

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

NECTAR TREASURY

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Contents

1	Intro	oduction	4
	1.1	About Nectar Treasury	4
	1.2	About PeckShield	Ę
	1.3	Methodology	Ę
	1.4	Disclaimer	7
2	Find	lings	g
	2.1	Summary	ç
3	Con	clusion	10
Re	feren	nces	11

1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the **Nectar Treasury** design document and related smart contract source code, we outline in the report our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts can be further improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Nectar Treasury

The smart contract being audited is a contract designed to hold 17,000 ETH on behalf of NEC token holders and the NEC DAO. It enables two basic functions which are a) for NEC holders to burn their tokens in order to claim their share of the ETH, or b) for the DAO to directly draw on the funds.

The basic information of Nectar Treasury is as follows:

Item	Description
Issuer	DeversiFi
Website	https://www.deversifi.com/
Туре	Ethereum Smart Contract
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	January. 22, 2021

Table 1.1: Basic Information of Nectar Treasury

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit:

https://github.com/DeversiFi/minimal-NEC-treasury (88c0a13)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [3] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of the current blockchain ecosystems by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).




Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [2]:

- <u>Likelihood</u> represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild:
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

Category	Check Item
	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
Basic Coding Bugs	Revert DoS
Dasic Coung Dugs	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Digital Asset Escrow
,	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
	Holistic Risk Management
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
A 1 11:1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Using Fixed Compiler Version
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- <u>Semantic Consistency Checks</u>: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.
- Advanced DeFi Scrutiny: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [1], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some categories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this audit does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s), i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.

Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during
	the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functional-
	ity that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calcula-
	tion or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like
	authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography,
	and privilege management. (Software security is not security
	software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper man-
	agement of time and state in an environment that supports
	simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple
	systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions,	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if
Return Values,	a function does not generate the correct return/status code,
Status Codes	or if the application does not handle all possible return/status
	codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper manage-
	ment of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behav-
	iors from code that an application uses.
Business Logic	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying
	problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the
	business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can
	be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used
	for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of
	arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written
	expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices
	that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex-
	ploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They
	may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the
	product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

2 | Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the Nectar Treasury design and implementation. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Moreover, we examine the presence of any possible issues of varying severities that need to be brought up and paid more attention to. Our examination shows no issue that needs further investigation.

Overall, no issue was found. As a kind suggestion, due to the fact that compiler upgrades might bring unexpected compatibility or inter-version inconsistencies, it is always preferred to use fixed compiler versions whenever possible. As an example, we highly encourage to explicitly indicate the Solidity compiler version, e.g., pragma solidity 0.6.0; instead of pragma solidity ^0.6.0;

3 Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed the Nectar Treasury design and implementation. During the audit, we notice that the current code base is well structured and neatly organized, and we proceeded to examine these areas such as coding practices and business logics. Overall, no issue was found and the current codebase is ready for mainnet deployment.

Furthermore, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.



References

- [1] MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html.
- [2] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.
- [3] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. https://www.peckshield.com.

