Food crisis and debt distress

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Abstract

This paper studies how food crises and sovereign debt defaults are connected in developing economies reliant on food imports. Fluctuations in food prices can worsen these economies' debt situations, leading to defaults. To examine this, we use unexpected harvest shocks as an instrument to isolate the impact of food price changes. Focusing on Ghana, which defaulted on its external debt in 2022, we find that positive price shocks raise import prices, inflation, trade imbalances, currency depreciation, and external debt. We use a sovereign default model where we implement trade to clarify this interplay. The results indicate that even countries reliant on food imports with low debt can default due to high food import prices. On the other hand, highly indebted nations can default with minor price increases. These findings emphasize the need for urgent international aid to mitigate the combined effects of food and debt crises, especially for countries heavily reliant on commodity imports.

Keywords: Food crisis, Sovereign debt defaults, Commodity price shocks, Debt crisis

JEL Classification: C32, E21, E23, E31, E32, E43, F34, O11, O19, O55, Q18

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1 Introduction

Growing concerns are currently being voiced about an imminent debt crisis, particularly in low-income countries. As of 2022, the IMF assessed more than half of the low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa to be at high risk or already in debt distress. Zambia became the first African country to default on its sovereign debt in November 2020, following the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, both Ghana and Sri Lanka defaulted on their external debt, while Pakistan and Egypt are teetering on the brink of default.[1] In contrast to previous debt crises, particularly those in the 1980s that arose in the aftermath of declining commodity prices, the ongoing crisis affecting these economies is characterized by an escalation in commodity prices, partly due to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. This surge has led to an unprecedented increase in food import bills, significantly impacting impoverished countries where the import of wheat, rice, maize, and soybeans plays a critical role in their trade balance. With countries already grappling with debt distress, soaring food commodity prices are exerting additional pressure on their financial situations, potentially exacerbating the risk of a food crisis.

If a country's debt distress can trigger a food crisis, it is plausible that the surge in prices of food-related commodities has significantly contributed to the current debt landscape. Many countries facing debt distress heavily rely on imported commodities. In Africa, for instance, numerous nations depend on food imports sourced from countries like Russia and Ukraine[2]. Essential commodities such as wheat, rice, maize, and soybeans have low elasticity of substitution and serve as both primary food items and intermediate production goods. For low-income countries dependent on net imports of these commodities, the challenge of substituting them easily in the face of price hikes can lead to a deteriorating terms of trade and trade balance. Consequently, this adds pressure to their repayment capabilities, ultimately impacting public debt and potentially sparking a subsequent debt crisis.

The goal of this paper is, therefore, to explore the relationship between food crises and a country's ability to repay its debt, potentially leading to a sovereign default. We investigate the impact of escalating food prices on the likelihood of default for a low-income, net-importing country. Our assertion is that an unexpected rise in prices of food-related commodities can diminish a country's ability to repay debt and potentially lead to a sovereign default.

First, we empirically investigate the mechanisms that could drive this outcome. To comprehend the impact of a supply shock, characterized by a sudden surge in food prices, as an independent factor influencing economic indicators associated with a higher risk of default, it is crucial to examine shifts in food prices as a distinct driver. This step is vital since prices can also be influenced by global business cycles. Without distinguishing these shocks from macroeconomic activities, establishing a clear, direct link between food crises and debt issues becomes challenging. Debt problems may be associated only with global business cycles, which might not be necessarily correlated to food shocks. In our paper, we build upon the methodologies introduced by De Winne & Peersman (2016) and Peersman (2022) to create an instrumental variable that aids in characterizing shocks in food prices. We begin by identifying quarterly unexpected harvest shocks for the four most critical food commodities globally: corn, wheat,

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[1]So far, Pakistan has successfully secured a preliminary $ 3 billion funding deal with the International Monetary Fund, aimed at alleviating short-term pressures on its debt situation.

[2]According to the World Bank, as many as 25 African economies import at least one-third of their wheat from these countries, with 15 of them importing more than 50 percent.

maize, and soybeans. We then employ these harvest shocks as tools to identify external shocks in food prices using a VAR model. Additionally, we expand and update this methodology using the most extensive available dataset for all relevant series, thereby constructing a shock that considers events worldwide.

Considering these price shocks, we present real-world evidence of how the escalation in food imports exacerbated Ghana's economic conditions, ultimately leading the country to default on its external debt in 2022. Our analysis relies on estimating the impulse response function (IRFs) of selected variables to price shocks using the local projection approach introduced by Jordà (2005). These estimates illustrate that sudden rises in commodity prices translate into increased costs of imported goods. Firstly, this prompts a surge in food inflation and, to a lesser extent and over time, in non-food inflation. Notably, as these four commodities also serve as intermediate production goods, the impact on non-food items is more gradual. Consequently, overall inflation rises, primarily influenced by the surge in food inflation, emphasizing the significance of these shocks as an independent driver of inflation. Secondly, this leads to a decline in the country's terms of trade and a depreciation of the local currency. As a result of currency devaluation, Ghana's export earnings decrease, while the cost of imports rises, exacerbating the trade balance. Lastly, our investigation into the impact on government debt and the divergence in interest rates (spreads) reveals that the price shock does not significantly affect domestic debt but does contribute to higher external debt. Moreover, it widens interest rate spreads. This evidence emphasizes Ghana's heavy reliance on international markets, with the increased interest rates signaling an escalating likelihood that the country may face challenges in repaying its debts.

While we employ an external instrument to identify the price shock, the discussed transmission mechanism lacks clear identification. To address this concern, we expand upon the foundational work of Arellano (2008) to validate our empirically identified mechanisms. Our model focuses on a small open economy where the government chooses between consuming two types of goods—one produced locally and the other imported (e.g., food)—while also determining the extent of debt issuance. In our model, we consider the government as benevolent, and in line with the observations in the empirical evidence, we assume that imported goods, particularly food items, exhibit a low elasticity of substitution. This method of identification is crucial in emphasizing the connection between food crises and debt troubles. For essential goods that the government cannot readily replace, such as these, external sources become necessary to navigate challenging economic circumstances like a sudden increase in food prices. We consider two specifications: one simpler, focused on import prices, and a more elaborate one involving terms of trade. Our findings reveal that when import prices surge to a certain level, even countries with modest debt levels could default. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to incorporate trade in the sovereign default model framework.

However, it is important to note that the issue of debt has been on the rise for low-income countries long before the onset of the COVID-19 crisis.[3] In our model, we illustrate that even slight increases in import prices can push heavily indebted nations into a crisis that culminates in default. Should this scenario prove accurate, these countries would find themselves with limited capacity to address this challenge. We view these findings as a testament to the strength of our

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[3]As estimated by the World Bank, by the end of 2020, the total public and publicly guaranteed debt of low-income countries had reached approximately \$124 billion, representing a substantial increase of about 75% compared to the levels observed in 2010

modeling approach, as they enable us to explore the cause-and-effect relationship between food crises and debt distress, particularly in scenarios where the debt burden is already significant prior to the unexpected shock.

Lastly, we evaluate the significance of a country's degree of openness in relation to the likelihood of default. Our analysis demonstrates that as the degree of openness increases, a nation augments its ability to participate in financial markets and secure international aid. Consequently, a higher degree of openness correlates with a reduced susceptibility to default for the country.

These findings underscore that the central challenge revolves around small, heavily indebted economies with limited openness, precisely the focal point of our analysis. The outcomes presented in this paper do not suggest that the ongoing debt crisis is a universal phenomenon. Rather, as we assert, it may predominantly affect developing economies, particularly those reliant on food imports. As revealed by our quantitative findings, in a scenario where countries are already burdened by substantial debt, a food crisis leaves them with few viable options for effective action.

In terms of policy-making, our paper presents a clear framework that highlights the connections between these two issues. According to our results, for countries already entrenched in debt, the most feasible approach to addressing debt distress in the face of a food crisis lies in seeking international assistance. The specifics of formulating such assistance extend beyond the scope of this paper and remain a subject for future research.

Literature review This paper primarily contributes to the literature on the impacts of world price shocks. Kose (2002) demonstrate that world price shocks significantly drive business cycles in small, open, emerging economies, accounting for approximately 88% of the variations in aggregate output, underscoring their substantial explanatory power. Additionally, studies by Caballero & Panageas (2008) and Calvo et al. (2008) observe that a decline in commodity prices increases the likelihood of sudden stops in capital flows. Building upon this body of research, our analysis focuses specifically on food commodities, characterized by a low elasticity of substitution, making them particularly challenging to substitute, especially for low-income countries. To explore these dynamics, we draw upon the literature on identifying commodity price shocks, as exemplified by the works of De Winne & Peersman (2016) and Peersman (2022).

Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature on sovereign default modeling. Our approach builds on the quantitative models of sovereign default, originating from the influential framework developed by Eaton & Gersovitz (1981), subsequently extended by Aguiar & Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). We extend this framework by incorporating trade, distinguishing aggregate consumption between domestic and imported goods. This enables us to model fluctuations in import prices and terms of trade, both recognized as influential factors in sovereign default, as evidenced by Min (1998) and Cuadra & Sapriza (2006).

Furthermore, existing literature has notably emphasized the significant impact of commodity price fluctuations on a country's probability of default. For instance, in the case of Ecuador, Hatchondo et al. (2007) highlight the critical role of commodity prices in exacerbating macroeconomic conditions, ultimately leading to a sovereign default in 1999. However, most of these studies have predominantly approached this phenomenon from an export-oriented perspec-

tive, as reflected in the works of Hilscher & Nosbusch (2010) and Roch (2019). In contrast, our paper shifts its focus to examine the implications of price fluctuations from an import-oriented perspective.

Finally, Farah-Yacoub et al. (2022) estimate that following a sovereign default, the affected country experiences a persistent deficit in calorie availability. This gap, compared to their synthetic control groups, widens by 4 percentage points a decade after the default occurs, emphasizing how sovereign debt distress can lead to food crises and underscoring the policy significance of this issue, given its potentially enduring consequences.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the harvest shocks, the estimation methodology, and presents the arguments for using these shocks as an external instrument for price shocks. Section 3 provides empirical evidence of the mechanisms at hand, using the shocks built before to show that indeed those shocks affect the variables of interest. Section 4 builds a toy model where we make certain assumptions to better illustrate the intuitions; more precisely, the analysis in this section depends on import prices. Section 5 presents a more complex model where we allow the analysis to depend on the terms of trade. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Supply shocks

We first propose to examine empirically the link between food crisis and debt distress. Here, by *food crisis*, we are referring to an unprecedented surge in food commodity prices, which could also be denominated as a supply shock and not related to the business cycle. To understand how much food prices affected the probability of default and repayment capacity, we need to isolate exogenous changes in food prices. This appears key as food prices are influenced not only by external factors, such as insufficient food availability, but also by business cycle properties, which could also affect debt distress. Therefore, we need to measure the impact of the food crisis separately from business cycles to study this relationship.

In the following sections, we will first explain how we construct a measure for exogenous variations in international food commodity prices. Subsequently, we will use this instrumental variable to estimate the impact of an increase in import prices on some selected variables for Ghana. We chose to focus on Ghana because the country defaulted on its external debt in December 2022 and is a net importer of the four aggregated commodities and, on average, a net importer of each of the four commodities. Some additional elements regarding the economic situation of Ghana can be found in Appendix A.

2.1 Construction

To identify exogenous variations in international food commodity prices, we elaborate on De Winne & Peersman (2016) and Peersman (2022) to construct an instrumental variable. Since the instrument's validity relies on satisfying the exogeneity condition, as explain previously, we adopt the approach of De Winne & Peersman (2016).

This involves first constructing a quarterly global food production index, aligning with the annual production cycle and planting and harvesting schedules for specific crop-country

pairs. Despite the possibility of commodity prices swiftly reacting to macroeconomic shocks, there remains a delay of at least one quarter between the decision to produce, through planting, and the actual production following the harvest. Consequently, macroeconomic shocks cannot immediately impact harvest volumes; instead, such volumes are influenced only by exogenous shocks to the economy, like unanticipated weather conditions or crop diseases.

More precisely, the procedure starts by using the annual production data for each of four commodities - corn, maize, wheat and soybeans - for 191 countries over the period 1960-2022 that are published by the FAO. For each commodity, the production is converted into edible calories according to an updated version of the conversion parameters estimated by Roberts & Schlenker (2013). They estimate for each commodity the conversion parameters to go from bushel to pound and from pound to calorie, then rescale the caloric conversion ratios so the average price in 1961-2010 of all four crops equals that of maize. We use the same method, only updated in order to rescale the caloric conversion ratios so the average price in 1961-2022 based on monthly data of all four crops equals that of maize. By multiplying the two conversion coefficients and dividing by the price rescaler, we derive a conversion factor for each individual commodity, facilitating the transition from bushels to calories. Given that our data is denominated in tons, an additional converter is employed to facilitate the shift from tons to calories.

We therefore build on the crop calendar for each country and each of the specified crop developed by De Winne & Peersman (2016) where they are able to determine a specific quarter to which allocate the country's annual production for this specific crop. More details on the determination of the quarter for each pair of crop and country can be found in their paper. We update their calendar according to the "AMIS - GEOGLAM Crop Calendar"[4] that provides an up-to-date calendar for some selecting leading producers for each of the four crops. In addition, compared the crop calendar by De Winne & Peersman (2016), this calendar distingues two categories: "harvest (peak)" and "harvest". De Winne & Peersman (2016) restricts their sample according to some assumptions. Indeed, if a single harvesting season is spread over two subsequent quarters, they allocate the production volume to the first quarter. In addition, if part of the planting and harvesting seasons overlap at the quarterly frequency or if there is more than one harvesting period, or because the crops are harvested almost uniformly throughout the year, they exclude the country's production of their index. We depart from those assumptions and choose to spread the production equally according to all the months labeled as part of the harvesting period, and then aggregate at the quarterly level to have a that reflect how many months in the quarter are labeled as part of the harvesting period. For the countries where the subtility between "harvest (peak)" and "harvest" is available, we consider that a "harvest" month has half of the weight of a "harvest (peak)" month. Overall, this enables to have for each pair of crop and country, a quarterly production quantified in edible calories. The quarterly production data are then aggregated across crops and countries to give a global quarterly production series and converted into an index which takes as reference 2016. Following De Winne & Peersman (2016), we seasonally adjust our index using the U.S. Census Bureau's X-13ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment program. In Peersman (2022), the author focused on the effect of fluctuations in international food prices on euro-area inflation dynamics and therefore, do not include the harvests of European countries in the index. In our case, as Ghana can be considered as a small open economy among the 191 countries and is not considered as a leading producer for any of the selected crops, we do not consider necessary

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[4]https://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/user_upload/amis/docs/Crop_Calendar/AMIS_Crop_Calendar.pdf

to exclude Ghana from our index computation, as it is unlikely that specific shocks applying only to Ghana would impact the world commodity production and prices. Overall, our quarterly global food production index is represented in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Quarterly global food production index.

In addition, we also follow De Winne & Peersman (2016) and Peersman (2022), and construct a cereal price index based on prices of our four selected commodities: wheat, corn, rice and soybeans. Once again, we use the FAO annual production data for each of the four commodities. This data is aggregated among countries for each specific commodity and year, from 1960 to 2022. For each commodity, we compute the trend production volumes by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to annual production data, with smoothing parameter of 100. We then compute the crop's proportion of the annual global production, thereby obtaining the appropriate weight for price calculations. Extending this methodology to each crop, we duplicate the annual global production data for every quarter within a year. This dataset is then merged with quarterly price data for each crop, spanning from 1960 to 2022, sourced from the World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet). For every quarter of each year and for each crop, the share is multiplied by the corresponding quarterly price. Subsequently, the weighted prices are averaged among crops for each quarter of each year. We finally apply seasonal adjustment to the averaged data using the U.S. Census Bureau's X-13ARIMA-SEATS program. Overall, our quarterly cereal price index is represented in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Quarterly cereal price index.

2.2 Estimation

The series of instrumental variables is obtained through the estimation of the subsequent supply shocks equation:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 \Psi_t + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \lambda_{i,x} X_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \gamma_i y_{t-i} + \xi_t, \tag{1}$$

where Ψ_t is a vector of the Multivariate El Niño/Southern Oscillation index (MEI), the Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) collected from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and a dummy variable based on the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) definition of El Niño, and should control for the global weather phenomena.

X_t is a vector of control variables that could have a lagged influence on global food production. It includes the Industrial Production Total Index of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) in order to account for current economic activity, the MSCI World Equity Price Index collected from Refinitiv Eikon, and the G-20 value of the OECD Composite Leading Indicator to account for expected economic activity. These data are available quarterly from 1960 to 2022. In addition, it includes the real crude oil prices from 1974 to 2022, and global oil production from 1973 to 2022, both collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Both the crude oil prices and the global oil production are seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau's X-13ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment program. As some variables are potentially based on nominal elements, we also include the US personal consumption expenditures implicit price deflator index collected from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1960 to 2022. Finally, it includes the cereal price index previously explained and the IMF global price of Food index, where those value represents the benchmark prices (period averages in nominal U.S. dollars) which are representative of the global market and are determined by the largest exporter of a given commodity. This includes prices regarding cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges. The IMF Global Price of Food index is also seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau's X-13ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment program. Finally the sum represents the lag operator, where we use $p = 6$ in the estimation.

The estimation of this equation is conducted on a quarterly basis from 1974 to 2022, which represents the most extensive dataset available for all the relevant series. Presuming that the information available to local farmers is not more comprehensive than what's encompassed by equation 1, the residuals ξ_t can be interpreted as a sequence of unexpected harvest shocks, that we will refer as supply shocks. These shocks can then serve as an external instrument to identify exogenous shocks in international food commodity prices. The corresponding data is depicted in Figure 3.

Source: Authors' computations.

Figure 3: Supply shock.

3 Empirical Evidence

This section presents empirical evidence that serves three main purposes: (i) supporting the upcoming model's predictions, (ii) validating certain aspects of the model's mechanisms, and (iii) emphasizing the pivotal role of our instrumental variable, ξ_t. This variable function as an external instrument to identify shocks in international food commodity prices.

By employing this variable as a shock, we can effectively determine whether there exists empirical support for the notion that food crises can trigger adverse economic conditions leading to debt distress. To accomplish this, we exploit the fact that the information available to producers is no greater than that in equation (1). Consequently, the residuals ξ_t can be treated as a sequence of unforeseen harvest shocks. These shocks then serve as an external instrument, aiding in the identification of shocks in the international food commodity prices.

The use of this instrument is essential. Without it, one could say that countries can anticipate shifts in commodity prices and take measures to hedge against the associated risks. In such a scenario, the link between food crises and debt distress would not be as straightforward. Our approach, therefore, centers on scrutinizing the impact of unanticipated supply shocks on a country's economic and financial conditions, particularly in terms of defaults.[5]

3.1 Commodity prices transmission mechanisms

First, we begin by estimating harvest shocks in the data following the procedure described in equation (1). We then utilize these harvest shocks as an external instrument to price shocks. Once this data is obtained, we analyze its impact on the variables of interest. To quantitatively assess this impact, we estimate the following model:

$$y_{t+h} = \beta_0^h + \beta_1^h \varepsilon_t^p + controls_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}, \tag{2}$$

where y_t represents the variable under investigation for which we wish to study the effect of the price shock, ε_t^p denotes the commodity price shock, and ε_t is the residual. In this expression,

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[5]For example, in light of recent events like the Ukraine-War, many analysts were unable to predict their occurrence. Within our model, these events are considered unanticipated shocks. This underlines our focus on understanding the effects of such shocks on a country's economic dynamics, particularly in the context of defaults. For a recent study using the war as an unanticipated event see Afunts et al. (2023).

$controls_t \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_{i,x}^h X_{t-i} + \gamma_1^h trend_t$, where X_t represents a vector of control variables, and $trend_t$ denotes the time trend. The null hypothesis is $\beta_1^h = 0$, and $\beta_1^h \neq 0$ indicates that a negative harvest shock, understood here as a negative supply shock that will lead to a positive price shock, renders supply shocks as having an effect in the variable under consideration. The specific vector of control variables will be discussed for each case we present subsequently. We include four lags ($p = 4$) of control variables since we are using quarterly data.

In order to accurately estimate equation (2) and investigate whether price shocks affect the variables of interest, it is imperative to have an exogenous measure of price shocks to causally analyze their effects. This justifies our reliance on the points outlined in Section 2.1, ensuring that these shocks are plausibly uncorrelated with other macroeconomic shocks, which fulfills the required exogeneity condition.

To estimate the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) presented next, we utilize the local projection methodology proposed by Jordà (2005). To account for potential cointegration between the variables, the model in equation (2) is estimated in levels, adhering to the recommendations of Sims et al. (1990). An advantage of this approach is its ability to delve into the transmission mechanism in greater detail, particularly the pass-through effect onto the variables of interest.

Figure 4 illustrates the outcomes derived from estimating model (2) for each value of $h = 0, 1, ..., 12$, considering a one-unit escalation in price shocks. The figure also includes the 68% and 90% confidence intervals, which are constructed using Newey-West standard errors.

(a) Commodity Price Imports.

(b) Inflation Food.

(c) Inflation Non Food.

(d) Inflation Headline.

Figure 4: Impact of a Positive Shock in International Food Commodity Prices.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of selected prices and inflation following an unforeseen positive supply shock, characterized as an unanticipated increase in commodity prices on the international market. In particular, panel (a) displays $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, estimated from the model: $y_{t+h} = \beta_0^h + \beta_1^h \varepsilon_t^p + controls_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}$. Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports, and the control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD, the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate), and the lag of the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports. Panel (b) exhibits the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ from the model specified in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Food, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Panel (c) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Non-Food items. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Lastly, panel (d) presents the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the logarithm of Headline Consumer Price Index (CPI). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The lightly shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the more prominently shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed employing Newey-West Standard Errors.

Figure 4 conveys a crucial message: the null hypothesis that price shocks do not influence internal prices in Ghana can be dismissed across multiple time horizons, particularly in the initial quarters. Notably, the food commodity price shock triggers a progressive and statistically significant surge in commodity price imports. Examining panel (a), we discern that a unit increase in the price shock results in an approximately 0.1% increase in the commodity price of imports index after 5 quarters. This impact endures for about six quarters before losing its statistical significance, underscoring the temporal and diminishing nature of the shock's effect. Panels (b) and (c) illuminate the impacts on Inflation for Food items and Inflation for Non Food items. As anticipated, given the nature of the shock, the transmission to Food Inflation is immediate and persists over the long run, slightly increasing with each passing quarter. A

nearly 20% increase in food inflation emerges after ten quarters. However, the shock does not appear to result to non-food inflation, as there is no significant effect on the Inflation Non Food. Lastly, Headline Inflation appears to be predominantly influenced by Food Inflation, as it exhibits a similar reaction following the shock, albeit at a comparable magnitude. This observation underscores the significance of these commodities within Ghana's consumption basket. It is worth noting that for the Core and Headline Inflation, a one-unit increase in the price shock continues to have effects even after several quarters. This persistent influence underscores the lasting nature of the price impact, suggesting the likely presence of indirect consequences stemming from fluctuations in international food commodity prices on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Overall, these findings demonstrate the discernible influence of international food commodity prices on retail prices.

Moving forward, our analysis delves into the ramifications of the supply shock on Ghana's Terms of Trade.

(a) Exchange Rate. (b) Total Imports in USD.

(c) Total Exports in USD. (d) Trade Balance in USD.

Figure 5: Impact of a Positive Shock in International Food Commodity Prices.

Note: This figure presents Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) reflecting the impact of a positive supply shock on international trade conditions. Panel (a) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (b), the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is depicted from the model outlined in equation (2), with y_t indicating the logarithm of Import Prices. Here, the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (c), $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is shown, obtained through estimating the model described by equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Export Prices. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. Finally, panel (d) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the Trade Balance in USD dollars. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of External Debt in USD. The light shaded area corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval, both constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.

Analyzing Figure 5 brings forth several key insights. First, as a one-unit increase in the price shock increases the price of commodity imports, it implies a decrease in the Ghanaian terms of trade. This leads to a devaluation of the currency, here against the dollar, depicted in panel (a). It appears to be a one-month lag in the USD-GHS exchange rate increase compared to the initial shock, and it rises over time. Panel (b) unveils a significant result: the price shock triggers a substantial increase in the Total Imports in USD, which includes all the country imports. This effect is immediate and gradually decreases over time. This underscores that a price shock in the food sector promptly compels the country to augment its spending on imports at the moment of the shock, before being able to partly switch suppliers and contracts. Considering our focus on food products and their limited substitutability, it becomes clear that an immediate replacement of these items is not feasible, coupled with a depreciation of the currency which makes all imports more expensive. On the opposite, panel (b) shows that the Total Exports in USD dollars does not appear affected by the shock. This result appears particularly interesting as a depreciation of the currency could boost Ghana's exports. In addition, if Ghana's exports of commodities played a significant role in its overall export portfolio, then the price increase could potentially lead to an export boost. Overall, as the response of total exports in USD is unsignificant, this highlights Ghana's status as a net importer of commodities. Finally, panel (c) demonstrates that the trade balance worsens on impact and quickly adjusted back after the shock. Overall, those results underscores Ghana's vulnerability as a net importer of commodities, particularly during periods of surging food prices.

Our central proposition, as we delve into subsequent model development, centers on the cumulative impact of deteriorating trade balance coupled with the low elasticity of substitution inherent in food markets. Our central assumption in the model is that a benevolent government in face of this reality drives the trajectory toward increase public debt, since the increase in prices of goods with low elasticity of substitution as food, will lead to a benevolent government to increase public debt to compensate the adverse economic conditions.[6] The subsequent analysis studies the consequences of those shocks to debt and interest rate spreads and it seems to corroborate to the main assumption used in the modeling part developed in Section 4.

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[6]Here, we identify two contributing mechanisms driving increased public debt. Primarily, currency depreciation heightens debt service value. Secondarily, given the low elasticity of substitution in food, a benevolent government might augment debt to counterbalance the adverse international conditions. Those assumptions are crucial in the model development presented in Section 4.

(a) Spread.

(b) External Debt in USD.

(c) Domestic Debt in USD.

(d) Total Debt in USD.

Figure 6: Impact of a Positive Shock in International Food Commodity Prices.

Note: This figure presents the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that depict the behavior of debt and spread in response to a positive supply shock. Specifically, in panel (a), we illustrate $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, derived from estimating the model as described in equation (2). Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Spread, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Panel (b) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from the model outlined in equation (2), where y_t refers to the logarithm of External Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Moreover, panel (c) depicts the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model as described in equation (2), with y_t refers to the logarithm of Domestic Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Lastly, panel (d) shows the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. The lighter shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.

First, following an unexpected price shock, the spread, which is the difference on debt interest rate between the US and Ghanaian's bonds, increases. This reflects a loss in market confidence in the government's debt repayment capacity. This could be due on impact to the deteriorating international trade position but potentially later on by the depreciation of the currency, which implies that the burden of interest on debt held in foreign currency increases. This could explain why, while domestic debt remains relatively unaffected by food price shocks, external debt exhibits a distinct response. The effect reaches a peak of 20% after 1 quarter (3 months) and then gradually decreases up to 2 quarters (6 months). In panel (b), we observe that an increase in the price shock corresponds to a rise in Ghana's external debt. This effect appears with a significant delay, after 2 quarters (6 months), and then increases gradually. The delay and the shape in the response could be explained by the gradual rollover of the current external debt, as low-income country usually borrow on international market at low duration. Furthermore, in panel (c) of Figure 6, we observe a lack of evidence to reject a null effect across

initial horizons regarding an effect on the domestic debt. Finally, panel (d) demonstrates an increase in the total debt in USD, driven by the external debt increases. Overall, this suggests Ghana's reliance on international debt markets to support its financial position is substantial. As the spread remains high and the country rollovers its debt, this further increases the cost of external debt. In conclusion, as these interconnected factors mutually reinforce each other, it could potentially lead to a sovereign default similar to Ghana's experience at the end of 2022.

In Appendix D, we employ an Oil Supply News Shocks model developed by Känzig (2021) to investigate whether the results presented here may be attributed to the influence of oil shocks. Our analysis reveals no evidence supporting the notion that oil shocks are driving the observed outcomes, as there is no significant effect on the external debt.

Furthermore, in Appendix E, we repeat this investigation using Monetary Policy Shocks, as detailed in the paper by Choi et al. (2022). Once more, we do not find any evidence indicating that this is the underlying mechanism responsible for the observed results. While an increase in the external debt can be seen on impact, the effect fades after one month, compared to our results where this effect is significant and persistent over the long-run.

3.2   Discussions

Overall, we employ these empirical findings to support the modeling we develop in the next section, and as we will see, they are consistent with the predictions of our quantitative model. We view these empirical findings as a complementary result for the theoretical modeling part we develop next. The advantage of using the theoretical model, as opposed to relying solely on the empirical findings we found, is that we are able to identify the causal effects.

Even though we argue that we are using an external instrument to identify the price shocks that are uncorrelated with other macroeconomic conditions, the transmission mechanism discussed above lacks neat identification: the empirical findings might be driven by unobserved factors correlated with the prices that ultimately affect the transmission we have discussed above. It is worth clarifying that the goal of our paper is to highlight the importance of a food crisis for debt distress and to point out that certain scenarios of food crises can increase the probability of a sovereign default. Due to the issue of finding a neat identification strategy in the empirical modeling, in what follows we begin the development of our quantitative analyses, where we can see the mechanisms at hand and compare them with our empirical findings.

4   The toy model: import prices specification

Time is discrete, and the horizon is infinite. We are examining a small open economy in which the government receives an endowment and makes choices regarding consumption between two types of goods: one produced domestically and the other imported. The government also decides the amount of debt to issue. In this economy, there exists a continuum of risk-neutral international financial intermediaries that function as international financial markets. These intermediaries determine the quantity of debt to purchase from the domestic government based on its return relative to a risk-free interest rate, represented as r^*. In this first version of the model, we use some simplifying assumptions in order to better illustrate the intuitions. We will consider

that the government receives a constant endowment and we will assume that the price of the domestic good and that the price of the consumption basket are both equal to one. We will also departure from Arellano (2008) and model the premium cost of defaulting as an additional increase in the cost of imports, which appears realistic as defaulting also implies being excluding from international trade. Overall, in our toy model, the analysis depends on the import prices while in the more complex version, it depends on the terms of trade.

4.1   Environment

There are two types of goods: domestically produced goods, denoted H, and foreign goods denoted F, which are produced abroad and imported. The benevolent government consumes both types of goods according to the following consumption basket:

$$C_t = \left((1-\alpha)^{1/\rho} \, C_{Ht}^{(\rho-1)/\rho} + \alpha^{1/\rho} \, C_{Ft}^{(\rho-1)/\rho} \right)^{\rho/(\rho-1)}, \tag{3}$$

where the parameter ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods while α measures the openness of the economy, such that $(1-\alpha)$ is the degree of home bias in preferences. The consumer price index associated to this basket is:

$$P_t = \left((1-\alpha) \, P_{Ht}^{1-\rho} + \alpha \, P_{Ft}^{1-\rho} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)}, \tag{4}$$

which implies that the government split his aggregate consumption C_t between domestic and imported goods according to:

$$C_{Ht} = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} \right)^{-\rho} C_t, \tag{5}$$

$$C_{Ft} = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_t} \right)^{-\rho} C_t. \tag{6}$$

Finally, the terms of trade can be defined as the ratio of each good price:

$$T_t = \frac{P_{Ft}}{P_{Ht}}. \tag{7}$$

In each period, the government receives a real endowment in terms of domestic production that it can use to consume directly or to trade. In this model, we consider the endowment to be constant over time, such that it will be denoted y.

The benevolent government derives its utility from its overall consumption according to:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u_t(C_t), \tag{8}$$

where $0 < \beta < 1$ is the discount factor, C_t is the aggregate consumption which depends on both C_{Ht}, the consumption of domestic goods and C_{Ft}, the consumption of foreign goods, and $u(.)$ is strictly increasing and concave.

Taking prices as given, the government chooses how much consumption, borrowing of domestic bonds, denoted B_{Ht}, and whether to default or not on the existing debt in order to

maximize the utility of a continuum of households with similar preferences. Notice, if $B_{Ht} > 0$, the government holds positive assets, whereas if $B_{Ht} < 0$, the country is indebted.

Domestic bonds are denominated in local currency. The nominal price of the domestic bond, q_{Ht} is a function of both the amount of debt chosen by the government and of the terms of trade, which under our simplifications, will be equal to the price of the imported good.

The budget constraint in nominal terms is therefore:

$$P_{Ht}C_{Ht} + P_{Ft}C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(B_{Ht+1}, T_t)\, B_{Ht+1} \leq P_{Ht}y + B_{Ht}. \tag{9}$$

In real terms, variables become $b_{Ht} \equiv \frac{B_{Ht}}{P_{Ht}}$. Finally, define the gross inflation rate between periods $t-1$ and t as $\Pi_{Ht} \equiv \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ht-1}}$. The budget constraint can be rewritten as:

$$C_{Ht} + T_t C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)\, b_{Ht+1}\, \Pi_{Ht+1} \leq y + b_{Ht}. \tag{10}$$

We can characterize households' choices with the following optimality conditions:

$$\frac{u_{cF,t}}{u_{cH,t}} = T_t,$$

$$u_{cH,t} = \frac{1}{q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)}\beta E_t\left(\frac{u_{cH,t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}}\right).$$

In this toy version, we first assume that the monetary policy at home keeps the price of domestic goods in domestic currency constant, such that $P_{Ht} = P_t = 1$ at each period t. This imply that, under our assumptions:

$$C_t = C_{Ht} + P_{Ft}C_{Ft}. \tag{11}$$

Under our simplifications, nominal and real terms are identical, such that the budget constraint can be simplified to:

$$C_{Ht} + P_{Ft}C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} \leq y + b_{Ht}. \tag{12}$$

Under our simplifications, optimal conditions can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{u_{CF,t}}{u_{CH,t}} = P_{Ft},$$

$$u_{CH,t} = \frac{1}{q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})}\beta E_t\left(u_{CH,t+1}\right).$$

Given our previous results and under our assumptions, the budget constraint can be rewritten as:

$$(1-\alpha)C_t + \alpha P_{Ft}\left(P_{Ft}\right)^{-\rho}C_t + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} \leq y + b_{Ht}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (1-\alpha)C_t + \alpha\left(P_{Ft}\right)^{1-\rho}C_t + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} \leq y + b_{Ht}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow C_t\left((1-\alpha) + \alpha\left(P_{Ft}\right)^{1-\rho}\right) + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} \leq y + b_{Ht}.$$

This finally gives us an expression of C_t:

$$C_t = \frac{y_t + b_{Ht} - q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1}}{\left((1-\alpha) + \alpha \left(P_{Ft}\right)^{1-\rho}\right)}. \tag{13}$$

We denote the export of domestic production to the rest of the world X_t.

The market clearing condition for domestic production is:

$$y = C_{Ht} + X_t. \tag{14}$$

The trade balance, defined as the difference between exports and imports, will be equal to:

$$Tb_t = P_{Ht}X_t - P_{Ft}C_{Ft}. \tag{15}$$

In real terms, the trade balance becomes $tb_t \equiv \frac{Tb_t}{P_{Ht}}$. In real terms and under our simplifications, it implies that the trade balance can be rewritten:

$$tb_t = X_t - P_{Ft}C_{Ft}. \tag{16}$$

Using the simplified budget constraint (12) and the market clearing condition (14), we can characterized the trade balance in our environment:

$$C_{Ht} + P_{Ft}C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} = y + b_{Ht}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow C_{Ht} + P_{Ft}C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} = C_{Ht} + X_t + b_{Ht}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow X_t - P_{Ft}C_{Ft} = q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} - b_{Ht}.$$

Such that:

$$tb_t = q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} - b_{Ht}. \tag{17}$$

4.2   Default decisions

Here we assume that the final consumption can be of two types: one when the government does not default and one when the government defaults. We also assume that under the case when the government decides to default, it is excluded from the international credit market and has every period a given probability to regain access to the markets. In addition, in the line of the output loss faced by the government following its default, as modeled by Arellano (2008), we assume that, following its default, the government faces an extra cost in the form of an increase in the price of imports.

Under our simplifying assumptions, consumption in each case is characterized by the two following expressions:

- when the government chooses to repay its debt:

$$C_t = \frac{y + b_{Ht} - q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1}}{\left((1-\alpha) + \alpha \left(P_{Ft}\right)^{1-\rho}\right)}. \tag{18}$$

- when the government chooses to default:

$$C_t = \frac{y}{\left((1 - \alpha) + \alpha \left(\tilde{P}_{Ft}\right)^{1-\rho}\right)},$$ (19)

where $\tilde{P}_{Ft} \geq P_{Ft}$ and is the extra cost that the government faces when its default as a punishment.

The timing of the model is as follows:

1. At the beginning of each period, the government decides whether or not to default on its debt. Let V_t^d denotes the value function when the government chooses to default and V_t^p the value function when the government chooses to repay its debt.

2. Default is optimal whenever $V_t^d > V_t^p$. Every time this condition holds, the government chooses to default and therefore does not pay back its past debt.

3. During the default period, the government is excluded from the international markets and, thus cannot borrow. We also assume that the government faces as another punishment an increase in the price paid for its imports.

The problem is therefore such that the government chooses the optimal policy b_{Ht+1} to maximize utility. The expected value from the next period onward and the bond prices q_{Ht} will incorporate the fact that the government can choose to default in the future.

The state in this economy is represented by a vector $s(b_{Ht}, P_{Ft})$. Before we proceed, it is important to recall that foreign creditors in this economy have access to the international credit market and are subject to a constant international interest rate denoted as $r^* > 0$. We make the assumption that these creditors are risk neutral and behave in a competitive manner. Consequently, in each period, we can observe their expected profits, defined as ρ_t:

$$\rho_t = q_{Ht}\, b_{Ht+1} - \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{1 + r^*}\, b_{Ht+1} = 0,$$

where δ_t is the probability of default. Notice that when $b_{Ht+1} \geq 0$, the probability of default is zero since the government is saving. This no arbitrage condition implies that the equilibrium price of a discounted bond is given by:

$$q_{Ht} = \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{1 + r^*}.$$ (20)

The probability of default, δ_t, is endogenous to the model and relies on incentives of the government to repay. The probability of default is a function of both b_{Ht+1} and P_{Ft} (under our simplifications), which means that q_{Ht} is also a function of those variables. Finally, the gross interest rate is defined as $r_t \equiv 1/q_{Ht} - 1$ and the spread as $s_t \equiv r_t - r^*$. With those elements, we can define the recursive competitive equilibrium.

4.3 Recursive competitive equilibrium

Given the state vector $s(b_H, P_F)$, the government's policy functions b'_H, the price functions q_H, and the consumption functions C, we can determine the equilibrium.

Foreign creditors, being risk-neutral and competitive, determine bond prices based on the following condition:

$$q_H(b'_H, P_F) = \frac{1 - \delta(b'_H, P_F)}{1 + r^*}.$$

Now, let $V^0(b_H, P_F)$ be the government's value function at the beginning of the period, with assets b_H and facing import price P_F. The government decides whether to repay or default to maximize utility represented in (8). The value function $V^0(b_H, P_F)$ is defined by the following equation:

$$V^0(b_H, P_F) = \max_{\{C, b'_H\}} \{V^p(b_H, P_F), V^d(P_F)\}, \tag{21}$$

where $V^p(b_H, P_F)$ represents the value function when repaying, and $V^d(P_F)$ represents the value function when defaulting. When the government defaults, it enters a state of autarky but has a constant and exogenous chance to regain access to credit markets every period.

The value function of defaulting is given by:

$$V^d(P_F) = u\left(\frac{y}{\left((1 - \alpha) + \alpha(\tilde{P}_F)^{1-\rho}\right)}\right) + \beta \int_{P'_F} \left[\theta\, V^0(0, P'_F) + (1 - \theta)\, V^d(P'_F)\right] f(P'_F, P_F)\, dP'_F, \tag{22}$$

where θ represents the probability of re-entering the credit market.

On the other hand, when the government has not defaulted, and therefore has repaid its debt, the value function $V^p(b_H, P_F)$ is given by:

$$V^p(b_H, P_F) = \max_{b'_H} \left\{ u\left(\frac{y + b_H - q_H(b'_H, P_F)\, b_H}{\left((1 - \alpha) + \alpha(P_F)^{1-\rho}\right)}\right) + \beta \int_{P'_F} V^0(b'_H, P'_F)\, f(P'_F, P_F)\, dP'_F \right\}. \tag{23}$$

Therefore, the government chooses b'_H to maximize utility, with the decision being made period by period. Additionally, to prevent Ponzi schemes, we assume that the government faces a lower bound on debt defined as $b'_H \geq -z$, not binding in equilibrium.

The policy functions can be characterized by the following sets:

$$A(b_H) = \{P_F \in \mathbb{P} : V^p(b_H, P_F) \geq V^d(P_F)\},$$

and

$$D(b_H) \equiv \tilde{A}(b_H) = \{P_F \in \mathbb{P} : V^p(b_H, P_F) < V^d(P_F)\}.$$

where the set $A(b_H)$ represents the optimal set for remaining in the contract, while the set $D(b_H)$ represents the optimal set for default. Given this information, and denoting the aggregate states of the economy as $s(b_H, P_F)$, we can define a recursive equilibrium as follows:

Definition 1. *The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy functions for (i) consumption $C(s)$; (ii) government's asset holdings $b'_H(s)$, repayment sets $A(b_H)$, and default sets $D(b_H)$; and (iii) the price function for bonds $q_H(b'_H, P_F)$ such that:*

1. Taking as given the government policies, household consumption $C(s)$ satisfies the resource constraint.
2. Taking as given the bond price function $q_H(b'_H, P_F)$, the government policy function $b'_H(s)$, repayment sets $A(b_H)$, and default sets $D(b_H)$ satisfy the government optimization problem.
3. Bonds prices $q_H(b'_H, P_F)$ reflect the government's default probabilities and are consistent with the creditor's expected zero profits.

Furthermore, default probabilities $\delta(b'_H, P_F)$ and default sets $D(b'_H)$ are related by the following equation:

$$\delta(b'_H, P_F) = \int_{D(b'_H)} f(P'_F, P_F) \, dP'_F. \tag{24}$$

In other words, when $D(b'_H) = \emptyset$, equilibrium default probabilities are zero because the government does not choose to default for any realization of the import prices when it has assets b'_H. Similarly, when $D(b'_H) = \mathbb{P}$, default probabilities are equal to one.

The value of remaining in the contract increases with b_H, while the value of default is independent of b_H. Assuming bounded support for import price shocks, there exists a level of assets low enough for which $D(b'_H) = \mathbb{P}$. However, since default only occurs when assets are negative, there is a level of b_H for which the default set is empty.

From equation (24), we can observe that the equilibrium bond price increases with b'_H, indicating that a low discount price for a large loan compensates lenders for the possibility of default. Additionally, bond prices are also dependent on import price shocks.

4.4 Calibration

In the simulations presented below, we employed the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma},$$

where $\sigma = 2$. The risk-free interest rate is set at 1%, which corresponds to the quarterly yield of the US 5-year bond.

We decide to take a probability of re-entry on international markets that is equal to 0.07 which appears to be low compared to the literature, but seems particularly accurate for countries like Ghana who had never defaulted in history.

To derive an accurate estimation of the stochastic process for the import price, we employ a specific methodology. Firstly, we compute a weighted average price for four crucial commodities - rice, maize, wheat, and soybeans. This calculation is based on the relative share of each commodity within Ghana's total imports of these specific items, as reported by the FAO between 1961 and 2021. Using monthly data on commodity prices sourced from the World Bank, we then determine a weighted average price for each month. This computation takes into account the proportional share of the four commodities within Ghana's imports. Since the data for the 2022 import shares is currently unavailable, we approximate the 2022 share by taking the average share from 2015 to 2021. In order to maintain consistency within our analysis, we focus on the period from January 2008 to October 2022, aligning it with the available monthly data for

Ghana. This meticulous selection process allows us to create a comprehensive series of import prices for the four commodities. Subsequently, this series, after being transformed in log, serves as the basis for estimating the stochastic process governing the import price. This transformed data is illustrated in Figure 7.


Figure 7: Import prices.

The stochastic process for the import price follows the equation:

$$\log P_{Ft+1} = (1-\xi)\mu + \xi \log P_{Ft} + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $E[\varepsilon] = 0$ and $E[\varepsilon^2] = \eta_p^2$. The calibrated values used are: $\xi = 0.971$, $\eta_p = 0.239$, and $\mu = 4.366$. These values are determined by using the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the imported prices of commodities, which takes into account a weighted average of the imported prices of maize, rice, soybeans, and wheat. We discretize the shock into a 60-state Markov process, employing the method developed by Tauchen & Hussey (1991).

The parameter α is estimated to be around 0.22 and represents the average import share of commodities relative to the total consumption of commodities for Ghana in quantity, based on annual FAO informations regarding production, exports and imports of these four commodities, from 2008 to 2021.

Following Arellano (2008), the punishment is in the following form:

$$h(P_F) = \left\{ \begin{array}{lll} P_F & \text{if} & P_F > \tilde{P}_F \\ \tilde{P}_F & \text{if} & P_F \leq \tilde{P}_F \end{array} \right\}$$

This implies that if the government is already facing a high import prices, there is no extra punishment in terms of import prices associated to default. This asymmetric default punishment make the value of autarky a less sensitive function of the shock. We choose to calibrate the import prices under default $\tilde{P}_F$ to be equal to a 50% increase of the mean of the stochastic process for import prices.

Overall, the parameters of the model are represented in the table 1. By using the parameters as defined in Table 1, we simulate the model and we obtain the following results for the competitive recursive equilibrium. In what follows we discuss the results. The algorithm to solve the model is discussed in the Appendix B.

It worth noticing that we choose the elasticity of substitution to be below than 1, in order for the goods to be poor substitutes. Indeed, in our framework, we think of imports as

22

Table 1: Model Parameters.

Parameter	Value
Risk-free interest rate	$r^* = 1\%$
Risk aversion	$\sigma = 2$
Stochastic structure	$\xi = 0.971,\ \mu = 4.366,\ \eta_p = 0.239$
Discount factor	$\beta = 0.96$
Probability of reentry	$\theta = 0.07$
Elasticity of substitution among domestic and foreign goods	$\rho = 0.9$
Import share	$\alpha = 0.219$
Import price in default	$\tilde{P}_F = 1.5 \times \text{mean}(P_F)$
Endowment	$y = 100$

food products and more specifically cereals such as maize, rice and wheat. For this type of product that are both used to consume directly and to produce, it is costly and complicated to substitute toward other suppliers, even more under a context as the Ukraine-Russia war which has motivated this project.

4.5 Results for the competitive equilibrium

Figure 8 illustrates the bond price experienced by the borrower in relation to assets b_{Ht}, considering two import price shocks: one that is 20 percent above the mean, identified as high, and another that is 20 percent below the mean, identified as low.

(a) Bond price schedules.

(b) Equilibrium interest rate.

Figure 8: Bond prices and assets.

The left panel of Figure 8 presents the bond price schedules, displaying the bond price faced by the government as a function of assets b_{Ht} for the aforementioned import price shocks. The interpretation of this panel is straightforward: bond prices increase as assets increase. In other words, higher levels of debt (larger $-b_{Ht+1}$) result in greater discounts in the face value, leading to higher interest rates. Notably, a high import price corresponds to more discounting, indicating that foreign creditors anticipate a higher likelihood of default. This fact is further emphasized in Figure 9, where the shaded area represents moments of default. It is evident that, under low import prices, the country never defaults since international conditions are favorable

in such cases. Conversely, when import prices reach sufficiently high levels, even with low levels of debt, default becomes optimal for the government. As the debt levels increase, the level of import prices under which default is optimal decreases, showing that for high-debt countries, the import price shocks do not need to be high enough for default to become optimal.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the borrowing constraint is more relaxed during periods of low import prices compared to periods of high import prices. This discrepancy arises due to the preference for default during times when import prices are high and shocks to these prices are persistent. This occurs because a high import price shock today suggests a likelihood of similarly high shocks in the future, prompting the government to default even when debt levels are not sufficiently high. As a result, the interest rate increases in anticipation of this behavior by foreign creditors, as can be seen in the right panel of Figure 8. The model highlighted here exhibits counter-cyclical borrowing constraints.

Figure 9: Default probability.

It is also important to highlight that in this model, the government has two tools at its disposal to influence the consumption trajectory in response to import price shocks: borrowing and defaulting. The purpose of debt issuance is to mitigate the impact of income fluctuations on consumption. Moreover, considering that the parameter β is less than the inverse of the risk-free interest rate (i.e., $\frac{\beta}{1+r_t} < 1$), the government always favors the option of borrowing over defaulting.

(a) Savings Function.

(b) Value Function.

Figure 10: Savings and Value Function.

The left panel of Figure 10 illustrates the conditional savings function, considering the non-defaulting scenario, as a function of b_{Ht} for the two previously explained import price levels. When b_{Ht} is small and negative, it is evident that the government prefers to borrow more when import prices increase. However, due to certain unavailable financial contracts, the government is constrained and unable to do so. This tighter borrowing constraint is characterized by significantly higher interest rates compared to the borrowing constraint faced when import prices are low. Notably, for low import prices and high debt levels, the government is allowed to borrow, leading to a decrease in savings. As the government becomes a net saver, the two savings functions converge.

The right panel of Figure 10 presents the value function in relation to b_{Ht} for the two aforementioned import price levels. It is worth observing that, for both cases, default is chosen for all asset levels below a threshold represented by the flat line. Furthermore, it is important to note that there exists a range of debt levels where default is not chosen when import prices are low, but becomes optimal as import prices increase. This highlights the significance of international conditions in the default decisions of small open economies, particularly those with high levels of indebtedness.

Figure 11: Comparison between the Model and the Data.

Finally, in Figure 11, we present the quantitative predictions of the model, particularly focusing on its ability to match the data, with special emphasis on Import Prices and the Spread

- the variables of primary interest. The simulation entails modeling the system over time, identifying default events, extracting pre-default observations to align with the data, and subsequently calculating the means of the targeted variables.

Regarding the calibrated parameters, the model demonstrates a reasonable approximation to import prices, especially during the periods leading up to the price increases before the default event. It also performs well in replicating the observed data for the spread. Notably, in both the model and the actual data, spreads are observed to be low during prosperous times prior to the default episode.

One noteworthy point is that in the model, the price volatility during these periods is lower than in the actual data, although it closely approximates moments immediately preceding the default episode. The model successfully anticipates the default episode in Ghana in December 2022, accurately predicting the elevated spread that the Ghanaian government faced during that period.

In terms of price evolution, the model effectively captures the rising trend in prices that occurred in the months leading up to the default episode, which we identify as the driver force leading to default. By comparing the data, we can see a relationship between the spreads and the import prices. The story here is that the increase in prices can increase default probabilities which results in increases in spreads, and in case the default is materialized as in December 2022 the result is an even increase in those spreads.

4.6 Analysing the importance of the international conditions

To examine the impact of international conditions, specifically import prices, on the default decisions of small open economies, we can analyze how the equilibrium changes by varying the parameter α, which as explained before, represents the degree of economic openness. We anticipate that as α decreases, the influence of international conditions diminishes. Consequently, the decision to default or not becomes less dependent on the fluctuation of import prices. On one hand, this may appear favorable as it reduces the country's vulnerability to international conditions. However, on the other hand, as α decreases, the government's fiscal buffer diminishes. In the extreme case, when the country is completely closed and unable to access international markets, it can only accumulate positive debt levels in the form of savings, as can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 14. Notice that as the country becomes more open, it also becomes more indebted.

Conversely, as the degree of openness increases, the country gains the ability to borrow more through its greater participation in financial markets and potentially securing substantial international assistance. Moreover, even in scenarios where import prices rise, a more open country will face lower interest rates for the same debt level compared to a lower degree of openness, which can be easily seen by comparing panels (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 12. Finally, by examining Figure 13, we observe a reduction in the regions where default occurs as we increase α, which implies that a country with higher openness is less prone to default.

Therefore, the main challenge lies in small highly indebted open economies with limited openness. While a highly indebted country that is more open experiences a decrease in the regions prone to default, the same cannot be said for small open countries with high debt levels.

These economies align with the focus of our analysis.

(a) Bond price schedules, $\alpha = 0.01$.

(b) Equilibrium interest rate, $\alpha = 0.01$.

(c) Bond price schedules, $\alpha = 0.21$.

(d) Equilibrium interest rate $\alpha = 0.21$.

(e) Bond price schedules, $\alpha = 0.80$.

(f) Equilibrium interest rate, $\alpha = 0.80$.

Figure 12: Bond prices and assets.

(a) Default probability, $\alpha = 0.01$.

(b) Default probability, $\alpha = 0.21$.

(c) Default probability, $\alpha = 0.80$.

Figure 13: Default Probabilities.


(a) Savings Function, $\alpha = 0.01$.

(b) Value Function, $\alpha = 0.01$.

(c) Savings Function, $\alpha = 0.21$.

(d) Value Function, $\alpha = 0.21$.

(e) Savings Function, $\alpha = 0.80$.

(f) Value Function, $\alpha = 0.80$.

Figure 14: Savings and Value Function.

4.7 Analysing the importance of elasticity of substitution

In Appendix C, we analyse the effect of the elasticity of substitution for our results and we argue that our choice $\rho < 1$ is reasonable, especially under our simplifying assumptions.

5 The model: terms of trade specification

Here, we do an extension analyzing the model considering the terms of trade specification. Time is discrete, and the horizon is infinite. We are examining a small open economy in which the government receives an endowment and makes choices regarding consumption between two types of goods: one produced domestically and the other imported. The government also decides the amount of debt to issue. In this economy, there exists a continuum of risk-neutral international financial intermediaries that function as international financial markets. These intermediaries determine the quantity of debt to purchase from the domestic government based on its return relative to a risk-free interest rate, represented as r_t^*. In this second version of the model, we characterize the decisions using a more complex structure based on the terms of trade and relax our previous simplifying assumptions.

5.1 Environment

There are two types of goods: domestically produced goods, denoted H, and foreign goods denoted F, which are produced abroad and imported. The benevolent government consumes both types of goods according to the following consumption basket:

$$C_t = \left((1-\alpha)^{1/\rho} \, C_{Ht}^{(\rho-1)/\rho} + \alpha^{1/\rho} \, C_{Ft}^{(\rho-1)/\rho} \right)^{\rho/(\rho-1)}, \tag{25}$$

where the parameter ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods while α measures the openness of the economy, such that $(1-\alpha)$ is the degree of home bias in preferences. The consumer price index associated to this basket is:

$$P_t = \left((1-\alpha) \, P_{Ht}^{1-\rho} + \alpha \, P_{Ft}^{1-\rho} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)}, \tag{26}$$

which implies that the government split his aggregate consumption C_t between domestic and imported goods according to:

$$C_{Ht} = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} \right)^{-\rho} C_t, \tag{27}$$

$$C_{Ft} = \alpha \left(\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_t} \right)^{-\rho} C_t. \tag{28}$$

Finally, the terms of trade can be defined as the ratio of each good price:

$$T_t = \frac{P_{Ft}}{P_{Ht}}. \tag{29}$$

In each period, the government receives a nominal endowment in terms of domestic production Y_t that it can use to consume directly or to trade.

The benevolent government derives its utility from the consumption of both types of goods according to:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u_t(C_{Ht}, C_{Ft}), \tag{30}$$

where $0 < \beta < 1$ is the discount factor, C_{Ht} is the consumption of domestic goods, C_{Ft} is the consumption of foreign goods, and $u(.)$ is strictly increasing and concave.

Taking prices as given, the government chooses how much consumption, borrowing of domestic bonds, denoted B_{Ht}, and whether to default or not on the existing debt in order to maximize the utility of a continuum of households with similar preferences. Notice, if $B_{Ht} > 0$, the government holds positive assets, whereas if $B_{Ht} < 0$, the country is indebted.

Domestic bonds are denominated in local currency. The nominal price of the domestic bond, q_{Ht} is a function of both the amount of debt chosen by the government and of the terms of trade, which under our simplifications, will be equal to the price of the imported good.

The budget constraint in nominal terms is therefore:

$$P_{Ht} C_{Ht} + P_{Ft} C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(B_{Ht+1}, T_t) B_{Ht+1} \le P_{Ht} y_t + B_{Ht}. \tag{31}$$

In real terms, variables become $b_{Ht} \equiv \frac{B_{Ht}}{P_{Ht}}$. Finally, define the gross inflation rate between periods $t-1$ and t as $\Pi_{Ht} \equiv \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ht-1}}$. The budget constraint can be rewritten as:

$$C_{Ht} + T_t C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t) b_{Ht+1} \Pi_{Ht+1} \le y_t + b_{Ht}. \tag{32}$$

We can characterize households' choices with the following optimality conditions:

$$\frac{u_{cF,t}}{u_{cH,t}} = T_t,$$

$$u_{cH,t} = \frac{1}{q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)} \beta E_t \left(\frac{u_{cH,t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right).$$

Using our previous results, we can rewrite the ratio of each good price with respect to the domestic consumer price index as:

$$\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} = \frac{P_{Ht}}{\left(\left(1 - \alpha \right) P_{Ht}^{(1-\rho)} + \alpha P_{Ft}^{(1-\rho)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(1-\rho)}}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} = P_{Ht} \left(\left(1 - \alpha \right) P_{Ht}^{(1-\rho)} + \alpha P_{Ft}^{(1-\rho)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\rho-1)}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} = \left(P_{Ht}^{(\rho-1)} \left(1 - \alpha \right) P_{Ht}^{(1-\rho)} + P_{Ht}^{(\rho-1)} \alpha P_{Ft}^{(1-\rho)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\rho-1)}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} = \left(\left(1 - \alpha \right) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ht}} \right)^{(1-\rho)} + \alpha \left(\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_{Ht}} \right)^{(1-\rho)} \right)^{\frac{1}{(\rho-1)}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} = \left(1 - \alpha + \alpha T_t^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}.$$

Similarly:

$$\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_t} = \left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho-1}}.$$

This imply that the optimal decision of domestic and imported goods can be rewritten with respect to the terms of trade as:

$$C_{Ht} = (1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T_t^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} C_t. \tag{33}$$

$$C_{Ft} = \alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} C_t. \tag{34}$$

The budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as:

$$(1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T_t^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} C_t + T_t\, \alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} C_t + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)\, b_{Ht+1}\, \Pi_{Ht+1}$$
$$\leq y_t + b_{Ht}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow C_t\left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T_t^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + T_t\, \alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}\right) + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)\, b_{Ht+1}\, \Pi_{Ht+1}$$
$$\leq y_t + b_{Ht}.$$

This finally gives us an expression of C_t:

$$C_t = \frac{y_t + b_{Ht} - q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, T_t)\, b_{Ht+1}\, \Pi_{Ht+1}}{\left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T_t^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + T_t\, \alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}\right)}. \tag{35}$$

We denote the export of domestic production to the rest of the world X_t.

For simplicity, we consider the inflation in the home country to be equal to 1.

The market clearing condition for domestic production is:

$$y_t = C_{Ht} + X_t. \tag{36}$$

The trade balance can therefore be written as:

$$Tb_t = P_{Ht} X_t - P_{Ft} C_{Ft}.$$

In real terms, the trade balance becomes $tb_t \equiv \frac{Tb_t}{P_{Ht}}$. According to our definition of the terms of trade, the trade balance can be rewritten as:

$$tb_t = X_t - T_t C_{Ft}. \tag{37}$$

Using the simplified budget constraint (12) and the market clearing condition (36), we

can characterized the trade balance in our environment:

$$C_{Ht} + T_t C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} = y_t + b_{Ht}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow C_{Ht} + T_t C_{Ft} + q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} = C_{Ht} + X_t + b_{Ht}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow X_t - T_t C_{Ft} = q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} - b_{Ht}.$$

Such that, as before:

$$tb_t = q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1} - b_{Ht}. \tag{38}$$

5.2 Default decisions

Here we assume that the final consumption can be of two types: one when the government does not default and one when the government defaults. We also assume that under the case when the government decides to default, it is excluded from the international credit market and has every period a given probability to regain access to the markets. In addition, in the line of the output loss faced by the government following its default, as modeled by Arellano (2008), we assume that, following its default, the government faces an extra cost in the form of an increase in the price of imports.

Under our terms of trade specification, consumption in each case is characterized by the two following expressions:

- when the government chooses to repay its debt:

$$C_t = \frac{y_t + b_{Ht} - q_{Ht}(b_{Ht+1}, P_{Ft})\, b_{Ht+1}}{\left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T_t^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + T_t\, \alpha \left(\left(1-\alpha\right) T_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \right)}. \tag{39}$$

- when the government chooses to default:

$$C_t = \frac{y_t}{\left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, \tilde{T}_t^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + \tilde{T}_t\, \alpha \left(\left(1-\alpha\right) \tilde{T}_t^{\rho-1} + \alpha \right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \right)}. \tag{40}$$

where $\tilde{T}_t \geq T_t$.

The timing of the model is as follows:

1. At the beginning of each period, the government decides whether or not to default on its debt. Let V_t^d denotes the value function when the government chooses to default and V_t^p the value function when the government chooses to repay its debt.

2. Default is optimal whenever $V_t^d > V_t^p$. Every time this condition holds, the government chooses to default and therefore does not pay back its past debt.

3. During the default period, the government is excluded from the international markets and, thus cannot borrow. We also assume that the government faces as another punishment an increase in the price paid for its imports.

The problem is therefore such that the government chooses the optimal policy b_{Ht+1} to maximize utility. The expected value from the next period onward and the bond prices q_{Ht} will incorporate the fact that the government can choose to default in the future.

The state in this economy is represented by a vector $s(b_{Ht}, T_t)$. Before we proceed, it is important to recall that foreign creditors in this economy have access to the international credit market and are subject to a constant international interest rate denoted as $r_t^* > 0$. We make the assumption that these creditors are risk neutral and behave in a competitive manner. Consequently, in each period, we can observe their expected profits, defined as ρ_t:

$$\rho_t = q_{Ht}\, b_{Ht+1} - \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{1 + r_t}\, b_{Ht+1} = 0,$$

where δ_t is the probability of default. Notice that when $b_{Ht+1} \geq 0$, the probability of default is zero since the government is saving. This no arbitrage condition implies that the equilibrium price of a discounted bond is given by:

$$q_{Ht} = \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{1 + r_t}. \tag{41}$$

The probability of default, δ_t, is endogenous to the model and relies on incentives of the government to repay. The probability of default is a function of both b_{Ht+1} and T_t, which means that q_{Ht} is also a function of those variables. Finally, the gross interest rate is defined as $r_t \equiv 1/q_{Ht} - 1$ and the spread as $s_t \equiv r_t - r_t^*$. With those elements, we can define the recursive competitive equilibrium.

5.3   Recursive competitive equilibrium

Given the state vector $s(b_H, T)$, the government's policy functions b_H', the price functions q_H, and the consumption functions C, we can determine the equilibrium.

Foreign creditors, being risk-neutral and competitive, determine bond prices based on the following condition:

$$q_H(b_H', T) = \frac{1 - \delta(b_H', T)}{1 + r}.$$

Now, let $V^0(b_H, T)$ be the government's value function at the beginning of the period, with assets b_H and facing terms of trade T. The government decides whether to repay or default to maximize utility represented in (30). The value function $V^0(b_H, T)$ is defined by the following equation:

$$V^0(b_H, T) = \max_{\{C, b_H'\}} \{V^p(b_H, T), V^d(T)\}, \tag{42}$$

where $V^p(b_H, T)$ represents the value function when repaying, and $V^d(T)$ represents the value function when defaulting. When the government defaults, it enters a state of autarky but has a constant and exogenous chance to regain access to credit markets every period.

The value function of defaulting is given by:

$$V^d(T) = u\left(\frac{y}{g(\tilde{T})}\right) + \beta \int_{T'} \left[\theta\, V^0(0, T') + (1 - \theta)\, V^d(T')\right] f(T', T)\, dT', \tag{43}$$

where θ represents the probability of re-entering the credit market and

$$g(\tilde{T}) = \left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, \tilde{T}^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + \tilde{T}\,\alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right)\tilde{T}^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \right).$$

On the other hand, when the government has not defaulted, and therefore has repaid its debt, the value function $V^p(b_H, T)$ is given by:

$$V^p(b_H, T) = \max_{b'_H} \left\{ u\left(\frac{y + b_H - q_H(b'_H, T)\, b_H}{g(T)} \right) + \beta \int_{T'} V^0(b'_H, T')\, f(T', T)\, dT' \right\}, \qquad (44)$$

where

$$g(T) = \left((1-\alpha)\left(1 - \alpha + \alpha\, T^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} + T\,\alpha\left(\left(1-\alpha\right)T^{\rho-1} + \alpha\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \right).$$

Therefore, the government chooses b'_H to maximize utility, with the decision being made period by period. Additionally, to prevent Ponzi schemes, we assume that the government faces a lower bound on debt defined as $b'_H \geq -z$, not binding in equilibrium.

The policy functions can be characterized by the following sets:

$$A(b_H) = \{T \in \mathbb{P} : V^p(b_H, T) \geq V^d(T)\},$$

and

$$D(b_H) \equiv \tilde{A}(b_H) = \{T \in \mathbb{P} : V^p(b_H, T) < V^d(T)\}.$$

where the set $A(b_H)$ represents the optimal set for remaining in the contract, while the set $D(b_H)$ represents the optimal set for default. Given this information, and denoting the aggregate states of the economy as $s(b_H, T)$, we can define a recursive equilibrium as follows:

Definition 2. *The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy functions for (i) consumption $C(s)$; (ii) government's asset holdings $b'_H(s)$, repayment sets $A(b_H)$, and default sets $D(b_H)$; and (iii) the price function for bonds $q_H(b'_H, T)$ such that:*
1. Taking as given the government policies, household consumption $C(s)$ satisfies the resource constraint.
2. Taking as given the bond price function $q_H(b'_H, T)$, the government policy function $b'_H(s)$, repayment sets $A(b_H)$, and default sets $D(b_H)$ satisfy the government optimization problem.
3. Bonds prices $q_H(b'_H, T)$ reflect the government's default probabilities and are consistent with the creditor's expected zero profits.

Furthermore, default probabilities $\delta(b'_H, T)$ and default sets $D(b'_H)$ are related by the following equation:

$$\delta(b'_H, T) = \int_{D(b'_H)} f(T', T)\, dT'. \qquad (45)$$

In other words, when $D(b'_H) = \emptyset$, equilibrium default probabilities are zero because the government does not choose to default for any realization of the import prices when it has assets b'_H. Similarly, when $D(b'_H) = \mathbb{P}$, default probabilities are equal to one.

The value of remaining in the contract increases with b_H, while the value of default is

independent of b_H. Assuming bounded support for import price shocks, there exists a level of assets low enough for which $D(b'_H) = \mathbb{P}$. However, since default only occurs when assets are negative, there is a level of b_H for which the default set is empty.

From equation (45), we can observe that the equilibrium bond price increases with b'_H, indicating that a low discount price for a large loan compensates lenders for the possibility of default. Additionally, bond prices are also dependent on import price shocks.

5.4 Calibration

We use the same idea we discussed in Section 4.4, where the stochastic process for the terms of trade follows the equation:

$$\log T_{t+1} = (1 - \xi)\mu + \xi \log T_t + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $E[\varepsilon] = 0$ and $E[\varepsilon^2] = \eta_p^2$. The calibrated values used are: $\xi = 0.94$, $\eta_p = 0.2$, and $\mu = 0.00$. We discretized the shock into a 60-state Markov process, employing the method developed by Tauchen & Hussey (1991). Overall, the parameters of the model are represented in the table below:

Table 2: Model Parameters.

Parameter	Value
Risk-free interest rate	$r = 1\%$
Risk aversion	$\sigma = 2$
Stochastic structure	$\xi = 0.94,\ \mu = 0.00,\ \eta_p = 0.2$
Discount factor	$\beta = 0.96$
Probability of reentry	$\theta = 0.2$
Elasticity of substitution among domestic and foreign goods	$\rho = 0.9$
Import share	$\alpha = 0.5$
Term of trade in default	$\tilde{T} = \max(T_t)$
Endowment	$y = 1000$

By using the parameters as defined in Table 2, we simulate the model and we obtain the following results for the competitive recursive equilibrium. The algorithm to solve the model is discussed in the Appendix B.

5.5 Results for the competitive equilibrium

(a) Bond price schedules.

(b) Equilibrium interest rate.

Figure 15: Bond prices and assets.

Figure 16: Default probability.

(a) Savings Function.

(b) Value Function.

Figure 17: Savings and Value Function.

6 Concluding remarks

The conjunction of the COVID-19 crisis, conflict in Ukraine, and surging global commodity food prices has left a harsh impact on the world's poorest countries. A number of these nations confronting imminent food crises are simultaneously burdened by mounting debt. Subsequent to these debt crises, there has been a rapid escalation in costs associated with food imports, notably affecting countries heavily reliant on imports of essentials such as wheat, rice, and maize. Unlike prior debt crises, the current crisis arises from a surge in commodity prices, with import-dependent economies bearing the brunt.

These dynamics predominantly impact countries with significant debt and limited openness. Our study delves into the link between food crises and debt distress.

Through our model, we explore how food crises interact with debt repayment. The sudden surge in food prices, termed a supply shock, can detrimentally impact a nation's capacity to meet its debt obligations. We underscore the need to distinctly examine shifts in food prices, detached from global economic cycles, to discern their direct influence on debt-related issues. To do this distinction, we use the concept of a harvest shock, which plays a crucial role in understanding food crisis impacts. This shock involves unexpected variations in food commodity supply, and it shapes our understanding of how food prices affect economic conditions. This element allows us to isolate and measure the unique impact of food shocks on economies. Applying this methodology to Ghana, which defaulted in 2022, we find three set of results: (i) when commodity prices suddenly rise, we observe an increase in the cost of imported goods and a rise in overall inflation, (ii) price shocks push up the cost of imports and, as a consequence of currency depreciation, diminish Ghana's export earnings, and (iii) price shock does not seem to impact domestic debt, but it does lead to higher external debt. It also causes interest rate spreads to widen. This last piece of evidence shows that Ghana heavily relies on international markets, and the higher interest rates suggest that the likelihood of the country having trouble repaying its debts is increasing.

To better understand this link we build a small open economy model, where a benevolent government of a country dependent on commodity import decides between consumption of a domestic good, an imported one, and how much debt to issue. Our modeling part shows two main results: (i) import-dependent countries with a low debt can default when faced with high price shocks, (ii) highly-indebted countries can be pushed towards the default zone even for small increases in import prices. This last result is of uttermost importance, since it means that when those countries face a food crisis, they are left with no room for action.

In terms of policy implications, our approach provides insights into addressing debt crises triggered by food-related emergencies. For highly indebted countries grappling with a food crisis, international assistance appears as the primary avenue for relief. The design and implementation of effective assistance strategies remain subjects for future research.

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Appendix

A Motivation facts

Ghana defaulted on its external debt in December 2022, following a series of events, as depreciation of its currency, which lost more than 50% of its value from January to October 2022. This subsequent event led to an increase in the debt burden of around \$6bn[7]. Some general observations we can do about Ghana's economy that make it a good laboratory for the present paper are as follows:

Observation 1: Increase in the commodity prices.   Amidst the economic vulnerabilities inflicted by the COVID-19 crisis, particularly impacting low-income and emerging nations, the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia war in February 2022 introduced new challenges for these countries. The war was associated by an overall and unprecedented rise of commodity prices, as shown in Figure 18b. When we narrow our focus to four specific commodities - rice, maize, wheat and soybeans - we can see that the prices reached in 2022 are among the highest observed since 1960 - Figure 18a.

(a) Prices of four selected commodities.   (b) Global price of Food Index.

Figure 18: Evolution of Prices and Global Food Price Index.

Observation 2: Ghana is a net-importer of commodities.   For countries that are net-importers of those commodities, and given the low elasticity of substitution regarding those goods, such an increase can have massive economic consequences. Over the past few decades, Ghana has consistently been a net importer of at least three out of the four specified commodities. Over the four commodities, Ghana was a net-importer until 2011, and once again in 2018. Since 2015, out of the four commodities, it has experienced a positive trade balance only in some years regarding soybeans. This is the case even though there has been a positive change in its trade balance in recent years, as illustrated in the accompanying Figure 19.

Given its trade situation and the increase in commodity prices, Ghana's import terms of trade increased in 2022, as captured by the commodity import price index of individual commodities shown in Figure 20.

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[7]After the default the Ghana goal is to reduce its external debt repayment of \$20bn by half to secure a loan deal from the IMF to be able to restructure its debt.

(a) For selected commodities.

(b) Overall.

Figure 19: Ghana's trade balance (USD).

(a) Individual commodities weighted by ratio of imports to GDP.

(b) Individual commodities weighted by ratio of imports to total commodity.

Figure 20: Comparison of commodity import price index.

Observation 3: Surge in inflation. In a historic turn of events, Ghana experienced its first instance of debt default in December 2022. Our analysis suggests that the substantial surge in commodity prices, along with its repercussions on Ghana's economy, could provide partial insight into the factors that led the country to a state of sovereign default by year's end. Indeed, an increase in import prices for a net-importer first translates into an increase of inflation, especially to food items when it comes to commodity prices. Certainly, in 2022, Ghana experienced a remarkable and unprecedented rise in its overall inflation rate, as shown in Figure 21. Notably, this trend was most pronounced in the food sector, where prices surged by over 60%. As import price increases, the country theoretically try to decrease its import. However, when it comes to food and commodities, the elasticity of substitution is usually low, as the market is concentrated among a small number of exporters and prices are determined on international markets.


Figure 21: Ghana's year-on-year inflation.

Observation 4: Depreciation of the currency. As import price increases, the trade balance in value of the country deteriorates. It also implies that the country's currency depreciates. This effect appears to be even stronger in a context of gradual increase in Fed's interest rate since February 2022 due the worldwide increase in inflation. This makes the dollar more attractive, especially in periods of high uncertainty, which accentuates the safe-haven property of the dollar. Consequently, Ghana's currency, the Ghanaian cedi, has experienced depreciation against the dollar throughout 2022, as depicted in Figure 22.


Figure 22: Exchange rate against the dollar (end of the month).

Observation 5: Increase in public debt. For Ghana, a depreciation of its currency also implies an increase of the service of its debt, as almost half of the debt is denominated in dollar, as shown in Figure 23.

42

| (a) Ghana's public debt (USD millions). | (b) Ghana's debt (in percent of GDP). |

Figure 23: Ghana's debt.

Observation 6: Increase in spread. As a consequence, there is an increase in the interest rates faced by Ghana on its debt as it raises some concern regarding the government's ability to repay the debt in the future, as shown in Figure 24.


Figure 24: Ghana's spread.

During the year 2022, a self-fulfilling mechanism was feared by international markets regarding Ghana. First, it is due to the fact that a significant proportion of the country's debt is denominated in dollars. In the case of Ghana, this represents more than half of its debt in the early 2022, as shown in Figure 23 (ending in September 2022). Its debt has massively increased in the recent years, going from almost 20% of GDP in 2008 to above 80% of GDP in 2022, as shown in Figure 23. Therefore, a depreciation raises the burden of the government's debt that is held in foreign currencies. As the cedi's value diminishes, the equivalent amount in local currency required to service the debt increases, intensifying the debt burden. However, while the debt burden continues to grow, market starts to loss confidence in the ability of the government to reimburse its debt, which increases the interest rates on government debt's, as depicted on Figure 24. This increases the external debt, leading to another depreciation of the currency. Overall, these two elements reinforce each other and can lead to a sovereign default, precisely what Ghana faced by the end of 2022.

B   Algorithm

1. Set up the calibrated value of the parameters summarized in the table above and define the grids of assets, which in our case consist of 400 grids equally spaced between -100 and 100, representing respectively the minimum and maximum value of b_H;

2. Discretize the Markov process into a 60- state space vector using the idea of Tauchen & Hussey (1991);

3. Give some initial guess for the bond price schedule such as $q_H^0(b_H, P_F) = 1/(1 + r)$;

4. Given $q_H^0(b_H, P_F)$, solve the optimal policies functions for consumption $C(b_H, P_F)$, asset holdings $b_H'(b_H, P_F)$, repayment sets $A(b_H)$, and default sets $D(b_H)$ through value function iteration. Define the consumption in the two states (default and not default), create the initial guess for all value functions involved in the process - default and not default, give some guess for the expected value given current state - expected value when in default, not in default and when the government had defaulted in the previous period and regain the credit markets. Iterate until convergence for a given q_H^0;

5. Using these sets of default and sets of repayment, compute bond price schedule $q_H^1(b_H, P_F)$ such that lenders break even and compare it to the price schedule of the previous iteration $q_H^0(b_H, P_F)$. If a convergence step is met, $\max\{q_H^0(b_H, P_F) - q_H^1(b_H, P_F)\} < \varepsilon$, you are done, otherwise come back to the step 4.

C   Elasticity of substitution

From the optimality condition with respect to the consumption basket, we can rewrite:

$$\frac{C_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}} = \frac{\alpha \left(\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_t}\right)^{-\rho} C_t}{(1 - \alpha)\left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t}\right)^{-\rho} C_t},$$

which can be simplified to:

$$\frac{C_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right)\left(\frac{P_{Ft}}{P_{Ht}}\right)^{-\rho}.$$

This can be rewritten as:

$$C_{Ht} = \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}\right)\left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)^{-\rho} C_{Ft}.$$

First, we can characterize the relationship between the two goods by computing the cross-elasticity of demand of the domestic product with respect to the foreign product, denoted $\mathbf{A}$:

$$\mathbf{A} = \frac{P_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}} \frac{\partial C_{Ht}}{\partial P_{Ft}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \frac{P_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}} C_{Ft} \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \left(-\rho\right) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)^{-\rho-1} \left(\frac{-P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}^2}\right)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \left(\frac{C_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}}\right) \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \left(\rho\right) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)^{-\rho-1} \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \left(\frac{C_{Ft}}{C_{Ht}}\right) \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \left(\rho\right) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)^{-\rho-1+1}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \left(\rho\right) \left(\frac{1}{C_{Ht}}\right) \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\right) \left(\frac{P_{Ht}}{P_{Ft}}\right)^{-\rho} C_{Ft}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \left(\rho\right) \left(\frac{C_{Ht}}{C_{Ht}}\right)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \mathbf{A} = \rho.$$

Given that $\rho > 0$, it means that the two goods are substitutes. This implies that for a 1 percent increase in the price of the imports, there is a ρ percent increase in the demand of domestic production. Theoretically, if $\rho \in (0,1)$, then a change in price of foreign good results in a less than proportionate change in quantity demanded for domestic good, while if $\rho > 1$, a change in price of foreign good results in a more than proportionate change in quantity demanded for domestic good.

D   Oil Supply News Shocks

(a) Impulse Response Commodity Prices.   (b) Impulse Response Inflation Food.

(c) Impulse Response Inflation Non Food. (d) Impulse Response Inflation Headline.

Figure 25: Impact of a Positive Shock in Oil Supply Shock News in International Food Commodity Prices.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of selected prices and inflation following an unforeseen positive oil supply shock as developed by Känzig (2021). In particular, panel (a) displays $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, estimated from the model: $y_{t+h} = \beta_0^h + \beta_1^h \varepsilon_t^p + controls_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}$. Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports, and the control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD, the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate), and the lag of the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports. Panel (b) exhibits the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ from the model specified in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Food, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Panel (c) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Non-Food items. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Lastly, panel (d) presents the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the logarithm of Headline Consumer Price Index (CPI). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The lightly shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the more prominently shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed employing Newey-West Standard Errors.

In this figure, it is evident that positive oil supply news shocks have a diminishing effect on import commodity prices and exert a negative influence on inflation for non-food items. However, when it comes to inflation for food items and headline inflation, we cannot dismiss the hypothesis that oil supply news shocks may not significantly affect these variables.

(a) Exchange rate.

(b) Total Exports in USD.

(c) Total Imports in USD.

(d) Trade Balance in USD.

Figure 26: Impact of a Positive Shock in Oil Supply Shock News.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) on international trade conditions following an unforeseen positive oil supply shock as developed by Känzig (2021). Panel (a) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (b), the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is depicted from the model outlined in equation (2), with y_t indicating the logarithm of Import Prices. Here, the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (c), $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is shown, obtained through estimating the model described by equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Export Prices. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. Finally, panel (d) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the Trade Balance in USD dollars. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of External Debt in USD. The light shaded area corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval, both constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.

Here, it is evident that the oil supply new shocks seems to have no impact in the variables that represents the international situation of the country.

(a) Spread.

(b) External Debt in USD.

(c) Domestic Debt in USD.

(d) Total Debt in USD.

Figure 27: Impact of a Positive Shock in Oil Supply Shock News.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for debt and spread following an unforeseen positive oil supply shock as developed by Känzig (2021). Specifically: Specifically, in panel (a), we illustrate $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, derived from estimating the model as described in equation (2). Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Spread, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Panel (b) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from the model outlined in equation (2), where y_t refers to the logarithm of External Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Moreover, panel (c) depicts the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model as described in equation (2), with y_t refers to the logarithm of Domestic Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Lastly, panel (d) shows the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. The lighter shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.

The only observable effect we can discern here is the initial impact on the spread in the periods immediately following the shock. However, this effect diminishes and becomes negligible after a couple of months. As for other variables, particularly in terms of the external debt situation, we cannot dismiss the null hypothesis that the effect is zero. Even in the context of the spread, the effects appear to be minor.

E   Monetary Policy Shocks

(a) Commodity Price Imports.

(b) Inflation Food.

(c) Inflation Non Food.

(d) Inflation Headline.

Figure 28: Impact of a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock in the United States.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of selected prices and inflation following an unforeseen contractionary monetary policy shock as developed by Choi et al. (2022). In particular, panel (a) displays $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, estimated from the model: $y_{t+h} = \beta_0^h + \beta_1^h \varepsilon_t^p + controls_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}$. Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports, and the control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD, the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate), and the lag of the logarithm of Commodity Price Imports. Panel (b) exhibits the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ from the model specified in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Food, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Panel (c) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Non-Food items. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). Lastly, panel (d) presents the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the logarithm of Headline Consumer Price Index (CPI). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Imports in USD and the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The lightly shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the more prominently shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed employing Newey-West Standard Errors.

(a) Exchange rate.

(b) Total Imports in USD.

(c) Total Exports in USD.

(d) Trade Balance in USD.

Figure 29: Impact of a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock in the United States in International Food Commodity Prices.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) on international trade conditions following a contractionary monetary policy shock as developed by Choi et al. (2022).Panel (a) showcases the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ derived from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of FX Debt Value (the exchange rate). The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (b), the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is depicted from the model outlined in equation (2), with y_t indicating the logarithm of Import Prices. Here, the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. In panel (c), $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ is shown, obtained through estimating the model described by equation (2), with y_t representing the logarithm of Export Prices. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. Finally, panel (d) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t denotes the Trade Balance in USD dollars. The control vector X_t encompasses the logarithm of Inflation Food and the logarithm of External Debt in USD. The light shaded area corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval, both constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.

(a) Spread.

(b) External Debt in USD.

(c) Domestic Debt in USD.

(d) Total Debt in USD.

Figure 30: Impact of a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock in the United States.

Note: This figure illustrates the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for debt and spread following a contractionary monetary policy supply shock as developed by Choi et al. (2022). Specifically: Specifically, in panel (a), we illustrate $\hat{\beta}_1^h$, derived from estimating the model as described in equation (2). Here, y_t represents the logarithm of Spread, and the control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Panel (b) displays the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from the model outlined in equation (2), where y_t refers to the logarithm of External Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Moreover, panel (c) depicts the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ resulting from estimating the model as described in equation (2), with y_t refers to the logarithm of Domestic Debt in USD. In this context, the control vector X_t comprises the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. Lastly, panel (d) shows the estimated $\hat{\beta}_1^h$ obtained from estimating the model in equation (2), where y_t is the logarithm of Total Debt in USD. The control vector X_t includes the logarithm of Total Debt in USD and Inflation Food. The lighter shaded region corresponds to a 68% confidence interval, while the darker shaded area indicates the 90% confidence interval. Both intervals are constructed using Newey-West Standard Errors.