

Web Application Report

This report includes important security information about your web application.

Security Report

This report was created by HCL AppScan Standard 10.4.0 Scan started: 11/2/2023 10:39:49 AM

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- Application Error 7
- Email Address Pattern Found 4
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- Missing "Referrer policy" Security Header 1
- Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found 1

How to Fix

- Blind SQL Injection
- SQL Injection
- Integer Overflow
- Phishing Through URL Redirection
- Reflected Cross Site Scripting
- Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute
- Cross-Site Request Forgery
- Database Error Pattern Found
- Direct Access to Administration Pages
- Host Header Injection
- Inadequate Account Lockout
- Link Injection (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
- Missing Secure Attribute in Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie
- Older TLS Version is Supported
- Phishing Through Frames
- SHA-1 cipher suites were detected
- Session Identifier Not Updated
- Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field
- Body Parameters Accepted in Query
- Cacheable SSL Page Found
- Credit Card Number Pattern Found (Visa)
- Encryption Not Enforced
- Missing "Content-Security-Policy" header
- Missing HttpOnly Attribute in Session Cookie
- Missing or insecure "X-Content-Type-Options" header
- Missing or insecure Cross-Frame Scripting Defence
- Missing or insecure HTTP Strict-Transport-Security Header
- Query Parameter in SSL Request
- Unnecessary Http Response Headers found in the Application
- Application Error
- Email Address Pattern Found
- HTML Comments Sensitive Information Disclosure
- Missing "Referrer policy" Security Header
- Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found

Application Data

- Cookies
- JavaScripts
- Parameters
- Comments

- Visited URLs
- Failed Requests
- Filtered URLs
- Components

Introduction

This report contains the results of a web application security scan performed by HCL AppScan Standard.

Critical severity issues:	5
High severity issues:	11
Medium severity issues:	34
Low severity issues:	46
Informational severity issues:	17
Total security issues included in the report:	113
Total security issues discovered in the scan:	113

General Information

Scan file name:	demo.testfire.net
Scan started:	11/2/2023 10:39:49 AM
Test policy:	Default
CVSS version:	3.1
Test optimization le	vel: Fast
Host	demo.testfire.net
Port	443
Operating system:	Unknown
Web server:	Apache
Application server:	Tomcat

Login Settings

Login method:	Recorded login
Concurrent logins:	Enabled
In-session detection:	Enabled
In-session pattern:	>Sign Off<
Tracked or session ID cookies:	JSESSIONID AltoroAccounts
Tracked or session ID parameters:	

Login sequence:

https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp

Summary

Issue Types 34

Issue Type	Number of Issues
Blind SQL Injection	1
SQL Injection	4
Integer Overflow	2
Phishing Through URL Redirection	1
Reflected Cross Site Scripting	8
Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute	2
Cross-Site Request Forgery	5
	6
Direct Access to Administration Pages	2
Host Header Injection	1
Inadequate Account Lockout	1
Link Injection (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)	6
Missing Secure Attribute in Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie	1
Older TLS Version is Supported	1
Phishing Through Frames	7
SHA-1 cipher suites were detected	1
Session Identifier Not Updated	1
Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field	4
Body Parameters Accepted in Query	3
Cacheable SSL Page Found	17
Credit Card Number Pattern Found (Visa)	4
Encryption Not Enforced	1
Missing "Content-Security-Policy" header	1
Missing HttpOnly Attribute in Session Cookie	1
Missing or insecure "X-Content-Type-Options" header	1
Missing or insecure Cross-Frame Scripting Defence	1
Missing or insecure HTTP Strict-Transport-Security Header	1
Query Parameter in SSL Request	11
Unnecessary Http Response Headers found in the Application	1
Application Error	7
Email Address Pattern Found	4
4	

1	HTML Comments Sensitive Information Disclosure	4	
1	Missing "Referrer policy" Security Header	1	
1	Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found	1	

Vulnerable URLs 27

	URL	Numb	per of Issues
С	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply	4	
С	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions	9	
С	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	7	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer	7	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount	6	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp	9	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp	7	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	6	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp	5	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	5	
Н	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp	5	
М	https://demo.testfire.net/	11	
М	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	6	
М	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/	1	
М	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	6	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp	2	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	2	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp	1	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp	2	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	2	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp	1	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp	1	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp	3	
L	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/properties.json	2	
1	https://demo.testfire.net/doSubscribe	1	
1	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-bundle.js	1	
1	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js	1	

Fix Recommendations 28

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	Remediation Task	Number of Issues
Н	Disable redirection to external sites based on parameter values	1

H	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	32	
Н	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions	9	
Μ	Add the 'Secure' attribute to all sensitive cookies	1	
Μ	Apply proper authorization to administration scripts	2	
Μ	Change server's supported ciphersuites	1	
Μ	Change session identifier values after login	1	
M	Construct HTTP headers very carefully, avoiding the use of non-validated/unsanitized input data	1	
Μ	Enforce account lockout after several failed login attempts	1	
Μ	Review possible solutions for configuring SameSite Cookie attribute to recommended values	2	
Μ	Use a different signature algorithm for the certificate. See "Fix Recommentation" for specific server instructions	1	
Μ	Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form	5	
L	Add the 'HttpOnly' attribute to all session cookies	1	
L	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	11	
L	Config your server to use the "Content-Security-Policy" header with secure policies	1	
L	Config your server to use the "Referrer Policy" header with secure policies	1	
L	Config your server to use the "X-Content-Type-Options" header with "nosniff" value	1	
L	Config your server to use the "X-Frame-Options" header with DENY or SAMEORIGIN value	1	
L	Correctly set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off"	4	
L	Do not accept body parameters that are sent in the query string	3	
L	Do not allow sensitive information to leak.	1	
L	Download the relevant security patch for your web server or web application.	1	
L	Enforce the use of HTTPS when sending sensitive information	1	
L	Implement the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security policy with a long "max-age"	1	
L	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no- cache" headers to their responses.	17	
L	Remove credit card numbers from your website	4	
L	Remove e-mail addresses from the website	4	
L	Remove sensitive information from HTML comments	4	

Security Risks 14

Risk	Number of Issues
It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables	11
It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information	9
It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.	23
It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	18
Prevent cookie information leakage by restricting cookies to first-party or same-site	2

	context, Attacks can extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens).		-
Μ	It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.	5	
Μ	It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application	3	
Μ	It is possible to deface the site content through web-cache poisoning	1	
Μ	It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server	6	
Μ	It may be possible to steal user and session information (cookies) that was sent during an encrypted session	1	
	It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism	4	
	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations	38	
	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	12	
	It is possible to retrieve the absolute path of the web server installation, which might help an attacker to develop further attacks and to gain information about the file system structure of the web application	1	1

Causes 32

	Cause	Num	ber of Issues
С	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input	20	
С	Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input.	4	
С	Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner.	4	
С	Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands.	4	
С	SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.	4	
н	An Integer Overflow (or wraparound) occurs when a value that is too large is stored (larger than the maximum value the variable can hold) in an integer data type (including byte, short, long, and other types). The most significant bits of the integer are lost, and the remaining value is relative to the minimum value (either 0 or very negative value for signed types).	2	
Н	The web application redirects users to an external site based on untrusted data.	1	
Н	In particular, the submitted request was found to include a URL as a parameter. The web application uses this value to redirect the user's browser to the specified URL.	1	
Н	An attacker can modify this URL value to an arbitrary address. The attacker would then cause the victim to submit the altered request, thus being redirected to a site of the attacker's choosing.	1	
н	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser.	8	
Н	In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data.	8	

Н	In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.	8	
н	The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.	8	
Μ	Sensitive Cookie with Improper or Insecure or Missing SameSite Attribute	2	
М	This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally.	5	
Μ	An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user.	5	
Μ	When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more.	5	
Μ	For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. ` `. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.	5	
M	The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way	4	
M M	The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way Lack of input validation and sanitization	4	
M M M			
	Lack of input validation and sanitization	1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration	1 23	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL	1 23 1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange	1 23 1 17	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to	1 23 1 17 1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels.	1 23 1 17 1 1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute	1 23 1 17 1 1 1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	1 23 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 1	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type	1 23 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 11 7 7	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments	1 23 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 11 7 7	
	Lack of input validation and sanitization Insecure web application programming or configuration The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc. Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance	1 23 1 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 4	

WASC Threat Classification

Threat	Number of Issues
Abuse of Functionality	1
Brute Force	1
Content Spoofing	13
Cross-site Request Forgery	5
Cross-site Scripting	8
Information Leakage	64
Integer Overflows	2
Predictable Resource Location	2
Server Misconfiguration	4
Session Fixation	1
SQL Injection	11
URL Redirector Abuse	1

Issues Sorted by Issue Type

c Blind SQL Injection 1

Issue 1 of 1

Difference:	Parameter passwd manipu	ulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0**	to:	\$27+\$7C\$7C+\$27\$27+\$7C\$7C+\$27**CONFIDENTIAL 0**
	Parameter passwd manip	ulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0**	to:	%27+%7C%7C+%27+%7C%7C+%27**CONFIDENTIAL 0**
	Parameter passwd manip	ulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0**	to:	**CONFIDENTIAL 0**%27+%7C%7C+%27+%7C%7C+%27
	Parameter passwd manipu	ulated from: ** CONFIDENTIAL 0**	to:	**CONFIDENTIAL 0**%27+%7C%7C+%27%27+%7C%7C+%27

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because it shows that values can be appended to parameter values, indicating that they were embedded in an SQL query. In this test, three (or sometimes four) requests are sent. The last is logically equal to the original, and the next-to-last is different. Any others are for control purposes. A comparison of the last two responses with the first (the last is similar to it, and the next-to-last is different) indicates that the application is vulnerable.

c SQL Injection 4

Issue 1 of 4

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SQL Inject	QL Injection	
Severity:	Critical	
CVSS Score:	9,4	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions	
Entity:	startDate (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables	
Cause:	Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input. Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner. Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands. SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

Difference: Parameter (startDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (2019-01-01)'*20having*201=1--*20)

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

Raw Test Response:

org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:339) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731) org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java;67) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.servlet.AccountViewServlet.doPost(AccountViewServlet.java:78) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:650) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731) org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67) Root Cause java.sql.SQLSyntaxErrorException: Syntax error: Encountered "having" at line 1, column 141. org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.SQLExceptionFactory40.getSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.Util.generateCsSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.wrapInSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedConnection.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.ConnectionChild.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.execute(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.executeQuery(Unknown Source) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.util.DBUtil.getTransactions(DBUtil.java:403)

Issue 2 of 4

SQL Inject	QL Injection	
Severity:	Critical	
CVSS Score:	9,4	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions	
Entity:	endDate (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables	
Cause:	Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input. Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner. Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands. SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

Difference: Parameter (endDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (2019-01-01)'*20having*201=1--*20)

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

Raw Test Response:

org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:339) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731) org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java;67) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.servlet.AccountViewServlet.doPost(AccountViewServlet.java:78) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:650) javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731) org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67) Root Cause java.sql.SQLSyntaxErrorException: Syntax error: Encountered "having" at line 1, column 167. org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.SQLExceptionFactory40.getSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.Util.generateCsSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.wrapInSQLException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedConnection.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.ConnectionChild.handleException(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.execute(Unknown Source) org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.executeQuery(Unknown Source) com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.util.DBUtil.getTransactions(DBUtil.java:403)

Issue 3 of 4

SQL Injection	
Severity:	Critical
CVSS Score:	9,4
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Entity:	uid (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
Cause:	Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input. Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner. Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands. SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8 Parameter (uid) manipulated from: (jsmith to: jsmith%27%3B+select+*+from+master..sysmessages--

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

Raw Test Response:

Issue 4 of 4

SQL Injection	
Severity:	Critical
CVSS Score:	9,4
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Entity:	passw (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
Cause:	Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input. Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner. Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands. SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Cookie JSESSIONID removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8 Parameter passw manipulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0** to: **CONFIDENTIAL 0***27*3B+select+*+from+master..sysmessages--

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

Raw Test Response:

Issue 1 of 2

Integer Ov	nteger Overflow	
Severity:	High	
CVSS Score:	8,6	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount	
Entity:	listAccounts (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information	
Cause:	An Integer Overflow (or wraparound) occurs when a value that is too large is stored (larger than the maximum value the variable can hold) in an integer data type (including byte, short, long, and other types). The most significant bits of the integer are lost, and the remaining value is relative to the minimum value (either 0 or very negative value for signed types).	
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions	

Reasoning: The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

Raw Test Response:

<pre>Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 0</pre>
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en Content-Length: 3642 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:09:21 GMT Connection: close
<pre><!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font- family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans- serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background- color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY </pre></th></tr><tr><th></th></tr></tbody></table></style></head></html></pre>

Issue 2 of 2

Integer Overflow	
Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	8,6
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	toAccount (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	An Integer Overflow (or wraparound) occurs when a value that is too large is stored (larger than the maximum value the variable can hold) in an integer data type (including byte, short, long, and other types). The most significant bits of the integer are lost, and the remaining value is relative to the minimum value (either 0 or very negative value for signed types).
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

Reasoning: The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

Raw Test Response:

Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw
ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 94
fromAccount=800003&toAccount=-9999999999999999999998transferAmount=1234&transfer=Transfer+Money
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Apache-Covote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en
Content-Length: 1815
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:08 GMT
Connection: close
html <html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font-</td></tr><tr><td>family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-</td></tr><tr><td>serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-</td></tr><tr><td>color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY</td></tr><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td>·</td></tr><tr><td></td></tr></tbody></table></style></head></html>

H Phishing Through URL Redirection 1

Issue 1 of 1

Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	8,2
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
Entity:	content (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.
Cause:	The web application redirects users to an external site based on untrusted data. In particular, the submitted request was found to include a URL as a parameter. The web application uses this value to redirect the user's browser to the specified URL. An attacker can modify this URL value to an arbitrary address. The attacker would then cause the victim to submit the altered request, thus being redirected to a site of the attacker's choosing.
Fix:	Disable redirection to external sites based on parameter values

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains a redirection to demo.testfire.net, showing that the application allows redirection to external sites, a weakness which can be exploited for phishing attacks.

н Reflected Cross Site Scripting (8)

Issue 1 of 8

Reflected	ed Cross Site Scripting	
Severity:	High	
CVSS Score:	7,1	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	
Entity:	sendFeedback (Page)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	
Cause:	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

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Difference:	Parameter (cfile) manipulated from: comments.txt to: %3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
	Parameter name manipulated from: John+Smith to: %3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
	Parameter (email_addr) manipulated from: 753+Main+Street to:
	%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
	Parameter (subject) manipulated from: (1234) to: %3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
	Parameter (comments) manipulated from: (1234) to: <pre>%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E</pre>
	Parameter (submit) manipulated from: +submit+ to: (%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

Test Response



Raw Test Response:

counts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA	A3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh80DAwMDA	AzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM	130Dg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw
3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2	2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E%2	22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%2	9%3C%2Fscript%3E&
200 OK Apache-Coyote/1.1 Type: <mark>text/html</mark> ;charset=ISO-8859-1 Length: 7182 u, 02 Nov 2023 09:04:22 GMT			
	<pre>counts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQZNDJ DTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQZNDAXM ength: 369 2822%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2 =%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2 =%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C 200 OK apache-Coyote/1.1 Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Length: 7182</pre>	DTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFNTh8 .ength: 369 C%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&name=%3E%22%2 E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E =%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E 200 OK &pache-Coyote/1.1 Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 .ength: 7182	<pre>counts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODAONjQ0NzM DTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Length: 369 2822%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&subject=%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&submit=%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28237% 200 OK Apache-Coyote/1.1 Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Length: 7182</pre>

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"></div>
<h1>Thank You</h1>
Thank you for your comments, >"'> <script><mark>alert(237)</mark></script> . They will be reviewed by our Customer Service staff and given the full attention that they deserve.
However, the email you gave is incorrect () and you will not receive a response.


Issue 2 of 8

Reflected Cross Site Scripting	
Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	7,1
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp
Entity:	query (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user
Cause:	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

Test Response

10/05/2024



HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 6997 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:08:35 GMT

```
<!-- BEGIN HEADER -->
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
```

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">

...

<h1>Search Results</h1>	-
No results were found for the query: 	
1234 <script><mark>alert(1207)</mark></script>	-
	ł
BEGIN FOOTER	
~~~~~	~

## Issue 3 of 8

**Reflected Cross Site Scripting** Severity: High CVSS Score: 7.1 URL: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp Entity: customize.jsp (Page) Risk: It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user Cause: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser. Fix: Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection Difference: Parameter (content) manipulated from: (customize.jsp) to: (*3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28358%29%3C%2Fscript%3E Parameter (lang) manipulated from: international to: \$3E\$22%27*3E\$3Cscript\$3Ealert\$28358\$29*3C\$2Fscript\$3E Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response,

Test Response

•

which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

		<u>Sign Off</u>   <u>C</u>	ontact Us   Feedback   Search	Go
<b>Altoro</b> Mutua				DEMO SITE ONLY
MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO M	IUTUAL
I WANT TO View Account Summary View Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles Customize Site Language	erver Status Check	358 358 Simulation of the pop-up that appears when this page is opened in a browser	Jage 3: o <u>ur copy from GitHub</u> and take advanta	age of advanced features
The AltoroJ website is published by IBM Cor defects. This site is not a real banking site. either express or implied. IBM does not assu 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en/subc Copyright © 2008, 2023, IBM Corporation, A	Similarities, if any, t me any risk in relatic <u>ategory/SWI10</u> .	o third party product and/or websites purely co	products in detecting web application vulnerab pincidental. This site is provided "as is" without , please go to <u>http://www-</u>	

```
. . .
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
\texttt{AltoroAccounts} = \texttt{ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw}
ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 5584
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:05:21 GMT
. . .
. . .
   <div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
  <hl>Customize Site Language</hl>
  <form method="post">
    Current Language: >"'><script>alert(358)</script>
```

```
You can change the language setting by choosing:
<a id="HyperLink1" href="./customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp&lang=international">International</a>
<a id="HyperLink2" href="./customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp&lang=english">English</a>
...
```

## Issue 4 of 8

**Reflected Cross Site Scripting** Severity: High CVSS Score: 7.1 URL: https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp Entity: HostName (Parameter) Risk: It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user Cause: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser. Fix: Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection Difference: Parameter (HostName) manipulated from: (AltoroMutual) to: AltoroMutual%5C%3C%2Fscript%5C%3E%5C%3Csvg%2Fonload%3Dalert%282132%29+width%3D100%5C%2F%3E **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

Test Response

1	2132	
	of the pop-up that nen this page is a browser	

```
. . .
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
\texttt{ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8}
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 107
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:11:26 GMT
{
 "HostName": "AltoroMutual\</script\>\<svg/onload=alert(2132) width=100\/>",
"HostStatus": "OK"
}
. . .
```

## Issue 5 of 8

Reflected	Cross Site Scripting
Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	7,1
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp
Entity:	content (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user
Cause:	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

- Difference: Parameter content manipulated from: personal.htm to: personal.htmhj%3Cscript%0A%3Eeval%28%27ale%27%2B%27%2B%27%2B%27%28%27138%27%29%3C%2Fscript%3Ehj
- **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

**Test Response** 



TOC END
Failed due to The requested resource (/static/personal.htmhj <script &gt;eval('ale'+'rt'+'('138')')hj) is not available</script 
BEGIN FOOTER

## Issue 6 of 8

	Cross Site Scripting
Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	7,1
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback
Entity:	name (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user
Cause:	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

Test Response

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. . . Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw = ODAwMAAwODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 132 cfile=comments.txt&name=John+Smith<script>alert(1508) </script>&email addr=753+Main+Street&subject=1234&comments=1234&submit=+Submit+ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 7204 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:09:08 GMT . . . . . . 

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"></div>
<hl>Thank You</hl>
Thank you for your comments, John Smith <script>alert(1508)</script> . They will be reviewed by our Customer Service staff and given the full attention that they deserve.
However, the email you gave is incorrect (753 main street) and you will not receive a response.

# Issue 7 of 8

allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user         Cause:       Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly u JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed or the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter query manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: Enter+title+120e.g. +Watchfire129222+onMouseOver3Dalert1202305292EP12EP         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the appli	Reflected (	Cross Site Scripting	
URL:       https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp         Entity:       query (Parameter)         Risk:       It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimeration allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user         Cause:       Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly underable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data.         In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed or the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter guery manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Natchfire) to: Entertitle+t28e.g.+Natchfire12922+onMouseOvert3Dalert1282236629527577         Reasoning:       The	Severity:	High	
Entity:       query (Parameter)         Risk:       It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitime allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user         Cause:       Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly u JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed of the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter (guery)         Mainter (guery)       manipulated from: [Enter title (e.g. Matchfire) to: [Entertitle*28e.g.+Matchfire*29*22+onMouseOver*3Dalert*28235629*27*27<	CVSS Score:	7,1	
Risk:       It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitime allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user         Cause:       Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly u JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The common method of sending malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter (query) manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: Enter+title+¥28e.g.+Watchfire\$29\$22+onMouseOver\$3Dalert\$2236\$29\$29\$27\$27         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means	URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp	
allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user         Cause:       Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly u JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The common method of sending malicious cortent is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed or the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter guery) manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: Enter+title+t28e.g.,+Watchfiret29t22+onMouseOvert3Dalertt282236t29t2Ft2F         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the app	Entity:	query (Parameter)	
JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In the an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then the victim's browser.         In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data.         In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.         The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed or the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convince visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the is executed by the victim's browser.         Fix:       Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection         Difference:       Parameter (guery) manipulated from: (Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: (Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29\$22+onMouseOver*3Dalert%282236\$29\$25F\$2F\$         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks.		It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate use allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	
Difference:       Parameter guery manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to:         Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29%22+onMouseOver%3Dalert%282236%29%2F%2F         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks.		In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content	
Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29%22+onMouseOver%3Dalert%282236%29%2F%2F         Reasoning:       The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks.	Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	
		Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29%22+onMouseOver%3Dalert%282236%29%2F%2F The test successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed once the user activates the OnMouseOver function (i.e., hovers with the mouse cursor over the vulnerable control). This means that the	
lest Response	Test Resp	onse	

<b>Altoro</b> Mutual	>	Sign Off   Contact Us   Fee		GO DEMO SITE ONLY
MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL		INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	
I WANT TO  View Account Summary View Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles Customize Site Language Privacy Policy Security Statement Security Security Statement Security Security Statement Security Security Statement Security Security Security Statement Security Secu	appears w	2236 coc of the pop-up that then this page is a browser	<u>from GitHub</u> and take advantage of adva	nced features
The AltoroJ website is published by IBM Corp defects. This site is not a real banking site. S either express or implied. IBM does not assuu 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en/subca Copyright © 2008, 2023, IBM Corporation, All	Similarities, if any, to third party party part ne any risk in relation to your use of the ategory/SWI10.		acting web application vulnerabilities and v site is provided "as is" without warranty c ttp://www-	

Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyf1NhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 5658 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:11:43 GMT
MEMBER TOC END
<pre><div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"> <hl>Search News Articles</hl> <form action="https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryXpath.jsp" id="QueryXpath" method="get"> Search our news articles database    <input id='content"' name="content" type="hidden" value="queryXpath.jsp"/> <input id='content"' name="query" onmouseover='alert(2236)//"/' type="hidden" value="Enter title (e.g. Watchfire)" width="450"/> <input id="Button1" type="submit" value="Query" width="75"/>     </form></div></pre>

1	News title not found, try again	
		1

## Issue 8 of 8

Reflected	Cross Site Scripting
Severity:	High
CVSS Score:	7,1
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
Entity:	lang (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user
Cause:	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser. In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data. In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser. The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter (lang) manipulated from: (international to: (international%3Cimg+src%3Djavascript%3Aalert%282527%29%3E)

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because Appscan successfully embedded a script in the response, which will be executed when the page loads in the user's browser.

Test Response

AILUIUIVIUL	ual		Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go Go G
MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL		INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
I WANT TO  View Account Summary View Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles Customize Site Language rivacy Policy Statement	<u>ıt</u>   <u>Server Status Check</u>	2527 2527 Simulation of the pop-up that appears when this page is opened in a browser	t our copy from GitHub and take advantage of advanced feature
The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real bank	ing site. Similarities, if any, t	to third party produce and/on website are purel	IBM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website ly coincidental. This site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind,
either express or implied. IBM does 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/		on to your use of this were information of the second second second second second second second second second s	tion, please go to <u>http://www-</u>
Copyright © 2008, 2023, IBM Corpo	ration, All rights reserved.		
Test Response:			
Test Response:			
ccept: text/html,applica eferer: https://demo.tes ost: demo.testfire.net ser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ( ookie: JSESSIONID=635473	tfire.net/bank/cus Windows NT 6.2; WC 4A2B825ABCB2DC812C NhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5	C04629BE8; SNTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDA	sp⟨=international , like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.3 AzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM30Dg1RTIwfDQ1Mz

<hl>Customize Site Language</hl>

```
<form method="post">
Current Language: international<img src=javascript:alert(2527)>
You can change the language setting by choosing:
<a id="HyperLink1" href="./customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp&lang=international">International</a>
<a id="HyperLink1" href="./customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp&lang=english">English</a>
...
```

### Issue 1 of 2

тос

#### **Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute**

Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	4,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	JSESSIONID (Cookie)
Risk:	Prevent cookie information leakage by restricting cookies to first-party or same-site context, Attacks can extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens).
Cause:	Sensitive Cookie with Improper or Insecure or Missing SameSite Attribute
Fix:	Review possible solutions for configuring SameSite Cookie attribute to recommended values

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains Sensitive Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute, which may lead to Cookie information leakage, which may extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery(CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place.

#### **Original Response**

...
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:19 GMT
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=992EEE657118C508CE46528D92B33F19; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly

### Issue 2 of 2

. . .

35

### **Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute**

Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	4,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	AltoroAccounts (Cookie)
Risk:	Prevent cookie information leakage by restricting cookies to first-party or same-site context, Attacks can extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens).
Cause:	Sensitive Cookie with Improper or Insecure or Missing SameSite Attribute
Fix:	Review possible solutions for configuring SameSite Cookie attribute to recommended values

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8)

Reasoning: The response contains Sensitive Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute, which may lead to Cookie information leakage, which may extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery(CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place.

#### Original Response



тос

Issue 1 of 5

<b>Cross-Site</b>	Request Forgery				
Severity:	Medium				
CVSS Score:	6,5				
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions				
Entity:	showTransactions (Page)				
Risk:	It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.				
Cause:	This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally. An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user. When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more. For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. ` <img border="0" height="0" src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amp;amount=10000" width="0"/> `. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.				
Fix:	Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form				
Difference	e: Header sec-ch-ua removed from request: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116" Header sec-ch-ua-mobile removed from request: 20 Header sec-ch-ua-platform removed from request: "Windows" Header Upgrade-Insecure-Requests removed from request: 1 Header Origin manipulated from: https://demo.testfire.net to: https://bogus.origin.hcl.com Header Sec-Fetch-Site removed from request: same-origin Header Sec-Fetch-Mode removed from request: navigate				

- Header (Sec-Fetch-User) removed from request: ?1
- Header (Sec-Fetch-Dest) removed from request: document
  Header (Referer) manipulated from: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp) to:

https://bogus.referer.hcl.com

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is identical to the Original Response, indicating that the Cross-Site Request Forgery attempt was successful, even though it included a fictive 'Referer' header.

AltoroMutu	SITE ONLY	AltoroMutua	
MAN TO V We Account Surmary V We Account Surmary I Transfer Funds Contornize Site Language Scuttorize Site Language Scuttorize Site Language	Image: Second Action Second	Mr.A.cocourt      More A.cocourt      More A.cocourt      State Account (Sensity      Sensity and Sensity)      Sensity and Sensity      Exact Dears Account      Endout Linguise      Endout Lin	ERENDAL     E
fects. This site is not a real banking	Corporation for the sole purpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IMM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website also. Similarities, if any, to third party products and/or websites are purely concidentiat. This die is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind, asseme any with in inducts to your use of this website. For more information, please go to <a href="http://conc&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;detectorgenciation">http://conc</a>	defects. This site is not a real banking sit	
ine expense of implied, care core not	on, All rights reserved.		

# Issue 2 of 5

<b>Cross-Site</b>	e Request Forgery
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	doTransfer (Page)
Risk:	It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.
Cause:	This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally. An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user. When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more. For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. ` <img border="0" height="0" src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amp;amount=10000" width="0"/> `. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.
Fix:	Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form

Difference: Header (Referer) manipulated from: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp to:

https://bogus.referer.hcl.com

Header Origin) added to request: https://bogus.origin.hcl.com

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is identical to the Original Response, indicating that the Cross-Site Request Forgery attempt was successful, even though it included a fictive 'Referer' header.

**Test Response** 

#### **Original Response**

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	MY ACCOUNT	PERBONAL	SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE A	LTORO MUTUAL
VANT TO Van Account Surmary Van Recent Transaction Van Besch Transaction I Transfer Funds Sacch busies Athiles Contomize Site Language	Transfer Funds       Frem Account:     800002 Savings       To Account:     800002 Savings       Amount is Transfer:     Transfer Morey	1 HWAY TO • ware incoment · Jonato Acada • Constants Acad • Constants Atad	Transactions Is From Account: Articles To Amounts	B00002 Savings V B00002 Savings V Transfer Money	
ne Altoro) website is published by IBM affects. This site is not a real banking s	1214 O sea societativity transformed from Account 800003 into Account 800003 and 120202 # 00 AM. Bener, Statutu Cultur, I = 8028 Allow Power Manuel, Re. The week applications is gene sourced for toors care, them 2014d and take advantage of advanced Restr. Compositions for the scie purposes of devocational systems and the statuture and the science advanced adv	The Alford vebste is defect. This de term	unity Statement   Server Status Check   BEST API   7745   5 published by IBM Corporation for the sole purpose of demons	web application is open source! <u>Get your capy from GitHub</u> and take trating the effectiveness of IBM products in detecting web application is and/or websites are purely coincidental. This site is provided "as is	e advantage of advanced i
opyright @ 2008, 2023, IBM Corporatio	n, al rights reserved.	Copyright @ 2009, 20	223, IBM Corporation, All rights reserved.		

# Issue 3 of 5

#### **Cross-Site Request Forgery** Severity: Medium CVSS Score: 6.5 https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp URL: Entity: customize.jsp (Page) Risk: It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated. Cause: This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally. An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user. When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more. For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. `<img src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amount=10000" width=0 height=0 border=0>`. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session. Fix: Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form

### Difference: Header (Referer) manipulated from: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp to: https://bogus.referer.hcl.com Header (origin) added to request: https://bogus.origin.hcl.com

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is identical to the Original Response, indicating that the Cross-Site Request Forgery attempt was successful, even though it included a fictive 'Referer' header.

Test Response

### **Original Response**


MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL	BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
I WANT TO		Customize Sit	e Language	
<u>View Account Summary</u> <u>View Recent Transactions</u>			.e Language	
Transfer Funds     Search News Articles		Current Language:		
Customize Site Language		You can change the languag	e setting by choosing:	
		International English		
The AltoroJ website is published by I defects. This site is not a real banki	IBM Corporation for the sole pu	sose of demonstrating the effectiv	open source! Get your carry from Gi	the advantage of advanced feat to application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kin #=
The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real banki either express or impled. IBM does n 142-bm.com/software/brodwsts/ks/	IBM Corporation for the sole pu ng site. Similarities, if any, to t ot assume any risk in relation : en/subcategory/SWI10.	This web application is	open source/ Get your capy from Giveness of IRM products in detecting we are purely coincidental. This site is pr	ab application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kini
The AltoroJ website is published by 1 defects. This site is not a real banki either express or implied. IBM does r	IBM Corporation for the sole pu ng site. Similarities, if any, to t ot assume any risk in relation : en/subcategory/SWI10.	This web application is	open source/ Get your capy from Gi	ab application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kini
The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real banki either express or impled. IBM does n 142-bm.com/software/brodwsts/ks/	IBM Corporation for the sole pu ng site. Similarities, if any, to t ot assume any risk in relation : en/subcategory/SWI10.	This web application is	open source/ Get your capy from Gi	ab application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kini
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The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real banki either express or impled. IBM does n 142-bm.com/software/brodwsts/ks/	IBM Corporation for the sole pung site. Similarities, if any, to to assume any risk in relation : an/subcategory/SWI10.	This web application is	open source/ Get your capy from Gi	ab application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kini
The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real backi either express or impled. IBM does n 142.lbm.com/software/products/us/	IBM Corporation for the sole pung site. Similarities, if any, to to assume any risk in relation : an/subcategory/SWI10.	This web application is	open source/ Get your capy from Gi	ab application vulnerabilities and website rovided "as is" without warranty of any kini

UNINTO	MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL		SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
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	defects. This site is not a real bank either express or implied. IBM does 142.ibm.com/software/products/us	ing site. Similarities, if any, to not assume any risk in relation (en/subcategory/SW110)	third party products and/or a	vebsites are purely coincidenta	I. This site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit

### Issue 4 of 5

(	
<b>Cross-Site</b>	Request Forgery
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply
Entity:	ccApply (Page)
Risk:	It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.
Cause:	This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally. An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user. When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more. For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. ' <img border="0" height="0" src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amp;amount=10000" width="0"/> `. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.
Fix:	Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form
Difference	Header sec-ch-ua removed from request: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116" Header sec-ch-ua-mobile removed from request: ?0 Header sec-ch-ua-platform removed from request: "Windows" Header Upgrade-Insecure-Requests removed from request: 1

- Header (origin) manipulated from: (https://demo.testfire.net) to: (https://bogus.origin.hcl.com)
- Header (Sec-Fetch-Site) removed from request: same-origin
- Header (Sec-Fetch-Mode) removed from request: navigate
- Header (Sec-Fetch-User) removed from request: (?1)
- Header Sec-Fetch-Dest removed from request: document
- Header Referer) manipulated from: (https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp) to: (https://bogus.referer.hcl.com)
- **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is identical to the Original Response, indicating that the Cross-Site Request Forgery attempt was successful, even though it included a fictive 'Referer' header.



### Issue 5 of 5

<b>Cross-Site</b>	Request Forgery
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp
Entity:	admin.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.
Cause:	This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally. An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid request from an authenticated user. When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more. For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. ' <img border="0" height="0" src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amp;amount=10000" width="0"/> `. As a result, money is transferred from the victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.
Fix:	Validate the value of the "Referer" header, and use a one-time-nonce for each submitted form

- Difference: Header (Referer) manipulated from: https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp to: https://bogus.referer.hcl.com Header (origin) added to request: https://bogus.origin.hcl.com
- **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is identical to the Original Response, indicating that the Cross-Site Request Forgery attempt was successful, even though it included a fictive 'Referer' header.

AltoroMut	ual	Sign O	I Contact Us   Eredback	Search Go	
MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSI	NESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	
I WANT TO View Account Summary Usee Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles Customize Site Language	Edit User Information				
	Users:	Account Types:			
	admin 🗸	Savings 🗸		Add Account	
	Change user's pas Users: admin v	sword Passward:	Confirm:	Change Ressword	
	Add an new user				
	First Name: Last Name:	Username:	Password: Confirm:		
				Add User	
	It is highly recommended th	at you leave the username as first ini	tial last name.		



### M Database Error Pattern Found 6

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**Original Response** 

# Issue 1 of 6

verity:	
	Medium
SS Score:	5,3
L:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions
ity:	showTransactions (Global)
k:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
use:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection
Raw Tes	the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters. <b>t Response:</b>

Issue 2 of 6

Database Error Pattern Found			
Severity:	Medium		
CVSS Score:	5,3		
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions		
Entity:	startDate (Global)		
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables		
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input		
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection		

Difference: Parameter (startDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (2019-01-01WFXSSProbe%27%22%29%2F%3E)

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

#### Raw Test Response:

org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:339)	
javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731)	
org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52)	
com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67)	
com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.servlet.AccountViewServlet.doPost(AccountViewServlet.java:78)	
javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:650)	
javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731)	
org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52)	
com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67)	
<b>Root Cause</b> <pre>java.sql.SQLSyntaxErrorException: Syntax error: Encountered " " at</pre>	line
1, column 149.	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.SQLExceptionFactory40.getSQLException(Unknown Source)	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.Util.generateCsSQLException(Unknown Source)	
${\tt org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.wrapInSQLException(Unknown Source)}$	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.handleException(Unknown Source)	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedConnection.handleException(Unknown Source)	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.ConnectionChild.handleException(Unknown Source)	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.execute(Unknown Source)	
org.apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.executeQuery(Unknown Source)	
com.ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.util.DBUtil.getTransactions(DBUtil.java:403)	

## Issue 3 of 6

тос

Database	Error Pattern Found
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	5,3
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions
Entity:	endDate (Global)
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter (endDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (2019-01-01WFXSSProbe%27%22%29%2F%3E)

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

ora	apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:339)
~	x.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java.731)
	nache tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter.(WsFilter.java:52)
	hm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67)
	ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.servlet.AccountViewServlet.doPost(AccountViewServlet.java:78)
	x.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:650)
2	x.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:731)
2	apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52)
com.:	ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.filter.AuthFilter.doFilter(AuthFilter.java:67)
/pre>	> <b>cb&gt;Root Cause</b> <pre>java.sql.SQLSyntaxErrorException: Syntax error: Encountered "\" " at lin.</pre>
, coi	lumn 175.
org.a	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.SQLExceptionFactory40.getSQLException(Unknown Source)
org.a	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.Util.generateCsSQLException(Unknown Source)
org.a	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.wrapInSQLException(Unknown Source)
org.a	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.TransactionResourceImpl.handleException(Unknown Source)
	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedConnection.handleException(Unknown Source)
	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.ConnectionChild.handleException(Unknown Source)
	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.execute(Unknown Source)
~	apache.derby.impl.jdbc.EmbedStatement.executeQuery(Unknown Source)
com.	ibm.security.appscan.altoromutual.util.DBUtil.getTransactions(DBUtil.java:403)

### Issue 4 of 6

Database Error Pattern FoundSeverity:MediumCVSS Score:5,3URL:https://demo.testfire.net/doLoginEntity:uid (Global)Risk:It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tablesCause:Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user inputFix:Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8 Parameter (uid) manipulated from: (jsmith) to: %27%20%7C%20%27id)

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

Raw Test Response:

...
Cookie: JSESSIONID=3D882747A7B986CE04069E8D2E7D98EE
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1

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TOC

sue 5	of 6
atabase	Error Pattern Found
verity:	Medium
/SS Score:	5,3
RL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
tity:	passw (Global)
sk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
iuse:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
<b>k</b> :	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection
Reasonin	<ul> <li>Cookie JSESSIONID removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8</li> <li>Parameter passw manipulated from: **conFIDENTIAL 0** to: \$27\$20\$7C\$20\$27id</li> <li>The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.</li> <li>Response:</li> </ul>
 Cookie:	JSESSIONID=F1B1BDA62907DE850B7BDD9187DDE686
10/05/202	24 4:

BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"
TOC END
<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"></div>
<h1>Online Banking Login</h1>
To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-555-6159 <span id="_ctl0ctl0_Content_Main_message" style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;"> Syntax error: Encountered " " at line 1, column 47. </span>
<form action="doLogin" id="login" method="post" name="login" onsubmit="return (confirminput(login));"></form>

# lssu

Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:16:57 GMT

Database	Error Pattern Found
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	5,3
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Entity:	passw (Global)
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

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```
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:17:03 GMT
<!-- BEGIN HEADER -->
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
. . .
. . .
<!-- TOC END -->
  <div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
  <h1>Online Banking Login</h1>
  <!-- To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-555-6159 -->
  <span id="_ctl0__ctl0_Content_Main_message" style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;">
  Syntax error: Encountered "|" at line 1, column 69.
  </span>
  <form action="doLogin" method="post" name="login" id="login" onsubmit="return (confirminput(login));">
   >
       Username:
```

# Issue 6 of 6

тос

Database	Error Pattern Found
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	5,3
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Entity:	doLogin (Global)
Risk:	It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8 Parameter (uid) manipulated from: (jsmith) to: (%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%283063%29%3C%2Fscript%3E) **Parameter** (passw) manipulated from: (**CONFIDENTIAL 0**) to:

(%3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%283063%29%3C%2Fscript%3E)

Parameter (btnSubmit) manipulated from: Login to: %3E%22%27%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%283063%29%3C%2Fscript%3E

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains SQL Server errors. This suggests that the test managed to penetrate the application and reach the SQL query itself, by injecting hazardous characters.

### Raw Test Response:

Cookie: JSESSIONID=451F61901D2D552744B713243E2BDD96 Accept-Language: en-US Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin Host: demo.testfire.net User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:16:40 GMT
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"
TOC END
<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"> <hl>Online Banking Login</hl></div>
To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-555-6159 <span id="_ctl0ctl0_Content_Main_message" style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;"> Syntax error: Encountered "&lt;" at line 1, column 49. </span>
<form action="doLogin" id="login" method="post" name="login" onsubmit="return (confirminput(login));">            &lt;         Username:         </form>
···

тос

### Issue 1 of 2

ess to Administration Pages
Medium
5,3
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/
admin.jsp (Page)
It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application
The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way
Apply proper authorization to administration scripts

- Difference: Method manipulated from: (HEAD to: GET Path manipulated from: (/admin/clients.xls) to: //admin/admin.jsp
- **Reasoning:** AppScan requested a file which is probably not a legitimate part of the application. The response status was 200 OK. This indicates that the test succeeded in retrieving the content of the requested file.

**Test Request:** 

**Test Response** 

#### •••

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,ap plication/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/index.j sp?content=personal_other.htm Host: demo.testfire.net User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; W OW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Geck o) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812 C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmlu Z3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMD AzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODAONjQONzM3ODg1RTIw fDQ1MzkwODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LT EuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 0

### HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:14:55 GMT

```
. . .
```

. . .

} </script>

 $<\!!--$  Be careful what you change. All ch anges are made directly to AltoroJ databas e. -->

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
<span style="color:#FF0066;font-size:
12pt;font-weight:bold;">

</span>

<h1>Edit User Information</h1>

<!-- action="addAccount" --> <form id="addAccount" name="addAccount" action="" method="post"> <h2>Add an account to an existing user</h2> > Users: > Account Types: 

```
GET /admin/admin.jsp HTTP/1.1
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,ap
plication/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/index.j
sp?content=personal other.htm
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; W
OW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Geck
o) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812
C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmlu
Z3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMD
AzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIw
fDQ1MzkwODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LT
EuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 0
```

```
. . .
   </select>
     <Select name="accttypes">
        <option Value="Checking">Checkin
g</option>
        <option Value="Savings" Selected</pre>
>Savings</option>
        <option Value="IRA">IRA</option>
       </Select>
     <input type="submit" value="Add
<mark>Account</mark>">
   </form>
  <!-- action="changePassword" -->
   <form id="changePass" name="changePass"
" action="" method="post" onsubmit="return
confirmpass(this);">
   <mark>ser's password</mark></h2>
   >
      Users:
     >
       Password:
     >
. . .
. . .
   </select>
     <input type="password" name="passw
ord1">
     <input type="password" name="passw
ord2">
     < t d >
       <input type="submit" name="change"
value="Change Password">
     </form>
   <!-- action="addUser" -->
   <form method="post" name="addUser" act
ion="" id="addUser" onsubmit="return confi
rmpass(this);">
   <h2><br><dd an n
<mark>ew user</mark></h2>
```

> First Name: <br> Last Name: > Username: . . . . . . <input type="text" name="username" > <input type="password" name="passw ord1"> <br> <input type="password" name="passw ord2"> <input type="submit" name="add" va lue="Add User"> It is highly recomme nded that you leave the username as first initial last name. </form> . . .

# Issue 2 of 2

Direct Acc	ess to Administration Pages
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	5,3
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	admin.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application
Cause:	The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way
Fix:	Apply proper authorization to administration scripts

Difference: Path manipulated from: /login.jsp to: /admin/admin.jsp

TOC

**Reasoning:** AppScan requested a file which is probably not a legitimate part of the application. The response status was 200 OK. This indicates that the test succeeded in retrieving the content of the requested file.

**Test Request:** 

**Test Response** 

```
•••
```

Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812
C04629BE8
Content-Length: 0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:14:50 GMT

. . .

•••

} </script>

 $<\!!--$  Be careful what you change. All ch anges are made directly to AltoroJ databas e. -->

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
<span style="color:#FF0066;font-size:
12pt;font-weight:bold;">

</span>

<h1>Edit User Information</h1>

```
<!-- action="addAccount" -->
 <form id="addAccount" name="addAccount"
action="" method="post">
  <h2>Add an account to an existing
user</h2>
   >
     Users:
    Account Types:
    . . .
. . .
  </select>
```

```
GET /admin/admin.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: demo.testfire.net
Connection: keep-alive
sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium
";v="116"
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0;
Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, lik
e Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,ap
plication/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,
image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-ex
change; v=b3; q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812
C04629BE8
Content-Length: 0
```

```
<Select name="accttypes">
        <option Value="Checking">Checkin
g</option>
        <option Value="Savings" Selected</pre>
>Savings</option>
        <option Value="IRA">IRA</option>
       </Select>
     <input type="submit" value="Add
Account">
   </form>
  <!-- action="changePassword" -->
   <form id="changePass" name="changePass"
" action="" method="post" onsubmit="return
confirmpass(this);">
   ser's password</h2></r>
   >
      Users:
     >
      Password:
     \langle th \rangle
. . .
. . .
   </select>
     <+d>
       <input type="password" name="passw
ord1">
     <input type="password" name="passw
ord2">
     <input type="submit" name="change"
value="Change Password">
     </form>
   <!-- action="addUser" -->
   <form method="post" name="addUser" act
ion="" id="addUser" onsubmit="return confi
rmpass(this);">
   <h2><br><br>Add an n
<mark>ew user</mark></h2>
   >
      First Name:
       <br>
      Last Name:
     >
```



### M Host Header Injection 1

### Issue 1 of 1

Host Head	ler Injection
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	5,3
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp
Entity:	queryxpath.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to deface the site content through web-cache poisoning
Cause:	Lack of input validation and sanitization
Fix:	Construct HTTP headers very carefully, avoiding the use of non-validated/unsanitized input data

10/05/2024

### **Difference:** Header (Host) manipulated from: (demo.testfire.net) to: (appscanheaderinjection.com) **Reasoning:** The value AppScan injected seems to be included in the response.

### Raw Test Response:

1	
	<li><a href="/bank/customize.jsp" id="MenuHyperLink5">Customize Site Language</a></li>
	MEMBER TOC END
1	<pre><div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"></div></pre>
	<h1>Search News Articles</h1>
	<pre><form action="https://appscanheaderinjection.com/bank/queryXpath.jsp" id="QueryXpath" method="get"></form></pre>
	Search our news articles database
	<pre></pre>
	<input id='content"' name="content" type="hidden" value="queryxpath.jsp"/>
	<input id="query" name="query" type="text" value="Enter title (e.g. Watchfire)" width="450"/>
1	<input id="Button1" type="submit" value="Query" width="75"/>
	<pre></pre>
1	
	N

# Issue 1 of 1

Inadequat	e Account Lockout
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
Entity:	passw (Parameter)
Risk:	It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Enforce account lockout after several failed login attempts

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8 Parameter (passw) manipulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0** to: 4ppSc4n

**Reasoning:** Two legitimate login attempts were sent, with several false login attempts in between. The last response was identical to the first. This suggests that there is inadequate account lockout enforcement, allowing brute-force attacks on the login page. (This is true even if the first response was not a successful login page.)

## Issue 1 of 6

Link Inject	tion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp
Entity:	query (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter query manipulated from: 1234 to: \$22\$27\$3E\$3CIMG+SRC\$3D\$22\$2FWF_XSRF1311.html\$22\$3E

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

**Test Response** 

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
RSONAL	Conrola Door		
Deposit Product	Search Resu	uits	
<u>Checking</u>			
Loan Products	No results were found fo	or the query:	
<ul> <li><u>Cards</u></li> <li>Investments &amp; Insurance</li> </ul>			
Other Services	···>		
MALL BUSINESS			
Deposit Products			
<ul> <li>Lending Services</li> <li>Cards</li> </ul>			
Insurance			
Retirement			
Other Services			
ISIDE ALTORO MUTUAL			
About Us			
Contact Us			
Locations			
Investor Relations			
Press Room			
<u>Careers</u>			
<u>Subscribe</u>			
acy Policy   Security Statement	Server Status Check REST.	API   © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc.	
			opy from GitHub and take advantage of advanced featur

TOC

## Issue 2 of 6

Link Inject	tion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp
Entity:	content (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter content manipulated from: personal.htm to: %22%27%3E%3CA+HREF%3D%22%2FWF_XSRF1434.html%22%3EInjected+Link%3C%2FA%3E

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO M	UTUAL
<u> RSONAL </u> <u> Deposit Product </u> <u> Checking </u> <u> Loan Products </u> <u> Cards </u> <u> Investments &amp; Insurance  <u> Other Services  <u> Lending Services </u> <u> Cards </u> <u> Insurance </u> <u> Retirement </u> <u> Other Services  SIDE ALTORO MUTUAL <u> About Us </u> <u> Cardat Us </u> </u></u></u>	Failed due to The reques	ted resource (/static/">Injected Link) is not available	
Locations     Investor Relations     Press Room     Careers     Subscribe			
	Server Status Check   PEST A	DI L © 2022 Altoro Mutual Inc	
icy Policy   Security Statement	Server Status Check REST A	. <u>PI</u>   © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc. T <b>his web application is open source!</b> <u>Get your copy from GitHub</u> and take advanta	ne of advanced features

**Test Response** 

# Issue 3 of 6

Link Inject	tion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp
Entity:	HostName (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter (HostName) manipulated from: (AltoroMutual) to: (\$22\$27\$3E\$3CIMG+SRC\$3D\$22\$2FWF_XSRF2178.html\$22\$3E})

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

### Test Response

{ "HostName": """>>>>", "HostStatus": "OK" }

### Issue 4 of 6

Link Inject	ion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback
Entity:	name (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

### Difference: Parameter (name) manipulated from: (John+Smith) to: (\$22\$27\$3E\$3CIMG+SRC\$3D\$22\$2FWF_XSRF1576.html\$22\$3E})

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

#### **Test Response**

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL		SMALL BUSINESS		INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	
PERSONAL • Deposit Product	Thank You	I				
Checking     Loan Products     Cards     Investments & Insurance     Other Services				ur Customer Service st et) and you will not rec	aff and given the full attentio ceive a response.	n that they
SMALL BUSINESS						
Deposit Products						
Lending Services						
• <u>Cards</u>						
Insurance     Detirement						
<ul> <li><u>Retirement</u></li> <li>Other Services</li> </ul>						
INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL						
• <u>About Us</u>						
<u>Contact Us</u>						
Locations     Investor Relations						
Press Room						
<u>Careers</u>						
<u>Subscribe</u>						
ivacy Policy   Security Statement	Server Status Check RES		toro Mutual, Inc.			
		inis web applicat	ion is open source! 🤤	<u>et your copy trom Gitr</u>	<u>lub</u> and take advantage of ad	vancea teatures

10/05/2024

Link Inject	ion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp
Entity:	query (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

### Difference: Parameter (query) manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: %22%27%3E%3CIMG+SRC%3D%22%2FWF_XSRF2333.html%22%3E

# **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

#### **Test Response**

	Search	News Articles		
		s articles database		
pration for the sole purpose o	This web applie	cation is open source! <u>Get your copy fi</u>	ing web application vulnerabilities and	website
e any risk in relation to your tegory/SWI10.				er en j kinaj
	oration for the sole purpose o Similarities, if any, to third par	rver Status Check   REST API   © 2023 Al This web appli oration for the sole purpose of demonstrating the Similarities, if any, to third party products and/or ne any risk in relation to your use of this website tegory/SWI10.	News title not found, try again           rver Status Check         REST API         © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc.           This web application is open source! Get your copy fr           oration for the sole purpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in detect           similarities, if any, to third party products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This si           ne any risk in relation to your use of this website. For more information, please go to <a <a="" any="" as="" for="" go="" href="http://www-tteggry/SWI10" in="" information,="" is"="" more="" ne="" of="" please="" relation="" risk="" this="" to="" use="" warranty="" website.="" without="" your="">http://www-tteggry/SWI10</a> .	

# Issue 6 of 6

Link Inject	ion (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Severity:	Medium
CVSS Score:	6,5
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
Entity:	lang (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter (lang) manipulated from: (international) to: \$22\$27\$3E\$3CIMG+SRC\$3D\$22\$2FWF_XSRF2482.html\$22\$3E

### Test Response

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
WANT TO View Account Summary View Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles		Customize Site Language
<u>Customize Site Language</u>		You can change the language setting by choosing:
The AltoroJ website is published by lefects. This site is not a real ban	/ IBM Corporation for the sole pu king site. Similarities, if any, to t	urpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website third party products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind,
The AltoroJ website is published by lefects. This site is not a real ban ither express or implied. IBM does 42.jbm.com/software/products/us	/ IBM Corporation for the sole pu king site. Similarities, if any, to t not assume any risk in relation /en/subcategory/SWI10.	I       Image: Contract of the second s
The AltoroJ website is published by lefects. This site is not a real ban ither express or implied. IBM does 142.ibm.com/software/products/us	/ IBM Corporation for the sole pu king site. Similarities, if any, to t not assume any risk in relation /en/subcategory/SWI10.	REST API       © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc.         This web application is open source! Get your copy from GitHub       and take advantage of advanced features         urpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website       this site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind,
The AltoroJ website is published by defects. This site is not a real ban	/ IBM Corporation for the sole pu king site. Similarities, if any, to t not assume any risk in relation /en/subcategory/SWI10.	REST API       © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc.         This web application is open source! Get your copy from GitHub       and take advantage of advanced features         urpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website       this site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind,
The AltoroJ website is published by lefects. This site is not a real ban ither express or implied. IBM does 42.jbm.com/software/products/us	/ IBM Corporation for the sole pu king site. Similarities, if any, to t not assume any risk in relation /en/subcategory/SWI10.	Image: REST API [ © 2023 Altoro Mutual, Inc.         This web application is open source! Get your copy from GitHub and take advantage of advanced features         urpose of demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in detecting web application vulnerabilities and website third party products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind,

# M Missing Secure Attribute in Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie 1

TOC

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a link to the file "WF_XSRF.html".

## Issue 1 of 1

### Missing Secure Attribute in Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie

Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/	
Entity:	AltoroAccounts (Cookie)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal user and session information (cookies) that was sent during an encrypted session	
Cause:	The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL	
Fix:	Add the 'Secure' attribute to all sensitive cookies	

### Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8)

**Reasoning:** AppScan found that an encrypted session (SSL) is using a cookie without the "secure" attribute.

### Original Response

uid=jsmith&passw=**CONFIDENTIAL 0**&btnSubmit=Login
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Location: /bank/main.jsp Content-Length: 0 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:16:37 GMT Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=A316AA5F42F8A4FF124E05481469C272; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
AltoroAccounts="ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjguMjkxMjcyMDg1NTE3OTNFMjB8NDUzOTA 4MjAzOTM5NjI4OH5DcmVkaXQgQ2FyZH4tMS45OTk1NDM0MDEyNzg3MTIzMkUxOHw="; Version=1
<pre>GET /bank/main.jsp HTTP/1.1 Cookie: JSESSIONID=A316AA5F42F8A4FF124E05481469C272; AltoroAccounts="ODAwMDAyf1NhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjguMjkxMjcyMDg1NTE3OTNFMjB8NDUzOTA 4MjAzOTMSNj14OH5DcmVkaXQgQ2FyZH4tMS45OTk1NDM0MDEyNzg3MTIzMkUxOHw=" Accept-Language: en-US Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin</pre>

M Older TLS Version is Supported 1

Issue 1 of 1

тос

тос

10/05/2024

Older TLS	der TLS Version is Supported	
Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	5,3	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	
Cause:	The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way	
Fix:	Use a different signature algorithm for the certificate. See "Fix Recommentation" for specific server instructions	

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan discovered that the server supports an older TLS version (either TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1) **Raw Test Response:** 

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:00:33 GMT Content-Length: 8519
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"
<html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html>

Issue 1 of 7

Phishing Through Frames		
Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp	
Entity:	query (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.	
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

Difference: Parameter query manipulated from: 1234 to: 1234%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D1323+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

# Issue 2 of 7

 Phishing Through Frames

 Severity:
 Medium

 CVSS Score:
 6,5

 URL:
 https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp

 Entity:
 content (Parameter)

 Risk:
 It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

 Cause:
 Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

 Fix:
 Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference:	Parameter (content) manipulated from: (personal.htm) to:	
	personal.htm%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D1437+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E	
Bassaning	The test result ecome to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe t	

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

### Issue 3 of 7

TOC

Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	
Entity:	name (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.	
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

John+Smith%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D1587+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E)

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

### Issue 4 of 7

 Phishing Through Frames

 Severity:
 Medium

 CVSS Score:
 6,5

 URL:
 https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback

 Entity:
 email_addr (Parameter)

 Risk:
 It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

 Cause:
 Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

 Fix:
 Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter email_addr manipulated from: 753+Main+Street to: 753+Main+Street%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D1647+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

### Issue 5 of 7

тос

Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp	
Entity:	HostName (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.	
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

AltoroMutual%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D2180+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

# Issue 6 of 7

 Phishing Through Frames

 Severity:
 Medium

 CVSS Score:
 6,5

 URL:
 https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp

 Entity:
 query (Parameter)

 Risk:
 It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

 Cause:
 Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

 Fix:
 Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection

Difference: Parameter (query) manipulated from: Enter title (e.g. Watchfire) to: Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D2349+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html% 3E

Reasoning: The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

### Issue 7 of 7

тос

Phishing 1	nishing Through Frames	
Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp	
Entity:	lang (Parameter)	
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.	
Cause:	Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input	
Fix:	Review possible solutions for hazardous character injection	

Difference: Parameter [lang] manipulated from: international to: international%27%22%3E%3Ciframe+id%3D2486+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fdemo.testfire.net%2Fphishing.html%3E

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the test response contained a frame/iframe to URL "http://demo.testfire.net/phishing.html".

### M SHA-1 cipher suites were detected 1

### Issue 1 of 1

SHA-1 cip	SHA-1 cipher suites were detected	
Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	5,3	
URL:	ttps://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	
Cause:	use: The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way	
Fix:	Change server's supported ciphersuites	

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan determined that the site uses weak cipher suites by successfully creating SSL connections using each of the weak cipher suites listed here.

Verify that the site uses the cryptographically weak cipher suites listed here.

### The following weak cipher suites are supported by the server:

ld	Name	SSL Version
51	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.0
57	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.0

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49171	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.0
49172	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.0
51	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.1
57	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.1
49171	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.1
49172	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.1
51	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.2
57	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.2
49171	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.2
49172	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS 1.2

# м Session Identifier Not Updated 1

# Issue 1 of 1

Session Identifier Not Updated		
Severity:	Medium	
CVSS Score:	6,5	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	
Entity:	doLogin (Page)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user	
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration	
Fix:	Change session identifier values after login	

Difference:

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the session identifiers in the Original Request and in the Response are identical. They should have been updated in the response.

**Original Request** 

**Original Response** 

	HTTP/1.1 302 Found Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Location: /bank/main.jsp Content-Length: 0 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:00:35 GMT Set-Cookie: AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdml uZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwM DAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTI wfDQ1MzkwODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+L TEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
uid=jsmith&passw=**CONFIDENTIAL 0**&btnSub mit=Login	<pre>GET /bank/main.jsp HTTP/1.1 Host: demo.testfire.net Connection: keep-alive Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, lik e Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,ap plication/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp, image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-ex change;v=b3;q=0.7 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document </pre>

### Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field 4

### Issue 1 of 4

Autocomplete HTML Attribute	Not Disabled for Password Field
-----------------------------	---------------------------------

Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp
Entity:	login.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Correctly set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off"

### Difference:

Reasoning: AppScan has found that a password field does not enforce the disabling of the autocomplete feature.

**Raw Test Response:** 

```
. . .
    Password:
    <input type="password" id="passw" name="passw" style="width: 150px;">
     <input type="submit" name="btnSubmit" value="Login">
     . . .
```

TOC

Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field						
Severity:	Low					
CVSS Score:	3,7					
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp					
Entity:	apply.jsp (Page)					
Risk:	It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism					
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration					
Fix:	Correctly set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off"					

**Reasoning:** AppScan has found that a password field does not enforce the disabling of the autocomplete feature. **Raw Test Response:** 

MEMBER TOC END
<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;"></div>
<pre><div class="fi" style="width: 99%;">                                                  </div></pre>
<pre><span><b>No application is needed.</b>To approve your new \$10000 Altoro Mutual Gold Visa br /&gt;with an 7.9% APR simply</span></pre>
enter your password below.
<span id="_ctl0ctl0_Content_Main_message" style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;"></span>
<pre><form action="ccApply" method="post" name="Credit">Password:<input <br="" type="password"/>name="passwd"&gt;</form></pre>
<pre></pre>
BEGIN FOOTER
See Begin Pooler>

# Issue 3 of 4

тос

Autocomp	Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field						
Severity:	Low						
CVSS Score:	3,7						
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply						
Entity:	ccApply (Page)						
Risk:	It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism						
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration						
Fix:	Correctly set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off"						

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan has found that a password field does not enforce the disabling of the autocomplete feature. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
. . .
     <!-- MEMBER TOC END -->
     <div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
    <h1>Altoro Mutual Gold Visa Application</h1>
    <b>No application is needed.</b>To approve your new $10000 Altoro Mutual Gold Visa<br />with an 7.9% APR simply
enter your password below.
    <span id="_ctl0__ctl0_Content_Main_message" style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;">
    Login Failed: We're sorry, but this username or password was not found in our system. Please try again.
    </span>
   <form method="post" name="Credit" action="ccApply"><form method="post" name="credit" action="ccApply"</td>
name="passwd"><id><input type="submit" name="Submit" value="Submit" ></form></span>
  </div>
     </div>
<!-- BEGIN FOOTER -->
. . .
```

## Issue 4 of 4

TOC

Autocomp	nplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field						
Severity:	Low						
CVSS Score:	3,7						
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp						
Entity:	admin.jsp (Page)						
Risk:	It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism						
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration						
Fix:	Correctly set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off"						

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan has found that a password field does not enforce the disabling of the autocomplete feature. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
...
    <option value="jsmith">jsmith</option>
    <option value="sspeed">sspeed</option>
    <option value="tuser">tuser</option>
    </select>

        <input type="password" name="passwordl">

        <input type="password" name="password2">

        <input type="password" name="password2">
```

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```
<input type="submit" name="change" value="Change Password">
    </form>
   <!-- action="addUser" -->
   <form method="post" name="addUser" action="" id="addUser" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);">
   . . .
. . .
    <input type="text" name="firstname">
      <br>
      <input type="text" name="lastname">
    <input type="text" name="username">
    <input type="password" name="password1">
      <br>
      <input type="password" name="password2">
    <input type="submit" name="add" value="Add User">
    It is highly recommended that you leave the username as first
     initial last name.
    . . .
```

## Body Parameters Accepted in Query 3

# Issue 1 of 3

Body Parameters Accepted in Query							
Severity:	Low						
CVSS Score:	3,7						
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer						
Entity:	doTransfer (Page)						
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations						
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration						
Fix:	Do not accept body parameters that are sent in the query string						

Difference: Body Parameter removed from request: (800003) Query Parameter added to request: (800003) Body Parameter removed from request: (800003)

тос

Query Parameter added to request: 800003 Body Parameter removed from request: 1234 Query Parameter added to request: 1234 Body Parameter removed from request: Transfer Money Query Parameter added to request: Transfer Money Method manipulated from: POST to: GET

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is similar to the Original Response, indicating that the application processed body parameters that were submitted in the query

**Test Response** 

### **Original Response**

MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	MY ACCOUNT	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL
WANT TO     View Account Summary     View Recent Transactions	Transfer Funds			I WANT TO View Account Summary View Recent Transactions	Transfer Funds		
Transfer Funds     Search News Articles	From Account: To Account:	800002 Savings		Transfer Funds     Search News Articles	From Account: To Account:	800002 Savings 800002 Savings	~
Cuitonize Site Language	Amount to Transfer:	autouz savings V		<u>Cuttomize Site Language</u>	Amount to Transfer:	auduuz sawings	
		Transfer Noney				Transfer Money	
		insferred from Account 800003 into Account 800				sfully transferred from Account 800003 int	
wacy Policy I Security Statement	I Server Status Check   REST API   © 2023 Alto		003 at 11/2/23 4:00 AM.	Rivacy Policy   Security Statement	Server Status Check   REST API   ©		3 Account 800003 at 11/2/23 4:05 AM.
		stion is open source! <u>Get your capy from GitHy</u>	<u>i</u> and take advantage of advanced features				<u>gy from GitHyb</u> and take advantage of advan
The Altorn1 website is sublished by IR	4 Corporation for the sole purpose of demonstrating the site. Similarities, if any, to third party products and/or w	vebsites are purely coincidental. This site is provi	ided "as is" without warranty of any kind,	defects. This site is not a real banking site	e. Similarities, if any, to third party products sume any risk in relation to your use of this	and/or websites are purely coincidental. 1	etecting web application vulnerabilities and we his site is provided "as is" without warranty of <u>http://www-</u>
defects. This site is not a real banking	: assume any risk in relation to your use of this website. //wbcategory/20/110-			Copyright () 2008, 2023, IBM Corporation,	dil sistem encount		
defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does no	/subcategory/DW110			copyright @ 2006, 2023, ten corporation,	, an ingina reserved.		
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defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does no 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/er	/subcategory/DW110			copyright & 2006, 2008, and corporation	an ngins reserves.		
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## Issue 2 of 3

Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions
Entity:	showTransactions (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Do not accept body parameters that are sent in the query string

- Query Parameter added to request: 2019-01-01 Body Parameter removed from request: 2019-01-01 Query Parameter added to request: 2019-01-01 Method manipulated from: POST to: GET
- **Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is similar to the Original Response, indicating that the application processed body parameters that were submitted in the query

**Original Response** 

**Test Response** 

тос

MY ACCOUNT			INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL		010 T	-		INSIDE ALTO	
MY ACCOUNT  I WANT TO      View Account Summary	Recent Tra	small BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	I WANT TO		Recent Tran	small BUSINESS	INSIDE ALTO	O MUTUAL
View Recent Transactions     Transfer Funds     Search News Articles	After 2019-01-01 yyyy-mm-dd	Before 2019-01-01 yyyy-mm-dd	- Trac 200	Recent Transactions for Funds th News Articles mice Site Language	After 2019-01-01 yyyy-mm-dd	Before 2019-01-01 yyyy-mm-dd	Submit		
Cuttorrize Site Language	Transaction 10	Transaction Time Account I	D Action Amount		uuren anen rekolanise	Transaction 10	Transaction Time	Account ID Action	Amour
defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does not	site. Similarities, if any, to third part assume any risk in relation to your	demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM products in det y products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This are of this website. For more information, please go to <u>b</u>	site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit	d, defects. The either expression	site is not a real banking site.	Similarities, if any, to third party are any risk in relation to your up	demonstrating the effectiveness of IBM produ products and/or websites are purely coincid se of this website. For more information, plea	lental. This site is provided "as is" wit	
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defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does not 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en	site. Similarities, if any, to third part assume any risk in relation to your /subcategory/SW/10-	y products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This	site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit	d, defects. The wither expression 142 ibm.com	i site is not a real banking site. Is or implied. IBM does not assi /software/products/us/er/subs	Similarities, if any, to third party ane any risk in relation to your us ategory/SW110-	products and/or websites are purely coincid	lental. This site is provided "as is" wit	
defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does not 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en	site. Similarities, if any, to third part assume any risk in relation to your /subcategory/SW/10-	y products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This	site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit	d, defects. The wither expression 142 ibm.com	i site is not a real banking site. Is or implied. IBM does not assi /software/products/us/er/subs	Similarities, if any, to third party ane any risk in relation to your us ategory/SW110-	products and/or websites are purely coincid	lental. This site is provided "as is" wit	
defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does not 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en	site. Similarities, if any, to third part assume any risk in relation to your /subcategory/SW/10-	y products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This	site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit	d, defects. The wither expression 142 ibm.com	i site is not a real banking site. Is or implied. IBM does not assi /software/products/us/er/subs	Similarities, if any, to third party ane any risk in relation to your us ategory/SW110-	products and/or websites are purely coincid	lental. This site is provided "as is" wit	
defects. This site is not a real banking either express or implied. IBM does not 142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en	site. Similarities, if any, to third part assume any risk in relation to your /subcategory/SW/10-	y products and/or websites are purely coincidental. This	site is provided "as is" without warranty of any kit	d, defects. The wither expression 142 ibm.com	i site is not a real banking site. Is or implied. IBM does not assi /software/products/us/er/subs	Similarities, if any, to third party ane any risk in relation to your us ategory/SW110-	products and/or websites are purely coincid	lental. This site is provided "as is" wit	

# Issue 3 of 3

тос

Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp
Entity:	admin.jsp (Page)
	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Do not accept body parameters that are sent in the query string

Body Parameter removed from request: Savings

Query Parameter added to request: Savings Method manipulated from: POST to: GET

**Reasoning:** The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the Test Response is similar to the Original Response, indicating that the application processed body parameters that were submitted in the query

**Original Response** 

**Test Response** 

View Account Summary     View Recent Transactions     Transfer Funds	Edit User Info		View Account Summary     View Recent Transactions     Transfer Funds	Edit User Info	rmation					
Search News Articles     Customize Site Language	Add an account to an	1 existing user				Search News Articles     Cuitomize Site Language	Add an account to an	existing user		
	Users: admin v	Account Types: Sewings		Add Account			Users: admin 🗸	Account Types: Savings V		Add Account
	Change user's passv	vord			$\sim$		Change user's passw	ord		
	users:	Password:	Confirm:	Change Password	$\sim$		users: admin 🗸	Passward:	Confirm:	Change Password
	Add an new user						Add an new user			
	First Name: Last Name:	Username:	Password: Confirm:	Add User			First Name: Last Name:	Username:	Password: Confirm:	Add User
	It is highly recommended that y	you leave the username as first initial	last name.				It is highly recommended that y	ou leave the username as first initial L	ist name.	
Privacy Fulloy I Security Statement						Privacy Patery   Security Statement	I Server Status Check   PEST	API   © 2223 Altoro Mutual. Inc.		
L Cacheab	le SSL I	Page Fo	und 17							

Altoro Mutual

## Issue 1 of 17

**Altoro**Mutual

Cacheable	eable SSL Page Found							
Severity:	Low							
CVSS Score:	3,7							
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp							
Entity:	login.jsp (Page)							
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations							
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser							
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.							

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

## Raw Test Response:

TOC

SITE

	1
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х	

# Issue 2 of 17

Cacheable	SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp
Entity:	index.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

### **Raw Test Response:**

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:21 GMT
```

# Issue 3 of 17

Cacheable	SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp
Entity:	feedback.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

### Raw Test Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:53 GMT	
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xl<br <html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html>	htmll-transitional.dtd">

## Issue 4 of 17

TOC

Cacheable	SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/properties.json
Entity:	properties.json (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

**Raw Test Response:** 

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: W/"9400-1553517609517"
Last-Modified: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:40:09 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 9400
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:04:58 GMT
{
 "basePath": "/api",
 "paths": {
    "/login": {
                 : {
"get": {
"tags": [
                                  "1. Login"
                          "summary": "Check if any user is logged in",
                          "description": "If a user is loggedin the username will be returned",
                          "operationId": "checkLogin",
. . .
```

## Issue 5 of 17

 Cacheable SSL Page Found

 Severity:
 Low

 CVSS Score:
 3,7

 URL:
 https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp

 Entity:
 queryxpath.jsp (Page)

 Risk:
 It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

 Cause:
 Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser

 Fix:
 Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### Raw Test Response:

80

	1
	1
	1
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	1
•••	1
	1
	1
	 1

# Issue 6 of 17

Cacheable	e SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp
Entity:	transaction.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**



# Issue 7 of 17

Cacheable	e SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp
Entity:	apply.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

### Raw Test Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 5710 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:03:18 GMT	
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"<br <html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html>	'>

## Issue 8 of 17

TOC

Cacheable	SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
Entity:	customize.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

**Raw Test Response:** 

## Issue 9 of 17

TOC

Cacheable	e SSL Page Found
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp
Entity:	main.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 6109
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:58 GMT
<!-- BEGIN HEADER -->
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" >
```

	1
	1
	1
	1
	1
•••	1
	1
	1
	/

# Issue 10 of 17

Cacheable	acheable SSL Page Found	
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score:	3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp	
Entity:	transfer.jsp (Page)	
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations	
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser	
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.	

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**



# Issue 11 of 17

Cacheable SSL Page Found					
Severity:	Low				
CVSS Score:	3,7				
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp				
Entity:	search.jsp (Page)				
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations				
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser				
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.				

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

### Raw Test Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 6969 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:03:42 GMT	
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transition</td <td>al.dtd"&gt;</td>	al.dtd">
<html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html>	

# Issue 12 of 17

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Cacheable	Cacheable SSL Page Found				
Severity:	Low				
CVSS Score:	3,7				
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount				
Entity:	showAccount (Page)				
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations				
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser				
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.				

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:03:42 GMT
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"
<html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html>

## Issue 13 of 17

TOC

Cacheable	Cacheable SSL Page Found					
Severity:	Low					
CVSS Score:	3,7					
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp					
Entity:	subscribe.jsp (Page)					
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations					
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser					
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.					

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**

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# Issue 14 of 17

Cacheable	e SSL Page Found			
Severity:	Low			
CVSS Score:	3,7			
URL: https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp				
Entity:	status_check.jsp (Page)			
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations			
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser			
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.			

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**



## Issue 15 of 17

Cacheable SSL Page Found					
Severity:	Low				
CVSS Score:	3,7				
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp				
Entity:	serverStatusCheckService.jsp (Page)				
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations				
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser				
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.				

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Length: 59
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:04:49 GMT
{
    "HostName": "AltoroMutual",
    "HostStatus": "OK"
}...
```

# Issue 16 of 17

Cacheable	Cacheable SSL Page Found					
Severity:	Low					
CVSS Score:	3,7					
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp					
Entity:	survey_questions.jsp (Page)					
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations					
Cause:	Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser					
Fix:	Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.					

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

#### **Raw Test Response:**

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1

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Trans	fer-Er	ncod	ding:	chur	nked	
Date:	Thu,	02	Nov	2023	09:05:32	GMT

## Issue 17 of 17

 Cacheable SSL Page Found

 Severity:
 Low

 CVSS Score:
 3,7

 URL:
 https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp

 Entity:
 admin.jsp (Page)

 Risk:
 It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

 Cause:
 Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser

 Fix:
 Prevent caching of SSL pages by adding "Cache-Control: no-store" and "Pragma: no-cache" headers to their responses.

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with a response that indicates the page should be cached, but cache controls aren't set (you can set "Cache-Control: no-store" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" or "Pragma: no-cache" to prevent caching).

## Raw Test Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:25:06 GMT
<pre><!-- BEGIN HEADER--> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">     <html xml:lang="en" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></html></pre>
<head></head>

## Issue 1 of 4

Credit Card Number Pattern Found (Visa)				
Severity:	Low			
CVSS Score:	3,7			
URL: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp				
Entity:	main.jsp (Page)			
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations			
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration			
Fix:	Remove credit card numbers from your website			

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains a complete Visa credit card number. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
. . .
 <form name="details" method="get" action="showAccount">
 <TR valign="top">
    View Account Details:
    <select size="1" name="listAccounts" id="listAccounts">
   <option value="800002" >800002 Savings</option>
<option value="800003" >800003 Checking</option>
<option value="4539082039396288" >4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
   </select>
     <input type="submit" id="btnGetAccount" value=" G0 ">
    </h2>You have been pre-approved for an Altoro Gold Visa with a credit limit of $10000!Visa with a credit limit of $10000!
Click <a href='apply.jsp'>Here</a> to apply.</span>
  . . .
```

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Credit Card Number Pattern Found (Visa)	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp
Entity:	transfer.jsp (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove credit card numbers from your website

**Reasoning:** The response contains a complete Visa credit card number. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
. . .
 strong>From Account:</strong>
     <select size="1" id="fromAccount" name="fromAccount">
   <option value="800002" >800002 Savings</option>
<option value="800003" >800003 Checking</option>
<option value="4539082039396288" >4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
    </select>
     <strong>To Account:</strong>
    <select size="1" id="toAccount" name="toAccount">
   <option value="800002">800002 Savings</option>
<option value="800003">800003 Checking</option>
<option value="4539082039396288">4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
   </select>
     <strong> Amount to Transfer:</strong>
    <input type="text" id="transferAmount" name="transferAmount">
   . . .
```

Credit Car	d Number Pattern Found (Visa)
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount
Entity:	showAccount (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove credit card numbers from your website

**Reasoning:** The response contains a complete Visa credit card number.

## Raw Test Response:

```
. . .
         Balance Detail

<form id="Form1" method="get" action="showAccount">
<select size="1" name="listAccounts" id="listAccounts">
      <option value="800003">800003 Checking</option>
<option value="800002">800002 Savings</option>
<option value="4539082039396288">4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
     </select>
         <input type="submit" id="btnGetAccount" Value="Select Account">
         </FORM>
         Amount
         . . .
```

# Issue 4 of 4

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Credit Car	d Number Pattern Found (Visa)
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	doTransfer (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove credit card numbers from your website

#### Difference:

#### Reasoning: The response contains a complete Visa credit card number.

#### Raw Test Response:

```
. . .
 <strong>From Account:</strong>
     <select size="1" id="fromAccount" name="fromAccount">
   <option value="800002" >800002 Savings</option>
<option value="800003" >800003 Checking</option>
<option value="4539082039396288" >4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
    </select>
    strong>To Account:</strong>
    <select size="1" id="toAccount" name="toAccount">
   <option value="800002">800002 Savings</option>
<option value="800003">800003 Checking</option>
<option value="4539082039396288">4539082039396288 Credit Card</option>
    </select>
     <strong> Amount to Transfer:</strong>
     <input type="text" id="transferAmount" name="transferAmount">
   . . .
```

## Encryption Not Enforced 1

## Issue 1 of 1

n Not Enforced
Low
3,7
https://demo.testfire.net/
demo.testfire.net (Page)
It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted
The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information. An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels.
Enforce the use of HTTPS when sending sensitive information


Difference: Scheme manipulated from: https to: http

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тос

Port manipulated from: 443 to: 80 Header (Host) manipulated from: demo.testfire.net to: demo.testfire.net:80

**Reasoning:** The test response is very similar to the original response. This indicates that the the resource was successfully accessed using HTTP instead of HTTPS.



## Missing "Content-Security-Policy" header 1

## Issue 1 of 1

Missing "O	Content-Security-Policy" header
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Config your server to use the "Content-Security-Policy" header with secure policies

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan detected that the Content-Security-Policy response header is missing or with an insecure policy, which increases exposure to various cross-site injection attacks

#### **Raw Test Response:**

... Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp

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	AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmlu23N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw
	ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
	Content-Length: 0
	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
	Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
	Accept-Ranges: bytes
	ETag: W/"1427-1548795420000"
	Last-Modified: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:57:00 GMT
	Content-Type: text/html
	Content-Length: 1427
	Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:14:35 GMT
	HTML for static distribution bundle build
	HTML for static distribution bundle build html
	<pre><!--DOCTIVE html--> </pre> <pre></pre> <p< th=""></p<>
	<pre><meta charset="utf-8"/></pre>
	<title>Swagger UI</title>
	<li>link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="./swagger-ui.css" &gt;</li>
	<pre></pre>
	<pre><li><li>k rel="icon" type="image/png" href=".favicon-16x16.png" sizes="16x16" /&gt;</li></li></pre>
1	<style></th></tr><tr><th>1</th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th>1</th><th></th></tr><tr><th>1</th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Missing HttpOnly Attribute in Session Cookie 1</th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th></tr></tbody></table></style>

# Issue 1 of 1

Accept-Language: en-US

Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;

Missing Ht	ttpOnly Attribute in Session Cookie
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	AltoroAccounts (Cookie)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user
Cause:	The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute
Fix:	Add the 'HttpOnly' attribute to all session cookies

Difference: Cookie (JSESSIONID) removed from request: 6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8)

**Reasoning:** AppScan found that a session cookie is used without the "HttpOnly" attribute. **Original Response** 

```
...
uid=jsmith&passw=**CONFIDENTIAL 0**&btnSubmit=Login
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Location: /bank/main.jsp
```

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тос

Date Set-( <mark>Set-(</mark> Alto:	ent-Length: 0 : Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:16:37 GMT Cookie: JSESSIONID=18046DD169D1DA3A5265A8F55B1ED898; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly <mark>Cookie:</mark> roAccounts="ODAwMDAyf1NhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjguMjkxMjcyMDg1NTE3OTNFMjB8NDUzOTA zOTM5NjI4OH5DcmVkaXQgQ2FyZH4tMS45OTk1NDM0MDEyNzg3MTIzMkUxOHw="; Version=1	
Cook Alto 4MjA Acce Acce	/bank/main.jsp HTTP/1.1 ie: JSESSIONID=18046DD169D1DA3A5265A8F55B1ED898; roAccounts="ODAwMDAyf1NhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQ2NDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjguMjkxMjcyMDg1NTE3OTNFMjB8NDUzOTA zOTM5Nj14OH5DcmVkaXQgQ2FyZH4tMS45OTk1NDMOMDEyNzg3MTIZMkUxOHw=" pt-Language: en-US pt: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 rer: https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	

# Missing or insecure "X-Content-Type-Options" header ④

# Issue 1 of 1

Missing o	r insecure "X-Content-Type-Options" header
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Config your server to use the "X-Content-Type-Options" header with "nosniff" value

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan detected that the "X-Content-Type-Options" response header is missing or has an insecure value, which increases exposure to drive-by download attacks

## Raw Test Response:

<pre>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed- exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Sec-Fetch-Dest: document</pre>
Accept-Language: en-US Content-Length: 0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

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Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:20 GMT Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=6E9208129C77FD658F688F6A07E27501; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly

Missing or insecure Cross-Frame Scripting Defence ①

# Issue 1 of 1

. . .

Missing or insecure Cross-Frame Scripting Defence	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Config your server to use the "X-Frame-Options" header with DENY or SAMEORIGIN value

### Difference:

Reasoning: AppScan detected that the X-Frame-Options response header is missing or with insecure value, which may allow Cross-Frame Scripting attacks

#### Raw Test Response:

...
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
AltoroAccounts=ODAWMDAyf1Nhdmlu23N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw
ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

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# Missing or insecure HTTP Strict-Transport-Security Header ①

# Issue 1 of 1

. . .

тос

Missing or	· insecure HTTP Strict-Transport-Security Header
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Implement the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security policy with a long "max-age"

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan detected that the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security response header is missing or with insufficient "max-age" **Raw Test Response:** 

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:02:20 GMT Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=6E9208129C77FD658F688F6A07E27501; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly	
Set-Cookie. USESSIONID-DE9200129C//FD030F000F0R0/E2/301, Fach-/, Secure, Helponiy	
BEGIN HEADER html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd" 	

## Issue 1 of 11

тос

Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score: 3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp
Entity:	HostName (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 

```
...

GET /util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp?<mark>HostName</mark>=AltoroMutual HTTP/1.1

Host: demo.testfire.net

Connection: keep-alive

sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116"

sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"

Accept: */*

Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin

Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors

...
```

# Issue 2 of 11

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Query Par	Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score: 3,7		
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp	
Entity:	query (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 



# Issue 3 of 11

Query Par	Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity: Low		
CVSS Score:	e: 3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	
Entity:	content (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 

```
...
GET /index.jsp?<mark>content</mark>=personal.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: demo.testfire.net
Connection: keep-alive
```

<pre>sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116"</pre>	
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0	
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"	
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, 1	like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept:	
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/	/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-
exchange;v=b3;q=0.7	
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin	
S	

# Issue 4 of 11

TOC

Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount
Entity:	listAccounts (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.

### Difference:

## Reasoning: AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL.

## **Original Request**

GET /bank/showAccount?listAccounts=800003 HTTP/1.1	
Host: demo.testfire.net	
Connection: keep-alive	
<pre>sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116"</pre>	
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0	
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"	
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (H	<pre>KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36</pre>
Accept:	
<pre>text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp</pre>	,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-
exchange;v=b3;q=0.7	
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin	

# Issue 5 of 11

тос

Query Par	Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score: 3,7		
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp	
Entity:	step (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 



# Issue 6 of 11

TOC

Query Parameter in SSL Request		
Severity: Low		
CVSS Score:	: 3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp	
Entity:	content (Parameter)	
Risk: It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent of		
Cause:	Cause: Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 

```
...
POST /bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp&lang=international HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: JSESSIONID=1DAB8EDCD7B25D3144C0FAEF39C14A1C;
```

AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw
ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=international
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 0

# Issue 7 of 11

тос

Query Par	Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score: 3,7		
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp	
Entity:	content (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL.

**Original Request** 

 GET /bank/queryxpath.jsp? <mark>content</mark> =queryxpath.jsp&query=Enter+title+%28e.q.+Watchfire%29 HTTP/1.1
Host: demo.testfire.net
Connection: keep-alive
sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116"
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-
exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
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# Issue 8 of 11

тос

Query Parameter in SSL Request	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp
Entity:	job (Parameter)
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 

 GET /index.jsp?content=inside jobs.htm& <mark>job</mark> =OperationalRiskManager:RiskManagement HTTP/1.1
Cookie: JSESSIONID=1DAB8EDCD7E25D3144C0FAEF39C14A1C;
AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 0

# Issue 9 of 11

Query Parameter in SSL Request		
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score:	3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp	
Entity:	query (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

## Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 

GET /bank/queryxpath.jsp?content=queryxpath.jsp&<mark>query</mark>=Enter+title+%28e.g.+Watchfire%29 HTTP/1.1 Host: demo.testfire.net Connection: keep-alive sec-ch-ua: "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="116"

# Issue 10 of 11

TOC

Query Parameter in SSL Request		
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score:	3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp	
Entity:	lang (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL.

Original	Request
----------	---------

POST /bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp& <mark>lang</mark> =international HTTP/1.1	
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded	
Cookie: JSESSIONID=1DAB8EDCD7B25D3144C0FAEF39C14A1C;	
AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw	
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=international	
Host: demo.testfire.net	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36	
Content-Length: 0	
<	
	<pre>POST /bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp\$lang=international HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: JSESSIONID=1DABBEDCD7B25D3144C0FAEF39C14A1C; AltoroAccounts=ODAWMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh80DAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzk2OTYyODh+Q3JIZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAXMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Accept-Language: en-US Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=international Host: demo.testfire.net User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Content-Length: 0</pre>

## Issue 11 of 11

тос

Query Parameter in SSL Request		
Severity:	Low	
CVSS Score:	3,7	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp	
Entity:	txtEmail (Parameter)	
Risk:	It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted	
Cause:	Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information	
Fix:	Always use SSL and POST (body) parameters when sending sensitive information.	

**Reasoning:** AppScan found parameters in the query part of the HTTP request, which was sent over SSL. **Original Request** 



## Unnecessary Http Response Headers found in the Application 🕚

## Issue 1 of 1

Unnecessary Http Response Headers found in the Application	
Severity:	Low
CVSS Score:	3,7
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Do not allow sensitive information to leak.

Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains unnecessary headers, which may help attackers in planning further attacks. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
...
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO=8859=1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:01:47 GMT
...
```

## Issue 1 of 7

Applicatio	n Error
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount
Entity:	listAccounts (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

Difference: Parameter (listAccounts) manipulated from: (800003) to: (800

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

```
. . .
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp
Accept-Language: en-US
Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 0
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en
Content-Length: 2233
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:09:32 GMT
Connection: close
<!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font-
family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-
serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-
color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY
. . .
```

Applicatio	on Error
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	: 0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	transferAmount (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

Difference: Parameter (transferAmount) manipulated from: (1234) to: -

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### Raw Test Response:

Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp
Host: demo.testfire.net
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
Content-Length: 75
fromAccount=800003&toAccount=800003&transferAmount=&transfer=Transfer+Money
HTTP/1.1 <mark>500</mark> Internal Server Error
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en
Content-Length: 1794
Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:15 GMT
Connection: close
html <html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font- family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans- serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background- color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY</td></tr><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td></td></tr><tr><td>~</td></tr></tbody></table></style></head></html>

# Issue 3 of 7

Application Error	
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions
Entity:	startDate (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

#### Difference: Parameter (startDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (\")

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

. . . Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 31 startDate=\"&endDate=2019-01-01 HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:10 GMT Connection: close <!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {fontfamily:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sansserif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;backgroundcolor:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY . . .

# Issue 4 of 7

Application Error	
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	toAccount (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

#### Difference: Parameter (toAccount) manipulated from: (800003) to: (827)

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp Host: demo.testfire.net User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 76	
fromAccount=800003&toAccount=%27&transferAmount=1234&transfer=Transfer+Money	
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en Content-Length: 1775 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:10 GMT Connection: close	
<pre><!DOCTYPE html>    <html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font- family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans- serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background- color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY </pre></th><th></th></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table></style></head></html></pre>	

# Issue 5 of 7

Application Error	
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions
Entity:	endDate (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

#### Difference: Parameter (endDate) manipulated from: (2019-01-01) to: (%00)

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

. . . Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 32 startDate=2019-01-01&endDate=%00 HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en Transfer-Encoding: chunked Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:10 GMT Connection: close <!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {fontfamily:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sansserif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;backgroundcolor:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY . . .

# Issue 6 of 7

Applicatio	n Error
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
Entity:	transfer (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

Difference: Parameter (transfer) manipulated from: (transfer) to: __ORIG_VAL_.

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

í	
	Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp
	Host: demo.testfire.net
	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36 Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8;
	AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+O3J1ZG10IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTOzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8
	Content-Length: 80
	fromAccount=800003&toAccount=800003&transferAmount=1234&transfer.=Transfer+Money
	HTTP/1.1 <mark>500</mark> Internal Server Error
	Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
	Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8
	Content-Language: en
	Content-Length: 1808
1	Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:12:01 GMT
	Connection: close
1	html <html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {font-</td></tr><tr><th></th><th>family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-</th></tr><tr><td></td><td><pre>serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background- color:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY</pre></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table></style></head></html>

# Issue 7 of 7

Applicatio	n Error
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply
Entity:	passwd (Parameter)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information
Cause:	Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected
Fix:	Verify that parameter values are in their expected ranges and types. Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions

#### Difference: Parameter (passwd) manipulated from: **CONFIDENTIAL 0** to: \$27

**Reasoning:** The application has responded with an error message, indicating an undefined state that may expose sensitive information.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

. . . Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: JSESSIONID=6354734A2B825ABCB2DC812C04629BE8; AltoroAccounts=ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1Mzkw ODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JlZGl0IENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8 Content-Length: 24 passwd=%27&Submit=Submit HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en Content-Length: 1004 Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2023 09:13:14 GMT Connection: close <!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><title>HTTP Status 500 - Internal Server Error</title><style type="text/css">H1 {fontfamily:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:22px;} H2 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sansserif;color:white;background-color:#525D76;font-size:16px;} H3 {font-family:Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;color:white;backgroundcolor:#525D76;font-size:14px;} BODY . . .

Email Address Pattern Found 4

Issue 1 of 4

тос

Email Add	Iress Pattern Found
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/doSubscribe
Entity:	doSubscribe (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove e-mail addresses from the website

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains an e-mail address that may be private. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
. . .
  <h1>Subscribe</h1>
  We recognize that things are always evolving and changing here at Altoro Mutual.
  Please enter your email below and we will automatically notify of noteworthy events. 
 \p>
  <form action="doSubscribe" method="post" name="subscribe" id="subscribe" onsubmit="return
confirmEmail(txtEmail.value);">
    <div style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 12px; color: red;" id="message">Thank you. Your email
test@altoromutual.com has been accepted.</div>
        Email:
        <input type="text" id="txtEmail" name="txtEmail" value="" style="width: 150px;">
        . . .
```

# Issue 2 of 4

Email Add	dress Pattern Found
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/properties.json
Entity:	properties.json (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove e-mail addresses from the website

#### Difference:

Reasoning: The response contains an e-mail address that may be private.

#### **Raw Test Response:**

```
. . .
   ],
   "properties": {
    "name": {
     "type": "string",
     "example": "J Smith"
    },
    "email": {
  "type": "string",
     "format": "email",
     "example": "jsmtih@altoromutual.com"
    },
    "subject": {
     "type": "string",
     "example": "Amazing web design"
    },
    "message": {
     "type": "string",
     "example": "I like the new look of your applicaiton"
    }
. . .
```

# Issue 3 of 4

**Email Address Pattern Found** Severity: Informational CVSS Score: 0.0 URL: https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js Entity: swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js (Page) **Risk:** It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations Cause: Insecure web application programming or configuration Remove e-mail addresses from the website

#### Difference:

Fix:

Reasoning: The response contains an e-mail address that may be private. Raw Test Response:

```
...on(t) {
/*!
* The buffer module from node.js, for the browser.
+
* @author Feross Aboukhadijeh <feross@feross.org> <http://feross.org>
* @license MIT
*/
var r=n(325),i=n(326),o=n(167);function u(){return s.TYPE...
. . .
...&t. esModule?t:{default:t}}var a={string:function(){return"string"},string email:function()
```

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```
{return"user@example.com"},"string_date-time":function() {return(new Date).toISOString()},number:function() {return
0},number_...
...
```

# Issue 4 of 4

Email Add	Iress Pattern Found
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-bundle.js
Entity:	swagger-ui-bundle.js (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Remove e-mail addresses from the website

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains an e-mail address that may be private. **Raw Test Response:** 

```
...on(e){
   * The buffer module from node.js, for the browser.
   * @author Feross Aboukhadijeh <feross@feross.org> <http://feross.org>
   * @license MIT
   */
var r=n(529),o=n(530),i=n(261);function a(){return s.TYPE...
 . . .
&&"function"==typeof t.callee?"Arguments":a}},function(e,t){var n=0,r=Math.random();e.exports=function(e)
{return"Symbol(".concat(void 0===e?"":e,")_",(++n+r).toString(36))}},function(e,t,n){var
r=n(74),o=n(33).document,i=r(o)&&r(o.createElement);e.exports=function(e){return i?o.createElement(e):{}},function(e,t,n)
 \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e, t, n) \{var r=n (242) ("keys"), o=n (167); e.exports=function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}, function (e) \{return r[e] || (r[e]=o (e)) \} \}
r=n(117).f,o=n(118),i=n(17)("toStringTag");e.exports=function(e,t,n){e&&!o(e=n?e:e.prototype,i)&&r(e,i,
 {configurable:!0,value:t})}},function(e,t,n){"use strict";var r=n(121);e.exports.f=function(e){return new function(e){var
t,n;this.promise=new e(function(e,r){if(void 0!==t||void 0!==n)throw TypeError("Bad Promise
constructor");t=e,n=r}),this.resolve=r(t),this.reject=r(n)}(e)},function(e,t,n){var
r=n(256),o=n(53);e.exports=function(e,t,n){if(r(t))throw TypeError("String#"+n+" doesn't accept regex!");return
String(o(e))\}, function(e,t,n) \{var r=n(17) ("match"); e.exports=function(e) \{var t=/./; try\{"/./"[e](t) \} catch(n) \{try\{return n, n\} (try\{return n, n] (try\{return n, n\} (try\{return n, n] (try{return n, n} (t
t[r]=!1, !"/./"[e](t) catch(e) {} return!0}, function(e,t,n) {t.f=n(19)}, function(e,t,n) {var} {} return!0} {} return!0
r=n(21),o=n(15),i=n(114),a=n(174),u=n(40).f;e.exports=function(e){var t=o.Symbol||(o.Symbol=i?{}):r.Symbol||
 {});"_"==e.charAt(0)||e in t||u(t,e,{value:a.f(e)})}},function(e,t){t.f=Object.getOwnPropertySymbols},function(e,t)
 {},function(e,t,n){"use strict";(function(t){
 /*!
   * @description Recursive object extending
   *
           @author Viacheslav Lotsmanov < lotsmanov89@gmail.com>
    ÷
          @license MIT
   * The MIT License (MIT)
   * Copyright (c) 2013-2018 Viacheslav Lotsmanov
   * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
    * this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
    * the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
```



...&e.__esModule?e:{default:e}}var u={string:function(){return"string"},string_email:function()
{return"user@example.com"},"string_date-time":function(){return(new Date).toISOString()},number:function(){return

# Issue 1 of 4

. . .

...

0},number_...

...r r,o,i;o=this,i=function() {

HTML Con	nments Sensitive Information Disclosure
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount
Entity:	To modify account information do not connect to SQL source directly. Make all changes (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc. Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance issues. Comments in HTML and JavaScript are usually easily viewable by end users.
Fix:	Remove sensitive information from HTML comments

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan discovered HTML comments containing what appears to be sensitive information. **Original Response** 

```
...

<div class="fl" style="width: 99%;">
```

# Issue 2 of 4

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HTML Comments Sensitive Information Disclosure	
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp
Entity:	To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-555-6159 (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc. Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance issues. Comments in HTML and JavaScript are usually easily viewable by end users.
Fix:	Remove sensitive information from HTML comments

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan discovered HTML comments containing what appears to be sensitive information. **Original Response** 

# Issue 3 of 4

HTML Con	nments Sensitive Information Disclosure
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp
Entity:	Be careful what you change. All changes are made directly to AltoroJ database. (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc. Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance issues. Comments in HTML and JavaScript are usually easily viewable by end users.
Fix:	Remove sensitive information from HTML comments

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** AppScan discovered HTML comments containing what appears to be sensitive information.

#### Original Response

```
myform.password2.value="";
myform.password1.focus();
alert ("Passwords do not match");
return false;
}
{/script>
<!-- Be careful what you change. All changes are made directly to AltoroJ database. -->
<div class="f1" style="width: 99%;">
<span style="width: 99%;">
<span style="width: 99%;">
<span style="color:#FF0066;font-size:12pt;font-weight:bold;">
</span>
<hl>Edit User Information</hl>
<!-- action="addAccount" -->
...
```

# Issue 4 of 4

# **HTML** Comments Sensitive Information Disclosure

Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp
Entity:	action="changePassword" (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc. Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance issues. Comments in HTML and JavaScript are usually easily viewable by end users.
Fix:	Remove sensitive information from HTML comments

#### Difference:

Reasoning: AppScan discovered HTML comments containing what appears to be sensitive information.

#### Original Response

<pre><pre>coption Value="Savings" Selected&gt;Savings     <pre><option value="IRA">IRA</option>            <!--</th--><th></th><th><pre><option value="Checking">Checking</option></pre></th></pre></pre></pre>		<pre><option value="Checking">Checking</option></pre>
<pre><option value="IRA">IRA</option> </pre>		
<pre>        <!--</th--><th></th><th></th></pre>		
<input type="submit" value="Add Account"/> <th></th> <th></th>		
<form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form id="change password"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <form action="" id="change pass" method="post" name="change pass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> </form></form></form></form></form></form></form></form></form></form>		<input type="submit" value="Add Account"/>
<pre><!-- action="changePassword"--> <form action="" id="changePass" method="post" name="changePass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);">     </form></pre>	<	/tr>
<form action="" id="changePass" method="post" name="changePass" onsubmit="return confirmpass(this);"> <h2> Change user's password</h2></form>	<	/form>
Users:	<	<pre></pre>
	•	

# Missing "Referrer policy" Security Header 1

# Issue 1 of 1

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TOC

Missing "F	Referrer policy" Security Header
Severity:	Informational
CVSS Score:	0,0
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/
Entity:	demo.testfire.net (Page)
Risk:	It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc. It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations
Cause:	Insecure web application programming or configuration
Fix:	Config your server to use the "Referrer Policy" header with secure policies

#### **Difference:**

**Reasoning:** AppScan detected that the Referrer Policy Response header is missing or with an insecure policy, which increases exposure to various cross-site injection attacks

### Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found 1

# Issue 1 of 1

Possible S	Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found	
Severity:	Informational	
CVSS Score:	0,0	
URL:	https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	
Entity:	feedback.jsp (Page)	
Risk:	It is possible to retrieve the absolute path of the web server installation, which might help an attacker to develop further attacks and to gain information about the file system structure of the web application	
Cause:	Latest patches or hotfixes for 3rd. party products were not installed	
Fix:	Download the relevant security patch for your web server or web application.	

#### Difference:

**Reasoning:** The response contains the absolute paths and/or filenames of files on the server. **Raw Test Response:** 

...
Cur Frequently Asked Questions area will help you with many of your inquiries.
If you can't find your question, return to this page and use the e-mail form below.
<b>IMPORTANT!</b> This feedback facility is not secure. Please do not send any <br />
account information in a message sent from here.
<form name="cmt" method="post" action="sendFeedback">

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```
<!--- Dave- Hard code this into the final script - Possible security problem.
Re-generated every Tuesday and old files are saved to .bak format at L:\backup\website\oldfiles --->
<input type="hidden" name="cfile" value="comments.txt">
To:
To:
Online Banking</b> 
Your Name:
```

# How to Fix

# **Blind SQL Injection**

#### Cause:

Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

#### Risk:

It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables

The software constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input, but fails to neutralize elements that could modify the SQL command when it is sent to the database.

Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands.

For example, let's say we have an HTML page with a login form, which eventually runs the following SQL query on the database using the user input:

SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username='\$user' AND password='\$pass'

The two variables, \$user and \$pass, contain the user credentials entered by the user in the login form.

If the user has input "jsmith" as the username, and "Demo1234" as the password, the SQL query will look like this:

SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username='jsmith' AND password='Demo1234'

But if the user input """ (a single apostrophe) as the username, and """ (a single apostrophe) as the password, the SQL query will look like this: SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username="" AND password=""

This, of course, is a malformed SQL query, and will invoke an error message, which may be returned in the HTTP response.

An error such as this informs the attacker that an SQL Injection has succeeded, which will lead the attacker to attempt further attack vectors. Blind SQL Injection is similar of SQL Injection. The difference lies in the fact that to leverage it, the attacker does not need to look for SQL errors in the response. Therefore, the method AppScan uses to identify it is also different.

Instead of attempting to invoke an SQL error, AppScan locates scripts that are susceptible to SQL injection, by manipulating the logic of the application through multiple requests.

The technique calls for sending requests whose vulnerable parameter (the parameter that gets embedded in the SQL query) is modified so that the response indicates whether the data is used in SQL query context or not. The modification involves the use of an AND Boolean expression with the original string, which evaluates once as True and once as False. In one case, the net result should be identical to the original result (a successful login), and in the other case, the result should be significantly different (a failed login). An OR expression which evaluates as True may also be useful for some rare cases.

If the original data is numeric, a simpler trick can be played. Let's consider original data 123. This can be replaced with 0+123 in one request, and with 456+123 in another. The result of the first request should be identical to the original result, whereas the result of the second request should be different (as the number is evaluated as 579). For some cases, we still need a version of the attack described above (using AND and OR), but without escaping from string context.

The concept behind Blind SQL Injection is that it is possible, even without receiving direct data from the database (in the form of an error message, or leaked information), to extract data from the database, one bit at a time, or to modify the query in a malicious way. The idea is that the application's behavior (returning responses that are identical or different to the original response) can provide a single bit of information about the evaluated (modified) query, meaning, it's possible for the attacker to formulate an SQL Boolean expression whose evaluation (single bit) is compromised in the form of the application behavior (identical/un-identical to the original behavior).

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

#### 10/05/2024

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

There are several mitigation techniques:

[1] Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness or provides constructs that make it easier to avoid.

[2] Strategy: Parameterization

If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this at every point where output is generated.

[3] Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks.

[4] Strategy: Output Encoding

If you need to use dynamically-generated query strings or commands in spite of the risk, properly quote arguments, and escape any special characters within those arguments.

[5] Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy: a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on detecting for malicious or malformed inputs with a blacklist. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Here are two possible ways to protect your web application against SQL injection attacks:

[1] Use a stored procedure rather than dynamically built SQL query string. The way parameters are passed to SQL Server stored procedures, prevents the use of apostrophes and hyphens.

Here is a simple example of how to use stored procedures in ASP.NET:

'Visual Basic example Dim DS As DataSet Dim MyConnection As SqlConnection Dim MyCommand As SqlDataAdapter Dim SelectCommand As String = "select * from users where username = @username" ... MyCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters.Add(New

SqlParameter("@username", SqlDbType.NVarChar, 20)) MyCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters("@username").Value =

UserNameField.Value // C# example String selectCmd = "select * from Authors where state = @username"; SqlConnection myConnection = new SqlConnection("server=..."); SqlDataAdapter myCommand = new SqlDataAdapter(selectCmd, myConnection);

myCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters.Add(new SqlParameter("@username", SqlDbType.NVarChar, 20));

myCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters["@username"].Value = UserNameField.Value;

[2] You can add input validation to Web Forms pages by using validation controls. Validation controls provide an easy-to-use mechanism for all common types of standard validation - for example, testing for valid dates or values within a range - plus ways to provide custom-written validation. In addition, validation controls allow you to completely customize how error information is displayed to the user. Validation controls can be used with any controls that are processed in a Web Forms page's class file, including both HTML and Web server controls.

In order to make sure user input contains only valid values, you can use one of the following validation controls:

a. "RangeValidator": checks that a user's entry (value) is between specified lower and upper boundaries. You can check ranges within pairs of numbers, alphabetic characters, and dates.

b. "RegularExpressionValidator": checks that the entry matches a pattern defined by a regular expression. This type of validation allows you to check for predictable sequences of characters, such as those in social security numbers, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, postal codes, and so on.

Important note: validation controls do not block user input or change the flow of page processing; they only set an error state, and produce error messages. It is the programmer's responsibility to test the state of the controls in the code before performing further application-specific actions. There are two ways to check for user input validity:

1. Testing for a general error state:

In your code, test the page's IsValid property. This property rolls up the values of the IsValid properties of all the validation controls on the page (using a logical AND). If one of the validation controls is set to invalid, the page's property will return false.

2. Testing for the error state of individual controls:

Loop through the page's Validators collection, which contains references to all the validation controls. You can then examine the IsValid property of each validation control.

** Prepared Statements:

There are 3 possible ways to protect your application against SQL injection, i.e. malicious tampering of SQL parameters. Instead of dynamically building SQL statements, use:

[1] PreparedStatement, which is precompiled and stored in a pool of PreparedStatement objects. PreparedStatement defines setters to register input parameters that are compatible with the supported JDBC SQL data types. For example, setString should be used for input parameters of type VARCHAR or LONGVARCHAR (refer to the Java API for further details). This way of setting input parameters prevents an attacker from manipulating the SQL statement through injection of bad characters, such as apostrophe.

Example of how to use a PreparedStatement in J2EE:

// J2EE PreparedStatemenet Example // Get a connection to the database Connection myConnection; if (isDataSourceEnabled()) { // using the DataSource to get a managed connection Context ctx = new InitialContext(); myConnection =

((DataSource)ctx.lookup(datasourceName)).getConnection(dbUserName, dbPassword); } else { try { // using the DriverManager to get a JDBC connection Class.forName(jdbcDriverClassPath); myConnection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcURL, dbUserName, dbPassword); } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { ... } } ... try { PreparedStatement myStatement = myConnection.prepareStatement("select * from users where username = ?"); myStatement.setString(1, userNameField); ResultSet rs = myStatement.executeQuery(); ... rs.close(); } catch (SQLException

sqlException) { ... } finally { myStatement.close(); myConnection.close(); }

[2] CallableStatement, which extends PreparedStatement to execute database SQL stored procedures. This class inherits input setters from PreparedStatement (see [1] above).

The following example assumes that this database stored procedure has been created:

CREATE PROCEDURE select_user (@username varchar(20))

AS SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME = @username;

Example of how to use a CallableStatement in J2EE to execute the above stored procedure:

// J2EE PreparedStatemenet Example // Get a connection to the database Connection myConnection; if (isDataSourceEnabled()) { // using the DataSource to get a managed connection Context ctx = new InitialContext(); myConnection =

((DataSource)ctx.lookup(datasourceName)).getConnection(dbUserName, dbPassword); } else { try { // using the DriverManager to get a JDBC connection Class.forName(jdbcDriverClassPath); myConnection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcURL, dbUserName, dbPassword); } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { ... } } ... try { PreparedStatement myStatement = myConnection.prepareCall("{?= call select_user ?,?}"); myStatement.setString(1, userNameField); myStatement.registerOutParameter(1, Types.VARCHAR); ResultSet rs =

myStatement.executeQuery(); ... rs.close(); } catch (SQLException sqlException) { ... } finally { myStatement.close(); myConnection.close(); } [3] Entity Bean, which represents an EJB business object in a persistent storage mechanism. There are two types of entity beans: beanmanaged and container-managed. With bean-managed persistence, the developer is responsible of writing the SQL code to access the database (refer to sections [1] and [2] above). With container-managed persistence, the EJB container automatically generates the SQL code. As a result, the container is responsible of preventing malicious attempts to tamper with the generated SQL code. Example of how to use an Entity Bean in J2EE:

// J2EE EJB Example try { // lookup the User home interface UserHome userHome = (UserHome)context.lookup(User.class); // find the User remote interface User = userHome.findByPrimaryKey(new UserKey(userNameField)); ... } catch (Exception e) { ... } RECOMMENDED JAVA TOOLS

N/A

REFERENCES

https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/sql/PreparedStatement.html

https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/sql/CallableStatement.html

** Input Data Validation:

While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must be performed on the server-tier using Servlets. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript.

A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following:

[1] Required field

[2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default)

[3] Field length

[4] Field range

[5] Field options

[6] Field pattern

[7] Cookie values

[8] HTTP Response

A good practice is to implement the above routine as static methods in a "Validator" utility class. The following sections describe an example validator class.

[1] Required field

Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces.

Example of how to validate required fields:

// Java example to validate required fields public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRequired(String value) { boolean isFieldValid =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().tength() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ...

request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { // fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... } [2] Field data type

In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type. Use the Java primitive wrapper classes to check if the field value can be safely converted to the desired primitive data type.

Example of how to validate a numeric field (type int):

// Java example to validate that a field is an int number public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateInt(String value) { boolean
isFieldValid = false; try { Integer.parseInt(value); isFieldValid = true; } catch (Exception e) { isFieldValid = false; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... //
check if the HTTP request parameter is of type int String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { //
fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... }

A good practice is to convert all HTTP request parameters to their respective data types. For example, the developer should store the "integerValue" of a request parameter in a request attribute and use it as shown in the following example:

// Example to convert the HTTP request parameter to a primitive wrapper data type // and store this value in a request attribute for further
processing String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { // convert fieldValue to an Integer Integer
integerValue = Integer.getInteger(fieldValue); // store integerValue in a request attribute request.setAttribute("fieldName", integerValue); } ... //
Use the request attribute for further processing Integer Value = (Integer)request.getAttribute("fieldName"); ...

The primary Java data types that the application should handle:

- Byte

- Short

- Integer

- Long

- Float
- Double
- Date
- [3] Field length

Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length.

Example to validate that the length of the userName field is between 8 and 20 characters:

// Example to validate the field length public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateLength(String value, int minLength, int maxLength)
{ String validatedValue = value; if (!validateRequired(value)) { validatedValue = ""; } return (validatedValue.length() >= minLength &&
validatedValue.length() <= maxLength); } ... } ... String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if</pre>

(Validated value.length) <- maxLength), } ... } ... Sumg userName = request.gen aranteter( userName ), if (Validator.validateRequired(userName)) { if (Validator.validateLength(userName, 8, 20)) { // userName is valid, continue further processing ... } } [4] Field range

Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements.

Example to validate that the input numberOfChoices is between 10 and 20:

// Example to validate the field range public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRange(int value, int min, int max) { return (value >=
min && value <= max); } ... } ... String fieldValue = request.getParameter("numberOfChoices"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { if
(Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { int numberOfChoices = Integer.parseInt(fieldValue); if (Validator.validateRange(numberOfChoices, 10, 20)) {
// numberOfChoices is valid, continue processing request ... } }</pre>

[5] Field options

Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. Example to validate the user selection against a list of allowed options:

// Example to validate user selection against a list of options public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateOption(Object[] options, Object value) { boolean isValidValue = false; try { List list = Arrays.asList(options); if (list != null) { isValidValue = list.contains(value); } } catch (Exception e) { } return isValidValue; } ... } ... // Allowed options String[] options = {"option1", "option2", "option3"); // Verify that the user selection is one of the allowed options String userSelection = request.getParameter("userSelection"); if (Validator.validateOption(options, userSelection)) { // valid user selection, continue processing request ... }

[6] Field pattern

Always check that the user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression:

^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$

Java 1.3 or earlier versions do not include any regular expression packages. Apache Regular Expression Package (see Resources below) is recommended for use with Java 1.3 to resolve this lack of support. Example to perform regular expression validation:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Apache regular expression package import

org.apache.regexp.RE; import org.apache.regexp.RESyntaxException; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String value, String expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { RE r = new RE(expression); match = r.match(value); } return match; } ... } ... // Verify that the userName request parameter is alpha-numeric String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if (Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { // userName is valid, continue processing request ... }

Java 1.4 introduced a new regular expression package (java.util.regex). Here is a modified version of Validator.matchPattern using the new Java 1.4 regular expression package:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Java 1.4 regular expression package import
java.util.regex.Pattern; import java.util.regexe.Matcher; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String value, String
expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { match = Pattern.matches(expression, value); } return match; } ... }
[7] Cookie value

Use the javax.servlet.http.Cookie object to validate the cookie value. The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc.

Example to validate a required cookie value:

// Example to validate a required cookie value // First retrieve all available cookies submitted in the HTTP request Cookie[] cookies =
request.getCookies(); if (cookies != null) { // find the "user" cookie for (int i=0; i<cookies.length; ++i) { if (cookies[i].getName().equals("user")) { //
validate the cookie value if (Validator.validateRequired(cookies[i].getValue()) { // valid cookie value, continue processing request ... } } }
[8] HTTP Response</pre>

[8-1] Filter user input

To guard the application against cross-site scripting, sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters:

< > " ' % ; ) ( & +

Example to filter a specified string by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities:

// Example to filter sensitive data to prevent cross-site scripting public Class Validator { ... public static String filter(String value) { if (value == null)
{ return null; } StringBuffer result = new StringBuffer(value.length()); for (int i=0; i<value.length(); ++i) { switch (value.charAt(i)) { case '<':
result.append("<"); break; case '>': result.append(">"); break; case ''': result.append("""); break; case '\': result.append("""); break; case '\':
result.append("%"); break; case '; result.append(";"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case '\': result.append(""); break; case '&:
result.append("%"); break; case '+: result.append("+"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case ')': result.append(""); break; case '&:
result.append("&"); break; case '+: result.append("+"); break; default: result.append(value.charAt(i)); break; } return result; } ... } ... // Filter the
HTTP response using Validator.filter PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); // set output response out.write(Validator.filter(response));
out.close();

The Java Servlet API 2.3 introduced Filters, which supports the interception and transformation of HTTP requests or responses. Example of using a Servlet Filter to sanitize the response using Validator.filter:

// Example to filter all sensitive characters in the HTTP response using a Java Filter. // This example is for illustration purposes since it will filter all content in the response, including HTML tags! public class SensitiveCharsFilter implements Filter { ... public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain) throws IOException, ServletException { PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); ResponseWrapper wrapper = new ResponseWrapper((HttpServletResponse)response); chain.doFilter(request, wrapper); CharArrayWriter caw = new CharArrayWriter(); caw.write(Validator.filter(wrapper.toString())); response.setContentType("text/html");

response.setContentLength(caw.toString().length()); out.write(caw.toString()); out.close(); } ... public class CharResponseWrapper extends HttpServletResponseWrapper { private CharArrayWriter output; public String toString() { return output.toString(); } public

CharResponseWrapper(HttpServletResponse response){ super(response); output = new CharArrayWriter(); } public PrintWriter getWriter(){ return new PrintWriter(output); } } }

[8-2] Secure the cookie

When storing sensitive data in a cookie, make sure to set the secure flag of the cookie in the HTTP response, using Cookie.setSecure(boolean flag) to instruct the browser to send the cookie using a secure protocol, such as HTTPS or SSL.

Example to secure the "user" cookie:

// Example to secure a cookie, i.e. instruct the browser to // send the cookie using a secure protocol Cookie cookie = new Cookie("user",
"sensitive"); cookie.setSecure(true); response.addCookie(cookie);

RECOMMENDED JAVA TOOLS

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a powerful framework that implements all the above data validation requirements. These rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields. Struts supports output filtering of dangerous characters in the [8] HTTP Response by default on all data written using the Struts 'bean:write' tag. This filtering may be disabled by setting the 'filter=false' flag.

Struts defines the following basic input validators, but custom validators may also be defined:

required: succeeds if the field contains any characters other than white space.

mask: succeeds if the value matches the regular expression given by the mask attribute.

range: succeeds if the value is within the values given by the min and max attributes ((value >= min) & (value <= max)).

maxLength: succeeds if the field is length is less than or equal to the max attribute.

minLength: succeeds if the field is length is greater than or equal to the min attribute.

byte, short, integer, long, float, double: succeeds if the value can be converted to the corresponding primitive.

date: succeeds if the value represents a valid date. A date pattern may be provided.

creditCard: succeeds if the value could be a valid credit card number.

e-mail: succeeds if the value could be a valid e-mail address.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <//validator> ... </global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> </arvance/[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$</arvance/varvalue> </arvance/commonset> </arv

[2] JavaServer Faces Technology

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events and input validation.

The JavaServer Faces API implements the following basic validators, but custom validators may be defined:

validate_doublerange: registers a DoubleRangeValidator on a component

validate_length: registers a LengthValidator on a component

validate_longrange: registers a LongRangeValidator on a component

validate_required: registers a RequiredValidator on a component

validate_stringrange: registers a StringRangeValidator on a component

validator: registers a custom Validator on a component

The JavaServer Faces API defines the following UlInput and UlOutput Renderers (Tags):

input_date: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance

output_date: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance

input_datetime: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance

output_datetime: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance

input_number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat

output_number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat input text: accepts a text string of one line.

output_text: displays a text string of one line.

input_time: accepts a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance

output_time: displays a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance

input_hidden: allows a page author to include a hidden variable in a page

input_secret: accepts one line of text with no spaces and displays it as a set of asterisks as it is typed

input_textarea: accepts multiple lines of text

output_errors: displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier output label: displays a nested component as a label for a specified input field

output_message: displays a localized message

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces:

<%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-a-login-validation-with-jsf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean"

scope="session" /> <f:use faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input text id="userName" size="20"

modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate_required/> <f:validate_length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input_text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output_errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command_button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use_faces>

REFERENCES

Java API 1.3 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html

Java API 1.4 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html Java Servlet API 2.3 -

https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api

Java Regular Expression Package http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/

Jakarta Validator -

http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/

JavaServer Faces Technology -

http://www.javaserverfaces.org/

#### ** Error Handling:

Many J2EE web application architectures follow the Model View Controller (MVC) pattern. In this pattern a Servlet acts as a Controller. A Servlet delegates the application processing to a JavaBean such as an EJB Session Bean (the Model). The Servlet then forwards the request to a JSP (View) to render the processing results. Servlets should check all input, output, return codes, error codes and known exceptions to ensure that the expected processing actually occurred.

While data validation protects applications against malicious data tampering, a sound error handling strategy is necessary to prevent the application from inadvertently disclosing internal error messages such as exception stack traces. A good error handling strategy addresses the following items:

[1] Defining Errors

[2] Reporting Errors

[3] Rendering Errors

[4] Error Mapping

[1] Defining Errors

Hard-coded error messages in the application layer (e.g. Servlets) should be avoided. Instead, the application should use error keys that map to known application failures. A good practice is to define error keys that map to validation rules for HTML form fields or other bean properties. For example, if the "user_name" field is required, is alphanumeric, and must be unique in the database, then the following error keys should be defined:

(a) ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field is required;
 (b) ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field should be alphanumeric;

(c) ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is a duplicate in the database;

(d) ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID: this error key is used to display a generic message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is invalid; A good practice is to define the following framework Java classes which are used to store and report application errors:

- ErrorKeys: defines all error keys

// Example: ErrorKeys defining the following error keys: // - ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED // - ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC // - ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE // - ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID // ... public Class ErrorKeys { public static final String

ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED = "error.username.required"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC =

"error.username.alphanumeric"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE = "error.username.duplicate"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID = "error.username.invalid"; ... }

- Error: encapsulates an individual error

// Example: Error encapsulates an error key. // Error is serializable to support code executing in multiple JVMs. public Class Error implements Serializable { // Constructor given a specified error key public Error(String key) { this(key, null); } // Constructor given a specified error key and array of placeholder objects public Error(String key, Object[] values) { this.key = key; this.values = values; } // Returns the error key public String getKey() { return this.key; } // Returns the placeholder values public Object[] getValues() { return this.values; } private String key = null; private Object[] values = null; }

- Errors: encapsulates a Collection of errors

// Example: Errors encapsulates the Error objects being reported to the presentation layer. // Errors are stored in a HashMap where the key is the bean property name and value is an // ArrayList of Error objects. public Class Errors implements Serializable { // Adds an Error object to the Collection of errors for the specified bean property. public void addError(String property, Error error) { ArrayList propertyErrors =

(ArrayList)errors.get(property); if (propertyErrors == null) { propertyErrors = new ArrayList(); errors.put(property, propertyErrors); }

propertyErrors.put(error); } // Returns true if there are any errors public boolean hasErrors() { return (errors.size > 0); } // Returns the Errors for the specified property public ArrayList getErrors(String property) { return (ArrayList)errors.get(property); } private HashMap errors = new HashMap(); }

Using the above framework classes, here is an example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field:

// Example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field. Errors errors = new Errors(); String userName =

request.getParameter("user_name"); // (a) Required validation rule if (!Validator.validateRequired(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name",

new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED)); } // (b) Alpha-numeric validation rule else if (!Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC)); } else { // (c) Duplicate check validation rule // We assume that there is an existing UserValidationEJB session bean that implements // a checklfDuplicate() method to verify if the user already exists in the database. try { ... if (UserValidationEJB.checklfDuplicate(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (RemoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (remoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (remoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE); } // set the errors object in a request attribute called "errors" request.setAttribute("errors", errors); ...

[2] Reporting Errors

There are two ways to report web-tier application errors:

(a) Servlet Error Mechanism

(b) JSP Error Mechanism

[2-a] Servlet Error Mechanism

A Servlet may report errors by:

- forwarding to the input JSP (having already stored the errors in a request attribute), OR

- calling response.sendError with an HTTP error code argument, OR

- throwing an exception

It is good practice to process all known application errors (as described in section [1]), store them in a request attribute, and forward to the input JSP. The input JSP should display the error messages and prompt the user to re-enter the data. The following example illustrates how to forward to an input JSP (userInput.jsp):

// Example to forward to the userInput.jsp following user validation errors RequestDispatcher rd =

getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd != null) { rd.forward(request, response); }

If the Servlet cannot forward to a known JSP page, the second option is to report an error using the response sendError method with

HttpServletResponse.SC INTERNAL SERVER ERROR (status code 500) as argument. Refer to the javadoc of

javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse for more details on the various HTTP status codes. Example to return a HTTP error:

// Example to return a HTTP error code RequestDispatcher rd = getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd == null) { // messages is a resource bundle with all message keys and values

response.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,

messages.getMessage(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID)); }

As a last resort, Servlets can throw an exception, which must be a subclass of one of the following classes:

- RuntimeException

- ServletException

- IOException

[2-b] JSP Error Mechanism

JSP pages provide a mechanism to handle runtime exceptions by defining an errorPage directive as shown in the following example: <%@ page errorPage="/errors/userValidation.jsp" %>

Uncaught JSP exceptions are forwarded to the specified errorPage, and the original exception is set in a request parameter called javax.servlet.jsp.jspException. The error page must include a isErrorPage directive as shown below:

<%@ page isErrorPage="true" %>

The isErrorPage directive causes the "exception" variable to be initialized to the exception object being thrown.

[3] Rendering Errors

The J2SE Internationalization APIs provide utility classes for externalizing application resources and formatting messages including:

(a) Resource Bundles

(b) Message Formatting

[3-a] Resource Bundles

Resource bundles support internationalization by separating localized data from the source code that uses it. Each resource bundle stores a map of key/value pairs for a specific locale.

It is common to use or extend java.util.PropertyResourceBundle, which stores the content in an external properties file as shown in the following example:

Multiple resources can be defined to support different locales (hence the name resource bundle). For example, ErrorMessages_fr.properties can be defined to support the French member of the bundle family. If the resource member of the requested locale does not exist, the default member is used. In the above example, the default resource is ErrorMessages.properties. Depending on the user's locale, the application (JSP or Servlet) retrieves content from the appropriate resource.

[3-b] Message Formatting

The J2SE standard class java.util.MessageFormat provides a generic way to create messages with replacement placeholders. A MessageFormat object contains a pattern string with embedded format specifiers as shown below:

// Example to show how to format a message using placeholder parameters String pattern = "User name {0} already exists, please choose another one"; String userName = request.getParameter("user_name"); Object[] args = new Object[1]; args[0] = userName; String message = MessageFormat.format(pattern, args);

Here is a more comprehensive example to render error messages using ResourceBundle and MessageFormat:

// Example to render an error message from a localized ErrorMessages resource (properties file) // Utility class to retrieve locale-specific error messages public Class ErrorMessageResource { // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the environment locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, defaultLocale); } // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Locale locale) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, null, locale); } // Returns a formatted error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Object[] args, Locale locale) { // Get localized ErrorMessageResource ResourceBundle errorMessageResource = ResourceBundle.getBundle("ErrorMessages", locale); // Get localized error message String errorMessage = errorMessageResource.getString(errorKey); if (args != null) { // Format the message using the specified placeholders args return MessageFormat.format(errorMessage, args); } else { return errorMessage; } // default environment locale private Locale defaultLocale = Locale.getDefaultLocale(); } ... // Get the user's locale Locale userLocale =

request.getLocale(); // Check if there were any validation errors Errors errors = (Errors)request.getAttribute("errors"); if (errors != null && errors.hasErrors()) { // iterate through errors and output error messages corresponding to the "user_name" property ArrayList userNameErrors = errors.getErrors("user_name"); ListIterator iterator = userNameErrors.iterator(); while (iterator.hasNext()) { // Get the next error object Error error = (Error)iterator.next(); String errorMessage = ErrorMessageResource.getErrorMessage(error.getKey(), userLocale); output.write(errorMessage + "\r\n"); } }

It is recommended to define a custom JSP tag, e.g. displayErrors, to iterate through and render error messages as shown in the above example. [4] Error Mapping

Normally, the Servlet Container will return a default error page corresponding to either the response status code or the exception. A mapping between the status code or the exception and a web resource may be specified using custom error pages. It is a good practice to develop static error pages that do not disclose internal error states (by default, most Servlet containers will report internal error messages). This mapping is configured in the Web Deployment Descriptor (web.xml) as specified in the following example:

<!-- Mapping of HTTP error codes and application exceptions to error pages --> <error-page> <exception-

type>UserValidationException</exception-type> <location>/errors/validationError.html</error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> ... </error-page> ..

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a Java framework that defines the error handling mechanism as described above. Validation rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields and the corresponding validation error keys. Struts provides internationalization support to build localized applications using resource bundles and message formatting.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator > <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> </validator> ... </global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> <var-value>^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$</var-value> </var> </field> ... </form> ... </formset> </form-validation>

The Struts JSP tag library defines the "errors" tag that conditionally displays a set of accumulated error messages as shown in the following example:

<%@ page language="java" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-html.tld" prefix="html" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-bean.tld"
prefix="bean" %> <html:html> <head> <body> <html:form action="/logon.do"> 
<html:errors property="username"/> <bean:message key="prompt.username"/> <html:text property="username"
size="16"/> size="16"/> align="right"> <html:submit><bean:message key="button.submit"/> <html:text property="username"
size="16"/> align="right"> <html:submit> <bean:message key="button.submit"/>

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events, validate input, and support internationalization.

The JavaServer Faces API defines the "output_errors" UIOutput Renderer, which displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces:

<%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-a-login-validation-with-jsf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean"

scope="session" /> <f:use_faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input_text id="userName" size="20"

modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate_required/> <f:validate_length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input_text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output_errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command_button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use_faces>

REFERENCES

Java API 1.3 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html

Java API 1.4 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html

Java Servlet API 2.3 -

https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api

Java Regular Expression Package -

http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/

Jakarta Validator -

http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/

# JavaServer Faces Technology -

http://www.javaserverfaces.org/ ** Filter User Input Before passing any data to a SQL query, it should always be properly filtered with whitelisting techniques. This cannot be over-emphasized. Filtering user input will correct many injection flaws before they arrive at the database.

** Quote User Input

Regardless of data type, it is always a good idea to place single quotes around all user data if this is permitted by the database. MySQL allows this formatting technique.

** Escape the Data Values

If you're using MySQL 4.3.0 or newer, you should escape all strings with mysql_real_escape_string(). If you are using an older version of MySQL, you should use the mysql_escape_string() function. If you are not using MySQL, you might choose to use the specific escaping function for your particular database. If you are not aware of an escaping function, you might choose to utilize a more generic escaping function such as addslashes().

If you're using the PEAR DB database abstraction layer, you can use the DB::quote() method or use a query placeholder like ?, which automatically escapes the value that replaces the placeholder.

REFERENCES http://ca3.php.net/mysql_real_escape_string http://ca.php.net/mysql_escape_string http://ca.php.net/addslashes

#### http://pear.php.net/package-info.php?package=DB

** Input Data Validation:

While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must always be performed on the server-tier. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript.

A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following:

[1] Required field

[2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default)

[3] Field length

[4] Field range

[5] Field options

[6] Field pattern

[7] Cookie values

[8] HTTP Response

A good practice is to implement a function or functions that validates each application parameter. The following sections describe some example checking.

[1] Required field

Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces.

Example of how to validate required fields:

// PHP example to validate required fields function validateRequired(\$input) { ... \$pass = false; if (strlen(trim(\$input))>0){ \$pass = true; } return
\$pass; ... } ... if (validateRequired(\$fieldName)) { // fieldName is valid, continue processing request ... }

[2] Field data type

In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type.

[3] Field length

Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length.

[4] Field range

Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements.

[5] Field options

Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. [6] Field pattern

Always check that user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression:

^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\$

[7] Cookie value

The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc.

[8] HTTP Response

[8-1] Filter user input

To guard the application against cross-site scripting, the developer should sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters:

<>"'%;)(&+

PHP includes some automatic sanitization utility functions, such as htmlentities():

\$input = htmlentities(\$input, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');

In addition, in order to avoid UTF-7 variants of Cross-site Scripting, you should explicitly define the Content-Type header of the response, for example:

<?php header('Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8'); ?>

[8-2] Secure the cookie

When storing sensitive data in a cookie and transporting it over SSL, make sure that you first set the secure flag of the cookie in the HTTP response. This will instruct the browser to only use that cookie over SSL connections.

You can use the following code example, for securing the cookie:

<\$php \$value = "some_value"; \$time = time()+3600; \$path = "/application/"; \$domain = ".example.com"; \$secure = 1; setcookie("CookieName",
\$value, \$time, \$path, \$domain, \$secure, TRUE); ?>

In addition, we recommend that you use the HttpOnly flag. When the HttpOnly flag is set to TRUE the cookie will be made accessible only through the HTTP protocol. This means that the cookie won't be accessible by scripting languages, such as JavaScript. This setting can effectively help to reduce identity theft through XSS attacks (although it is not supported by all browsers). The HttpOnly flag was Added in PHP 5.2.0.

#### REFERENCES

 [1] Mitigating Cross-site Scripting With HTTP-only Cookies: http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533046.aspx
 [2] PHP Security Consortium: http://phpsec.org/
 [3] PHP & Web Application Security Blog (Chris Shiflett): http://shiflett.org/

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CWE:
```

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#### **External References:**

"Web Application Disassembly with ODBC Error Messages" (By David Litchfield) "Using Binary Search with SQL Injection" (By Sverre H. Huseby)

# **SQL** Injection

TOC

#### Cause:

- Sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input.
- Dynamically generating queries that include unvalidated user input can lead to SQL injection attacks. An attacker can insert SQL commands
  or modifiers in the user input that can cause the query to behave in an unsafe manner.
- Without sufficient validation and encapsulation of user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted
  as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that
  modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands.
- SQL payloads can enter the system through any untrusted data, including user input, data previously stored in the database, files, 3rd party APIs, and more.

#### Risk:

Potential consequences include the loss of:

Confidentiality - Since SQL databases generally hold sensitive data, loss of confidentiality is a frequent problem with SQL injection vulnerabilities.

Authentication - If poor SQL commands are used to check user names and passwords, it may be possible to connect to a system as another user with no previous knowledge of the password.

Authorization - If authorization information is held in a SQL database, it may be possible to change this information through the successful exploitation of a SQL injection vulnerability.

Integrity - Just as it may be possible to read sensitive information, it is also possible to make changes or even delete this information with a SQL injection attack.

### Fix Recommendation:

General

Use stored procedures with parameters to prevent injection of SQL commands in data, or at least parameterized database calls that do not allow the injection of code. Do not include any dynamic SQL execution in the stored procedures.

An even better solution is to use an ORM (object-relational mapping) framework such as Hibernate or EntityFramework, if you have one available on your platform.

Ensure that all user input is validated and filtered on the server side, not just to disallow bad characters such as a single quote (') and double quotes ("), but rather to only allow safe characters. Narrowly define the set of safe characters based on the expected value of the parameter in the request.

Use escaping functions on all user input.

Configure the application identity for the least database privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks. Harden the database server to disable any unneeded functionality, such as shell commands.

CWE:

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External References: OWASP - SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet

# **Integer Overflow**

#### Cause:

An Integer Overflow (or wraparound) occurs when a value that is too large is stored (larger than the maximum value the variable can hold) in an integer data type (including byte, short, long, and other types). The most significant bits of the integer are lost, and the remaining value is relative to the minimum value (either 0 or very negative value for signed types).

#### Risk:

When an integer overflow occurs, the interpreted value will appear to have 'wrapped around' past the maximum value and reset back to the minimum value.

The value can unexpectedly become zero or negative. This can have security implications if the value is used to control looping, manage resources (such as memory allocation), or make business logic decisions.

For example, an integer overflow can give money to the customer in addition to their purchases, when the transaction is completed.

In particular, if a mathematical operation results in a number larger than the maximum possible for the integer type, the value wraps around and the variable is set to zero, or negative.

i=UINT_MAX+1; // Maximum value for a variable of type unsigned int - 4294967295 (0xffffffff). The result is: i=0

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Validate all inputs are within an expected range and the sign before relying on their values or using them in arithmetic calculations.

Be sure to check both upper bounds and lower bounds, including negative lower bounds for signed integers (integer overflow is also possible with very large negative numbers).

Use unsigned integers where possible.

Consider using a safe integer-handling library (such as C/C++ SafeInt or IntegerLib).

Consider enabling compiler extensions that prevent some classes of buffer overflows.

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CWE:
```

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# Phishing Through URL Redirection

#### Cause:

- The web application redirects users to an external site based on untrusted data.
- In particular, the submitted request was found to include a URL as a parameter. The web application uses this value to redirect the user's browser to the specified URL.
- An attacker can modify this URL value to an arbitrary address. The attacker would then cause the victim to submit the altered request, thus being redirected to a site of the attacker's choosing.

#### Risk:

This vulnerability can allow an attacker to take advantage of the trust the user holds for the application, causing them to trust an arbitrary site under control of the attacker as well. This would often be leveraged through the use of phishing techniques.

Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential information (frequently authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker. Phishing is essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information.

An attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam and steal user credentials or other sensitive information such as credit card number, social security number, and more.

It can also be possible to redirect the user to install malware that could infect the user's computer.

# Exploit Example:

The following example shows a URL redirection to untrusted site. The redir parameter is used to redirect the user to a different page automatically.

[REQUEST] GET /MyPage.php?redir=/AnotherPage.php HTTP/1.1

[RESPONSE]

An attacker might trick the GET parameter used to redirect the user to an external site

[REQUEST] GET /MyPage.php?redir=https://www.malware.com HTTP/1.1

[RESPONSE]

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Avoid redirecting requests based on untrusted data if possible.

If relying on user input cannot be avoided, the URL should first be validated before redirection. Data that a user can modify must be treated as untrusted data.

A unique token, linked to the current user session, should be sent along with the redirect field value. This unique token should then be verified by the server before the actual redirect takes place. This ensures that attackers would have a harder time using the redirect field to propagate their malicious activities, since they cannot guess the user's session token.

Sanitize input by comparing to a predefined list of trusted URLs, based on an allow-list.

Force all redirects to first go through a page notifying users that they are about to leave your site, with the destination clearly displayed, and have them click a link to confirm.

CWE:

601

External References: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Cheat Sheet

# **Reflected Cross Site Scripting**

#### Cause:

- Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities arise when an attacker sends malicious code to the victim's browser, mostly using JavaScript. A
  vulnerable web application might embed untrusted data in the output, without filtering or encoding it. In this way, an attacker can inject a
  malicious script to the application, and the script will be returned in the response. This will then run on the victim's browser.
- In particular, sanitization of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input or untrusted data.
- In reflected attacks, an attacker tricks an end user into sending request containing malicious code to a vulnerable Web server, which then reflects the attack back to the end user's browser.
- The server receives the malicious data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. The most common method of sending malicious content is adding it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs that contain the malicious script constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby the convinced victim visits a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. The site then reflects the malicious content back to the victim, and then the content is executed by the victim's browser.

#### Risk:

XSS attacks can expose the user's session cookie, allowing the attacker to hijack the user's session and gain access to the user's account, which could lead to impersonation of users.

An attacker could modify and view the users' records and perform transactions as those users. The attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user, or gain access to any sensitive data belonging to the user. This would be especially dangerous if the user has administrator permissions.

The attacker could even run a malicious script on the victim's browser which would redirect the user to other pages or sites, modify content presentation, or even make it possible to run malicious software or a crypto miner.

## Exploit Example:

The following example shows a script that returns a parameter value in the response. The parameter value is sent to the script using a GET request, and then returned in the response embedded in the HTML.

```
[REQUEST]
GET /index.aspx?name=JSmith HTTP/1.1
```

[RESPONSE] HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: SomeServer Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2002 00:31:19 GMT Content-Type: text/html Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 27

<HTML> Hello JSmith </HTML>

An attacker might leverage the attack like this. In this case, the JavaScript code will be executed by the browser.

[REQUEST]
GET /index.aspx?name=>"'><script>alert('XSS')</script> HTTP/1.1

[RESPONSE] HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: SomeServer Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2002 00:31:19 GMT Content-Type: text/html Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 83

<HTML> Hello >"'><script>alert('XSS')</script> </HTML>

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Fully encode all dynamic data from an untrusted source that is inserted into the webpage, to ensure it is treated as literal text and not as a script that could be executed or markup that could be rendered.

Consider the context in which your data will be used, and contextually encode the data as close as possible to the actual output: e.g. HTML encoding for HTML content; HTML Attribute encoding for data output to attribute values; JavaScript encoding for dynamically generated JavaScript. For example, when HTML encoding non-alphanumeric characters into HTML entities, '<' and '>' would become `&lt;' and `&gt;'. As an extra defensive measure, validate all external input on the server, regardless of source. Carefully check each input parameter against a rigorous positive specification (allowlist) defining data type; size; range; format; and acceptable values. Regular expressions or framework controls may be useful in some cases, though this is not a replacement for output encoding.

Output encoding and data validation must be done on all untrusted data, wherever it comes from: e.g. form fields, URL parameters, web service arguments, cookies, any data from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files and filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

For every web page that is returned by the server, explicitly set the `Content-Type` HTTP response header. This header value should define a specific character encoding (charset), such as `ISO-8859-1` or `UTF-8`. When an encoding is not specified, the web browser may choose a different encoding by guessing which encoding is actually being used by the web page, which would allow a potential attacker to bypass XSS protections.

Additionally, set the `httpOnly` flag on the session cookie, to prevent any XSS exploits from stealing a user's cookie.

Prefer using a framework or standard library that prevents this vulnerability by automatically encoding all dynamic output based on context, or at least that provides constructs that make it easier to avoid.

For every web page that is returned by the server, explicitly set the `Content-Security-Policy` HTTP response header. In order to make it significantly more difficult for the attacker to actually exploit the XSS attack.

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CWE:
```

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#### **External References:**

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) OWASP XSS Cheat Sheet

# Cookie with Insecure or Improper or Missing SameSite attribute

#### Cause:

Sensitive Cookie with Improper or Insecure or Missing SameSite Attribute

#### Risk:

Prevent Cookie information leakage by restricting cookies to first-party or same-site context

Attacks can extend to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens). The SameSite attribute controls how cookies are sent for cross-domain requests.

The attribute may have three values: 'Lax', 'Strict', or 'None'. If 'None' is used, a website may create a cross-domain POST HTTP request to another website, and the browser automatically adds cookies to this request.

This may lead to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens). Modes and their uses:

'Lax' mode: the cookie will only be sent with a top-level get request.

'Strict' mode; the cookie will not be sent with any cross-site usage even if the user follows a link to another website.

'None' mode: the cookie will be sent with the cross-site requests.

The attribute having: 'Lax' or 'None' must have 'Secure' Flag set and must be transferred over https.

Example - Set-Cookie: key=value; SameSite=Lax;Secure

Setting attribute to 'Strict' is the recommended option.

Example - Set-Cookie: key=value; SameSite=Strict

# Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

[1] Review possible solutions for configuring SameSite Cookie attribute to recommended values.

[2] Restrict Cookies to a first-party or same-site context.

[3] Verify and set the SameSite attribute of your cookie to Strict, to ensure that the cookie will only be sent in a first-party context.

[4] Or, if you want to relax the restrictions of first-party context, then verify and set the SameSite attribute of the cookie to Lax with Secure Flag enabled and transferred over HTTPS.

CWE:

1275

#### **External References:**

WASC Threat Classification: Information Leakage SameSite Cookies

# **Cross-Site Request Forgery**

#### Cause:

- This vulnerability arises because the application allows the user to perform some sensitive action without verifying that the request was sent intentionally.
- An attacker can cause a victim's browser to emit an HTTP request to an arbitrary URL in the application. When this request is sent from an
  authenticated victim's browser, it will include the victim's session cookie or authentication header. The application will accept this as a valid
  request from an authenticated user.
- When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, an attacker may be able to trick a client into making an unintentional request from a different site, which will be treated as an authentic request by the application. This can be done by submitting a form, loading an image, sending an XMLHttpRequest in JavaScript, and more.
- For example, this IMG tag can be embedded in an attacker's webpage, and the victim's browser will submit a request to retrieve the image. This valid request will be processed by the application, and the browser will not display a broken image. `<img src="https://myapp.com/transfer?acct=VICTIM&amount=10000" width=0 height=0 border=0>`. As a result, money is transferred from the

# victim's account to the attacker, using the victim's session.

#### Risk:

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform sensitive actions in another user's account, or using their privileges.

It may be possible to force an end-user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated. This would allow the attacker to alter user records and to perform transactions as that user.

If the user is currently logged-in to the victim site, the request will automatically use the user's credentials such as session cookies, IP address, and other browser authentication methods. Using this method, the attacker forges the victim's identity and submits actions on their behalf.

The severity of this vulnerability depends on the affected functionality in context of the application. For example, a CSRF attack on a search page is less severe than a CSRF attack on a money-transfer or profile-update page.

# Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Set all session and authentication cookies to include the `SameSite` attribute, setting it to `Strict` or `Lax`. When setting this attribute to `Lax` ensure that no sensitive action can be performed via a `GET` request, as per the HTTP standard.

Use built-in CSRF protection provided by the platform or framework, and ensure to activate it appropriately whether in configuration or code. If your platform does not provide a built-in anti-CSRF mechanism, consider integrating a well-vetted library to implement the protection, such as OWASP CSRFGuard.

Avoid building a custom anti-CSRF implementation, as this can be complicated to achieve correctly without allowing trivial bypass. If you absolutely must do so due to lack of standard library support, you should generate a secure, random and non-predictable token (e.g. GUID v4) on the server and embed it in each HTML form, while binding it to the user's session. Upon receiving the submitted form, verify that the included form token matches the token previously bound to the user. It is also feasible to embed the CSRF token in a designated cookie ('double-submitted cookie'), or even better use a custom request header - when the server receives these together with the submitted form token, it is simple to validate that they match (instead of storing in the user's session).

An alternative approach would be to require user reauthentication for specific actions, to ensure the user's active confirmation. Note that this would substantially impact user experience, so this should be used sparingly and only for especially sensitive actions.

Verify the source of the request by validating the `Origin` header if present, or at least the `Referer` header. Discard sensitive requests that originate from a different site.

#### CWE:

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#### **External References:**

OWASP CSRF Cheat Sheet OWASP CSRFGuard

# **Database Error Pattern Found**

#### Cause:

Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

#### Risk:

It is possible to view, modify or delete database entries and tables

AppScan discovered Database Errors in the test response, that may have been triggered by an attack other than SQL Injection.

It is possible, though not certain, that this error indicates a possible SQL Injection vulnerability in the application.

If it does, please read the following SQL Injection advisory carefully.

The software constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input, but it incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when sent to the database.

Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, and possibly including execution of system commands.

For example, let's say we have an HTML page with a login form, which eventually runs the following SQL query on the database using the user input:

SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username='\$user' AND password='\$pass'

The two variables, \$user and \$pass, contain the user credentials entered by the user in the login form.

Therefore, if the user has input "jsmith" as the username, and "Demo1234" as the password, the SQL query will look like this:

SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username='jsmith' AND password='Demo1234'

But if the user input "" (a single apostrophe) as the username, and "" (a single apostrophe) as the password, the SQL query will look like this: SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE username=" AND password="

This, of course, is a malformed SQL query, and will invoke an error message, which may be returned in the HTTP response.

An error such as this informs the attacker that an SQL Injection has succeeded, which will lead the attacker to attempt further attack vectors. Sample Exploit:

The following C# code dynamically constructs and executes a SQL query that searches for items matching a specified name. The query restricts the items displayed to those where owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.

... string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName(); string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = "" + userName + " AND itemname = " + ItemName.Text + ""; sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn); DataTable dt = new DataTable(); sda.Fill(dt); ...

The query that this code intends to execute follows:

SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = AND itemname = ;

However, because the query is constructed dynamically by concatenating a constant base query string and a user input string, the query only behaves correctly if itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:

SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = 'wiley' AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';

The addition of the OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:

SELECT * FROM items;

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

# Fix Recommendation:

### General

There are several mitigation techniques:

[1] Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur, or provides constructs that make it easier to avoid.

[2] Strategy: Parameterization

If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.

[3] Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks.

[4] Strategy: Output Encoding

If you need to use dynamically-generated query strings or commands in spite of the risk, properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments.

[5] Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy: a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on blacklisting malicious or malformed inputs. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Here are two possible ways to protect your web application against SQL injection attacks:

[1] Use a stored procedure rather than dynamically built SQL query string. The way parameters are passed to SQL Server stored procedures, prevents the use of apostrophes and hyphens.

Here is a simple example of how to use stored procedures in ASP.NET:

'Visual Basic example Dim DS As DataSet Dim MyConnection As SqlConnection Dim MyCommand As SqlDataAdapter Dim SelectCommand As String = "select * from users where username = @username" ... MyCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters.Add(New

SqlParameter("@username", SqlDbType.NVarChar, 20)) MyCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters("@username").Value =

UserNameField.Value // C# example String selectCmd = "select * from Authors where state = @username"; SqlConnection myConnection = new SqlConnection("server=..."); SqlDataAdapter myCommand = new SqlDataAdapter(selectCmd, myConnection);

myCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters.Add(new SqlParameter("@username", SqlDbType.NVarChar, 20));

myCommand.SelectCommand.Parameters["@username"].Value = UserNameField.Value;

[2] You can add input validation to Web Forms pages by using validation controls. Validation controls provide an easy-to-use mechanism for all common types of standard validation - for example, testing for valid dates or values within a range - plus ways to provide custom-written validation. In addition, validation controls allow you to completely customize how error information is displayed to the user. Validation controls can be used with any controls that are processed in a Web Forms page's class file, including both HTML and Web server controls.

In order to make sure user input contains only valid values, you can use one of the following validation controls:

a. "RangeValidator": checks that a user's entry (value) is between specified lower and upper boundaries. You can check ranges within pairs of numbers, alphabetic characters, and dates.

b. "Regular ExpressionValidator": checks that the entry matches a pattern defined by a regular expression. This type of validation allows you to check for predictable sequences of characters, such as those in social security numbers, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, postal codes, and so on.

Important note: validation controls do not block user input or change the flow of page processing; they only set an error state, and produce error messages. It is the programmer's responsibility to test the state of the controls in the code before performing further application-specific actions. There are two ways to check for user input validity:

1. Testing for a general error state:

In your code, test the page's IsValid property. This property rolls up the values of the IsValid properties of all the validation controls on the page (using a logical AND). If one of the validation controls is set to invalid, the page's property will return false.

2. Testing for the error state of individual controls:

Loop through the page's Validators collection, which contains references to all the validation controls. You can then examine the IsValid property of each validation control.

** Prepared Statements:

There are 3 possible ways to protect your application against SQL injection, i.e. malicious tampering of SQL parameters. Instead of dynamically building SQL statements, use:

[1] PreparedStatement, which is precompiled and stored in a pool of PreparedStatement objects. PreparedStatement defines setters to register input parameters that are compatible with the supported JDBC SQL data types. For example, setString should be used for input parameters of type VARCHAR or LONGVARCHAR (refer to the Java API for further details). This way of setting input parameters prevents an attacker from manipulating the SQL statement through injection of bad characters, such as apostrophe.

Example of how to use a PreparedStatement in J2EE:

// J2EE PreparedStatemenet Example // Get a connection to the database Connection myConnection; if (isDataSourceEnabled()) { // using the DataSource to get a managed connection Context ctx = new InitialContext(); myConnection =

((DataSource)ctx.lookup(datasourceName)).getConnection(dbUserName, dbPassword); } else { try { // using the DriverManager to get a JDBC connection Class.forName(jdbcDriverClassPath); myConnection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcURL, dbUserName, dbPassword); } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { ... } ... try { PreparedStatement myStatement = myConnection.prepareStatement("select * from users where username = ?"); myStatement.setString(1, userNameField); ResultSet rs = myStatement.executeQuery(); ... rs.close(); } catch (SQLException

sqlException) { ... } finally { myStatement.close(); myConnection.close(); }

[2] CallableStatement, which extends PreparedStatement to execute database SQL stored procedures. This class inherits input setters from PreparedStatement (see [1] above).

The following example assumes that this database stored procedure has been created:

CREATE PROCEDURE select_user (@username varchar(20))

AS SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME = @username;

Example of how to use a CallableStatement in J2EE to execute the above stored procedure:

// J2EE PreparedStatemenet Example // Get a connection to the database Connection myConnection; if (isDataSourceEnabled()) { // using the DataSource to get a managed connection Context ctx = new InitialContext(); myConnection =

((DataSource)ctx.lookup(datasourceName)).getConnection(dbUserName, dbPassword); } else { try { // using the DriverManager to get a JDBC connection Class.forName(jdbcDriverClassPath); myConnection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcURL, dbUserName, dbPassword); } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { ... } } ... try { PreparedStatement myStatement = myConnection.prepareCall("{?= call select_user ?,?}"); myStatement.setString(1, userNameField); myStatement.registerOutParameter(1, Types.VARCHAR); ResultSet rs =

myStatement.executeQuery(); ... rs.close(); } catch (SQLException sqlException) { ... } finally { myStatement.close(); myConnection.close(); } [3] Entity Bean, which represents an EJB business object in a persistent storage mechanism. There are two types of entity beans: beanmanaged and container-managed. With bean-managed persistence, the developer is responsible of writing the SQL code to access the database (refer to sections [1] and [2] above). With container-managed persistence, the EJB container automatically generates the SQL code. As a result, the container is responsible of preventing malicious attempts to tamper with the generated SQL code. Example of how to use an Entity Bean in J2EE:

// J2EE EJB Example try { // lookup the User home interface UserHome userHome = (UserHome)context.lookup(User.class); // find the User remote interface User = userHome.findByPrimaryKey(new UserKey(userNameField)); ... } catch (Exception e) { ... } RECOMMENDED JAVA TOOLS

N/A

REFERENCES

https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/sql/PreparedStatement.html

https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/sql/CallableStatement.html

** Input Data Validation:

While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must be performed on the server-tier using Servlets. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript.

A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following:

[1] Required field

[2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default)

[3] Field length

[4] Field range

[5] Field options

[6] Field pattern

[7] Cookie values

[8] HTTP Response

A good practice is to implement the above routine as static methods in a "Validator" utility class. The following sections describe an example validator class.

[1] Required field

Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces.

Example of how to validate required fields:

// Java example to validate required fields public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRequired(String value) { boolean isFieldValid =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... } ... String fieldValue =
false; if (value != null && value.trim().tength() > 0 { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ... } ...

request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { // fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... } [2] Field data type

In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type. Use the Java primitive wrapper classes to check if the field value can be safely converted to the desired primitive data type.

Example of how to validate a numeric field (type int):

// Java example to validate that a field is an int number public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateInt(String value) { boolean
isFieldValid = false; try { Integer.parseInt(value); isFieldValid = true; } catch (Exception e) { isFieldValid = false; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... //
check if the HTTP request parameter is of type int String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { //
fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... }

A good practice is to convert all HTTP request parameters to their respective data types. For example, the developer should store the "integerValue" of a request parameter in a request attribute and use it as shown in the following example:

// Example to convert the HTTP request parameter to a primitive wrapper data type // and store this value in a request attribute for further
processing String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { // convert fieldValue to an Integer Integer
integerValue = Integer.getInteger(fieldValue); // store integerValue in a request attribute request.setAttribute("fieldName", integerValue); } ... //
Use the request attribute for further processing Integer Value = (Integer)request.getAttribute("fieldName"); ... //
Use the request attribute for further processing IntegerValue = (Integer)request.getAttribute("fieldName"); ...

The primary Java data types that the application should handle:

- Byte

- Short

- Integer

- Long

- Float
- Double
- Date
- [3] Field length

Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length.

Example to validate that the length of the userName field is between 8 and 20 characters:

// Example to validate the field length public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateLength(String value, int minLength, int maxLength)
{ String validatedValue = value; if (!validateRequired(value)) { validatedValue = ""; } return (validatedValue.length() >= minLength &&
validatedValue.length() <= maxLength); } ... } ... String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if</pre>

(Validated value.length) <- maxLength), </td>(Validator.validateLength(userName, 8, 20)) { // userName is valid, continue further processing ... } }[4] Field range

Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements.

Example to validate that the input numberOfChoices is between 10 and 20:

// Example to validate the field range public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRange(int value, int min, int max) { return (value >=
min && value <= max); } ... } ... String fieldValue = request.getParameter("numberOfChoices"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { if
(Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { int numberOfChoices = Integer.parseInt(fieldValue); if (Validator.validateRange(numberOfChoices, 10, 20)) {
// numberOfChoices is valid, continue processing request ... } }</pre>

[5] Field options

Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. Example to validate the user selection against a list of allowed options:

// Example to validate user selection against a list of options public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateOption(Object[] options, Object value) { boolean isValidValue = false; try { List list = Arrays.asList(options); if (list != null) { isValidValue = list.contains(value); } } catch (Exception e) { } return isValidValue; } ... } ... // Allowed options String[] options = {"option1", "option2", "option3"); // Verify that the user selection is one of the allowed options String userSelection = request.getParameter("userSelection"); if (Validator.validateOption(options, userSelection)) { // valid user selection, continue processing request ... }

[6] Field pattern

Always check that the user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression:

^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$

Java 1.3 or earlier versions do not include any regular expression packages. Apache Regular Expression Package (see Resources below) is recommended for use with Java 1.3 to resolve this lack of support. Example to perform regular expression validation:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Apache regular expression package import

org.apache.regexp.RE; import org.apache.regexp.RESyntaxException; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String value, String expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { RE r = new RE(expression); match = r.match(value); } return match; } ... } ... // Verify that the userName request parameter is alpha-numeric String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if (Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { // userName is valid, continue processing request ... }

Java 1.4 introduced a new regular expression package (java.util.regex). Here is a modified version of Validator.matchPattern using the new Java 1.4 regular expression package:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Java 1.4 regular expression package import
java.util.regex.Pattern; import java.util.regexe.Matcher; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String value, String
expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { match = Pattern.matches(expression, value); } return match; } ... }
[7] Cookie value

Use the javax.servlet.http.Cookie object to validate the cookie value. The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc.

Example to validate a required cookie value:

// Example to validate a required cookie value // First retrieve all available cookies submitted in the HTTP request Cookie[] cookies =
request.getCookies(); if (cookies != null) { // find the "user" cookie for (int i=0; i<cookies.length; ++i) { if (cookies[i].getName().equals("user")) { //
validate the cookie value if (Validator.validateRequired(cookies[i].getValue()) { // valid cookie value, continue processing request ... } } }
[8] HTTP Response</pre>

[8-1] Filter user input

To guard the application against cross-site scripting, sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters:

< > " ' % ; ) ( & +

Example to filter a specified string by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities:

// Example to filter sensitive data to prevent cross-site scripting public Class Validator { ... public static String filter(String value) { if (value == null)
{ return null; } StringBuffer result = new StringBuffer(value.length()); for (int i=0; i<value.length(); ++i) { switch (value.charAt(i)) { case '<':
result.append("<"); break; case '>': result.append(">"); break; case ''': result.append("""); break; case '\': result.append("""); break; case '\':
result.append("%"); break; case '; result.append(";"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case '\': result.append(""); break; case '&:
result.append("%"); break; case '+: result.append("+"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case ')': result.append(""); break; case '&:
result.append("&"); break; case '+: result.append("+"); break; default: result.append(value.charAt(i)); break; } return result; } ... } ... // Filter the
HTTP response using Validator.filter PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); // set output response out.write(Validator.filter(response));
out.close();

The Java Servlet API 2.3 introduced Filters, which supports the interception and transformation of HTTP requests or responses. Example of using a Servlet Filter to sanitize the response using Validator.filter:

// Example to filter all sensitive characters in the HTTP response using a Java Filter. // This example is for illustration purposes since it will filter all content in the response, including HTML tags! public class SensitiveCharsFilter implements Filter { ... public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain) throws IOException, ServletException { PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); ResponseWrapper wrapper = new ResponseWrapper((HttpServletResponse)response); chain.doFilter(request, wrapper); CharArrayWriter caw = new CharArrayWriter(); caw.write(Validator.filter(wrapper.toString())); response.setContentType("text/html");

response.setContentLength(caw.toString().length()); out.write(caw.toString()); out.close(); } ... public class CharResponseWrapper extends HttpServletResponseWrapper { private CharArrayWriter output; public String toString() { return output.toString(); } public

CharResponseWrapper(HttpServletResponse response){ super(response); output = new CharArrayWriter(); } public PrintWriter getWriter(){ return new PrintWriter(output); } } }

[8-2] Secure the cookie

When storing sensitive data in a cookie, make sure to set the secure flag of the cookie in the HTTP response, using Cookie.setSecure(boolean flag) to instruct the browser to send the cookie using a secure protocol, such as HTTPS or SSL.

Example to secure the "user" cookie:

// Example to secure a cookie, i.e. instruct the browser to // send the cookie using a secure protocol Cookie cookie = new Cookie("user",
"sensitive"); cookie.setSecure(true); response.addCookie(cookie);

RECOMMENDED JAVA TOOLS

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a powerful framework that implements all the above data validation requirements. These rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields. Struts supports output filtering of dangerous characters in the [8] HTTP Response by default on all data written using the Struts 'bean:write' tag. This filtering may be disabled by setting the 'filter=false' flag.

Struts defines the following basic input validators, but custom validators may also be defined:

required: succeeds if the field contains any characters other than white space.

mask: succeeds if the value matches the regular expression given by the mask attribute.

range: succeeds if the value is within the values given by the min and max attributes ((value >= min) & (value <= max)).

maxLength: succeeds if the field is length is less than or equal to the max attribute.

minLength: succeeds if the field is length is greater than or equal to the min attribute.

byte, short, integer, long, float, double: succeeds if the value can be converted to the corresponding primitive.

date: succeeds if the value represents a valid date. A date pattern may be provided.

creditCard: succeeds if the value could be a valid credit card number.

e-mail: succeeds if the value could be a valid e-mail address.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> </validator> </validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> </validator> </validator> ... </global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> </ar>

[2] JavaServer Faces Technology

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events and input validation.

The JavaServer Faces API implements the following basic validators, but custom validators may be defined:

validate_doublerange: registers a DoubleRangeValidator on a component

validate_length: registers a LengthValidator on a component

validate_longrange: registers a LongRangeValidator on a component

validate required: registers a RequiredValidator on a component

validate_stringrange: registers a StringRangeValidator on a component

validator: registers a custom Validator on a component

The JavaServer Faces API defines the following UlInput and UlOutput Renderers (Tags):

input_date: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance

output_date: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance

input_datetime: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance

output_datetime: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance

input_number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat

output_number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat input text: accepts a text string of one line.

output_text: displays a text string of one line.

input_time: accepts a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance

output_time: displays a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance

input_hidden: allows a page author to include a hidden variable in a page

input_secret: accepts one line of text with no spaces and displays it as a set of asterisks as it is typed

input_textarea: accepts multiple lines of text

output_errors: displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier output label: displays a nested component as a label for a specified input field

output_message: displays a localized message

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces:

<%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-a-login-validation-with-jsf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean"

scope="session" /> <f:use faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input text id="userName" size="20"

modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate_required/> <f:validate_length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input_text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output_errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command_button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use_faces>

REFERENCES

Java API 1.3 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html

Java API 1.4 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html Java Servlet API 2.3 -

Java Serviel AP1 2.3 -

https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api

Java Regular Expression Package -

http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/

Jakarta Validator -

http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/

JavaServer Faces Technology http://www.javaserverfaces.org/

** Error Handling:

Many J2EE web application architectures follow the Model View Controller (MVC) pattern. In this pattern a Servlet acts as a Controller. A Servlet delegates the application processing to a JavaBean such as an EJB Session Bean (the Model). The Servlet then forwards the request to a JSP (View) to render the processing results. Servlets should check all input, output, return codes, error codes and known exceptions to ensure that the expected processing actually occurred.

While data validation protects applications against malicious data tampering, a sound error handling strategy is necessary to prevent the application from inadvertently disclosing internal error messages such as exception stack traces. A good error handling strategy addresses the following items:

[1] Defining Errors

[2] Reporting Errors

[3] Rendering Errors

[4] Error Mapping

[1] Defining Errors

Hard-coded error messages in the application layer (e.g. Servlets) should be avoided. Instead, the application should use error keys that map to known application failures. A good practice is to define error keys that map to validation rules for HTML form fields or other bean properties. For example, if the "user_name" field is required, is alphanumeric, and must be unique in the database, then the following error keys should be defined:

(a) ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field is required;
 (b) ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field should be alphanumeric;

(c) ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is a duplicate in the database;

(d) ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID: this error key is used to display a generic message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is invalid; A good practice is to define the following framework Java classes which are used to store and report application errors:

- ErrorKeys: defines all error keys

// Example: ErrorKeys defining the following error keys: // - ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED // - ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC // - ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE // - ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID // ... public Class ErrorKeys { public static final String

ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED = "error.username.required"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC =

"error.username.alphanumeric"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE = "error.username.duplicate"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID = "error.username.invalid"; ... }

- Error: encapsulates an individual error

// Example: Error encapsulates an error key. // Error is serializable to support code executing in multiple JVMs. public Class Error implements Serializable { // Constructor given a specified error key public Error(String key) { this(key, null); } // Constructor given a specified error key and array of placeholder objects public Error(String key, Object[] values) { this.key = key; this.values = values; } // Returns the error key public String getKey() { return this.key; } // Returns the placeholder values public Object[] getValues() { return this.values; } private String key = null; private Object[] values = null; }

- Errors: encapsulates a Collection of errors

// Example: Errors encapsulates the Error objects being reported to the presentation layer. // Errors are stored in a HashMap where the key is the bean property name and value is an // ArrayList of Error objects. public Class Errors implements Serializable { // Adds an Error object to the Collection of errors for the specified bean property. public void addError(String property, Error error) { ArrayList propertyErrors =

(ArrayList)errors.get(property); if (propertyErrors == null) { propertyErrors = new ArrayList(); errors.put(property, propertyErrors); }

propertyErrors.put(error); } // Returns true if there are any errors public boolean hasErrors() { return (errors.size > 0); } // Returns the Errors for the specified property public ArrayList getErrors(String property) { return (ArrayList)errors.get(property); } private HashMap errors = new HashMap(); }

Using the above framework classes, here is an example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field:

// Example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field. Errors errors = new Errors(); String userName =

request.getParameter("user_name"); // (a) Required validation rule if (!Validator.validateRequired(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name",

new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED)); } // (b) Alpha-numeric validation rule else if (!Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC)); } else { // (c) Duplicate check validation rule // We assume that there is an existing UserValidationEJB session bean that implements // a checklfDuplicate() method to verify if the user already exists in the database. try { ... if (UserValidationEJB.checklfDuplicate(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (RemoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (remoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } } catch (remoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE); } // set the errors object in a request attribute called "errors" request.setAttribute("errors", errors); ...

[2] Reporting Errors

There are two ways to report web-tier application errors:

(a) Servlet Error Mechanism

(b) JSP Error Mechanism

[2-a] Servlet Error Mechanism

A Servlet may report errors by:

- forwarding to the input JSP (having already stored the errors in a request attribute), OR

- calling response.sendError with an HTTP error code argument, OR

- throwing an exception

It is good practice to process all known application errors (as described in section [1]), store them in a request attribute, and forward to the input JSP. The input JSP should display the error messages and prompt the user to re-enter the data. The following example illustrates how to forward to an input JSP (userInput.jsp):

// Example to forward to the userInput.jsp following user validation errors RequestDispatcher rd =

getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd != null) { rd.forward(request, response); }

If the Servlet cannot forward to a known JSP page, the second option is to report an error using the response sendError method with

HttpServletResponse.SC INTERNAL SERVER ERROR (status code 500) as argument. Refer to the javadoc of

javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse for more details on the various HTTP status codes. Example to return a HTTP error:

// Example to return a HTTP error code RequestDispatcher rd = getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd == null) { // messages is a resource bundle with all message keys and values

response.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,

messages.getMessage(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID)); }

As a last resort, Servlets can throw an exception, which must be a subclass of one of the following classes:

- RuntimeException

- ServletException

- IOException

[2-b] JSP Error Mechanism

JSP pages provide a mechanism to handle runtime exceptions by defining an errorPage directive as shown in the following example: <%@ page errorPage="/errors/userValidation.jsp" %>

Uncaught JSP exceptions are forwarded to the specified errorPage, and the original exception is set in a request parameter called javax.servlet.jsp.jspException. The error page must include a isErrorPage directive as shown below:

<%@ page isErrorPage="true" %>

The isErrorPage directive causes the "exception" variable to be initialized to the exception object being thrown.

[3] Rendering Errors

The J2SE Internationalization APIs provide utility classes for externalizing application resources and formatting messages including:

(a) Resource Bundles

(b) Message Formatting

[3-a] Resource Bundles

Resource bundles support internationalization by separating localized data from the source code that uses it. Each resource bundle stores a map of key/value pairs for a specific locale.

It is common to use or extend java.util.PropertyResourceBundle, which stores the content in an external properties file as shown in the following example:

Multiple resources can be defined to support different locales (hence the name resource bundle). For example, ErrorMessages_fr.properties can be defined to support the French member of the bundle family. If the resource member of the requested locale does not exist, the default member is used. In the above example, the default resource is ErrorMessages.properties. Depending on the user's locale, the application (JSP or Servlet) retrieves content from the appropriate resource.

[3-b] Message Formatting

The J2SE standard class java.util.MessageFormat provides a generic way to create messages with replacement placeholders. A MessageFormat object contains a pattern string with embedded format specifiers as shown below:

// Example to show how to format a message using placeholder parameters String pattern = "User name {0} already exists, please choose another one"; String userName = request.getParameter("user_name"); Object[] args = new Object[1]; args[0] = userName; String message = MessageFormat.format(pattern, args);

Here is a more comprehensive example to render error messages using ResourceBundle and MessageFormat:

// Example to render an error message from a localized ErrorMessages resource (properties file) // Utility class to retrieve locale-specific error messages public Class ErrorMessageResource { // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the environment locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, defaultLocale); } // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Locale locale) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, null, locale); } // Returns a formatted error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Object[] args, Locale locale) { // Get localized ErrorMessageResource ResourceBundle errorMessageResource = ResourceBundle.getBundle("ErrorMessages", locale); // Get localized error message String errorMessage = errorMessageResource.getString(errorKey); if (args != null) { // Format the message using the specified placeholders args return MessageFormat.format(errorMessage, args); } else { return errorMessage; } // default environment locale private Locale defaultLocale = Locale.getDefaultLocale(); } ... // Get the user's locale Locale userLocale =

request.getLocale(); // Check if there were any validation errors Errors errors = (Errors)request.getAttribute("errors"); if (errors != null && errors.hasErrors()) { // iterate through errors and output error messages corresponding to the "user_name" property ArrayList userNameErrors = errors.getErrors("user_name"); ListIterator iterator = userNameErrors.iterator(); while (iterator.hasNext()) { // Get the next error object Error error = (Error)iterator.next(); String errorMessage = ErrorMessageResource.getErrorMessage(error.getKey(), userLocale); output.write(errorMessage + "\r\n"); } }

It is recommended to define a custom JSP tag, e.g. displayErrors, to iterate through and render error messages as shown in the above example. [4] Error Mapping

Normally, the Servlet Container will return a default error page corresponding to either the response status code or the exception. A mapping between the status code or the exception and a web resource may be specified using custom error pages. It is a good practice to develop static error pages that do not disclose internal error states (by default, most Servlet containers will report internal error messages). This mapping is configured in the Web Deployment Descriptor (web.xml) as specified in the following example:

<!-- Mapping of HTTP error codes and application exceptions to error pages --> <error-page> <exception-

type>UserValidationException</exception-type> <location>/errors/validationError.html</error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> ... </error-page> ..

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a Java framework that defines the error handling mechanism as described above. Validation rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields and the corresponding validation error keys. Struts provides internationalization support to build localized applications using resource bundles and message formatting.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator > <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> </validator> ... </global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> <var-value>^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$</var-value> </var> </field> ... </form> ... </formset> </form-validation>

The Struts JSP tag library defines the "errors" tag that conditionally displays a set of accumulated error messages as shown in the following example:

<%@ page language="java" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-html.tld" prefix="html" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-bean.tld"
prefix="bean" %> <html:html> <head> <body> <html:form action="/logon.do"> 
<html:errors property="username"/> <bean:message key="prompt.username"/> <html:text property="username"
size="16"/> size="16"/> align="right"> <html:submit><bean:message key="button.submit"/>

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events, validate input, and support internationalization.

The JavaServer Faces API defines the "output_errors" UIOutput Renderer, which displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces:

<%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-a-login-validation-with-jsf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean"

scope="session" /> <f:use_faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input_text id="userName" size="20"

modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate_required/> <f:validate_length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input_text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output_errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command_button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use_faces>

REFERENCES

Java API 1.3 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html

Java API 1.4 -

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html

Java Servlet API 2.3 -

https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api

Java Regular Expression Package -

http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/

Jakarta Validator -

http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/

## JavaServer Faces Technology -

http://www.javaserverfaces.org/ ** Filter User Input Before passing any data to a SQL query, it should always be properly filtered with whitelisting techniques. This cannot be over-emphasized. Filtering user input will correct many injection flaws before they arrive at the database.

** Quote User Input

Regardless of data type, it is always a good idea to place single quotes around all user data if this is permitted by the database. MySQL allows this formatting technique.

** Escape the Data Values

If you're using MySQL 4.3.0 or newer, you should escape all strings with mysql_real_escape_string(). If you are using an older version of MySQL, you should use the mysql_escape_string() function. If you are not using MySQL, you might choose to use the specific escaping function for your particular database. If you are not aware of an escaping function, you might choose to utilize a more generic escaping function such as addslashes().

If you're using the PEAR DB database abstraction layer, you can use the DB::quote() method or use a query placeholder like ?, which automatically escapes the value that replaces the placeholder.

REFERENCES http://ca3.php.net/mysql_real_escape_string http://ca.php.net/mysql_escape_string http://ca.php.net/addslashes

#### http://pear.php.net/package-info.php?package=DB

** Input Data Validation:

While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must always be performed on the server-tier. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript.

A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following:

[1] Required field

[2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default)

[3] Field length

[4] Field range

[5] Field options

[6] Field pattern

[7] Cookie values

[8] HTTP Response

A good practice is to implement a function or functions that validates each application parameter. The following sections describe some example checking.

[1] Required field

Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces.

Example of how to validate required fields:

// PHP example to validate required fields function validateRequired(\$input) { ... \$pass = false; if (strlen(trim(\$input))>0){ \$pass = true; } return
\$pass; ... } ... if (validateRequired(\$fieldName)) { // fieldName is valid, continue processing request ... }

[2] Field data type

In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type.

[3] Field length

Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length.

[4] Field range

Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements.

[5] Field options

Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. [6] Field pattern

Always check that user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression:

^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\$

[7] Cookie value

The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc.

[8] HTTP Response

[8-1] Filter user input

To guard the application against cross-site scripting, the developer should sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters:

<>"'%;)(&+

PHP includes some automatic sanitization utility functions, such as htmlentities():

\$input = htmlentities(\$input, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');

In addition, in order to avoid UTF-7 variants of Cross-site Scripting, you should explicitly define the Content-Type header of the response, for example:

<?php header('Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8'); ?>

[8-2] Secure the cookie

When storing sensitive data in a cookie and transporting it over SSL, make sure that you first set the secure flag of the cookie in the HTTP response. This will instruct the browser to only use that cookie over SSL connections.

You can use the following code example, for securing the cookie:

<\$php \$value = "some_value"; \$time = time()+3600; \$path = "/application/"; \$domain = ".example.com"; \$secure = 1; setcookie("CookieName",
\$value, \$time, \$path, \$domain, \$secure, TRUE); ?>

In addition, we recommend that you use the HttpOnly flag. When the HttpOnly flag is set to TRUE the cookie will be made accessible only through the HTTP protocol. This means that the cookie won't be accessible by scripting languages, such as JavaScript. This setting can effectively help to reduce identity theft through XSS attacks (although it is not supported by all browsers). The HttpOnly flag was Added in PHP 5.2.0.

#### REFERENCES

 Mitigating Cross-site Scripting With HTTP-only Cookies: http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533046.aspx
 PHP Security Consortium: http://phpsec.org/
 PHP & Web Application Security Blog (Chris Shiflett): http://shiflett.org/

CWE:

209

External References: "Web Application Disassembly with ODBC Error Messages" (By David Litchfield)

## **Direct Access to Administration Pages**

#### Cause:

The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way

#### Risk:

It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application

A common user can access certain pages on a site through simple surfing (i.e. following web links). However, there might be pages and scripts that are not accessible through simple surfing, (i.e. pages and scripts that are not linked).

An attacker may be able to access these pages by guessing their name, e.g. admin.php, admin.asp, admin.cgi, admin.html, etc. Example request for a script named "admin.php":

http://[SERVER]/admin.php

Access to administration scripts should not be allowed without proper authorization, as it may allow an attacker to gain privileged rights. Sample Exploit:

http://[SERVER]/admin.php http://[SERVER]/admin.asp http://[SERVER]/admin.aspx http://[SERVER]/admin.html http://[SERVER]/admin.cfm http://[SERVER]/admin.cgi

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Do not allow access to administration scripts without proper authorization, as it may allow an attacker to gain privileged rights.

CWE:

306

тос

## **Host Header Injection**

### Cause:

Lack of input validation and sanitization

## Risk:

- Dispatch requests to the first virtual host on the list - Cause a redirect to an attacker-controlled domain - Perform web cache poisoning - Manipulate password reset functionality

A web server commonly hosts several web applications on the same IP address, referring to each application via the virtual host. In an incoming HTTP request, web servers often dispatch the request to the target virtual host based on the value supplied in the Host or X-Forwarded-Host header. Sample Exploit:

GET /login.html HTTP/1.1 Host: evilhost.com

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Validate and sanitize the user supplied inputs properly

### CWE:

644

External References: OWASP - WSTG Latest Practical Host header attacks

## Inadequate Account Lockout

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It might be possible to escalate user privileges and gain administrative permissions over the web application

AppScan Detected that the application does not limit the number of false login attempts.

It did so by sending 10 requests with a bad password, and then successfully logged in using the correct credentials.

Not limiting the number of false login attempts exposes the application to a brute force attack.

A brute force attack is an attempt by a malicious user to gain access to the application by sending a large number of possible passwords and/or usernames.

Since this technique involves a large amount of login attempts, an application that does not limit the number of false login requests allowed is vulnerable to these attacks.

It is therefore highly recommended to restrict the number of false login attempts allowed on an account before it is locked. Sample Exploit:

The following request illustrates a password-guessing request:

http://site/login.asp?username=EXISTING_USERNAME&password=GUESSED_PASSWORD

If the site does not lock the tested account after several false attempts, the attacker may eventually discover the account password and use it to impersonate the account's legitimate user.

TOC

## Affected Products:

This issue affects several applications

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Decide upon the number of login attempts to be allowed (usually from 3 to 5), and make sure that the account will be locked once the permitted number of attempts is exceeded.

To avoid unnecessary support calls from genuine users who were locked out of their account and require enabling, it is possible to suspend account activity only temporarily, and enable it after a specific period of time. Locking the account for a period of ten minutes or so is usually sufficient to block brute force attacks.

CWE:

307

External References: "Blocking Brute-Force Attacks" by Mark Burnett

## Link Injection (facilitates Cross-Site Request Forgery)

Cause:

Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

TOC

#### Risk:

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user

It is possible to upload, modify or delete web pages, scripts and files on the web server

The software constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input, but fails to neutralize elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted.

Link Injection is the modifying of the content of a site by embedding in it a URL to an external site, or to a script in the vulnerable site. After embedding the URL in the vulnerable site, an attacker is able to use it as a platform to launch attacks against other sites, as well as against the vulnerable site itself.

Some of these possible attacks require the user to be logged in to the site during the attack. By launching these attacks from the vulnerable site itself, the attacker increases the chances of success, because the user is more likely to be logged in.

The Link Injection vulnerability is a result of insufficient user input sanitization, the input being later returned to the user in the site response. The resulting ability to inject hazardous characters into the response makes it possible for attackers to embed URLs, among other possible content modifications.

Below is an example for a Link Injection (We will assume that site "www.vulnerable.com" has a parameter called "name", which is used to greet users).

The following request:

HTTP://www.vulnerable.com/greet.asp?name=John Smith

Will yield the following response:

<HTML> <BODY> Hello, John Smith. </BODY> </HTML>

However, a malicious user may send the following request:

HTTP://www.vulnerable.com/greet.asp?name=<IMG SRC="http://www.ANY-SITE.com/ANY-SCRIPT.asp">

This will return the following response:

<HTML> <BODY> Hello, <IMG SRC="http://www.ANY-SITE.com/ANY-SCRIPT.asp">. </BODY> </HTML>

As this example shows, it is possible to cause a user's browser to issue automatic requests to virtually any site the attacker desires. As a result, Link Injection vulnerability can be used to launch several types of attack:

[-] Cross-Site Request Forgery

[-] Cross-Site Scripting

[-] Phishing

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

There are several mitigation techniques:

[1] Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur, or provides constructs that make it easier to avoid.

Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.

[2] Understand the context in which your data will be used, and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.

Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:

[-] HTML body

[-] Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")

[-] URIs

[-] JavaScript sections

[-] Cascading Style Sheets and style property

Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.

Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.

[3] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. [4] Strategy: Output Encoding

For every web page that is generated, use and specify a character encoding such as ISO-8859-1 or UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, the web browser may choose a different encoding by guessing the web page encoding. This can cause the web browser to treat certain sequences as special, opening up the client to subtle XSS attacks. See CWE-116 for more mitigations related to encoding/escaping. [5] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface

To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.

[6] Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy: a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on a blacklist of malicious or malformed inputs. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if you are expecting colors such as "red" or "blue."

When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent whitelists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed: not only parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so on. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.

Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon (" <3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.

Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address. Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a

component is reused or moved elsewhere.

#### **External References:**

OWASP Article The Cross-Site Request Forgery FAQ

## **Missing Secure Attribute in Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie**

#### Cause:

The web application sends non-secure cookies over SSL

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal user and session information (cookies) that was sent during an encrypted session

During the application test, it was detected that the tested web application set a cookie without the "secure" attribute, during an encrypted session. Since this cookie does not contain the "secure" attribute, it might also be sent to the site during an unencrypted session. Any information such as cookies, session tokens or user credentials that are sent to the server as clear text, may be stolen and used later for identity theft or user impersonation.

In addition, several privacy regulations state that sensitive information such as user credentials will always be sent encrypted to the web site

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Basically the only required attribute for the cookie is the "name" field. Common optional attributes are: "comment", "domain", "path", etc. The "secure" attribute must be set accordingly in order to prevent to cookie from being sent unencrypted. For more information on how to set the secure flag, see OWASP "Secure Attribute" cheatsheet at

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html#secure-attribute RFC 2965 states:

"The Secure attribute (with no value) directs the user agent to use only (unspecified) secure means to contact the origin server whenever it sends back this cookie, to protect the confidentially and authenticity of the information in the cookie."

For further reference please see the HTTP State Management Mechanism RFC 2965 at:

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2965.txt

and for "Best current practice" for use of HTTP State Management please see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2964

## CWE:

614

#### **External References:**

Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Sarbanes-Oxley Act California SB1386

## **Older TLS Version is Supported**

#### Cause:

The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user

The server supports TLS cipher suites that either do not offer encryption or use weak encryption algorithms. An attacker may therefore be able to

decrypt the secure communication between the client and the server, or successfully execute a "man-in-the-middle" attack on the client, enabling them to view sensitive information and perform actions on behalf of the client. Current most secure TLS version is 1.3

Current most secure TLS version is 1.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Reconfigure the server to avoid the use of weak cipher suites. The configuration changes are server-specific.

For Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Windows Server 2003, follow these instructions:

http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245030

For Microsoft Windows Vista, Microsoft Windows 7, and Microsoft Windows Server 2008, remove the cipher suites that were identified as weak from the Supported Cipher Suite list by following these instructions:

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb870930(v=vs.85).aspx

For Apache TomCat server, follow these instructions:

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Talk:Securing_tomcat#Disabling_weak_ciphers_in_Tomcat

For Apache server, follow these instructions:

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/ssl/ssl_howto.html

## CWE:

327

#### **External References:**

Deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1 Overview of TLS 1.3

## **Phishing Through Frames**

#### Cause:

Sanitation of hazardous characters was not performed correctly on user input

156

#### Risk:

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential information (very frequently authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker. Phishing is essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information.

It is possible for an attacker to inject a frame or an iframe tag with malicious content. An incautious user may browse it and not realize that he is leaving the original site and surfing to a malicious site. The attacker may then lure the user to login again, thus acquiring his login credentials.

The fact that the fake site is embedded in the original site helps the attacker by giving his phishing attempts a more reliable appearance.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

There are several mitigation techniques:

[1] Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur, or provides constructs that make it easier to avoid.

Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.

[2] Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.

Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:

[-] HTML body

[-] Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")

[-] URIs

[-] JavaScript sections

[-] Cascading Style Sheets and style property

Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.

Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.

[3] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. [4] Strategy: Output Encoding

For every web page that is generated, use and specify a character encoding such as ISO-8859-1 or UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, the web browser may choose a different encoding by guessing which encoding is actually being used by the web page. This can cause the web browser to treat certain sequences as special, opening up the client to subtle XSS attacks. See CWE-116 for more mitigations related to encoding/escaping.

[5] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface

To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.

[6] Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy: a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on a blacklist of malicious or malformed inputs. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if you are expecting colors such as "red" or "blue."

When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent whitelists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.

Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon (" <3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.

Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address. Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a

component is reused or moved elsewhere.

CWE: 79

External References: FTC Consumer Alert - "How Not to Get Hooked by a 'Phishing' Scam"

## SHA-1 cipher suites were detected

#### Cause:

The web server or application server are configured in an insecure way

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user

The server supports SHA-1 ciphersuites.

SHA-1 was officially deprecated by NIST in 2011, but many applications still rely on it.

Up until now (2021), only theoretical attacks have been known agsinst SHA-1, which is why many applications still rely on it.

Recently, a practical attack was introduced by CWI Amsterdam and Google Research teams ([1] and [2]).

### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Secure Cipher-Suites best practices: [1] Use strong cryptographic hashing algorithms [2] Server cipher TLS requirements

# CWE: 327

External References: [1] SHATTERED [2] The first collision for full SHA-1

## **Session Identifier Not Updated**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

159

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user

Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier, gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.

Such a scenario is commonly observed when:

[1] A web application authenticates a user without first invalidating the existing session, thereby continuing to use the session already associated with the user

[2] An attacker is able to force a known session identifier on a user so that, once the user authenticates, the attacker has access to the authenticated session

[3] The application or container uses predictable session identifiers.

In the generic exploit of session fixation vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on a web application and records the associated session identifier. The attacker then causes the victim to associate, and possibly authenticate, against the server using that session identifier, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.

AppScan has found that the session identifiers before and after the login process were not updated, which means that user impersonation may be possible. Preliminary knowledge of the session identifier value may enable a remote attacker to pose as a logged-in legitimate user. The flow of attack:

a) An attacker uses the victim's browser to open the login form of the vulnerable site.

b) Once the form is open, the attacker writes down the session identifier value, and waits.

c) When the victim logs into the vulnerable site, his session identifier is not updated.

d) The attacker can then use the session identifier value to impersonate the victim user, and operate on his behalf.

The session identifier value can be obtained by utilizing a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability, causing the victim's browser to use a predefined session identifier when contacting the vulnerable site, or by launching a Session Fixation attack that will cause the site to present a predefined session identifier to the victim's browser.

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Prevent user ability to manipulate session ID. Do not accept session IDs provided by the user's browser at login; always generate a new session to which the user will log in if successfully authenticated.

Invalidate any existing session identifiers prior to authorizing a new user session.

For platforms such as ASP that do not generate new values for sessionid cookies, utilize a secondary cookie. In this approach, set a secondary cookie on the user's browser to a random value and set a session variable to the same value. If the session variable and the cookie value ever don't match, invalidate the session, and force the user to log on again.

#### CWE:

304

#### **External References:**

"Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web-based Applications", By Mitja Kolsek - Acros Security PHP Manual, Session Handling Functions, Sessions and security

## Autocomplete HTML Attribute Not Disabled for Password Field

тос

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It may be possible to bypass the web application's authentication mechanism

The "autocomplete" attribute has been standardized in the HTML5 standard. W3C's site states that the attribute has two states, "on" and "off", and that omitting it altogether is equivalent to setting it to "on".

This page is vulnerable since it does not set the "autocomplete" attribute to "off" for the "password" field in the "input" element.

This may enable an unauthorized user (with local access to an authorized client) to autofill the username and password fields, and thus log in to the site.

#### Affected Products:

N/A

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

If the "autocomplete" attribute is missing in the "password" field of the "input" element, add it and set it to "off". If the "autocomplete" attribute is set to "on", change it to "off".

For example:

Vulnerable site:

<form action="AppScan.html" method="get"> Username: <input type="text" name="firstname" /><br /> Password: <input type="password" name="lastname" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <form>

Non-vulnerable site:

<form action="AppScan.html" method="get"> Username: <input type="text" name="firstname" /><br /> Password: <input type="password" name="lastname" autocomplete="off"/> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <form>

## CWE:

522

## **Body Parameters Accepted in Query**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

GET requests are designed to query the server, while POST requests are for submitting data.

However, aside from the technical purpose, attacking query parameters is easier than body parameters, because sending a link to the original site, or posting it in a blog or comment, is easier and has better results than the alternative - in order to attack a request with body parameters, an attacker would need to create a page containing a form that will be submitted when visited by the victim. It is a lot harder to convince the victim to visit a page that he doesn't know, than letting him visit the original site. It it therefore not recommended to support body parameters that arrive in the guery string.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Re-program the application to disallow handling of POST parameters that were listed in the Query

CWE: 200

External References: GET POST

## **Cacheable SSL Page Found**

#### Cause:

Sensitive information might have been cached by your browser

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

Most web browsers are configured by default to cache the user's pages during use. This means that SSL pages are cached as well. It is not recommended to enable the web browser to save any SSL information, since this information might be compromised when a vulnerability exists.

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Disable caching on all SSL pages or all pages that contain sensitive data.

This can be achieved by using "Cache-Control: no-store" and either "Pragma: no-cache" or "Cache-Control: no-cache" response directives in your SSL page headers.

Cache-Control: private - This directive instructs proxies that the page contains private information, and therefore should not be cached by a shared cache. However, it does not instruct browsers to refrain from caching the pages.

Cache-Control: no-cache - This directive also instructs proxies that the page contains private information, and therefore should not be cached. It also instructs the browser to revalidate with the server to check if a new version is available. This means that the browser may store sensitive pages or information to be used in the revalidation. Certain browsers do not necessarily follow the RFC and may treat no-cache as no-store. Cache-Control: no-store - This is the most secure directive. It instructs both the proxy and the browser not to cache the page or store it in its cache folders.

Pragma: no-cache - This directive is required for older browsers, that do not support the Cache-Control header.

CWE:

525

## **Credit Card Number Pattern Found (Visa)**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

AppScan detected a response containing a complete Visa credit card number.

For reasons of security and privacy, credit card numbers should not appear in web pages.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Refrain from including credit card numbers in your website.

## CWE:

200

## **Encryption Not Enforced**

#### Cause:

- The application does not use a secure channel, such as TLS/SSL, to exchange sensitive information.
- An attacker with access to the network traffic can eavesdrop on packets over the connection. This attack is not technically difficult, but does
  require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels.

#### Risk:

Any information sent to the server as clear text may be stolen over the network and used later for identity theft or user impersonation.

It may be possible to intercept sensitive data such as user login information (usernames and passwords), credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted.

It may be possible to perform man in the middle (MitM) attacks, which would give an attacker full control of the communication, including changing content, stealing data, or impersonating the user to the server.

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

You should always transmit all data over a TLS/SSL connection only. This includes all external communications, including browsers, backend connections such as databases, third party APIs, and other services.

In addition, several privacy regulations state that sensitive information such as user credentials will always be sent encrypted to the web site. Always enforce the use of an encrypted connection (e.g. TLS/SSL), and do not allow any access to sensitive information using unencrypted HTTP.

Use TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 and use strong cryptographic hashing algorithms and cipher suites.

тос

#### **External References:**

OWASP - TLS Cipher String Cheat Sheet OWASP - Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet

## **Missing "Content-Security-Policy" header**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

The absence or improper values of CSP can cause the web application being vulnerable to XSS, clickjacking, etc.

The "Content-Security-Policy" header is designed to modify the way browsers render pages, and thus to protect from various cross-site injections, including Cross-Site Scripting. It is important to set the header value correctly, in a way that will not prevent proper operation of the web site. For example, if the header is set to prevent execution of inline JavaScript, the web site must not use inline JavaScript in its pages. To protect against Cross-Site Scripting, Cross-Frame Scripting and clickjacking, it is important to set the following policies with proper values: Both of 'default-src' and 'frame-ancestors' policies, *OR* all of 'script-src', 'object-src' and 'frame-ancestors' policies.

For 'default-src', 'script-src' and 'object-src', insecure values such as '*', 'data:', 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval' should be avoided.

For 'frame-ancestors', insecure values such as '*' or 'data:' should be avoided.

Additionally for 'script-src', and 'default-src' (fallback directive for 'script-src') 'self' is considered insecure and should be avoided. Please refer the following links for more information.

Please note that "Content-Security-Policy" includes four different tests. A general test that verifies if the "Content-Security-Policy" header is being used and three additional tests that check if "Frame-Ancestors", "Object-Src" and "Script-Src" were configured correctly.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

#### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Configure your server to send the "Content-Security-Policy" header.

It is recommended to configure Content-Security-Policy header with secure values for its directives as below:

For 'default-src', and 'script-src' secure values such as 'none', or https://any.example.com.

For 'frame-ancestors', and 'object-src' secure values such as 'self', 'none' or https://any.example.com are expected.

"unsafe-inline" and "unsafe-eval" must not be used in any circumstance. Using nonce / hash would be only considered for short-term workaround.

For Apache, see:

http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/mod_headers.html

For IIS, see:

https://technet.microsoft.com/pl-pl/library/cc753133%28v=ws.10%29.aspx

For nginx, see:

http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_headers_module.html

## CWE:

1032

## External References:

List of some secure Headers An Introduction to Content Security Policy MDN web docs - Content-Security-Policy

## **Missing HttpOnly Attribute in Session Cookie**

## Cause:

The web application sets session cookies without the HttpOnly attribute

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal or manipulate customer session and cookies, which might be used to impersonate a legitimate user, allowing the hacker to view or alter user records, and to perform transactions as that user

During the application test, it was detected that the tested web application set a session cookie without the "HttpOnly" attribute. Since this session cookie does not contain the "HttpOnly" attribute, it might be accessed by a malicous script injected to the site, and its value can be stolen. Any information stored in session tokens may be stolen and used later for identity theft or user impersonation.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Basically the only required attribute for the cookie is the "name" field. Common optional attributes are: "comment", "domain", "path", etc. The "HttpOnly" attribute must be set accordingly in order to prevent session cookies from being accessed by scripts.

# CWE: 653

653

## Missing or insecure "X-Content-Type-Options" header

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

## Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

The "X-Content-Type-Options" header (with "nosniff" value) prevents IE and Chrome from ignoring the content-type of a response. This action may prevent untrusted content (e.g. user uploaded content) from being executed on the user browser (after a malicious naming, for example).

TOC

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

## Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Configure your server to send the "X-Content-Type-Options" header with value "nosniff" on all outgoing requests. For Apache, see: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/mod_headers.html For IIS, see: https://technet.microsoft.com/pl-pl/library/cc753133%28v=ws.10%29.aspx For nginx, see: http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_headers_module.html

```
CWE:
```

200

## **External References:**

List of useful HTTP headers Reducing MIME type security risks

## **Missing or insecure Cross-Frame Scripting Defence**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

Cross-Frame Scripting is an attack technique where an attacker loads a vulnerable application in an iFrame on his malicious site.

The attacker can then launch a Clickjacking attack, which may lead to Phishing, Cross-Site Request Forgery, sensitive information leakage, and more.

For best protection, it is advised to set the header value to DENY or SAMEORIGIN.

Sample Exploit:

Within a malicious site, it is possible to embed the vulnerable page:

<frame src="http://vulnerable.com/login.html">

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

## General

Use the X-Frame-Options to prevent (or limit) pages from being embedded in iFrames. For older browser, include a "frame-breaker" script in each page that should not be framed.

### **External References:**

Cross-Frame Scripting Clickjacking

## Missing or insecure HTTP Strict-Transport-Security Header

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a mechanism which protects secure (HTTPS) websites from being downgraded to non-secure HTTP. This mechanism enables web servers to instruct their clients (web browsers or other user agents) to use secure HTTPS connections when interacting with the server, and never use the insecure HTTP protocol.

It is important to set the 'max-age' to a high enough value to prevent falling back to an insecure connection prematurely.

The HTTP Strict Transport Security policy is communicated by the server to its clients using a response header named "Strict-Transport-Security". The value of this header is a period of time during which the client should access the server in HTTPS only. Other header attributes include "includeSubDomains" and "preload".

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

General

Implement the The HTTP Strict Transport Security policy by adding the "Strict-Transport-Security" response header to the web application responses.

For more information please see https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html

CWE:

200

External References:

OWASP "HTTP Strict Transport Security" HSTS Spec

## **Query Parameter in SSL Request**

TOC

TOC

#### Cause:

Query parameters were passed over SSL, and may contain sensitive information

#### Risk:

It may be possible to steal sensitive data such as credit card numbers, social security numbers etc. that are sent unencrypted During the application test, it was detected that a request, which was sent over SSL, contained parameters that were transmitted in the Query part of an HTTP request.

When sending requests, the browser's history can be used to reveal the URLs, which contain the query parameter names and values. Due to the sensitivity of encrypted requests, it is suggested to use HTTP POST (without parameters in the URL string) when possible, in order to avoid the disclosure of URLs and parameter values to others.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Make sure that sensitive information such as:

- Username
- Password
- Social Security number
- Credit Card number
- Driver's License number
- e-mail address
- Phone number
- Zip code

is always sent in the body part of an HTTP POST request.

CWE:

598

#### **External References:**

Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Sarbanes-Oxley Act California SB1386

## **Unnecessary Http Response Headers found in the Application**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

тос

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web server type, version, OS and more.

AppScan detected a Http response header that is unnecessary.

For reasons of security and privacy, The Http response headers like "Server", "X-Powered-By", "X-AspNetMvc-Version" and "X-AspNet-Version" should not appear in web pages.

The "Server" header is a header that is added usually by default whenever a response is sent to the client by the server.

The "X-Powered-By" header is a header that might be added by default whenever a response is sent to the client by the server.

These added header(s) may reveal sensitive information about the internal server software version and type, thus enabling attackers to fingerprint it and attack it with targeted exploits. Moreover, when a new exploit becomes known to the public, the server will most likely get attacked with it.

## Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Configure your server to remove the default "Server" header from being sent to all outgoing requests. For IIS, see: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/iis-support-blog/remove-unwanted-http-response-headers/ba-p/369710 For nginx, see: https://www.getpagespeed.com/server-setup/nginx/how-to-remove-the-server-header-in-nginx For Weblogic, see: https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E13222_01/wls/docs81/adminguide/web_server.html For Apache, see: https://techglimpse.com/set-modify-response-headers-http-tip/

CWE:

200

## External References:

Fingerprinting Preventing Information Leakage

## **Application Error**

#### Cause:

- Proper bounds checking were not performed on incoming parameter values
- No validation was done in order to make sure that user input matches the data type expected

тос

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive debugging information

If an attacker probes the application by forging a request that contains parameters or parameter values other than the ones expected by the application (examples are listed below), the application may enter an undefined state that makes it vulnerable to attack. The attacker can gain useful information from the application's response to this request, which information may be exploited to locate application weaknesses. For example, if the parameter field should be an apostrophe-quoted string (e.g. in an ASP script or SQL query), the injected apostrophe symbol will prematurely terminate the string stream, thus changing the normal flow/syntax of the script.

Another cause of vital information being revealed in error messages, is when the scripting engine, web server, or database are misconfigured. Here are some different variants:

- [1] Remove parameter
- [2] Remove parameter value
- [3] Set parameter value to null
- [4] Set parameter value to a numeric overflow (+/- 99999999)
- [5] Set parameter value to hazardous characters, such as ' " \' \" ) ;
- [6] Append some string to a numeric parameter value
- [7] Append "." (dot) or "[]" (angle brackets) to the parameter name

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

General

[1] Check incoming requests for the presence of all expected parameters and values. When a parameter is missing, issue a proper error message or use default values.

[2] The application should verify that its input consists of valid characters (after decoding). For example, an input value containing the null byte (encoded as %00), apostrophe, quotes, etc. should be rejected.

[3] Enforce values in their expected ranges and types. If your application expects a certain parameter to have a value from a certain set, then the application should ensure that the value it receives indeed belongs to the set. For example, if your application expects a value in the range 10..99, then it should make sure that the value is indeed numeric, and that its value is in 10..99.

[4] Verify that the data belongs to the set offered to the client.

[5] Do not output debugging error messages and exceptions in a production environment.

In order to disable debugging in ASP.NET, edit your web.config file to contain the following:

<compilation

debug="false"

/>

For more information, see "HOW TO: Disable Debugging for ASP.NET Applications" in:

http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;815157

You can add input validation to Web Forms pages by using validation controls. Validation controls provide an easy-to-use mechanism for all common types of standard validation (for example, testing for valid dates or values within a range), plus ways to provide custom-written validation. In addition, validation controls allow you to completely customize how error information is displayed to the user. Validation controls can be used with any controls that are processed in a Web Forms page's class file, including both HTML and Web server controls. To make sure that all the required parameters exist in a request, use the "RequiredFieldValidator" validation control. This control ensures that the user does not skip an entry in the web form.

To make sure user input contains only valid values, you can use one of the following validation controls:

[1] "RangeValidator": checks that a user's entry (value) is between specified lower and upper boundaries. You can check ranges within pairs of numbers, alphabetic characters, and dates.

[2] "RegularExpressionValidator": checks that the entry matches a pattern defined by a regular expression. This type of validation allows you to check for predictable sequences of characters, such as those in social security numbers, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, postal codes, and so on.

Important note: validation controls do not block user input or change the flow of page processing; they only set an error state, and produce error messages. It is the programmer's responsibility to test the state of the controls in the code before performing further application-specific actions. There are two ways to check for user input validity:

1. Test for a general error state:

In your code, test the page's IsValid property. This property rolls up the values of the IsValid properties of all the validation controls on the page (using a logical AND). If one of the validation controls is set to invalid, the page's property will return false.

2. Test for the error state of individual controls:

Loop through the page's Validators collection, which contains references to all the validation controls. You can then examine the IsValid property of each validation control.

** Input Data Validation:

While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must be performed on the server-tier using Servlets. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript.

A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following:

[1] Required field

[2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default)

[3] Field length

[4] Field range

[5] Field options

[6] Field pattern

[7] Cookie values

[8] HTTP Response

A good practice is to implement the above routine as static methods in a "Validator" utility class. The following sections describe an example validator class.

[1] Required field

Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces.

Example of how to validate required fields:

// Java example to validate required fields public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRequired(String value) { boolean isFieldValid = false; if (value != null && value.trim().length() > 0) { isFieldValid = true; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... String fieldValue =

request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { // fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... } [2] Field data type

In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type. Use the Java primitive wrapper classes to check if the field value can be safely converted to the desired primitive data type.

Example of how to validate a numeric field (type int):

// Java example to validate that a field is an int number public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateInt(String value) { boolean
isFieldValid = false; try { Integer.parseInt(value); isFieldValid = true; } catch (Exception e) { isFieldValid = false; } return isFieldValid; } ... } ... //
check if the HTTP request parameter is of type int String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { //
fieldValue is valid, continue processing request ... }

A good practice is to convert all HTTP request parameters to their respective data types. For example, store the "integerValue" of a request parameter in a request attribute and use it as shown in the following example:

// Example to convert the HTTP request parameter to a primitive wrapper data type // and store this value in a request attribute for further
processing String fieldValue = request.getParameter("fieldName"); if (Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { // convert fieldValue to an Integer Integer
integerValue = Integer.getInteger(fieldValue); // store integerValue in a request attribute request.setAttribute("fieldName", integerValue); } ... //
Use the request attribute for further processing Integer integerValue = (Integer)request.getAttribute("fieldName"); ...
The primary Java data types that the application should handle:

- Byte
- Short
- Integer
- Long
- Float
- Double
- Date

[3] Field length

Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length.

Example to validate that the length of the userName field is between 8 and 20 characters:

// Example to validate the field length public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateLength(String value, int minLength, int maxLength)
{ String validatedValue = value; if (!validateRequired(value)) { validatedValue = ""; } return (validatedValue.length() >= minLength &&
validatedValue length() <= movt ength; } = transport ength; }</pre>

validatedValue.length() <= maxLength); } ... } ... String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if

(Validator.validateRequired(userName)) { if (Validator.validateLength(userName, 8, 20)) { // userName is valid, continue further processing ... } } [4] Field range

Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements.

Example to validate that the input numberOfChoices is between 10 and 20:

// Example to validate the field range public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateRange(int value, int min, int max) { return (value >=
min && value <= max); } ... } ... String fieldValue = request.getParameter("numberOfChoices"); if (Validator.validateRequired(fieldValue)) { if
(Validator.validateInt(fieldValue)) { int numberOfChoices = Integer.parseInt(fieldValue); if (Validator.validateRange(numberOfChoices, 10, 20)) {
// numberOfChoices is valid, continue processing request ... } }</pre>

[5] Field options

Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. Example to validate the user selection against a list of allowed options:

// Example to validate user selection against a list of options public Class Validator { ... public static boolean validateOption(Object[] options, Object value) { boolean isValidValue = false; try { List list = Arrays.asList(options); if (list != null) { isValidValue = list.contains(value); } } catch (Exception e) { } return isValidValue; } ... } ... // Allowed options String[] options = {"option1", "option2", "option3"); // Verify that the user selection is one of the allowed options String userSelection = request.getParameter("userSelection"); if (Validator.validateOption(options, userSelection)) { // valid user selection, continue processing request ... }

[6] Field pattern

Always check that the user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression: ^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$

Java 1.3 or earlier versions do not include any regular expression packages. Apache Regular Expression Package (see Resources below) is recommended for use with Java 1.3 to resolve this lack of support.

Example to perform regular expression validation:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Apache regular expression package import
org.apache.regexp.RE; import org.apache.regexp.RESyntaxException; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String
value, String expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { RE r = new RE(expression); match = r.match(value); }
return match; } ... } ... // Verify that the userName request parameter is alpha-numeric String userName = request.getParameter("userName"); if
(Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { // userName is valid, continue processing request ... }

Java 1.4 introduced a new regular expression package (java.util.regex). Here is a modified version of Validator.matchPattern using the new Java 1.4 regular expression package:

// Example to validate that a given value matches a specified pattern // using the Java 1.4 regular expression package import java.util.regex.Pattern; import java.util.regexe.Matcher; public Class Validator { ... public static boolean matchPattern(String value, String expression) { boolean match = false; if (validateRequired(expression)) { match = Pattern.matches(expression, value); } return match; } ... } [7] Cookie value

Use the javax.servlet.http.Cookie object to validate the cookie value. The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc. Example to validate a required cookie value:

// Example to validate a required cookie value // First retrieve all available cookies submitted in the HTTP request Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies(); if (cookies != null) { // find the "user" cookie for (int i=0; i<cookies.length; ++i) { if (cookies[i].getName().equals("user")) { //

validate the cookie value if (Validator.validateRequired(cookies[i].getValue()) { // valid cookie value, continue processing request ... } } }

[8] HTTP Response [8-1] Filter user input

To guard the application against cross-site scripting, sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters:

#### <>"'%;)(&+

Example to filter a specified string by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities:

// Example to filter sensitive data to prevent cross-site scripting public Class Validator { ... public static String filter(String value) { if (value == null)
{ return null; } StringBuffer result = new StringBuffer(value.length()); for (int i=0; i<value.length(); ++i) { switch (value.charAt(i)) { case '<':
 result.append("<"); break; case '>': result.append(">"); break; case '': result.append("""); break; case '\':
 result.append("%"); break; case ',': result.append(";"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case ',': result.append("%"); break; case ',':
 result.append("%"); break; case ',': result.append(";"); break; case '(': result.append("("); break; case ')': result.append("); break; case '&:
 result.append("%"); break; case '+': result.append("+"); break; default: result.append(value.charAt(i)); break; } return result; } ... } ... // Filter the
 HTTP response using Validator.filter PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); // set output response out.write(Validator.filter(response));
 out.close();

The Java Servlet API 2.3 introduced Filters, which supports the interception and transformation of HTTP requests or responses.

Example of using a Servlet Filter to sanitize the response using Validator filter:

// Example to filter all sensitive characters in the HTTP response using a Java Filter. // This example is for illustration purposes since it will filter all content in the response, including HTML tags! public class SensitiveCharsFilter implements Filter { ... public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain) throws IOException, ServletException { PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); ResponseWrapper wrapper = new ResponseWrapper((HttpServletResponse)response); chain.doFilter(request, wrapper); CharArrayWriter caw = new CharArrayWriter(); caw.write(Validator.filter(wrapper.toString())); response.setContentType("text/html");

response.setContentLength(caw.toString().length()); out.write(caw.toString()); out.close(); } ... public class CharResponseWrapper extends HttpServletResponseWrapper { private CharArrayWriter output; public String toString() { return output.toString(); } public

CharResponseWrapper(HttpServletResponse response){ super(response); output = new CharArrayWriter(); } public PrintWriter getWriter(){ return new PrintWriter(output); } } }

[8-2] Secure the cookie

When storing sensitive data in a cookie, make sure to set the secure flag of the cookie in the HTTP response, using Cookie.setSecure(boolean flag) to instruct the browser to send the cookie using a secure protocol, such as HTTPS or SSL.

Example to secure the "user" cookie:

// Example to secure a cookie, i.e. instruct the browser to // send the cookie using a secure protocol Cookie cookie = new Cookie("user",
"sensitive"); cookie.setSecure(true); response.addCookie(cookie);

RECOMMENDED JAVA TOOLS

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a powerful framework that implements all the above data validation requirements. These rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields. Struts supports output filtering of dangerous characters in the [8] HTTP Response by default on all data written using the Struts 'bean:write' tag. This filtering may be disabled by setting the 'filter=false' flag.

Struts defines the following basic input validators, but custom validators may also be defined:

required: succeeds if the field contains any characters other than white space.

mask: succeeds if the value matches the regular expression given by the mask attribute.

range: succeeds if the value is within the values given by the min and max attributes ((value >= min) & (value <= max)).

maxLength: succeeds if the field is length is less than or equal to the max attribute.

minLength: succeeds if the field is length is greater than or equal to the min attribute.

byte, short, integer, long, float, double: succeeds if the value can be converted to the corresponding primitive.

date: succeeds if the value represents a valid date. A date pattern may be provided.

creditCard: succeeds if the value could be a valid credit card number.

e-mail: succeeds if the value could be a valid e-mail address.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator > <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator > </global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> </arrows/login.userName/loginserName.displayname"/> </arrows/login.userName> </arrows/login.serName> </arrows/login.serName> </arrows/login.serName> </arrows/loginserName> </arrows/loginser

[2] JavaServer Faces Technology

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events and input validation.

The JavaServer Faces API implements the following basic validators, but custom validators may be defined:

validate_doublerange: registers a DoubleRangeValidator on a component

validate_length: registers a LengthValidator on a component

validate_longrange: registers a LongRangeValidator on a component

validate_required: registers a RequiredValidator on a component

validate_stringrange: registers a StringRangeValidator on a component

validator: registers a custom Validator on a component

The JavaServer Faces API defines the following UIInput and UIOutput Renderers (Tags):

input_date: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance

output date: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.Date instance input datetime: accepts a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance output datetime: displays a java.util.Date formatted with a java.text.DateTime instance input number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat output_number: displays a numeric data type (java.lang.Number or primitive), formatted with a java.text.NumberFormat input_text: accepts a text string of one line. output_text: displays a text string of one line. input_time: accepts a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance output_time: displays a java.util.Date, formatted with a java.text.DateFormat time instance input_hidden: allows a page author to include a hidden variable in a page input secret: accepts one line of text with no spaces and displays it as a set of asterisks as it is typed input textarea: accepts multiple lines of text output errors: displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier output label: displays a nested component as a label for a specified input field output message: displays a localized message Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces: <%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-alogin-validation-with-isf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean" scope="session" /> <f:use faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input text id="userName" size="20" modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate required/> <f:validate length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use faces> REFERENCES Java API 1.3 https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html Java API 1.4 https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html Java Servlet API 2.3 https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api Java Regular Expression Package http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/ Jakarta Validator http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/ JavaServer Faces Technology http://www.javaserverfaces.org/ ** Error Handling:

Many J2EE web application architectures follow the Model View Controller (MVC) pattern. In this pattern a Servlet acts as a Controller. A Servlet delegates the application processing to a JavaBean such as an EJB Session Bean (the Model). The Servlet then forwards the request to a JSP (View) to render the processing results. Servlets should check all input, output, return codes, error codes and known exceptions to ensure that the expected processing actually occurred.

While data validation protects applications against malicious data tampering, a sound error handling strategy is necessary to prevent the application from inadvertently disclosing internal error messages such as exception stack traces. A good error handling strategy addresses the following items:

[1] Defining Errors

[2] Reporting Errors

[3] Rendering Errors

[4] Error Mapping

[1] Defining Errors

Hard-coded error messages in the application layer (e.g. Servlets) should be avoided. Instead, the application should use error keys that map to known application failures. A good practice is to define error keys that map to validation rules for HTML form fields or other bean properties. For example, if the "user_name" field is required, is alphanumeric, and must be unique in the database, then the following error keys should be defined:

(a) ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field is required;
 (b) ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" field should be alphanumeric;

(c) ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE: this error key is used to display a message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is a duplicate in the database;

(d) ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID: this error key is used to display a generic message notifying the user that the "user_name" value is invalid; A good practice is to define the following framework Java classes which are used to store and report application errors:

- ErrorKeys: defines all error keys

// Example: ErrorKeys defining the following error keys: // - ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED // - ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC // -ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE // - ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID // ... public Class ErrorKeys { public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED = "error.username.required"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC = "error.username.alphanumeric"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE = "error.username.duplicate"; public static final String ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID = "error.username.invalid"; ... }

- Error: encapsulates an individual error

// Example: Error encapsulates an error key. // Error is serializable to support code executing in multiple JVMs. public Class Error implements Serializable { // Constructor given a specified error key public Error(String key) { this(key, null); } // Constructor given a specified error key and array of placeholder objects public Error(String key, Object[] values) { this.key = key; this.values = values; } // Returns the error key public String getKey() { return this.key; } // Returns the placeholder values public Object[] getValues() { return this.values; } private String key = null; private Object[] values = null; }

- Errors: encapsulates a Collection of errors

// Example: Errors encapsulates the Error objects being reported to the presentation layer. // Errors are stored in a HashMap where the key is the bean property name and value is an // ArrayList of Error objects. public Class Errors implements Serializable { // Adds an Error object to the Collection of errors for the specified bean property. public void addError(String property, Error error) { ArrayList propertyErrors = (ArrayList)errors.get(property); if (propertyErrors == null) { propertyErrors = new ArrayList(); errors.put(property, propertyErrors); } propertyErrors.put(error); } // Returns true if there are any errors public boolean hasErrors() { return (errors.size > 0); } // Returns the Errors for the specified property public ArrayList getErrors(String property) { return (ArrayList)errors.get(property); } private HashMap errors = new HashMap(); }

Using the above framework classes, here is an example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field:

// Example to process validation errors of the "user_name" field. Errors errors = new Errors(); String userName =

request.getParameter("user_name"); // (a) Required validation rule if (!Validator.validateRequired(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_REQUIRED)); } // (b) Alpha-numeric validation rule else if (!Validator.matchPattern(userName, "^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$")) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_ALPHANUMERIC)); } else { // (c) Duplicate check validation rule // We assume that there is an existing UserValidationEJB session bean that implements // a checkIfDuplicate() method to verify if the user already exists in the database. try { ... if (UserValidationEJB.checkIfDuplicate(userName)) { errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } catch (RemoteException e) { // log the error logger.error("Could not validate user for specified userName: " + userName); errors.addError("user_name", new Error(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_DUPLICATE)); } // set the errors object in a request attribute called "errors" request.setAttribute("errors", errors); ...

[2] Reporting Errors

There are two ways to report web-tier application errors:

(a) Servlet Error Mechanism

(b) JSP Error Mechanism

[2-a] Servlet Error Mechanism

A Servlet may report errors by:

- forwarding to the input JSP (having already stored the errors in a request attribute), OR

- calling response.sendError with an HTTP error code argument, OR

- throwing an exception

It is good practice to process all known application errors (as described in section [1]), store them in a request attribute, and forward to the input JSP. The input JSP should display the error messages and prompt the user to re-enter the data. The following example illustrates how to forward to an input JSP (userInput.jsp):

// Example to forward to the userInput.jsp following user validation errors RequestDispatcher rd =

getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd != null) { rd.forward(request, response); }

If the Servlet cannot forward to a known JSP page, the second option is to report an error using the response sendError method with

HttpServletResponse.SC_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR (status code 500) as argument. Refer to the javadoc of

javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse for more details on the various HTTP status codes.

Example to return a HTTP error:

// Example to return a HTTP error code RequestDispatcher rd = getServletContext().getRequestDispatcher("/user/userInput.jsp"); if (rd == null) {
// messages is a resource bundle with all message keys and values

response.sendError(HttpServletResponse.SC INTERNAL SERVER ERROR,

messages.getMessage(ErrorKeys.ERROR_USERNAME_INVALID)); }

As a last resort, Servlets can throw an exception, which must be a subclass of one of the following classes:

- RuntimeException

- ServletException

- IOException

[2-b] JSP Error Mechanism

JSP pages provide a mechanism to handle runtime exceptions by defining an errorPage directive as shown in the following example: <%@ page errorPage="/errors/userValidation.jsp" %>

Uncaught JSP exceptions are forwarded to the specified errorPage, and the original exception is set in a request parameter called javax.servlet.jsp.jspException. The error page must include a isErrorPage directive as shown below:

<%@ page isErrorPage="true" %>

The isErrorPage directive causes the "exception" variable to be initialized to the exception object being thrown.

[3] Rendering Errors

The J2SE Internationalization APIs provide utility classes for externalizing application resources and formatting messages including:

(a) Resource Bundles

(b) Message Formatting

[3-a] Resource Bundles

Resource bundles support internationalization by separating localized data from the source code that uses it. Each resource bundle stores a map of key/value pairs for a specific locale.

It is common to use or extend java.util.PropertyResourceBundle, which stores the content in an external properties file as shown in the following example:

Multiple resources can be defined to support different locales (hence the name resource bundle). For example, ErrorMessages_fr.properties can be defined to support the French member of the bundle family. If the resource member of the requested locale does not exist, the default member is used. In the above example, the default resource is ErrorMessages.properties. Depending on the user's locale, the application (JSP or Servlet) retrieves content from the appropriate resource.

[3-b] Message Formatting

The J2SE standard class java.util.MessageFormat provides a generic way to create messages with replacement placeholders. A MessageFormat object contains a pattern string with embedded format specifiers as shown below:

// Example to show how to format a message using placeholder parameters String pattern = "User name {0} already exists, please choose another one"; String userName = request.getParameter("user_name"); Object[] args = new Object[1]; args[0] = userName; String message = MessageFormat.format(pattern, args);

Here is a more comprehensive example to render error messages using ResourceBundle and MessageFormat:

// Example to render an error message from a localized ErrorMessages resource (properties file) // Utility class to retrieve locale-specific error messages public Class ErrorMessageResource { // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the environment locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, defaultLocale); } // Returns the error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Locale locale) { return getErrorMessage(errorKey, null, locale); } // Returns a formatted error message for the specified error key in the specified locale public String getErrorMessage(String errorKey, Object[] args, Locale locale) { // Get localized ErrorMessageResource ResourceBundle errorMessageResource = ResourceBundle.getBundle("ErrorMessages", locale); // Get localized error message String errorMessage = errorMessageResource.getString(errorKey); if (args != null) { // Format the message using the specified placeholders args return MessageFormat.format(errorMessage, args); } else { return errorMessage; } // default environment locale private Locale defaultLocale = Locale.getDefaultLocale(); } ... // Get the user's locale Locale userLocale = request.getLocale(); // Check if there were any validation errors Errors errors = (Errors)request.getAttribute("errors"); if (errors != null &&

errors.hasErrors()) { // iterate through errors and output error messages corresponding to the "user_name" property ArrayList userNameErrors = errors.getErrors("user_name"); ListIterator iterator = userNameErrors.iterator(); while (iterator.hasNext()) { // Get the next error object Error error = (Error)iterator.next(); String errorMessage = ErrorMessageResource.getErrorMessage(error.getKey(), userLocale); output.write(errorMessage + "\r\n"); }

It is recommended to define a custom JSP tag, e.g. displayErrors, to iterate through and render error messages as shown in the above example. [4] Error Mapping

Normally, the Servlet Container will return a default error page corresponding to either the response status code or the exception. A mapping between the status code or the exception and a web resource may be specified using custom error pages. It is a good practice to develop static error pages that do not disclose internal error states (by default, most Servlet containers will report internal error messages). This mapping is configured in the Web Deployment Descriptor (web.xml) as specified in the following example:

<!-- Mapping of HTTP error codes and application exceptions to error pages --> <error-page> <exception-

type>UserValidationException</exception-type> <location>/errors/validationError.html</error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> </error-page> ... </error-page> ..

The two main Java frameworks for server-side validation are:

[1] Jakarta Commons Validator (integrated with Struts 1.1)

The Jakarta Commons Validator is a Java framework that defines the error handling mechanism as described above. Validation rules are configured in an XML file that defines input validation rules for form fields and the corresponding validation error keys. Struts provides internationalization support to build localized applications using resource bundles and message formatting.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using Struts Validator:

<form-validation> <global> ... <validator name="required" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateRequired" msg="errors.required"> </validator > <validator name="mask" classname="org.apache.struts.validator.FieldChecks" method="validateMask" msg="errors.invalid"> </validator> <validator > 
</global> <formset> <form name="loginForm"> <!-- userName is required and is alpha-numeric case insensitive --> <field property="userName" depends="required,mask"> <!-- message resource key to display if validation fails --> <msg name="mask" key="login.userName.maskmsg"/> <arg0 key="login.userName.displayname"/> <var> </ary value>^[a-zA-Z0-9]*\$</ary value> </ary </ary </ary > </ary </ary > </ary </ary > </ary >

The Struts JSP tag library defines the "errors" tag that conditionally displays a set of accumulated error messages as shown in the following example:

<%@ page language="java" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-html.tld" prefix="html" %> <%@ taglib uri="/WEB-INF/struts-bean.tld" prefix="bean" %> <html:html> <head> <body> <html:form action="/logon.do"> <html:ntml> <head> <body> <html:form action="/logon.do"> <html:errors property="username"/> <bean:message key="prompt.username"/> <html:text property="username" size="16"/> size="16"/>

JavaServer Faces Technology is a set of Java APIs (JSR 127) to represent UI components, manage their state, handle events, validate input, and support internationalization.

The JavaServer Faces API defines the "output_errors" UIOutput Renderer, which displays error messages for an entire page or error messages associated with a specified client identifier.

Example to validate the userName field of a loginForm using JavaServer Faces:

<%@ taglib uri="https://docs.oracle.com/javaee/6/tutorial/doc/glxce.html" prefix="h" %> <%@ taglib uri="http://mrbool.com/how-to-create-alogin-validation-with-jsf-java-server-faces/27046" prefix="f" %> ... <jsp:useBean id="UserBean" class="myApplication.UserBean" scope="session" /> <f:use faces> <h:form formName="loginForm" > <h:input text id="userName" size="20" modelReference="UserBean.userName"> <f:validate required/> <f:validate length minimum="8" maximum="20"/> </h:input text> <!-- display errors if present --> <h:output errors id="loginErrors" clientId="userName"/> <h:command button id="submit" label="Submit" commandName="submit" /> </h:form> </f:use_faces> REFERENCES Java API 1.3 https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-13docs-downloads.html Java API 1.4 https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/java-archive-142docs-downloads.html Java Servlet API 2.3 https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/javax.servlet/javax.servlet-api Java Regular Expression Package http://jakarta.apache.org/regexp/ Jakarta Validator http://iakarta.apache.org/commons/validator/ JavaServer Faces Technology http://www.javaserverfaces.org/ ** Input Data Validation: While data validations may be provided as a user convenience on the client-tier, data validation must always be performed on the server-tier. Client-side validations are inherently insecure because they can be easily bypassed, e.g. by disabling Javascript. A good design usually requires the web application framework to provide server-side utility routines to validate the following: [1] Required field [2] Field data type (all HTTP request parameters are Strings by default) [3] Field length [4] Field range [5] Field options [6] Field pattern [7] Cookie values [8] HTTP Response A good practice is to implement a function or functions that validates each application parameter. The following sections describe some example checking. [1] Required field Always check that the field is not null and its length is greater than zero, excluding leading and trailing white spaces. Example of how to validate required fields: // PHP example to validate required fields function validateRequired(\$input) { ... \$pass = false; if (strlen(trim(\$input))>0){ \$pass = true; } return \$pass; ... } ... if (validateRequired(\$fieldName)) { // fieldName is valid, continue processing request ... } [2] Field data type In web applications, input parameters are poorly typed. For example, all HTTP request parameters or cookie values are of type String. The developer is responsible for verifying the input is of the correct data type. [3] Field length Always ensure that the input parameter (whether HTTP request parameter or cookie value) is bounded by a minimum length and/or a maximum length. [4] Field range Always ensure that the input parameter is within a range as defined by the functional requirements. [5] Field options Often, the web application presents the user with a set of options to choose from, e.g. using the SELECT HTML tag, but fails to perform serverside validation to ensure that the selected value is one of the allowed options. Remember that a malicious user can easily modify any option value. Always validate the selected user value against the allowed options as defined by the functional requirements. [6] Field pattern Always check that user input matches a pattern as defined by the functionality requirements. For example, if the userName field should only allow alpha-numeric characters, case insensitive, then use the following regular expression: ^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\$ [7] Cookie value The same validation rules (described above) apply to cookie values depending on the application requirements, e.g. validate a required value, validate length, etc. [8] HTTP Response [8-1] Filter user input To guard the application against cross-site scripting, the developer should sanitize HTML by converting sensitive characters to their corresponding character entities. These are the HTML sensitive characters: <>"'%;)(&+ PHP includes some automatic sanitization utility functions, such as htmlentities(): \$input = htmlentities(\$input, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); In addition, in order to avoid UTF-7 variants of Cross-site Scripting, you should explicitly define the Content-Type header of the response, for example: <?php header('Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8'); ?> [8-2] Secure the cookie

response. This will instruct the browser to only use that cookie over SSL connections.

You can use the following code example, for securing the cookie:

<\$php \$value = "some_value"; \$time = time()+3600; \$path = "/application/"; \$domain = ".example.com"; \$secure = 1; setcookie("CookieName",
\$value, \$time, \$path, \$domain, \$secure, TRUE); ?>

In addition, we recommend that you use the HttpOnly flag. When the HttpOnly flag is set to TRUE the cookie will be made accessible only through the HTTP protocol. This means that the cookie won't be accessible by scripting languages, such as JavaScript. This setting can effectively help to reduce identity theft through XSS attacks (although it is not supported by all browsers). The HttpOnly flag was Added in PHP 5.2.0.

REFERENCES

 Mitigating Cross-site Scripting With HTTP-only Cookies: http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533046.aspx
 PHP Security Consortium: http://phpsec.org/
 PHP & Web Application Security Blog (Chris Shiflett): http://shiflett.org/

CWE:

550

#### **External References:**

An example for using apostrophe to hack a site can be found in "How I hacked PacketStorm (by Rain Forest Puppy), RFP's site" "Web Application Disassembly with ODBC Error Messages" (By David Litchfield) CERT Advisory (CA-1997-25): Sanitizing user-supplied data in CGI scripts

## **Email Address Pattern Found**

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

Spambots crawl internet sites, set out to find e-mail addresses in order to build mailing lists for sending unsolicited e-mail (spam). AppScan detected a response containing one or more e-mail addresses, which may be exploited to send spam mail

Furthermore, the e-mail addresses found may be private and thus should not be accessible to the general public.

#### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

## Fix Recommendation:

General

Remove any e-mail addresses from the website so that they won't be exploited by malicious users.

CWE:

359

External References: Definition of Spambot (Wikipedia) тос

## **HTML Comments Sensitive Information Disclosure**

#### Cause:

- Many web application programmers use HTML comments to help debug the application when needed. While adding general comments is
  very useful, some programmers tend to leave important data in client-side comments, such as filenames related to the web application, links
  which were not meant to be browsed by users, old code fragments including passwords, etc.
- Comments such as BUG, FIXME, and TODO may be an indication of missing security functionality and checking. Others indicate code
  problems that you should fix, such as hard-coded variables, error handling, not using stored procedures, and performance issues. Comments
  in HTML and JavaScript are usually easily viewable by end users.

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations.

An attacker who finds these comments can map the application's structure and files, expose hidden parts of the site, and study the fragments of code to reverse engineer the application, which may help develop further attacks against the site.

### Fix Recommendation:

#### General

Remove client-side comments that could reveal internal information for development time. Consider processing files before deployment to automatically remove all comments. This allows comments to be visible to internal developers but not to external users. Do not leave any sensitive information, such as filenames, file paths, passwords, or SQL queries, in HTML or JavaScript comments. Remove traces of previous (or future) site links in the production site comments.

## CWE:

615

## Missing "Referrer policy" Security Header

#### Cause:

Insecure web application programming or configuration

#### Risk:

It is possible to gather sensitive information about the web application such as usernames, passwords, machine name and/or sensitive file locations

It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

The absence or improper values of Referrer Policy can cause URL leak itself, and even sensitive information contained in the URL will be leaked to the cross-site.

This is a part of ruleset to check if Referrer Policy is present and if so to test its configuration. The "Referer Policy" header defines what data is made available in the Referer header, and for navigation and iframes in the destination's (document.referrer). This header is designed to modify the way browsers render pages, and thus to prevent cross-domain Referer leakage. It is important to set the header value correctly, in a way that will not prevent proper operation of the web site.

Referer header is a request header that indicates the site which the traffic originated from. If there is no adequate prevention in place, the URL itself, and even sensitive information contained in the URL will be leaked to the cross-site.

"no-referrer-when-downgrade" and "unsafe-url" are the policies which leaks the Full Url for the ThirdParty Sites. The remaining policies are"no-referrer", "origin", "origin-when-cross-origin", "same-origin", "strict-origin", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin. Please refer the following links for more information.

### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products

### Fix Recommendation:

General

Configure your server to send the "Referrer Policy" header. It is recommended to configure Referrer Policy header with secure values for its directives as below: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" offers more privacy. With this policy, only the origin is sent in the Referer header of cross-origin requests. For Google Chrome, see: https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2020/07/referrer-policy-new-chrome-default For Firefox , see: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-Policy.

CWE:

200

**External References:** 

MDN web docs - Referrer-Policy

## **Possible Server Path Disclosure Pattern Found**

### Cause:

Latest patches or hotfixes for 3rd. party products were not installed

### Risk:

It is possible to retrieve the absolute path of the web server installation, which might help an attacker to develop further attacks and to gain information about the file system structure of the web application

AppScan detected a response containing a file's absolute path (e.g. c:\dir\file in Windows, or /dir/file in Unix).

An attacker may be able to exploit this information to access sensitive information on the directory structure of the server machine which could be used for further attacks against the site.

### Affected Products:

This issue may affect different types of products.

### Fix Recommendation:

General

There are several mitigation techniques:

[1] In case the vulnerability is in the application itself, fix the server code so it doesn't include file locations in any output.

[2] Otherwise, if the application is in a 3rd party product, download the relevant security patch depending on the 3rd party product you are using on your web server or web application.

CWE:

200

# Application Data

# Visited URLs 60

URL

https://demo.testfire.net/
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp?query=1234
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount?listAccounts=800003
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_deposit.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_checking.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_loans.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_investments.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_other.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_lending.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_cards.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_retirement.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/retirement.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_about.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_press.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_careers.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/doSubscribe
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=privacy.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=security.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp?HostName=AltoroMutual
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/properties.json
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-bundle.js
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions

https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp?content=queryxpath.jsp&query=Enter+title+(e.g.+Watchfire)
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=international
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/apply.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=a
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=b
https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm?url=http://www.netscape.com
https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.swf
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_executives.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20061109.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_benefits.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_trainee.htm
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=international
https://demo.testfire.net/logout.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=OperationalRiskManager:RiskManagement
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=done&txtEmail=jsmith@mail.com
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp

# Parameters 33

Name	Value	URL	Туре
content	customize.jsp	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=internati onal	Simple Link
content	queryxpath.jsp	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp?content=queryxpath.jsp&query=Enter +title+(e.g.+Watchfire)	Hidden
passwd	**CONFIDENTIAL 0**	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply	Password
step	a b done	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=a	Simple Link
txtEmail	jsmith@mail.com	https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=done&txtEmail=jsmith@mail.co m	Simple Link
uid	jsmith	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	Text
passw	**CONFIDENTIAL 0**	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	Password
listAccount s	800003	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount?listAccounts=800003	Select
url	http://www.netscape.com	https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm?url=http://www.netscape.com	Simple Link
btnSubmit	Subscribe	https://demo.testfire.net/doSubscribe	Submit
content	inside_contact.htm	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm	Simple

TOC

...

btnSubmit	Login	https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	Submit
query	Enter title (e.g. Watchfire)	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/queryxpath.jsp?content=queryxpath.jsp&query=Enter +title+(e.g.+Watchfire)	Text
query	1234	https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp?query=1234	Text
Submit	Submit	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply	Submit
endDate	2019-01-01	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions	Text
submit	+Submit+	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Submit
transferAm ount	1234	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer	Text
txtEmail	test@altoromutual.com	https://demo.testfire.net/doSubscribe	Text
cfile	comments.txt	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Hidden
startDate	2019-01-01	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showTransactions	Text
name	John+Smith	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Text
accttypes	Savings	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	Select
transfer	Transfer Money	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer	Submit
HostName	AltoroMutual	https://demo.testfire.net/util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp?HostName=AltoroMutua	Simple Link
email_addr	753+Main+Street	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Text
toAccount	800003	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer	Select
comments	1234	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	TextArea
username	sspeed	https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	Select
fromAccou nt	800003	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/doTransfer	Select
subject	1234	https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Body
job	OperationalRiskManager:RiskMa nagement	https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=OperationalRiskM anager:RiskManagement	Simple Link
lang	international	https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=internati onal	Simple Link

# Failed Requests 6

TOC

URL	Reason
https://demo.testfire.net/default.jsp?content=security.htm	Response Status '404' - Not Found
https://demo.testfire.net/inside_points_of_interest.htm	Response Status '404' - Not Found
https://demo.testfire.net/default.jsp?content=security.htm	Response Status '404' - Not Found
https://demo.testfire.net/Privacypolicy.jsp?sec=Careers&template=US	Response Status '404' - Not Found
https://demo.testfire.net/default.jsp?content=security.htm	Response Status '404' - Not Found
https://demo.testfire.net/default.jsp?content=security.htm	Response Status '404' - Not Found

# Filtered URLs 242

URL	Reason
https://demo.testfire.net/style.css	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/logo.gif	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/header_pic.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/pf_lock.gif	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/cgi.exe	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/home1.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/home2.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/home3.jpg	File Extension
https://github.com/AppSecDev/AltoroJ/	Untested Web Server
http://www-142.ibm.com/software/products/us/en/subcategory/SWI10	Untested Web Server
http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/images/inside6.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_main.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/pr/communityannualreport.pdf	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/inside1.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_deposit.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_checking.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_loans.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_investments.jpg	File Extension
http://demo-analytics.testfire.net/urchin.js	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/clients.xls	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/p_other.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/b_lending.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/b_cards.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/b_retirement.jpg	File Extension
http://www.newspapersyndications.tv/	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/images/inside5.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/inside7.jpg	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/inside4.jpg	File Extension
http://www.cert.org/	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/images/icon_top.gif	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui.css	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/favicon-32x32.png	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/favicon-16x16.png	File Extension
https://online.swagger.io/validator?url=https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/properties.json	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_savings.htm	Similar Body
https://demo.testfire.net/images/ok.gif	File Extension
https://demo.testfire.net/images/cancel.gif	File Extension
http://www.netscape.com/	Untested Web Server
https://www.aol.com/	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/benji/benji-1.0.83.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/nn/lib/metro/g/myy/advertisement_0.0.19.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-dl-1.6.2.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/wafer-core.d8a2bbe83acf7922.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/polyfills.e0be59dc1da96626.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/vendor-glide.a8bd1773c27f716d.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/utils.783372195eb15b3c.js	Untested Web Server

https://s.vima.com/cog/uf/uf rapid 1.10.7 is	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-rapid-1.10.7.js https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-scrollview-2.21.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.ying.com/aaq/wi/wi-scloliview-2.21.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.ying.com/aaq/wi/wi-tabs-1.12.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.ying.com/aaq/wi/wi-toggie-1.10.4.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/video_player_wafer.08e7f13466871cff.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/video_player_water.ove/11540007101.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/dispatchet.e1ad09000141ab04.js	Untested Web Server
	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-autocomplete-1.31.7.js	-
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/readmo.8c9dae6c4d72bf7e.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-module-2.0.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-text-1.2.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-beacon-1.3.4.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-fetch-1.19.1.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-bind-1.1.3.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/notification_banner.021ba5ca8466c0b7.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/ad_blocker.66ca66172460f2e8.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/aaq/wf/wf-image-1.4.0.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/dl.3f04b2accc977d6a.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/notification_bell.c68f40de3779e9a4.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/weather.35ca22e5bc4d12c5.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/ss/rapid3.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/aol_header.da6597b18c191447.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/os/yaft/yaft-0.3.29.min.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.yimg.com/oa/consent.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/news.ec578b81c96c3c35.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/choose_news.db3547969a1b837c.js	Untested Web Server
https://consent.cmp.oath.com/cmp.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/caas-assets-production/assets/v1/y_finance_markets.c976d9537fe5aaf8.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/images/dims?format=jpg&quality=80&thumbnail=32,32ℑ_uri=https://s.yimg.com/os/cre atr-uploaded-images/2021-12/27ab1e70-68e8-11ec-9f8f-130668cce848&client=76f99bdb8f78cd44cc0b&signatur e=12d46bf50c61cc738244b48afd58278f22fa2d41	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/images/dims?format=jpg&quality=80&thumbnail=32,32ℑ_uri=https://s.yimg.com/os/cre atr-uploaded-images/2021-06/77d38700-d9ed-11eb-be27-f7edbce29062&client=76f99bdb8f78cd44cc0b&signatur e=f681a4e420fd5eb2c85085401f6fad97b8f5c7d1	
https://s.aolcdn.com/images/dims?format=jpg&quality=80&thumbnail=32,32ℑ_uri=https://s.yimg.com/os/cre atr-uploaded-images/2023-06/1504f900-095d-11ee-af59-036f8ef2680e&client=76f99bdb8f78cd44cc0b&signature =f96c8983d15c2cd551b47caf27cd710ec77e61ad	
https://s.yimg.com/cx/vzm/cs.js	Untested Web Server
https://s.aolcdn.com/images/dims?format=jpg&quality=80&thumbnail=32,32ℑ_uri=https://s.yimg.com/os/cre atr-uploaded-images/2020-12/575bc790-355f-11eb-ad7b-2304a1f8730f&client=76f99bdb8f78cd44cc0b&signature =9ff3de001884e92d939ae40d08e9b7109e31ec24	
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https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_investor.htm	Similar DOM
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https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm?url=http://www.microsoft.com	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount?listAccounts=800002	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20061005.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060928.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/customize.jsp?content=customize.jsp⟨=english	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/ccApply	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/images/spacer.gif	File Extension
http://www.exampledomainnotinuse.org/mybeacon.gif	Untested Web Server
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_deposit.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_checking.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_loans.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_investments.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_deposit.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_lending.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_insurance.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_retirement.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_about.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_investor.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_investor.htm https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_press.htm	Similar DOM Similar DOM

https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=security.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp?query=1234	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/sendFeedback	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_community.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060921.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060817.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060720.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060518.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=pr/20060413.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_internships.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp?step=c	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=ExecutiveAssistant:Administration	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=Teller:ConsumaerBanking	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=CustomerServiceRepresentative:CustomerServic	Similar DOM
e	
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=LoyaltyMarketingProgramManager:Marketing	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_jobs.htm&job=MortgageLendingAccountExecutive:Sales	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal.htm	Similar DOM
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https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_checking.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_loans.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_investments.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_deposit.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_lending.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_insurance.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_retirement.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_about.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_investor.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_press.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_careers.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_savings.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=privacy.htm	Similar DOM

https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=security.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp?query=1234	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_contact.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	Similar DOM
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https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_loans.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_investments.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_deposit.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_lending.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_cards.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_insurance.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_retirement.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=business_other.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_about.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_investor.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_press.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=inside_careers.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=personal_savings.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=privacy.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/survey_questions.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp?content=security.htm	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/search.jsp?query=1234	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/	Similar Body
https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	Similar Body
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	Similar Body
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/doLogin	Likely Similar DOM
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	Similar DOM

# Comments 40

URL	Comment
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	BEGIN HEADER
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"<br "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	END HEADER
nttps://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	TOC BEGIN
nttps://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	TOC END
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	To get the latest admin login, please contact SiteOps at 415-555-6159
nttps://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	BEGIN FOOTER
https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp	END FOOTER
https://demo.testfire.net/	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, online banking, banking, checking, savings, accounts
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	MEMBER TOC BEGIN
nttps://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	<li><a href="/bank/stocks.jsp" id="MenuHyperLink3">Trade Stocks</a></li>
nttps://demo.testfire.net/bank/main.jsp	MEMBER TOC END
nttps://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, online banking, contact information, subscriptions
https://demo.testfire.net/feedback.jsp	- Dave- Hard code this into the final script - Possible security problem. Re-generated every Tuesday and old files are saved to .bak format at L:\backup\website\oldfiles -
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/showAccount	To modify account information do not connect to SQL source directly. Make all changes through the admin page.
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, personal deposit, personal checking, personal loans, personal cards, personal investments
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual
nttps://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, deposit products, personal deposits
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, personal checking, checking platinum, checking gold, checking silver, checking bronze
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, auto loans, boat loans, lines of credit, home equity, mortgage loans, student loans
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, brokerage services, retirement, insurance, private banking, wealth and tax services
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, Altoro Private Bank, Altoro Wealth and Tax
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, real estate loans, small business loands, small business loands, equipment leasing, credit line
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, credit cards, platinum cards, premium credit
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, press releases, media, news, events, public relations
nttps://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, job openings, benefits, student internships, management trainee programs
nttps://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, privacy, information collection, safeguards, data usage
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, security, security, security, we provide security, secure online banking
https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html	HTML for static distribution bundle build
nttps://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html	html
https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp	TODO PAGES: <span>1</span> <a href="javascript:doPostBack('_ctl0\$_ctl0\$Content\$Main\$MyTransactions\$_ctl54\$_ ctl1',")"&gt;2</a 
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual Press Release
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, benefits, child-care, flexible time, health club, company discounts, paid vacations
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, careers, opportunities, jobs, management
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, management trainess, Careers, advancement
https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp	Keywords:Altoro Mutual, executives, board of directors

https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	Be careful what you change. All changes are made directly to AltoroJ database.
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	action="addAccount"
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	action="changePassword"
https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp	action="addUser"

# JavaScripts 22

### URL / Code

#### https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp

```
function setfocus() {
   if (document.login.uid.value=="") {
       document.login.uid.focus();
    } else {
       document.login.passw.focus();
    }
      }
function confirminput(myform) {
    if (myform.uid.value.length && myform.passw.value.length) {
     return (true);
   } else if (!(myform.uid.value.length)) {
     myform.reset();
     myform.uid.focus();
     alert ("You must enter a valid username");
     return (false);
    } else {
     myform.passw.focus();
     alert ("You must enter a valid password");
     return (false);
   }
      }
window.onload = setfocus;
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/login.jsp

return (confirminput(login));

#### https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp

window.open('disclaimer.htm?url=http://www.netscape.com', '_blank',
'status=no,location=no,menubar=no,resizable=no,scrollbars=no,toolbar=no,width=450,height=200'); return false;

#### https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp

window.open('disclaimer.htm?url=http://www.microsoft.com', '_blank',
'status=no,location=no,menubar=no,resizable=no,scrollbars=no,toolbar=no,width=450,height=200'); return false;

### https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp

#### https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp

```
function confirmEmail(sEmail) {
 var msg = null;
 if (sEmail != "") {
   var emailFilter=/^[\w\d\.\%-]+@[\w\d\.\%-]+\.\w{2,4}$/;
   if (!(emailFilter.test(sEmail))) {
     var illegalChars= /[^\w\d\.\%\-@]/;
     if (sEmail.match(illegalChars)) {
         msg = "Your email can only contain alphanumeric\ncharacters and the following: @.%-\n\n";
     } else {
       msg = "Your email address does not appear to be valid. Please try again.\n\n";
     }
   }
  } else {
   msg = "Please enter an email address.\n\n";
        }
  if (msg != null) {
     alert(msg);
     return false;
  } else {
     return true;
        }
      }
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.jsp

```
return confirmEmail(txtEmail.value);
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/status_check.jsp

```
var xmlHttp = false;
 //http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/web/library/wa-ajaxintro1/index.html
 /* Create a new XMLHttpRequest object to talk to the Web server */
 xmlHttp = false;
 /*@cc on @*/
 /*@if (@_jscript_version >= 5)
try {
  xmlHttp = new ActiveXObject("Msxml2.XMLHTTP");
 } catch (e) {
  try {
    xmlHttp = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
   } catch (e2) {
         xmlHttp = false;
        }
       }
 @end @*/
 if (!xmlHttp && typeof XMLHttpRequest != 'undefined') {
  xmlHttp = new XMLHttpRequest();
       }
var sLastHostName='';
function checkSiteStatus(sHostName)
sLastHostName = sHostName;
 //Make JSON request
 xmlHttp.open("GET","util/serverStatusCheckService.jsp?HostName=" + sHostName);
 xmlHttp.onreadystatechange = StateChangeForJSON;
```

```
xmlHttp.send(null);
function StateChangeForJSON()
if(xmlHttp.readyState == 4 && xmlHttp.status == 200)
        var jsonObj = eval('('+ xmlHttp.responseText + ')');
        var jsonFetchHostStatus = jsonObj["HostStatus"];
        var jsonFetchHostName=jsonObj["HostName"];
        //get JSON values and output
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostName');
        x.innerHTML=jsonFetchHostName;
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostStatus');
        x.innerHTML=jsonFetchHostStatus;
else if(xmlHttp.readyState == 4 && xmlHttp.status == 500)
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostName');
        x.innerHTML=sLastHostName;
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostStatus');
        x.innerHTML='The service returned an error. Please be patient while our administrators fix the issue.';
else if(xmlHttp.readyState == 4 && xmlHttp.status == 404)
        {
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostName');
        x.innerHTML=sLastHostName;
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostStatus');
        x.innerHTML='The service returned an error. The status service appears to not be available';
else if(xmlHttp.readyState == 4 && xmlHttp.status == 401)
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostName');
        x.innerHTML=sLastHostName;
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostStatus');
        x.innerHTML='The service returned a 401 unauthorized error, indicating it was implemented incorrectly';
else if(xmlHttp.readyState == 4 && xmlHttp.status == 302)
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostName');
        x.innerHTML=sLastHostName;
        x=document.getElementById('FetchHostStatus');
        x.innerHTML='The service returned a 302 redirect, indicating it was implemented incorrectly';
        }
}
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/index.html

```
window.onload = function() {
  // Build a system
 const ui = SwaggerUIBundle({
   url: window.location.href.substr(0, window.location.href.lastIndexOf("\/") + 1) + "properties.json",
    dom id: '#swagger-ui',
    deepLinking: true,
   presets: [
     SwaggerUIBundle.presets.apis,
     SwaggerUIStandalonePreset
   1.
   plugins: [
      SwaggerUIBundle.plugins.DownloadUrl
    1,
    layout: "StandaloneLayout"
  })
  window.ui = ui
3
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-standalone-preset.js

!function(t,e){"object"==typeof exports&&"object"==typeof module?module.exports=e():"function"==typeof define&&define.amd?

define([],e):"object"==typeof exports?exports.SwaggerUIStandalonePreset=e():t.SwaggerUIStandalonePreset=e()}(this,function(){return function(t) {var e={};function n(r){if(e[r])return e[r].exports;var i=e[r]={i:r,l:!1,exports;{}};return t[r].call(i.exports,i,i.exports,n),i.l=!0,i.exports}return n.m=t,n.c=e,n.d=function(t,e,r){n.o(t,e)||Object.defineProperty(t,e, {configurable:!1,enumerable:!0,get:r})},n.n=function(t){var e=t&&t.__esModule?function(){return t.default}:function(){return t};return n.d(e,"a",e),e},n.o=function(t,e){return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(t,e)},n.p="/dist",n(n.s=206)}([function(t,e,n){"use strict"; var r=n(52), i=["kind", "resolve", "construct", "instanceOf", "predicate", "represent", "defaultStyle", "styleAliases"], o= ["scalar", "sequence", "mapping"]; t.exports=function(t,e) {var n,u; if (e=e||{},Object.keys(e).forEach(function(e){if(-1===i.indexOf(e))throw new r('Unknown option "'+e+'" is met in definition of "'+t+'" YAML type.') }), this.tag=t, this.kind=e.kind||null, this.resolve=e.resolve||function() {return!0}, this.construct=e.construct||function(t) {return t},this.instanceOf=e.instanceOf||null,this.predicate=e.predicate||null,this.represent=e.represent||null,this.defaultStyle=e.defaultStyl e||null,this.styleAliases=(n=e.styleAliases||null,u={},null!==n&&Object.keys(n).forEach(function(t){n[t].forEach(function(e) {u[String(e)]=t})}),u),-1===o.indexOf(this.kind))throw new r('Unknown kind "'+this.kind+'" is specified for "'+t+'" YAML type.')}}, function(t,e,n){var r=n(133)("wks"),i=n(98),o=n(5).Symbol,u="function"==typeof o;(t.exports=function(t){return r[t]|| (r[t]=u&&o[t]||(u?o:i)("Symbol."+t))}).store=r},function(t,e){var n=t.exports={version:"2.5.5"};"number"==typeof e&& ( e=n)},function(t,e,n){var r=n(5),i=n(19),o=n(17),u=n(30),a=n(60),s=function(t,e,n){var c,f,l,p,h=t&s.F,d=t&s.G,v=t&s.S,y=t&s.P,g=t&s.B,m=d?r:v?r[e]||(r[e]={}):(r[e]||{}).prototype, =d?i:i[e]||(i[e]={}),b= .prototype|| (.prototype={});for(c in d&&(n=e),n)l=((f=!h&&m&&void 0!==m[c])?m:n)[c],p=g&&f?a(l,r):y&&"function"==typeof 1? a(Function.call,l):1,m&&u(m,c,l,t&s.U),_[c]!=1&&o(_,c,p),y&&b[c]!=1&&  $(b[c]=l) \ ; \ r. core=i, s. F=1, s. G=2, s. S=4, s. P=8, s. B=16, s. W=32, s. U=64, s. R=128, t. exports=s \ , function (t, e, n) \ (varable a structure a stru$ r=n(3),i=n(43),o=n(10),u=/"/g,a=function(t,e,n,r){var i=String(o(t)),a="<"+e;return""!==n&&(a+=" "+n+'="'+String(r).replace(u,""")+'"'),a+">"+i+"</"+e+">"};t.exports=function(t,e){var n={};n[t]=e(a),r(r.P+r.F*i(function(){var n={};n[t]=e(a),r(r.P+r.F*i(function())})} e=""[t]('"');return e!==e.toLowerCase()||e.split('"').length>3}),"String",n)}},function(t,e){var n=t.exports="undefined"!=typeof window&&window.Math==Math?window:"undefined"!=typeof self&&self.Math==Math?self:Function("return this")();"number"==typeof g&& ( g=n)}, function(t,e,n){var r=n(93)("wks"),i=n(55),o=n(9).Symbol,u="function"==typeof o;(t.exports=function(t){return r[t]|| (r[t]=u&&o[t]||(u?o:i)("Symbol."+t))}).store=r},function(t,e,n){var r=n(169),i="object"==typeof self&&self.Object===Object&&self,o=r||i||Function("return this")();t.exports=o},function(t,e){var n=Array.isArray;t.exports=n},function(t,e){var n=t.exports="undefined"!=typeof window&&window.Math==Math?window:"undefined"!=typeof self&&self.Math==Math?self:Function("return this")();"number"==typeof __g&&(__g=n)},function(t,e){t.exports=function(t){if(void 0==t)throw TypeError("Can't call method on "+t);return t}},function(t,e){var n;n=function(){return this}();try{n=n||Function("return this")() || (0, eval)("this")}catch(t){"object"==typeof window&&(n=window)}t.exports=n},function(t,e,n){"use strict";t.exports=function(t) {if("function"!=typeof t)throw new TypeError(t+" is not a function");return t}},function(t,e,n){var r=n(9), i=n(2), o=n(126), u=n(26), a=n(16), s=function(t,e,n) {var c,f,l,p=t&s.F,h=t&s.G,d=t&s.S,v=t&s.P,y=t&s.B,g=t&s.W,m=h?i:i[e]||(i[e]= {}), =m.prototype,b=h?r:d?r[e]:(r[e]||{}).prototype;for(c in h&&(n=e),n)(f=!p&&b&&void 0!==b[c])&&a(m,c)||(l=f? b[c]:n[c],m[c]=h&&"function"!=typeof b[c]?n[c]:y&&f?o(1,r):g&&b[c]==1?function(t) {var e=function(e,n,r) {if(this instanceof t) {switch(arguments.length) {case 0:return new t; case 1:return new t(e); case 2:return new t(e,n) }return new t(e,n,r) }return t.apply(this,arguments)};return e.prototype=t.prototype,e}(l):v&&"function"==typeof l?o(Function.call,l):l,v&&((m.virtual||(m.virtual= {}))[c]=1,t&s.R&& &&! [c]&&u(,c,1)))};s.F=1,s.G=2,s.S=4,s.P=8,s.B=16,s.W=32,s.U=64,s.R=128,t.exports=s},function(t,e,n){var r=n(27), i=n(127), o=n(89), u=Object.defineProperty; e.f=n(15)?Object.defineProperty:function(t,e,n){if(r(t),e=o(e,!0),r(n),i)try{return} u(t,e,n)}catch(t){}if("get"in n||"set"in n)throw TypeError("Accessors not supported!");return"value"in n&& (t[e]=n.value),t},function(t,e,n){t.exports=!n(29)(function(){return 7!=Object.defineProperty({},"a", {get:function(){return 7}}).a})},function(t,e){var n={}.hasOwnProperty;t.exports=function(t,e){return n.call(t,e)}},function(t,...

#### https://demo.testfire.net/swagger/swagger-ui-bundle.js

!function(e,t){"object"==typeof exports&&"object"==typeof module?module.exports=t():"function"==typeof define&&define.amd? define([],t):"object"==typeof exports?exports.SwaggerUIBundle=t():e.SwaggerUIBundle=t()}(this,function(){return function(e){var t= {};function n(r){if(t[r])return t[r].exports;var o=t[r]={i:r,l:!1,exports:{}};return e[r].call(o.exports,o,o.exports,n),o.l=!0,o.exports}return n.m=e,n.c=t,n.d=function(e,t,r){n.o(e,t)|0bject.defineProperty(e,t, {configurable:!1,enumerable:!0,get:r}) }, n.n=function(e) {var t=e&&e. esModule?function() {return e.default}:function() {return e}; return n.d(t,"a",t),t},n.o=function(e,t){return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(e,t)},n.p="/dist",n(n.s=446)}([function(e,t,n){"use strict"; e.exports=n(75)}, function(e,t,n) {e.exports=n(854)()}, function(e,t,n) {"use strict"; t. esModule=!0,t.default=function(e,t) {if(! (e instanceof t))throw new TypeError("Cannot call a class as a function")}},function(e,t,n){"use strict";t. esModule=!0;var r,o=n(262),i=(r=o)&&r. esModule?r:{default:r};t.default=function(){function e(e,t){for(var n=0;n<t.length;n++){var r=t[n];r.enumerable=r.enumerable||!1,r.configurable=!0,"value"in r&&(r.writable=!0),(0,i.default)(e,r.key,r)}}return function(t,n,r)  $\{ \texttt{return n\&\&e(t.prototype,n), r\&\&e(t,r),t} \} () \}, \texttt{function(e,t,n)} \{ \texttt{e.exports} = \{\texttt{default:n(767), _esModule:!0} \}, \texttt{function(e,t,n)} \{ \texttt{use} \} \}$ strict";t. esModule=!0;var r,o=n(45),i=(r=o)&&r. esModule?r:{default:r};t.default=function(e,t){if(!e)throw new ReferenceError("this hasn't been initialised - super() hasn't been called");return!t||"object"!==(void 0===t?"undefined":(0,i.default)  $(t)) \&\&"function"!=typeof t?e:t\}, function(e,t,n) {"use strict";t. esModule=!0;var r=a(n(769)),o=a(n(350)),i=a(n(45));function a(e),o=a(n(45));function a(e),o=a(n(45));f$ {return e&&e. esModule?e:{default:e}}t.default=function(e,t){if("function"!=typeof t&&null!==t)throw new TypeError("Super expression must either be null or a function, not "+(void 0===t?"undefined":(0,i.default)(t));e.prototype=(0,o.default)(t&&t.prototype, {constructor:{value:e,enumerable:!1,writable:!0,configurable:!0}}),t&&(r.default?(0,r.default)(e,t):e.__proto__=t)}},function(e,t,n) {var r;r=function(){"use strict";var e=Array.prototype.slice;function t(e,t){t&& (e.prototype=Object.create(t.prototype)),e.prototype.constructor=e}function n(e){return a(e)?e:J(e)}function r(e){return u(e)? e:Y(e) function o(e) {return s(e)?e:K(e) function i(e) {return a(e) &&!1(e)?e:G(e) function a(e) {return! (!e||!e[f]) function u(e) {return! (|e||e[p]) function s(e) {return! (|e||e[d]) function l(e) {return u(e)||s(e) function c(e) {return! (!e||!e[h]) t(r,n),t(o,n),t(i,n),n.isIterable=a,n.isKeyed=u,n.isIndexed=s,n.isAssociative=1,n.isOrdered=c,n.Keyed=r,n.Indexed=o,n.Set=i ;var £="@@ IMMUTABLE ITERABLE @@",p="@@ IMMUTABLE KEYED @@",d="@@ IMMUTABLE INDEXED @@",h="@@ IMMUTABLE ORDERED @@",v=5,m=1<<v,y=m-1,g={},b={value:!1}, ={value:!1};function w(e) {return e.value=!1,e}function E(e) {e&& (e.value=!0) } function x() {} function S(e,t) {t=t||0;for(var n=Math.max(0,e.length-t),r=new Array(n),o=0;o<n;o++)r[0]=e[o+t];return r}function C(e){return void 0===e.size&&  $(e.size=e._iterate(A)), e.size \} function k(e,t) \{ if ("number"!=type of t) \{ var n=t >>>0; if (""+n!==t) | 4294967295===n ) return NaN; t=n \} return NaN;$ t<0?C(e)+t:t}function A(){return!0}function O(e,t,n){return(0===e||void 0!==n&&e<=-n)&(void 0===t||void 0!==n&&t>=n)}function P(e,t) {return M(e,t,0)}function T(e,t) {return M(e,t,t)}function M(e,t,n) {return void 0===e?n:e<0?Math.max(0,t+e):void 0===t? e:Math.min(t,e)}var I=0,j=1,N=2,R="function"==typeof Symbol&&Symbol.iterator,D="@@iterator",L=R||D;function U(e){this.next=e}function q(e,t,n,r) {var o=0===e?t:1===e?n:[t,n];return r?r.value=o:r={value:o,done:!1},r}function F() {return{value:void 0,done:!0}}function z(e) {return!!H(e)}function B(e){return e&&"function"==typeof e.next}function V(e){var t=H(e);return t&&t.call(e)}function H(e){var t=e&& (R&&e[R]||e[D]); if ("function"==typeof t) return t} function W(e) {return e&&"number"==typeof e.length} function J(e) {return null===e||void 0===e?ie():a(e)?e.toSeq():function(e){var t=se(e)||"object"==typeof e&&new te(e);if(!t)throw new TypeError("Expected Array or iterable

object of values, or keyed object: "+e);return t}(e) {function Y(e) {return null===e||void 0===e?ie().toKeyedSeq():a(e)?u(e)?

e.toSeq():e.fromEntrySeq():ae(e) {function K(e) {return null===e| |void 0===e?ie():a(e)?u(e)?e.entrySeq():e.toIndexedSeq():ue(e) }function G(e) {return(null===e| |void 0===e?ie():a(e)?u(e)?e.entrySeq():e:ue(e)).toSetSeq() }U.prototype.toString=function() {return" [Iterator]"},U.KEYS=I,U.VALUES=j,U.ENTRIES=N,U.prototype.inspect=U.prototype.toSource=function() {return this.toString()},U.prototype[L]=function() {return this},t(J,n),J.of=function() {return J(arguments)},J.prototype.toSeq=function() {return this,J.prototype.toString=function() {return this.__toString("Seq {","}")},J.prototype.cacheResult=function() {return!this._cache&&this.__iterateUncached&&(this._cache=this.entrySeq().toArray(),this.size=this._cache.length),this},J.pro...

#### https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp

```
function confirminput(myform) {
                         if (myform.startDate.value != "") {
                                 var valid = false;
                                 var splitStrings = myform.startDate.value.split("-");
                                 if (splitStrings.length == 3)
                                         var year = parseInt(splitStrings[0]);
                                         var month = parseInt((splitStrings[1].charAt(0)==0 && splitStrings[1].length == 2)?
splitStrings[1].charAt(1):splitStrings[1]);
                                         var day = parseInt((splitStrings[2].charAt(0)==0 && splitStrings[2].length == 2)?
splitStrings[2].charAt(1):splitStrings[2]);
                                         var validNums = !(isNaN(year) || isNaN(month) || isNaN(day));
                                         if (validNums)
                                                 valid = validateDate(month, day, year);
                                 if (!valid) {
                                        alert ("'After' date of " + myform.startDate.value + " is not valid.");
                                        return false;
                                        }
                                }
                         if (myform.endDate.value != "") {
                                 var valid2 = false;
                                 var splitStrings2 = myform.endDate.value.split("-");
                                 if (splitStrings2.length == 3) {
                                         var year2 = parseInt(splitStrings2[0]);
                                         var month2 = parseInt((splitStrings2[1].charAt(0)==0 && splitStrings2[1].length == 2)?
splitStrings2[1].charAt(1):splitStrings2[1]);
                                         var day2 = parseInt((splitStrings2[2].charAt(0)==0 && splitStrings2[2].length == 2)?
splitStrings2[2].charAt(1):splitStrings2[2]);
                                         var validNums2 = !(isNaN(year2) || isNaN(month2) || isNaN(day2));
                                         if (validNums2)
                                                 valid2 = validateDate(month2, day2, year2);
                                 if (!valid2){
                                         alert ("'Before' date of " + myform.endDate.value + " is not valid.");
                                         return false;
                                        }
                                1
                         return true;
                        }
                 function validateDate(month, day, year){
                        try {
                                 var thisDate = new Date();
                                 var wrongMonth = month<1 || month>12;
                                 var wrongDay = (day<1) || (day>31) || (day>30 && ((month==4)||(month==6)||(month==9)||
(month==11))) || (day>29 && month==2 && (year%4==0) && (year%100!=0 || year%400==0)) || (day>28 && month==2 && ((year%4!=0) ||
(year%100==0 && year%400!=0)));
                                 var wrongYear = year < 1990 || year > parseInt(thisDate.getFullYear());
                                 var thisYear = parseInt(thisDate.getFullYear());
                                 var thisMonth = parseInt(thisDate.getMonth())+1;
                                 var thisDay = parseInt(thisDate.getDate());
                                 var wrongDate = year==thisYear && ((thisMonth<month) || (thisMonth==month && thisDay<(day-1)));</pre>
                                 if (wrongMonth ||wrongDay || wrongYear || wrongDate)
                                        return false;
                                 } catch (error) {
                                        return false;
                                        }
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transaction.jsp

}

return (confirminput(Form1));

#### https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp

```
function confirminput(myform) {
    var dbt=document.getElementById("fromAccount").value;
    var cdt=document.getElementById("toAccount").value;
    var amt=document.getElementById("transferAmount").value;
    if (dbt == cdt) {
        alert("From Account and To Account fields cannot be the same.");
        return false;
        }
    else if (!(amt > 0)) {
            alert("Transfer Amount must be a number greater than 0.");
            return false;
        }
    return true;
    }
}
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/bank/transfer.jsp

```
return (confirminput(tForm));
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm

```
function go() {
   var iPos = document.URL.indexOf("url=")+4;
      var sDst = document.URL.substring(iPos,document.URL.length);
      if (window.opener) {
              window.opener.location.href = sDst;
              cl();
      } else {
              window.location.href = sDst;
      }
  }
  function cl() {
    window.close();
  }
  var iPos = document.URL.indexOf("url=")+4;
      var sDst = document.URL.substring(iPos,document.URL.length);
   // if redirection is in the application's domain, don't ask for authorization
if ( sDst.indexOf("http") == 0 && sDst.indexOf(document.location.hostname) != -1 ) {
       if (window.opener) {
               window.opener.location.href = "http" + sDst.substring(4);
              cl();
      } else {
              window.location.href = "http" + sDst.substring(4);
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm

document.write(encodeURI(sDst));

#### https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm

go();return false;

#### https://demo.testfire.net/disclaimer.htm

cl();return false;

#### https://demo.testfire.net/index.jsp

```
var jobs = {
         "Administration":{"ExecutiveAssistant":"jobs/20061023.htm"},
         "ConsumaerBanking":{"Teller":"jobs/20061019.htm"},
"CustomerService":{"CustomerServiceRepresentative":"jobs/20061026.htm"},
         "Marketing":{"LoyaltyMarketingProgramManager":"jobs/20061025.htm"},
         "RiskManagement":{"OperationalRiskManager":"jobs/20061027.htm"},
         "Sales":{"MortgageLendingAccountExecutive":"jobs/20061024.htm"}
};
function loadPage() {
if (document.location.hash == "#alljobs") {
         document.location.hash = "";
         return;
        1
 /* check if job parameter exists */
 var job = getParameter("job");
 if (job && job.length > 0) {
         var sp = job.split(':');
         if (sp.length == 2 && jobs[sp[1]] && jobs[sp[1]] != "") {
    /* check if job exists */
                  if (jobs[sp[1]][sp[0]] && jobs[sp[1]][sp[0]] != "") {
                          document.location.href = "index.jsp?content="+jobs[sp[1]][sp[0]];
                  } else {
                          /* tell the user the job isn't open anymore */
                         document.write("<h2 style='color:#ff0000'>We're sorry, but it appears the position for " + sp[0] + " in
group " + sp[1] + " is not open anymore</h2>");
                         }
               }
        }
}
function getParameter(name) {
var searchStr = document.location.search.substring(1);
 var params = searchStr.split('&');
 for (var i=0; i < params.length; i++) {</pre>
        nv = params[i].split('=');
         if (nv.length == 2 && nv[0] == name) {
                 return nv[1];
                 }
 return "";
}
function sethash() {
```

```
document.location.hash = "alljobs";
}
/* set IE to go back to orig page when pressing the back command in teh next page */
if (navigator.appName == 'Microsoft Internet Explorer') {
   window.onbeforeunload=sethash;
}
window.onload = loadPage;
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp

```
function confirmpass(myform)
        {
        if (myform.passwordl.value.length && (myform.passwordl.value==myform.password2.value))
        {
            return true;
        }
        else
        {
            myform.passwordl.value="";
            myform.password2.value="";
            myform.password2.value="";
            myform.password2.value="";
            myform.password2.value="";
            myform.password3.focus();
        alert ("Password3 do not match");
        return false;
        }
    }
}
```

#### https://demo.testfire.net/admin/admin.jsp

return confirmpass(this);

# Cookies **2**

Name	First Set	Domain	Secure	HTTP Only	Same Site	JS Stack Trace
Value	Requested URL		Expires			
AltoroAccounts	https://demo .testfire.net/ doLogin		False	False		
ODAwMDAyflNhdmluZ3N+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDA3MDM5MTU 2MjJFMTh8ODAwMDAzfkNoZWNraW5nfjcuMTA2ODA0NjQ0 NzM3ODg1RTIwfDQ1MzkwODIwMzkzOTYyODh+Q3JIZGl0I ENhcmR+LTEuOTk5NTQzNDAxMjc4NzEyMzJFMTh8	https://demo .testfire.net/ bank/main.j sp					
JSESSIONID	https://demo .testfire.net/	demo.te stfire.net	True	True		
A496F85EFEC2D4852626C21B50001A3A	https://demo .testfire.net/l ogin.jsp					

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# Components 0

	Name	Version	URL
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