

Questions:

1. **SSL (50 points)** Consider the SSL protocol shown below (with $K = h(S, R_A, R_B)$):

1. $A \rightarrow B : R_A$
2. $A \leftarrow B : \text{Cert}_B, R_B$
3. $A \rightarrow B : \{S\}_B, E(K, h(msgs || K))$
4. $A \leftarrow B : h(msgs || K)$
5. $A \leftrightarrow B : \text{Data encrypted under } K$

- (a) In step 3, if we change $E(K, h(msgs || K))$ to $h(msgs || K)$, will the protocol still be secure?
- (b) What exactly is the purpose of the message $E(K, h(msgs || K))$ sent in step 3?
- (c) If we remove this part in step 3, i.e., if we changed step 3 to

$$3. A \rightarrow B : \{S\}_B$$

Would the protocol still be secure?

2. **IKE (50 points)** In IKE Phase 1 digital-signature-based aggressive mode (see below), proof_A and proof_B are signed by Alice and Bob, respectively. However, in IKE Phase 1 public-key-encryption-based aggressive mode, proof_A and proof_B are neither signed nor encrypted. Explain why they can still securely perform the authentication.

1. $A \rightarrow B : CP, g^a \bmod p, \{\text{"Alice"}\}_{\text{Bob}}, \{R_A\}_{\text{Bob}}$
2. $A \leftarrow B : CS, g^b \bmod p, \{\text{"Bob"}\}_{\text{Alice}}, \{R_B\}_{\text{Alice}}, \text{proof}_B$
3. $A \rightarrow B : \text{proof}_A$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{proof}_A &= h(\text{SKEYID}, g^a \bmod p, g^b \bmod p, CP, \text{"Alice"}) \\ \text{SKEYID} &= h(g^{ab} \bmod p, R_A, R_B)\end{aligned}$$