

Let's start by examining the main problem at hand, which is twofold. Given that the language is the main instrument of human's access to intelligence, as without it whatever we think would be mere "imaginaries" and a collection of neuron firings, language gives our thoughts both a semantic ground and a syntactic structure. Our two problems are: (1) the mystery of the word and therefore the concept of "being", "is", "exist" to us, and (2) an immediate difference between an entity and the entity-ness.

1) Univocity of Being: When we say there is a desk in front of us, and there is a friendship between A and B, and there is a unicorn in my head right now; do we use the word "is" in a unified sense? Does a desk "is" in the same way a friendship "is". Is there anything common between them, and if so what is this?

2) Ontological Difference: Say among all the things that one can firmly dub "is", what if try to search for something that simply, does not exist? For example, a unicorn surely does not "exist" right now in any place of the world. But of course, we simply said that no such unicorn is "present" "at this time" "in such place". We merely talked about some predications to an if-being unicorn, and not the unicorn itself. Let us try to do better. Can we say "A unicorn surely is not"? Again, we simply chose one unicorn, predicated the "concept of unicorn" itself with the word "A"; we simply have chosen a non-existing unicorn and stated the obvious!

So, does unicorn is? Is what? Is red? Is exists? Is can be instantiated? What are we trying to do in the first place, if we even cannot talk about "unicorn" as "is not",

are our options then limited to variable names to find this “is not” thing?

X is not. Then we can ask, what is this thing that is not? It may as well be X is red and is not. We see that just as “is red”, “is not”. We are still simply predicating, in our quest to finding something “is not”, we realize that we are simply finding things that have the predicate of “not”. We failed at the first step by thinking that “is not” is a contrast to “is”, while just as the “is” and “red” are different, so are “is” and “not”.

So we realize that among the things that things can be; being be, or being, stands in a difference to being other things, being something. Being and being something are fundamentally different. And this is not limited to adjectives, as we can also say “X is unicorn”, “Socrates is a man” and “Man is ‘what Socrates is’”.

There is nothing is not, and that is a positive remark. There is something that is not, dubbed as nothing. In fact, there are many things that is not, we can see this both logically and metaphysically. Logically, for example, as nothing is red and nothing is not red and so many other ways of saying of nothing are valid. Metaphysically, for example, in the fact that we can not immediately “pick out”/“put forth” one nothing, and so there must be infinite of such nothings.

But, and let us get ahead of ourselves here, since Dasein will *care* all “not” things in the same way, nothing is many and in this many-ness, it is one. All these not things are unified already in the first glance in the particular way Dasein *cares*

about these. The same story will go for being too, which remember, being is not a contrast to nothing, all beings unify in, not this time in the way Dasein cares about them, but in the sense that each being constituted in Dasein's care for it. So being is being for. Being is being for (Dasein).

So being and beings is fundamentally different.

3) Unity of Being in Aristotle: In light of this insight, let's return to our first question, the univocity of being.

According to Aristotle, "being(s) is said in many ways". He both divides it into four and further divides the second of these into ten. Almost arbitrarily, without prior notice, he does these divisions. Even though it is unclear whether the division is done on being or beings, we can see that in a sense, and quoting from Heidegger, "Being unfolds into categories of beings". So while those four categories are the constitutions of beings, what is unfolding and constitutes these four categories themselves is being.

So according to Heidegger, while Aristotle holds that being is said in many ways, that does not mean being is many. He interprets some readings from Aristotle as carrying the "first truth of philosophy", from Parmenides, that being is one, in many of his quotations. Aristotle is first to bring light to the question and tries to unify being in spite of its manifoldness. We will see that Aristotle ascribes a "unity of analogy" to the "concept" of being. And furthermore, we will see that "substance" is not the central unification of being at all, but only beings as such.

Aristotle holds that, out of the ten categories, the first one, substance, is prior to all other nine categories, and with an extension to other three categories.

Because all other categories are in each case said of substances and not said by themselves. There can not be anything bald, without a head. Substance is primary in its being, all other categories are secondary. In this sense, the ten categories unify in their relation to substance.

But what kind of relation is this? And taking a step back, what about being as truth, being as accident and *dunamis/energeia*? They are not simple predicates, but they too said of being. Do being in these senses used in a similar way? If equivocality what simply had been at play here, how could being had been said in many ways? There would not be a one thing to be said in many ways, there would be many things said in their respective ways. There must be a sense in the word being, that those categories refer back to in each case.

Even though Aristotle did not give an exact treatment, he holds there to be a unity of analogy between (all) categories, that not by genus, not by common nature; but by different relations to a particular first sense exists between the categories and being. Let's quote Tonner here (2010,p.16) "[Substance] is the ultimate subject and exists in the most fundamental way, all other uses of 'is' will be related to how it is used in terms of these primary beings". But what about the nature of 'is' itself?

4) The Inadequacy of Substance Analogy :

According to Tonner, two main objections are done to Aristotle by Heidegger, (1) Dasein is not properly thematized and simply taken to be a being among all others and (2) he does not bring forth the distinction between being and beings properly.

A third, interrelated problem comes from Brogan(2005,p.118), (3) he quotes Heidegger as not satisfied with such look at Aristotle as substance doctrine. More specifically, he is not content with such unity of analogy in relation to substance among “other three categories”. Heidegger insists that “analogical relationality(to substance)” is meant to explain multiplicity in the restricted sense of the ten categories. Truth and *dunamis* cannot lead back to substance the same way quality and quantity does.

(3) Brogan holds that “Is this [broader] multiplicity in some sense also analogical? And that means in some sense a *logos* and in relation to *logos*?”. This draws a sharp contrast to the medieval substance doctrine and is exactly what Heidegger has in mind. He prefers to quote Aristotle in following ways, (a) “[Human being] is the one whose living is constituted by logos” and (b) “The soul (of the human being) is in a sense all beings”. *Logos* is not an attribute here, but a way of being for Heidegger. Our being *is* *logos*. The separateness and multiplicity in each case arise from oneness, and this oneness does not stand above the manifoldness, but

an un-concealment of it into logos.

(2) So categories are the senses of beings. They have to do with beings and their attributes. The multiplicity of beings stand in contrast with the oneness of being, which in turn all beings are one in their belonging to being.

This draws a sharp distinction to the substance doctrine also in a historical context. Heidegger himself, in his introductory essay (p.37), complain about the issue: "It was concluded that first guiding fundamental meaning of being in general was ousia. ... Hence it is generally accepted opinion that Aristotle's is a substance doctrine ... it was overlooked that only a question is here first of all being prepared".

And this analogy of being that, all subsequent attempts in philosophy enmeshed in, up with the forgetfulness of the question of being as not about beings. The Middle Age philosophers further abused the "apparent solution" for their theological problems. Yet in Aristotle, the nature of the analogy itself was at issue in relation to being's relation to oneness.

5) Three Prejudice: The subsequent forgetfulness of being, according to Heidegger, is listed in 3 main points.

1) Being is the most universal concept: According to some such is the case, but Heidegger notes this does not imply being as the highest genus there is, which

would have been a simple and clear explanation for it. Since Aristotle break from Plato's such conception, there is a need to clarify such generality of being, as Aristotle tried to do with the unity of analogy. The transcendental philosophy of Middle Ages also did not explain the universality of being as it is, and Hegel's position turned away from bridging the connection of being's universal oneness to its multiplicity.

2) Prejudice of indefinability: Parasitic on the first one, the problem with this one is that it tried to understand being through beings, missed the ontological difference and tries (and rightfully fails) to define being in terms of genus and beings. Such rightful indefinability demands that we face up to the question.

3) The self-evidentness of being: In every thinking and understanding the notion of being is made use of, so being is intelligible without effort. The fact that in each case we understand being only shows an "average comprehensibility". Our openness to being shall not be mixed with the conceptualization of being as such. The fact that an enigma lies what we each case make use of again demands the formulation of a question of being.

6) The Centrality of Dasein :

The only analogy among categories is not an analogy of attribution, but also analogy in the sense of proportion, in the sense of metaphor. The categorical way of addressing beings is only one of the many senses of revealing being. We

already tried it to be felt that those boils down in the pot of logos, some kind of unity of legein. What we can't put our tongue on, McGrath comes to help, and help us to finally incorporate Dasein into the discussion.

Both Brogan and McGrath agree on the non-distinction of object and subject in Aristotle and Greek doctrine. Brogan says "We need to get beyond thinking in terms of subject and object if we are to understand Aristotle's problem".

Categories are not simply judgments about objects attributed by subject. They can not simply be understood in terms of attribution and does not exhaust all meaning of being of beings. But this arises a need for some kind of subjectivity, which Descartes was first to hold with.

McGrath (2008,p.57) asks if ontology can be reduced to substance and its properties. According to him, Heidegger was attracted to Duns Scotus because his answer was no, that something else too was needed, "thisness" of things. "A thing is not individuated by matter but by a formal structure of the difference shared with no other things", "... ten categories are valid for only actual reality". Scotus's term puts intuitive knowledge about things above theoretical/abstract knowledge on them. Now things can be individualized by Dasein with Dasein's relation to them. Heidegger writes (GA1,203) "Scotus's thisness shows a keen sensitivity 'to real life...'".

It is about to be, for Heidegger, being is the meaningful presence (of things) for (Dasein).

The concept of thisness directly correlated with Brentano's intentionality. Finally a need for future opening and unifying of being surfaces. Scotus's widening of the ontology of categories, helped Heidegger realize that "... [categories] are read into nature by us"(Frede,2006,p.48). Categories are one way of interpreting beings, and the totality of such conceptions are boiled down in the soul of the human, its intentionality in to beings, without falling in to the trap of dualism, Dasein does not reveal the whatness of beings, but whatness and thatness opens up in the understanding of Dasein towards being. Dasein determines beings, while being is the care of Dasein related as such.

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