## Software Systems Verification and Validation



Vescan Andreea, PHD, Assoc. Prof.



Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Babeş-Bolyai University

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## Software Systems Verification and Validation

"Tell me and I forget, teach me and I may remember, involve me and I learn."


(Benjamin Franklin)

## (Next)/Today Lecture

Symbolic execution

Model checking

#### What we will learn!



• <a href="http://www.easterbrook.ca/steve/2010/11/the-difference-between-verification-and-validation/">http://www.easterbrook.ca/steve/2010/11/the-difference-between-verification-and-validation/</a>

#### **Outline**

#### Model checking

- System verification
- Model checking
- Transition system
- Linear-Time Properties
- Linear-Time Logic
- Computation Tree Logic

#### **Spin Model Checker**


- Spin
- Promela Model
  - Statements
  - Examples
- Concurrency and Interleaving Semantics
  - Examples
- Linear Temporal Logic
  - Examples
- JSpin

• Questions

#### **System verification (1)**


- Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
- Correct ICT systems
  - It is all about money.
  - It is all about safety.
- Reliability of the ICT systems
  - Interactive systems concurrency & nondeterminism
  - Pressure to reduce system development time
- System verification techniques


#### **System verification (2)**



#### System verification (2)

Catching software errors: the sooner the better






## Model checking (1)

#### Formal methods

- More time and effort spend on verification than on construction
  - in software/hardware design of complex systems.
- The role of formal methods:
  - To establish system correctness with mathematical rigor.
  - To facilitate the early detection of defects.
- Verification techniques
  - Testing small subset of paths is treated
  - Simulation restrictive set of scenarios in the model
  - Model checking exhaustive exploration
- Remark. Any verification using model-based techniques is only as good as the model of the system.


# Model checking (1) Formal methods





- Chemical Engineering is like looking for a black cat in a dark room.
- Software Engineering is like looking for a black cat in a dark room in which there is no cat.
- Systems Engineering is like looking for a black cat in a dark room in which there is no cat and someone yells, "I got it!"

## Model checking (2)



## Model checking (3)

#### **Characteristics**

- Model checking is an automated technique that, given a finite-state model of a system and a formal property, systematically checks whether this property holds for (a given state in) that model.
- The model checking process
  - Modeling phase
    - model the system under consideration
    - formalize the property to be checked.
  - Running phase
  - Analysis phase
    - property satisfied?
    - property violated?

## Model checking (4)

#### **Strengths**

- General verification approach
- Supports partial verification
- Provides diagnostic information
- Potential "push-button" technology
- Increasing interest by industry
- Easily integrated in existing development cycles

#### Weaknesses

- Appropriate to controlintensive applications
- Its applicability is subject to decidability issues
- It verifies a system model
- Checks only stated requirements
- Suffers from the state-space explosion problem
- Requires some expertise

## **Transition system (1)**

#### **Definition**

- Transition systems used in computer science as models to describe the behavior of the systems.
- Transition systems directed graphs:
  - Nodes represent states;
  - Edges model transitions, i. e. state changes.
- A Transition System (TS) is tuple (S, Act, →, I, Ap, L), where
  - S is a set of states,
  - Act is a set of actions,
  - $\bullet$   $\to \subseteq S \times Act \times S$  is a transition relation,
  - $I \subseteq S$  is a set of initial states,
  - AP is a set of atomic propositions, and
  - $L: S \to 2^{AP}$  is a labeling function.
- TS is called finite if S, Act and AP are finite.

## **Transition system (2)**

#### Remark

- Intuitive behavior of a transition system
  - Initial state s<sub>0</sub> ∈ I
  - Using the transition relation → the system evolves
  - Current state s, a transition  $s \stackrel{\alpha}{\to} s'$  is selected nondeterministically
  - The selection procedure is repeated and finishes once a state is encountered that has no outgoing transitions.
- The labeling function L relates a set L(s) ∈ 2<sup>AP</sup> at atomic propositions to any state s. L(s) intuitively stands for exactly those atomic propositions a ∈ AP which are satisfied by state s.
- Given that φ is a propositional logic formula, then s satisfies the formula φ if the evaluation induced by L(s) makes the formula φ true,

$$s \models \phi \text{ iff } L(s) \models \phi.$$

## **Transition system (3)**

### **Example**


#### **Beverage Vending Machine**

- S = {pay, select, soda, beer}, I = {pay}
- Act = {insert\_coin, get\_soda, get\_bear, τ}
- Example transitions: pay insert\_coin select, beer → pay
- Atomic propositions depends on the properties under consideration.

A simple choice - to let the state names act as atomic propositions, i. e.  $L(s) = \{s\}$ .

"The vending machine only delivers a drink after providing a coin,"  $AP = \{paid, drink\}, L(pay) = \emptyset, L(soda) = L(beer) =$ 

 $\{paid, drink\}, L(select) = \{paid\}.$ 



### **Linear-Time Properties**

- **Deadlock** if the complete system is in a terminal state, although at least one component is in a (local) nonterminal state.
  - A typical deadlock scenarios occurs when components mutually wait for each other to progress.
- Safety properties = "nothing bad should happen".
  - The number of inserted coins is always at least the number of dispensed drinks.
  - A typical safety property is deadlock freedom
  - Mutual exclusion problem "bad" = more than one process is in the critical section
- Liveness properties = "something good will happen in the future".
  - Mutual exclusion problem typical liveness properties assert that:
    - (eventually) each process will eventually enter its critical section
    - (repeated eventually\_ = each process will enter its critical section infinitely often
    - (starvation freedom) each waiting process will eventually enter its critical section
- Remark
  - Safety properties are violated in finite time (a finite system run)
  - Liveness properties are violated in infinite time (by infinite system runs)

### **Temporal Logic**

- Propositional temporal logics extensions of propositional logic by temporal modalities.
- The elementary temporal modalities that are present in most temporal logics include the operators
  - "eventually" (eventually in the future) -
  - "always" (now and forever in the future -
- The nature of time in temporal logics can be either **linear** or **branching**.
- The adjective "temporal"
  - specification of the relative order of events
  - does not support any means to refer to the precise timing of events

# Linear-Time Logic (1) Syntax of LTL

- Construction of LTL formulae in LTL ingredients:
  - atomic propositions a ∈ AP, (stands for the state label a in a transition system)
  - boolean connectors like conjunction ∧ and negation ¬,
- LTL formulae over the set AP of atomic proposition are formed according to the following grammar:

 $\varphi ::= true |a| \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 |\neg \varphi| \bigcirc \varphi |\varphi_1 \bigcup \varphi_2$ , where  $a \in AP$ .


## **Linear-Time Logic (2)**

### LTL temporal modalities

- The until operator allows to derive the temporal modalities ◊
   ("eventually", sometimes in the future) and □ ("always",
   from now on forever) as follows:
  - $\Diamond \varphi = \text{true} \bigcup \varphi$ .
  - $\bullet \quad \Box \varphi = \neg \Diamond \neg \varphi.$
- By combining the temporal modalities ◊ and □, new temporal modalities are obtained:
  - □◊φ "infinitely often φ."
     at any moment j there is a moment i i ≥ j at which an a state is visited
  - ◊□φ "eventually forever φ."
     from some moment j on, only a-states are visited.

## **Linear-Time Logic (3)**


#### Intuitive meaning of temporal modalities



## **Linear-Time Logic (4)**

#### LTL semaphore example

- $\Box(\neg(A = green \land B = green))$ 
  - A and B can not be simultaneously green.
- $\bullet \Box (A = yellow \rightarrow A = red)$ 
  - If A is yellow eventually will become red.
- $\Box$ ( $A = yellow \rightarrow \bigcirc (A = red)$ )
  - If A is yellow then it will be red into the next state.
- $\Box(\neg(B = green) \bigcup (A = red))$ 
  - B will not be green until A changes in red.



## **Computation Tree Logic (1)**

## Syntax of CTL

- Construction of CTL formulae:
  - as in LTL by the next-step and until operators,
  - must be not combined with boolean connectives
  - no nesting of temporal modalities is allowed.
- CTL formulae over the set AP of atomic proposition are formed according to the following grammar:  $\phi := \text{true } |a|\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2|\neg\phi|\exists\phi|\forall\phi$ , where  $a \in AP$  and  $\varphi$  is a path formula.
- CTL path formulae are formed according to the following grammar:

 $\varphi ::= \bigcirc \phi | \phi_1 \bigcup \phi_2$ , where  $\phi, \phi_1$  and  $\phi_2$  are state fromulae.

## **Computation Tree Logic (2)**

#### CTL - state and path formulae

- CTL distinguishes between state formulae and path formulae:
  - State formulae express a property of a state.
  - Path formulae express a property of a path, i.e. an infinite sequence of states.
- Temporal PATH operators and
  - φ holds for a path if φ holds in the next state of the path;
  - φ ∪ ψ holds for a path if there is some state along the path for which ψ holds, and φ holds in all states prior to that state.
- Path formulae ⇒ state formulae by prefixing them with
  - path quantifier ∃ (pronounced "for some path");
     ∃φ holds in a state if there exists some path satisfying φ that starts in that state.
  - path quantifier ∀ (pronounced "for all paths".)

 $\forall \phi ext{-holds}$  in a state if all paths that start in that state satisfy  $\phi$ .

#### **Outline**

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#### **Spin Model Checker**

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  - Examples
- Concurrency and Interleaving Semantics
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  - Examples
- JSpin

• Questions

## Model checking

#### Spin

- Developed at Bell Labs.
- In 2002, recognized by the ACM with Software System Award.
- SPIN (= Simple Promela Interpreter)
- is a tool for analyzing the logical consistency of concurrent systems
- Concurrent systems are described in the modelling language called Promela (= Protocol/Process Meta Language)

#### **Promela**

- Promela (= Protocol/Process Meta Language)
- allows for the dynamic creation of concurrent processes.
- communication via message channels can be defined to be
  - synchronous (i.e. rendezvous),
  - asynchronous (i.e. buffered).

#### Promela Model

- Promela model consist of:
  - type declarations
  - channel declarations
  - variable declarations
  - process declarations
  - [init process]
- A process type (proctype) consist of
  - a name
  - a list of formal parameters
  - local variable declarations
  - Body

- A process
  - is defined by a **proctype definition**
  - executes concurrently with all other processes, independent of speed of behaviour
  - communicate with other processes
    - using global (shared) variables
    - using channels
- There may be several processes of the same type.
- Each process has its own local state:
  - process counter (location within the proctype)
  - contents of the local variables

#### Promela Model - Statements

- The body of a process consists of a sequence of statements.
- A statement is either
  - executable: the statement can be executed immediately.
  - blocked: the statement cannot be executed.
- An assignment is always executable.
- An expression is also a statement; it is executable if it evaluates to non-zero
- The skip statement is always executable.
  - "does nothing", only changes process' process counter
- A printf statement is always executable (but is not evaluated during verification, of course).
- assert(<expr>);
  - The assert-statement is always executable.
  - If <expr> evaluates to zero, SPIN will exit with an error, as
- the <expr> "has been violated".
  - The assert-statement is often used within Promela models,
- to check whether certain properties are valid in a state.

# **Examples** (01 Simple Examples)

- · ReversingDigits.pml
  - Check
  - Random
- DiscriminantOfQuadraticEquation.pml
  - Check
  - Random
- NumberDaysInMonth.pml
  - Check
  - Random
- MaximumNondeterminism.pml
  - Check
  - Random
  - "Branch 1" and "Branch 2"
- Maximum -second example-MaximumIfElse.pml
  - Check
  - Random
- GCD.pml
  - Check
  - Random
- IntegerDivison01.pml
  - Check
  - Random

# Concurrency and Interleaving Semantics 02 Concurrency and interleaving semantics

- · Promela processes execute concurrently.
  - Non-deterministic scheduling of the processes.
  - Processes are interleaved (statements of different processes do not occur at the same time).
  - exception: rendez-vous communication.
- All statements are atomic; each statement is executed without interleaving with other processes.
- Each process may have several different possible actions enabled at each point of execution only one choice is made, non-deterministically.
- InterleavingStatements.pml
  - Check
  - Random
  - · 6 possibilities of the execution
    - n1,p,n2,q;
    - n1,n2,p,q;
    - n1,n2,q,p;
    - n2,q,n1,p;
    - n2,n1,q,p;
    - n2,n1,p,q.
  - Interactive simulation Interactive button
- InterferenceBetweenProcesses.pml
- InterferenceBetweenProcessesDeterministic.pml

## **Examples** (03 Critical section)

- CriticalSection\_Incorrect.pml
  - both processes in the critical section
- CriticalSection\_MutualExclusion.pml not satisfied
  - Mutual exclusion at most one process is executing its critical section at any time.
- CriticalSection With Deadlock.pml
  - Blocking on an expression user Interactive simulation
  - Absence of deadlock it is impossible to reach a state in which come processes are trying to enter their critical sections, but no process is successful.
- CriticalSection\_SolutionAtomic.pml
  - The atomic sequence may be blocked from executing, but once it starts executing, both statements are executed without interference from the other process.

# Linear Temporal Logic

Temporal logic formulae can specify both safety and liveness properties.

```
    LTL = propositional logic + temporal operators
    []P always P
    <>P eventually P
    P U Q P is true until Q becomes true
```

# **Examples** (04 LTL examples)

- CriticalSection\_MutualExclusionLTL.pml
  - LTL formula:
    - []mutex
  - Translate
  - Verify
- CriticalSection\_MutualExclusionLTL02.pml
  - LTL formula:
    - []mutex
  - Translate
  - Verify
- · CriticalSection\_With\_Starvation.pml
  - LTL formula:
    - <>csp
  - Translate
  - Acceptance
  - Verify

## Channels in Promela 05 Channels

- A channel in Promela = a data type with two operations:
  - send
    - The send statement consists of a channel variable followed by **an exclamation point** and then a sequence of expressions whose number and types match the message type of the channel.
  - receive
    - The receive statement consists of a channel variable followed by question mark and a sequence of variables.
- Every channel has associated with it a message type.
- The message type that specifies the structure of each message that can be send on the channel as a sequence of fields).

Chan ch = [capacity] of {typname, ..., typename}

- There are two types of channels with different semantics:
  - Rendezvous channels of capacity 0
  - Buffered channels of capacity greater than 0
- Examples
- Client-server-channels.plm

# Rendezvous Channels in Promela 05 Channels (Book [2]: pages 107-109)

- Rendezvous channel with capacity 0.
  - The transfer of the message from the sender (a process with a send statement) to the receiver (a process with the receive statement) is synchronous and is executed as a single atomic operation.
- Examples
- Simple-Rendezvous.pml
  - The rendezvous is one atomic operation; even if there were other processes, no interleaving could take place between the execution of the send statement and the receive statement.

#### Traffic-Pedestrian 06 Channels

- Examples
- PromelaMarryMe\_Simple.pml
- PromelaMarryMe.pml
- traffic\_pedestian.pml

## **JSpin**

- http://spinroot.com/
- Installation JSpin

http://jspin.software.informer.com/5.0/

#### **Outline**


**Mentimeter** 

- Static analysis, Testing, Symbolic execution
- Conventional vs Symbolic execution
- Symbolic execution for sequential, alternative, repetitive structures
  - Sequential structure execution
  - Alternative structure execution
  - Repetitive structure execution
- Symbolic Execution Tree
  - Symbolic Execution Tree
  - Properties

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In Lecture 11 **19 May 2023, Friday, 8-10** 

### Having fun learning about Model checking



- Problem definition
- Assembly furniture
- Cooking
- Sports
- Watching TV series
- 2 actors student + Carrier Adviser
- Signals CA→S: what do you like? (AF, C, S)
- S $\rightarrow$ CA: How much money? (100, 200)

## JSpin – Problem implementation

- Form team of X members 1 minutes
   (1 needs a computer with JSpin installed)
- Problem definition –

2 minutes

- 2 Actors
- 2 "signals" between the actors
- Implement in Promela Language the model 15 minutes
- Write 1 LTL formula

2 minutes

#### **Experience learning**

25 XP/student

(All activities: Code + Mentimeter + Form survey)

#### References

- [1] Baier Christel, Katoen Joost-Pieter, Principles of Model Checking, ISBN 9780262026499, The MIT Press, 2008
  - Chapter 1 System verification, Chapter 2 Modelling Concurrent systems (pag. 19-20), Chapter 3 (pag. 89, 107, 120-121), Chapter 5 Linear Temporal Logic (pag. 229-233), Chapter 6 Computation Tree Logic (pag. 313-323)
- [2] Ben-Ari, Mordechai, Principles of the Spin Model Checker, ISBN 978-1-84628-770-1, Springer-Verlag London, 2008

#### **Next Lecture**

Connatix Invited Lecture

# QA&QC DURING THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

Presenters: Tuesday

Roxana Soporan 9 May 2023, 8-10 am

Peter Toth Room: 2/I (Main Building)





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