide a useful alternative starting point. Foucault explains that in the eighteenth century, "the population as a political subject, as a new collective subject absolutely foreign to the juridical and political thought of earlier centuries [was] appearing." He argues that "the population as a collective subject is very different from the collective subject constituted and created by the social contract." Members of the population do not consent to government so much as they submit to management. Members of "the population" were neither royal subjects nor democratic citizens, but a new category entirely. All those who interact with state institutions (through tax collection, public health, or the penal system, to cite several of Foucault's examples) are members of the population regardless of whether or not they can also claim status as members of the political citizenry.[10]

Foucault's notion of "population" describes well how white male citizens imagined that many noncitizens would be incorporated into the nation in the United States in 1812. Foucault offered "population" as

a capacious term to be applied to *all* the inhabitants of varying social and political status that together make up the "collective subjects" of the nation. He wrote using grain scarcity as a case study, and, in his analysis, the "population" refers to all those whose access to grain must be regulated by the apparatus of the state. In other words, in Foucault's conceptualization, *everyone* is a member of the "population" because *everyone* is a consumer of grain. Linked neither to lineal descent nor to legal consent, population afforded a universal category in which affiliation could be achieved through joint participation.

In the United States in 1812, almost anyone who could bear arms or bear children counted as a member of the "population." Some members of the population (in Foucault's schema, the privileged few who are suppliers as well as consumers of grain) held the additional distinction of being "citizens," persons with recognized political and civil rights. But anyone and everyone, male or female, young or old, black or white, native born or new immigrant, who inhabited the nation made up its population—everyone that is except the one class of people that remained in but not of the nation—Native Americans. While Native Americans were denizens of North America, they were not residents of the United States in any meaningful sense.

Foucault's theory of "population" accounts for this anomalous category with the term the "people." For Foucault, "people," describes all those who "conduct themselves in relation to the management of the population . . . as if they were not part of the population." In the example of grain, the term "people" refers to all those putative buyers and sellers who disrupt the orderly market for grain. "The people throw themselves on the supplies . . . they even seize them without paying, and, on the other hand, some people hold back grain irrationally. . . . These people do not really belong to the population. What are they? Well this is the people. . . . The people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system." In nineteenth-century America, Native Americans (who shared space within the territorial claims of the nation without constituting part of the US population, who maintained allegiance to their own tribal nations without accepting US regulation) constituted "the people." In this special sense, "the people . . . are those who resist regulation of the population, who try to elude the apparatus by which the population exists."[11]

Norbert Elias assumed that colonizing countries would necessarily need to absorb conquered peoples into their own populations—and that once this process was begun his analysis of the affective terms of class relations within countries would prove largely applicable to the asymmetric relations of established vs. outsider populations within empires. Summing up relations between the rising middle classes and the settled aristocracy within England, Elias stated that "one can observe a continuous assimilating process in the course of which upper-class models

(especially a code of good manners) were adopted in a modified form by middle-class people, while middle-class features (as for instance a code of morals) were adopted by upper-class people." In essence, the upper classes tended to emphasize "affect-control," a certain poise and regulation of emotion, while the middling classes placed greater emphasis on "knowledge and morals," particularly those regarding "the regulation of sexual relations." Taking into account Foucault's intervening insights that in the early modern era not all people *were* or even desired to be members of the population, we can begin to assess the affective contours of a world in which inhabitants of the United States were a "lower and larger outside stratum" vis à vis the British, and in which they were in some, though crucially not all, respects a "hegemonial upperclass country" with respect to Native Americans.[12]

POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS AND NEO-IMPERIAL ARDOR

Because war boosters within the United States cast the War of 1812 as a literal "Second American Revolution," many American nationalists critiqued British sexual perversity and moral corruption in terms that would have seemed quite predictable to Elias. Yet because they also played an imperialist role with respect to American Indians, US war supporters simultaneously drew on explicitly sexualized passions in their efforts to dominate Indians. In triangulating between Indians and English, US residents tried to assert a stricter moral code than that adhered to by the purportedly libertine British even as they also sought to use their own sexuality and higher rates of reproduction to assert superiority over Indians. In the process, they engaged successfully in imperial domination in the name of national liberation.

How did affect work on the American continent in the formative period when the United States was both an agent and an antagonist of empire? American expansionists developed a rhetoric of patriotic love that twined virtuous romantic affections and lustful acquisitive passions into a running thread of national desire. By 1812, self-declared American patriots sought above all to foment military action: to force Indians to relinquish lingering territorial rights to the grounds of the recent Louisiana Purchase and to compel the British to abandon still-existent Indian alliances. They needed, ultimately, to fuel determination for geographic gains. Quite conversant with the notion that there is an inherent connection between passion and action, Americans at the turn of the nineteenth century knew that they needed to stoke longing before they could stake claim to new lands. It was no accident, then, that the love that underlay early American nationalism was an explicitly yearning kind.[13]

To understand the intertwined process by which American expansionists condemned the British for libertinage while congratulating themselves

on the lustful ardors that allowed for rapid population growth, consider the cumulative work of Hezekiah Niles. Niles was the DC-area newspaper publisher who would mark the end of the war by condemning the British for seeking "beauty and booty." But in 1812, as British/American tensions first began to flare high, he made his name by endorsing America's special claim to nurture romantic love and the maximized reproduction allowed by early marriage. Just three months before the U.S. declared war on Britain, Niles featured in his *Weekly Register* a multipart essay titled "An Analytical Review of the 'Essay on the Principle of Population, by T.R. Malthus, A.M.' with Some Remarks More Particularly Applicable to the Present and Probable Future State of the United States."[14]

The foremost British work on political economy to emerge in this period, Thomas Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population . . . with . . . an Inquiry into . . . the Evils which It Occasions*, made the example of American population expansion the basis for a far-ranging critique of war and imperialism. Offering a trenchant analysis of the causal relationship between population demands and the need for land, Malthus's work set forth the argument that because populations increase geometrically, while the means of subsistence increase arithmetically, expanding populations inevitably outstrip food supplies. Futile efforts to avert famine and starvation by staking out new territories ultimately only augment human misery. Malthus maintained that "the right of exterminating, or driving to a corner where they must starve, even the inhabitants of thinly peopled regions, will be questioned in a moral view." Applying this critique directly to the United States, he declared, "if America continue increasing, which she certainly will do . . . the Indians will be driven further and further back into the country, till the whole race is ultimately exterminated." In Malthus's interpretation, one of the chief evils occasioned by the spread of population was US engrossment of Indian lands.[15]

Niles presented Malthus to the public only to contradict him. His "analytical review" of the *Essay on Population* aimed to explain why the British theorist's arguments in favor of population restriction were *not* "particularly applicable" to the United States. He took it upon himself to increase public awareness of the interconnections between individual reproduction and national population, the better to inspire his fellow Americans with patriotic fervor at a moment of national crisis.[16]

All wars put population strength at a premium and create strong public interest in personal attachment to the nation. Resident populations must be mobilized, neutralized, and / or defended. Wars always ask people to give themselves to their country. But in America, in 1812, the very idea of entering into open battle remained highly controversial. Since the constitutional founding of the United States in 1789, the nation had never yet made a formal declaration of war. The decision to do so generated intense debate. The population practices and patriotic emotions that emerged during the United States' inaugural war would shape the nation for many ages to come.

War supporters embraced a polarizing vision of national progress in which people would become endeared to the nation through unfettered freedom to reproduce. Procreation functioned simultaneously as a fundamental right and an essential obligation. A nation that protected the natural human drive to beget children deserved the love and loyalty of its inhabitants. In return, those who enjoyed these liberties owed their offspring to the nation, the very embodiment of patriotic love. In what many Euro-Americans saw as a virtuous cycle, but many Native Americans and their British and Canadian allies viewed as a vicious circle, the continent's wide-open grounds supported demographic expansion even as increasing US populations enabled the seizure and settlement of new land. The resultant divergence in British vs. American attitudes towards the merits of population significantly increased tensions between the two nations.[17]

Throughout the first quarter century of US independence, Britons and Americans had chafed each other about questions of population: its regulation, limitation, or optimization. White Americans coveted Indian lands to support the ever-growing number of the nation's people. The British interfered with US plans by continuing to man and supply Indian trading posts throughout the West, supporting the rival population from whom the United States perceived the greatest immediate threat. Meanwhile, at sea, the British Royal Navy needed every hand it could find on deck. The consequent British practice of boarding American ships to round up vagabond British seamen provoked enormous controversy, the more so since these efforts swept the occasional American into British nets.[18]

In the midst of such moral and political confusion, both Americans and Britons made scattershot efforts to maintain the better claim to virtue. Although the United States boasted of being the land of the free, it drew sharp distinctions between the citizenship rights of native-born, property-holding white men and the options available to all those national denizens not recognized as formal citizens. The British lambasted Americans for the way their practices constricted liberty—even though their own impressment tactics flouted the rights of American citizenry and their dominion of the seas supported their own imperial efforts in India and beyond. The rising crisis with Britain compounded every element of the promise and problems of population in the United States.[19]

Polemicists such as Hezekiah Niles brought the abstractions of political economy to the entertainments of popular culture. Print was a key arena where public and private intersected, where personal behavior could be glossed with political meaning. In this context, even those with no formal voice in government could be asked to lend their weight. Maximizing the number of people who could be mustered for the nation meant relaxing barriers to public participation, finding new ways to inspire loyalty to the country, and encouraging reproduction. With the stress of war making every person's contribution count, personal feelings and patriotic feats became connected in new ways.[20]

NEO-IMPERIAL ARDOR IN PRACTICE

If writers like Hezekiah Niles promoted family formation as the a key philosophical and practical action US residents should take in the building of the nation, this was but the vanguard of the rhetorical assault that US commentators from high politicians to hack writers would launch against Native Americans during the war. Consider now one of the most significant Native American setbacks to occur during the war, the 1813 anti-Indian campaign of General William Henry Harrison. The publicity surrounding Harrison's efforts went far to spread a new kind of eroticized patriotism that made population increases through sexual reproduction an essential tool of territorial seizures.

When General William Henry Harrison's troops successfully confronted the forces of the British General Henry Proctor on the River Thames on October 5, 1813, they cleared the way to eliminate a crucial British ally and one of the staunchest of the United States' Indian opponents, the Shawnee leader Tecumseh. According to American and British formal statements on war, the body count, while a convenient means of score-keeping, was hardly the aim of the conflict. The purpose of any given battle was to take and hold ground. Once that work was done, any survivors of the conflict were to be treated not as prizes but simply as people in need of care. The eventual "parole" and return of prisoners from each side was a routine, almost ritual element in the aftermath of battle.[21]

General Proctor must have regarded it as an almost mundane matter, when, ten days after the battle, he sent a letter to General Harrison "requesting humane treatment for the prisoners" in the blandest formal terms. But Harrison did not respond in kind. Instead, he chose that moment to pen a stirring letter of outrage that spared no literary flourish in accusing the British of allowing their Indian allies to violate every possible rule of humane conduct, most especially in the matter of prisoners.[22]

The centerpiece of General Harrison's gothic account of atrocities was the story of an expectant mother taken prisoner by British-allied Indians at Cold Creek near Lake Erie the previous spring. Captured "in an advanced state of pregnancy—she was immediately tomahawked, stripped naked, her womb ripped open, and the child taken out!" Despite the more than six hundred British prisoners taken in the Battle of Thames, for Harrison, the story of this single feticide was the casualty that counted most.[23]

Unlike Europeans and Euro-Americans, Indians regarded the taking of captives as one of the primary rewards of war. Sometimes tortured, sometimes adopted, people taken in battle played important symbolic and practical roles in Indian communities. And whereas Europeans and Euro-Americans claimed that only soldiers could ever be made prisoners of war, Indians deliberately included men and women, adults and children, alike among their captives. With the British fighting alongside Indians, two very different approaches to war coincided in ways that the United States portrayed as

deeply alarming. Urging the British not to accept aid from their Indian allies, Harrison charged them to "stop that dreadful effusion of innocent blood which proceeds from the employment of those savage monsters."[24]

US tradition said that access to more acreage allowed families to grow larger. But the reverse proposition also applied. The bigger the nation's population, the more new inhabitants there were available to seize the land through settlement. Many contemporaries viewed the production of progeny as a foundational element of military planning. Former president Thomas Jefferson spelled this out explicitly in the midst of the war when he declared, "We shall indeed survive the conflict . . . breeders enough will remain to carry on population. We shall retain our country . . . beat our enemy, & probably drive him from the continent. We have men enough." In an era when residents of the United States sought eagerly to spread their habitations ever-further westward to the farthest horizon, Indians and Americans alike understood the key relationship between population expansion and territorial extension.[25]

In a very literal sense, American war boosters argued that sexual ardor and martial ardor went hand in hand, that rousing the people to fight against Indians required some measure of sexual arousal. There is not space enough here to demonstrate the point in depth, but suffice it to say that a huge industry of broadside prints and poems grew up to encourage a sort of eroticized patriotism. Consider, by way of quick example, the following broadside poem. A broadside poem circa 1812 called "The Soldier and his Fair Maid" claimed that young women could safely give themselves up to the sexual advances of soldiers because military men were too honorable not to marry them should a pregnancy result. The poem began:

> The soldier as he walk'd thro' the field,
> To see what flowers the earth would yield,
> It was there he spy'd a lady gay,
> Without any gown a raking hay

The image of a nude woman frolicking in a field could hardly have been more explicit, but the poem went on to describe how:

> He treated her with wine and cake,
> And with gold rings, fine ribbons and gloves,
> Until he gained this fair maid's love

When the gay lady found herself big with child, "She cursed the hour and the day / She went with the soldier and left her hay." Yet, the poem promised, she need not be concerned:

> For soldiers they love to sport and play,
> With pretty girls a raking hay,
> And if by chance they play too hard,
> They'll marry them for their reward

Addressing women, directly, the poem advised:

> Come pretty maids both fair and gay,
> If e'er you go to raking hay,
> And if by chance a soldier you see,
> You must not slight his company.

The whole message of such verses was that women could support the country by "sporting" with soldiers. They ran no risk in doing so, for men who met their obligations to country would never fail to respect those to their sexual partners. And, in fact, women who bore children for the nation contributed a crucial service in the contest to best Native Americans in population numbers.[26]

Despite US claims that women and children had no role to play in battles and should never be taken prisoner by Indians, all antagonists in the era of 1812 understood at some fundamental level that reproduction was a tool of war. Whether the Cold Creek maternal-fetal massacre really occurred—and General Harrison swore in the very last line of his letter, "I pledge myself for the truth of the above statement in relation to the murders committed by Indians"—or whether the story simply echoed the sort of penny-dreadful atrocity tales Americans had read recreationally for decades, the story illuminated a larger fact. In the competition for control of the North American continent, every body counted.[27]

The final flourish of General Harrison's reply to General Proctor in November in 1813 came with a pointed rebuke of British efforts to impute incivility to the United States. Harrison seethed, "I have never heard a single excuse for the employment of the savages by your government, unless we can credit the story of some British officer having dared to assert that 'as we employed the Kentuckians you had a right to make use of the Indians.'" Harrison boasted that his soldiers displayed more civility in their treatment of British soldier-prisoners than Proctor had any reason to imagine or right to expect. Feigning disbelief that a Briton would dare to accuse Kentucky militiamen of behaving like Indian fighters, he claimed, "if such injurious sentiments have really prevailed, to the prejudice of a brave, well informed, and virtuous people, it will be removed by the representations of your officers who were lately taken upon the river Thames." Harrison vouched that British prisoners would have nothing but humane treatment to report.[28]

Kentuckians were virtuous, brave, and so gentle and refined in their behavior that "far from offering any violence to the persons of their prisoners, *these savages* would not permit a word to escape them which was calculated to wound or insult their feelings." Harrison pointedly reused the word "savages" to underscore the absurdity of associating the word with members of the United States. Every US victory was ipso facto a triumph of civility and liberty over both Indian savagery *and* British tyranny. He painted his victory primarily as a strike against captive-takers

and portrayed continuing British-Indian alliances as the main menace to American freedom.[29]

Stories of infanticide and feticide worked an incantation, casting such a spell of disgust on Indians that all moral claims they might make to their own lands were extinguished in the minds of US readers. Whereas US citizens like Harrison remained defensive about British claims that they lacked civility, they found success in arguing that they avoided anything like Native American savagery while also guarding against a British-style slide toward luxurious and licentious corruption.

Just as Norbert Elias predicted of hegemonic powers, the United States touted its superior civility, its adherence to civilized standards of warfare, when comparing itself to Native American Nations. At the same time, also as Elias would have expected, the United States indulged in greater sexual activity than they believed their supposed social inferiors, the Indians, did. The United States gloried in the superior fecundity of its people compared to the nearly barren Native Americans who were compelled to try to steal children they could neither sire nor bear. Yet, when relating to the British, the voices for the United States shifted valence and claimed virtues superior to those of their once and would-be dominators—again, in just the way Elias describes the typical attitude of the rising middling sort confronted with the manners of the upper classes.

POSTCOLONIAL PASSIONS IN PRINT

If US war supporters accused Indians of savage attempts to spoil the fruits of their superior sexuality and reproductive vigor, the charges they aimed at the British differed in subtle but significant ways. In seeking to cast opprobrium on their erstwhile colonial masters, US boosters claimed that the British were guilty of vicious and libertine sexual excess. An official report of inquiry by the United States Congress published in July 1813 (which upon being reprinted became popularly known by the title *Barbarities of the Enemy*) stated directly that many US women numbered among the "innocent victims of infernal lust" left to suffer by "British officers whose duty, as men, required them to protect every female whom the fortune of war had thrown into their power." Inflammatory first-person testimony reprinted in the report claimed that "unfortunate females . . . were suffered to be abused in the most shameful manner . . . by the venal savage foe." This too is all of a piece with Elias's view that "the regulation of sexual relations, the fences surrounding the sexual sphere of libidinal life, are far stronger in the middle and rising bourgeois classes."[30]

Consider now a third and final example of the rhetoric of sex and reproduction that pervaded US attempts to use titillating tales to frame the meaning of the war. On February 16, 1815, when the United States House of Representatives met to devise an official Congressional resolution

of thanks to General Andrew Jackson, triumphant leader of a massive victory for the United States at the Battle of New Orleans, a fight that proved to be the last major encounter of the War of 1812, the image of Jackson as the defender of the women of New Orleans loomed large. On that day, Jared Ingersoll, a lawyer and member of the Democratic-Republican party from Philadelphia, took the floor and told his fellow members of Congress that the British officers had "offered beauty and booty—in other words rape and rapine, as the reward of victory." But, he chortled, "thus led and thus invited the British army made its storm. Their discomfiture is without example. Never was there such disparity of loss." The supposed decision of the British to authorize extreme measures had only produced an extraordinary defeat. The virtues of American ardor had won the day over vile British lusts. While both kinds of love were rooted in sexuality, the very different blooms that flowered from this common stock displayed distinct moral color in the eyes of white Americans.[31]

The story of "Beauty and Booty" electrified the country. As General Andrew Jackson's friend and biographer John Eaton explained in an account of the battle he published in 1817, "*Booty and Beauty* was the watch word of Sir Edward Pakenham's army, in the battle of the 8th. Its criminality is increased, from being the act of a people, who hold themselves up to surrounding nations, as examples of everything that is correct and proper." From the beginning, the War of 1812 had been fought as contest over the meaning and validity of American claims to champion liberty in an expansionist age. Whereas British commentators like Thomas Malthus had tried to seize the moral high ground by critiquing American imperialism, the story of "Beauty and Booty" helped bolster American assertions of greater morality and deny the British claims of superior civility. As Eaton observed, they could no longer "hold themselves up" as the standard to which Americans should aspire.[32]

Besides making great gossip, the "Beauty and Booty" scandal polished the US image as a uniquely virtuous nation bent on preserving the most fundamental form of liberty—sexual consent—from British perfidy. Each person who repeated the story of "Beauty and Booty" helped validate assertions that American men fought for country because of the romantic ardor they felt for their wives and sweethearts and the devotion with which they doted on their children. In doing so, US soldiers enacted a love of liberty that they defined as entirely different from both British tyranny and Native American "savagery."

CONCLUSION

By the close of the war white opinion leaders in the United States were displaying what Elias called "social power and self confidence" of the "middle and rising bourgeois classes" in relation to the British, proclaiming their

superior virtue and the stronger "fences surrounding the sexual sphere of libidinal life" among American fighters compared to British soldiers. Never again would Britain and the United States face each other as adversaries in war. Yet, at the same time, citizens of the United States continued to denigrate Indians for their supposedly tepid ardor and relative reproductive weakness. Americans' celebration of their own fecundity in contrast to Indians' relative infertility, their encomiums to their romantic passions in contrast to Indian sexual passivity, speak volumes about the role of ardent emotion in the United States pivot from postcolonial nation to neo-imperial power.[33]

Though white Americans of the 1812 era placed high value on population, they had little intention of creating anything like the securely unified world of Elias's theory. Elias took for granted that in colonial situations, "outsider groups . . . undergo a process of assimilation . . . even though the identification may show strong ambivalences." Yet in the United States, in the post-1812 period, Native Americans never took on the role of successfully assimilating outsiders, hewing far more closely to the model Foucault advanced for "the people." The Shawnee ranged in opposition to Harrison did all that they could to refuse membership in the state, while the Creeks conquered by Andrew Jackson, despite eventually becoming known as members of the "Five Civilized Tribes," nevertheless faced forced removal from the United States. US expansionists believed they needed Indian land but not Indian people.[34]

In staking a position between Indians and English, the United States tried, largely successfully, to have it both ways, to claim moral superiority vs. the libertine British yet also higher civility than infertile Indians. By playing with colonial sexual and emotional codes from both sides, the United States ultimately achieved imperial domination in the name of liberation. Elias's vision of a world in which total integration is possible remains as appealing now as it must have seemed in 1936. But a look at how these processes played out during the real-world emergence of a global superpower offers no easy encouragement that his dream of perfect unification can soon be realized. For the United States, finding a balance between happiness and security, between sexuality and aggressivity, proved to be as easy as straddling the fulcrum between the status of postcolonial nation and that of neo-imperial power.

NOTES

1. Hezekiah Niles, "From a Late *Boston Centennial*," *Niles Weekly Register*, 25 February 1815, 410. See also, Phillip R. Schmidt, *Hezekiah Niles and American Economic Nationalism: A Political Biography* (New York: Arno, 1982), esp. 46–51.
2. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, rev. ed., trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 399–400 and 433–434. On "the harnessing of affect to political life," see Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic*

Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 70.

3. Elias, "Increasing Constraints on the Upper Class: Increasing Pressures from Below," Part 4, Section 7, *Civilizing Process*, 421–443, quotation on 432. Comparing the histories of England, France, and Germany, Elias explains: "Lacking in Germany for a long period was a particular function which in some other countries, especially England, enhanced in both noble and bourgeois classes . . . a similar pattern of firmly differentiated self-control: the central function in a very extensive network of interdependencies, as the upper class of a colonial empire" (435).
4. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 430.
5. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 431–432.
6. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 433 and 446, and Michel Senellart, ed., Graham Burchell, trans., *Michel Foucault: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977–1978* (New York: Picador, 2007).
7. Anderson and Cayton, *The Dominion of War Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000* (New York: Viking, 2005), *xiii, xvii–xviii,* and 223–222; Sandra M. Gustafson, "Histories of Democracy and Empire," *American Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2007): 107–133; and Regina Janes, "Scandalous Empires, Scandalous Scholarship: Fables of East and West," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): 314–317.

   See also: Jack P. Greene, "Colonial History and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem," *William and Mary Quarterly* (April 2007): 235–250; and Kariann Yokota, "Postcolonialism and Material Culture in the Early United States," *William and Mary Quarterly* (April 2007): 263–270; Peter Hulme, "Postcolonial Theory and Early America," in *Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America,* ed. Robert Blair St. George (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 33–48; and Michael Warner, "What's Colonial about Colonial America?," St. George, *Possible Pasts*, 49–70.
8. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 431. See Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*; Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies," *The Journal of American History* (December 2001): 829–865, 831; and *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History,* ed. Stoler (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). On Anglophilia, see Leonard Tennenhouse, *The Importance of Feeling English: American Literature and the British Diaspora, 1750–1850* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), and see Elisa Tamarkin, *Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion, and Antebellum America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
9. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 73, and Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 447 (italics in original), and 446–47.
10. *Foucault: Security, Territory, Population*, 42–44.
11. See Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 44.

    When considered as a category of analysis, "population" has an explanatory power that exceeds that of citizenship. Classic studies of US citizenship, including work by James H. Ketner and Rogers M. Smith, often treat its marked limitations as a matter of flawed logic or unfulfilled promise. More recent scholarship informed by feminism and by critical race theory, from the work of Carol Smith-Rosenberg to that of Evelyn Nakano Glenn, insists that there was nothing accidental about restrictive definitions of citizenship, that rhetorically and materially, the privileges of white male citizenship gained significance only when counterposed to the status of the noncitizen. Yet even this more critical appraisal of citizenship still rests on the analysis

of exclusion. As such, it cannot account for the ways in which wartime demands drew on contributions from *all* the nation's inhabitants and thus required a new vocabulary of limited inclusion even as it also relegated Indians to some other outsider category altogether. See: James H. Ketner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals, Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *This Violent Empire: The Birth of American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); and Evelyn Nakano Glenn, *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

12. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 428 & 433.
13. Political philosophers like Susan James remind us that there is an inherent connection between passion and action. See Susan James, *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 5.
14. See Niles, "Malthus on Population," *Niles Weekly Register*, 28 March 1812, 66. The first number in this article series was Niles, "Malthus on Population, An Analytical Review of the 'Essay on the Principle of Population, by T. R. Malthus, A.M.' with Some Remarks More Particularly Applicable to the Present and Probable Future State of the United States," *Niles Weekly Register*, 28 September 1811, 52.
15. T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population; or, A View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness with an Inquiry into Our Prospects Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of the Evils which It Occasions . . . First American From the Third London Edition* (Washington [D.C.]: Weightman, 1809), 9–10.
16. Population expansion was explicitly understood as the surest means of laying territorial claim to new "underpopulated regions." See Susan E. Klepp, *Revolutionary Conceptions: Women, Fertility, and Family Limitation in America, 1760–1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 274; J. David Hacker, "Rethinking the 'Early' Decline of Marital Fertility in the United States," *Demography* (November 2003): 605–620, 605; and Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 25.
17. See J.C.A. Skaggs, *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), and see Marie–Jeanne Rossignol, *The Nationalist Ferment: The Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1792–1812* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2004), 189.
18. John Latimer, *1812: War with America* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), esp. 25–32.
19. Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies* (New York: Knoph, 2010), esp. chap. 4.
20. Debate on the role of print in the development of nationalism and/or political factionalism continues to be vigorous. See Jeffrey L. Pasely, *"The Tyranny of Printers": Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic* (Richmond: University of Virginia Press, 2003), esp. 17–22, and Trish Loughran, *The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), esp. 3–14. On the Mexican War and US imperialism, see Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

21. On the military and political significance of the Battle of the Thames, see R. Douglas Hurt, *The Indian Frontier, 1763–1846* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 135, and see Walter R. Borneman, *1812: The War that Forged a Nation* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 161. For statements on war captives, see below.
22. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent. Head-Quarters, Fort George. 3d Nov. 1813," New York, New York, *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2.
23. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent," *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2.
24. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent," *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2. On traditional practices of captive taking among the Iroquois, see Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 35.
25. Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 28 November 1814, Jefferson Papers, United States Library of Congress. Indians were keenly aware of the impact of rising Euro-American populations on Indian land rights. See James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: Norton, 2000), 277–278.
26. "The Soldier and his Fair Maid together with Hard Times," Broadside Ballads from the Collection of Isaiah Thomas, vol. 1, American Antiquarian Society.
27. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent," *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2. See Roy Harvey Pearce, "The Significances of the Captivity Narrative," *American Literature* (March 1947): 1–20, 1; Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W Norton, 2007), 84–86; and see June Namias, *White Captives: Gender and Ethnicity on the American Frontier* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 272.
28. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent," *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2.
29. "From Gen. Harrison to Gen. Vincent," *The National Advocate*, 7 January 1814, 2.
30. *Barbarities of the Enemy Exposed in a Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States Appointed to Inquire into the Spirit and Manner in which the War Has Been Waged by the Enemy* (Worcester, MA: Isaac Sturtevant for Remark Dunnell, 1814), 10 and 111. The report with these quotations was also reprinted in the *Historical Register of the United States*, 163 and Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 433.

    These accounts referred to what was actually a single documented instance of British sexual atrocity during the war, at Hampton, Virginia. Nevertheless, the event became an oft-referenced rallying point. On Hampton, see Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 153–154.
31. "Mr. Ingersole's Observations on . . . the Resolutions Expressive of the Thanks of Congress to Gen. Jackson," 20 February 1815; "Paragraphs from the Trenton T. American," *American Watchman*, 4 March 1815, 3.
32. John Henry Eaton, *The Life of Andrew Jackson, Major General in the Service of the United States Comprising a History of the War in the South, from the Commencement of the Creek Campaign, to the Termination of Hostilities before New Orleans* (Philadelphia: M. Carey & Son, 1817), 352.
33. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 433.
34. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 432.

9 Politics and Changing Views of Jealousy in the Antebellum United States

Michael E. Woods

INTRODUCTION

By illuminating the connection between absolutist state formation and shifts in emotional regimes, Norbert Elias pioneered the history of emotions as it relates to political histories, now a growing field.[1] While building on Elias's insights, this chapter questions the assumption that shifts in emotional regimes require a complete transformation of political structures and many centuries in which to mature. Certainly, the growth of absolutism profoundly influenced early modern European emotional norms and styles. But similarly dramatic shifts have advanced more rapidly and without a reordering of political structures. An investigation of the interplay between politics and emotion conducted on a narrower time scale may help to bridge the methodological gap between Elias and some of his critics. Elias's sweeping arguments have been criticized by specialists who point to exceptions, discontinuities, and nuances overlooked in Elias's bird's-eye view of history.[2] This essay, however, uses the rapid reordering of middle-class conceptions of jealousy that took place in the nineteenth-century Northern (nonslaveholding) region of the United States as a case study to explore how specialists, especially historians, might draw on Elias to explore the powerful mutual impact of political conflict and emotional styles. This transformation occurred within two generations and was propelled not by a revolution in US political structures, but by severe ideological conflict within an existing political framework. The sharp discontinuity in Northern understandings of jealousy becomes comprehensible when situated in the context of the furious political struggle over slavery.

Between 1830 and the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, Northern cultural norms regarding jealousy experienced a stunningly rapid transformation. In the nineteenth century, "jealousy" was not used interchangeably with "envy," but instead referred to the "fear of impending loss" and "anger at the source of loss."[3] This could mean loss of property, privileges, status, or liberty. From the American Revolution until the third decade of the nineteenth century, Americans praised jealousy as a virtuous, masculine emotion. In domestic life, jealousy seemed to buttress patriarchal

order by inspiring heads of households to defend their manly prerogatives.[4] Meanwhile, in political life, jealousy ensured that republican citizens vigilantly guarded their liberties against government encroachment. Jealousy "dominated the American mind because most Americans approved it" as a cornerstone of white male independence and authority.[5] But although this approval persisted in the slave states of the US South through 1861,[6] after about 1830, the expression of jealousy attracted increasing hostility from middle-class Northerners. Authors who codified Northern bourgeois emotional values in advice literature, etiquette guides, and fiction denounced jealousy as an aristocratic threat to liberty and a feminine passion that poisoned domestic affection.[7] Once regarded as a friend to well-ordered liberty, jealousy was now condemned as one of the "bitterest feelings that can be foes of man."[8]

Historians have described this cultural shift more thoroughly than they have explained it. Some argue that the rise of companionate marriage and the idealization of domestic life encouraged Americans to reject jealousy's utility in household governance.[9] But this explanation leaves important questions unanswered. It ignores the parallel transformation in Northern understandings of political jealousy, which moved from approval to denunciation. Moreover, it cannot account for why the campaign against jealousy was limited to the free states of the North. Southern slaveholders embraced companionate marriage and idealized their plantation households in sentimental terms, while simultaneously retaining traditional views of jealousy as an affective ingredient of patriarchy and citizenship.[10] Existing explanations of the demise of Northern political jealousy are similarly incomplete. One theory is that the success of America's republican experiment weakened the imperative for jealous vigilance,[11] but this argument overlooks jealousy's continued prevalence in Southern political culture until the Civil War. Given these limitations, it is tempting to attribute shifting views of jealousy to structural changes in the North. And to be sure, between 1820 and 1860, the social and economic landscape of the free states was swiftly transformed by the growth of a market economy, urbanization, industrialization, immigration, and the proliferation of communication and transportation networks.[12] But a structural interpretation of this shift in emotional values remains speculative until we analyze what historical actors actually said about jealousy and the contexts in which they debated its merits.

In fact, antebellum Americans most frequently discussed jealousy in the context of the political conflict over slavery that led to the secession of eleven slave states and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. As the conflict escalated, Americans frequently defined sectional difference in emotional terms. Because Northerners and Southerners conceived of jealousy so differently, the emotion came to demarcate regional difference. Ultimately, sectional politics and changes in emotional regimes were mutually influential. Changes in emotional norms contributed to the sectionalization of political identity by highlighting the widening gap between Northern and

Southern emotional styles. Northerners defined their regional identity in opposition to what they saw in the South, and emotion played an important role in that process.[13] At the same time, political conflict pushed the regions' divergent emotional norms farther apart, intensifying Northern mistrust of jealousy while retarding a similar shift in the South. White male Southerners celebrated their fidelity to political jealousy, while their Northern critics contributed to the delegitimization and feminization of jealousy through the trope of the jealous plantation mistress—the Southern lady, wracked by jealous passions, who became a stock character in antislavery narratives. Thus, while the Civil War was not primarily fought over competing views of jealousy, cultural divergence did aggravate sectional hostility. Similarly, while sectional rivalry was not the sole cause of shifts in Northern understandings of jealousy, it was an important catalyst in this transformation. An exploration of the mutual influence of political and emotional discourse reveals that political strife shapes emotional norms, which in turn fuel conflict between competing political communities that are themselves delineated in emotional terms. Elias correctly associated changes in emotional regimes with political history, but political discourse can contribute to rapid emotional shifts even in the absence of long-term structural adjustments.

JEALOUSY AND SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH

Despite their fierce antagonism, the Old South's severest detractors and staunchest defenders agreed that the region's white men were a peculiarly jealous lot. Southern jealousy, particularly among the dominant slaveholding class, was proverbial. Some observers remained neutral on the subject. English traveler Alfred Pairpoint, who hoped to visit a Maryland tobacco plantation while visiting the United States, despaired of being granted entrance into the household, for he knew "that the Southerners are very jealous of the intrusion of strangers."[14] Most contemporaries, however, could not contemplate Southern jealousy without judging it, and thus the white Southern emotional style engendered intense political debate. Except for unwavering opponents of secession, most white male Southerners reveled in their reputation for jealousy, considering it proof of their political virtue.[15] One Virginian counted jealousy among the many laudable Southern attributes: "Proud, high-spirited and independent, the love of freedom, and a jealousy of any invasion of their rights . . . have ever, I think, been distinguishing attributes of the Virginia and Southern character."[16]

Southern writers candidly attributed this jealousy to the presence of slavery. They saw no hypocrisy in referring to the "high and chivalrous jealousy with which slaveholding States have ever regarded civil liberty," or arguing that slavery made white Southerners jealous of their rights and privileges.[17] One planter told a British sojourner that slavery "elevated the character

of the master" and "made him jealous of his own, and the natural friend of public liberty."[18] Virginia's Nathaniel Beverley Tucker concurred that "freemen who are the masters of slaves" were especially jealous of their own freedom. But heightened political jealousy extended to nonslaveholders as well. "The existence of slavery in a community," Tucker proclaimed, "will always keep alive a jealous passion for liberty in the lowest class of those who are not slaves."[19] Many Southern writers conceived of jealousy not only as a political virtue, but also a social necessity. The presence of millions of potentially rebellious slaves, argued South Carolina's William Henry Trescot, required masters to remain jealous of their prerogatives against "outside interference" and internal subversion, as a means of "sustaining the master's authority as the guarantee of the safety of society." Jealousy fostered the eternal vigilance required for the protection of Southern states and households against abolitionist agitation and slave revolt.[20] This interpretation anticipated Elias's argument that "the structure of society" can give rise to "a specific standard of emotional control."[21]

Northern criticism of Southern jealousy, however, was ideological rather than structural in origin. Like their opponents, antislavery authors identified slavery as the mainspring of Southern jealousy. But they regarded jealousy as a regional defect, as evidence of slavery's degrading influence on whites, and as a font of oppression and violence. They argued that slaveholders' jealousy explained why nonslaveholding whites, slaves, and free blacks all languished under the brutal rule of the planter class. Hinton R. Helper decried planters' "fiendish jealousy," which he blamed for the ignorant docility of nonslaveholders. Suspicious of all poor whites who might speak out against slavery, "slave-driving ruffians" cowed them into silence, depriving them of education and violently suppressing all those who "dare to think for themselves."[22] Antislavery writers also blamed masters' jealousy for slaves' demeaning ignorance. "I was a slave," Thomas Jones recalled, "and all avenues to real improvement I found guarded with jealous care and cruel tenacity against the despised and desolated bondman."[23] Incensed by slaveholders' determination to maintain the illiteracy of their human property, one Northern critic denounced the "jealous laws of slavery" for stifling the intellectual and religious improvement of bondspeople.[24] Like slaves and poor whites, Southern free blacks also suffered from the jealousy of the planter elite. James R. Willson described free people of color as "objects of jealousy to the slave-masters," who in turn kept them "in a more degraded state than those who are still held in bondage."[25] Antislavery writers traced the ills of Southern society—ignorance, oppression, and unbending social hierarchy—to slaveholders' virulent jealousy.

Most personally alarming for Northern critics was the hostile reception that outsiders—both foreigners and Northerners—encountered in the South. Many onlookers attributed the violence visited upon "meddlers" to the emotion of jealousy.[26] As early as 1837, the American Anti-Slavery Society warned that "no northern man is safe at the South, against whom it is possible for

the most jealous slaveholder to entertain a suspicion."[27] The Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society came to a similar conclusion in 1844,[28] and the turbulent 1850s only reinforced this view. By 1861, observers on both sides of the Atlantic noted that Southern whites' extreme jealousy made travel in the region unsafe. An American Anti-Slavery Society report denounced the "suspicious jealousy with which strangers were regarded" in the South following John Brown's 1859 attempt to spark a slave insurrection at Harper's Ferry, Virginia.[29] Irish economist J. E. Cairnes more thoroughly described the fate of interlopers who articulated heretical opinions about slavery:

> Travellers, who have incautiously, in ignorance of the intensity of the popular feeling, ventured to give temperate expression to anti-slavery opinions, have been seized by the mob, tarred and feathered, ducked, flogged, and in some instances hanged. Nay, so sensitively jealous has the feeling of the South become, that the slightest link of connexion with a suspected locality—to have resided in the North, to have sent one's children to a Northern school—is sufficient to secure expulsion from a slave state.[30]

Like the region's social stultification, Southern violence against outsiders could readily be attributed to proslavery jealousy. Northerners who might still regard jealousy as a virtue, antislavery authors implied, need only look southward to witness the emotion's vicious influence. And Northerners seeking to understand the violently reactionary Old South found a simple explanation in the proverbial jealousy of Southern slaveholders and their allies.

Hostile writers pointed to jealousy as the emotional basis for Southern violence, repression, and paranoia. But these numerous, if scattered, references to jealousy did not exhaust their critique of the Southern emotional style. Two more sophisticated and sustained attacks on Southern jealousy appeared during the antebellum period, reinforcing Northern cultural injunctions against jealousy while defining white Southerners, especially slaveholders, as threatening and morally corrupt. The criticisms of Southern jealousy presented thus far decried the emotion's influence on Southern behavior. The more complex critiques went further and argued that jealousy had damaged the Southern personality so severely that, as long as slavery persisted, Southern whites could never be upstanding citizens or respectable householders. In an age of rising egalitarianism and domestic sentimentalism, these arguments were damning.

The first prong of this attack inverted the old view that jealousy bolstered republicanism by casting the emotion as an aristocratic vice. It therefore added an affective element to a broader critique of slaveholders' aristocratic pretensions and unfitness for republican citizenship.[31] Shortly after South Carolina Representative Preston Brooks brutally caned Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on the Senate floor, Josiah Quincy denounced

Southern tyrants for attempting to dominate national politics. "Educated under circumstances [i.e., slavery] which make pride, and exercise of power, the chief elements of their character," planters "come to Congress with the arrogant spirit of aristocratic despots; looking down on the Representatives of the Free States as an inferior class; jealous, fearful, and hating all talents which they cannot command."[32] In his aptly titled *Despotism in America*, Richard Hildreth agreed, describing the planter class as "an order as jealous, fretful and suspicious as ever was the aristocracy of Venice."[33] Hildreth's reference to Venice was well chosen, for the famed city-state had long fascinated Americans hungry for historical lessons about republicanism. Popular opinion held that the plain republicans of Venice had struggled heroically against the city's aristocracy, and nineteenth-century Northern writers celebrated Venetian republicans' historical victories.[34] Northern critics maintained that slavery bred a similarly jealous, unrepublican planter class. George Allen argued that slavery was "by necessity of its nature, jealous, rapacious, vindictive, implacable. . . . Freedom, mind, truth, the light of religion, the righteous government of God, are objects of its jealousy and hatred."[35] Aristocratic jealousy thus threatened Northerners' religious, political, and social values. Far from a preserver of liberty, Southern proslavery jealousy menaced republican freedom.

JEALOUSY AND THE POLITICS OF THE SLAVEHOLDING HOUSEHOLD

If the threat of Southerners' political jealousy frightened antebellum Northerners, slaveholders' domestic jealousy thoroughly disgusted them. Indeed, the most sustained rebuke of Southern jealousy focused on the Southern household. In a patriarchal society preoccupied with preserving racial hierarchy and white women's purity, sexual and political jealousy were inherently intertwined, allowing Northern critics to attack domestic slavery and proslavery politics simultaneously.[36] Moreover, as the cult of domesticity idealized the home as a spiritual and emotional haven from the coldness and anxiety of public life, Northerners scrutinized slaveholding households, denouncing what they saw as slavery's baleful influence on the white Southern family.[37] In this context, the jealous Southern mistress came to symbolize the affective depravity of slaveholding homes. By stressing slavery's harmful effects on Southern domestic life, Northern antislavery writers deployed the increasingly dominant interpretation of jealousy as a feminine emotion that corroded familial bonds. The jealousy aroused in Southern women by their husbands' infidelity provided abolitionists with a potent weapon against slavery. By using it, they contributed to the ongoing cultural shift toward a view of jealousy as a female vice rather than a masculine virtue. Antislavery activism, rather than a revolution in political structures, propelled this change in Northern emotional norms.

Antislavery Northerners believed that Southern planters, surrounded by exotic and defenseless bondswomen, indulged in unrestrained adultery. Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison turned the old canard of the lustful black male on its head by describing Southern masters as "enamoured with amalgamation."[38] After depicting plantation households as harems, antislavery writers readily decried the emotions associated with sexual disloyalty. Mary A. Denison wrote that white Southern men frequently indulged in sexual relations with slaves, but the watchfulness of their "keen-eyed" wives forced them to visit neighboring plantations to satisfy their lusts. Thanks to the "jealousy that more or less infects a Southern home," planters had to hide their escapades.[39] Rather than a constitutive element of household order, jealousy, in Denison's hands, became a moral disease that corrupted otherwise healthy domestic relationships.[40] Ex-slave Jermain Loguen averred that planters' infidelities provided "a ceaseless source of jealousy and discontent" within white families.[41] In the context of Northern emotional norms, these comments carried tremendous moral significance. Proponents of domestic sentimentalism described jealousy, along with anger and envy, as "those bitter fountains which so often tincture the streams of private and domestic joy."[42] They wrote of the "sanctity of the home invaded" by such emotional "fiends" as "jealousy,"[43] and warned against allowing jealousy into the heart. Not only did jealousy reflect poorly on one's character, it also bore evil fruit, for "the most cold-blooded assassinations" were associated with a "jealous disposition."[44] Southern households chronically failed the basic test of domestic emotional harmony.

White Southern women seemed especially prone to jealous passions, and antislavery writers cited jealousy to explain the sadistic behavior attributed to plantation mistresses. The testimony of ex-slave Moses Roper offered a disturbing commentary on the outrages provoked by jealousy:

> A few months before Roper was born, his [white] father married his mother's young mistress. As soon as she heard of his birth, she sent one of his mother's sisters to see whether he was black or white. On returning, she told her mistress that the child was white, and that he was the image of Mr. Roper, her husband. No sooner had she received this intelligence, than the savage propensities of her nature were aroused. She procured a large club stick and knife, and hastened to the place in which the mother was confined, with the full determination to do Herod's bidding, and murder the young child. But, just as she raised the knife to do the bloody deed, his grandmother entered the cabin, caught hold of the murderer's arm, and saved the child's life. But the murder being prevented, something else must be done to appease the wrath of the green-eyed monster–jealousy. Both the mother and child were, therefore, sold or sent to some slave master soon after the confinement.[45]

Thus, the jealousy aroused by the sexual improprieties inherent in slavery spawned violence and encouraged the oft-condemned internal slave trade. Ex-slave Frederick Douglass made a similar connection between female jealousy, physical abuse, and the social brutality of selling human beings. Because of the "jealousy which the young mulatto excites in the breast of the master's wife," he noted, "the master is frequently compelled to sell this class of slaves, out of deference to the feelings of his white wife." The wounded emotions of the jealous mistress directly promoted commerce in human beings. But sale was the lesser evil, Douglass grimly concluded, for the master's alternative was to whip his own child and allow the slave's white half-brother to "ply the gory lash to his naked back."[46]

The most heartbreaking and damning accounts of jealous plantation mistresses appeared in the writings of fugitive slaves. Some scholars regard these sources with suspicion, believing that they reflect more about Northern expectations than Southern reality.[47] But accounts of jealous mistresses that appear in these narratives are useful precisely because they were crafted to appeal to Northern readers. That ex-slaves chose to base critiques of Southern domesticity on the pervasiveness of jealousy suggests that the emotional dynamics of plantation households were of immense interest to antislavery Northerners. By constructing the figure of the jealous mistress, fugitive slave narratives reflected and shaped Northern emotional norms, damning slavery by exposing the jealousy it engendered, while contributing to jealousy's feminization and delegitimization by highlighting the unladylike emotionality of Southern mistresses.[48]

Solomon Northup, a Northern free black who was kidnapped and held in bondage for twelve years before securing his release and publishing an account of his experiences, advanced the antislavery critique of jealousy in the depiction of Mistress Epps. Normally a kind woman, Mistress Epps was plagued by jealousy of a female slave, Patsey, who was frequently flogged to appease her mistress. Northup's account of the tender lady converted into a sadist aroused readers' pity for Epps (and for her victims) and revulsion against the vile system that corrupted her. "Mistress Epps was not naturally such an evil woman," but her husband's sexual dalliances with Patsey aroused in her "the devil, jealousy." In response, Mistress Epps demanded that Patsey be sold. Master Epps refused, claiming that Patsey was too valuable in the cotton fields, but from time to time he ordered that Patsey be whipped severely, "almost beyond endurance," "merely to gratify the mistress." Every time Mistress Epps "work[ed] herself to the red-hot pitch of rage," Patsey was tortured. Thus did "the jealousy and hatred of Mistress Epps ma[k]e the daily life of her young and agile slave completely miserable." More generally, the plantation household was but a mockery of the proper domestic sphere: "Thus did pride, and jealousy, and vengeance war with avarice and brute-passion in the mansion of my master, filling it with daily tumult and contention."[49] Northup's text was widely admired in the Northern press as a "more extraordinary work" even than *Uncle*

Tom's Cabin because it presented "a simple, unvarnished tale" from the perspective of a former slave and would "minister powerfully to the sound, intelligent, anti-slavery sentiment of the country."[50]

Harriet Jacobs, whose resistance to the lustful advances of her master and subsequent escape made her one of the most famous antebellum fugitive slaves, developed a similarly sophisticated critique of Southern jealousy. Jacobs devoted an entire chapter of *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl* (1861) to a discussion of "The Jealous Mistress."[51] Jacobs's mistress, Mrs. Flint (a pseudonym for Mary Matilda Norcom), had every reason to be jealous; her husband (Dr. Flint/Dr. James Norcom) coerced other bondswomen into sexual relationships and tried for nearly a decade to seduce Jacobs. Mrs. Flint "watched her husband with unceasing vigilance," and although he carried on his infidelities without detection, his suspicious wife "had no sympathy" for the young female slaves of her household. They were, rather, "the objects of her constant suspicion and malevolence."[52]

This dearth of sympathy reflected Mrs. Flint's affective shortcomings; she simply lacked the emotional repertoire that Northern domestic sentimentalists prized. Jacobs described her as "not a very refined woman, and had not much control over her passions." Perhaps she had "some touch of feeling" for her beleaguered slaves, but she evinced "no compassion for the poor victim of her husband's perfidy." Instead, she wallowed in self-pity, anger, and "wounded pride." Jacobs recognized that, as the object of her master's lust, she had also become the object of Mrs. Flint's "jealousy, and, consequently, of her hatred," and she expected no kindness from her mistress. Yet Mrs. Flint's emotional failings were not her fault. Cleverly, Jacobs attributed Mrs. Flint's miserable emotional state to the institution of slavery. "I could not blame her" for her feelings of rage and jealousy. "Slaveholders' wives feel as other women would under similar circumstances."[53] The "bad institution" of slavery, Jacobs concluded, "deadens the moral sense, even in white women, to a fearful extent."[54] For a Northern audience suspicious of the influence of slavery on Southern whites and convinced of the innate goodness of white women, this was a compelling critique.

In the eyes of Jacobs and her readers, Mrs. Flint's jealousy did more than prevent her from sympathizing with a suffering slave. It also ruined the harmony of her household and threatened to destroy her feminine character. According to the emotional norms of the Northern bourgeoisie, anger between wives and husbands was to be studiously avoided, and anger itself was incompatible with proper femininity.[55] The anger associated with Mrs. Flint's jealousy damaged her already tense relationship with her husband: "angry words frequently passed" between them and the couple had "repeated quarrels" over Jacobs's presence in the household.[56] Like Northup's master and mistress, Dr. and Mrs. Flint were divided emotionally by the practice of slaveholding and, according to Jacobs, were not unique. Indeed, the Flint plantation stood in for the domestic realities of an entire region:

> Reader, I draw no imaginary pictures of southern homes. I am telling you the plain truth. . . . The young wife soon learns that the husband in whose hands she has placed her happiness pays no regard to his marriage vows. Children of every shade of complexion play with her own fair babies, and too well she knows that they are born unto him of his own household. Jealousy and hatred enter the flowery home, and it is ravaged of its loveliness.[57]

Jacobs's account is one of domesticity betrayed, of a private sphere characterized not by affection, but by those emotions which Northerners strove to exclude from the home. In Jacobs's hands, jealousy became an emotional marker of the Southern plantation mistress. Thus, she directly appealed to Northern readers' suspicions that the feminine passion of jealousy threatened the affective bonds of domesticity. Praised by its defenders as a "domestic institution," slavery appeared very different under the cultural lens of the Northern middle class.

The chronic problem of sexual jealousy in slaveholding households was a standard theme in diverse antislavery publications that reached wide audiences in the United States and beyond. In a public letter "to the Women of England," Edward Yates lamented that "the slave women suffer greatly, as Hagar from Sarah, from the jealousy of their mistresses" and recounted brutal assaults perpetrated by jealous plantation mistresses on hapless bondswomen.[58] Other authors recounted horrific abuses inflicted by jealous mistresses in eighteenth-century St. Domingue, using memories of that infamous slave society to criticize the emotional influence of slaveholding.[59] Novelists made the jealous mistress a key figure in antislavery novels published throughout the antebellum period.[60] By providing firsthand accounts of the cruelties perpetrated by white mistresses afflicted by jealousy, ex-slaves such as Jacobs and Northup reaffirmed a widely repeated argument against the emotional degradation associated with slaveholding.

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EMOTIONAL DIVERGENCE

Antebellum Northerners and Southerners held irreconcilable views of jealousy's role in political and domestic life. As political identity and emotional styles became deeply intertwined, emotional norms and habits assumed tremendous ideological significance in defining differences between the sections, aptly illustrating Joanna Bourke's point that emotions "align individuals with communities" and delineate boundaries between communities.[61] White Southerners conceived of jealousy as a safeguard of white men's political liberty and social prerogatives, maintaining a tradition inherited from the American Revolution. But the Northern middle class rejected this view. After 1830, Northern writers feminized and delegitimized jealousy, presenting

it as a dangerous emotion with vicious consequences. As Northern critics attacked slavery, they also criticized the white Southern character. Northerners were republicans; Southerners were aristocrats. Northern homes were harmonious; Southern homes were ravaged by bad passions. As Northerners affectively distinguished themselves from their Southern antagonists, they drew upon a growing mistrust of jealousy to condemn their opponents, who in turn clung to jealousy as a manly virtue. Sectional politics contributed to cultural divergence between the Old North and the Old South, which in turn fueled political conflict. Neither the political conflict nor the cultural alienation should be read as the "cause" of the other, but they were mutually supportive. The more that Northern emotional values changed, the more readily they could be used to attack the South; the more that they were used as political weapons, the more deeply entrenched the new emotional norms became. Crucially, changes in Northern and Southern social and economic structures did not mechanically transform emotional regimes. Rather, the changes grew from, and contributed to, contentious political discourses rising from the escalating conflict over American slavery. Political and ideological strife, like the changes in political structure emphasized by Elias, promote and feed on profound changes in emotional regimes.

This case study also sheds light on the debate over emotional modernity, in which Elias's work has been foundational. It would be easy to portray competing Northern and Southern notions of jealousy as a conflict between a modern, self-restrained North, and a premodern, impassioned South. This is precisely how antislavery Northerners viewed the contest; abhorrence of slavery has also encouraged modern scholars to cast the South as a premodern foil to the ostensibly modern North.[62] But to attribute the persistence of an older view of jealousy to Southern "premodernity" would be a mistake. It requires scholars to remain hostage to a master narrative of emotions history—in which premodern indulgence in passion yields to modern civilized restraint—which Barbara Rosenwein has perceptively criticized for its reliance on an untenable "hydraulic" view of emotions.[63]

There are, moreover, other empirical and theoretical reasons to reject a story of Northern modernity battling against Southern premodernity. First, except for their divergence over jealousy, the emotional regimes of the antebellum North and South were remarkably similar. Advice writers in both regions extolled the home as a haven of domestic affections, denounced anger as a sinful intruder into social relations, and sought to maintain social harmony through the cultivation of love and the repression of wrath.[64] Southern authors eagerly embraced the affective values of nineteenth-century domestic sentimentalism and aggressively deployed them in defense of slavery.[65] The debate over jealousy revealed and exacerbated deep cultural alienation between the sections, but their differences were never absolute. Second, Southern authors did not need to draw on premodern ideals to vindicate jealousy. Instead, they borrowed from recent history, most importantly from the American War for Independence. They

hearkened back not to the age of chivalry but to the age of revolution and presented themselves as heirs of the spirit of '76.[66] Southern appeals to jealousy rested on modern conceptions of citizenship, circumscribed though they were by racism and sexism.

Scholars must therefore evaluate the relationship between slavery and the modernity of slaveholders' emotional styles with care. Robin Blackburn has powerfully demonstrated that slavery "was associated with several of those processes which have been held to define modernity: the growth of instrumental rationality, the rise of national sentiment and the nation-state, racialized perceptions of identity, the spread of market relations and wage labour, the development of administrative bureaucracies and modern tax systems, the growing sophistication of commerce and communication, the birth of consumer societies, the publication of newspapers and the beginnings of press advertising, 'action at a distance' and an individualist sensibility."[67] Similarly, Eugene Genovese has argued that US slaveholders thought of themselves as thoroughly modern, though they remained uncomfortable with elements of modernity—including wage labor and egalitarianism—and "sought an alternate route to modernity."[68] The assumption that the Old South was premodern because of its labor system, and that its prevailing emotional codes must have been premodern as well, is flawed. White southerners' faith in jealousy as a preserver of individual liberty was as modern as the northern view of jealousy as a threat to the nuclear family. Elias admonished scholars not to cast "civilized" as antithetical to "uncivilized," for the terms "represent stages in a development which . . . is still continuing."[69] If we push this argument further and recognize the multiple trajectories upon which this "development" has taken place, we can better understand the characteristics that the antebellum North and South shared, as well as those that divided them. The abolition of slavery was a rare instance of unqualified progress, but it did not mark the South's passage from emotional premodernity into modernity.

NOTES

1. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 [1939]), esp. 191. Recent work on the American Revolution underscores the important link between emotions and politics. See Nicole Eustace, *Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); and Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Other key works on emotions and US political history include Andrew Burstein, "The Political Character of Sympathy," *Journal of the Early Republic* 21, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 601–632; and Jose R. Torre, *The Political Economy of Sentiment: Paper Credit and the Scottish Enlightenment in Early Republic Boston, 1780–1820* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2007).

2. See Stephen Mennell, *Norbert Elias: Civilization and the Human Self-Image* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 30; and Robert van Krieken, *Norbert Elias* (London: Routledge, 1998), 80.
3. Peter N. Stearns, *Jealousy: The Evolution of an Emotion in American History* (New York: New York University Press, 1989), xi. Masha Belenky's description of jealousy as the "anxiety of dispossession" applies to the nineteenth-century United States as well as to nineteenth-century France. See Masha Belenky, *The Anxiety of Dispossession: Jealousy in Nineteenth-Century French Culture* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2008).
4. Stearns, *Jealousy*, 13–20.
5. James H. Hutson, "The Origins of 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics': Public Jealousy from the Age of Walpole to the Age of Jackson," in *Saints & Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History*, ed. David D. Hall, John M. Murrin, and Thad W. Tate (New York: Norton, 1984): 332–372, quotation on 351.
6. See Stearns, *Jealousy*, 26–28.
7. For an overview of this shift, see Stearns, *Jealousy*, chap. 2.
8. Lawrence Labree, *Rebels and Tories, or, The Blood of the Mohawk!* (New York: DeWitt & Davenport, 1851), 147.
9. See Stearns, *Jealousy*, chaps. 1–2, esp. 21.
10. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor: Ethics & Behavior in the Old South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 250, 263; and Steven M. Stowe, *Intimacy and Power in the Old South: Ritual in the Lives of the Planters* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 50–51, 124.
11. Hutson, "Origins of 'The Paranoid Style,'" 364–365.
12. Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
13. On the South as a negative reference point for the construction of Northern identities, see Susan-Mary Grant, *North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).
14. Alfred Pairpoint, *Uncle Sam and His Country; or, Sketches of America, in 1854–55–56* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1857), 259–260, quotation on 260.
15. Southern Unionists denounced political jealousy. See Thomas S. Grimke, *A Letter to the Honourable John C. Calhoun, Vice President of the United States, Robert Y. Hayne, Senator of the United States, George M'Duffie, of the House of Representatives of the United States, and James Hamilton, Jr., Governor of the State of South Carolina* (Philadelphia: Thomas Kite, 1832), 11, 14, 15; James Louis Petigru to Hugh S. Legare, 1 August 1834, James Louis Petigru Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia; and Henry S. Foote, *Oration delivered by the Hon. Henry S. Foote, on the Fourth of July, 1850, at Monument Place, with an Introduction* (Washington, DC: Henry Polkinhorn, 1850), 15.
16. Caius Gracchus, "No. 2; To the President and Members of the Auxiliary Colonization Society of Powhatan," in *Controversy between Caius Gracchus and Optimus: in Reference to the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Colour in the United States: First Published in the Richmond Enquirer* (Georgetown, D.C.: James C. Dunn, 1827), 17.
17. William Burwell, "The North, the South, and the Union," *DeBow's Review* 17, no. 2 (August 1854): 178.

18. George William Featherstonhaugh, *Excursion Through the Slave States, from Washington on the Potomac to the Frontier of Mexico; with Sketches of Popular Manners and Geological Notices* (New York: Harper, 1844), 158.
19. Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, "An Essay on the Moral and Political Effect of the Relation between the Caucasian Master and the African Slave, Part II," *Southern Literary Messenger* 10, no. 8 (August 1844): 474.
20. W. H. Trescot, "South Carolina—A Colony and State," *DeBow's Review* 27, no. 6 (December 1859): 676.
21. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 169.
22. Hinton Rowan Helper, *The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It* (New York: Burdick Brothers, 1857), 44. A native of North Carolina, Helper provocatively attacked slavery for its degrading effects on nonslaveholding whites, whom he viewed as the primary victims of the peculiar institution. Despite Helper's racism, his status as a domestic critic of slavery deeply worried proslavery Southerners.
23. *The Experience of Thomas Jones, Who Was a Slave for Forty-Three Years* (Boston: Daniel Laing Jr., 1850), 26. Richard Hildreth made a comparable point in *The White Slave; or, Memoirs of a Fugitive* (Boston: Tappan & Whittemore, 1852), 172.
24. "Religious Instruction of the Slaves," *New Englander and Yale Review* 4, no. 13 (January 1846): 54.
25. James R. Willson, *Address, on the Subject of African Slavery: Delivered at Fayetteville, September 14, 1837* (Chambersburg, PA: J. Pritts, 1837), 22.
26. On this violence, see William W. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion,* vol. 1: *Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chap. 6.
27. *Fourth Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society, with the Speeches Delivered at the Anniversary Meeting Held in the City of New York, on the 9th May, 1837 and the Minutes of the Meetings of the Society for Business* (New York: William S. Dorr, 1837), 88.
28. *Twelfth Annual Report, Presented to the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, by Its Board of Managers, January 24, 1844. With an Appendix* (Boston: Oliver Johnson, 1844), 60.
29. *The Anti-Slavery History of the John Brown Year; being the Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society* (New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1861), 114.
30. J. E. Cairnes, *The Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Probable Designs: Being an Attempt to Explain the Real Issues Involved in the American Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York: Carleton, 1862), 92.
31. On the critique of Southern aristocracy, see Grant, *North Over South*, esp. 140–141, and Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* ([1970] New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 67–69, 71.
32. Josiah Quincy, *Address Illustrative of the Nature and Power of the Slave States, and the Duties of the Free States: Delivered at the Request of the Inhabitants of the Town of Quincy, Mass., on Thursday, June 6, 1856* (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1856), 7.
33. Richard Hildreth, *Despotism in America: An Inquiry into the Nature, Results, and Legal Basis of the Slave-Holding System in the United States* (Boston: J. P. Jewett, 1854), 71.
34. See Edward Deering Mansfield, *American Education, Its Principles and Elements* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1851), 21; W. C. Taylor, *A Manual of Modern History*, 5th ed. (New York: D. Appleton, 1851), 438; and "Primary Law

of Political Development in Civil History," *North American Review* 88, no. 183 (April 1859): 400. On the uses of Venetian history, see James S. Grubb, "When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of Venetian Historiography," *Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 1 (March 1986): 43–94.

35. George Allen, *Mr. Allen's Report of a Declaration of Sentiments on Slavery, Dec. 5, 1837* (Worcester, MA: Henry J. Howland, 1838), 9.
36. Even from the Southern perspective it is difficult to disentangle private, sexual jealousy from public, political jealousy. In the Old South, as one perceptive historian has noted, "'high' politics *was* the politics of the household, and all relations of power in what we would call the 'private sphere,' including those of men and women, were inevitably politicized." Stephanie McCurry, *Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, & the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 236.
37. Ronald G. Walters, *The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism After 1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), chap. 6; Gregg Camfield, "The Moral Aesthetics of Sentimentality: A Missing Key to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 43, no. 3 (December 1988): 319–345; and Gregg D. Crane, "Dangerous Sentiments: Sympathy, Rights, and Revolution in Stowe's Antislavery Novels," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 51, no. 2 (September 1996): 176–204.
38. *Liberator*, February 5, 1831, quoted in Walters, *Antislavery Appeal*, 73. See also Ronald G. Walters, "The Erotic South: Civilization and Sexuality in American Abolitionism," *American Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (May 1973): 177–201.
39. Mary A. Denison, *Old Hepsy* (New York: A. B. Burdick, 1858), 44.
40. I am indebted to an anonymous reader for encouraging me to develop this point.
41. Jermain Wesley Loguen, *The Rev. J.W. Loguen, as a Slave and as a Freeman: A Narrative of Real Life* (Syracuse, NY: J.G.K. Truair, 1859), 39–40.
42. Rev. Edward Thomson, "The Conflicts of Mind, Part I," *Ladies' Repository* 2, no. 11 (November 1842): 323.
43. Louisa C. Tuthill, *Reality, or, The Millionaire's Daughter* (New York: Scribner, 1856), 260.
44. George Peck, *Formation of a Manly Character: A Series of Lectures to Young Men* (New York: Carlton & Philips, 1854), 107.
45. Roper's story appeared in J. Passmore Edwards, *Uncle Tom's Companions: or, Facts Stranger than Fiction. A Supplement to Uncle Tom's Cabin: Being Startling Incidents in the Lives of Celebrated Fugitive Slaves* (London: Edwards, 1852), 143.
46. Quoted in Edwards, *Uncle Tom's Companions*, 16.
47. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South*, rev., enlarged ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 367–374.
48. On the trope of the jealous mistress, see Minrose C. Gwin, "Green-Eyed Monsters of the Slavocracy: Jealous Mistresses in Two Slave Narratives," in *Conjuring: Black Women, Fiction, and Literary Tradition*, ed. Marjorie Pryse and Hortense J. Spillers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985): 39–52.
49. Solomon Northup, *Twelve Years a Slave: Narrative of Solomon Northup, a Citizen of New-York, Kidnapped in Washington City in 1841, and Rescued in 1853, from a Cotton Plantation near the Red River, in Louisiana* (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby & Miller, 1853), 197–198, 199–200, 253–254.
50. See the quotations in the (Philadelphia) *Pennsylvania Freeman*, 8 September 1853.

51. Harriet Jacobs, *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: Written by Herself*, ed. L. Maria Child (Boston: Published for the Author, 1861), chap. 6. "The Jealous Mistress" is the chapter title. For a contemporary view of the book, see *Salem* (Mass.) *Observer*, 16 February 1861.
52. Jacobs, *Incidents*, 49.
53. Jacobs, *Incidents*, 53.
54. Jacobs, *Incidents*, 57.
55. Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Control in America's History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), chap. 2.
56. Jacobs, *Incidents*, 51.
57. Jacobs, *Incidents*, 56–57.
58. Edward Yates, *A Letter to the Women of England, on Slavery in the Southern States of America; Considered Especially in Reference to the Condition of the Female Slaves* (London: John Snow, 1863), quotation on 17, 18, 31–32, 35–38. For the Biblical account of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar, see Genesis, chaps. 16 and 21.
59. [Elizur Wright,] "The Horrors of St. Domingo," *Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine* 1, no. 3 (April 1836): 257–258.
60. See, for example: [Richard Hildreth] *The Slave: or, Memoirs of Archy Moore*, 2 vols. (Boston: John H. Eastburn, 1836), 2:27–28; Francis Colburn Adams, *Our World: or, The Slaveholder's Daughter* (New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1855), 452–453; and Desmos, *Old Toney and His Master; or, The Abolitionist and the Land Pirate* (Nashville: Southwestern Publishing House, 1861), 239.
61. Joanna Bourke, "Fear and Anxiety: Writing about Emotion in Modern History," *History Workshop Journal 55* (Spring 2003): 123–124.
62. For a critical view of this tendency, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 821–845, esp. 830–831.
63. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History."
64. On the North, see Stearns and Stearns, *Anger*, chap. 3; and Mary P. Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790–1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. chap. 4. Far less work has been done on the South, but relevant primary sources abound with praise for domestic affections and injunctions against dangerous passions such as anger. On the former, see George Fitzhugh, "Make Home More Attractive," *De Bow's Review* 28, no. 6 (December 1860): 633; for the latter, see "A Model Young Man," *Eufaula* (Ala.) *Express*, reprinted in the (Athens, Ga.) *Southern Watchman*, 27 September 1861, 1.
65. Jeffrey Robert Young, *Domesticating Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina, 1670–1837* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); and Lacy K. Ford, *Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
66. See for instance, "Murray's Travels," *Southern Literary Messenger* 6, no. 1 (January 1840): 83; *Speech of Mr. Hilliard, of Alabama, on the Mexican War, Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 5, 1847* (Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon, 1847), 5; and Herbert Fielder, *The Disunionist: A Brief Treatise upon the Evils of the Union between the North and the South, and the Propriety of Separation and the Formation of a Southern United States* (n.p., printed for the author, 1858), 11.
67. Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800* (London: Verso, 1998), 4.

68. Eugene D. Genovese, *The Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom and Progress in Southern Conservative Thought, 1820–1860* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 13.
69. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 52.

Part III

Emotions and the Happy Life

The Modern Politics of Emotions

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10 Norbert Elias and the Sociology of Resentment[1]

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INTRODUCTION: NORBERT ELIAS AND THE LONG RISE OF THE BOURGEOIS HOUSEHOLD

Interpretations of the sociology of Norbert Elias can too easily focus on the changing nature of manners, while neglecting the equally important aspects of his political sociology, namely the evolution of the state and the household. If there is a political sociology of the state in his work, there is equally, although more implicitly, a sociology of emotions. In *The Civilizing Process,* Elias traced the historical unfolding of European manners from an early warrior society through medieval feudalism, the court system, the bourgeois household, and finally to the modern state.[2] As he showed originally in *The Court Society* (1983), the history of courtesy cannot be understood without a history of the court.[3] We can read his classic work as a history of the taming of violent, often destructive, emotions and the creation of societies that cherished restraint. In the English context, a gentleman did not express emotions, because overtly aggressive behavior was uncouth and vulgar.

In addition, Elias perhaps again implicitly rather than explicitly deals with the changing social class structure of Europe in his overview of the history of manners. The warrior society of early feudalism was a society sharply divided between the peasants who labored on the land and the land-owning warrior class who exercised political control over the land primarily through the threat of physical violence. I shall return to this issue later, but, given the fact that Elias almost wholly ignored religion, it is not surprising that he does not have a lot to say about the clergy as a stratum or class in the evolution of civilized society.

This somewhat primitive social structure of warriors evolved over centuries into the European court society, and Elias shifted his focus toward the early pacification of the warrior class and the subsequent emergence of a court system and its associated behavioral system and norms of conduct. This court society was the centerpiece of *The Civilizing Process* within which he begins to describe the capitalist society with the emerging dominance of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois household as the center of

attention, and a new type of state. In simplified terms, we can say initially that Elias presented a history of three dominant classes—the feudal warrior, the social nobility of the European court, and the bourgeois gentleman of early capitalism—and described the *habitus* associated with each class. The *habitus* of each class was constituted by the dispositions, norms, and practices that were relevant to the various strata. The control of emotions was an important part of the *habitus* of bourgeois culture.

The overall theme of Elias's master concept of civilizing processes was that violent expressions of anger were gradually cultivated and modified to place greater emphasis on self-control and self-monitoring. Civilization at the level of individual behavior meant the regulation and discipline of highly expressive or aggressive actions and feelings. Shame played a major part in this long-term process of self-cultivation. Despite its social importance, shame is apparently a rather "quiet" emotion, being "heavily veiled to the sight of others; however strong it may be, it is never expressed in noisy gesture."[4] It involves a fear of loss of respect of significant others, but it is not "noisy" because it involves a private inner struggle. Shame, while having these psychological characteristics, was often instigated by the exposure of bodily parts. Elias correctly placed this idea of shame within the hierarchical structure of court society in the sense that exposure of bodily parts to an inferior was not an occasion for shame. A king might, while lying in bed, expose himself to a minister or servant without shame. With the decline of both feudalism and court society, shame becomes more generalized in a democratic society. Bodily exposure is branded as offensive, and it is accompanied by embarrassment—"an inseparable counterpart of shame."[5] Shame and embarrassment as emotions advanced rapidly from the sixteenth century. As mutual dependence in society increases, mutual observation increases, and emotions become more differentiated and more subtle. The differences between social classes are reduced. Extreme expressions are contained by social controls, and people become more attuned to detecting and understanding gestures and expressions. As the aristocratic world declined to be replaced by bourgeois sensibilities in the age of capitalism, there was an equally important transformation of manners that were consistent with a society in which status was based on wealth from enterprises rather than on inherited wealth from ownership of the land.

Although these are general trends in societies as a whole, Elias was aware obviously of important variations between different societies and different classes. In England, there had been a certain fusion between the landed aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie, and hence the bourgeois class often adopted and absorbed aristocratic manners. The national code of the United States "has to a greater extent middle-class characteristics."[6] In addition, as an island, England did not depend on a large standing army, and the navy played a much larger role in the upper-class system of honor. In Prussia, the opposite was the case. Although Elias was specifically aware of such

important variations, these did not detract from the force of his overall thesis, namely that Europe had undergone an important pacification of its feudal warrior system and that changes in individual behavior were associated with changes in the nature of the state. The increasing democratization of society was associated, not only with a leveling of status, but with a leveling of emotions, especially the reduction of expressions of violence and anger in public. As mutual dependence increased, the visibility of naked anger became problematic—it had to be refined and suppressed.

The modern theory of citizenship understands the citizen to be an active social being who is empowered by social rights to challenge where necessary either the inequalities of society or the violence of the state. The active citizen has become the ideal of both conservative and liberal ideologies. Without some degree of autonomy, the citizen cannot become virtuous either in claiming rights or undertaking duties. By contrast, the modern actors of Elias's bourgeois world appear to be largely passive. There is little sense in Elias's account of European history that peasants ever revolted against their overlords, or that the urban bourgeoisie ever complained about excessive taxation, or that modern workers ever engaged in strike activity against their capitalist masters. The social actor in Elias's conceptual scheme knows his or her place in society, especially when they have accepted the norms of civilized behavior. They express deference to their rightful and privileged superiors. These inferiors in the hierarchy of privilege and good manners never exhibit any indignation or resentment with respect to any sense of injustice. One can imagine that a defense of Elias would argue that notions of justice and revolt against inequality are essentially modern, having little role in the world described by Elias. However this defense will not work, because we know that peasant revolts over heavy taxes or land seizure were common, especially as a consequence of poor harvests and famine. Furthermore, many of these protests found their ideological justification in the Christian tradition and specifically in biblical imagery—"When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?" The tradition of natural law as expressed by the great doctors of the Church such as Aquinas had developed a framework of ideas such as the just wage and the criticism of usury. In short, there was no shortage of ideological justification for legitimate protest. How, perhaps more importantly why, did Elias overlook these issues?

One answer is that Elias provided an account of European civilizational processes with virtually no reference to organized religion. There are one or two footnotes to Catholicism toward the end of *The Civilizing Process,* and there were essays published in *Theory, Culture & Society* on how the Church sought to regulate warfare (for example by developing a code for the treatment of aristocratic women who had been taken captive in military campaigns); but these commentaries on religion are marginal to the overall argument that emphasized the *secular* nature of these restraints on violence.[7]

This absence is problematical for a variety of reasons. One historical example concerns the Viking raids on medieval England—surely a perfect example of a warrior society. These were eventually pacified because the Viking court embraced Christianity. Attacks on religious sites in England declined significantly with the Christianization of these northern warrior societies. These developments point to a paradox in the Christian tradition that has on the one hand been important in legitimating the power of the dominant class and its political apparatus and on the other hand justifying opposition by denying the legitimacy of the dominant class and its social system. Christianity legitimated godly rule and godly protest. In this regard, one might argue that Elias's historical thesis takes for granted the resignation of the disprivileged social strata to the cultural legitimacy and political power of their superiors, thereby neglecting resentment and rage toward them. In order to develop this line of argument as a criticism of Elias's treatment of emotions, I want to consider resentment as a powerful emotion.

RESENTMENT AND THE RELIGION OF THE DISPRIVILEGED

Nietzsche was the original source of inspiration for most contemporary theories of resentment. Weber made specific references to Nietzsche in *Ancient Judaism,* but his engagement with the issue of resentment gave rise to highly controversial comments on Jewish society in the Old Testament period as a "pariah community." Because the Jews were an exiled community in Egypt, they set up a number of barriers to prevent their assimilation into a hostile world and the dilution of their religion and culture. These barriers included special dietary rules and prohibitions on intermarriage. Weber was less concerned to describe these rituals and more concerned to understand "the dualism of in-group and out-group morality." These group norms had the effect of isolating the Jewish community from the external world of strangers; and for Weber, more importantly these group structures did not encourage the growth of an economically rational ethic similar to the Protestant inner-worldly asceticism. As a guest people in a land of strangers, Jewish norms did not stimulate any rational mastery of the world, but rather promoted a ritualistic attitude toward everyday practices, especially dietary regulations. While these religious norms had important consequences for economic behavior, dietary restrictions had equally significant outcomes for communal relationships and for social stratification in which Jews became heavily concentrated in specific occupational niches. Thus Weber noted that "ritualization of dietary habits made commensalisms very difficult," and hence pious practices on the part of observant Jews had the effect of segregating religious communities from contact with Gentiles.[8]

Because Weber was preoccupied by the question of Jewish economic behavior, the question of resentment played only a minor role in *Ancient Judaism,* and when it did emerge it was in conjunction with the issue of

what he called "the theodicy of the disprivileged." This theodicy is the wellspring of resentment, because it entails, as Weber said, a definition of the absence of authenticity or deservedness among the privileged. It may be worth noting that word here is "disprivileged" and not simply "unprivileged." In short, privilege has been actively and consciously removed from a social group. The pariah group is strengthened by its theodicy, and the central aspect of that theodicy is resentment. It was particularly strong among the Jews because the dream of future success and revenge necessitated a theodicy of the present; it was a resentment that kept the individual acting and moving forward. Weber noted this phenomenon is not just a quality of religious groups, but also of secular groups—he mentioned the proletariat. Weber concluded this preliminary discussion of resentment with an interesting contrast between Judaism and early Christianity. The catastrophic plight of the Jewish community with the destruction of the Temple led the rabbis to concentrate on the "ethical problems of the resentment of repressed and sublimated revenge," but early Christianity "was less sophisticated and has given less thought to these facts. . . . (Christianity) shows some examples of a rather open ethic of resentment."[9]

Weber's analysis of in-group and out-group morality also appeared in his study of *The Religion of India* where the notion of "guest peoples" (*Gastvolk*) was used as a description of those who had lost their land through conquest and invasion, or communities that had been marginalized and lived a nomadic and migratory existence. Where the barriers between guest people and the dominant community were reinforced by ritual norm of pollution, Weber spoke of "pariah peoples." These examples of social separation between different strata of society were, for Weber, particularly prevalent in societies with a well-established system of castes in a hierarchy of purity and impurity. While he thought of these closed groups as characteristic of archaic societies, he noted that similar patterns of ritual or religious exclusion operated in the United States in terms of racial stratification. However his main preoccupation was with the continuing social exclusion of the Jews in Europe.

Weber addressed the issue of social position, theodicy, and resentment more explicitly in *The Sociology of Religion* in suggesting that resentment is a consequence of the opposition of nonprivileged classes against the privileged, in which the unequal distribution of resources is caused by "the sinfulness and illegality of the privileged."[10] However, "the religion of suffering acquires the specific character of *ressentiment* only under special circumstances."[11] It was absent in Hinduism and Buddhism, where suffering is the result of individual wrongdoing, but the situation was quite different in Judaism. The Psalms are replete with the need for legitimate revenge against worldly and arrogant powers. However, a theodicy of disprivilege is an inevitable adjunct of any salvation religion that draws many of its followers from disprivileged groups.

As one might expect, Weber's analysis of "pariah people" has been the subject of much criticism. It has been argued that Weber mistakenly compared the plight of the Jews with the Indian caste system and that his analysis ignores "Jewish sensibilities."[12] Two comments may be appropriate here. The first is that this analysis of privileged and disprivileged religion might be connected to a broader concern in Weber's sociology of religion, which was to identify the variable religious needs of different social strata. While the dominant classes wanted legitimacy, the subordinate strata demanded compensation and, in the absence of compensation, revenge in the next world. The second is that Weber took from Nietzsche not only the somewhat narrow sociology of status groups and their worldviews, but also the analysis of modern society in terms of nihilism. For Nietzsche, the death of God had brought about a nihilistic crisis in human values such that life had become meaningless, but this same crisis also opened up the opportunity to reevaluate all values. In conclusion, there is an important gap in Weber's account of resentment, namely the absence of a more general analysis of resentment and powerlessness by reference to status groups, hierarchical domination, and social conflict.

TOWARD THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESENTMENT: NIETZSCHE AND WEBER

Weber's sociology of religion suggests perhaps that resentment is a basic, indeed primitive and elemental, emotion associated with messianic religions in societies that are sharply divided by in-groups and out-groups, or societies that have something approximating a caste system along with a theory of pollution. In short, resentment is not a "modern" emotion because the deep division of society into castes with an in-group and out-group social structure on the basis of norms defining pollution is not a feature that is characteristic of modern democratic cultures. This interpretation might lead to the commonsense assumption that modernization or secularization would weaken the conditions that produce resentful feelings. With the decline of caste-like hierarchies, perhaps both resentment and pity are less socially acceptable emotions. Where it occurs, resentment is typically seen as a corrosive and individualistic emotion and, in a society that ideologically proclaims a commitment to egalitarianism, expressing pity toward our inferiors might also be regarded with suspicion.

Nietzsche associated resentment with Christianity because it was a religion of the weak—Blessed are the poor for they shall inherit the earth! Hence asceticism is not a virtue of the heroic manly life. Nietzsche argued that Christianity came to redirect resentment by driving it inward via the idea of personal sin and placing the blame for suffering onto the self. More generally in *The Will to Power* he claimed that both religion and philosophy, insofar as they invent alternative worlds and hate this world, are

driven by resentment. In fact by exercising a negative judgment on humanity morality exhibits pessimism toward life. Morality is ultimately a manifestation of resentment.

With Nietzsche, I propose the counterintuitive thesis that, not only does resentment flourish with modernization, it is in fact par excellence a modern sentiment. My starting point is simply to recognize the greater visibility between individuals and social groups in modern societies, especially within urbanization. In traditional agrarian societies, people lived within tight communities often separated by forests and wilderness from other communities. The peasantry as a social class was also physically and culturally separated from landowners. In these societies, there was little development of any society-wide system of communication. The society of the court was sheltered from the routine gaze of commoners, and there were religious constraints on the willful display of wealth. Greed and avarice were regarded as sins in Catholic doctrine in the Middle Ages. With the rise of Puritanism, there were prohibitions on the display of luxury. John Wesley expelled women from his chapels if they wore adornments to religious services, encouraging people to save all they could and to give all away. One should not exaggerate the degree to which personal wealth was hidden in such societies, but there were obvious religious injunctions against display. Admittedly the Counter Reformation developed artistic and architectural styles that overtly displayed luxury, but this movement was a celebration of the world to come, not of this world.

Traditional societies offered few opportunities to gaze at wealth. The elite was small and hidden behind castle walls, and in attending Church services the elite sat in their family boxes, which prevented the intrusive gaze of the common people. Just as there was less occasion to gaze on the privileged stratum, so there was less opportunity to gaze upon the face of any ordinary individual. An important difference between our world and this traditional world was that mirrors were unknown, at least among the poor.

In modern societies, communities are more open, mobile, and contiguous. They are so to speak more socially contagious. We "rub shoulders" with elites on modern transport systems in the mega-city and, if we do not literally rub shoulders with them, then we see them on TV, read about them in magazines, and hear about them on the radio. The incomes and investments of the rich are routinely recorded in the *Financial Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*. Wealth is not only on display, we are invited to gaze at it and where possible to admire and endorse it. While we are encouraged to consume the sight of luxury, we are also encouraged to consider how we might also come into possession of luxuries. The *Financial Times* brings out a color supplement on *How To Spend It* in which we can contemplate luxury yachts, holidays in the Swiss Alps, handcrafted leather bags, high-performance automobiles, and any number of precision watches. My notion of the importance of gazing at the other and the rise of self-regard is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than by the global spread of Facebook,

Twitter, and You-tube. Everybody is on display and available to a large audience. We know about David Beckham's income, about his taste and his tattoos, and we know about Elton John's marriage and about the contents of his wardrobe. These celebrities have joined the super-rich.

We can get additional insight into mid-century American wealth by considering C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite*, where he discussed "The Celebrities." For Mills, the key change in the celebrity system was obviously the rise of mass communications—the prime means of acclaim—" . . . as the power of political institutions becomes greater, the men at the top become celebrities in a national system of prestige that cannot be very well resisted."[13] He thought that the prestige system has a number of functions. It creates a national sense of involvement, and converts economic and political power into legitimate authority. However, he suggested that the very rich and powerful try to a large extend to keep out of the public eye—"It is by no means certain, just at this historical juncture, that they are not quite content to rest uncelebrated."[14] He was of course referring mainly to New York in the 1950s. Modern celebrity is different in many ways. The new celebrity elite is made up of people from diverse sectors such as the entertainment industry, the world of sport, art, journalism, advertising, and fashion. However this element in the new power elite is increasingly recruited from global communication groups, perhaps best illustrated by the rapid rise and spread of Facebook. Many celebrities hide themselves from the prying interest of the general public. As an example of the modern seclusion of the super-rich, we might consider Rachel Mellon, the heiress of the Mellon banking fortune. For many decades a recluse, she has been brought into the political scandal surrounding Senator Edwards, the former Democratic vice-presidential candidate who has been investigated on charges that he used campaign funds to cover up a mistress and an illegitimate child. Rachel Lowe Lambert Lloyd Mellon was born August 9, 1910. In 1948 she married Paul Mellon, philanthropist, art collector, and heir to the Mellon banking fortune. He died in 1999. She became close to the Kennedy family, being a Democrat in a world of Republicans. She also became friends with Edwards, former senator of North Carolina whose good looks reminded her of President Kennedy, and so she gave him $6 million over a number of years to help in his campaign. In May 2007 Edwards's mistress Rielle Hunter discovered she was pregnant and Rachel Mellon gave him $725,000 to help him manage the scandal. While she and Edwards claimed that the money was not campaign money but merely a nonpolitical gift, she has been identified as a person who might be called as a witness. Her involvement in the public arena goes against her personal philosophy, which is "Nothing should be noticed." However the paradox is that even the rich cannot stay out the "limelight" for too long. Her story was revealed in the *New York Times* in June 2011.[15]

It is perhaps difficult to hide wealth in societies where journalists are hungry for scandal and exposure. In addition there is some degree of merger

between the traditional elite and the celebrity world of sports personalities and politicians. Indeed in modern societies these two spheres overlap and support each other. For example, we know a great deal about the public and private life of Silvio Berlusconi because his wealth, politics, and sexual life are displayed on the global media. Wealth is displayed to the underprivileged and the disprivileged in large doses. This propinquity and visibility enhance the opportunities for resentment. This is the foundation of the principal paradox of modern resentment. We love celebrities but, through our resentment, we also revel in their misfortunes and downfall. It appears that *Schadenfreude* is the constant companion of resentment, and it is the constant and oppressive visibility of wealth and success that creates conditions for envy and resentment.

TOWARD THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESENTMENT: ROUSSEAU AND GOFFMAN

Rousseau was perhaps the first political philosopher to comment on this emerging issue. In the *Letter to M. d'Alembert* he developed his famous critique of the theatre. We can regard this letter as an early contribution to the sociology of modern spectacle. His writing on spectacle in the theatre was a moral as well as a political criticism of d'Alembert. Whereas d'Alembert had defended the introduction of theatre into Paris and the provinces, Rousseau regarded these entertainments as yet another occasion for the corruption of the natural goodness of the young. In rejecting the Christian doctrine of original sin, Rousseau had concluded that it is society that corrupts the innocent natural subject and not the depraved individual who corrupts society—the topic of *Emile*.

For Rousseau, the problem with modern society—as preeminently illustrated in the theatre—is that people can no longer be themselves, because there is an erosion of self-regard by the need to display the self to the public. The need for status display involves the fabrication of a social mask in which this outer *persona* contradicts the person whom we really are. With the evolution of urban society, it was now in "the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train."[16] Both men and women had to learn artful methods of presenting themselves to strangers.

Rousseau did not deal with resentment as such, but there is a long passage on envy in Book 4 of *Emile*. His theory of sentimental education was designed to protect the innocent child from the displays of wealth and power in society. In particular children are to be sheltered from the dangers of the display of wealth in the artificial world of the theatre—"Do not expose his eyes at the outset to the pomp of courts, the splendor of palaces,

or the appeal of the theater."[17] A child can only gaze upon such sites when he or she is adequately prepared to make their own independent judgment.

In the process of thinking about education he developed an interesting comparison between pity and envy.[18] His argument was that we are attracted to our fellow humans not by their pleasures but by their pains. Whereas the sight of a happy person inspires us with envy rather than with love, our sympathies are stirred by the sight of suffering. He concluded that "If our common needs unite us by interest, our common miseries unite us by affection." [19] We gain psychological pleasure from witnessing the misery of others, especially if we can look down on them.

It is perhaps not surprising that Rousseau did not enter into Elias's *The Civilizing Process*; Elias does not give systematic references to his sources or to the influences on his theory. Nevertheless what is perhaps more surprising is the absence of any discussion of emotions that one might, on commonsense grounds alone, predict about court society and the eventual rise to social influence of the bourgeoisie. In English literature one might take Jane Austen's novels as marking the transition from feudal wealth to a new social order in which entrepreneurial talent in the colonial exploitation of sugar was producing a stratum of new wealth. Her major novels—*Pride and Prejudice, Sense and Sensibility,* and *Mansfield Park*—were set within the reign of George III, and she wrote from the perspective of the lower gentry from the context of an English village. Her novels were silent about the major political events of her time, such as the French Revolution, but they are characterized by an acute insight into the making and losing of fortunes. In her brilliant analysis of marriage strategies, we find a Rousseau-like world of envy against the successful and pity for those who have "fallen." Consequently some philosophers have seen her as contributing to the study of virtue ethics,[20] while others have compared her novels to the work of Henry James as narratives of emotions.[21] If we compare Austen and Elias as theorists of emotions, there is little in Elias about the social psychology of such emotions as envy, jealousy, and resentment with respect to rising and falling social strata in European societies.

This way of reading Rousseau (as a sociologist of the modern self) brings out a striking resemblance to the sociology of interpersonal behavior in the work of Erving Goffman. In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman (1959) studied the micro-rituals by which we routinely construct a self in social encounters.[22] In this respect, his work invites the assumption that our social selves are fabricated, because successful interactions require strategies in which we may try to avoid any loss of face. Because Goffman's analysis of social situations involved a distinction between the front stage and the back stage, the implication can be legitimately drawn that the back stage is where the authentic self—the natural person—is lodged. This way of looking at the social interaction was defined as the "dramaturgical approach" to social reality insofar as Goffman recognized that we often have to act out social roles in a rather creative way; we can also play social

roles in which we can distance ourselves from the immediate situation. Like the script in a stage play, the interactions of everyday encounters have to be performed and enacted. The point of this dramaturgical approach was to avoid the impression created by the mainstream sociology that roles are fixed and secure. The idea that society has itself become a drama is a remarkable confirmation of Rousseau's criticisms of the theatre.

The social environment that Goffman described in the 1950s in America represented the historical realization of Rousseau's worst fears. With the "theatricalisation" of everyday life, conformity to social norms of behavior is no longer linked to virtue. Success in interactional situations requires strategy, namely the artful construction and presentation of the self to the social world. Success in such strategic encounters requires me to present my face in a manner that is artful. I will need to gaze on the other to strategize in a manner that can maximize my advantage. This competitive urban society, as described by Goffman in his interaction rituals, is the epitome of Rousseau's notion of society as a corrosive spectacle. In such a world, "If intention is nothing, and surface behaviour all, then morality is not so much threatened as dissolved."[23]

Goffman's strategic actors can also be interpreted as examples of "the organization man."[24] The corporate world of the emerging consumer society of the 1950s as described by William F. Whyte was a world of managed emotions and standardized lifestyles. For the organization man, successful role-playing requires interactional skills in managing the front stage of the everyday world, carefully avoiding any embarrassment and strategically protecting oneself from any loss of face. The social world is merely a complex game in which winning and losing acquire an arbitrary character; the social game is a game of luck. However we cannot criticize Goffman's sociology as a cynical and amoral portrayal of the corporate world of twentieth-century America. Because when there is no shared moral framework, then there is no value consensus and hence no shared criteria by which the virtue of an actor could be judged. The result is to inflame resentment.

In a Goffmanesque world, because prestige is inevitably scarce, its distribution must be unequal and uneven, and hence the quest for prestige must inevitably lead to disappointment. Disappointment all too easily evolves into more active resentment against others, because where there is no shared moral vocabulary, success (in prestige terms) will always appear to be random. Modern success has the character of a lottery system in which rewards are arbitrarily allocated without regard to merit or worth. Consequently, the modern status system is volatile and unpredictable, and its legitimacy is open to constant questioning. There are equally rapid moves upwards and downwards in which success does not appear to depend on individual effort or personal merit. The modern system of prestige hierarchy is based on a celebrity system that is orchestrated by the media, and the new "power elite" does not necessarily have power, but the assembly of football stars, media tycoons, film stars, and millionaires who achieve

instant success on Internet "start-ups" enjoy both notoriety and material wealth—at least in the short term.

The sociological focus here is on the fluidity of status hierarchies. Whereas Weber was concerned with resentment in societies that were sharply divided between the privileged and the disprivileged in which the latter developed theodicies of resentment against the arrogance of wealth, modern resentment dwells in the fluid spaces between the amoral affluence of the upwardly socially mobile and justified resentment of those whose declining position traps them in suburban wastelands. What counts is the visibility or the display of status wealth with the proliferation of modern commodities that can so easily carry the hallmarks of superior status—automobiles, wristwatches, homes, attire, holidays, sport, and so forth, namely the cornucopia of commodities and services that are on display every weekend in Sunday newspapers. There is the physical rubbing of shoulders with the rich and successful that takes place in mass transit systems, where different status groups cannot avoid each other. Then there is the propinquity of urban spaces in which the rich and the not-so-rich can merge and make discriminating comparisons. The commodification of everyday life opens up new and infinitely elastic opportunities for status games—social climbing, social comparisons, and social exclusions, but also of social decline, humiliation, and finally invisibility. Nobody can really escape from these status games, since any consumer item may function as a positional good.

The real key to modern resentment is the disjuncture between material or status success and personal worth. Because we no longer live in an industrial society based on production where personal worth was connected to hard work, skill levels, and education, in a consumer society the traditional virtues (saving and asceticism) have no place, and success has the appearance of a lottery. Hence chance and risk appear to play a large role in material success and failure. Because effort and reward no longer have a clear connection, the scope for resentment is enhanced. Sudden riches—from speculation and financial gambles—and sudden disaster appear to have no necessary relationship to moral worth, and hence we can feel a sense of *justified resentment*.

The modern status system appears to be based on the "luck of the draw," and there is as a result ample scope for disappointment, frustration, envy, and resentment. Such fragile and precarious reward systems create conditions for an inflationary growth of resentment within the modern occupational system and income ladder. Where success is broadcast through prizes, public awards, and status-conferring ceremonies, the opportunities for resentment are further enhanced. Institutions where such ritualized rewards for celebrities are still emphasized—the academy and the film industry—will offer occasions for acute if typically mute resentment. In the past one might anticipate that, in societies where class loyalties were still important, resentment would evolve into rage and then into rebellion, but contemporary resentment is an individualized disposition, which, while it

might be shared by a large number of people, does not lend itself to collective action. Resentment is, as I will suggest with Tea Party politics, diffused into the social system producing a social bias toward negative politics. To use a medieval metaphor, resentment is a sort of social bile.

CLASS, STATUS, AND RESENTMENT

One of the few sociological contributions to the study of resentment in relation to social class was provided by Jack Barbalet in his *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure* in which, against Nietzsche's view that resentment is a spiteful and self-destructive emotion, he defined resentment as an emotionally charged perception of an advantage that did not appear to be deserved.[25] His account is especially pertinent to my discussion, because he treats resentment, following T. H.Marshall's theory of citizenship, as an inescapable feature of social-class relationships. In an early paper in 1938 on class conflict, Marshal treated class antagonism as a source of "resentment against inequality."[26] The basic logic of class-driven resentment is simply the ways in which various forms of privilege produce inequalities of opportunity that lead in turn to frustration. Class resentment imputes responsibility for a sense of injustice and material deprivation to a superior class that enjoys numerous privileges. These unequal opportunity structures are an inevitable outcome of the actual structure of domination in which one class exploits another. Marshall concluded his discussion of resentment with his theory of citizenship. The class structure of early capitalism was changing with the rise of consumerism, the expansion of social rights, and the decline of economic wealth as the sole determinant of social influence. The implication of this argument is that the level of social resentment should decline with improvements in life chances emerging with an expansion of citizenship.

Barbalet introduced two important qualifications to Marshall's argument that are important for our discussion. The first is that the model is not sufficiently complex in that Marshall only makes interclass comparisons, whereas Barbalet argues that, by introducing the impact of the business cycle on opportunities, we can then make important intraclass comparisons. Following an article by Bensman and Vidich, the impact of the business cycle means that ascendant social groups will acquire a certain degree of unearned prosperity, while declining social groups will by contrast be worse off regardless of their effort or merit.[27] While ascendant social groups will experience emotions of satisfaction and self-confidence as their material rewards expand, declining social groups are likely to feel dissatisfaction and resentment with their society.

Barbalet found some empirical support for these patterns in British society in the second half of the twentieth century, for example in the famous study by W. G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (1966),

where, as the incomes of the manual workers rose, nonmanual workers experienced resentment, not because the improvements of the manual workers were regarded as illegitimate, but rather because they had no capacity to maintain their relative position.[28] Barbalet proposed that resentment can develop into radical politics or it can be sublimated and diverted elsewhere. For example, religious movements might feed off such class resentments in which hatred of foreigners or homosexuals might be the channel for sublimated resentment.[29]

The second problem is that Marshall's account of class, resentment, and citizenship was located within the context of British society from the 1930s to the 1950s in which social action was typically collectivist and oriented toward political change. However, the situation of capitalist society in the second half of the twentieth century in both Britain and America was very different. Drawing upon Sennett and Cobb's *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (1972), Barbalet notes that working-class men were frequently divided in terms of their sense of loyalty to fraternity and class on the one hand and to individualistic notions of their personal worth and merit. While these men often felt a strong sense of obligation to their families and children, they also felt that their sacrifices were never fully recognized or rewarded. Because their position in society was never fully recognized, these men had a strong sense of general ingratitude toward them. For Barbalet, although these resentments have their origins in class relations, they are experienced in psychological terms by individuals who engage in self-blame and shame. These resentments do not result in collective action or political protest. Working-class men do not engage in collective action but rather "resentment is directed against those who are perceived as gaining rewards without having made sacrifices, such as welfare recipients, and those who disdain the rewards the economy can provide for them, such as radical students."[30]

Responding to Barbalet, I suggest that to connect resentment almost exclusively to social class struggles is to limit the role of resentment in social life, and hence the argument treats the relationship between class and resentment in a somewhat mechanistic fashion. By contrast, connecting resentment with status opens up richer opportunities for theory and research. For one thing, there is a general issue about the relevance of social class to late capitalism. It is not possible here to enter into the long and complicated debate about this matter, but suffice it to say that there is a plausible view that social class no longer provides the foundation for collective political action. Barbalet more or less admits the validity of this argument. The collectivist aspects of modern politics have been eroded largely because the class basis of local communities has also disappeared. Social classes have lost their communal solidarity. The decline of trade union membership, international outsourcing of jobs, the decline of large manufacturing enterprises, and the globalization of the labor market have largely robbed social class of its place in the political landscape, and as a result political parties in Western capitalism have drifted toward the center, forging a

political consensus that has left radical parties with extreme platforms on the electoral margins.

There is of course no disagreement that income inequality has increased, but "social class" in the so-called strong program of class analysis is a thing of the past. By contrast status distinction and status conflict appears to increase in modern society with the growth of consumerism from the middle of the twentieth century.[31] What Barbalet's analysis lacks, and what Rousseau's theory expounds, is the nature of status *display*. Modern resentment is not based on any simple class dichotomy between the haves and the have-nots, but on the visible gradations of distinction in everyday life that convince us that we are not being rewarded adequately and that those above us on the ladder of display are not entirely worthy, but also that we cannot do anything about it. Subtle forms of inequality of prestige are literally in our face through the modern media, which daily recount the value of the houses that celebrities have recently bought, the assets redistributed to actresses in divorce cases, the massive bonuses offered to bankers and financiers, the inflated salaries of football players, and so on. Modern society is a spectacle of success and failure, and we are merely the passive observers of a fantasy world that we can never enter but that surrounds us like the ether.

THE CREDIT CRISIS AND THE RISE OF TEA PARTY POPULISM

Having considered a number of sources that can help us construct a theory of resentment as an emotion that is a function of unequal wealth, visibility, and propinquity in consumer cultures creating narratives of the rise and fall of celebrities, let us now begin to conclude with an empirical case study from contemporary American politics. I have chosen the rise of the Tea Party in order to draw attention to the fact that Elias had relativity little to say about America, and yet, as Stephen Mennell has shown in *The American Civilizing Process* (2007) American history presents an interesting case study of Elias's claims about civilizing behavior.[32]

This outline of a theory of resentment appears to be especially relevant to the recent history of the financial crisis in the West from 2007 to the present, in which large fortunes have been lost and many social certainties destroyed. There has been widespread resentment against bankers and financiers, perhaps best illustrated by the resentment against such figures as Bernie Madoff. The identification of the villains such as the AIG executives and finance managers of the large banks by the media has allowed public criticism to fall on individuals rather than on the problems of the economy as a whole. Since the crises are unavoidable (at least according to economic theories of the business cycle), the resulting "greed talk," to coin a phrase, is also pervasive. The current form of late capitalism generates high levels of personal indebtedness, and, because personal status

depends on consumption, modern consumer society requires that everybody become greedy. With the pressure to consume, citizens acquire liabilities rather than assets, and hence they are highly dependent for their status on the cycle of accumulation that also produces periodic economic crises. Hence the peculiarity of modern society is the structural requirement of acquisitiveness and the ubiquity of "the blame game," to use the language of Robert Skidelsky, in which resentment is an inevitable outcome of this combination of uncertainty, visibility, and the amoral character of success and failure.[33]

Religious fundamentalism, and especially the religion of the Moral Majority, fits this social system relatively well. In this regard, the theme of greed maps perfectly onto the social structure of a declining industrial power, because it provides a ready-made language of criticism for the male, blue-collar worker who experiences his economic redundancy as one of personal decline. William E. Connolly has grasped this general sense of resentment in his account of the creation of a fundamentalist ideology, the rise of the Republican Right, and the crisis of a number of foreign adventures from the Vietnam War to modern-day Afghanistan against the backdrop of the transformation of manufacturing industry and the financialization of American capitalism. He writes that "[t]he Southern Baptist Church was consolidated through a common feeling of betrayal and resentment. This combination of military defeat, deep resentment against the victorious forces, and aggressive moralization to overturn those forces forms the recurrent basis of fundamentalism in America."[34] The political fundamentalism of the South has combined with other dimensions of American life in the late 1960s. He invites us to "[c]onsider northern, male, white, blue-collar workers and white-collar workers of modest means," and the Southern white workers who are the backbone of fundamentalism.[35] This constituency felt under seige from middle-class feminism, the welfare program of the Great Society, the growth of the service sector, environmentalism, and more recently by the election of President Obama. The result is that white working-class men, having lost out as a consequence of the decline of industrial society, aggressively assert their grievances against feminists, gay men, East Coast intellectuals, and African-Americans. Much of this resentment provided the energy behind the Christian Evangelical Right that proved so influential in George W. Bush's presidential campaign and in the emergence, with the political skills of Karl Rove, of faith-based politics in the Bush administration.[36]

The Republican Party has been successful in tapping into these pools of resentment. The conservative agenda came originally to be orchestrated around George Wallace, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan. Workers who had been traditional Democrats were attracted to the Republican Party by resentments conjured up by the Vietnam War, the cultural movements of the 1960s, affirmative action on race and gender, the decline of factory work, legislation on same-sex marriage, and so forth. These sectors

of society, who have already been victims of the Rust Belt and the Internet bubble, have now been subjected to the housing market crisis, the liquidity crisis, the slide in the value of the dollar, the banking meltdown, the economic recession, and the legal scandals around mortgages and foreclosure. The greed talk and the blame game offer an explanation of their plight, a conduit for their resentment and occasional displays of outrage against Wall Street bankers and AIG executives. The mass media, comparing current malefactors with fictional Wall Street characters such as Gordon Gekko demanded the "disgorgement" of such wrongdoers. Modern greed talk and the blame game are negative—they are about revenge and not about rebuilding institutions. Their content is moral and theological rather than economic and practical. It is about the allocation of blame on an individual basis for those whose behavior exceeds what we might call normal greed. The vocabulary around the modern crises of capitalism has a moral and occasionally religious framework, but the mainstream churches lack any effective language to analyze the contemporary structure and functions of a society that is going through a transformation from an industrial capitalist society to a society that is organized in terms of the rhythm of global finance. In American politics, moral outrage offers a more acceptable face for resentment and revenge.

Obviously the business cycle may contribute to the temporal flow of resentment, but it is not central to the problem that modern consumption promotes the display of status distinction based not on merit or virtue, but largely on luck. One example of this phenomenon is the spread of Tea Party politics following the election of President Obama and the debate over the financial crisis.[37] This conservative reaction has been driven by concerns about the financial crisis and its impact on Americans in terms of job losses and mortgage foreclosures, and by the health-care reform program. There has also been personal and racial hostility to the president, but this combination of factors has produced a movement made up of white, retired, middle-class opponents expressing their frustration against politicians, teachers, scientists, doctors, and bureaucrats. The hostility is against all forms of government, but the movement as such has no viable political agenda or economic policy apart from opposition to taxation, gay marriage, immigration, and abortion. The Tea Party movement is in many respects like traditional manifestations of populism, but with a more decisive emphasis on the individual. These Tea Party Jacobins can be regarded as a manifestation of individualized resentment that is not rooted in class conflict but in a deeper feeling of not belonging in any meaningful way to society.[38] Geriatric members of the Tea Party correctly believe that their world is disappearing.

There is also a general underlying racism to much of the agenda of the populist Right, which is expressed often indirectly as a criticism of both legal and illegal migration. These political movements are of course stronger in some states than others. Arizona has been prominent in the

current attempts to stem migration, and its gun laws have of course become notorious following the attempted assassination of Democratic Representative Gabrielle Giffords on January 8, 2011. While Arizona is significant in its stand against migration, attention has also been concentrated on Alaska following the extraordinary rise in popularity of Sarah Palin, whose media presence was heavily orchestrated by Fox News and by her reality TV Series *Sarah Palin's Alaska*. Although she was routinely critical of the media, she used it effectively. Her denunciations of the Obama White House were conducted successfully through Twitter, and she had several best-selling publications such as *America by Heart*. Her success was a striking illustration of the growth of celebrity politics and the rise of figures like Palin as vehicles of a generalized resentment against party politics.

Another example of a popular "media commodity" is Pamela Geller who wages a campaign against Islam on the website Atlas Shrugs, where she calls for the removal of the Dome on the Rock and claims that the State Department is run by "Islamic supremacists." She came to public attention through her campaign against the Park51—a proposal to build a culture center near the site of the 9/11 attack. While she is lampooned by critics such as Loonwatch, she has been successful in focusing American public attention on the Danish cartoons, the Sudan crisis, and the foreign-policy comments of the President of Iran. Her views have subsequently influenced the public statements of Newt Gingrich who has for example publicly declared his opposition to the possibility of the *Shari'a* influencing American judicial decisions. The successful reelection of President Obama based on his ability to attract younger voters, the Hispanic community, and the white middle class in eastern states has demonstrated that the Republican Party suffers from a demographic challenge—can Republican leaders extract the party from its aging, white constituency?

These populist movements have been explained as a conservative reaction to American decline, racist opposition to the election of President Obama, and frustration over the failure to bring individuals held responsible for the credit crisis to justice. There is also the emergence of generational politics as the Baby Boomer generation approaches retirement only to find that their savings have been undermined by the financial crisis or that their pensions have been canceled because states and corporations no longer have the funding to support what are now seen to be generous provisions of earlier times. The widespread nature of the current popular anger with politicians, bankers, and intellectuals is the product of resentment, which in turn is nurtured by the ubiquity of the media and the modern display of power and wealth. In a society where there is significant instability in the systems of prestige and status, where the relationship between effort and personal value has been broken, and where the nexus between work and reward is opaque, there is ample scope for the circulation of negative emotions of envy and resentment.

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT

Weber treats resentment in a relatively simple fashion as the conflict between the privileged and the disprivileged, where the latter holds to an ideology that explains their position as unjust. For Nietzsche, resentment is less to do with structural inequalities and pariah groups and more to do with the individualism and nihilism of modernity. In this chapter, I have combined these two traditions to understand both the structural and the subjective circumstances of resentment. Having drawn initially on Nietzsche and Weber to lay the foundations of a theory, I considered Rousseau and Goffman as starting points to reflect on displays of wealth and its relationship to status. In modern society, the promise of success is never matched by actual experience, and rewards appear to be randomly distributed. These crises appear to be especially evident in modern America. In concluding this discussion I turn finally to that great theorist of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, who in *Democracy in America* tied resentment to the disjunction between the promise and the experience of equality:

> Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely. This complete equality is always slipping through people's fingers at the moment when they think they grasp it, fleeing, as Pascal says, in an eternal flight; the people grow heated in search of this blessing, all the more precious because it is near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.[39]

These consequences (resentment and envy) I have argued, taking my inspiration from Weber and Rousseau, are an inevitable outcome of visibility, propinquity, and the seesaw quality of wealth in late capitalism. Thus, while resentment is clearly present in class relationships, it is far more prevalent in competitive status situations, especially where, with increasing social mobility, there is more anxiety about retaining a position in the status order and a greater probability of a rapid erosion of certainty and a steep descent into social oblivion. As we have seen, Elias's theory is predominantly a class theory of manners in which he traces the rise of the bourgeoisie and its competition with a declining landed aristocracy. The relationship between those two great classes has determined the precise nature of manners and explains important differences between France, Germany, and England. In the English case, the antagonism between these classes was contained by the transformation of the feudal aristocracy into agrarian capitalists with enclosure and the development of the wool industry. The cultural contrast between the aristocrat and the gentleman was less sharp and hostile than in Germany and France.

In my reading of Elias, the conclusion to his master text on civilizational manners is that the complex and highly differentiated status relations between various strata in late Victorian society provided an ideal context

for the emergence of endemic resentment. The repression of strong emotions of aggression, the regulation of sexuality and the endless status competition found its outlet, not in rage but in bourgeois resentment. Modern capitalism has further enflamed this emotion by creating an unstable system of prestige, where effort, success, and reward have no obvious connections. The blame game becomes a generalized theme of moral discourse against the invisible super-rich who are assumed to be in control of the system and the visible celebrities who are the obvious beneficiaries of the capricious system of rewards.

NOTES

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11 Abortion, Selflessness and "Happy Objects"[1]

Erica Millar

> [T]he narrative of natural development from gendered womanhood to pregnancy to motherhood is one of the few transformational lexicons of the body and identity we have. It has framed womanhood in a natural narrative movement of the body, starting at the moment a child is sexed female and moving to her inscription in public heterosexuality, her ascension to reproduction, and her commitment to performing the abstract values of instrumental empathy and service that have characterized norms of female fulfillment.[2]

INTRODUCTION

Women who have abortions seemingly act in contradiction to the normative life path that casts pregnant women, as Lauren Berlant so eloquently writes, "in advance as already a mother embarked on a life trajectory of mothering."[3] A woman's want for an abortion is therefore profoundly threatening to the myriad social, cultural, and affective investments in a naturalized maternal-centered identity for women. This chapter argues that public speech on abortion restores aborting women to the norm of motherhood, examining how ideas about women's happiness circulate around and produce the figure of the aborting woman in a very specific way. I focus here on two parliamentary debates that gave women in Australia more lawful choices in relation to abortion in the mid-2000s. Instead of defining abortion as a woman's rejection of motherhood, or as freeing women from coerced motherhood, we will see that parliamentarians supported liberal changes to abortion law by asserting that aborting women were temporarily and inescapably *held back from maternal happiness*.[4] Parliamentarians supported fewer legal restrictions on abortion by recuperating abortion to a maternal sensibility, restating this norm in the process.

By emphasizing the centrality of individual affective and psychic constitutions to broader sociocultural developments, this study follows an approach to sociological analysis of emotions and manners within historical change pioneered by the work of Norbert Elias. In *The Civilizing Process*, Elias provides an important precursor for thinking about how emotional regimes relate to broader sociohistorical change on one hand, and the creation of modern selves on the other.[5] Elias's account of the "civilizing process" shows similarity to Foucault's account of the rise of disciplinary societies.[6]

Elias and Foucault both look at historical change through an overarching narrative of increasing discipline and the relationship between technologies of the self and socially delineated modes of conduct and decorum.[7] A study of such regimes of self-policing has become increasingly important in the late modern era, where Foucauldian scholars have argued that there has been a shift from external (particularly the law) to internal means of policing the self.[8]

When it comes to conceptualizing the regulation of abortion in contemporary Australian history, Elias's work usefully draws attention to the relationship between emotional performativity, rules of decorum, and sociohistorical change. Yet his account of emotions and their effects needs rethinking. Elias presumes emotions are natural and universal responses to phenomena, a "hydraulic" model that focuses his attention on how emotions are managed in terms of suppression or expression.[9] As we shall see, however, modes of decorum have not increasingly encouraged aborting women to suppress their emotional experiences. Rather, it is my contention here that there are very particular emotional templates aborting women are compelled to follow in order to rehabilitate their abortions to norms of femininity. For aborting women, it is a question of expressing appropriate emotions—a performativity more encompassing than mere expression or suppression. Emotions thus become a means, not of divorcing humanity from animality, but of aligning individuals with some bodies and away from others.[10] Specifically in this example, the circulation of emotions in parliamentary speeches enabled parliamentarians to restore aborting women to norms of maternal happiness. As we shall see, the parliamentarians who debated abortion in the mid-2000s expanded women's legal choices by repeatedly citing the assumption that pregnant women were oriented toward their fetuses as objects of happiness. Norms regarding the appropriate affective relationship between pregnant women and their fetuses were critical to the shift these two debates formalized from the law to self-surveillance as the primary technology regulating women's abortion conduct in contemporary Australia.

The two debates this chapter examines came amid public debate on the issue of abortion on a scale not witnessed in Australia since the law reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 2006, the Therapeutic Goods Amendment (Repeal of Ministerial Responsibility for Approval of RU486) Bill 2005 (henceforth referred to as the Commonwealth Bill) sought to remove the Federal Health Minister's veto over the release of RU486 into Australia. RU486 is a medical abortifacient, the use of which alleviates the need for anesthesia and surgery for abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy. The pharmaceutical was widely available in the majority of European countries and the United States of America by the turn of the millennium.[11] A deal between the newly elected Liberal-National coalition government and the conservative Catholic, Independent MP Brian Harradine in 1996 had, however, effectively halted its release into Australia by making the Health Minister, and not

the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), responsible for the release of RU486 into Australia.[12] In 2008, the Abortion Law Reform Bill (henceforth referred to as the Victorian Bill) sought to decriminalize the procedure in the Australian state of Victoria. Both bills were successful, theoretically removing significant restrictions on women's abortion choices. In the case of the Commonwealth Bill, however, significant administrative hurdles—such as the reported $185,000 it cost pharmaceutical companies to apply to import and distribute RU486—remained in front of Australian women's access to the abortifacient.[13] Law reform did not in fact dramatically alter the performance of abortion in Victoria: abortion on request, as afforded in the new law, had been commonly practiced (albeit by no means guaranteed) since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the two debates were widely heralded in the print media, and by their participants, as the first significant debates on abortion, in their respective legal jurisdictions, since laws were liberalized at the turn of the 1970s. The two debates also provide discursive snapshots of the arguments for, and against, legal restrictions on women's abortion choices in the mid-2000s. Before examining the debates in detail, this chapter establishes a new theoretical framework for thinking about the regulation of aborting women in neoliberal Australia.

HAPPY CHOICES

Many theorists of late modern femininity observe that, as this chapter affirms, there has been a shift from external (through mechanisms such as the law) to internal (self-surveillance) means of subject regulation. Angela McRobbie argues that popular culture and state discourse proclaims feminism to be a completed project and depicts young women as having unlimited opportunities available to them. This narrative of choice has justified a renewed attachment to a heavily circumscribed femininity. Youthful femininity is embossed with norms of whiteness and heterosexuality and focused on being sexually attractive, available, and in pursuit of a husband. Yet women are seen to follow such normative scripts, not because they are forced to by social custom or prohibitions on their actions, but because they freely choose to. Instead of being policed through restricting individual choices, therefore, late modern femininity is policed *through* women's choices by "demarcated pathologies (leaving it too late to have a baby, failing to find a good catch, etc.) . . . [which] carefully define the parameters of what constitutes livable lives for young women without the occasion of re-invented feminism."[14] Late modernity has "re-regulated"[15] women, who are now called upon to monitor their own conduct through what Rosalind Gill terms a "*self-policing narcissistic gaze*."[16]

McRobbie's argument that femininity has been reregulated through choice in late modernity is enriched by Sara Ahmed's work on happiness, which highlights that the desire for happiness orients subjects toward

certain objects as end points. Ahmed seeks to disrupt the dominant view of happiness as the emotion that "gives meaning, purpose, and order to human existence."[17] She examines happiness, not as the property of certain individuals, but as a promise contained in certain objects: "[t]he promise of happiness takes this form: if you do this or if you have that, then happiness is what follows."[18] Texts that circulate within the public domain designate certain objects as being "happy" before individuals encounter them. Such "happy objects" secure social norms and normative subject positions so that "[h]appiness scripts could be thought of as straightening devices, ways of aligning bodies with what is already lined up."[19] The promise of happiness contained in certain objects individualizes social, structural, and cultural mechanisms of power by turning social norms into social goods.[20]

Ahmed singles out marriage and reproduction as key happy objects for women. Building on Simone de Beauvoir's comment that "it is always easy to describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to place them,"[21] she asserts that the discursive figure of the "happy housewife" performs domestic tasks, not because she is directed to by others, but because domesticity is believed to bring women happiness. The promise of happiness contained in domestic life compels individual women to conform to its parameters. Ahmed concludes that

> [t]he happy housewife is a fantasy figure that erases the signs of labor under the sign of happiness. The claim that women are happy and that this happiness is behind the work they do functions to justify gendered forms of labor, not as products of nature, law, or duty, but as expressions of a collective wish and desire.[22]

The emphasis Ahmed places on the future and objects that promise a future feeling of happiness is critical when considering abortion. Normative pregnancy orients subjects toward the future—the pregnant woman's future role as mother and the fetus's future positions as child and citizen—and abortion is an act that prevents this future from materializing and enables another to take its place. My contention in this chapter is that a child of one's own is invariably positioned to be a happy object, probably *the* happiest object, for women generally and, likewise, that an orientation toward one's fetus as a happy object is the only intelligible way to inhabit pregnancy.

I refer here to the public fetus rather than the multifarious ways in which pregnant women view or experience their fetuses.[23] The fetus is an essentially contested concept, impossible to define and one read through irreducible conceptual frames.[24] Unknowable and voiceless, it is a carrier for cultural investments and, as an object onto which individuals and collectives project attributes and ideologies, is an "other" upon which individual and collective selves are formed. As a fantasy figure, the fetus contains a "cluster of promises"[25] relating to identity, fulfillment, nationhood, and, most importantly for this chapter, women's happiness. The insight that the

fetus or future child is a happy object that directs subjects toward continuing with a pregnancy offers a theory for how late modern aborting subjects are regulated by a disposition toward making certain choices and avoiding others: not through prohibitions on choice, in other words, but through the very choices available to them. The cluster of promises contained within the figure of the fetus weights pregnancy decisions heavily toward motherhood.

The predetermined orientation of women toward their children as happy objects structures the way the choice of abortion is given meaning and is foundational to the more general renaturalization of motherhood through choice in late modernity. Here it is supposed that, although women have unlimited choices available to them, including the choice to terminate a pregnancy, they overwhelmingly choose a life and identity centered on motherhood, with this choice expressive of women's maternal desire and their alignment with the feminine sensibilities (such as selflessness and nurture) that position them in the family. Because nothing but personal desire is perceived to compel women to choose motherhood, motherhood is individualized, its social, cultural, and political implications disguised, and the labor and difficulties involved in its performance erased. While abortion is a site where the renaturalization of motherhood through choice is articulated with particular clarity, this renaturalization is a dominant feature of contemporary femininity more generally. Before examining representations of abortion, this chapter examines this broader context.

MOTHERHOOD, HAPPINESS, AND CHOICE IN HOWARD'S AUSTRALIA

The Commonwealth coalition government headed by Prime Minister John Howard from 1996 to 2007 imagined the nuclear family to be the foundation of Australian society. Howard's family ideal comprised a heterosexual married couple with children, with the father working full-time and the mother dedicating herself to her children. She may or may not work part-time around this primary role.

Government policies normalized this fantasized family, entrenching, as political economist Elizabeth Hill notes, "women's status as low-income, short-hours, non-career workers, as well as primary carers." These policies included the privatization of childcare in 1996; the continued refusal to grant women maternity leave on the grounds it would discriminate against "stay-at-home" mothers; and the introduction of income splitting, which gave significant tax breaks to heterosexual couples with children on a single or primary income.[26]

Although such policies subsumed, in the words of Anne Summers, "all of women's other choices and ambitions into a motherhood mentality,"[27] Howard artfully introduced and supported them through deploying the language

of choice. Using the heavily criticized work of British sociologist Catherine Hakim, he claimed that 70 percent of women preferred to sacrifice their paid employment to focus on motherhood upon the birth of a child, and that mothers were therefore satisfied with "lower grade and lower paid jobs" in exchange for flexible workplace arrangements.[28] Howard cited Hakim's "realistic and compelling" research in several policy speeches and sponsored her tour of Australia in 2003.[29] Armed with Hakim's "preference theory," Howard proposed that policies favoring stay-at-home mothers facilitated rather than restricted individual choice. This claim enabled him to celebrate the Liberal Party as "the party of personal freedom and individual choice . . . [and one] faithful, very faithful indeed, to the principle of choice and freedom of choice for Australian women."[30] Howard's claim that mothers worked part time solely because they preferred to individualized the difficulties women faced when combining parenthood with meaningful employment while obfuscating the social and structural determinants on their choices, such as government policies and workplace arrangements. Men's unquestioned role as breadwinner meant the government never employed the vocabulary of choice to address men's work / life balance.

The government's claim that policies geared toward working mothers discriminated against the majority reinforced its derision of feminism as an elite social movement, bent on gaining power for a minority of women at the expense of "ordinary Australians."[31] The recasting of motherhood as a woman's autonomous choice involved characterizing feminism as concerned solely with individual career advancement, redundant because women were perceived to have formal equality and freedom of choice, and out of touch with the maternal-centered desires of most women. This view of feminism informed Howard's celebratory comment on a minor rise in fertility among Australian women in 2006 that "[f]ortunately, I think today's younger women are more in the post-feminist period, where they don't measure their independence and freedom by the number of years they remain full-time in the workforce without having children. They've moved on."[32]

The government's derision of feminism and celebration of a naturalized maternal desire drew on and formalized what historian Natasha Campo terms the "feminism failed me" narrative.[33] This narrative was formulated in the Australian media and in several heavily publicized books at the turn of the millennium. It criticized feminism for persuading women that, as well-known journalist and broadcaster for the ABC Virginia Haussegger put it, "female fulfillment came with a leather briefcase" instead of motherhood. In a much debated and overwhelmingly well-received book and series of newspaper articles, Haussegger generalized her personal experience of childlessness onto all childless women in their late thirties and early forties. She blamed feminism for encouraging women to focus on their careers and for not telling "us the truth about the biological clock": "I am childless and I am angry. Angry that I was so foolish to take the word of my feminist mothers as gospel."[34]

The "feminism failed me" narrative maintained that the opening up of choices for women was disorienting, masking the only authentic source of women's happiness in motherhood. Ita Buttrose, one of Australia's best-known "career mums," wrote in the book she coauthored with Penny Adams: "the guilt mothers felt regarding their children . . . can be deliberately attributed to the gaining of 'choices' at the time of Women's Liberation."[35] Choices, they implied, confused women, taking them away from stay-at-home motherhood, which was "every woman's dream."[36] The journalist Anne Manne reiterated the binary between the "selfish feminist" and normative femininity most explicitly. In a favorably reviewed book and several journal articles, Manne proclaimed that children need the full-time care of their mothers and that feminism had failed both women and children by encouraging women to focus on paid employment.[37] Feminists, she argued, devalued the selfless nurturing inherent to femininity.

The dominant discourse circumscribing the meanings of feminism, motherhood, and femininity at the time of the debates on abortion examined below represented feminists as orienting women toward the wrong happy object: the career. Choice was further conceived of as singular and irrevocable. Women could choose to focus their lives on motherhood or their career, with these choices deemed expressive of whether they had properly oriented, selfless sensibilities or misdirected, unfeminine, self-interested ones. The emotional economy of female happiness regulated motherhood as a normative identity for women without recourse to prohibitive juridical power: even though women had choices available to them, the economy compelled them to center their lives and identities on motherhood because motherhood was posited as the only genuine path to women's happiness. This emotional economy was constituted, in part, by positioning feminists as "affect aliens"—"out of line with the affective community" because they "do not experience pleasure from proximity to objects that are attributed as being good."[38] Feminists were thereby held responsible, not for uncovering the labor involved in motherhood, but for taking women away from what made them happy. The figures of the feminist and the selfish woman were bound together against the maternal, selfless subject through their orientation away from children as happy objects.

As an apparent choice not to mother, the large number of women who terminate their pregnancies in Australia could present a challenge to normative femininity.[39] Representations of the abortion choice in the debates I now turn to have served to displace this potential disruption. The speeches parliamentarians gave in support of the two bills acted as "straightening devices," realigning aborting women with what was already "lined up" (a normative, maternal-centered happiness).[40] These technologies of reorientation formed the main ideological support for fewer legal restrictions on women's abortion choices.

A CHOICE UNEQUAL AMONG OTHERS

Parliamentarians who supported the bills emphasized the reasons women terminated their pregnancies. While supporters unanimously condoned abortions performed to preserve a women's physical and psychological health, in cases of severe fetal abnormality, or when pregnancies resulted from rape or incest, the majority expressed uneasiness over the practice of abortion for so-called "social" reasons. As Kahl Eideh stated in the Victorian debate, "I wish it [abortion] did not happen except in cases of emergencies or difficult circumstances. The majority of people with whom I have discussed the bill share this view."[41] Shaun Leanne went so far as to state that for reasons "such as incest or rape or where scanning of the foetus shows severe abnormalities that mean the foetus will not survive," abortions were "easy to talk about."[42] Only a view of abortion—and by extension pregnancy—that focused on fetal well-being could render rape, incest, and severe fetal deformity easy discussion points. The diminishment of a woman's desire and self-interest in such cases is apparently what makes them "easy."

Supporters also represented abortions for "social" reasons in a way that retained a woman's orientation toward children as happy objects, claiming that desperate circumstances invariable drove women to terminate their pregnancies. Supporters deemed such circumstances as "desperate,"[43] "traumatic,"[44] "terrible,"[45] "tragic,"[46] "unfortunate, regrettable,"[47] "frightening,"[48] and "never envisaged and not necessarily of their own making."[49] They framed the conditions compelling women to terminate their pregnancies in terms of lack: aborting women, for example, had not completed their education, did not have sufficient social support, lacked the necessary financial resources, their contraception failed, or they "just cannot cope with one more child—they cannot cope physically, emotionally, mentally, financially or for some other reason."[50]

Support for the bills drew on a long tradition in Australian epidemiological research on abortion. Such research focuses on the "type" of woman who aborts—charting factors such as her age, marital status, and religion—and the reasons women give for terminating their pregnancies.[51] This body of research constructs women who terminate their pregnancies as deviations from the norm and aims, explicitly or otherwise, to locate those women most "at risk" of abortion in order to alter the variables that lead women to terminate their pregnancies.[52] Not surprisingly, a major theme in both debates was the need for more support services to enable women to continue with their pregnancies. As Kate Lundy said in the Commonwealth debate, "[i]nstead of applying penalties to women facing an abortion, this parliament should be working hard to alleviate the problems and concerns that can force women to the point where they have to make a decision about an abortion."[53]

More support services are needed to assist women who want to continue their pregnancies to do so.[54] Lundy's statement makes clear, however, that

the emphasis on contextual reasons for abortion presumed that women are "compelled"[55] or "forced"[56] to terminate their pregnancies because they "see no option but abortion."[57] Elizabeth Powell predicated her support for the Victorian Bill on the basis that "[t]here is no way a person would choose to have an abortion. It is the most traumatic procedure that anybody would want to have . . . so, rightly, a woman would not choose to have an abortion just because her pregnancy was unwanted."[58] Abortion, then, was not framed as a choice equal to continuing with a pregnancy, but as "a last resort for all women."[59]

While both bills gave women more formal choices in regard to abortion, the choosing subject imagined by supporters was not autonomous and independent. Rather, she was tied to relationships and the practical financial and vocational realities of her daily life. Supporters drew a homogenous imagining of the abortion decision that formed an imperative to self-regulate, where women were given formal choice in exchange for approaching abortion with "careful consideration."[60] Kristen Livermore outlined this contract in her statement, "I am an advocate of a woman's right to choose an abortion *if*, after weighing up her circumstances, that is what she believes is right for her."[61] Tanya Plibersek succinctly represented this pro-choice politics as one where "[w]e believe that for most women it is a terribly difficult thing to decide to terminate a pregnancy, but we respect women enough to believe they have the ability and the right to make such decisions for themselves."[62]

Supporters rationalized the abortion choice through the somewhat paradoxical claim that, in some circumstances, women have no choice but to terminate their pregnancies: as choice, therefore, abortion figured as a non-choice. It is no accident that the social acceptance of abortion was relatively high for women who may need state support to raise their children—the young and impoverished. Such women are already failures in the neoliberal regime of individual responsibility: the responsible mother can financially support her children.[63] More importantly for the argument I am constructing here, by placing unfortunate external circumstances as the cause of a woman's abortion, "pro-choice" parliamentarians elided the possibility that abortion could be a "happy choice," instead representing aborting women as temporarily and inescapably held back from doing what would make them happy. Consumerist convenience and the active pursuit of self-interest, activities, and sensibilities aligned with masculine civil society were thereby separated from the domain of the feminized family.[64]

THE SELFISH ABORTION

The assumption that abortion reflected a woman's desperation rather than her will is a long-standing response to the deep-seated, negative association between abortion and selfishness.[65] This political strategy was renewed with

the publication of Leslie Cannold's *The Abortion Myth* in 1998.[66] Cannold is president of Reproductive Choice Australia and Pro Choice Victoria and, as such, has held a leading role in defining pro-choice politics in contemporary Australia and in presenting pro-choice arguments for abortion law reform to politicians and the broader public.[67] *The Abortion Myth* asserted that the law must recognize women as subjects of abortion decisions because women make such decisions "thoughtfully, sorrowfully and with respect for the sacredness of pregnancy and with love for their could-be child."[68] Cannold juxtaposed this responsible abortion decision with one that "was just plain wrong" because it "did not reflect a woman's 'feelings' and 'love' for her could-be child and other significant people in her life, and which was not motivated by care and protective concern for all those she loves."[69] Through this binary, Cannold clearly defined the parameters of what constituted an intelligible emotion script for abortion decision-making. Marked by love and sorrowfulness, it was made according to a woman's orientation toward her fetus as a happy object. A quasi-essentialist rendering of maternal desire grounded her confidence that aborting women overwhelmingly abided by this template. "The idea that the desire for motherhood is completely culturally constructed," she averred, "undermines the accountability women must hold for their choices and, therefore, diminishes the respect and power that ought to be bestowed upon women's choices."[70]

Cannold's insistence that women terminated their pregnancies selflessly carried over to the debates, where expressions such as "I genuinely believe it is not a procedure that is sought on a selfish whim"[71] were commonplace. The emphasis on selfless abortions amounted to a reverse discourse that recapitulated the connection between abortion and selfishness it attempted to displace. Subsequently, the figure of the "selfish aborting woman" directed the major questions framing the debates: whether the respective legislations would make abortion easier for women, lead to more abortions, to abortion "on demand," or to "convenience abortions."

Opponents called on these established fears, branding abortions "casual choices" related to lifestyle and convenience that signaled the commodification of children and parenthood in contemporary society. Bill Heffernan, for example, claimed that RU486 would turn "the world's greatest vocation into a social convenience."[72] Danna Vale similarly expressed concern that "[i]n our self-indulgent, convenient, modern, easy contemporary Australian lifestyle, children are now seen in some sections as consumers and polluters and just plain hard work."[73] The derision of abortion as a selfish choice reflected broader anxiety pertaining to women's reproductive autonomy. In the Victorian Debate, Damian Drum, for example, emoted that opponents of abortion

> are told, "get out of the road. It's a woman's right to get pregnant. It's a woman's right to have an abortion. Don't you dare impose your will on my right to live my life the way I want to live it."[74]

In Drum's imagination, some women become pregnant intentionally, just so they can have abortions and exercise a specifically female form of autonomy. Many opponents derided abortion as an exercise of "female empowerment," with women choosing "to have an abortion only because she sees it as her right."[75]

By arguing that abortion amounted to an exercise in individual self-advancement, the practice was aligned with the politics of feminism, which, as we have seen, was similarly circumscribed in the mid-2000s. Several speakers explicated the connection between abortion and feminism. Tony Abbott deplored those women who regarded abortion as "a badge of liberation from old oppressors,"[76] suggesting that only self-identified feminists terminate their pregnancies and they do so to gain more power in an already equal society. Santo Santoro echoed this concern, worrying that "the feminist sisterhood has clouded sensible debate on the issue."[77] Adem Somyurek warned that the Victorian Bill represented a "radicalism grounded in dogma;" an example of feminism's turn to "zealotry," which he condemned as "nasty and irrational."[78] Many opponents thereby aligned the "aborting woman" with the "feminist," bolstering the position of both as "affect aliens" because of their self-involvement and orientation away from children as happy objects.

Opponents of abortion argued that surgery and anesthesia (in the Commonwealth debate) and criminality (in the Victorian debate) acted as deterrents, ensuring that abortion remained stigmatized by the community and was never easy to obtain. In the Victorian debate, opponents claimed that the new law would give women "unfettered . . . open-slather access to abortion . . . [for] any and every reason."[79] Abortion would be performed solely on the "insistence of the mother,"[80] which would "see women simply proceeding with an abortion as a matter of a process [and] that seems not just to be supportive at this point but to me almost borders on trying to be encouraging."[81] Commonwealth parliamentarians were concerned that the availability of RU486 would expand women's access to abortion and make the procedure more comfortable and straightforward, leading women to approach abortion with less hesitancy. As Christopher Pyne proselytized, "I do believe that a woman having to see her doctor and go through a surgical procedure performed by a doctor gives her time to pause, reflect and change her mind."[82] Parliamentarians also claimed that the availability of RU486 would "send a powerful message . . . that we as a community are becoming more indifferent to, or blasé about, abortion."[83] Abortion, opponents implied, should be difficult to obtain, stigmatized by the community, and invasive and uncomfortable, for this not only deters women from having abortions, but punishes women who do.

On the whole, supporters did not counter the argument that abortion should never be easy or convenient with the assertion that abortion should be as comfortable and straightforward for women as possible. Rather, they justified their position by arguing that the two pieces of legislation would

not enable abortion on demand because doctors would continue to play a major role in the procedure. Moreover, they claimed that abortion *can* never be easy for women and *no woman* terminated a pregnancy simply for her convenience. In the words of Jenny Macklin, "I do not know *any woman* who would find abortion an easy choice; *it is always* a difficult and emotional decision."[84] Parliamentarians frequently predicated their support for reduced restrictions on abortion by noting that, as Wendy Lovell opined, "the decision to terminate a pregnancy is one that . . . women agonize over. The women who make that heart-wrenching decision deserve to be supported by legislation that provides them with the safeguards they deserve."[85] Such rationalization implied that there should be no interference in women's abortion decisions because aborting women are already "punished enough by . . . their own conscience[s]."[86] The singular and repeated representation of abortion as a difficult and traumatic experience constructed a decidedly narrow discursive space available to women as they approach and experience abortion. Such representations, therefore, do not merely describe aborting women's self-punishment: they incite it.[87]

Restrictive views on abortion usually coincide with conservative views on female sexuality and motherhood.[88] Given this, it is interesting that opponents of the bills maintained that women aborted for selfish reasons, which in turn implied that some women are not inherently maternal and other-centered. This implication was countered by the argument that women "do not freely choose"[89] abortion, but are coerced into abortion by abortionists, family members, or partners. Alternatively, opponents maintained that the women who made the "culturally conditioned"[90] choice to abort have been deceived into identifying with an unnatural self-centeredness by Australia's "convenient, instant, high-tech indulgent society,"[91] which tells "young women that in some way parenting is not desirable and that it is demeaning to be a parent or a mother."[92]

Women who considered abortion in this schema needed to be reoriented in the right direction, with children reinstalled as happy objects. The idea that women have abortions against their true wishes allowed opponents to argue for restrictions on abortion on the basis they were helping women make the right choice and protecting "deeply conflicted and vulnerable" women from coercion by others.[93] Donna-Lee Petrovich stated, "I believe that a woman does have the right to make her own choices, but unfortunately the pressure to have an abortion as a first option and the pressure that is applied to women often sees them making choices they regret."[94] In this way, the subject of choice intrinsic to the late modern definition of freedom was deployed by those who sought to restrict women's access to abortion. This paradox enabled the Howard Government to deploy the language of choice in support of policies that favored stay-at-home mothers while simultaneously supporting increased limitations on abortion.

Whether parliamentarians depicted abortion as a decision that *was* never easy or convenient, or as a practice that *should* never be easy or

convenient, the representation of abortion as a straightforward, convenient procedure that women demand was anathema to the socially legible female subject. The willful, easy abortion runs contrary to a pregnant woman's orientation toward her fetus as a happy object. The arguments for and against the bills were mutually reinforcing, constructing a dualism. The legitimate aborting woman invoked by supporters of the bills agonized over the abortion decision and was penalized for it. The illegitimate aborting woman called upon by opponents held a deviant, self-interested desire that needed curtailment. The binary contrasting the "good," suffering aborting woman with the "bad," selfish aborting woman eclipsed the legitimacy of self-interested abortions for all women: the idea that, for pregnant women, immediate nonpregnant bodies, childlessness, or no more children may be happy objects achievable only through abortion appeared unspeakable.

Both supporters and opponents attached penalties to aborting women's transgression from the maternal norm. For supporters, aborting women always suffer and punish themselves. For opponents, the criminalization of abortion or a surgical procedure ensured that abortion was never easy or convenient. Parliamentarians unanimously declared aborting women to be vulnerable and in need of protection. Such protection would be afforded by either retained (opponents) or decreased (supporters) limitations on abortion. Furthermore, parliamentarians did not frame abortion as an autonomous choice, but as a procedure that women were forced to undergo as a result of socioeconomic factors (supporters), or by cultural conditioning or the influence of others (opponents). The presumption that women were naturally oriented toward children of their own as happy objects formed a regulatory norm in both instances. Opponents wanted to enforce this norm through formal restrictions on women's choices. Supporters, in contrast, believed no restrictions were necessary because women were always already aligned with it.

CONCLUSION

The figure of the aborting woman driving the debates was transmitted through notions of female happiness. Supporters uniformly painted abortion as a decision that women agonize over—as a dramatic and difficult response to extraordinary circumstances. Abortion was justified in circumstances where parliamentarians presumed a woman could not guarantee the future happiness of her child because she was, for example, too young or too poor. Supporters, thus, did not represent abortion as a rejection of motherhood, but as a temporary setback on a woman's journey toward motherhood. Supporters and opponents continually restated women's maternal happiness *despite and through* the abortion choice. Supporters maintained that no restrictions on abortion were necessary. Alternately, opponents argued that the law on abortion needed to be retained to protect women from making "wrong" and coerced choices.

In the realm of abortion, the contemporary shift from modern to late modern forms of governmentality is certainly not characterized by increasing emotional restraint, as Elias's model of emotions and social change would encourage us to think. In the minds of parliamentarians debating abortion in Australia in the mid-2000s, the idea that a woman could or should suppress her emotions following abortion was unthinkable. Instead, we have seen that the emotional template of abortion was determined by norms of female happiness. Children materialized inevitably and naturally as happy objects for pregnant women, disguising the repeated circulation of ideals of women's happiness, in discussions of abortion and elsewhere, that produced them as such. The question, thus, becomes not whether emotions are suppressed or repressed, but how they circulate in the broader community and, moreover, the effects of this circulation.

Lawful abortion neither stemmed from nor will it guarantee women's freedom in the realm of abortion. As we have seen, in two parliamentary debates that resulted in legislation freeing women's abortion choices in the law, aborting women were normatively constructed and interpellated in a way that secured their orientation toward children as happy objects. The entrenchment of this norm, rather than its displacement, made lawful choice possible. This is extremely problematic because abortion will always remain a non-normative, deviant choice while pregnancy is solely understood through the norm of maternal happiness. The continued restatement of this norm in discourse on abortion is obfuscated through the language of choice. One of the major effects of the decriminalization of abortion in Victoria may have been, in fact, to camouflage the norms regulating the conduct of aborting women even further.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Ann Genovese, Shane Kaluza, Maree Pardy, and Jordy Silverstein for comments on several drafts of this chapter.
2. Lauren Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 99.
3. Berlant, *Queen of America Goes to Washington City*, 86.
4. I take this idea from Sara Ahmed, who argues that "[d]escriptions of unhappy housewives can function as signs she is 'held back' or 'held up' from doing what makes her happy." Sara Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 51.
5. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners, and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978 [1939]), 225.
6. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975), trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979).
7. For a useful account of the similarities and divergences between the work of Elias and Foucault in relation to technologies of the self, see Robert van Krieken, "The Organization of the Soul: Elias and Foucault on Discipline and the Self," *European Journal of Sociology* 31, no. 2 (1990): 353–371.

8. See, for example, Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15–60; Thomas Lemke, "The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège De France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality," *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001): 190–207.
9. Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying About Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 834–836.
10. Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 14.
11. Caroline de Costa, *RU-486: The Abortion Pill* (Salisbury: Boolarong, 2007), 2.
12. Sally Heath, "Australia to Outlaw Abortion Pill," *The Age*, 17 May 1996.
13. Carol Nader, "Firms to Face High Costs for RU486," *The Age*, 5 July 2006. In August 2012, a drug company set up by Marie Stopes International successfully applied to import RU486 into Australia. In August 2013, RU486 will be listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), reducing the costs from $800 to $12 for low-income earners. See Stephanie Peatling, "Health Group Gets Green Light to Import Abortion Drug into Australia," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 August 2012; Samantha Maiden, "Julia Gillard's Cut-price Abortion Drug as RU486 Slashed to $12," *The Australian*, 1 July 2013.
14. Angela McRobbie, *The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change* (London: Sage, 2009), 22.
15. Angela McRobbie, "Post-feminism and Popular Culture," *Feminist Media Studies* 4, no. 3 (2004): 262.
16. Italics in the original. Rosalind Gill, "From Sexual Objectification to Sexual Subjectification: The Resexualisation of Women's Bodies in the Media," *Feminist Media Studies* 3, no. 1 (2003): 105.
17. Sara Ahmed, "Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness," *Signs* 35, no. 3 (2010): 572.
18. Ahmed, "Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness," 576.
19. Ahmed, *Promise of Happiness,* 91.
20. Ahmed, "Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness," 572.
21. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Picador, 1988), 28.
22. Ahmed, "Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness," 572–573.
23. See Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City,* 84–147.
24. Susanne Gibson, "The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy," *Bioethics* 18, no. 3 (2004): 221–233.
25. I take the idea of objects containing a "cluster of promises" from Lauren Berlant, who writes that such promises are located in all objects of desire and work to engender a sense of optimism that attach us to normative life paths. Like Ahmed, Berlant also opines that a "projected-out happiness" is contained within such clusters. See L. Berlant, "Nearly Utopian, Nearly Normal: Post-Fordist Affect in La Promesse and Rosetta," *Public Culture* 19, no. 2 (2007): 273–301.
26. Elizabeth Hill, "Budgeting for Work-Life Balance: The Ideology and Politics of Work and Family Policy in Australia," *Australian Bulletin of Labour* 33, no. 2 (2007): 241.
27. Anne Summers, "Corralled Back to the Kids and Kitchen," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 May 2004.
28. Catherine Hakim, "Five Feminist Myths about Women's Employment," *The British Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 3 (1995): 534.

29. See, for example, John Howard, "Prime Minister's Address to Federal Women's Forum, Liberal Party Federal Council," 12 April 2002, accessed 12 April 2011, www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2002/speech1594.htm. For a discussion of Howard's use of Hakim, see Natasha Campo, *From Superwomen to Domestic Goddesses: The Rise and Fall of Feminism* (Bern: Peter Lang), 101–102.
30. Howard, "Prime Minister's Address to Federal Women's Forum."
31. Marion Sawer and Barry Hindess, *Us and Them: Anti-elitism in Australia* (Perth: API Network, Australia Research Institute, Curtin University of Technology, 2004).
32. "Women have Moved on from Feminism: PM," *The Age*, 30 December 2006.
33. Natasha Campo, "'Having it all' or 'had enough'? Blaming Feminism in *The Age* and the *Sydney Morning Herald,* 1980–2004," *Journal of Australian Studies* 84 (2005): 63–72.
34. Virginia Haussegger, "The Sins of our Feminist Mothers," *The Age*, 23 July 2002. For a discussion of this article and book, see Campo, *From Superwomen to Domestic Goddesses,* 127–134.
35. Ita Buttrose and Penny Adams, *Motherguilt* (Camberwell: Viking, 2005), 4.
36. Buttrose and Adams, 207.
37. Anne Manne, *Motherhood: How Should We Care for Our Children?* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005); Anne Manne, "Women's Preferences, Fertility and Family Policy: The Case for Diversity," *Women* 9, no. 4 (2001): 6–24. See the following reviews: Cathy Sherry, "The Big Picture: Anne Manne Motherhood: How Should We Care for Our Children?," *Australian Book Review* 274 (September 2005): 34; Katherine Wilson, "Nurturing a True Balance," *The Age*, 8 October 2005.
38. Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness*, 41.
39. It is estimated that one in three Australian women will have an abortion. See Annabelle Chan and Leonie C. Sage, "Estimating Australia's Abortion Rates, 1985–2003," *The Medical Journal of Australia* 182, no. 9 (2005): 447–452.
40. See Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 92.
41. Victorian Parliamentary Debates (*VPD*), Legislative Council (*LC*), 9 October 2008, 4149 (Kahl Eideh).
42. *VPD, LC*, 8 October 2008, 4008 (Shaun Leanne).
43. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4092 (Theo Theophanus).
44. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (*CPD*), House of Representatives (HR), 15 February 2006, 60 (Gary Nairn).
45. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4151 (Gregory Barber).
46. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4161 (Susan Pennicuik); *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 153 (Stephen Gibbons).
47. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 94 (Anthony Albanese).
48. *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 153 (Stephen Gibbons).
49. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4157 (David Koch).
50. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 46 (Tanya Plibersek).
51. See, for example, Carolyn Nickson, Anthony M. A. Smith, and Julia M. Shelley, "Intention to Claim a Medicare Rebate among Women Receiving Private Victorian Pregnancy Termination Services," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health* 28, no. 2 (2004): 120–124.
52. Barbara Baird, "The Futures of Abortion," in *Women Making Time: Contemporary Feminist Critique and Cultural Analysis*, ed. Elizabeith McMahom

and Brigitta Olubas (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2006), 116–149.

53. *CPD,* Senate, 9 February 2006, 42 (Kate Lundy).
54. See, for example, Leslie Cannold, *What, No Baby? Why Women are Losing the Freedom to Mother, and How They Can Get it Back* (Fremantle, WA: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2005), 283–310.
55. *VPD,* Legislative Assembly (LA), 9 September 2008, 3362 (Ryan Smith); *CPD,* HR, 84, 14 February 2006 (Judith Moylan).
56. *CPD,* Senate, 9 February 2006 (Kate Lundy).
57. *VPD,* Legislative Assembly (LA), 9 September 2008, 3385 (Geoffrey Howard).
58. *VPD,* LA, 9 September 2008, 3349–3350 (Elizabeth Powell).
59. *VPD, LC*, 8 October 2008, 3928 (Mathew Viney).
60. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 96 (Peter Lindsay).
61. Emphasis added, *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 126 (Kristen Livermore).
62. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 46 (Tanya Plibersek).
63. See, for example, A. McRobbie, "Top Girls? Young Girls and the Post-Feminist Sexual Contract," *Cultural Studies* 21 (2007): 731–732.
64. For the qualities and sentiments informing the binary of the feminised family and masculine civil society, see Wendy Brown, *States of Injury* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 135–165.
65. For the dualism of (proabortion) desperation and (antiabortion) selfishness in campaigns for and against abortion law reform in the 1960s and 1970s, see Charlotte Leslie, "The 'Psychiatric Masquerade': The Mental Health Exception in New Zealand Abortion Law," *Feminist Legal Studies* 18, no. 1 (2010): 1–23.
66. Leslie Cannold, *The Abortion Myth: Feminism, Morality, and the Hard Choices Women Make* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998).
67. For example, Cannold wrote several articles in major newspapers leading to the debates I examine here. See, for example, Leslie Cannold, "Delay in Drug Debate Spells Trouble for Free Choice," *The Age*, 5 December 2005; Leslie Cannold, "High price to be Paid if Abortion Reform Bid Fails," *The Age*, 20 July 2007.
68. Cannold, *The Abortion Myth*, 127–128.
69. Cannold, *The Abortion Myth,* xiv.
70. Cannold, *The Abortion Myth,* 96–97.
71. *VPD,* LA, 9 September 2008, 3928 (Helen Shardey).
72. *CPD,* Senate, 9 February 2006, 44 (William Heffernan).
73. *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 45 (Danna Vale).
74. *VPD, LC*, 8 October 2008, 3995 (Damian Drum).
75. *VPD,* LA, 9 September 2008, 3334 (Marlene Kairouz).
76. *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 114 (Anthony Abbott).
77. *CPD*, HR, 14 February 2006, 55 (Santo Santoro).
78. *VPD*, LC, 8 October 2008, 4156 (Adem Somyurek).
79. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4140 (Gordon Rich-Philips).
80. *VPD, LC*, 7 October 2008, 3930 (Bruce Atkinson).
81. *VPD, LC*, 7 October 2008, 3930 (Atkinson).
82. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 91 (Christopher Pyne).
83. *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 3 (Andrew Robb).
84. Emphasis added, *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 52–53 (Jennifer Macklin).
85. *VPD, LC*, 7 October 2008, 3910 (Wendy Lovell 3910).
86. *CPD,* HR, 14 February 2006, 88–89 (Susan Ley).
87. For a detailed examination of the connection between representations and experiences of abortion in the Australian context, see Barbara Baird,

"Abortion, Questions, Ethics, Embodiment," *History Workshop Journal* 52 (2001): 197–216.

88. Kristin Luker, *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1984), 193; Jonothan Kelly and M.D.R. Evans, "Attitudes Toward Abortion: Australia in Comparative Perspective," *Australian Social Monitor* 2, no. 4 (1999): 86–87.
89. *VPD,* LA, 9 September 2008, 3334 (Marlene Kairouz).
90. Tony Abbott, quoted in Tom Noble, "Abbott Poses Counsel Rebate to Cut Abortions," *The Age*, 3 August 2005.
91. *CPD,* HR, 15 February 2006, 45 (Danna Vale).
92. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4123 (Donna-Lee Petrovich).
93. See, for example: *VPD,* LA, 9 September 2008, 3314 (James Merlino); 3343 (David Hodgett).
94. *VPD, LC*, 9 October 2008, 4124 (Donna-Lee Petrovich).

12 Civilizing Marriage
Norbert Elias, Same-Sex Marriage, and the State

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter argues that, despite some gaps and omissions, Elias's arguments in *The Civilizing Process* provide insights that are very relevant to analyzing the politics of same-sex marriage today. In making this argument, the chapter draws on analyses of the role played by the state and by political discourse in endorsing and recognizing particular forms of emotion—a process that not only encourages particular forms of public emotion but also has policy implications.[1] Emotion is primarily understood here in terms of the analysis of feelings. Some feelings can be precognitive. Nonetheless, there is often an extremely complex interrelationship between body, brain, and mind in which feelings can play an important role in cognitive judgment and are also deeply implicated in discursive meaning-making.[2] Consequently, it is also not possible to make a clear distinction between feelings in terms of affect and emotion. In some views, affect is seen as feelings that are more corporeal and less conscious (such as anxiety), while emotion is seen as forms of feelings that are more conscious and more implicated in discourse (such as fear).[3] However, this chapter sees affect and emotion as closely connected; indeed they are often inseparable, and both can be implicated in discourse and cognition.[4] In particular, this chapter draws on arguments that emotion influences political decision-making.[5] For example, who citizens are encouraged to feel empathy for; who they are encouraged to feel fear, anxiety, or disgust about, and which emotions and emotional attachments are seen as legitimate helps to frame conceptions of citizens' rights, obligations, and entitlements in areas ranging from immigration and indigenous policy to taxation and welfare policy.[6]

In particular, this chapter focuses on same-sex issues and argues that the regulation of sexuality is one of the many sites at which the regulation of emotions takes place. As former Australian High Court Judge, and long-term advocate of gay law reform, Michael Kirby, has eloquently put it: "Same-sex relationships were the outward manifestation of impermissible emotions" and that is one reason why "such emotions,

or at least the physical acts that gave them expression, were criminal in many countries."[7] It will be argued in this chapter that an interest in the role of the state and political discourse in regard to emotion can both complement and add to some of the analyses undertaken by Elias in *The Civilizing Process*. The chapter will begin by providing an outline of Elias's arguments regarding the regulation of sexuality including his analysis of marriage. It will then draw out some of the implications for arguments regarding same-sex marriage and also consider subsequent research by theorists as diverse as Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Martha Nussbaum.

ELIAS'S ARGUMENTS, MARRIAGE, AND SEXUAL REGULATION

The starting point to this analysis is one of the many interesting insights that can be found in *The Civilizing Process*, namely Elias's arguments about the role of marriage in regulating sexuality:

> That monogamous marriage is the predominant institution regulating sexual relations in the west is undoubtedly correct in general terms. Nevertheless, the actual control and molding of sexual relations changes considerably in the course of western history.[8]

Elias argues elsewhere in *The Civilizing Process* that marriage plays a particularly important role historically in regulating both when and with whom it is socially legitimized to have sex.

> Like many other drives, sexuality is confined more and more exclusively, for both women and men, to a particular enclave, socially legitimized marriage. Social tolerance of other relationships, for both husband and wife, which was by no means lacking earlier, is suppressed increasingly, if with fluctuations. Every violation of these restrictions, and everything conducive to one, is therefore relegated to the realm of secrecy, of what may not be mentioned, without loss of prestige or social position.[9]

However, Elias thought that some of these restrictions on sexuality that resulted were excessively repressive and would be increasingly challenged. In other words, the civilizing project of constraining excessive emotions could go too far, in which case it became necessary to moderate unduly repressive restrictions. This was itself part of the civilizing process and often related to movements for greater equality, for example, in relations between the sexes. In a later interview reflecting on *The Civilizing Process*, Elias argued that the moderating of sexual taboos around masturbation and of those taboos that required female sexual abstinence before marriage were cases in point:

> Civilization is . . . the setting to work of a network of limited restrictions which tend toward the attenuation of excesses in pleasure, violence, inequality and so forth. . . . In the sexual domain, for example, where taboos have been multiplied from the Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth century. . . . Then at times we go too far. For example: the extraordinary hypertrophy of the taboo against masturbation. . . . Today, in rejecting this taboo, we reject an excess and confirm the tendency of the civilizing process toward moderation. A further example, the prolonged abstinence imposed on girls before their marriage was another of these excessive taboos, a barbarism presently corrected in the course of the civilizing movement.[10]

However, while Elias suggested that that the process of removing excessively restrictive sexual taboos was a part and parcel of development in the West, he noted that sexual puritanism was still prevalent in periods of new state formation. Elias argued that such sexual puritanism played an important role in preserving national unity by establishing "a single code of conduct."[11] He cited China, the Soviet Union, and India as contemporary examples of new states in which sexual regulation became an important way in which the emerging state disciplined its citizens.

Q: How would you explain that in countries where there has been a revolution, as in China or the Soviet Union, modesty and even puritanism have been exacerbated? Wouldn't you expect the reverse?

Elias: I think that these phenomena are tied to a process to which sociologists have paid insufficient attention: the process of state-formation. In China today this process is going on and entails very severe consequences for the life of every individual. The problem is to establish and preserve national unity. And the establishment of a single code of conduct—a general discipline—becomes a necessity. Sexual puritanism is part of this code.

Q: Does the same apply to the Soviet Union as well?

Elias: More or less, and to India also. In all new nations we witness attempts at the reinforcement and unification of codes of conduct. Communism is basically an ideology of national state formation.[12]

Elias seems to be exclusively discussing sexual puritanism in regard to heterosexual relationships, and is highlighting issues such as attitudes to nudity; however, it will be argued in this chapter that it is instructive to attempt to relate his arguments about sexual regulation, puritanism, and the role of marriage in particular to issues of same-sex relationships.[13] The remainder of this chapter will therefore focus on drawing out some of the implications of Elias's arguments that have been outlined in this section.

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS AND REGULATING SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS

Elias's comments cited previously about sexual acts and relationships outside of marriage being "relegated to secrecy" have particular relevance to issues of same-sex relationships. Homosexuality was one of the forms of sexual behavior most confined to secrecy in such periods, particularly in the Anglophone world. Unfortunately, homosexuality is a subject on which *The Civilizing Process* has relatively little to say. However, Elias did note social prescriptions governing same-sex physical contact, for example, the propriety that should be followed if a man was forced to share a bed with a person of the same sex on a journey. In his chapter in *The Civilizing Process* "On Behavior in the Bedroom," Elias quotes the following passages from the 1729 and 1774 editions of La Salle's rules for seemly, Christian behavior:

> If you are forced by unavoidable necessity to share a bed with another person of the same sex on a journey, it is not proper to lie so near to him that you disturb or even touch him; and it is still less decent to put your legs between those of the other. . . .
>
> La Salle, *Les Régales de la bienséance et de la civilité chrétienne* (Rouen 1729), 55
>
> If you are forced to share a bed with a person of the same sex, which seldome happens, you should maintain a stricte and vigilant modesty. . . .
>
> La Salle, *Les Régales de la bienséance et de la civilité chrétienne* (1774 ed.), 31[14]

It is perhaps a sign of what could and could not be written about in 1930s' Germany that Elias didn't comment more explicitly on the obvious facts that the institution of marriage was heterosexual and also that the form of sexuality being prescribed via codes of shame was not just heterosexual sex outside of wedlock but also homosexuality. (This silence is arguably particularly poignant in Elias's case.)[15] After all, Robert Beachy has argued that the modern category of homosexual was largely developed as a result of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century academic and public debate in Germany.[16] The development of the category of homosexual in Germany was also a process that very much involved politics and the state, more so than in France, La Salle's home country, where sodomy was removed from the statute books as early as 1791. Indeed, the Reichstag had had a full public debate over decriminalizing homosexuality in 1898 after August Bebel, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party, had introduced

a motion to that effect in response to an earlier Prussian codification of sodomy as an offense in the 1870s.[17] Furthermore, 1920s and early 1930s Germany had a very prominent gay and lesbian subculture, particularly in major cities.[18] Research on sexuality had been undertaken by numerous German medical academics and social scientists and, in Elias's own time, particularly by Magnus Hirschfeld and his Berlin Institute for the Science of Sexuality.[19] However, Nazis burned the Institute's massive research collection in 1933, and the government subsequently outlawed gay rights groups. Gay and lesbian subculture fell victim to Nazi oppression as many gay men in particular were sent to prison or to concentration camps.[20]

Nonetheless, despite Elias's relative silence on heteronormativity (the construction of heterosexuality as the norm) in *The Civilizing Process*, there are some interesting insights that can be gained from a consideration of his work. It is useful to extend the insights Elias provides regarding the role of marriage as a form of social control further by considering the implications of this role of marriage for same-sex relationships.[21] This is particularly the case given that the exclusivity of heterosexual love has long been challenged, and heterosexual constructions of love and marriage have long been implicated in trying to suppress alternative forms of love and sexuality. While their arguments are controversial, John Boswell and others have even argued that a range of forms of same-sex unions existed in premodern Europe, including some that appear to have been sanctioned by religious authorities.[22] There is also evidence that love was not seen as being confined to heterosexual marriage by those who loved people of the same sex and who were also prepared to compare their love to heterosexual marriage. It is not possible to discuss this issue in depth here; however, two examples provide interesting insights into how same-sex attachments could be conceived prior to late twentieth-century/early twenty-first century constructions of same-sex love. The first is seventeenth-century poet Katherine Fowler Philips's poem to her beloved "friend" Anne Owen:

> For thou art all that I can prize,
> My joy, my life, my rest.
> No bridegroom's nor crown-conqueror's mirth
> To mine compar'd can be:
> They have but pieces of the earth,
> I've all the world in thee.[23]

Some commentators may still wish to claim that Philips's love for Anne Owen was that of a nonsexual romantic friendship. Who can know for certain, given the possible risks involved in being more explicit about same-sex sexual acts (not least because Philips was also in a heterosexual marriage)? Many published pre-twentieth-century literary works are similarly ambiguous. Obviously, one must be very cautious in trying to understand past expressions of emotion and sexuality, as well as friendship, and the

institution of marriage has had very different manifestations and meanings throughout history.

However, there can be no such doubts regarding relevant quotes from the early nineteenth-century diaries of Anne Lister, which were written in code to protect herself and the women involved. Lister wrote quite explicitly about her sexual affairs with other women, exchanged rings with one of her lovers, and considered their union to have been blessed in church (although how much the priest realized about the significance of this event is not clear). Lister not only expresses same-sex love, but likens it to marriage.

> *Monday 29 January 1821 (Halifax)*
> I love, & only love, the fairer sex & thus beloved by them in turn, my heart revolts from any other love than theirs.
>
> *Thursday 8 February 1821 (Halifax)*
> Mary, you cannot doubt the love of one who has waited for you so long and patiently. You can give me all of happiness I care for &, prest to the heart which I believe my own, caressed & treasured there, I will indeed be constant & never, from that moment, feel a wish or thought for any other than my *wife*. You shall have every smile & every breath of tenderness. "One shall our union & our interests be" and every wish that love inspires and every kiss & every dear feeling of delight shall only make me more securely and entirely yours.[24]

Such expressions of emotion make clear not only that those women who were attracted to their own sex and had the means to do so could conceive of loving unions with another of the same sex (although both Philips and Lister eventually lost the objects of their affection in these particular passages to the legitimated desire and economic and social security of heterosexual marriages). The fragments are also important in suggesting that the heterosexual construction of marriage and the prohibition on sex outside of it potentially enforced heteronormativity and homophobia. It will be argued in the following section that the heteronormative constructions of marriage also influenced constructions of citizenship and subsequent political debate.

MARRIAGE, THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

Importantly for the arguments here, the heterosexual construction of marriage also had implications for conceptions of citizenship, an aspect of the control, recognition, and encouragement of particular emotions that tends to be neglected by Elias in *The Civilizing Process*. The citizen in Western traditions was historically constructed as a married (white, property-owning) male head of household with all the implications that that had for

the subordination of women.[25] That construction of the citizen also had affective components in that both marriage and familial relationships were increasingly constructed as loving ones.[26] The male citizen may have been constructed as a "rational" citizen in the public sphere, but his role in the private sphere was increasingly seen in affective terms, not just in terms of a marriage contract or property rights.[27] Conceptions of heterosexual marriage therefore increasingly involved religious and state regulation of an affective partnership. Crucially, state entitlements were often provided via that citizenship unit, which in turn involved particular ways of "doing intimacy."[28] For example, twentieth-century welfare benefits were originally designed around the assumption that women and children would be financially dependent upon a male wage earner head of household.[29]

Given that the affective, intimate relationships were conceived around conceptions of heterosexual marriage, there were serious implications not only for gays and lesbians in general but also for those able to live in same-sex relationships. Same-sex couples were traditionally excluded from accessing many state and welfare entitlements, even in countries that recognized heterosexual de facto relationships.[30] Kotluski argues that there are around 1,049 federal entitlements related to marriage in the United States, ranging from social security to employment benefits, that same-sex couples are ineligible for.[31] These forms of citizenship were not just heteronormative, they were also forms of affective citizenship that involved the recognition or rejection of particular forms of emotional attachments.[32]

Elias suggested in the quotations cited earlier that sexual activity outside of marriage became less of an issue in the twentieth century, and he has suggested that this is related both to issues of gender equality and to early stages in the development of nation-states. Elias has a point when he suggests that sexual morality and developing a single code of conduct can be particularly important in the so-called developing world during the formation of nation-states. It is not just the regulation of heterosexuality that can be an issue in such contexts but also the regulation of homosexuality. Indeed, Carl Stychin has noted the ways in which homosexuality can be used to signify very different things in various national, political, and social contexts:

> homosexuality has been associated with communism, fascism, bourgeois capitalism, colonialism, the west and north, the east and south, environmentalism, Europe, and North America. In the project of nation building, homosexuality is a ready discursive tool that can be conflated with any enemy of the state, in the process becoming the enemy within.[33]

One could think of numerous examples from Asia and Africa. However, a particularly clear example is evident in a controversial speech at the 54th UMNO General Assembly in 2003, given by the former Malaysian prime minister, Dr. Mohamad Mahathir, who argued:

> The world that we have to face in the new decades and centuries will see numerous attempts by the Europeans to colonize us either indirectly or directly. If our country is not attacked, our minds, our culture, our religion and other things will become the target. . . . They have rejected the institutions of marriage and family. Instead they accept the practice of free sex, including sodomy as a right. Marriage between male and male, between female and female are officially recognized by them.[34]

Needless to say, Mahathir's comments are highly contentious in their assumption that "homosexuality" is Western and did not exist in Malaysia prior to colonization.[35] In fact the law that Mahathir and his successors have used against homosexuality in Malaysia, including to charge Opposition Leader Anwar with sodomy offenses, is actually a British colonial law. Elizabeth Povinelli, among others, has pointed out that colonial powers used Western conceptions of the "intimate couple" as "a key transfer point" of "liberal forms of power in the contemporary world, including being seen as constitutive of western civilization."[36] Consequently, other forms of kinship relations or constructions of sexuality were constructed as inferior. Nonetheless, Mahathir's comments are a clear example of codes of sexual conduct being utilized to build national identity and to shore up an emerging nation state against outside influences.

However, what is particularly interesting in the context of Elias's earlier arguments focusing on developing nation-states is that such arguments about marriage and same-sex relationships are very much part of the developed not just the so-called developing world. (This is hardly surprising given that it is only relatively recently historically that male homosexuality has been decriminalized in countries such as Britain, Australia, and the United States.) They are also, to refer back to Elias's arguments about China and Russia, just as much a part of the postcommunist as the communist world. For example, as Agnès Chetaille points out, the European Union's attempts to institute same-sex rights in Poland post communism has been fiercely resisted, with such moves being seen as undermining Polish national identity and sovereignty, which is increasingly being constructed as Catholic.[37]

Legal and other sanctions against same-sex activity may have been removed in many parts of the West but seeing same-sex love as equivalent to heterosexual love in marriage has often been where a major barrier has been set. It is also an issue in which, and this is where Elias's insights have some point, conceptions of marriage are very much constructed as integral to civilization as well as to particular conceptions of national identity. It is a view that is still being used to construct same-sex relationships and an emotion, same-sex love, as second-rate and not equivalent to heterosexual love.

The following quote from US President George W. Bush illustrates how heterosexual marriage can still be identified with both "civilization" and national identity and, in the process, can still be used to marginalize the emotion of same-sex love. (It is also a view of Civilization as static that runs

counter to Elias's own view of the Civilizing Process as an ongoing one in which repressive sexual taboos could be increasingly removed).

> After more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and millennia of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are presuming to change the most fundamental institution of *civilization*. Their actions have created confusion on an issue that requires clarity. . . . Activist courts have left the people with one recourse. If we are to prevent the meaning of marriage from being changed forever, our nation must enact a constitutional amendment to protect marriage in America. . . . [38]

Similar arguments were put forward by Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who referred to marriage as "one of the bedrock institutions of our society" and resisted attempts to change what "we understand to be the concept of marriage in this country."[39] Similarly, Australian deputy prime minister Julia Gillard supported the heterosexual nature of marriage, arguing that there were "hundreds of years of history in Australia and in western culture [and] beyond about what marriage means."[40] Gillard reaffirmed her position when she became prime minister, arguing that "for this nation, with our heritage as a Christian country, with what's defined us and continues to define us, the Marriage Act has a special status in our culture and for our community."[41] US President Barack Obama also initially cited Christianity in his attempts to define marriage: "I believe that marriage is the union between a man and a woman. Now, for me as a Christian, it's also a sacred union. God's in the mix."[42] It was only after several years in office that Obama announced that his views had evolved to supporting same-sex marriage. Obama justified his changed position by evoking the Christian injunction to "treat others the way you would want to be treated."[43]

In short, in these countries, marriage has been a major stumbling block (at least at the federal level), despite the decriminalization of homosexuality and varying levels of acceptability of same-sex relationships. Restrictions on marriage have played a key role in confirming that same-sex love will still be seen as not equal to heterosexual love, but deficient and even possibly deviant. By contrast, in those countries where same-sex marriage has been accepted, many of the arguments in favor have centered on accepting an emotion, same-sex love, as equivalent to heterosexual love.[44] That has also been the case in debates over lesser forms of civil partnerships.[45]

IMPLICATIONS FOR ELIAS

So, what are the implications of the above arguments for our ongoing understanding of Elias's work? Elias was clearly correct to draw attention to the

importance of marriage in attempts to control forms of sexual desire and emotion. He was also right to note that relations of increasing equality can impact on that—he noted it in respect to women and virginity before marriage, but we could also argue that the long fight for gay and lesbian equality is impacting on attitudes toward both sex and marriage.[46] Elias was also correct to tie such conceptions of marriage into conceptions of civilization and culture, and that is reflected in many of the politicians' statements. He was correct to draw attention to links between sexual morality and particular conceptions of national identity. In other words, even though the analysis here is rather different than Elias's on some points, engaging with Elias's work can still generate some interesting insights.

Indeed, Elias's focus on the regulatory power of marriage also explains why some queer theorists are so concerned about the implications of same-sex marriage for normalizing gay and lesbian sexual behavior. For example, Mariana Valverde argues that the introduction of same-sex marriage in Canada has now produced the construction of "a new entity in the history of sexuality: the respectable same-sex couple," with implications for all of those who do not fall within this category.[47] Similarly, Judith Butler has pointed out that same-sex marriage can potentially have normalizing and regulatory implications for those whose relationships fall outside of marriage: "What would it mean to exclude, from the field of potential legitimation those who are outside of marriage, those who live nonmonogamously, those who live alone, those who are in whatever arrangements they are in that are not the marriage form?"[48] She argues that other options are becoming shut off and "unthinkable" as they are constructed as being outside "the norm."[49] In short, there is a new twist to Elias's arguments about the way in which sexual relationships outside of marriage become unacceptable, namely that such forms of sexual regulation can now extend to same-sex marriage, not just heterosexual marriage.

However, there are also some points where the above arguments draw attention to gaps in Elias's analysis or at least the need for further research. Elias tends to play down the role of religion when it comes to issues of sex and marriage.[50] When it comes to same-sex marriage, religion is still absolutely crucial whether it involves Islamic values in Malaysia, the Catholic Church in Poland, or Christian values in Australia or the United Kingdom. Incidentally, the importance of Christianity is not just related to its role in regard to the state but also in terms of its influence on self-control of behavior. Foucault's arguments regarding the important role of Christianity in regard to self-regulation and conceptions of the self are also pertinent here, and Dennis Smith provides particularly useful insights in his comparison of Foucault and Elias.[51] Smith argues that Foucault believed that "the major shift towards perceiving sexuality itself as repugnant and evil coincided with the spread of Christianity."[52] By contrast, Smith argues that Elias saw self-monitoring and self-regulation as being due to "deep-rooted fears" about vulnerability to others.[53] Elias's comments regarding the relationship

between the regulation of sexuality and the need for nation-states to construct a common code of behavior are very insightful. However, they do neglect the extent to which this is not just an issue during the formation of the nation-state but can also be an issue among quite developed nation-states. Elias emphasized the importance of the state's control of violence for the civilizing of emotions. This is important, indeed, if one thinks of the role of debates over "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the United States, one might want to argue that state control over the mores and emotions of the warrior class can still play an important role in shaping wider sexual mores. However, given the emphasis in *The Civilizing Process* on the relationship between the development of the state and the control of the violent passions, Elias perhaps neglects the full extent to which the emotions are a site of political contest and vice versa. We need to think in more depth and breadth about the role of state in enforcing taboos, influencing public opinion toward which particular emotions are seen as acceptable, the implications for policy, and the role of various political actors from politicians to social movement activists in that contested politics. We also need to think about the role that the state itself has played in the construction of sexual identities, as pointed out by Margot Canaday in her book *The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America*, which looks at issues ranging from immigration to welfare policy. While Canaday herself does not pull out the implications for emotions, they are there.[54] Above all, it has been suggested here that the state's endorsement, recognition, or rejection of particular forms of emotional intimacy is closely tied to particular constructions of citizen identity and citizen entitlements. While the focus here has been on issues of sexuality, there are also important implications for issues of race, ethnicity, and religious identity.[55] The role of the state is therefore potentially even more crucial than Elias recognized.

Incidentally, this is one reason why one needs to be very hesitant about trying to develop universalizing theories about how public emotions change, never mind the emotions suppressed, encouraged, recognized, and endorsed by politicians and/or the state. Once the state is seen as playing a key role in both the consolidation and constitution of emotional regimes, including sexual ones (and involving complex interactions between state, society, and individuals) the process of historical change of emotions becomes even more heterogeneous. A recent study of the relationship between the gay and lesbian movement and the state in fifteen countries indicates that the factors leading to different political outcomes in these countries were incredibly varied and included different institutional and legal frameworks, different conceptions of national identity and culture, the differing roles of medical professional organizations and of religious bodies, and the impact of various social movements.[56] While he may have neglected the role of the state, it should be noted that the importance of studying different countries would not have surprised Elias. Elias himself pointed out in his volume 2 section on "Spread of the Pressure for Foresight and Self Constraint" that

the degree to which sexuality is controlled differs in different countries and "was a question in its own right."[57] At the same time, the arguments by politicians opposing same-sex marriage show just how important references to historical tradition can also be.

Recent work suggests that the emotions that need to be analyzed in terms of understanding different national trajectories regarding the control of sexuality include the politics of shame and disgust. Elias may have had insights he could have offered here. However unfortunately, while there is a general section on shame and repugnance in Volume 2 of *The Civilizing Process*, Elias leaves a more detailed analysis of issues of sexual shame for later. For he argues that a deeper analysis of sexual shame would require a detailed analysis of relationships between the sexes, of childhood, and a range of other factors.[58] Nonetheless, Janice Irvine has drawn on Elias in her argument that "one of the most significant features of the sexual revolution was its role in transforming the broader emotional culture, particularly that of sexual shame."[59] Martha Nussbaum has also undertaken relevant work on the politics of disgust, although Irvine argues that Nussbaum has misread Elias's argument as being "that as civilizations become more advanced, they code more things as disgusting," whereas Irvine focuses "on Elias's crucial historical argument that, in Western societies, shame extends its reach while simultaneously receding from people's awareness."[60] As we have seen, Elias also argued that excessive forms of sexual regulation are increasingly contested in those cases where the civilizing process has gone too far in stigmatizing behavior and moderation can subsequently assert itself. This is therefore not so incompatible with Nussbaum's own work, which analyzes not just the important role that the politics of disgust has played in regard to same-sex issues but also the way in which that disgust has been contested by social movements, politicians, and lawyers. As Martha Nussbaum writes:

> We are living in an era of transition between two very different types of politics in the area of sexual orientation. The politics of disgust, which so long has called the tune, is facing unprecedented challenges from the politics of humanity. . . . The politics of disgust, however, keeps pushing back, and the outcome, where law is concerned, remains unclear.[61]

In short, Nussbaum's argument reflects a fact that has been emphasized throughout this chapter, namely that politics is a site of emotional contest and vice versa. In the process she examines arguments that would not have seemed alien to Elias in his study of manners in *The Civilizing Process*, noting that while disgust is "standardly felt toward . . . feces, blood, semen, urine, nasal discharges, menstrual discharges, corpses, decaying meat, and animals/insects that are oozy, slimy, or smelly," disgust nonetheless needs to be learned by children.[62] Therefore "society has room to interpret and shape the emotion, directing it to some objects rather than

others, as happens with anger and compassion."[63] Nussbaum argues that the "politics of disgust" over same-sex relations is being challenged by the "politics of humanity" as heterosexuals increasingly sympathize with the life stories of gays and lesbians, some of whom may also be their relatives or colleagues.[64]

CONCLUSION

The analysis in this chapter has suggested that subsequent work, including Butler's and Nussbaum's, usefully complements Elias's work. Despite gaps and omissions in *The Civilizing Process*, Elias's work still provides useful insights to build on in regard to the control of sexual emotions. In particular, Elias was correct in identifying the key role that marriage can play in attempts to regulate sexuality and the interrelationship between moral codes of conduct and conceptions of civilization and national identity. These issues may no longer be quite so relevant to heterosexuals in the developed world, but constructions of marriage are still being used in some Western countries to construct same-sex relationships as second class in respect to heterosexual ones, while heterosexual marriage is constructed as part of Western civilization and national identity. Perversely, therefore, the very same-sex relationships that Elias failed to analyze in his seminal work reveal their ongoing relevance.

NOTES

1. See further Carol Johnson, "The Politics of Affective Citizenship: From Blair to Obama," *Citizenship Studies* 14 (2010): 495–509. For key literature on politics and the emotions see, e.g., Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett, *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies* (New York and London: Continuum, 2012); George Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2002); ed. W. Russell Neuman et al., *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Drew Westen, *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
2. For an in-depth analysis of a range of views on this interrelationship, see Margaret Wetherell, *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding* (London: Sage, 2012).
3. See, e.g., Hoggett and Thompson, "Introduction," *Politics and the Emotions*, 2–4.
4. See further Wetherell, *Affect and Emotion*.
5. Westen, *Political Brain*.
6. See further, Johnson, "Politics of Affective Citizenship."
7. Michael Kirby, "Sexuality and Australian Law," in *Sexuality and Human Rights: A Global Overview,* ed. Helmut Graupner and Phillip Tahmindjis (New York: Harrington, 2005), 31.

8. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners, Changes in the Code of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern Times*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen, 1978 [1939]), 183.
9. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 188.
10. Stanislas Fontaine, "The Civilizing Process Revisited: An Interview with Norbert Elias," from *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 29 April 1974, trans. Anton Blok and Rod Aya, *Theory and Society 5* (1978): 250.
11. Fontaine, "Civilizing Process Revisited," 248.
12. Fontaine, "Civilizing Process Revisited," 248.
13. Fontaine, "Civilizing Process Revisited," 248.
14. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 162. Saint Jean-Baptiste de La Salle (1651–1719) was the French founder of the Brothers of the Christian Schools. See further the "Introduction" by Gregory Wright, FSC, to John Baptist de La Salle, *The Rules of Christian Decorum and Civility*, trans. Richard Arnandez, FSC, and ed. Gregory Wright, FSC (Toronto and the United States: Lasallian Productions, 1990, repr. 2007), ix–xxiii.
15. Commenting on Norbert Elias's *Reflections on a Life*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), Helmut Puff has argued that "Elias himself provides a brilliant example of how central shame is to the workings of modernity. No word from him about his close bonds to a stream of male secretaries and companions who supported him emotionally and in a flurry of endeavours." See Helmut Puff, "The Shame of Queer History/Queer Histories of Shame," in *Gay Shame,* ed. David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 70.
16. Robert Beachy, "The German Invention of Homosexuality," *The Journal of Modern History* 82 (2010): 801–838.
17. Beachy, "German Invention of Homosexuality," 24.
18. See Florence Tamagne, *A History of Homosexuality in Europe: Berlin, London, Paris, 1919–1939*, vols. 1 & 2 combined (New York: Algora, 2006).
19. See Elena Mancini, *Magnus Hirschfeld and the Quest for Sexual Freedom: A History of the First International Sexual Freedom Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
20. See Richard Plant, *The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War against Homosexuals* (New York: Henry Holt, 1986).
21. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 188.
22. John Boswell, *Same-Sex Unions in pre-Modern Europe* (New York: Villard, 1994). See further Kathleen A. Lahey and Kevin Alderson, *Same-Sex Marriage: The Personal and Political* (Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2004), 16, 101–102; and the contributors to chap. 1 "For the First Time Ever? Same-sex Marriage in History," in *Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con; A Reader*, ed. Andrew Sullivan (New York: Vintage, 2004), 3–45.
23. Lilian Faderman, ed., *Chloe plus Olivia: An Anthology of Lesbian Literature from the Seventeenth Century to the Present* (New York: Penguin, 1994), 23. Katherine Fowler Philips lived from 1631 to 1664. Her poetry was constructed at the time as being in the tradition of "romantic friendship," see Faderman, *Chloe plus Olivia*, 17–19.
24. "Text of letter sent by Anne Lister to Mariana Lawton née Belcombe," in *The Secret Diaries of Miss Anne Lister,* ed. Helena Whitbread (London: Virago, 2010), 161 (emphasis added). Anne Lister (1791–1840) was a Halifax landowner and businesswoman (with coal mining interests); see Whitbread, "Introduction," *The Secret Diaries*, xiii–xxv, for more biographical information.
25. Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Belinda Roberts Peters, *Marriage in Seventeenth Century Political Thought*

(Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Susan Moller Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

26. See, e.g., Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1977); David R. Shumway, *Modern Love: Romance, Intimacy and the Marriage Crisis* (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 1–28; Stephanie Coontz, *Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage* (New York: Viking/Penguin, 2005), 5–12. For an argument that economic interests still underlay some of the arguments regarding true love, see David Lemmings, "Marriage and the Law in the Eighteenth Century: Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753," *The Historical Journal* 39 (1996): 339–360.
27. Marcus makes a convincing case that emotion and reason are not opposed; see George Marcus, *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2002).
28. See Kenneth Plummer, *Intimate Citizenship: Private Decisions and Public Dialogues* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003), 67–84.
29. Carole Pateman, "Democratization and Citizenship in the 1990s: The Legacy of T.H. Marshall," Vilhelm Aubert Memorial Lecture 1996 (Oslo: University of Oslo Institute for Social Research and Department of Sociology, 1996), 13–17.
30. Diane Richardson, "Claiming Citizenship? Sexuality, Citizenship and Lesbian/Feminist Theory," *Sexualities* 3 (2000): 255–272; David Bell and Jon Binnie, *The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); Shane Phelan, *Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians and Dilemmas of Citizenship* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia, *Same Sex: Same Entitlements. Report of the National Inquiry into Discrimination Against People in Same-sex Relationships: Financial and Work-Related Entitlements and Benefits*, 2007, accessed 1 May 2010, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/samesex/index.html.
31. Davina Kotluski, *Why You Should Give a Damn about Gay Marriage* (Los Angeles: Advocate Books, 2004), 56–57.
32. Carol Johnson, "Heteronormative Citizenship and the Politics of Passing," *Sexualities* 5 (2002): 316–336; Johnson, "Politics of Affective Citizenship," 495–509.
33. Carl F. Stychin, *A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity Politics and the Discourse of Rights* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 194.
34. Mohamad Mahathir, Speech at the 54th Umno General Assembly, Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 2003, accessed 13 February 2004, http://www.multiworld.org/m_versity/articles/mahathir.htm.
35. Baden Offord, *Homosexual Rights as Human Rights: Activism in Indonesia, Singapore and Australia* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), 45.
36. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy and Carnality* (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 17, 4.
37. Agnès Chetaille, "Poland: Sovereignty and Sexuality in Post-Socialist Times," in *The Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State: Comparative Insights into a Transformed Relationship,* ed. Manon Tremblay, David Paternotte, and Carol Johnson (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 119–134.
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39. John Howard, "Address to the National Marriage Forum," Parliament House, Canberra, 4 August 2004, accessed 23 September 2004, www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1051.html.
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42. Barack Obama, "Civil Forum at Saddleback Church with Rick Warren," 2009, accessed 1 January 2010, http://www.purpsedriven.com/article.html?c=115109&1=1.
43. White House, President Obama Supports Same-sex Marriage, accessed 14 June 2012, *http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/09/president-obama-supports-same-sex-marriage*.
44. David Cameron. "Leadership for a Better Britain," accessed 12 November 2011, www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/10/David_Cameron_Leadership_for_a_better_-Britain.aspx.
45. See, e.g., Jacqui Smith, then Minister of State for Industry and the Regions and Deputy Minister for Women and Equality, "Foreword," in Women and Equality Unit, *Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, June 2003,* accessed 28 March 2013, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/consultations/pdf/consultcivil.pdf.
46. See *The Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State: Comparative Insights into a Transformed Relationship*, ed. Manon Tremblay, David Paternotte, and Carol Johnson (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).
47. Mariana Valverde, "A New Entity in the History of Sexuality: The Respectable Same-Sex Couple," *Feminist Studies* 32 (2006): 155–162, 14–34.
48. Judith Butler, "Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual," *Differences* 13 (2002): 27.
49. Butler, "Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual," 18. For analyses of queer views on marriage in the Australian context see e.g. Jessica Rodgers, "'Live your Liberation—Don't Lobby for it': Australian Queer Student Activists' Perspectives of Same-Sex Marriage," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 24 (2010): 601–617, and Barbara Baird, "'Gay Marriage', Lesbian Wedding," *Gay & Lesbian Issues and Psychology Review* 3, no. 3 (2007): 161–170.
50. Elias argues: "That monogamous marriage is the predominant institution regulating sexual relations in the West is undoubtedly correct in general terms. Nonetheless, the actual control and moulding of sexual relations changes considerably in the course of Western history. The Church certainly fought early for monogamous marriage. But marriage takes on this strict form as a social institution binding on both sexes only at a late stage, when drives and impulses come under firmer and stricter control. For only then are extramarital relationships for men really ostracized socially or at least subjected to absolute secrecy. In earlier phases, depending upon the balance of social power between the sexes, extramarital relationships for men and sometimes also for women, were taken more or less for granted by secular society." Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 183.
51. Dennis Smith, "*The Civilizing Process* and *The History of Sexuality*: Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault," *Theory and Society* 28 (1999): 89, 87.

52. Smith, "*The Civilizing Process* and *The History of Sexuality*," 89
53. Smith, "*The Civilizing Process* and *The History of Sexuality*," 87. Incidentally, Smith sees Foucault's arguments as emphasizing a cognitive rather than affectual source of anxiety (p. 88)—I've argued above that the two can be interrelated.
54. Margot Canaday, *The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).
55. See further Johnson, "Affective Citizenship."
56. Tremblay, Paternotte, and Johnson, *Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State*.
57. Elias, *Power and Civility*, vol. 2 of *The Civilizing Process* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), 248.
58. Elias, *Power and Civility*, 295. Unfortunately, Elias's book manuscript on the relationships between the sexes was accidentally thrown out by a university cleaner after being left on his office floor; see Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom, "Introduction," in *Norbert Elias: On Civilisation, Power and Knowledge,* ed. Mennell and Johan Goudsblom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 13. Elias did reconstruct a fragment of that manuscript, analyzing the balance of power between the sexes in ancient Rome, which contained interesting insights regarding the impact of differing conceptions of gender equality on the nature of marriage. See Mennell and Goudsblom, *Norbert Elias*, 190.
59. Janice M. Irvine, "Shame Comes Out of the Closet," *Sexuality Research and Social Policy: Journal of NSRC* 6 (2009): 71, 77. See further Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 180 and 190.
60. Irvine, "Shame Comes Out of the Closet," 71n1.
61. Martha C. Nussbaum, *From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), xix.
62. Nussbaum, *From Disgust to Humanity*, 15; see, e.g, Elias, *The Civilizing Process* on changing attitudes to nasal discharges (150–151) or spitting (158–159).
63. Nussbaum, *From Disgust to Humanity*, 15.
64. Nussbaum, *From Disgust to Humanity*, xix.

Part IV

Trajectories of Civilization and De-Civilization?

Elias, Violence, and Regression in Modern Societies

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13 Comparative Reflections on *The Civilizing Process*

Peter Mayer

INTRODUCTION

What remains remarkable about *The Civilizing Process*[1] is the boldness with which Elias asserted that there is a long-term, complex causal chain linking changes in manners and etiquette, changes in the valence of emotions and the centralization of power in the early modern state in Europe. If Elias's detailed and graphic tracing of the history of accepted behavior in polite society is unquestionably the most memorable aspect of the book, his discussion of the growing control over the emotions and the developing domination of society by the increasingly powerful state is the most significant for the arguments developed in this chapter.

Elias discerned changes in behavior in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries that required increasing control over "natural functions." There was, says Elias, "a notable rise of the shame threshold."[2] Where an earlier generation freely and unselfconsciously urinated and defecated in public view, later generations came to consider it impolite even to discuss such topics in public. Initially "stricter control of impulses and emotions [were] . . . imposed by those of high social rank on their social inferiors, or, at most, their social equals,"[3] but these operated only when "in the company of others."[4] In time, however, these restraints on public behavior became internalized.[5] Changes in etiquette were matched by growing control over emotions of aggression against others.[6] Elias argued that medieval society was one "in which people gave way to drives and feelings incomparably more easily, quickly, spontaneously, and openly than today, in which the emotions were less restrained . . . ."[7] The warrior class delighted in war, plunder, rape, and the mutilation of prisoners.[8] Ordinary "[p]eople [were] wild, cruel, prone to violent outbreaks and abandoned to the joy of the moment."[9] There was a "permanent readiness to fight, weapon in hand."[10]

Is the emergence of polite behavior in society indeed the authentic core and origin of the civilizing process? To answer that question, in the following section I will undertake a comparative investigation, based on evidence from India and other parts of the non-European world. The comparative

evidence will be used to bolster the argument that we need to look elsewhere to locate the true core of the civilizing process.

Elias identified two developments that were responsible for the civilizing changes. The first was changes in the political economy of society, which, driven by growing population density, led to a growing division of labor in society.[11] The growing network of interdependence molded "the whole [of] emotional life, the personality structure, [was] also changed."[12] The second force for change was the increasing ability of European states to assert domestic monopolies on the use of violence, so that people were "forced to live in peace with each other"[13] and to suppress "any passionate impulse to attack another physically."[14] There is more than a small element of "Whig history" in Elias's account of the apparently inevitable rise of monopolization, that is, the emergence of the Weberian state, which asserts a monopoly over the use of violence and which controls most of the income from taxation within society.[15] As far as Elias's account is concerned, the development of the state appears to have reached its apotheosis by the reign of Louis XIV. Once the monopolization of force was achieved, and the state could impose regulation and restraint on individuals, it appears that the civilizing process had largely been completed.

I believe that Elias's account of the state is suggestive but truncated. At the end of the chapter I will suggest ways in which I think an expanded consideration of the changing nature of the state may open fresh ways to consider the changing place of the emotions in society.

CONTROLLING THE BODY AND IMPULSES IN TRADITIONAL INDIA AND ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE EUROPE

The civilizing process Elias outlined was a European one. Yet it is evident that he thought it was likely to be a universal phenomenon. In his Introduction to the 1968 edition, Elias indicates the processes he described may also be investigated in "so-called 'developing countries' in other parts of the world."[16] And H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen draws our attention to this "odd sentence": "Th[e] incipient transformation of Oriental or African people in the direction of Western standards represents the last wave of the continuing civilizing movement [that] we are able to observe."[17] Despite this, Elias does not appear to have attempted to validate his thesis with evidence from outside Europe. Thus the issue of the general applicability of the civilizing process remains. As Stephen Mennell has observed:

> The best test [of the civilizing process]—urgently needed—of whether the specific pattern of development first sketched for Western Europe represents a more generally valid model would be to investigate other historical civilizations—India, China, Japan for instance. Superficial differences in etiquette would of course be observed—developments in

> table manners towards the use of chopsticks rather than knives, forks and spoons, or the persistence of eating with the fingers, would not in themselves undermine Elias's thesis. It would, however, be necessary to show that the basic shift in the balance between external constraints and self-constraints in the social habitus of individuals was correlated with the social web becoming more extensive and complex.[18]

Despite Mennell's placing this urgent challenge on the scholarly agenda, we have only a handful of studies that consider the applicability of the civilizing process to non-European societies, and those we have cast doubt on its wider validity. Although, as we will see below, Japan has been considered in the light of Elias's thesis; India has not.[19]

India offers a particularly significant test of the process of civilization thesis. The French anthropologist Louis Dumont famously contrasted the "homo aequalis" of Western civilization with the "homo hierarchicus" of India. To summarize his argument in a sentence: if the fundamental social postulate of the West is the equality of souls (the "all men are created equal" of the United States Declaration of Independence), India takes as its point of departure social inequality.[20] Indian society rests upon the caste system, a structure of unequal relations between different hereditary endogamous groups. In Dumont's analysis, the whole is structured around the opposition of "purity" (those at the very top, the priestly Brahmins) and "impurity" (represented by the Untouchables, at the very bottom of society). Given these major distinctions in the structure of Indian society, if we were to find a similar unfolding of the European civilizing process in India, it would be a significant validation of the wider validity of Elias's ideas.

I am not aware of any Indian manuals of etiquette that are directly comparable to those which are so central to Elias's argument. We do, however, have written documents from somewhere around the beginning of the common era (200 BCE to 200 CE) that are highly prescriptive about the self-control that should be exercised over personal behavior, especially for Brahmin men. These are the *Manusmriti* which in English are usually referred to as the *Laws of Manu*. Although authorship of the *Laws* is traditionally ascribed to Manu, in fact, the true author is not known definitively. Nor is it very clear how widespread was their influence in traditional India; much the same situation indeed as applies to our knowledge of the influence of Erasmus's guidance on manners.

Significantly, for the present purposes, unlike European guides to etiquette, the twelve chapters of the *Laws* do not describe polite behavior in public or in company, but rather, as "laws," define both the proper private behavior of the individual, depending on their place in the hierarchy of caste and correct relations between castes.[21] Early chapters focus on the necessity of bodily restraint.[22] The dangers posed by sensual temptations are likened to the horses of a chariot which will "run wild" if not restrained by a charioteer.[23] Unless those attachments are subdued, "neither (the study

of) the Vedas, nor liberality, nor sacrifices, nor any (self-imposed) restraint, nor austerities, [will] ever procure the attainment (of rewards)."[24] The *Laws* repeatedly emphasize the need to control basic bodily functions. A few illustrative excerpts from Chapter 4 may convey something of the detailed nature of the prescriptions:

45. Let him [a Brahmin] not eat, dressed with one garment only; let him not bathe naked; let him not void urine on a road, on ashes, or in a cow-pen.
49. He may ease himself, having covered (the ground) with sticks, clods, leaves, grass, and the like, restraining his speech, (keeping himself) pure, wrapping up his body, and covering his head.
56. Let him not throw urine or faeces into the water, nor saliva, nor (clothes) defiled by impure substances, nor any other (impurity), nor blood, nor poisonous things.
66. Let him not use shoes, garments, a sacred string, ornaments, a garland, or a water-vessel which have been used by others.

The *Laws* also give strict directions about the consumption of food. There are many individuals from whom it is prohibited to receive food, including those who are drunk, angry or sick, thieves, musicians, carpenters, prostitutes, and moneylenders. Food that has merely been looked at by anyone who has killed a Brahmin, or been touched by a menstruating woman or by birds or by dogs is also prohibited. Specific foods which are forbidden—including garlic, leeks and onions, mushrooms, the milk of wild animals (and women), village pigs, and cocks—are enumerated in almost Levitican detail; those who eat them may be made outcastes.

It is not surprising that in a compendium of caste duties, infractions, and punishments, there are only a few direct references to the emotions. Manu warns rulers against the vices of pleasure (hunting, gambling, sleeping by day, censoriousness, excess with women, drunkenness, an inordinate love for dancing, singing, and music)[25] and those of wrath (tale-bearing, violence, treachery, envy, slandering, unjust seizure of property, reviling, and assault).[26] For ordinary individuals "coveting the property of others, thinking in one's heart of what is undesirable, . . . abusing (others, speaking) untruth, detracting from the merits of all men, and talking idly" are all behaviors that may cause one to be reborn as something inanimate, an animal, or a person of lower caste.[27] "Covetousness, sleepiness, pusillanimity, cruelty, atheism, leading an evil life, a habit of soliciting favours, and inattentiveness" are all actions that should cause a person to feel shame.[28]

If the compiler(s) of the *Laws of Manu* refer principally to emotions such as anger, lust, or covetousness that may lead individuals to commit offenses against others, at roughly the same period, other Indian authors developed a broad, complex theory of human emotions that drama and dance performances should seek to evoke. The eight inherent emotions

(*sthayi bhavas*) that performance should arouse so that the audience could experience ("taste") them (as *rasas*) were: desire/love, humor/laughter, pity/grief, anger, energy/vigor, fear/shame, disgust, and surprise/wonder.[29] In addition to these stable emotions, Indian theorists also identified thirty-three transitory emotions including jealousy, envy, despair, and anxiety.[30] Besides the skill of the performer, the communication of *rasas* required a sophisticated audience, able to interpret the gestures and poses by which they were expressed. Schechner suggests that performances aimed to convey a literally visceral emotional empathy with the character portrayed by the performer, and in the most perfect performances, to evoke transcendent feelings of spiritual bliss.[31]

I think these examples pose the first part of what I shall call the "India puzzle." The deep explorations in dramatic theory make it evident that from a very early date, Indian society was highly aware of the inner emotional states that individuals could experience and sought to cultivate feelings of empathy with the feelings of others. The extraordinary Tamil love poems that date from this period convey an intensity of passion, of the anxieties of lovers, and the sharp pains of loss that speak directly to the twenty-first-century reader.[32] The writings of Manu make it abundantly clear that two millennia ago there was an intense focus on control over bodily functions, and over emotions such as anger, at least for higher caste individuals (primarily male, one assumes) in Indian society. Although there are divine and secular punishments for violations of the laws, Manu's repeated references to the necessity for self-control—and, more rarely, to the feelings of shame—indicate that these rules were internalized very early on, in ways that seem precisely like those Elias describes as characteristic of society that has experience the "civilizing process."[33]

By the Middle Ages in India, vegetarianism had triumphed among the upper castes, and the caste system had become ever-more rigid. Food was classified into cooked and uncooked, and permissible commensality became strictly defined. Vulnerability to pollution threatened at every turn.[34] The personal fastidiousness that regulated the lives of better-off Hindus in the early years of colonial rule was acutely observed by the French Catholic missionary, the Abbé J. A. Dubois. The Abbé worked in southern India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Despite his palpable biases on some topics, he was one of the best-informed observers of Indian life in the early modern period; the similarities between his observations and the strictures expressed in the earliest documents are unmistakable. Dubois notes the fastidiousness with which Hindus avoided any possible sources of bodily pollution: "[a]ll that pertains to external and internal defilement, bodily and spiritual, is the very beginning and foundation of a Hindu's education, both religious and civil."[35] This was especially true of food and saliva; a single grain falling from the banana leaf plate of one diner on to that of another "would effectually prevent the latter from continuing his meal; or at any rate he would have to take a fresh leaf and another portion of food."[36] As Dubois reported:

> [They have an] insurmountable horror of saliva. They would look on a man who spat upon the floor as quite destitute of good manners . . . there is nothing astonishing in this excessive scrupulosity. No properly brought-up European would dream of expectorating on the floor of a room. But with the Hindu it is less from a due regard to cleanliness than from his ever-recurring fear of bodily defilement.[37]

There is much more that is potentially relevant in Dubois's account, but it may be sufficient for my purposes to reproduce his conclusion on the social behavior of the Hindus he encountered during his thirty-one years in India:

> In conclusion, it must be admitted that the laws of etiquette and social politeness are much more clearly laid down, and much better observed by all classes of Hindus, even by the lowest, than they are by people of corresponding social positions in Europe.[38]

CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE

The second part of the India puzzle has to do with the nature of the state. Although there are a few moments in the history of India when much of the subcontinent came under the rule of a single state authority—each, like the empires of Ashoka, or far, far later, the Mughals—was no more than a fleeting punctuation point in the broader scheme of things. On the whole, pre-British India was marked by invasion, conquest, and the rise and fall of kingdoms. Nineteenth-century observers of India sought to explain this in terms of the strength of caste and the "village community." Alexis de Tocqueville in his "Rough Draft of a Work on India," for example, suggested:

> The village community forms the social base of India. Above, everything is fleeting, moving, transient; it alone remains firm and stable. That explains many things. It explains above all how civilization was maintained in the midst of the ceaseless revolutions which ravaged the country for eight hundred years. Civilization always found an inviolable sanctuary in the village community. It also explains how so many conquests have succeeded and so many conquerors have so effortlessly established themselves in the country.[39]

In the Indian village, the upper castes, especially the land-owning castes, did not hesitate to employ violence to enforce the existing social hierarchy. In post-Independence India, elite dominance was increasingly threatened by forces unleashed by the growth of state power. Democratic politics were conducted with a universal franchise. The national parliament passed a

number of social reform measures including land reform, the abolition of Untouchability, and compensatory policies for ex-Untouchables and those from Backward Castes. These forces produced social changes that in turn led to challenges to the dominance of existing caste and economic elites in the countryside. In many instances, the responses to these challenges were often very violent. Threatened elites committed occasional "atrocities" on Untouchable and Backward groups in their villages, both to assert their own traditional ritual superiority and to physically force submission to their economic dominance. To cite just one well-documented example from 1980, in Pipra village in Bihar a gang of 200 men belonging to a Backward-but-landholding caste invaded the Untouchable [=Harijan= Dalit] quarter, looted and burned straw houses, and shot and killed their terrified inhabitants.[40] The continuing role of relatively unconstrained violence, especially in parts of north India, suggests that, despite the very tight constraints on personal behavior, there is not the corresponding control over aggressive behavior that we would expect if the thesis of the civilizing process were applicable *holus bolus* to India. Equally, the critical linkage between internalized self-control and a powerful centralized state that is able to enforce a monopoly on the exercise of violence is also absent in India.

India thus poses serious problems for the canonical version of Elias's civilizing process. If we have, from the very earliest records of Hindu civilization, the most stark evidence of a culture preoccupied with personal cleanliness and control of bodily functions, it is equally evident that there is no discernible correlation between the personal on the one hand and "the social web becoming more extensive and complex"[41] on the other. It is possible that this could be because social complexity was "hardwired" into the structure of Hindu society virtually from its origins. The very essence of the occupational foundations of caste forced interdependence on everyone. In which case, should we conclude that Indian society was civilized *ab initio*? If it *is* possible for a premodern society to achieve higher levels of self-control than prevailed in Europe at the time of the French Revolution, it seems to me that at a minimum, we are then required to think in terms of multiple civilizing *processes*. If that proposal is accepted, then it becomes even more urgent to consider the civilizing process in the light of the few other comparative explorations we possess of the applicability of Elias's argument to non-Western societies.

Velzen studied the Djuka Maroons of the interior of Suriname. He found that "three phenomena particularly characterize the Djuka civilization: courtly manners, palaver [meetings of adult males in the village] and the possession of self-control as the central value in dealing with emotions."[42] Velzen argued that the Djuka posed a serious problem for Elias's description of the civilizing process.

> . . . Djuka society exhibit[s] those characteristics of civilization which Elias found among the aristocracy of the ancient regime [emphasis in

> original]. But the Djuka society has no state apparatus of any significance. [The absence of a state monopoly of force] gives rise to the question as to which phenomena may indeed be viewed as the foundations of this civilization.[43]

If rigorous emotional self-control exists in Suriname in the rainforests of Central America, far from state control, perhaps the centralizing state is not essential, after all.

Eiko Ikegami has presented a deep and nuanced account of the historical steps by which Japan's warrior class of samurai were "tamed."[44] Ikegami traces successive interpretations of samurai conceptions of honor, starting from the late medieval period, when personal honor was based on an individual's ability to exert aggressive violence in battle and upon the prestige of the "house" to which he belonged. In the late sixteenth century, changes in the technology of warfare and the rise of powerful regional barons led to restrictions on individual acts of samurai valor in battle and severe prohibitions on fights between samurai, which undercut the older foundations of honor. The rise to supremacy of the Tokugawa clan was followed by the disarming of the peasantry and continued prohibitions on unauthorized samurai violence—"a classic case of state formation through monopolizing the use of violence."[45] The samurai, allowed to retain swords they could not use, were transformed into a hereditary bureaucratic ruling class. While the taming of samurai violence in Japan appears to fit well into Elias's conception of the civilizing process, what is notable is that there was no corresponding change in manners and etiquette. Ikegami notes in a reflection on the study of the emotions in history that in Japan there was

> no definite turning point for increasing self-constraint reflected in the text of etiquette books [from the late medieval to the early modern periods]. . . . In contrast to Elias's description of medieval table manners as rather rough and unsophisticated even among the aristocracy, late medieval Japanese courtiers already served food with individualized dishes and utensils, and they did not have to be advised against blowing their noses into their fingers or onto their sleeves, since such behaviours would never even occur to them.[46]

If, as the comparative evidence from India, Japan, and Suriname appears to indicate, it is possible for societies to develop elaborate codes regulating personal behavior without the parallel emergence of strong centralizing states, then we must consider whether Elias's heavy reliance on the history of manners as the key marker of the civilizing process is a mistaken, but entirely understandable, generalization from changes that, in fact, were specific to Europe. Even in Europe, it is not clear that the centralizing state was essential. Eisner points out that interpersonal violence declined sharply in the Low Countries, "where centralized power structures never

emerged," while it flourished in Italy where state structures were comparatively strong.[47]

Ikegami observes that even if Elias's grand narrative "is not a universal story" it does not then follow "that there was no cultural transformation in navigating and controlling sentiments."[48] She continues:

> Thus, although it is certainly misleading to assume a simple picture of the past in which people had fewer emotional constraints, it does not mean that a large-scale transformation of emotional culture cannot be a subject for historians.[49]

How, though, are those large-scale transformations to be traced, especially in contexts, such as India, where, until quite recently, we may have relatively few relevant documents, or where we have reason to think that there are significant regional differences for which comparative documents are not available? If we cannot rely on tracing the increasing gentility of manners and refinements of etiquette, where should we look for evidence of large-scale changes in sentiments?

I suggest that we must shift our focus from the control of bodily functions to the control of interpersonal violence. At the very end of his examination of the history of manners, Elias turned briefly to an examination of changes in aggressiveness. He argued, as we have seen, that in Europe, the growth in restraint of bodily functions occurred in tandem with curbs being placed on aggressive impulses.[50] But if, as the comparative evidence demonstrates, that linkage is not universal, then it is possible that the control of interpersonal violence—what Steven Pinker has called "the most important thing that has ever happened in human history[51]—is the true core of the civilizing process. In what follows I wish to argue for the relevance of records and documents that have not usually been employed in the study of the history of emotions but that furnish us both with optics to trace Elias's grand transformation and means to begin to more accurately identify different "emotional regimes."[52]

THE TAMING OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE AND INWARD OR OUTWARD AGGRESSION

The evidence that best illustrates my argument comes from Europe. Pieter Spierenburg's *A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* places that long history squarely within the framework of Elias's civilizing process. Like Elias, he notes that in the Middle Ages, murder, and violence generally, were routine. "For the elites, violence was part of their lifestyle . . . [they] considered violence to be their special prerogative."[53] Spierenburg places the defense of honor at the center of most violent acts in the Middle Ages and the early modern period,

noting aptly that while Elias referred frequently to shame, he dealt "hardly at all with the theme of honor."[54] Spierenburg's working hypothesis is that where the state is weak, individuals and families must procure security by their own efforts, and in those circumstances, the use of violence to defend "traditional male honor" will be at its maximum.[55] Like Elias, Spierenburg notes a correlation between the growth of state power and authority and changes in personal behavior, in this case, the emergence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of what he terms the "spiritualization of honor," or, using the words of George Fenwick Jones, a shift from "external to internal honor."[56] As Spierenburg said:

> [The association of honor] with outer appearance and the physical body weakened, while it became tied more strongly to moral values. . . . Alternative sources of honor, such as economic solidity, gradually came to the fore.[57]

Between 1800 and 1970 European murder rates fell steadily as homicide was steadily marginalized to the outer "periphery" of the Mediterranean and eastern Europe until rates touched a nadir in the 1950s. "In Europe west of the Iron Curtain, the 1950s were, on average, the least violent period in history."[58]

What is really remarkable, though rarely noticed, however, is that as homicide rates began to fall, *suicide* rates began to rise. It seems plausible that the growth in suicide rates may represent the internalization of aggression with honor. It must be observed here that Elias does not appear to have ever considered the relationship between the civilizing process and suicide. But Spierenburg notes that "suicides began to outnumber homicides, in some places by the mid-seventeenth century, and elsewhere, such as in Sweden, during the eighteenth. . . . Studies comparing countries or regions in the twentieth century often, but not always, find an inverse relationship between the incidence of homicide and that of suicide, but almost everywhere the second is more common."[59]

As Spierenburg notes, the inverse historical relationship between homicide and suicide is not universal, but it is very widespread and consistent, especially within nations. In medieval France and England, for example, homicide-to-suicide ratios of 20:1 or greater were common.[60] By contrast Enrico Morselli, one of the great sociologists of the nineteenth century, noted that the inverse relation was evident in the national statistics of a number of European countries toward the middle of the century.[61] Indeed the balance of suicide against homicide seems to shift toward the former with development, as measured within different parts of nation-states, as well as over time. To take just the examples of France and Italy, Morselli noted that in both countries as one moved from south to north, the ratio of interpersonal violence to suicide declined.[62] We can see in Figure 13.1

the geographic dispersion in France that Morselli refers to. According to the graph, in the 1870s suicides formed a small percentage of all crimes of violence against the person (the total of homicide and suicide rates) in undeveloped *départements* like Bastia in Corsica; by contrast the suicide percentage was much higher in the region around Paris.[63] This relation can also be demonstrated for Italy. Morselli's data show that homicide rates were relatively high and suicide-to-homicide ratios were nearly equal in southern regions such as Calabria, Sicily, and Campania. The suicide-to-homicide ratios were higher in mid-Italy and became much greater in northern regions such as Emilia-Romagna.[64] A. F. Henry and J. F. Short observed the same phenomenon in mid-twentieth-century United States: interpersonal violence was most prevalent in the South; "as we move from North to South in the United States, the probability of suicide decreases as the probability of homicide increases."[65].

Returning to India, the same phenomenon is evident in contemporary statistics. The geographic distribution is clearly evident in Figure 13.2. Where suicide rates are high, as in the southern states of Kerala and Tamil-nadu, homicide rates are low. As we move north the ratio of homicides increases. In northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand, where homicide rates are high, suicide rates are low.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, in a study of murder, Spierenburg does not speculate on why the inverse relationship between homicide and suicide



Figure 13.1 France: suicide rate vs. total violence rate (homicide + suicide), 1872. *Source:* see n62.



Figure 13.2 Homicide to suicide ratios in India, 1995.
Source: Computed from: National Crime Records Bureau, *Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India 1995* (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs Government of India, 1997); National Crime Records Bureau, *Crime in India 1997* (New Delhi: National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1997).

is so widespread. For a possible explanation we can turn to an earlier study. In their pathbreaking book *Suicide and Homicide*, Henry and Short examined the social origins of both homicide and suicide. Generalizing from US data from the first half of the twentieth century, Henry and Short identified two factors—a person's position in the social hierarchy and what they termed the "strength of the relationship system," that is, "the degree of involvement in social or cathectic [emotional] relations with other persons"[66]—that were relevant to both suicide and homicide. A person in a subordinate position in a hierarchical society is subject to external restraint. Those involved in intense personal relations with others Henry and Short considered to be subject to internal restraints.[67] The social consequences of the two forms of restraint are profound. Martin Gold summarized them in this way:

> [Henry and Short] theorize that [the] degree of external restraint distinguishes individuals who choose to commit [homicide] rather than [suicide]. An individual is externally restrained to the degree that his alternatives of behaviour are limited by others. It is postulated that, the more an individual is externally restrained, the more likely it is that he will regard others as legitimate targets for aggression. Hence, the greater the degree of external restraint upon an individual, the more likely that he will commit homicide rather than suicide.[68]

In Henry and Short's conceptualization, homicide and suicide are extreme poles of "a continuum of legitimacy of other-oriented aggression" reflecting the strength of external restraint over behavior.[69] Hugh P. Whitt summarizes this interpretation with admirable concision:

> suicide results when people blame themselves for their misfortunes, while homicide reflects external attributions of blame.[70]

Although there is a superficial similarity to Elias's theorizing about external and internal restraints on behavior, the differences are also strong and crucial. As we saw, Elias associated unrestrained impulsive acts of violence with the *absence* of external restraints by elites and, ultimately, by the state. In his conceptualization, as the strength of the state grows, the ability of the individual to engage in acts of violence is reduced. Henry and Short's conception of external constraints has more in common with Spierenburg's ideas about the role of honor in premodern Europe. Traditional or external honor is above all about irresistible public perceptions of a person's (most commonly a man's) ability to defend status, prestige, property, and dependents.[71] As Spierenburg observes: "an insult had to be public to be effective."[72] Traditional honor is very clearly the external restraint imposed on an individual by what others—peers, onlookers, etc.—will think, how they will be judged. It was akin to the world of what Gellner called the "tyranny of cousins": "Traditional man can sometimes escape the tyranny of kings, but only at the cost of falling under the tyranny of cousins, and of ritual."[73] In that context, emotional aggression must be turned against those who challenge it. In my view it is this that appears to explain why homicide rates are high where people are subject to the external restraints of an honor culture.[74] It is only when the state successfully asserts its monopoly of the right to use violence that we see the shift to internal honor and the concomitant turning of emotional aggression against the self; in the words of Henry and Sharp "in suicide, the target of aggression is the self."[75]

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

If one accepts that the relationship between homicide and suicide, or alternatively, between external and internal emotional aggression, is a significant proxy for the civilizing process, a number of fruitful conclusions follow.

The most obvious is the great enhancement to the precision with which we can trace the civilizing process. Using data on homicides and suicides permits us to disaggregate the process, to explore regional and local differences in detail and, where data permit, to be far more precise about chronology. In India, for example, we can see that the process has proceeded further in the south than in the north.[76]

Equally it opens up an important means to engage in the comparative study of both the civilizing process and the history of the emotions. It may be possible to move beyond one-dimensional considerations such as what eating with one's fingers—still prevalent in India—does or does not indicate about the civilizing process.

The insights of Henry and Sharp's approach also suggest superior typologies for thinking about the stages of the civilizing process. I find their categorization both more apt and more fruitful than the restrictive terms used by Elias. It seems plausible to me that we can conceive of the civilizing process as moving in four stages from the unpredictable, where internalized restraints are weak, into a second period in which other-oriented aggression is predominant, and then through a third transitional stage of anxiety or conflict to a fourth and "final" phase of self-oriented aggression.[77] The transitional third phase of anxiety or conflict seems to me to be a particularly fruitful one on which to concentrate in studying the history of the emotions.

Let me next make a few observations about how we may better theorize about the state in studying the history of the emotions. Despite the linkage that he identifies between social behavior and the development of the state, Elias is distressingly vague about the developmental stages of the state. Although he lavishes much attention to developments in France, those events are not well linked to his earlier themes. I believe more precise thinking about changes in the forms of the state over time will assist us to identify lacunae in our thinking about the civilizing process, the emotions, and violence.

In his monumental study *The Shield of Achilles*, the broader aim of which is to offer tools for understanding the contemporary age of globalization, Philip Bobbitt identifies six state forms that emerged successively in Europe between 1494 and 1989.[78] When we superimpose the periods of ascendency of each of his state forms on Spierenburg's remarkable history of the incidence of murder from 1300 to 2000[79] and suicide rates over the same period, a number of aspects emerge immediately (Figure 13.3).[80]

Firstly, much of the most rapid decline in homicide rates, and thus, perhaps, the most rapid advance in the civilizing process, appears to have occurred under state forms that predate those that form the subject of Bobbitt's study—and of Erasmus's publication of *De Civilitate Morum Puerilium* in 1530. Perhaps there is crucial evidence waiting to be found in the period of the dynastic War of the Roses in England, and elsewhere? C. Stephen Jaeger suggests that we can find the origins of courtliness in the German courts of the tenth century, and others have also argued for earlier origins.[81]



Figure 13.3 Historical murder and suicide rates and changing forms of the state, Europe 1300–2000.
Source: see n80.

Secondly, the two early periods of manners that Elias describes in some detail—*courtoisie* and *civilité*—align almost perfectly with Bobbitt's eras of the Princely State and the Kingly State. Can we not identify successive correspondences with later aspects of custom, behavior, the emotions, and forms of the state after the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 and the execution of King Charles I of England in 1649?

Finally, a more radical interpretation emerges if we overlay two stages from Pinker's periodization of the decline of violence onto Figure 13.3. For the sharp decline in interpersonal violence that occurred after the late Middle Ages, Pinker aptly adopts Elias's overall term, the Civilizing Process. Pinker also largely accepts Elias's identification of the driving forces that produced declining rates of homicide and interpersonal violence as the emergence of strong states and the intensification of economic interdependence.[82] Perhaps we should apply Elias's term and analysis only to the process that led to the suppression of external aggression. But as we have seen, curbing the outward valence of aggression does not mean that emotions such as anger are totally suppressed.

Pinker calls his second period, which had its origins between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Humanitarian Revolution. It was in this period that intellectual and social movements emerged which sought to end practices and institutions such as torture, slavery, despotism, superstitious killing, and wanton cruelty to animals. Although it is not part of

Pinker's subject, it is, of course, precisely in this period that rates of suicide began to rise rapidly. Pinker attributes the change in attitudes to these forms of violence and cruelty primarily to the rise of literacy and the growing availability of printed books. The emergence of the novel, the growing ability through reading to put oneself in the shoes of others, he suggests, led to the recognition of the rights of others, human and animal. Changing emotional expectations in this period, such as the idea that marriage should be a source of affection and companionship[83], were part of that Revolution. But one collateral consequence of the Humanitarian Revolution was the direction of emotional aggression inward, toward the self. There is, I suggest, much to be gained in the study of the history of emotions, by understanding the shift from external to internal aggression, such as occurred in the Humanitarian Revolution, as a separate, if related, civilizing process.

NOTES

1. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1939]).
2. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 110.
3. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 112.
4. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 113.
5. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 156.
6. Jonathan Fletcher, *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), 16–21.
7. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 176.
8. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 320, 158–159.
9. Elias, *Civilizing Process,*
10. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 162, 164.
11. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 303.
12. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 332.
13. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 165.
14. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 448.
15. In a recent study, Francis Fukuyama emphasizes just how contingent were the processes that produced the strong state in Europe. Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011).
16. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 181.
17. H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, "The Djuka Civilization," *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology* 20, no. 2 (1984): 95. The reference is to Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 464.
18. Stephen Mennell, *Norbert Elias: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 237.
19. Elias makes passing references to China and Japan in footnotes (*Civilizing Process,* 527fn22). Susanne Brandtstädter has used Elias to interpret changes in contemporary China. Brandtstädter, "With Elias in China: Civilizing Process, Local Restorations and Power in Contemporary Rural China," *Anthropological Theory* 3, no. 1 (2003).
20. Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay on the Caste System*, trans. Mark Sainsbury (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

21. Kautilya (possibly 300–200 BCE) in the *Arthashastra* gives extensive guidance to a king about governance, including punishments for violations of the laws. He does not set out detailed rules for personal behavior. R. Shamasastry, *Kautilya's Artha[Sh]Astra* (Mysore: Wesleyan Mission Press, 1929).
22. The following excerpts are from Bühler's translation of the *Laws of Manu* available at: http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu.htm, accessed 18 March, 2013.
23. Manu, *The Laws of Manu*, vol. 25: *Sacred Books of the East,* trans. Georg Bühler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1886), II, 88.
24. Manu, *Laws,* II, 97.
25. Manu, *Laws,* XII, 46–47.
26. Manu, *Laws,* XII, 48.
27. Manu, *Laws,* XII, 5–6.
28. Manu, *Laws,* XII, 33–35.
29. Richard Schechner, "Rasaesthetics," *TDR: The Drama Review* 45, no. 3 (T 171) (2001): esp. 31.
30. Owen M. Lynch, "The Social Construction of Emotion in India," in *Divine Passions: The Social Construction of Emotion in India*, ed. Lynch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 18.
31. Schechner, "Rasaesthetics," 32. See also Lynch, "Social Construction," 18. Steven Pinker suggests that the cultivation of empathy is part of Elias's conception of the civilizing process. Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (London: Penguin, 2012), 72. Although Elias refers frequently to "self-restraint," I am not able to find passages in *Civilizing Process* that unambiguously justify Pinker's interpretation. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* e.g., 443ff.
32. A. K. Ramanujan, *The Oxford India Ramanujan*, ed. Molly Daniels-Ramanujan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010).
33. Elias, *Civilizing Process,* 443ff.
34. Richard Lannoy, *The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 151.
35. J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978 [1906]), 178–179.
36. Dubois, *Hindu Manners*, 183.
37. Dubois, *Hindu Manners,* 183–184.
38. Dubois, *Hindu Manners,* 331.
39. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Ecrits Et Discours Politiques*, ed. J.-P. Mayer, vol. Tome 3: Troisieme Partie: L'Inde, *Oeuvres Completes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 450 (my translation).
40. Nageshwar Prasad, "Rural Violence: A Case Study of Parasbigha and Pipra Violence in Bihar," Monograph Series (Varanasi: Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1982), 51. For a discussion of atrocities inflicted on Dalit communities, see Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany, "The Question of the 'Harijan Atrocity,'" in *The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India*, ed. Mendelsohn and Vicziany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
41. Mennell, *Elias Introduction,* 237.
42. Velzen, "Djuka Civilization," 87.
43. Velzen, "Djuka Civilization," 85.
44. Eiko Ikegami, *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Eiko Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

45. Ikegami, *Taming of the Samurai*, 152.
46. Eiko Ikegami, "Emotions," in *Concise Companion to History*, ed. Ulinka Rublack (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 336.
47. Manuel Eisner, "Long-Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime," *Crime and Justice* 30 (2003): 129.
48. Ikegami, "Emotions," 336.
49. Ikegami, "Emotions," 336.
50. Elias, *Civilizing Process*.
51. Pinker, *Better Angels,* xxi.
52. William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
53. Pieter Spierenburg, *A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 19.
54. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 10. See also Eisner, "Violent Crime."
55. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 10.
56. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 9.
57. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 108.
58. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 203.
59. Spierenburg, *Murder.* Corey B. Bills, in a recent cross-national study, found although the inverse association was strong in the Americas and the Asia Pacific, there was a strong, positive correlation in contemporary Europe. Bills and Guohua Li, "Correlating Homicide and Suicide," *International Journal of Epidemiology* 34, no. 4 (2005): 838.
60. Spierenburg, *Murder,* 39.
61. Enrico Ferri was another nineteenth-century Italian sociologist who investigated the relationship between homicide and suicide. Ferri, *Omicida: A Psicologia E Psicopatologia Criminale & L'omicidio-Suicidio*, 2nd ed. Omicida and 5th ed. L'Omicidio-Suicidio (Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1925).
62. Henry M. D. Morselli [Enrico Morselli], *Suicide* (London: Kegan Paul, 1881), 149.
63. Robert D. Baller and Kelly K. Richardson analyzed French suicide data from Morselli for 1872–1876. They report a cluster of fourteen high-suicide *départements* around Paris. There are two low-suicide clusters, one in Brittany, the other in the south and southwest. Baller and Richardson, "Social Integration, Imitation, and the Geographic Patterning of Suicide," *American Sociological Review* 67, no. 6 (2002): 881. Hugh P. Whitt used a similar measure to analyze French data from 1833, and he found a high-suicide cluster in the north and a low-suicide to total-violence cluster in the south: see Whitt, "The Civilizing Process and Its Discontents: Suicide and Crimes against Persons in France, 1825–1830," *American Journal of Sociology* 116, no. 1 (2010).
64. Morselli, *Suicide*, 151.
65. A. F. Henry and J. F. Short, *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1954), 86. In *Bowling Alone*, Robert D. Putnam demonstrated an equally striking inverse relationship between Social Capital and homicide in the United States of the 1980s. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). This observation suggests to me that the civilizing process may also be a social capital building process. Eisner offers a similar analysis, "Violent Crime," 129.
66. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, 16.
67. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, 17.
68. Martin Gold, "Suicide, Homicide, and the Socialization of Aggression," *American Journal of Sociology* 63, no. 6 (1958): 652.

69. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, 18.
70. Whitt, "Civilizing Process," 131.
71. Spierenburg, despite his extensive discussion of the role of honor, puts little emphasis on the symbolic role of honor as a marker of the individual's ability to successfully defend possessions. The anthropological literature makes this aspect very clear. See, e.g., Fredrik Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans* (London: University of London, Athlone, 1965).
72. Pieter Spierenburg, "Violence and the Civilizing Process: Does It Work?," *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés /Crime, History & Societies* 5, no. 2 (2001): 109.
73. Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 7.
74. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, 101.
75. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, 101.
76. For three studies that use Indian women's magazines published in the first half of the twentieth century to examine aspects of emotional culture, see: Sita Anantha Raman, *Getting Girls to School: Social Reform in the Tamil Districts, 1870–1930* (Calcutta: Stree, 1996); Himani Bannerjee, "Fashioning a Self: Educational Proposals for and by Women in Popular Magazines in Colonial Bengal," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26, no. 43 (1991); Gail Minault, "Urdu Women's Magazines in the Early Twentieth Century," *Manushi* 48 (1988).
77. Henry and Short, *Suicide and Homicide*, adapted from fig. 1, p. 121.
78. Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (London: Penguin, 2003).
79. Spierenburg, "Violence and the Civilizing Process," 4, fig. 0.1. See also Eisner, "Violent Crime," 95, fig. 2.
80. I have constructed the time series for suicide rates using a range of sources: *1200–1650*: Alexander Murray, Suicide in the Middle Ages, vol. 1: The Violent Against Themselves (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). *1750–1960*: Ilkka Henrik Mäkinen et al., "Historical Perspectives on Suicide and Suicide Prevention in Sweden," Archives of Suicide Research 6, no. 3 (2002); Steven Stack, "The Effect of Modernization on Suicide in Finland: 1800–1984," Sociological Perspectives 36, no. 2 (1993). *1860–2007*: Kyla Thomas and David Gunnell, "Suicide in England and Wales, 1861–2007: A Time-Trends Analysis," International Journal of Epidemiology 39 (2010). Jeffrey R. Watt notes that there was an "explosion" of suicides in Geneva after 1750. There was a "fivefold increase in suicides from the first to the second half of the eighteenth century. The figures for the 1780s and 1790s correspond to a high annual suicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of 34.4 while that for the first half of the century was 5.2." Watt, "Suicide, Gender, and Religion: The Case of Geneva," in *From Sin to Insanity: Suicide in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Watt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 139.
81. C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 939–1210* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985): Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying About Emotions in History," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): fn57.
82. Pinker, *Better Angels*, 77ff.
83. See, for example: Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977); Jeffrey R. Watt, *The Making of Modern Marriage: Matrimonial Control and the Rise of Sentiment in Neuchatel, 1550–1800* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (London: Collins, 1976).

14 Shame, Marie Corelli, and the "New Woman" in *Fin-de-Siècle* Britain

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INTRODUCTION

Phenomenally popular *fin-de-siècle* celebrity Marie Corelli, in her fictional and nonfictional writing, repeatedly affirmed that the era's iconic New Woman represented not the promise but the threat of "modernity."[1] Modernity, as represented by the New Woman, did not extend the civilizing process. Rather, it jeopardized it. By challenging rules of behavior that were integral to the civilized state, the New Woman threatened a return to a previous state of barbarianism. Indeed, by refusing to allow a proper feeling of womanly shame to regulate her thoughts and actions, this icon of modernity seemed to counter Norbert Elias's understanding of the symbiotic relationship between advancing frontiers of shame and the progression of civilization. Given that this New Woman's improper behavior threatened to destabilize English society and interrupt British imperialism—Britain's international role of bringing "civilisation" to others—as self-appointed "guardian of the public conscience," Corelli took it upon herself to attempt to shame her. More accurately, she took it upon herself to elicit "proper" feelings of guilt and shame from her readers, particularly her female readers, whose sympathies dared to stray too closely toward the damaging feminist aspirations of the unseemly and unwomanly New Woman, and the decivilizing process she apparently championed.

Corelli unambiguously opposed what she saw as the transgressive New Woman's decivilizing drive; nevertheless her writing demonstrates her era's accommodation of a complex attitude toward the notion of human progress and its inevitability or otherwise. By the early decades of the twentieth century, Britain had reached what Corelli termed a state of "over-ripe civilisation." So, while this celebrity writer railed against the New Woman's threatened instigation of a decivilizing process, she simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, promoted a limited reversal of civilization. Importantly, she only advocated a partial, controlled rolling back of "progress" to a time when human relations were not threatened by an attempted obliteration of sexual difference. In the endeavor to restore civilization to a state of balance—to reverse cultural change—Corelli worked to reinstate

the frontier of shame: specifically, womanly shame. Given her rule as "queen of the bestsellers" for almost three decades—given that her writing was such an integral and ongoing part of the era's public debate—her large body of work casts light on just how accepted her literary technique of using emotions to attempt to effect wider cultural change was at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.

SHAME, POPULAR FICTION AND MARIE CORELLI (1855–1924)

Historians and literary scholars have been increasingly turning to popular culture, particularly popular fiction, for what these have to reveal about popular mentalities and collective emotions. As cultural historian Jeffrey Richards argues: "For the historian concerned with the real spirit of an age, the collective *mentalité*, the popular culture is of the greatest value; the high culture often misleads."[2] Implicit in this assertion is an understanding of the shared mental world of the writer and readers, of their shared values and assumptions. That the text serves as a "mediator between two interiors," the reader's and the author's, interiors that literary theorist Georges Poulet remarks "would otherwise be inaccessible to each other," is highly important, as it is into this shared consciousness that the historian of mentalities and emotions can enter.[3] Not only is it the recorded conversations and the obvious actions of the text, then, that allow historians a pathway into a particular society's "manners" and "feelings," even when, or especially when, they are not obvious to readers distanced from the era or society in which the text was produced; but it is also the "silences" in those texts. For it is here, in these unwritten but assumed understandings, that common, shared values and emotions lie.[4]

Analyzing emotions as articulated in popular fiction of late nineteenth-century Britain is particularly rewarding, for not only was this society labeled "a nation of avid novel readers," but it was during this era that the "modern" best seller emerged, spawning a category of literary works boasting unprecedented levels of commercial success.[5] Enabling such phenomenal degrees of commercial success was a necessarily broad and diverse readership whose shared "interior life," to borrow historian Bernard Bailyn's term, subsequent historians have been able to access.[6] In using best-selling fiction to attempt to understand the era's reaction to such a gendered emotion as shame, contemporary perceptions of reading—particularly lowbrow reading—as a gendered (female) practice is extremely useful as it offers greater access to how emotions like shame were packaged for women.[7] And this notion of packaging or articulating emotions is significant here, for these texts do not help us to build an accurate picture of how people actually "felt" about a particular situation. Rather, they help us understand how emotions were used, "how people articulated, understood, and represented how they felt." For, as emotions historian Barbara Rosenwein

argues: "This, in fact, is all we can know about anyone's feelings apart from our own."[8] That the repeated emotional utterances characteristic of so many phenomenally popular late Victorian and Edwardian novels, such as those written by *fin-de-siècle* celebrity Marie Corelli, appealed, and continued to appeal throughout the era, to such a large, widespread, and diverse readership is highly indicative of accepted or familiar emotional standards and expressions, if not of likely individual feelings.

Corelli's status as one of the highest selling and most famous writers of her age is undisputed. She reigned as best-selling writer and celebrity in Britain and the empire, as acknowledged "queen of the bestsellers" and "idol of suburbia"[9], for nearly thirty years up to the advent of the First World War.[10] During that time, at least thirty of the novels she published were "world best-sellers" (she was one of only two women who in the 1900s appeared in both British and Colonial "top ten" reading lists, for example), and she sold an average of 100,000 copies of her books per year, achieving a level of commercial success that went unrivaled during her own era.[11] Accompanying this unprecedented commercial success and stemming from the rise of a relatively new "mass" audience combined with a new era of mass media (including photojournalism), was a unique level of popularity that we would today describe as "superstar status."[12] Not only did hordes of admirers clamber to see her, some even fighting to touch her gown at public appearances, but her renown and influence were also recognized by the fact that she was invited to share her views via lectures organized by highly esteemed organizations such as the Edinburgh Philosophical Society and the Royal Society of Literature.[13] On a more spiritual note, Corelli achieved something close to the status of national moral guardian—indeed one of her biographers, Brian Masters, describes her as the self-appointed "guardian of the public conscience."[14] This reputation was further strengthened by the fact that a number of her works were used in an official capacity by prominent members of religious institutions to promote popular religion.[15] In both her fiction and nonfiction, Corelli reveled in the sordid dimensions of the modern world while simultaneously bitterly condemning them. She blamed and shamed transgressive modern women while indulging in their decadence. This approach—along with her phenomenal level of popularity—recommends her vast body of work to historians trying to gauge the era's reaction to the use of shame to effect social and cultural change, especially with regard to understandings of gender.[16]

How then, did she use emotions, particularly shame, to attempt to effect cultural change? In the first place, Corelli tapped into existing anxieties about the moral and physical condition of Britain, the empire, and by extension, "civilisation" itself. Britain's "civilising mission" had been strained both by recent anticolonial protests in places like India, Ireland, Afghanistan, and Africa, and by fears at home about racial degeneration brought about by contact with those who were "racially inferior" abroad.[17] A substantial aspect of this imperial anxiety, however, was also to specifically

draw on concerns about gender, as for various reasons anxiety about gender crossed many of these larger national and imperial worries.[18]

In the second place, Corelli's heavily didactic writing clarified a traditional code of morality that people individually and society collectively were expected to live by, thereby outlining something of an "emotional community" to use Barbara Rosenwein's term; "emotional community" here referring to a social group "whose members adhere to the same valuations of emotions and their expression."[19] The problem was that in *fin-de-siècle* Britain that code of morality was increasingly under attack. More specifically, as one fictional character put it, "Morality has always been declared unnecessary for men,—it is fast becoming equally unnecessary for women!"[20] That men were immoral was timeless, Corelli argued. But if women were to give up their appointed role as moral guardians of men, nation, race, and empire, then civilization itself was at great risk.

Thirdly, Corelli traced the many and varied transgressions of those codes, indulging as much in such displays of immorality as condemning them, a factor that doubtless contributed overwhelmingly to her mass appeal. And, finally, in order to prevent the fall of civilization, in the attempt to arrest the march of "progress," she attempted to shame those guilty of such transgressions, alienating them from the emotional community that she championed if they refused to feel proper shame. Importantly, this technique of shaming was reserved overwhelmingly for women in Corelli's texts; again, women being identified as the main instigators of the potential fall of civilization by virtue of their collective position as protectors of the nation and empire.

None of this is to argue that Corelli was unique in her linking of anxieties about gender and civilization. Across the empire, many Victorians and Edwardians did so, although their views were not necessarily as condemning as those of Corelli. In the far-flung peripheries, for example, when debating the merits of reforming divorce legislation to lessen the burden on women, the South Australian Legislative Council argued that "by maintaining the 'rights of women' they would not be retrograding in the scale of civilization."[21] Irish New Woman writer Hannah Lynch wrote later that, contrary to feminist advancement threatening the regression of civilization, not providing for the education of girls and instead preparing them for useless and dependent lives bore "no resemblance to the ideal of civilisation."[22] And, Corelli's peer, the English social commentator Lady Jeune, although she agreed that a nation's level of prosperity and progress should be measured in terms of the virtue and strength of its women, disagreed that the level to which *fin-de-siècle* English women had sunk was so low that it threatened the downfall of civilization.[23]

Nor, of course, is this to contend that Corelli was alone in her linking of shame and the civilizing process, particularly her use of shaming as a technique for controlling social and cultural change. As numerous scholars have pointed out, Norbert Elias most prevalent among them, shame and "progress" or "civilisation" have been understood to have had, and

continue to have, a symbiotic relationship. In *The Civilizing Process*—the book criminologist John Braithwaite describes as the "most important work on shame in Western history"—Elias explained the progression of civilization as a product of the advancing "frontier of shame and repugnance," a frontier he claimed that began to advance quite rapidly from the sixteenth century onwards.[24] This process of civilization, Elias clarified, did not entail the diminishing of external pressures or fears, such as that represented by physical violence. Nor did it witness the emergence of internal fears or "automatic internal anxieties." Rather, the main outcome of this civilizing process was a change in "the proportion between the external and the self-activating fears, and their whole structure."[25] Shame, then, defined in this ground-breaking study as "a specific excitation, a kind of anxiety which is automatically reproduced in the individual on certain occasions by force of habit," was to varying degrees intrinsically bound to the external community or society.[26] "Considered superficially," Elias elaborated, shame is "fear of social degradation or, more generally, of other peoples' gestures of superiority."[27]

> It takes on its particular coloration from the fact that the person feeling it has done or is about to do something through which he comes into contradiction with people to whom he is bound in one form or another, and with himself, with the sector of his consciousness by which he controls himself. The conflict expressed in shame-fear is not merely a conflict of the individual with prevalent social opinion; the individual's behaviour has brought him into conflict with the part of himself that represents this social opinion.[28]

Sixty years later, Thomas Scheff extended this understanding of the relationship between internal and external factors, arguing that the "large family of emotions" included under the term shame, a family that includes cognates and variants such as embarrassment, humiliation, feelings of rejection and failure, all have in common "the feeling of a *threat to the social bond*."[29] Shame worked on individuals by instilling in them a fear of losing the love or respect of someone or some community they were attached to or to whom they attached value. Shame connected internal anxieties to external influences, inner values to social standards.

It is with both Elias's "superficial" consideration of shame and Scheff's sociological understanding in mind, as opposed to the often "deeply hidden" inner experience of this painful emotion, that I approach Marie Corelli's best-selling texts for what they reveal about popular attitudes toward *fin-de-siècle* feminist transgressions. As stated earlier, shaming is one of Corelli's most important tools for attempting to impose social and moral conformity. Throughout her journalism and her fiction, she attempted to evoke a fear of social exclusion among her readers, particularly her female readers, whose thoughts threatened to stray too close

to those of the socially disruptive feminist or New Woman. She drew readers' attention to the fact that it was actually these New Women who brought shame and ostracism on themselves, for it was they who knowingly broke the bonds of social cohesion. So, although she often employed the terms "shame" and "ashamed" in her literature in order to invoke that emotion—referring, for example, to the notion of "burn[ing] with shame at being associated, as members of a common sex" with women like the Suffragettes[30] or the "many women in society" who were atheists, and who "made no secret of their shame"[31]—in many other instances she did not refer to the emotion directly, preferring instead to elicit feelings of shame by expounding women's role in the shameful state of modern England and their apparent culpability in the imminent fall of civilization.

Corelli's linking of shame with female weakness reflected her society's understanding of that emotion. The notion that shame was a regressive emotion—an emotion to be leveled at women and children and "savages"—has a long history (even though this, in many ways, runs counter to Elias's argument that shame was the emotion of the civilized, so-called savages or primitive people being more susceptible to the imposition of external fears than self-constraints or internal anxieties such as those triggered by shame). Nevertheless, commentators from Aristotle to Freud have characterized shame as an emotion "suitable for youth" and "womanish;" as a "feminine characteristic *par excellence*."[32] And this is a tradition that has not abated if we are to take John Braithwaite's assertion that even today shame remains "profoundly gendered."[33] Indeed, one only has to look to current debates surrounding the effectiveness or otherwise of feminist shaming, for example, to see that gender and shame intersect in many, multifarious ways.[34] Certainly, Corelli and her contemporaries considered it appropriate to target women as particular objects of shame. However, no matter how reliant on shame as a tool for social control—more specifically for the control of women—that Corelli and her contemporaries were, there is no means of judging just how successful or effective her shaming campaign was. For, as feminist theorist Jill Locke has argued in relation to feminist shaming, realization of how shame and shaming function brings with it recognition of the limited effects of shame as a form of social control, for shaming relies on the target's or intended recipient's "ability to engage in shameful self-assessment."[35] Shaming, then, Braithwaite adds, may produce uncertain outcomes. Whereas in some instances it may act to bind the recipient to the group or community to which they belong—bringing them back to the fold as it were—in others it may do the opposite, alienating and ostracizing the shaming target.[36] In line with Locke's and Braithwaite's cautions, Corelli's "shaming" of unwomanly New Women would only be successful if those unwomanly New Women had the "ability," and no doubt the desire, to engage in "shameful self-assessment."

CORELLI'S TEXTS AND ANTIFEMINIST SHAME

Women, Marie Corelli declared, were wholly responsible for the low position they held in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century society. It was as a result of their own self-degradation that they were regarded so lowly. If they were to assess their actions they would recognize the nature and extent of their faults, change their ways, and, consequently, arrest the threatened disintegration of the nation and empire. Thus they could potentially reverse cultural change and restore England and the empire to the state of balance achieved formerly.

In theory, Corelli championed widespread recognition of the substantial, even remarkable, intellectual capabilities of women in the often hostile environment of the male-dominated intellectual world.[37] However, she did not endorse the very visible, improper, and undignified manner in which feminist activists, like the Suffragettes, went about campaigning for this recognition. In passages equally as bitter and condemning in her fiction as in her nonfiction, Corelli attacked feminists, or what she called her "distracted, man-fighting sisters," who were inspired to go "clamouring like unnatural hens in a barn-yard about their 'rights' and 'wrongs'," intentionally attempting to "neutralise their sex," and at the very least robbing that sex of its dignity. Shamelessly deviant women, like the notorious New Woman and the Suffragettes, only invoked disgrace. Devoid of the womanly feelings of modesty and shame, they alienated their sisters, such as the woman she cites in her pamphlet, *Woman, or—Suffragette?,* who wrote to the publication *Truth* in 1907, declaring that she "burn[ed] with shame at being associated, as members of a common sex" with women like the Suffragettes who behaved more like "drunken men than even the worst feminist viragos."[38] Such indecorous behavior, Corelli assented, was "indeed a degradation to the very name of woman," causing pain not only to her fellow women, but also "to their husbands (where they have husbands) as well as to their sons (where they have sons)."[39] The actions of these shameless women, *Woman, or—Suffragette?* continued, were "a scandal to the nation," making "England a laughing-stock to the rest of the world."[40] English women—doubtless led by the actions of their more deviant sisters—Corelli lamented, were relinquishing all the characteristics that defined English womanhood and made her guardian of the English nation and the British Empire, namely, her home, her faith, and her very femininity.

Mass abandonment of domesticity, Corelli declared, represented a pace of cultural change that threatened complete chaos:

> For Great Britain is already too rapidly losing many of the noble ideals and institutions which once made her the unrivalled mistress of the world: the sanctity of the private household is being exchanged for the scrambling life of public restaurants and hotels,—preachers of all creeds are reproaching women (and rightly too) for their open and gross

> neglect of their highest duties,—for their frivolity, waste of love,—the grace of hospitality, the beauty of sincerity, the art of good manners are all being forgotten under an avalanche of loose conduct and coarse speech,—and if the mothers of the British race decide to part altogether with the birthright of their simple *womanliness* [Corelli's emphasis] for a political mess of pottage, then darker days are in store for the nation than can yet be foreseen or imagined. For with woman alone rests the Home, which is the foundation of the Empire. When they desert this, their God-appointed centre, the core of the national being, then things are tottering to a fall.[41]

Desertion of the home and abandonment of woman's primary function as ruler of the domestic hearth, then, not only brought pain and shame to fellow women, men, and nation, it threatened the continued existence of the nation and the empire.

The New Woman was also readily abandoning another of the essential ingredients of English womanhood, that of religious faith. Women, as metaphoric guardians of nation and empire, had primary, if not sole, responsibility for protecting religious faith. Not only this, but as mothers, they had the very real responsibility of bringing up new generations of Christians who would ensure the perpetuation of British civilization. However, as her protagonist in her 1904 novel, *God's Good Man*, John Walden, cries: "Society! why, now, many women in society were atheists, and made no secret of their shame!"[42] Unfortunately, New Women—or rather, "Christ-scorning female[s]," usually accompanied by "short hair and spectacles," as well as honors from Girton, "eminently fitted to become the mother of a brood of atheists"—were shamelessly prepared to "swallow benefits, and deny the Benefactor."[43] What benefits? Those that accompanied the advancement of civilization and that particularly favored women, for, Corelli argued,

> Women especially, who, but for Christianity, would still be in the low place of bondage and humiliation formerly assigned to them in the barbaric periods, are most of all to be reproached for their wicked and wanton attacks upon their great Emancipator, who pitied and pardoned their weaknesses as they had never been pitied or pardoned before.[44]

The fictional John Walden adds to this, claiming that the "murder" of "Christ in women," as opposed to men, is the cruelest of all modern sins, for if faith is lost in women it is lost in the world: "as woman's purity first brought the Divine master into the world, so must woman's purity keep Him here with us,—else we men are lost—lost through the sins, not only of our fathers, but chiefly of our mothers!"[45] And, in one of the nonhumorous passages in the otherwise satirical 1889 novella, *My Wonderful Wife*, another male character declares:

> When women voluntarily resign their position as the silent monitors and models of grace and purity, down will go all the pillars of society, and we shall scarcely differ in our manners and customs from the nations we call "barbaric," because as yet they have not adopted Christ's exalted idea of the value and sanctity of female influence on the higher development of the human race.[46]

The message was unambiguous, whether delivered in fictional or nonfictional form: it was to woman's shame that members of their own sex were seen leading the revolt against religious faith, against civilized life itself.

The loss or deliberate abandonment of femininity and feminine appearance, that other ingredient of true womanhood in Corelli's works, is treated rather more lightly than either domesticity or faith, although the pattern of blame and shame persists. Modern society, Corelli's writing sometimes humorously proclaimed, had spawned a breed of women, ridiculous in appearance, because of their insistence on aping the habits and mannerisms of men. This breed included women who smoked cigarettes, such as the vulgar smoking ladies of "fashion" in *God's Good Man*[47] or *My Wonderful Wife*'s Honoria Maggs, a manly New Woman whose husband informs us, he would have kissed on their wedding day "but that vile cigar stuck out of her mouth and prevented" him.[48] It also drew in women who rode bicycles, such as *The Mighty Atom*'s "ugly "advanced" young women who have brought their bicycles [to a country gathering] and go tearing about the country all day."[49] And finally, it included modern young women who used slang, like the "ladies" who may be asked, in *The Passing of a Great Queen: A Tribute to the Noble Life of Victoria Regina* (1901), to "give up smoking and the use of stable slang" or like Honoria Maggs, again, who proves her manliness by writing "a sporting novel, full of slap-dash vigour and stable slang."[50]

Swearing, smoking, and tearing about the country on a bicycle might have been characteristics of the New Woman that were easy to poke fun at, but they were also forms of aberrant behaviour that allowed Corelli the opportunity of launching into vast passages on woman's dangerous foolishness in pushing forward an agenda that was to see an obliteration of sexual difference; an agenda that involved not recognizing and accepting the privileges that "progress" had given her.

> Some men still make "angels" out of us in spite of our cycling mania,—our foolish "clubs," where we do nothing at all,—our rough games at football and cricket, our general throwing to the winds of all dainty feminine reserve, delicacy, and modesty,—and we alone are to blame if we shatter their ideals and sit down by choice in the mud when they would have placed us on thrones. It is our fault, not theirs. We have willed it so. Many of us are more "mannish" than womanly; we are

> more inclined to laugh at and make mock of a man's courtesy and reverence than we are to be flattered by it.[51]

Women, Corelli declared in *The Modern Marriage Market* (1898), were "free" "to assert their modesty, their sense of right, their desire for truth and purity, if only they will."[52] It was a sad indictment of the state of British femininity that they refused to do so.

Therefore, whether deserting their God-appointed role as mothers of the race or embracing that role in too sentimental a fashion, thereby producing mollycoddled men who would grow to despise them, women, Corelli asserted, were the manufacturers of their own demise.[53] As she sensationally stated in *Woman, or—Suffragette?* whatever the "folly and the tyranny of men in regard to woman," "woman alone is in fault for his war against her."[54] Given the abundance of unequivocal, often vitriolic pronouncements on woman's guilt—and harking back to Braithwaite's earlier argument regarding the anticipated outcomes of shaming—there is little to suggest that Corelli's shaming was intended to entice deviant women back into the fold of true womanhood and much to recommend that her preferred result was their confirmed exclusion.

"OVER-RIPE CIVILISATION"

Corelli's shaming of transgressive New Women offers invaluable insight into one popular author's use of emotion to attempt to affect social and cultural change; to arrest "progress." But, in taking debates about shame, cultural change, and the progression and regression of time to such a phenomenally wide and for the most part nonintellectual audience, her writing also offers historians a window on popular attitudes toward the very notion of "progress" and perceptions about the inevitability, even the desirability, of a reversal of the civilizing process.

Like many Victorians and Edwardians, Corelli accepted that "civilisation," as both a process and a state of being, brought with it advantages and disadvantages. Victorian philosopher John Stuart Mill, for example, although he applauded the advancement of knowledge, decay of superstition, softening of manners, decline of war and personal conflict accompanying "progress," simultaneously lamented the loss of independence, creation of artificial wants, inequality, and monotony.[55] By the end of the century, English society exhibited an even stronger concern for the varying consequences of the civilizing process. Many at this time were plagued by concerns about, as Bradley Deane puts it, "the apparent degeneracy of an England that had grown decadently over-civilised."[56] Certainly, William Morris was one of these. In an 1890s paper on socialism, a very jaded Morris, seeing little to recommend civilization, declared that the "dull squalor

of civilization had settled down on the world" creating a "hateful," "sordid, aimless, ugly confusion" where "simple pleasures" were deemed contemptible.[57] To a degree Corelli concurred.

Up until the beginning of the Victorian period, there was, Corelli argued, little to say that English history had not followed a rather straightforward trajectory toward greater freedom and greater enlightenment. As she wrote in her tribute to Queen Victoria on her death, England had "just completed a thousand years of historical upwards progress," making the English nation "steady, glorious, and supreme."[58] The march of progress seemed inexorable. However, after the early years of Victoria's reign, something changed. At this time, the state of equilibrium between the material and the spiritual sides of life disintegrated. From here, material advancement gathered pace to the detriment of developing human relations. Victoria, Corelli wrote, "must have watched Progress marching with swift, impetuous strides in one direction,—but Retrogression and Decay marching as steadily, though more slowly in another."[59] Progress and Retrogression marching hand in hand, resulting in the period defined as "modernity," had led to what Corelli, in her 1898 essay on "The Modern Marriage Market," pronounced a state of "over-ripe civilisation" or "ultra-civilisation."[60]

Like many of her contemporaries, Corelli also came to believe—as Raymond Williams was to later word it—that "civilization, a civilized way of life, the conditions of civilized society may be seen as capable of being lost as well as gained."[61] A period of "over-ripe civilisation" saw "Progress" and "Retrogression" striding past each other in opposite directions. Civilization was in fear of being reversed, if not entirely lost. So, how did this self-appointed guardian of the collective conscience propose to amend the situation? Corelli's proffered solution was twofold. On the one hand—and despite railing against the New Woman's threatened reversal of civilization, her decivilizing mission—Corelli's heavily didactic writing advocated a partial reversal of "civilisation," just back to the early Victorian years when there was balance between materialism and spirituality. If the "decivilising" process is, as Stephen Mennell defines it, "what happens when civilising processes go into reverse"[62]; then perhaps the term "uncivilising" process is a much more suitable one to apply to Corelli's plans for the nation, for contrary to advocating a complete and permanent reversal of civilization, she preferred an unraveling, an unpicking, a partial undoing of civilization.[63] And she advocated this unraveling process with a conception of civilization that embraced "inter-personal relations, tastes, modes of behaviour, and knowledge," not simply "some Victorian idea of moral or cultural progress of which the West would be bearer and beacon," although, admittedly, this latter view was an essential element of her understanding of human progress.[64]

On the other hand, at times Corelli did recommend a kind of decivilizing process: one that was only intended to be temporary, that was to be used to facilitate her uncivilizing process, and that was certainly very different from the dangerous process that she associated with the transgressive New

Woman. In her texts Corelli recommended that late Victorians return to the precivilized period—but again, only momentarily—and just to borrow some of the innocence, unworldliness, sentimentality, and faith that apparently reigned there and bring it back to the modern age. In a time when things had gone so far, when interpersonal relations had been so incredibly altered and sexual difference was almost a thing of the past, returning to that past and borrowing from it was an important step in Corelli's program of reinfusing the cold, stark modern age with the warmer sentiments of love, faith, and innocence.

What role did Corelli believe women had played—and what role were they to continue to play—in this movement of time backwards and forwards again? Women, Corelli's highly sensational writing proclaimed, were treated horrendously in the periods before the onset of civilization: before the time when, according to Elias, the frontier of shame and repugnance began to advance. Her texts—her fictional texts in particular—are littered with allusions to "barbaric arrangements" where, for instance, women were simply "men's drudges;" to "the early phases of civilization, when women were something less valuable than cattle;" to "barbaric periods" when women were "in the low place of bondage and humiliation;" or even to times when "rough unwashen tyrants . . . shut up their ladies in gloomy castles where very little light and air could penetrate,—and the adoring and devoted ladies, in their turn, made very short work of the whole business either dying of their own grief and ill-treatment, or else getting killed in cold blood by order of their lords and masters."[65] For "centuries," Corelli preached, "women have been unfairly hindered by men in every possible way from all chance of developing the great powers of intelligence they possess."[66]

Modernity, then, brought with it much that favored women. "Why," Corelli asserted in *God's Good Man*, "one of the finest proofs of an improvement in our civilisation is the freedom of thought and action given to women in the present day."[67] The problem was that in accepting this gift of independence and liberty with what she saw as a mistaken degree of over-enthusiasm, women had rejected other elements of relations between the sexes that Corelli thought they should have retained. Women, she wrote, were responsible for deliberately and stubbornly refusing to conform to Victorian understandings of gender difference, a wilful defiance as displayed by the manly actions of so many modern women. By selfishly pursuing their individual "rights" and purposely rejecting the chivalrous relations of old, these transgressive women were guilty of mass self-degradation. Modern British society was scarred by what she termed the "voluntary and fast-increasing self-degradation of women;" both the nation and the empire suffered.[68] As one male character points out:

> . . . this England of ours was once upon a time not behind but *before* [Corelli's emphasis] every nation in the whole world for the sweetness, purity and modesty of its women! That it has become one with less

> enlightened races in the deliberate unsexing and degradation of womanhood does not now, and will not in the future, redound to its credit.[69]

"[M]en will be most to blame if the next generation of wives and mothers are shameless, unsexed, indecorous, and wholly unworthy of their life's mission," she declared, but only insofar as they did not work hard enough to prevent woman's self-degradation.[70] For, as she stated in her nonfiction, whatever the "folly and the tyranny of men in regard to woman," "woman alone is in fault for his war against her."[71]

So, given the actions of manly New Women, Corelli was forced to use antifeminist shaming techniques to attempt to reverse cultural change: not only to push for a reinstating of the conditions reigning in the early Victorian years but also, more dramatically, for a return—however temporary—to the barbaric periods. The modern age, under the influence of transgressive women, seemed to have forgotten the softer, more sentimental, and romantic side of life. In what she called "the tangled ways of over-civilisation," too many noble mannerisms or beliefs, or "savage and splendid freedom[s]" had been lost; mannerisms or beliefs that "are seldom or never regained."[72] The so-called precivilized periods, for all their faults with regards to the treatment of women, at least subscribed to sentimentality, superstition and faith, offering an attractive alternative to a cold, stark, disbelieving modern era.

CONCLUSION

The civilizing process, Corelli argued, overwhelmingly altered relations between men and women. However, it was women who were most advantaged by this process, their treatment by men in the precivilized, and therefore pre-Christian, ages being barbarous, brutal, and horrendous. Yet, ironically, and to Corelli bewildering and maddening, it was women who were threatening to reverse this process of relations. Women, then, who had most to lose by a decivilizing process, were threatening to instigate exactly that process. Women, especially middle-class women as the standard-bearers of late Victorian morality, she continued, were feeding into the decadent beliefs of a "modern" world that was in favor of stripping life bare of all that was emotionally and spiritually nourishing, and replacing it with all that was superficial, material, and disbelieving. They, as exemplified by smoking, bicycle-riding "modern" women of fashion and by vulgar, shrill campaigning Suffragettes, were guilty of attempting to deplete all signs of gender difference, a pivotal notion on which rested late Victorian understandings of ideal male-female relationships, those based on mutual respect, complementary value, and chivalry.

Corelli wanted to halt this process of cultural change, and she deployed shame in the attempt. Her response to the presence of these dangerous and

threatening women, then, was to blame them and to attempt to shame them into conforming to her ideal of British womanhood. She clearly pointed out what it was that Britain was to lose should these women be allowed to continue their unwomanly, un-English, uncivilized ways. Britain, she argued, was already a "laughing-stock" of the world, rendered so by the unwomanly, indecorous, and ridiculous actions of its middle-class women. To allow such a downward spiral among the nation's womankind to continue was to cement the downward spiral of the nation itself, for it was in the hands of womanhood that "progress" rested, at least progress of a moral kind. Moreover, Britain's role as imperial leader and therefore as the standard-bearer of "civilisation" meant that much more was at risk than simply England's reputation. The process of civilization, itself, was at risk. The deviant behavior of England's womanhood threatened to topple the whole civilized state of being.

Yet, despite Corelli's vitriolic attacks on a womanhood that was threatening to destabilize, indeed to decivilize, her texts, fictional and nonfictional, also, paradoxically, championed a process of reversal, if only limited reversal. Like many of her contemporaries, intellectual and otherwise given the largely upper-working- and middle-class nature of her extremely wide audience, Corelli was doubtful about theories of the inevitability of historical progress and the benefits to be gained by that process. Instead, she fed into concerns about an overadvancement of civilization, and a looming fall. She had labeled Britain "over-civilised," or in her words, viewed it to be in a period of "over-ripe civilisation." Modernity as a stage of historical development had produced something of an imbalance between material and intellectual advancement on the one hand and cultural progress on the other. Such an imbalance had caused unrest, anxiety, and, indeed, unhappiness. The solution for those suffering under a cold, stark, emotionless blanket of "modernity" was to begin unraveling civilization, rolling it back to a point at which material and spiritual concerns aligned. However, the radical, undignified, and essentially unwomanly actions of feminist, modern, and New Women threatened a much more severe, damaging, and ultimately permanent unraveling, one back to a point of precivilization. Only the proper emotion of shame, then, stood between the complete annihilation of civilization as the late Victorians and Edwardians knew it, and its continuance, if only British womanhood was womanly enough to feel it.

NOTES

1. For a brief introduction to Corelli, see Margaret B. McDowell, "Marie Corelli," in *Dictionary of Literary Biography,* vol. 34: *British Novelists, 1890–1929: Traditionalists*, ed. Thomas F. Staley (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1985), 82–89.
2. Jeffrey Richards, "What is the History of Popular Culture?," in *What is History Today?* ed. Juliet Gardiner (Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan, 1989), 126–128, 126.

3. See a discussion of Poulet's theories in James Smith Allen's "History and the Novel: *Mentalité* in Modern Popular Fiction," *History and Theory* 22 (1983): 233–252, 247.
4. For a more detailed discussion of the usefulness of popular fiction for a history of emotions, see Sharon Crozier-De Rosa, "Popular Fiction and the 'Emotional Turn': The Case of Women in Late Victorian Britain," *History Compass* 8, no. 12 (2010): 1340–1351.
5. Richard D. Altick, "Publishing," in *A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture*, ed. Herbert F. Tucker (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999): 189–304, 303.
6. See Altick, "Publishing," 303; and Bernard Bailyn, "The Challenge of Modern Historiography," *American Historical Review* 87, no. 1 (1982): 18–19.
7. For detailed discussions of the gendered nature of the reading public, see Joseph McAleer, *Passion's Fortune: The Story of Mills & Boon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter D. McDonald, *British Literary Culture and Publishing Practice, 1880–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Kate Flint, *The Woman Reader, 1837–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
8. Barbara Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context I: International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1 (2010): 1–32, 11.
9. Annette R. Federico, *Idol of Suburbia: Marie Corelli and Late-Victorian Literary Culture* (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2000).
10. For readings on Corelli, see: Federico, *Idol*; Brian Masters, *Now Barabbas Was a Rotter: The Extraordinary Life of Marie Corelli* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); W. S. Scott, *Corelli: The Story of a Friendship* (London: Hutchinson, 1955); Eileen Bigland, *Corelli: The Woman and the Legend* (London: Jarrolds, 1953); George Bullock, *Corelli: The Life and Death of a Best-Seller* (London: Constable, 1940); and Teresa Ransom, *Miss Marie Corelli, Queen of Victorian Bestsellers* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1999). Shorter readings include John Lucas, "Marie Corelli," in *Great Writers of the English Language: Novelists and Prose Writers*, ed. James Vinson (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979): 281–283; and "Corelli," in *Edwardian Fiction: An Oxford Companion*, Sandra Kemp, Charlotte Mitchell, and David Trotter (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 77.
11. Edna Lyall was the other writer. See Julia Bush, *Women Against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81. See also Masters, *Barabbas*, 3, 6; and Federico, *Idol,* 2.
12. Federico discusses this in detail.
13. McDowell, "Corelli," 84; and Q. D. Leavis, *Fiction and the Reading Public* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1979 [1932]), 137.
14. Masters, *Barabbas,* 10.
15. Leavis, *Fiction*, 137.
16. See Maureen Duffy, *A Thousand Capricious Chances: A History of the Methuen List, 1889–1989* (London: Methuen, 1989), 10.
17. See Iveta Jusová, *The New Woman and the Empire* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2005), 3; and Bernard Porter, *The Absent-minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 252.
18. See Anne McClintock, "'No longer in a future heaven': Gender, Race and Nationalism," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, ed. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 89–112, for a discussion of the

effects of challenges to domestic ideals "at home" on the "civilising mission" in the colonies.

19. Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods," 1.
20. Lady Sibyl in Marie Corelli, *The Sorrows of Satan* (London: Methuen, 1895), 371.
21. Debate regarding the introduction of the *Matrimonial Causes Act 1858* (SA). Quoted in *Freedom Bound I: Documents on Women in Colonial Australia*, ed. M. Quartly, S. Janson, and P. Grimshaw (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 70.
22. Hannah Lynch, *Autobiography of a Child* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1899), 196–197, quoted in *Irish Novels, 1890–1940: New Bearings in Culture and Fiction,* J. W. Foster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 277–278.
23. Lady Jeune in Marie Corelli, Lady Jeune, Flora Annie Steel, and Susan, Countess of Malmesbury, *The Modern Marriage Market* (London: Hutchinson, 1898), 57–94, 68–69.
24. John Braithwaite, "Shame and Modernity," *The British Journal of Criminology* 33, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 1–18, 2; and Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1939]), 495.
25. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 498.
26. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 492. For an extended discussion of Elias's definition and characterization of shame, see Braithwaite, "Shame and Modernity," 2, 4; and Thomas Scheff, "A Taxonomy of Emotions: How Do We Begin?," accessed 5 April 2011, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/main.php?id=47.html.
27. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 492.
28. Elias, *Civilizing Process*, 492.
29. Thomas J. Scheff, "Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory," *Sociological Theory* 18 (March 2000): 84–99, 97.
30. Marie Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette? A Question of National Choice* (London: Arthur Pearson, 1907), 18.
31. Marie Corelli, *God's Good Man* (London: Methuen, 1918 [1904]), 411.
32. See Jill Locke, "Shame and the Future of Feminism," *Hypatia* 22, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 146–162, 148; Scheff, "Shame and the Social Bond," 86; and Thomas J. Scheff, "Elias, Freud and Goffman: Shame as the Master Emotion," in *Sociology of Norbert Elias,* ed. Steven Loyal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 229–242, 231.
33. Braithwaite, "Shame and Modernity," 4.
34. Locke, "Shame," 146–162; and Braithwaite, "Shame and Modernity," 16.
35. Locke, "Shame," 156.
36. Braithwaite, "Shame and Modernity," 15–16.
37. As exemplified, for instance, by the characters of Angela Sovrani in Corelli's *The Master-Christian* (London: Methuen, 1900) and the unnamed female protagonist in Corelli's *The Life Everlasting: A Reality of Romance* (London: Methuen, 1911).
38. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?,* 18.
39. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?*, 20.
40. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?*, 18.
41. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?*, 3–4.
42. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 411.
43. Marie Corelli, *The Mighty Atom* (London: Methuen, 1912 [1896]), 104.
44. Corelli, *Mighty Atom*, 104.
45. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 257.

46. Marie Corelli, "My Wonderful Wife" (1889), in *Cameos* (New York: Books for Libraries, 1970 [1895]), 232.
47. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 360.
48. Corelli, *Cameos*, 199.
49. Corelli, *Mighty Atom*, 17.
50. Marie Corelli, *The Passing of the Great Queen: A Tribute to the Noble Life of Victoria Regina* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1901), 30; and Corelli, *Cameos,* 181.
51. Marie Corelli in Corelli and others, *Modern Marriage Market*, 9–55, 16–17.
52. Corelli in Corelli and others, *Modern Marriage Market*, 9–55, 38–39.
53. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?,* 5.
54. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?,* 16.
55. Cited in Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), 48–50.
56. Bradley Deane, "Imperial Barbarians: Primitive Masculinity in Lost World Fiction," *Victorian Literature and Culture* 38 (2008): 205–225, 213.
57. William Morris, "How I Became a Socialist," William Morris Internet Archive, accessed 5 May 2011, http://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1894/hibs/hibs.htm. First published in *Justice*, 16 June 1894.
58. Corelli, *Passing of the Great Queen*, 76.
59. Corelli, *Passing of the Great Queen*, 16.
60. Corelli in Corelli and others, *Modern Marriage Market*, 17.
61. Williams, *Keywords*, 48–50.
62. Stephen Mennell, "Decivilising Processes: Theoretical Significance and Some Lines of Research," *International Sociology* 5, no. 2 (June 1990): 205–223, 205.
63. I do not employ the term "uncivilising" in the same way as Mary Kaldor, for example, who applies it to the links between physical violence and a "negative spiral of incivility." Rather I use it to refer to a partial rolling back of civilization. Mary Kaldor, "Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence," paper prepared for Conference on "Conceiving Cosmopolitanism," Warwick, 27–29 April 2000, accessed 24 April 2011, http://www.insumisos.com/lecturasinsumisas/Mary%20Kaldor%20%20sobre%20violencia.pdf.
64. Here I am referring to Loïc Wacquant's understanding of Elias's use of the term "civilising process" in Wacquant's "Decivilising and Demonizing: The Remaking of the Black American Ghetto," Loyal, *Sociology of Norbert Elias*, 95–121, 97.
65. See Corelli, *Master-Christian*; Corelli, *Mighty Atom*, 104; and Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 249.
66. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 249.
67. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 249.
68. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 430.
69. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 436.
70. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 430.
71. Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?,* 16.
72. Corelli, *God's Good Man*, 538.

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