so as to exclude the first group.) The Romantic's statement, "Alexander Pope was no poet," and the statement made of the philosophical analyst, "*That* man is not doing philosophy," both capitalize on the favorable emotive meaning (or emotive effect) of the words "poet" and "philosophy" to give their own in-group exclusive possession of the field. A writer of analytical tendencies may identify philosophy with "conceptual analysis," and one who prefers to engage in flights of speculation without benefit of anchoring in clear concepts may say that "philosophy is the systematic interpretation of all experience"; the first leaves no room for the speculation so highly valued by the second, and the second will doubtless fail to state what he means by "interpretation" and "experience" in this context, for the two terms do require clarification, especially when placed in conjunction with one another. (We know what it is to interpret a cryptic saying or a difficult passage of poetry: we try to state the meaning in simpler words; but what is it to interpret experience? Such definitions usually lead to more confusion than they dispel.) Conflicts such as these have led to Bertrand Russell's facetious definitions of "philosophy": "Philosophy is that which is studied in philosophy departments in our universities and colleges," and "Philosophy is the systematic abuse of terms deliberately devised for that purpose."

Let us try, however, to suggest some of the principal defining characteristics of philosophy: (1) Philosophy is concerned with the clarification of our concepts or ideas, and, accordingly, with the clearer usage of our key terms. And since the concepts it deals with are highly abstract, questions of the "What do-you-mean?" type are constantly and characteristically asked by philosophers. This aspect of philosophy is emphasized by the "conceptual analysis" school of philosophy. (2) Philosophy deals with issues and problems of the *highest degree of generality:* not with "What is a chair?" but with "What is it to be a physical object?"; not with the contents of your or my mind but with "What is mind?"; not with your or my free acts as studied by psychologists but with "What is freedom?"; not with your or my right or wrong acts but with "What is it for an act to be right?" This generality is so great as to transcend the limits of any one of the special sciences; indeed, it has sometimes been said (though this is often questioned) to be "a synthesis of all the sciences." (3) Philosophy proceeds not by unsupported *obiter dicta* nor yet by experimentation (there are no philosophy laboratories) but by reasoning and argument. No matter how important its subject or how wide its scope, an oracular pronouncement ("Reality is basically spiritual") is hardly worthy of being called philosophical. It only becomes so when it is defended (or attacked) by reasoning, not by recourse to authority, intuition, or faith; in these latter cases, it is no longer employing philosophical method, however general or important its pronouncements may be. (4) Philosophy asks *ultimate* questions; it inquires into the foundations and presuppositions underlying every other subject-matter, by asking questions of the "How-do-