# Smart Contract Secondary Code Review and Security Analysis Report

Customer: PumaPay П Date: September 21, 2018 В П В П Ш HACKEN CYBERSECURITY ECOSYSTEM.

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This document contains confidential information about IT systems and intellectual property of the customer as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

This confidential information shall be used only internally by the customer and shall not be disclosed to third parties.

## Document:

| Name                       | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis<br>Report for PumaPay                     |
|----------------------------|--|
| Platform                   | Ethereum / Solidity  |
| Link                       | https://github.com/pumapayio/pumapay-<br>token/blob/master/contracts/MasterPullPayment.sol |
| Date of first audit        | 12.09.2018   |
| Version of first audit     | badb0ec7b30821f3d34f8acab2876ac065dcc238   |
| Date of secondary audit    | 21.09.2018   |
| Version of secondary audit | 3ec35a84163436fb9fedce30622546206c01cf0a   |



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#### Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by PumaPay (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of Customer's smart contract and its code review conducted between September 4th, 2018 – September 12th, 2018. Secondary audit was conducted between September 18th, 2018 – September 21th, 2018.

## Scope

The scope of the project is PumaPay smart contract, which can be found at Github by the link below:

https://github.com/pumapayio/pumapay-token/blob/master/contracts/MasterPullPayment.sol

Commit version – 3ec35a84163436fb9fedce30622546206c01cf0a

We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that are considered (the full list includes them but is not limited to them):

- Reentrancy
- Timestamp Dependence
- Gas Limit and Loops
- DoS with (Unexpected) Throw
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Byte array vulnerabilities
- Style guide violation
- Transfer forwards all gas
- ERC20 API violation
- Malicious libraries
- Compiler version not fixed
- Unchecked external call Unchecked math
- Unsafe type inference
- Implicit visibility level



## **Executive Summary**


According to the assessment, Customer's smart contracts are secure.



Our team has performed analysis of code functionality, manual audit and automated checks with solc, Mythril, Slither and remix IDE (see Appendix B pic 1-13). All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all found issues can be found in Audit overview section.

We have found 2 medium and 1 low vulnerability in smart contract; we also outline 4 informational statements, that can't have any security effect, but should be presented in the report.

*Graph 1. The distribution of vulnerabilities.* 





## Severity Definitions

| Risk Level                    | Description  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Critical                      | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to tokens lose etc.   |
| High                          | High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial functions |
| Medium                        | Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose   |
| Low                           | Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution                                 |
| Lowest / Code<br>Style / Info | Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.                                    |

#### AS-IS overview

## PumaPayPullPayment contract overview

PumaPayPullPayment contract manages billing systems for businesses. It allows registering, executing and deleting pull payments.

PumaPayPullPayment contract inherits Ownable. It imports SafeMath library for math operations, but doesn't use it.

PumaPayPullPayment contract constructor sets:

token to \_token

#### PumaPayPullPayment has 8 modifiers:

- isExecutor checks whether msg.sender is an executor.
- paymentExists checks whether payment between two specified addresses exists.
- paymentNotCancelled checks whether payment is cancelled.
- isValidPullPaymentRequest checks whether pull payment request is valid.
- isValidDeletionRequest checks whether specified addresses are not 0x0 and paymentID.length is not equal to 0.
- isValidAddress checks whether specified address is not 0x0 address.
- executorExists checks whether specified address is an executor.
- executorDoesNotExists checks whether specified address is not an executor.



#### PumaPayPullPayment has 13 functions:

- addExecutor is a public function adds new executor. Has onlyOwner, executorDoesNotExists and isValidAddress modifiers.
- removeExecutor is a public function removes an executor. Has onlyOwner, executorExists and isValidAddress modifiers.
- setRate is a public function sets new exchange rate for specified currency. Has onlyOwner modifier.
- registerPullPayment is a public function creates a new pull payment. Has isExecutor modifier.
- deletePullPayment is a public function deletes pull payment. Has isExecutor, paymentExists, paymentNotCancelled, isValidDeletionRequest modifiers.
- executePullPayment is a public function makes a pull payment. Has paymentExists and isValidPullPaymentRequest modifiers.
- getRate is a public view function returns exchange rate for specified currency.
- calculatePMAFromFiat is an internal view function returns a number of PMA tokens that can be bought for fiat.
- isValidRegistration is an internal pure function checks whether registration is valid by comparing signature to specified client address.
- isValidDeletion is an internal view function returns true if deletion is valid. It compares signature to the specified client address.
- doesPaymentExist is an internal view function returns true if specified beneficiary address has a pull payment for the specified client address.
- isFundingNeeded is a private view function returns true if specified address balance is higher than MINIMUM\_AMOUN\_OF\_ETH\_FOR\_OPARATORS.
- fallback external payable function



#### Audit overview

#### **Critical**

No critical vulnerabilities were found.

## High

No high severity vulnerabilities were found.

#### Medium

1. executePullPayment function could lead to overflow. nextPaymentTimestamp and frequency are specified in contract registerPullPayment function. Only executors can register new payments, but if they provide huge input numbers, nextPaymentTimestamp will cause an overflow and this will result in inability of executing deletePullPayment and executePullPayment, which have a check whether nextPaymentTimestamp < 0 (See Appendix A pic. 1-5 for evidence).

pullPayments[\_client][msg.sender].nextPaymentTimestamp = pullPayments[\_client][msg.sender].nextPaymentTimestamp + pullPayments[\_client][msg.sender].frequency;

Not Fixed in 3ec35a8: The possibility of this to happen is very low, however it does exist.

2. calculatePMAFromFiat function doesn't use SafeMath library for math operations. It is a good security practice to use SafeMath for handling math, nevertheless it unlikely that this function will result in overflow. \_fiatAmountInCents should be set to 1\*10^50 or higher for overflow to happen. (See Appendix A pic. 6 for evidence).

return ((ONE\_ETHER \* DECIMAL\_FIXER \* \_fiatAmountInCents) / exchangeRates[\_currency]) / FIAT\_TO\_CENT\_FIXER;

#### Low

3. addExecutor function transfers ether before making changes to the state. It is considered as a bad practice because it violates Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern. However, transfer is safe against reentrancy because it forwards only 2,300 gas stipend (See Appendix A pic. 7 for evidence).



## Lowest / Code style / Info

## Informational statements

Informational statements are audit team findings that doesn't have any security issues. However, they are presented in report to clarify and outline functionality and business requirements.

- 4. Private variables in the lines 29-32, 40 are still visible for other people and can be read from blockchain.
- 5. Contract imports SafeMath library, but doesn't use it.
- 6. Contract name is PumaPayPullPayment, but file name is MasterPullPayment.

7. isValidRegistration function has the same comment as an isValidDeletion function.

Fixed in 3ec35a8: Comment was rewritten.



#### Conclusion

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. For the contract high level description of functionality was presented in As-is overview section of the report.

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

Overall quality of reviewed contracts is good; however, it contains 2 medium vulnerabilities and 1 low vulnerability.

## **Disclaimers**

#### Hacken Disclaimer

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only - we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure security of smart contracts.

#### Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.



## Appendix A. Evidences

#### Pic 1. registerPullPayment function:

```
function registerPullPayment (
 174
                      uint8 v,
 175
                      hvtes32 r.
 176
                      bytes32 s,
 177
                      string _merchantID,
 178
                      string _paymentID,
                      address _client,
address beneficiary,
 179
 180
                      string _currency,
uint256 _initialPaymentAmountInCents,
uint256 _fiatAmountInCents,
uint256 _frequency,
 181
 182
 183
 184
 185
                      uint256 _numberOfPayments,
 186
                      uint256 _startTimestamp
 187
 188
                public
 189
                isExecutor()
 190 -
 191
                      require(
 192
                            bytes(_paymentID).length > 0 &&
 193
                            bytes(_currency).length > 0 &&
                             _client != address(0) &&
_beneficiary != address(0) &&
 194
 195
                            __initialPaymentAmountInCents >= 0 &&
 196
 197
                             fiatAmountInCents > 0 &&
 198
                             frequency > 0 &&
                             numberOfPayments > 0 &&
 199
                             _startTimestamp > 0
 201
 202
 203
                      pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].currency = _currency;
                      pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].currency = _currency;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].initialPaymentAmountInCents = _initialPaymentAmountInCents;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].ftatAmountInCents = _fiatAmountInCents;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].frequency = _frequency;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].startTimestamp = _startTimestamp;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].numberOfPayments = _numberOfPayments;
 204
 205
 206
 207
 208
 200
 210
                      if (!isValidRegistration(v, r, s, _client, _beneficiary, pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary])) revert();
 211
                      pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].merchantID = _merchantID;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].paymentID = _paymentID;
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].nextPaymentTimestamp = _s:
pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].lastPaymentTimestamp = 0;
 212
 213
                                                                                                               startTimestamp;
 214
 215
 216
                      pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].cancelTimestamp = 0;
 217
 218
                      emit LogPaymentRegistered(_client, _beneficiary, _paymentID);
Pic 2. doesPaymentExist function:
                 function doesPaymentExist(address _client, address _beneficiary)
 394
                 internal
 395
 396
                 view
 397
                 returns(bool) {
 398
                        return (
 399
                              bytes(pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].currency).length > 0 &&
```

#### Pic 3. paymentExists modifier:



#### Pic 4. deletePullPayment function:

```
232
          function deletePullPayment (
               uint8 v,
233
234
               bvtes32 r.
235
              bvtes32 s.
              string _paymentID,
236
              address _client,
address _beneficiary
237
238
239
240
          public
241
          isExecutor()
242
          paymentExists(_client, _beneficiary)
          paymentNotCancelled(_client,_beneficiary)
243
244
          isValidDeletionRequest( paymentID, client, beneficiary)
245 🕶
246
                                              _paymentID, _client, _beneficiary)) revert();
               if (!isValidDeletion(v, r, s,
247
              pullPayments[_client][_beneficiary].cancelTimestamp = now;
248
249
               emit LogPaymentCancelled(_client, _beneficiary, _paymentID);
250
```

#### Pic 5. executePullPayment function:

```
function executePullPayment(address _client, string _paymentID)
272
273
274
275 *
              paymentExists(_client, msg.sender)
isValidPullPaymentRequest(_client, msg.sender, _paymentID)
                   uint256 amountInPMA
276
                   if (pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].initialPaymentAmountInCents > 0) {
    amountInPMA = calculatePMAFromFiat(pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].initialPaymentAmountInCents, pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].currency);
    pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].initialPaymentAmountInCents = 0;
277 -
278
279
280
281
                        amountInPMA = calculatePMAFromFiat(pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].fiatAmountInCents, pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].currency);
282
                        pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].nextPaymentTimestamp = pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].nextPaymentTimestamp + pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].frequency;
pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].numberOfPayments = pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].numberOfPayments - 1;
285
286
                   token.transferFrom(_client, msg.sender, amountInPMA);
287
288
                   pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].lastPaymentTimestamp = now;
289
                   emit LogPullPaymentExecuted(_client, msg.sender, pullPayments[_client][msg.sender].paymentID);
290
```

#### Pic 6. calculatePMAFromFiat function:

```
function calculatePMAFromFiat(uint256 _fiatAmountInCents, string _currency)
public

yiew
freturns (uint256) {
    return ((ONE_ETHER * DECIMAL_FIXER * _fiatAmountInCents) / exchangeRates[_currency]) / FIAT_TO_CENT_FIXER;
}
```

#### Pic. 7 addExecutor function:

```
143
          function addExecutor(address _executor)
144
          public
145
          onlyOwner
146
          isValidAddress( executor)
147
          executorDoesNotExists( executor)
148 *
               executor.transfer(1 ether);
149
150
              executors[_executor] = true;
151
152 -
              if (isFundingNeeded(owner)) {
153
                  owner.transfer(1 ether);
154
155
156
              emit LogExecutorAdded(_executor);
157
```



## Appendix B. Automated tools reports

#### Pic 1. Solc automated report:

```
max@Hacken:~/solidity/projects/PumaPay$ solc -o output --bin --abi --overwrite *.sol
max@Hacken:~/solidity/projects/PumaPay$
```

#### Pic 2. Mythril automated report 1:

#### Pic 3. Mythril automated report 2:



#### Pic 4. Mythril automated report 3:

```
Type: Mortanion
Contract: PumpRayPullPayment
Society: Jack
Society: Society
```

#### Pic 5. Mythril automated report 4:

```
ramsaction order dependence ====
Type: Marning
Contract: PunaPayPullPayment
Function name: setRate(string,uint256)
PC address: 12949
A possible transaction order independence vulnerability exists in function setRate(string,uint256). The value or direction of the call statement is determined from a tainted storage location
In file: MasterPullPayment.sol:188
Owner.transfer(1 ether)

max@Hacken:-/solidity/projects/punapay-token-master/contracts5
```

#### Pic 6. Slither automated report:

```
max@Hacken:~/solidity/projects/pumapay-token-master/contracts$ slither MasterPullPayment.sol
INFO:Slither:MasterPullPayment.sol analyzed (7 contracts), 0 result(s) found
max@Hacken:~/solidity/projects/pumapay-token-master/contracts$
```



#### Pic 7. Remix IDE automated report part 1:



#### Pic 8. Remix IDE automated report part 2:





#### Pic 9. Remix IDE automated report part 3:

Gas requirement of function ERC20/decreaseAllowance(address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/transfer(address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/transfer(address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/transfer from(address\_address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/transfer from(address\_address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/thintable\_decreaseAllowance(address\_uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20/thintable\_finiths/limiting/high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the

#### Pic 10. Remix IDE automated report part 4:

cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20Mintable transfer (address.uimiz56) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function ERC20Mintable transfer (address.uimiz56) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.addExecutor(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.addExecutor(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.addExecutor(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.adulatePMAFromFlation1256.string) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.getRate(string) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is high



#### Pic 11. Remix IDE automated report part 5:

MinterRole.renounceMinter(): Potentially should be constant but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Roles.add(struct Roles.Role,address): Potentially should be constant but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

PumaPayToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256): Potentially should be constant but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address) high: Infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayPullPayment.setRate(string.uint.256) high: Infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function MinterRole.addMinter(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function MinterRole.isMinter/address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.addMinter(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes X clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.decrea ce(address,uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPavToken, finish Minting() high; infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.increaseAllowance(address.uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.isMinter(address) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage Pic 12. Remix IDE automated report part 6: Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.mint(address,uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.name() high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be ex copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken, renounceMinter() high; infinite, If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed by the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed by the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed by the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit. Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.transfer(address.uint.256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage (this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage) Gas requirement of function PumaPayToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) high: infinite. If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed. Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of



## Pic 13. Remix IDE automated report part 7:

| Robers reconsciption of Robers Advanced in Protectiality should be constant but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  ### ERCOD, ministed-recounted 2561; Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  #### ERCOD, burnfold-recounted 2561; Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  ##################################  |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| ERC20_burn(address.uint256): Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  ERC20_burnFrom(address.uint256): Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  ERC20_burnFrom(address.uint256): Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  PumaPayPullPayment.is/ValidRegistration(uint8,bytes32,bytes32,address,address,struct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  Use assert(x) if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component. | should be constant but is not. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  | ×  |
| ERC20_burnFrom(address,uint256): Variables have very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  PumaPayPullPayment.addExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  **  PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  PumaPayPullPayment.lsValidRegistration(uint8,bytes32,bytes32,address,address,struct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  Use assert[x] if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require[x] if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.  **   | milar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.   | ×  |
| PumaPayPullPayment.addExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  PumaPayPullPayment.is/ValidRegistration(uint8, bytes32, bytes32, address, address, struct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  **  Use assert(x) if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a falling external component.  **   | imilar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  | ×  |
| PumaPayPullPayment.removeExecutor(address): Variables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  PumaPayPullPayment.isValidRegistration(uint8,bytes32,bytes32,address,address,atruct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  Use assert(x) if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.  | very similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  | ×  |
| PumaPayPullPayment.isValidRegistration(uint8,bytes32,bytes32,address,address,struct PumaPayPullPaymentPullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayment and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  X  Use assert(x) if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.   | es have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.   | ×  |
| Jse assert(x) if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.   | lables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.   | ×  |
|   | 32_bytes32_address_address_struct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysts. | is. X  |
|   | n any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use require(x) if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.  | ×  |
|   |   |  |
|   |   |  |
|   | si<br>e v   | similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  every similar names account and amount. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  bles have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  ariables have very similar names executors and _executor. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.  es32.bytes32.address.address.struct PumaPayPullPayment.PullPayment): Variables have very similar names pullPayments and _pullPayment. Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis. |

