Weekly Meeting

Make Agent Defeat Agent: Automatic Detection of Taint-Style Vulnerabilities in LLM-based Agents

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Agentic LLMs

- Built on the top of LLMs, powered by external tools

- Workflow:
  1. User issues prompt
  2. Assemble user prompt with system prompt
  3. LLM parses intent, generates plan
  4. Agent executes actions (via tools, APIs)



Figure 1: Simplified workflow of LLM-based agents.

-> Handle more complex queries (e.g., execute code, handle sensitive data in user's cloud)

Security Challenges for Agentic LLMs

- Taint-style Vulnerabilities: Occur when **unsanitized user input** flows into security-sensitive operations (SSOs)
  -> Can lead to remote code execution, SQL injection, full server compromise..

- Real-world cases (CVE-2024-12539): Code injection in ElasticSearch
  - Source: malicious prompt containing hidden payload
  - LLM plans to call ElasticSearchPermissionCheck() (Line 4)
  - Content ('source_doc:print(1)') is passed to function (Line 8)
  - Finally, call eval (print(1)) occurs, executing code.



Figure 2: A real-world vulnerability example from a popular open-source agent (the vulnerability has been patched).

Fuzzing LLM-based Agents: Challenges

- Challenge 1: Natural language input
  - Vast & Unstructured Input Space: state space of natural language is near-infinite
  - Semantic Requirement: agent behavior (e.g., tool selection) is triggered by the ‘semantic’ meaning of the input
    -> Fuzzer must generate coherent, functionality-specific prompts.
  - Failure of Traditional Fuzzers: Standard, byte-level generators (e.g., AFL) produce semantically meaningless gibberish

- Challenge 2: Seed prioritization
  - Indirect Calls: Hard to construct complete call graph
  - Semantic Gap: Identical CFG distance is apart from semantic relevance
    * For example, WebSearch() vs. ElasticSearchwithPermissionChecks() in Tools

```
1 Tools = [ ElasticSearch(), WebSearch(),
            ElasticsearchPermissionCheck() ]
```

- Challenge 3: Effective Mutation
  - Semantic Preservation: Random mutations destroy prompt meaning
  - Complex Constraints: Vulnerabilities hidden behind multi-part logical conditions
  - Prompt Mapping: Hard to identify which prompt substring becomes critical variable value

Background: Concolic execution, Z3 solver (1/2)

- Concolic execution: Hybrid program analysis technique combines concrete and symbolic execution
  - Goal: Systematically explore different execution paths in a program to find bugs, vulnerabilities…
  - Concrete execution: Program is run with random (or, user-defined) input.
  - Symbolic execution: Input variables are treated as “symbolic variables”, and set of conditions (i.e., “path conditions”) is built upon branch decisions made in concrete run
  - Constraint solving: Collected path condition is negated at a specific branch point to explore alternative path, then passed to constraint solver (e.g., Z3 solver)

- Z3 solver: Take complex logical constraints generated by concolic engine, find set of concrete input values that satisfies them
  - If Z3 find solution, it would be next round’s input (if not, mark as unreachable)

Background: Concolic execution, Z3 solver (2/2)

- Iteration 1:
  - Concrete Execution: Initial input: x = 5, y = 10. Follows Path 3.
  - Symbolic Execution: Path condition: $x \leq 10$.
  - Constraint Solving: Negate path condition to $x > 10$. Z3 finds a solution, e.g., x = 11. New input: (11, 10).

- Iteration 2:
  - Concrete Execution: New input: x = 11, y = 10. Follows Path 1.
  - Symbolic Execution: Path condition: $(x > 10) \wedge (y < 20)$.
  - Constraint Solving: Negate last constraint: $(x > 10) \wedge (y \geq 20)$. Z3 solution: x = 12, y = 25. New input: (12, 25).

- Iteration 3:
  - Concrete Execution: Input: x = 12, y = 25. Follows Path 2. All paths explored.

```
void my_function(int x, int y) {
    if (x > 10) {
        if (y < 20) {
            // Path 1
        } else {
            // Path 2
        }
    } else {
        // Path 3
    }
}
```

AgentFuzz: Overview



Figure 3: Architecture of AgentFuzz.

Phase 1: LLM-assisted Seed Generation (1/2)

- Goal: Generate functionality-specific seed prompts that can trigger different parts of the agent's code

- Step1: Sink & call-chain extraction
  - Use static analysis (CodeQL) to identify predefined sinks (e.g., eval, os.system).
  - Trace backwards from the sink to extract the call chain (e.g., Component.method -> eval).

- Step 2: LLM-powered Prompt Crafting (i.e., call chain -> prompt)
  - Idea: Method and class names in the call chain contain rich natural language semantics
  - Feed the call chain to an LLM using one-shot learning and CoT
  - LLM infers the component's functionality -> generates a natural language prompt to invoke vulnerabilities

Phase 1: LLM-assisted Seed Generation (2/2)

Seed Generation Prompt

You need to craft a prompt that guides the agent to invoke this component. **First**, infer the component's functionality from the class and function names in the call chain. **Second**, generate a prompt with matching semantics. **Finally**, verify its semantic similarity to the component, and revise it if necessary.

Now here is an example you can follow:
INPUT: <CALL CHAIN>: calculator→eval
OUTPUT: <COT>: (1) The call chain "calculator→eval" suggests that the component is designed to evaluate mathematical expressions. (2) The prompt should instruct the LLM to use the calculator component to perform an evaluation that aligns with the function inferred from the call chain. (3) The prompt should specify an expression for evaluation to ensure it is directly related to the component's purpose. <PROMPT>: Please use the calculator to evaluate the following expression: 3 * (4 + 5).

Figure 4: Seed generation prompt.

Table 5: Sink types and corresponding classes and methods.

Package	Class	Methods	Type
subprocess	/	run, call, check_call, Popen, getoutput	CMDi
os	/	system, popen, exec*, spawn*	CMDi
builtins	/	eval, exec	CODEi
urllib	/	request.urlopen	SSRF
requests	/	get, post, request	SSRF
requests	Session	get, post, request	SSRF
httpx	AsyncClient	get, post, request	SSRF
aiohttp	ClientSession	get, post, request	SSRF
urllib3	PoolManager	urlopen, request	SSRF
urllib3	/	request	SSRF
jinja2	Environment	from_string	SSTI
flask	Function	render_template_string	SSTI
sqlite3	Cursor	execute	SQLi
sqlalchemy	Session	execute	SQLi
sqlalchemy	Connection	execute	SQLi
django	/	cursor.execute	SQLi

Phase 2: Feedback-driven Seed Scheduling (1/2)

- Goal: Intelligently prioritize the most promising seeds to maximize fuzzing efficiency

- Idea: Code distance alone is insufficient, need for semantic alignment

- Feedback score: $F_S = \alpha * S_s + \beta * D_s - P_s$
  - S_S (semantic score): Semantic similarity between seed's actual execution trace and target call chain, via LLM
  - D_S (distance score): CFG distance from execution trace to the sink
    * $D_S = x^{-k}$, where x is shortest-distance of execution trace to sink callsite, k is hyperparameter
  - P_S (penalty score): Reduce score for frequently chosen seeds (avoid getting stuck in local optima)

Phase 2: Feedback-driven Seed Scheduling (2/2)

Scoring Prompt

You are tasked with evaluating whether the prompt semantics can correctly trigger the target component. Follow these steps: **First**, infer the component's functionality from the given call chain. **Second**, analyze the execution trace's semantics to assess how well it aligns with the target component, and score the prompt.
Scoring Criteria:
10 (Fully Aligned): The prompt perfectly triggers the target.
8-9 (High Semantic Match): The prompt does not directly trigger any component in the call chain, but is semantically close.
1-3 (Low Semantic Match): ...
0 (Completely Unrelated): The semantics of the triggered execution trace are completely unrelated to the target component.

Figure 5: Scoring prompt.

Semantic scoring via LLM



Figure 6: An illustration of the seed scheduling process.

Phase 3: Sink-Guided Seed Mutation (1/2)

- Goal: Transform high-quality seeds into vulnerability-triggering inputs via two mutators

- Functionality Mutator: Bridge semantic gaps between prompt component
  - Use LLM-powered self-improvement
  - Maintain separate chat memory for each seed
  - Refines prompt based on execution trace feedback, call chain semantics, and previous successful mutations

Phase 3: Sink-Guided Seed Mutation (2/2)

- Goal: Transform high-quality seeds into vulnerability-triggering inputs via two mutators

- Argument Mutator: Solve constraint to reach the sink (concolic execution)
  - Static Analysis: Extract control flow path to sink
  - Dynamic Analysis: Compare actual vs. expected execution
  - Concolic execution
    * Treat arguments as symbolic variables
    * Collect constraints from conditional statements
    * Use Z3 solver to find satisfying values

- Mutator scheduling: LLM-driven mutator selection process
  - High semantic gap: utilize functionality mutator
  - Unsolved constraint: utilize argument mutator
  -> LLM automatically selects based on context

Experimental Setup

- Static analysis: CodeQL for find sink callsite, build call/control flow graph
- Dataset: Source code of 20 open-source LLM agent from Github
- Environment: GPT-4o for AgentFuzz and agents

Applications	Stars	LoCs
AutoGPT	168,793	19,036
Dify.AI	53,770	117,752
LangFlow	37,032	45,075
Quivr	36,814	3,282
Chatchat	32,272	14,098
RagFlow	24,647	31,593
JARVIS	23,759	5,303
Devika	18,551	2,762
SuperAGI	15,541	14,003
Chuanhu	15,294	8,558
DB-GPT	13,858	84,323
PandasAI	13,629	13,774
Vanna	12,163	6,095
Bisheng	8,931	49,816
XAgent	8,195	10,365
TaskingAI	6,235	31,269
Taskweaver	5,377	9,833
AgentScope	5,368	13,627
Agent-Zero	4,937	3,424
OpenAgents	4,013	15,441
Total	/	/

Results overview

- Detection Performance:
  - 34 zero-day vulnerabilities discovered
  - 100% precision (zero false positives)
  - 23 CVE IDs assigned

- Vulnerability Breakdown:
  - Code Injection: 14 cases
  - SQL Injection: 5 cases
  - SSRF: 11 cases
  - Command Injection: 3 cases
  - SSTI: 1 case

- Efficiency Metrics:
  - Average Time-to-Exposure: 121.8 minutes
  - Total fuzzing time: 69.01 CPU hours
  - Token cost: ~0.69M tokens/agent ($6.90 max)

Table 2: Comparison between AgentFuzz and LLMSmith.

Baselines	TP	FP	FN	Prec(%)	Recall(%)
LLMSmith	10	332	25	2.92%	28.57%
AgentFuzz	34	0	1	100%	97.14%

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Table 1: Details of the 20 agents in our dataset. Agents with detected vulnerabilities are highlighted in gray.

Applications	Stars	LoCs	CVEs / Vulns	Total. Time Cost	Avg. TTE
AutoGPT	168,793	19,036	2 / 3	1.47	29.43
Dify.AI	53,770	117,752	0	3.00	/
LangFlow	37,032	45,075	2 / 3	8.13	162.58
Quivr	36,814	3,282	0	6.00	/
Chatchat	32,272	14,098	2 / 2	2.33	69.89
RagFlow	24,647	31,593	1 / 2	5.21	156.32
JARVIS	23,759	5,303	0	2.50	/
Devika	18,551	2,762	1 / 1	0.77	46.13
SuperAGI	15,541	14,003	2 / 3	7.32	146.45
Chuanhu	15,294	8,558	0	2.58	/
DB-GPT	13,858	84,323	3 / 3	4.46	89.20
PandasAI	13,629	13,774	0	3.58	/
Vanna	12,163	6,095	0	2.75	/
Bisheng	8,931	49,816	4 / 7	8.42	72.17
XAgent	8,195	10,365	0 / 1	2.33	139.80
TaskingAI	6,235	31,269	0 / 1	2.14	128.39
Taskweaver	5,377	9,833	1 / 1	1.17	70.21
AgentScope	5,368	13,627	3 / 4	3.58	53.70
Agent-Zero	4,937	3,424	1 / 1	1.08	64.78
OpenAgents	4,013	15,441	1 / 2	0.19	5.72
Total	/	/	**23 / 34**	69.01	121.78

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Vanna	12,163	6,095	0	2.75	/
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Case study



Figure 9: Code Injection vulnerability in S*** agent application (over 15k stars on Github).



Figure 10: Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in A*** agent application (over 160k stars on Github).

Pros, Cons, Future Directions

- Pros
  - Performance: 100% precision, no false positives
  - Real-world impact: found out 34 vulnerabilities
  - Comprehensiveness: Provide multi-faceted view (static analysis, dynamic execution, constraint solving)

- Cons
  - Huge consumption of resources: High token costs, CPU usage ($6.9, 3.45hrs / agent)
  - LLM dependency: performance tied to quality of LMs

- Future directions
  - Inter-agent communication (e.g., A2A environment) should be considered
  - Evading prompt-guard mechanism (e.g., LlamaGuard) should be considered

Thank you