
Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)





Signalement centralisé par NCMEC


Tous les signalements reçu par NCMEC sont partagé avec les law enforcement agencies


Position on End-to-End Encryption

- "Without <u>technological exceptions to end-to-end</u> encryption, the dehumanizing abuse of children will continue"
- Urges tech companies to "enhance consumer privacy while **prioritizing** child safety."









Perceptual hash functions principles

Similar images → Similar hashes



502ce 0 414f 8 e99c333f2f073 502ce 2 414f c e99c333f2f073


Different images → Different hashes





502ce0414f8e99c333f2f073

05387734eeb66e5fa4b908eb



Perceptual hash functions principles

Similar images → Similar hashes



502ce 0 414f 8 e99c333f2f073 502ce 2 414f c e99c333f2f073


Different images → Different hashes





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05387734eeb66e5fa4b908eb



Perceptual hash functions principles


Similar images → Similar hashes




502ce 0 414f 8 e99c333f2f073 502ce 2 414f c e99c333f2f073

Different images → Different hashes





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Si chiffré: impossible de scanner



Perceptual hash functions principles

Similar images → Similar hashes





502ce 0 414f 8 e99c333f2f073 502ce 2 414f c e99c333f2f073


Different images → Different hashes





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Potential Privacy Concerns

ChatControl Regulation

- <u>Discussion:</u> En cours depuis 3 ans
- False Positives: Innocent users could be falsely accused of possessing CSAM.
- <u>Client-Side Scanning:</u> Every photo and/or video on user devices is hashed.
- <u>Slippery Slope:</u> Allowing exceptions for CSAM could set a precedent for other exceptions.
- **Lack of Transparency:** The design, hashes, and parameters are not publicly disclosed.

Attacks on Perceptual Hash Functions Collision creation **PhotoDNA** Inverted **Ground Truth** Inversion 113, 92, 33, 67, Natural Collisions

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12 December 2024 : EU Council discussed ChatControl proposal



Very Weak Blocking Minority:

<u>In Favor:</u> 17 governments, 60% of the population <u>Adoption:</u> 15 governments and 65% of the population

Only 5% population missing for adoption

France currently supports ChatControl

All the details, summaries, and explanations about ChatControl:

www.chatcontrol.eu

What Now?

Next Steps et référence

contact QR code qql ref

What we can do

- **Sign open letters** advocating for privacy and safety
- **Discuss the issue** publicly
- Conduct research analyzing proposed solutions and their consequences
- Advocate for <u>open design</u> and <u>transparency</u> in perceptual hash functions used for CSAM detection
- Defend end-to-end encryption
- **Contact companies and policymakers** to warn them about potential risks
- Research alternative solutions to (CSS)
- Stop research on potentially harmful technologies

"Just because we can, doesn't mean we should."

Current Status in Europe (ChatControl)

ChatControl Regulation

- 2021: Clear intention to define a regulation enabling the detection of CSAM
- 2021: Exception to the ePrivacy Regulation for CSAM detection
- 2022: First proposal rejected
- 2023: Second proposal rejected
- 2024: Third proposal not yet voted on, but discussions are ongoing
- 2024: Exception for CSAM detection extended to 2026

Key points

- Proposal for detecting CSAM in messages (images or videos) using External Service Providers (ESPs)
- Explicit mention of perceptual hash functions (e.g., PhotoDNA and NeuralHash)

Top 3 Proposed Solutions

- **Full Hashing:** Perceptual hash on device; matches checked on ESP server. If matched, app reports the user and content.
- <u>Partial Hashing:</u> Partial hash on device; same process as full hashing.
- **Server Enclave:** ESP server decrypts, checks for CSAM, and re-encrypts non-CSAM content.

Perceptual hash functions principles


Similar images → Similar hashes



502ce 0 414f 8 e99c333f2f073 502ce 2 414f c e99c333f2f073

Different images \rightarrow Different hashes








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Detection process

- Image Upload:
- The perceptual hash of the image is calculated.
- The hash is compared against databases (e.g., NCMEC's 17.5M entries).
- Reporting:
- If a match is found, the image and user are reported to NCMEC.
- **NCMEC Steps:**
- All reports are shared with law enforcement agencies through a tool co-developed by Meta and the U.S. government.
- Collaboration between NCMEC and these agencies.

Exemples communication



EU PLANS FOR INDISCRIMINATE MESSAGING AND

CHATCONTROL


WHAT IS THIS ABOUT?

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS PLANNING THE GENERAL AND INDISCRIMINATE MONITORING OF CHAT, EMAIL AND MESSENGER CONVERSATIONS.



LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION.





GRAPHIC RECORDING (a) LORNA SCHÜTTE.

CC BY 3.0 DE

What Now?

- New regulations expected in the EU
- UK passed the "Online Safety Act"
- Australia passed the "Cyber Security Act"

What about creation of perceptual hash Server Side Scanning function?

- Propose alternative solutions
- Oppose security through obscurity
- Research is not neutral: The end goal matters.
- "Just because we can, doesn't mean we should."
- Engage and inform policymakers and companies

What Now?

Current Status in Europe (CHATCONTROL)

- Temporary exemption from the ePrivacy regulation since July 14, 2021
- ChatControl: Rejected in 2022 and 2023
- End of 2024: Exemption extended until 2026 + Search for a new consensus

Key points:

- Preferred solutions: Client-Side Scanning (hash or partial hash)
- Explicit mention of perceptual hash functions

- « PhotoDNA has been in use for more than 10 years by over 150 organisations [...] and law enforcement in the EU[...]. In these 10 years, the tool has been used daily and analysed hundreds of billions of images without any accuracy concerns»
- "Rate of false positives is estimated at 1 in 50 billion" Without sources!

Elsewhere in the World

- Countries: US, Canada, UK, Australia,
 New Zealand
- "Voluntary Principles to Counter
 Online Child Sexual Exploitation
 and Abuse."
- Signed by: Google, Apple, Amazon,
 Meta, Microsoft, Zoom, etc.
- Explicit mention of perceptual hash functions.

- Deploying automated tools to detect duplicates of CSAM photos and videos based on existing, known imagery, such as robust hash-matching or URL-blocking technologies.
- Deploying tools or features designed to prevent the creation of, interaction with, and dissemination of, CSAM.
- Incorporating relevant CSAM hash-sharing databases, and keyword and URL lists, such as The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children's hash database, the Internet Watch Foundation URL list or the Thorn Keyword Hub.
- Employing safety-enhancing technology, such as machine learning classifiers or other tools to detect and remove never-before-hashed CSAM imagery.