Solution.

最大化收益

$$\max_{q_i \geq 0} u_i(q_1,\ldots,q_n) = \max_{q_i \geq 0} (a-b(q_1+\cdots+q_n)-c)q_i$$

$$\diamondsuit \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial a_i} = 0,$$
得

$$a-b\sum_{j\neq i}q_j-2bq_i-c=0$$

$$q_i = rac{a-c-b\sum_{j
eq i} q_j}{2b}$$

类 似 地 , 可 以 得 到 Best Response Correspondence: $B_i(q_{-i}) = \max{(0, rac{a-c-b\sum_{j \neq i}q_j}{2b})}$

假设 $\{q_1^*,\ldots,q_n^*\}$ 达到纳什均衡,根据轮换对称性可知, $q_1^*=q_2^*=\cdots=q_n^*$

若 $q_i^*=0$,则不满足纳什均衡的条件. 故 $q_i^*>0$

于是由

$$q_i^* = rac{a-c-b\sum_{j
eq i}q_j^*}{2b}$$

得到

$$q_i^*=rac{a-c}{(n+1)b}, \quad i=1,2,\ldots,n$$

相应地

$$u_i = \frac{(a-c)^2}{(n+1)^2 b}$$

· Best Response Correspondence: Bi(2-i) = max (0, (a-c-b9-i)/2b) ·若 9-; >(a-c/b 则(意 2; >0都有 Ui(2; 9-i) <0.则 2;=0 # 2-i < (a-cs/6, Ry: Ui(9: 9-i) = (a-c-b(2;+9-i)) 9: $\frac{\partial u_{i}}{\partial z_{i}} = a - c - b 2 - i - 2 b 2 = 0$ ⇒ 2i= (a-c-bg-i)/2b The Nach equilibria: { (a-c a-c (n+1)b, (n+1)b) } $2i = B_i(2i) = (a - c - b2i)/2b$ 三号作: 9,+=92+=193+···+=12n=a-c ··· O = 21+ 22+ = 23+ ... + = 2n = a-c ... 2 = 21+ = 22 + = 23 + ... + 2n = a-c ... 6 可得: 0-0 = 2, = 9,* D-3 => 9, = 9, * 2,* = 2,* = 2,* = ... = 2,* (n-1) - (n) => 2,* = 9,* 解得: $2_1^* = 2_2^* = 2_3^* = \dots = 2_n^* = \frac{a-c}{n+1}$ ■ i已明 2* >0: 不好说 2*=0, 则 至 9; >1a-cs/b ①若 荒台>(a-c/6,则任意i(i+1)有 ui(2i,2i)<0,将减小2i,总会调整至荒谷音 ◎若 至2; = (a-c)/b, 同上有ui(2; 2-i)=0 也会减小的使收备的大、终将导致完全~~~

→ 2i* +0, A) 2i*>0 符记