

veYFI (Voting and Reward pool)

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# 1. Project Brief

Title	Description
Client	Yearn
Project name	veYFI (Voting and Reward pool)
Timeline	04-07-2022 - 08-07-2022
Number of auditors	3
Initial commit	696bb76be86a6O1f25cda577bfb9dc14daa91O79
Final commit	bb9d8ac9dd9Oa9a9772b9663ce4fa232fda7bce2

# **Short Overview**

veYFI is the token locking mechanic similar to the ve-style program of Curve. YFI tokens can be locked for any time, but the max reward generates when locking time is more or equal than 4 years. There are several contracts is the auditing scope:

- VotingYFI contract is intended to calculate voting power at any time point based on the locked YFI amount.
- RewardPool contract performs the distribution of YFI rewards based on voting power The time axis is divided into weeks, i.e any changes apply once per week (e.g locked amount changes, top-up tokens for rewards).

# **Project Scope**

The audit covered the following files:





# 2. Finding Severity breakdown

All vulnerabilities discovered during the audit are classified based on its potential severity and has the following classification:

Severity	Description
Critical	Bugs leading to assets theft, fund access locking, or any other loss funds to be transferred to any party.
High	Bugs that can trigger a contract failure. Further recovery is possible only by manual modification of the contract state or replacement.
Medium	Bugs that can break the intended contract logic or expose it to DoS attacks, but do not cause direct loss funds.
Informational	Bugs that do not have a significant immediate impact and could be easily fixed.

Based on the feedback received from the Customer regarding the list of findings discovered by the Contractor, they are assigned the following statuses:

Status	Description
Fixed	Recommended fixes have been made to the project code and no longer affect its security.
Acknowledged	The Customer is aware of the finding. Recommendations for the finding are planned to be resolved in the future.

# 3. Summary of findings



Severity	# of Findings
Critical	2
High	2
Medium	2
Informational	10

# 4. Conclusion



2 critical, 2 high, 2 medium and 10 informational severity issues were found, fixed all critical, high, medium and 4 informational issues were acknowledged.

Deployment commit: bb9d8ac9dd90a9a9772b9663ce4fa232fda7bce2

# Deployment

File name	Contract deployed on mainnet
contracts/VotingYFI.vy	Ox9Oc1f922Od9Od3966fbee24O45edd73e1d588ad5
contracts/RewardPool.vy	Oxb287a1964aee422911c7b84O9f5e5a273c1412fa

# 5. Findings report



# Critical

## veYFI balance might not decrease

Fixed at PR#179

#### Description

It is possible for a user to create a lock longer than MAX\_LOCK\_DURATION, but such that kink.ts at the line:

VotingYFI.vy#L136 is less than block.timestamp since it rounds down to a week. Then in the function balanceOf(), function replay\_slope\_changes() will not consider the change of slope at kink.ts resulting in a balance of user that doesn't decrease with time.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to refactor how timestamps are rounded to weeks and check if all slope changes are applied correctly.

# Incorrect balance calculation leading to higher reward

Fixed at PR#182

# Description

At the line: RewardPool.vy#L266

The balance calculation can be incorrect if a user creates a lock longer than 4 years such that checkpoint slope is 0. Then balance\_of would be the initial veYFI balance at old\_user\_point.ts without factoring change of slope in kink. Then a user might get a bigger reward than they were supposed to.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to use function balanceOf from the VotingYFI contract.

# High

### Incorrect interface

Fixed at <u>4e9dfe</u>

#### Description

At the lines: RewardPool.vy#L9-L16

The interface for the VotingYFI contract is incorrect.

# Recommendation

It is recommended to update the interface and the function calls to that contract.

#### Description

At the line: RewardPool.vy#L175

The function ve\_for\_at() returns the veYFI balance for a user at the timestamp. But the calculation can be incorrect if a user creates a lock longer than 4 years such that the checkpoint slope is 0. Then the balance at \_timestamp would return the initial veYFI balance without factoring change of slope in kink.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to use function balanceOf from the VotingYFI contract.

# Medium

Tokens may be lost if checkpoint functions are not called for 20 weeks

Fixed at <u>cfdf19</u>

#### Description

If the function \_checkpoint\_token() is not called for more than 20 weeks, then since\_last at the line RewardPool.vy#L92 will be bigger than 20 weeks, but the for loops only adds rewards for 20 weeks, meaning some tokens will be lost.

If the function \_checkpoint\_total\_supply() is not called for more than 20 weeks, then when claiming rewards self.ve\_supply[week\_cursor] will reach 0 reverting the transaction.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to refactor how rewards are distributed in edge cases and increase weeks in \_checkpoint\_total\_supply().

Incorrect indentation

Fixed at 961ef6

#### Description

RewardPool.vy#L211 With incorrect indentation the contract won't compile.

## Recommendation

It is recommended to correct indentation.

# Informational

Function \_find\_timestamp\_epoch() can be view

Fixed at PR#190

# Description

At the line <a href="RewardPool.vy#L130">RewardPool.vy#L130</a> function can be view.

#### Recommendation

We recommend adding @view modifier for this function.

Code duplication Fixed at PR#182

#### Description

Function \_find\_timestamp\_epoch() at <a href="RewardPool.vy#L130-L142">RewardPool.vy#L130-L142</a> is similar to \_find\_timestamp\_user\_epoch(). Call \_find\_timestamp\_epoch(timestamp) is equal to \_find\_timestamp\_user\_epoch(VEYFI.address, timestamp, VEYFI.epoch(VEYFI.address)).

#### Recommendation

We recommend rewriting \_find\_timestamp\_epoch() function:

@view

@internal

```
def _find_timestamp_epoch(_timestamp: uint256) -> uint256:
    return _find_timestamp_user_epoch(VEYFI.address, _timestamp, VEYFI.epoch(VEYFI.address))
```

#### Excess reentrancy protection

Acknowledged

## Description

At the line RewardPool.vy#L284 @noreentrant('lock') is not needed because this function only calls YFI token contract and VotingYFI contract.

#### Recommendation

We recommend removing @noreentrant('lock').

#### Client's comments

no harm

#### No check for address zero

Acknowledged

### Description

At the lines: VotingYFI.vy#L87-L88

There is no check for address zero for parameters token, reward\_pool.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to add sanity checks.

#### Client's comments

yearn thinks this issue can be mitigated during proper ops deployment of contract risk and impact are low since if addresses are not configured contract can be redeployed

# Unnecessary condition

Acknowledged

#### Description

At the line: RewardPool.vy#L100

The check block.timestamp == t is unnecessary since if since\_last == 0, then t is equal to block.timestamp.

## Recommendation

It is recommended to remove this condition.

Unreachable code Acknowledged

## Description

At the line: RewardPool.vy#L106

The condition is never true since next\_week can never be equal to t. If since\_last == 0, then block.timestamp < next\_week.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the if condition.

## Unnecessary gas usage

Fixed at PR#193

### Description

At the line: RewardPool.vy#L86

In the function \_checkpoint\_token(), if to\_distribute is 0, then the for loop at line <u>RewardPool.vy#L97</u> would not change anything.

## Recommendation

It is recommended to check if to\_distribute is 0 before the loop.

Unnecessary check Fixed at <u>fc3536</u>

# Description

RewardPool.vy#L212 The uint256 balance\_of var is already compared to zero, so it isn't necessary to check if balance\_of > 0.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the check.

Incorrect comment Fixed at PR#189

## Description

There is no contract owner, so anyone can call checkpoint\_token anytime at <a href="RewardPool.vy#L121-L122">RewardPool.vy#L121-L122</a>

# Recommendation

We recommend deletion of a part the comment about the owner

Unused arguments Fixed at <u>4e9dfe</u>

## Description

ve isn't used at RewardPool.vy#L130 RewardPool.vy#L147

# Recommendation

We recommend the deletion of unused ve

