

HIRAC

SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT OF



SMART CONTRACT AUDIT | SOLIDITY DEVELOPMENT & TESTING | PROJECT EVALUATION

RELENTLESSLY SECURING THE PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN

Audit Introduction

Auditing Firm InterFi Network

Audit Architecture InterFi Echelon Auditing Standard

Language Solidity

Client Firm PetWars

Website https://petwarstoken.com

Telegram https://t.me/petwarsofficial

Twitter https://twitter.com/PetWarsOfficial

Facebook https://www.facebook.com/petwarsofficial

Report Date March 11, 2022

Smart Contract Security Audit



Audit Summary

InterFi team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analyzed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

- PetWars' solidity source code has LOW RISK SEVERITY
- PetWars' smart contract has an ACTIVE OWNERSHIP
- Important owner privileges SET BUY & SELL FEES
- PetWars' smart contract owner has multiple "Write Contract" privileges. Centralization risk correlated to the active owner is LOW

For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, functional hack, and audit disclaimer, kindly refer to the audit.

- Token Contract address: 0x5053a8544DdE242030C8BA100b213d551776aAD1
- 🗱 Blockchain: Binance Smart Chain
- ☑ Verify the authenticity of this report on InterFi's GitHub: https://github.com/interfinetwork



Table Of Contents

Audit Information

| Audit Scope | 5 |
|--------------------------------|----|
| Echelon Audit Standard | |
| Audit Methodology | 6 |
| Risk Classification | 8 |
| Smart Contract Risk Assessment | |
| Static Analysis | 9 |
| Software Analysis | 14 |
| Manual Analysis | 19 |
| SWC Attacks | 22 |
| Risk Status & Radar Chart | 24 |
| Audit Summary | |
| Auditor's Verdict | 25 |
| <u>Legal Advisory</u> | |
| Important Disclaimer | 26 |
| About InterFi Network | 27 |



Audit Scope

InterFi was consulted by PetWars to conduct the smart contract security audit of their solidity source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to the mentioned solidity file(s) only:

PetWars.sol

Solidity Source Code On Blockchain (Verified Contract Source Code)

https://bscscan.com/address/0x5053a8544dde242030c8ba100b213d551776aad1#code

Contract Name: PWARS

Compiler Version: v0.8.12

Optimization Enabled: Yes with 200 runs

Solidity Source Code On InterFi GitHub

https://github.com/interfinetwork/audited-codes/blob/main/PetWars.sol

SHA-1 Hash

Solidity source code is audited at hash #191sed62f8f5e03a1347690423427a327422d8s9



Audit Methodology

The scope of this report is to audit the smart contract source code of PetWars. InterFi has scanned the contract and reviewed the project for common vulnerabilities, exploits, hacks, and back-doors. Below is the list of commonly known smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and hacks:

Category

| *** | Re-entrancy |
|-----|-------------|
|-----|-------------|

- Unhandled Exceptions
- Transaction Order Dependency
- Integer Overflow
- Unrestricted Action
- Incorrect Inheritance Order
- Typographical Errors
- Requirement Violation
- Ownership Takeover
- Gas Limit and Loops
- Deployment Consistency
- Repository Consistency
- Data Consistency
- Token Supply Manipulation
- Access Control and Authorization
- Operations Trail and Event Generation
- Assets Manipulation
- Liquidity Access

Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

Source Code Review

Functional Assessment



InterFi's Echelon Audit Standard

The aim of InterFi's "Echelon" standard is to analyze the smart contract and identify the vulnerabilities and the hacks in the smart contract. Mentioned are the steps used by ECHELON-1 to assess the smart contract:

- 1. Solidity smart contract source code reviewal:
 - Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to InterFi to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- 2. Static, Manual, and Software analysis:
 - * Test coverage analysis is the process of determining whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - Symbolic execution is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts

Automated 3P frameworks used to assess the smart contract vulnerabilities

- Slither
- Consensys MythX, Mythril
- SWC Registry
- Solidity Coverage
- Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code Complier



Risk Classification

Smart contracts are generally designed to manipulate and hold funds denominated in ETH/BNB. This makes them very tempting attack targets, as a successful attack may allow the attacker to directly steal funds from the contract. Below are the typical risk levels of a smart contract:

Vulnerable: A contract is vulnerable if it has been flagged by a static analysis tool as such. As we will see later, this means that some contracts may be vulnerable because of a false positive.

Exploitable: A contract is exploitable if it is vulnerable and the vulnerability could be exploited by an external attacker. For example, if the "vulnerability" flagged by a tool is in a function that requires owning the contract, it would be vulnerable but not exploitable.

Exploited: A contract is exploited if it received a transaction on the main network which triggered one of its vulnerabilities. Therefore, a contract can be vulnerable or even exploitable without having been exploited.

| SHOLL SOLICION | | |
|-----------------|--|--|
| Risk severity | Meaning Security Audit | |
| | This level vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, | |
| ! High | data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away. | |
| | This level vulnerabilities are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry | |
| ! Medium | an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk | |
| | severity | |
| | This level vulnerabilities should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future | |
| ! Low | exploits, and hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. | |
| | This level vulnerabilities can be ignored. They are code style violations and | |
| ! Informational | informational statements in the code. They may not affect the smart contract | |
| | execution | |



Static Analysis

Function can be modified Function is payable Function is locked Function can be accessed Important functionality

```
| **SafeMathUint** | Library | |||
| L | toInt256Safe | Internal 🗎 |
IIIIIII
| **SafeMathInt** | Library | |||
| L | mul | Internal 🗎 |
| <sup>L</sup> | div | Internal <sup>@</sup> |
| L | sub | Internal 🔒 |
| L | add | Internal 🗎 |
| L | abs | Internal 🔒 |
| L | toUint256Safe | Internal 🗎 |
111111
| **<mark>SafeMath</mark>** | Library |
| L | add | Internal 🗎 |
| L | sub | Internal 🔒 |
| L | sub | Internal 🔒 |
| L | mul | Internal 🗎 |
| L | div | Internal 🔒 |
| <sup>L</sup> | div | Internal <sup>@</sup> |
| L | mod | Internal 🔒 |
| <sup>L</sup> | mod | Internal <sup>@</sup> |
111111
| **Context** | Implementation | |||
| └ | _msgData | Internal 🗎 | | |
111111
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context |||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● |NO! |
| L | owner | Public ! | NO! |
| └ | renounceOwnership | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Public ! | • | onlyOwner |
```



```
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | |||
 L | factory | External | | NO! |
 L | WETH | External ! | |NO! |
| L | addLiquidity | External ! | • | NO! |
 L | addLiquidityETH | External ! | 🟴 |NO! |
 └ | removeLiquidity | External ! | ● |NO! |
| L | removeLiquidityETH | External ! | • | NO! |
 └ | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External ! | ● |NO! |
 └ | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External ! | ● |NO! |
| └ | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ! | ● |NO! |
| L | swapTokensForExactTokens | External ! | • | NO! |
 👢 | swapExactETHForTokens | External 📒 | 🐸 |NO ! |
| └ | swapTokensForExactETH | External ! | ● |NO! |
| └ | swapExactTokensForETH | External ! | ● |NO! |
 L | swapETHForExactTokens | External ! | 🚳 |NO! |
| L | quote | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAmountOut | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAmountIn | External ! | NO! |
L | getAmountsOut | External ! | NO! |
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 |||
| L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | O | NO! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 🔴 |NO! |
| └ | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ● |NO! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External L | 💹 NO! |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 🛑 | NO! |
| **IUniswapV2Pair** | Interface | |||
| L | name | External ! | NO! |
| L | symbol | External ! | NO! |
| L | decimals | External ! | NO! |
 L | totalSupply | External ! | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! |
                              |N0 ! |
| L | allowance | External ! |
                               |NO! |
| L | transfer | External ! | | NO! |
| L | transferFrom | External ! | P | NO! |
| L | DOMAIN_SEPARATOR | External ! | NO! |
| L | PERMIT_TYPEHASH | External ! |
                                   |NO ! |
| L | nonces | External ! | NO! |
| L | permit | External ! | \bigcirc |NO! |
| L | MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY | External ! |
                                      |NO! |
| L | factory | External ! | NO! |
| <sup>L</sup> | token0 | External ! |
                            |N0 ! |
| L | token1 | External ! |
| L | getReserves | External ! | NO! |
| L | priceOCumulativeLast | External ! |
                                         |N0 ! |
| L | price1CumulativeLast | External ! |
                                         |NO! |
| L | kLast | External ! | NO! |
```



```
| L | mint | External ! | 🔴
                          |NO ! |
| L | burn | External ! | •
                          INO! I
| L | swap | External ! | |
                          |N0 ! |
| L | skim | External ! | •
                          |NO ! |
| L | initialize | External ! | 🔎 |NO! |
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | |||
| L | feeTo | External ! | NO! |
| L | feeToSetter | External ! | NO! |
| L | getPair | External ! | NO! |
| L | allPairs | External ! | NO! |
| L | allPairsLength | External ! | NO! |
| L | createPair | External ! | 🔎 |NO! |
| L | setFeeTo | External ! | ● |NO! |
111111
| **IterableMapping** | Library | |||
| L | get | Public ! | | NO! |
| L | getIndexOfKey | Public ! |
                               |N0 ! |
| L | getKeyAtIndex | Public ! |
| L | size | Public ! | NO! |
| L | set | Public ! | • | NO! |
| L | remove | Public ! | Public ! | | NO! |
| **IERC20** | Interface | |||
| L | totalSupply | External ! |
                             |N0 ! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! |
                             |N0 ! |
| L | transfer | External ! | 🛑 |NO! |
| L | allowance | External ! |
| L | approve | External ! | P | NO! |
| L | transferFrom | External ! | • |NO! |
111111
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 |||
| L | name | External ! | NO! |
| L | symbol | External ! | NO! |
| L | decimals | External ! | NO! |
111111
| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata | | |
| L | name | Public ! | NO! |
| L | symbol | Public ! | NO! |
| L | decimals | Public ! | NO! |
| L | totalSupply | Public ! | NO! |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | transfer | Public ! | 🔴 |NO! |
| <sup>L</sup> | allowance | Public ! |
| L | approve | Public ! | Public ! | |
| L | transferFrom | Public ! | WO! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public ! | Public ! | | NO! |
```



```
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public ! | • | NO! |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🗎 | 🔎 | |
| L | _burn | Internal 🗎 | 🔎 | |
| L | _approve | Internal 🗎 | 🔴 | |
| **DividendPayingTokenOptionalInterface** | Interface | |||
| L | withdrawnDividendOf | External ! | NO! |
| L | accumulativeDividendOf | External ! | NO! |
| **DividendPayingTokenInterface** | Interface | |||
| L | dividendOf | External ! | NO! |
| L | withdrawDividend | External ! | • | NO! |
111111
| **DividendPayingToken** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable, DividendPayingTokenInterface,
DividendPayingTokenOptionalInterface |||
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | ERC20 |
| L | withdrawDividend | Public ! | • | NO! |
| └ | _withdrawDividendOfUser | Internal 🗎 | ● | |
| L | dividendOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | withdrawableDividendOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | withdrawnDividendOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | accumulativeDividendOf | Public ! | NO! |
| └ | _transfer | Internal 🗎 | 🛑 | |
| └ | _setBalance | Internal 🗎 | 🔴 | |
111111
| **IPinkAntiBot** | Interface | |||
| L | setTokenOwner | External ! | 🛑 |NO! |
| └ | onPreTransferCheck | External ! | ● |NO! |
| **PWARS** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable |||
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | ERC20 |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External ! | MO! |
| L | setEnableAntiBot | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
| └ | updateDividendTracker | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| └ | updateUniswapV2Router | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromFees | Public ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeMultipleAccountsFromFees | Public ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromMaxTx | Public ! | • | onlyOwner |
| └ | setMarketingWallet | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | setBuybackWallet | External ! | 🔎 | onlyOwner |
| └ | setCharityWallet | External ! | ● | onlyOwner |
| L | setBUYFee | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
```



```
| └ | setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Public ! | ● | onlyOwner |
  👢 | setAutomatedMarketMakerPair | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| L | updateGasForProcessing | Public ! | • | onlyOwner |
L | getClaimWait | External ! | NO! |
| L | getTotalDividendsDistributed | External ! | NO! |
| L | isExcludedFromFees | Public ! | NO! |
  L | isExcludedFromMaxTx | Public ! | NO! |
| L | withdrawableDividendOf | Public ! | NO! |
| L | dividendTokenBalanceOf | Public ! | NO! |
L | getAccountDividendsInfo | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAccountDividendsInfoAtIndex | External ! | NO! |
| L | claim | External ! | • | NO! |
| L | getLastProcessedIndex | External ! | NO! |
| L | getNumberOfDividendTokenHolders | External ! | NO! |
| └ | _transfer | Internal 🗎 | ● | |
 L | withdrawStuckBNB | External ! | 🔎 | onlyOwner |
| L | removeStuckToken | External ! | Page | onlyOwner |
| └ | swapAndSendToFee | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapAndLiquify | Private 🗎 | 🛑 | |
| └ | swapTokensForEth | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapTokensForBNB | Private 🔒 | 🔴 | |
| └ | addLiquidity | Private 🔐 | 🛑 | |
| L | swapAndSendDividends | Private | Private | L | L | SwapAndSendDividends | Private | L | L | SwapAndSendDividends | Private | SwapAndSe
| **PETWARSDividendTracker** | Implementation | Ownable, DividendPayingToken |||
| └ | <Constructor> | Public ! | ● | DividendPayingToken |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🗎 | | |
| L | withdrawDividend | Public ! | NO! |
| L | excludeFromDividends | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
| L | updateClaimWait | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
| L | getLastProcessedIndex | External ! | NO! |
| L | getNumberOfTokenHolders | External ! | NO! |
| L | getAccount | Public ! | NO! |
| L | getAccountAtIndex | Public ! | NO! |
| └ | canAutoClaim | Private 🔐 | | |
| L | setBalance | External ! | • | onlyOwner |
| L | process | Public ! | • | NO! |
| L | processAccount | Public ! | • | onlyOwner |
```



Software Analysis

Function Signatures

```
39509351 => increaseAllowance(address,uint256)
43509138 \Rightarrow div(int256,int256)
48760858 => onPreTransferCheck(address,address,uint256)
e823b9bf => toInt256Safe(uint256)
bbe93d91 => mul(int256,int256)
adefc37b => sub(int256,int256)
a5f3c23b => add(int256,int256)
1b5ac4b5 => abs(int256)
744f7c7d => toUint256Safe(int256)
771602f7 => add(uint256,uint256)
b67d77c5 => sub(uint256,uint256)
e31bdc0a => sub(uint256,uint256,string)
c8a4ac9c => mul(uint256,uint256)
a391c15b => div(uint256,uint256)
b745d336 => div(uint256,uint256,string)
f43f523a => mod(uint256,uint256)
71af23e8 => mod(uint256,uint256,string)
119df25f => _msgSender()
8b49d47e \Rightarrow msqData()
8da5cb5b => owner()
715018a6 => renounceOwnership()
f2fde38b => transfer0wnership(address)
c45a0155 => factorv()
ad5c4648 \Rightarrow WETH()
e8e33700 => addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
f305d719 =>
             addLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
baa2abde => removeLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
02751cec =>
              removeLiquidityETH(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
2195995c =>
removeLiquidityWithPermit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes3
2, bytes32)
ded9382a =>
removeLiquidityETHWithPermit(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256,bool,uint8,bytes32,byt
es32)
38ed1739 => swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
8803dbee => swapTokensForExactTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
7ff36ab5 =>
             swapExactETHForTokens(uint256, address[], address, uint256)
4a25d94a => swapTokensForExactETH(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
             swapExactTokensForETH(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
18cbafe5 =>
             swapETHForExactTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)
fb3bdb41 =>
ad615dec =>
             quote(uint256,uint256,uint256)
             getAmountOut(uint256, uint256, uint256)
054d50d4 =>
85f8c259 => getAmountIn(uint256,uint256,uint256)
             getAmountsOut(uint256,address[])
d06ca61f =>
1f00ca74 => getAmountsIn(uint256,address[])
```



```
af2979eb =>
removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256)
5b0d5984 =>
removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,u
int256,bool,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)
5c11d795 =>
swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
b6f9de95 => swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFee0nTransferTokens(uint256,address[],address,uint256)
791ac947 =>
swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)
06fdde03 => name()
95d89b41 => symbol()
313ce567 => decimals()
18160ddd => totalSupply()
70a08231 => balanceOf(address)
dd62ed3e => allowance(address,address)
095ea7b3 => approve(address,uint256)
a9059cbb => transfer(address,uint256)
23b872dd => transferFrom(address,address,uint256)
3644e515 => DOMAIN SEPARATOR()
30adf81f => PERMIT TYPEHASH()
7ecebe00 => nonces(address)
d505accf => permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32)
ba9a7a56 => MINIMUM LIQUIDITY()
0dfe1681 => token0()
d21220a7 => token1()
0902f1ac => getReserves()
5909c0d5 => price0CumulativeLast()
5a3d5493 => price1CumulativeLast()
7464fc3d => kLast()
6a627842 \Rightarrow mint(address)
89afcb44 => burn(address)
022c0d9f => swap(uint256,uint256,address,bytes)
bc25cf77 => skim(address)
fff6cae9 => sync()
485cc955 => initialize(address,address)
017e7e58 => feeTo()
094b7415 => feeToSetter()
e6a43905 => getPair(address,address)
1e3dd18b => allPairs(uint256)
574f2ba3 => allPairsLength()
c9c65396 => createPair(address,address)
f46901ed => setFeeTo(address)
a2e74af6 => setFeeToSetter(address)
268d8e2e => get(Map,address)
b45dad3d => getIndexOfKey(Map,address)
7596720f => getKeyAtIndex(Map,uint256)
b1b533f3 => size(Map)
6b06f325 => set(Map,address,uint256)
0eac8729 => remove(Map,address)
```



```
a457c2d7 => decreaseAllowance(address,uint256)
30e0789e =>
             _transfer(address,address,uint256)
4e6ec247 => _mint(address,uint256)
6161eb18 =>
             burn(address,uint256)
104e81ff => _approve(address,address,uint256)
cad3be83 => _beforeTokenTransfer(address,address,uint256)
a8b9d240 => withdrawableDividendOf(address)
aafd847a => withdrawnDividendOf(address)
27ce0147 => accumulativeDividendOf(address)
91b89fba => dividendOf(address)
6a474002 => withdrawDividend()
a30dee30 => distributeBNBDividends(uint256)
373de4aa => withdrawDividendOfUser(address)
ab86e0a6 => _setBalance(address,uint256)
18e02bd9 => setTokenOwner(address)
1f46b1c6 => setEnableAntiBot(bool)
88bdd9be =>
             updateDividendTracker(address)
65b8dbc0 =>
             updateUniswapV2Router(address)
c0246668 =>
             excludeFromFees(address,bool)
c492f046 =>
             excludeMultipleAccountsFromFees(address[],bool)
d4c989d3 =>
             excludeFromMaxTx(address,bool)
5d098b38 =>
             setMarketingWallet(address)
1d0adc07 => setBuybackWallet(address)
30563bd7 =>
             setCharityWallet(address)
029ce136 => setBUYFee(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)
8110c4a4 =>
             setSELLFee(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)
04fef1c1 => whitelistPresaleAddress(address)
9a7a23d6 => setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address,bool)
a7f7b36f =>
             setAutomatedMarketMakerPair(address,bool)
             updateGasForProcessing(uint256)
871c128d =>
e98030c7 =>
             updateClaimWait(uint256)
a26579ad =>
             getClaimWait()
30bb4cff =>
             getTotalDividendsDistributed()
4fbee193 => isExcludedFromFees(address)
658c27a9 => isExcludedFromMaxTx(address)
6843cd84 => dividendTokenBalanceOf(address)
31e79db0 =>
             excludeFromDividends(address)
ad56c13c =>
             getAccountDividendsInfo(address)
f27fd254 =>
             getAccountDividendsInfoAtIndex(uint256)
700bb191 =>
             processDividendTracker(uint256)
4e71d92d => claim()
             getLastProcessedIndex()
e7841ec0 =>
             getNumberOfDividendTokenHolders()
64b0f653 =>
484ed334 =>
             withdrawStuckBNB()
e083e922 =>
             removeStuckToken(address)
a210621e =>
             swapAndSendToFee(uint256)
173865ad =>
             swapAndLiquify(uint256)
b28805f4 => swapTokensForEth(uint256)
56c3726b =>
             swapTokensForBNB(uint256)
9cd441da => addLiquidity(uint256,uint256)
```



818c19dc => swapAndSendDividends(uint256)

09bbedde => getNumberOfTokenHolders()

fbcbc0f1 => getAccount(address)

5183d6fd => getAccountAtIndex(uint256)

77fdb837 => canAutoClaim(uint256)

e30443bc => setBalance(address,uint256)

ffb2c479 => process(uint256)


bc4c4b37 => processAccount(address,bool)



Smart Contract Security Audit



Inheritance Graph



Smart Contract Security Audit



Manual Analysis

| Function | Description | Tested | Verdict |
|--------------|---|--------|---------|
| Total Supply | provides information about the total token | Yes | Passed |
| | supply | | |
| Balance Of | provides account balance of the owner's | Yes | Passed |
| buluffe Of | account | | |
| Transfer | executes transfers of a specified number of | Yes | Passed |
| Iransier | tokens to a specified address | | |
| Approvo | allow a spender to withdraw a set number of | ., | Passed |
| Approve | tokens from a specified account | Yes | |
| Allowance | returns a set number of tokens from a spender to | | |
| Allowance | the owner | Yes | Passed |
| | is an action in which the project buys back its | | |
| Buy Back | tokens from the existing holders usually at a | NA | NA |
| | market price art Contract | | |
| Dure | executes transfers of a specified number of | NA | NA |
| Burn | tokens to a burn address | | |
| Mint | executes the creation of a specified number of | | |
| MIIIC | tokens and adds it to the total supply | NA | NA |
| | circulating token supply adjusts (increases or | | |
| Rebase | decreases) automatically according to a token's | NA | NA |
| | price fluctuations | | |
| Blacklist | stops specified wallets from interacting with the | | |
| BIGCRIST | smart contract function modules | NA | NA |
| Lock | stops or locks all function modules of the smart | | |
| Lock | contract | NA | NA |



| Function | Description | Tested | Verdict |
|-----------------------|--|--------|---------|
| Dividend | executes transfers of a specified dividend token to a specified address | Yes | Passed |
| Airdrop | executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address | NA | NA |
| Max Transaction | a non-whitelisted wallet can only transfer a specified number of tokens | NA | NA |
| Max Wallet | a non-whitelisted wallet can only hold a specified number of tokens | NA | NA |
| Cooldown Timer | functionality to limit the number of transactions that a wallet can make within 24-hours | NA | NA |
| Anti Bot | stops some or all bot wallets from interacting with the smart contract | Yes | Passed |
| Anti Snipe | prevents bots from making transaction at "addLiquidity" block | Yes | Passed |
| Transfer Ownership | executes transfer of contract ownership to a specified wallet | Yes | Passed |
| Renounce Ownership | executes transfer of contract ownership to a dead address | Yes | Passed |



Best Practices V

- Owner cannot stop or pause the smart contract.
- Owner cannot mint tokens after initial contract creation/deployment.
- The smart contract utilizes "SafeMath" function to avoid common smart contract vulnerabilities.

```
string private _name = "PetWars";
library SafeMath {
function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    uint256 c = a + b;
    require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");

function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    return sub(a, b, "SafeMath: subtraction overflow");

    uint256 c = a * b;
    require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow");

    return c;

function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
        return div(a, b, "SafeMath: division by zero");

function mod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
        return mod(a, b, "SafeMath: modulo by zero");
}
```

Note 4

- Active smart contract owner: 0xcdef4c63fbfed069eababefa5287de21ff581cd6
- Be aware that active smart contract owner privileges constitute an elevated impact to smart contract safety and security.
- Smart contract utilizes anti-bot function module to prevent bots from making transactions at "addLiquidity" block.
- Smart contract owner can change transaction fees. Maximum tax limits are set to reduce honeypot risk.



SWC Attacks

| SWC ID | Description | Verdict |
|---------|--|---------|
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | Passed |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELF-DESTRUCT Instruction | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Re-entrancy Company Co | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation Smart Contract | Passed |
| swc-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegate Call to Untrusted Callee | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | Passed |
| swc-117 | Signature Malleability | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | Passed |



| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Passed |
|---------|---|--------|
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | Passed |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables Security Audit | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with the hardcoded gas amount | Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects (Irrelevant/Dead Code) | Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Passed |



Risk Status & Radar Chart

| Risk Severity | Status | |
|-----------------|---|--|
| ! High | No high severity issues identified | |
| ! Medium | No medium severity issues identified | |
| ! Low | No low severity issues identified | |
| ! Informational | 1 informational severity issues identified | |
| | Active Ownership | |
| Verified | 54 functions and instances verified and checked | |
| | Interri | |
| | Score out of 100 | |
| | Compiler Check Simple 100 Child City | |
| | Sec. 190 1011 | |
| | Interface Safety 85 80 75 | |
| | Manual Analysis Software Analysis | |



Auditor's Verdict

InterFi team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analyzed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks.

- PetWars' smart contract source code has LOW RISK SEVERITY
- PetWars' smart contract has an ACTIVE OWNERSHIP
- PetWars' smart contract owner has multiple "Write Contract" privileges. Centralization risk correlated to the active owner is LOW



Note for stakeholders

- Be aware that active smart contract owner privileges constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.
- If the smart contract is not deployed on any blockchain at the time of the audit, the contract can be modified or altered before blockchain development. Verify contract's deployment status in the audit report.
- Make sure that the project team's KYC/identity is verified by an independent firm.
- Always check if the contract's liquidity is locked. A longer liquidity lock plays an important role in the project's longevity. It is recommended to have multiple liquidity providers.
- Examine the unlocked token supply in the owner, developer, or team's private wallets. Understand the project's tokenomics, and make sure the tokens outside of the LP Pair are vested or locked for a longer period.
- Ensure that the project's official website is hosted on a trusted platform, and is using an active SSL certificate. The website's domain should be registered for a longer period.



Important Disclaimer

InterFi Network provides contract development, testing, auditing and project evaluation services for blockchain projects. The purpose of the audit is to analyze the on-chain smart contract source code and to provide a basic overview of the project. **This report should not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to, or relied upon by any person for any purpose without InterFi's prior written consent.**

InterFi provides the easy-to-understand assessment of the project, and the smart contract (otherwise known as the source code). The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as enough assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other statements of the contract. While we have used all the data at our disposal to provide the transparent analysis, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only — we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts. Be aware that smart contracts deployed on a blockchain aren't resistant to external vulnerability, or a hack. Be aware that active smart contract owner privileges constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security. Therefore, InterFi does not guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contract.

The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

This report should not be considered as an endorsement or disapproval of any project or team.

The information provided in this report does not constitute investment advice, financial advice, trading advice, or any other sort of advice and you should not treat any of the report's content as such. Do conduct your due diligence and consult your financial advisor before making any investment decisions.



About InterFi Network

InterFi Network provides intelligent blockchain solutions. InterFi is developing an ecosystem that is seamless and responsive. Some of our services: Blockchain Security, Token Launchpad, NFT Marketplace, etc. InterFi's mission is to interconnect multiple services like Blockchain Security, DeFi, Gaming, and Marketplace under one ecosystem that is seamless, multi-chain compatible, scalable, secure, fast, responsive, and easy to use.

InterFi is built by a decentralized team of UI experts, contributors, engineers, and enthusiasts from all over the world. Our team currently consists of 6+ core team members, and 10+ casual contributors. InterFi provides manual, static, and automatic smart contract analysis, to ensure that project is checked against known attacks and potential vulnerabilities.

To learn more, visit https://interfi.network

To view our audit portfolio, visit https://github.com/interfinetwork

To book an audit, message https://t.me/interfiaudits



