

DEciding Equivalence Properties in SECurity protocols

User manual

version 2.0.0

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March 19, 2020

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Introduction

The **deepsec** prover is a verification tool for cryptographic protocols. It allows the verification of security properties (expressed as a trace equivalence) of protocols described in the applied pi calculus. The tool operates in the so-called "bounded number of sessions" model: while it only allows to specify a fixed number of participants and sessions, termination is always guaranteed (though computational ressources may be exhausted if the model is too large).

Scope of this manual

This manual provides a "hands-on" introduction on how to use the tool. It will provide intuitive explanations of the language and the properties. It will also explain the different options and provide a reference guide for the precise syntax. It will however *not* give formal semantics nor explain the underlying algorithms. The theory underlying **deepsec** is described in (Cheval, Kremer, and Rakotonirina 2018a) and (Cheval, Kremer, and Rakotonirina 2019). Some of the implementation choices are also discussed in a tool paper (Cheval, Kremer, and Rakotonirina 2018b).

Support

Please report any bugs to vincent.cheval@inria.fr or file an issue on our github.

Acknowledgements

The research that led to **deepsec** was primarily supported by ERC under the EU's H2020 research and innovation program (grant agreements No 645865-SPOOC), as well as from the French ANR projects SEQUOIA (ANR-14-CE28-0030-01) and TECAP (ANR-17-CE39-0004-01).

Download and installation

In this section we will guide you through the installation of the **DeepSec** prover and its graphical user interface **DeepSec UI**. **DeepSec** can be used independently of **DeepSec UI** but the latter requires the former to be installed. Please install both so that you can test as many feature as possible.

Installation of DeepSec

DeepSec requires **OCaml** > **4.05**. It is highly recommended to install **OCaml** through opam instead of a native package manager, such as apt-get (the latest version on apt-get may not be the latest release of OCaml). opam itself may however be safely installed using your favorite package manager (see instructions for installing opam). To know your current version of **OCaml**, just run ocaml --version.

Upgrading OCaml using OPAM 1.x.x (Can be skipped if you already have ocaml 4.05 or later)

- 1. Run opam switch list (The version 4.05.0 should be displayed in the list. Otherwise run first opam update).
- 2. Run opam switch 4.05.0 (or a more recent version).
- 3. Follow the instructions (at the end do not forget to set the environment by running eval `opam config env`).

Upgrading OCaml using OPAM 2.x.x (Can be skipped if you already have ocaml 4.05 or later)

- 1. Run opam switch list-available (The version ocaml-base-compiler 4.05.0 should be displayed in the list. Otherwise, first run opam update).
- 2. Run opam switch create 4.05.0 (or a more recent version).
- 3. Follow the instructions.

Installation of DeepSec from source

Deepsec requires the package **ocamlbuild** to compile which itself requires **ocamlfind**. It is important that both ocamlbuild and ocamlfind are compiled with the same version of OCaml. Running opam install ocamlbuild may not install ocamlfind if an instance of ocamlfind was installed on a different installation of OCaml (which sometimes happen on MacOSX). It is safer to run opam install ocamlfind before. Once the alpha version has been tested, we foresee to provide an opam package for **DeepSec** to ease the installation.

- 1. Run opam install ocamlfind (Optional if already installed)
- 2. Run opam install ocamlbuild (Optional if already installed)
- 3. Run git clone https://github.com/DeepSec-prover/deepsec.git (with a HTTPS connexion) or git clone git@github.com:DeepSec-prover/deepsec.git (with a SSH connexion)
- 4. Inside the directory deepsec, run make
- 5. The executable program deepsec has been built.

Note that two additional executables are compiled at the same time as deepsec_worker and deepsec_api. The former is used by **DeepSec** to distribute the computation on multi-core architectures and clusters of computers. The latter is used to communicate with **DeepSec UI**. Both should not be used manually nor should they be moved from the deepsec folder.

Installation of DeepSec UI

DeepSec UI has been packaged so you don't need to compile it from the source. Just download the version according to your OS and double click. You can also directly visit DeepSec UI Releases to get the lastest version. If you need another distribution, please feel free to ask (currently no windows support...)

- 1. For MacOSX: deepsec-ui-1.0.0-rc3_OSX.dmg
- 2. For Linux:
- Debian: deepsec-ui-1.0.0-rc3_amd64.deb
- Snapshot: deepsec-ui-1.0.0-rc3_amd64.snap
- AppImage: deepsec-ui-1.0.0-rc3.AppImage

To work, **DeepSec** UI requires to know the location of the executable deepsec_api that was installed by **DeepSec**. When **DeepSec** will be installed through opam in the foreseeable future, it will be added in your PATH environment automatically and so **DeepSec** UI will find it automatically. Thus currently, either you can add deepsec_api in your PATH or you can manually indicate to **DeepSec** UI where it is located (in the **Settings** menu of **DeepSec** UI).

Editor modes

The **deepsec** input language is very close to the one used by the **proverif** verification tool. You may use the proverif modes (pi mode) for emacs and atom distributed at https://proverif.inria.fr.

Tutorial

The Private Authentication Protocol

We will now explain protocol verification in **deepsec** through an example. As **deepsec** specializes in verifying equivalence properties, mainly used for modelling privacy preserving properties, we will use the Private Authentication Protocol (PAP) as our example (Abadi and Fournet 2004). The protocol can be described in "Alice & Bob" notation as follows:

```
A -> B: aenc( (Na,pk(skA)), pk(skB) )

B -> A: aenc( (Na,Nb,pk(skB)), pk(skA) ) if B accepts requests from A aenc( Nb, pk(skB) ) otherwise
```

Alice (A) makes a connection request to Bob (B). For this Alice sends the asymmetric encryption (aenc) of the pair (Na,pk(skA) with Bob's public key (pk(skB)). Here Na is a fresh random nonce and pk(skA) is Alice's public key. Here, pk(sk) denotes the public key corresponding to the private key sk. Bob may accept requests from Alice or not. The aim of the protocol is to conceal from outside observers whether Bob does accept connections from Alice or not. This is called *private* authentication. If Alice is in the list of connections accepted by Bob, Bob replies with the message aenc((Na,Nb,pk(skB)), pk(skB)), i.e. the encryption of the tuple (Na,Nb,pk(skB)) (where Nb is a fresh nonce generated by Bob) with Alice's public key pk(skA). Otherwise, in order to hide the connection refusal, Bob sends a decoy message aenc(Nb, pk(skB)).

The modelling of the PAP protocol in **deepsec** is available in the file

Examples/trace_equivalence/Private_authentication/PrivateAuthentication-1session.dps in the deepsec directory.

Modelling messages in deepsec

To complete.

```
Names, constants, etc.

free ca, cb, c.
free ska, skb, skc [private].

Declaring function symbols

fun aenc/2.
fun pk/1.

Rewrite rules

reduc adec(aenc(x,pk(y)),y) -> x.

NOTE: constructor-destructor

Explain difference between equations and reduc!

NOTE: deterministic vs randomized encryption
```

Modelling protocols as processes

To complete.

```
Alice's role
  let processA(ca,ska,pkb) =
    new na;
    out(ca,aenc((na,pk(ska)),pkb));
    in(ca,x).
Bob's role
  let processB(cb,skb,pka) =
    in(cb,yb);
    new nb;
    let (yna,=pka) = adec(yb,skb) in
      out(cb,aenc((yna,nb,pk(skb)),pka))
    else out(cb,aenc(nb,pk(skb))).
and the main process
  let ProcessAB =
    out(c,pk(ska));
    out(c,pk(skb));
    out(c,pk(skc));
      processA(ca,ska,pk(skb)) | processB(cb,skb,pk(ska))
    ).
Verifying anonymity
Add a "second" main process
  let ProcessCB =
    out(c,pk(ska));
    out(c,pk(skb));
    out(c,pk(skc));
      processA(ca,skc,pk(skb)) | processB(cb,skb,pk(skc))
    ).
and add query
  query trace_equiv(ProcessAB,ProcessCB).
To verify use command
  $ deepsec PrivateAuthentication-1session.dps
Deepsec says trace equivalent.
```

What happens when we remove the decoy message? Attack found.

Distributing the computation

Big scenario increases computation time. Distribute the computation.

The deepsec User Interface

Using the GUI in the example.

Input grammar

We describe in details the input grammar of **DeepSec**.

Type system

Function symbols

Processes

Precedences

Queries

Command-line options

Command-line options of DeepSec.

References

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