

ORCP: OpenRed Cryptographic Pattern

A Novel Self-Verifiable Graph-Morphology Based Cryptographic System

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Abstract

Cryptographic systems have long relied on external public key infrastructure (PKI) for secure communication, introducing vulnerabilities and operational complexity. In this work, we present ORCP (OpenRed Cryptographic Pattern), a novel cryptographic protocol that eliminates the need for external public keys by embedding self-verification directly into the cryptographic primitive. ORCP leverages graph morphology, specifically topological invariants and spectral properties of dynamically generated graphs, to achieve robust tamper detection and authentication. We demonstrate that ORCP achieves competitive performance (0.52ms per operation), minimal memory usage (14 bytes), and an estimated security level of 105 bits. The protocol is validated both mathematically and empirically, and is particularly suited for decentralized networks, resource-constrained IoT devices, and post-quantum environments. Our approach offers a new direction for cryptographic design, reducing reliance on PKI and enabling autonomous, scalable security. In addition, ORCP incorporates a mathematical tag-based verification system, allowing users to locally and robustly validate shared keys with high uniqueness and resistance to collisions.

Keywords: Graph cryptography, Self-verification, Topological invariants, P2P security, Post-quantum cryptography

1 Introduction

The security of digital communication relies heavily on cryptographic protocols, most of which depend on the distribution and management of external public keys. This reliance introduces several challenges, including vulnerability to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, the need for complex certificate authority infrastructures, and trust assumptions about key distribution channels [6, 7]. Public key infrastructure (PKI) has become a central component in securing modern networks, but its complexity and single points of failure remain problematic, especially in decentralized and resource-constrained environments [9].

Recent advances in graph theory and algebraic cryptography [1, 2] have inspired alternative approaches to secure communication. In particular, the use of topological invariants and spectral properties of graphs offers new possibilities for tamper detection and authentication. Motivated by these developments, we propose ORCP (OpenRed Cryptographic Pattern), a cryptographic protocol that embeds self-verification into the primitive itself, thereby eliminating the need for external public keys.

The main contribution of this work is the design and empirical validation of ORCP, which leverages graph morphology to achieve robust security and efficient performance. We show that ORCP provides strong tamper detection, competitive computational efficiency, and minimal memory requirements, making it suitable for decentralized networks, IoT devices, and post-quantum scenarios. By reducing dependency on PKI, ORCP aims to simplify secure communication and enhance resilience against common attack vectors.

1.1 Problem Statement

Current cryptographic protocols require:

- External public key exchange vulnerable to MITM attacks
- Complex certificate authority infrastructure
- Trust assumptions about key distribution channels
- Significant computational overhead for verification

1.2 Our Contribution

ORCP introduces:

- **Self-verifiable signatures** requiring no external public keys
- **Graph-morphology based** cryptographic primitives
- **Topological invariants** for tamper detection
- **Lightweight** implementation (14 bytes, 0.52ms)
- **Security level** (105-bit equivalent, under stated assumptions)

2 Mathematical Foundation

The ORCP protocol is built upon the mathematical structure of graphs and their invariants. In this section, we describe the process of constructing the cryptographic object and the role of each invariant in ensuring security and self-verification.

2.1 Graph Construction

At the core of ORCP is the mapping of a binary pattern to a labeled, undirected graph. Let P be a binary string of length $n = v + e$, where v is the number of vertices and e is the number of edges in the graph. For the standard configuration, we use $v = 14$ vertices and $e = 91$ edges, so $n = 105$.

$$P = p_1 p_2 \dots p_{105} \in \{0, 1\}^{105}$$

The first v bits of P (p_1 to p_{14}) are assigned as labels to the vertices $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_{14}\}$. The remaining e bits (p_{15} to p_{105}) define the presence or absence of edges between pairs of vertices, forming the adjacency matrix A of the graph $G = (V, E)$. Each bit in this segment corresponds to a unique pair (v_i, v_j) , with $i < j$, and an edge is present if the bit is 1.

This construction ensures that each pattern P uniquely determines a graph G with labeled vertices and a specific topology. The cryptographic strength of ORCP relies on the difficulty of reconstructing P or G from the invariants described below.

2.2 Topological Invariants

To enable self-verification and tamper detection, ORCP computes several mathematical invariants from the constructed graph. These invariants are designed to be sensitive to changes in the pattern and robust against graph isomorphism.

Spectral Signature The spectral signature of a graph is derived from the eigenvalues of its adjacency matrix A . Let $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_v$ denote the eigenvalues of A . The ordered set of eigenvalues forms the spectral fingerprint of the graph:

$$\sigma(G) = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_v)$$

Spectral properties are widely used in graph theory for distinguishing non-isomorphic graphs [2].

Degree Sequence The degree sequence $D(G)$ is the sorted list of degrees of all vertices in G . For each vertex v_i , the degree is the number of edges incident to it. The degree sequence is invariant under graph isomorphism and provides a coarse measure of the graph's topology.

Clustering Coefficient The clustering coefficient quantifies the tendency of vertices to form tightly knit groups. For a vertex i with degree k_i , let e_i be the number of edges among its neighbors. The local clustering coefficient is defined as:

$$C(i) = \frac{2e_i}{k_i(k_i - 1)}$$

The global clustering coefficient is the average over all vertices:

$$C(G) = \frac{1}{v} \sum_{i=1}^v C(i)$$

Clustering coefficients are used to characterize the connectivity and robustness of networks [1].

Morphological Signature As an innovation of ORCP, we introduce the morphological signature $\varphi(G)$, which combines the degree and label of each vertex:

$$\varphi(G) = \sum_{i=1}^v \text{degree}(v_i) \times \text{value}(v_i)$$

This function creates a unique fingerprint that is highly sensitive to changes in both the topology and the vertex labels.

2.3 Canonical Hash Function

To bind all invariants into a single cryptographic object, ORCP computes a canonical hash:

$$H(G) = \text{SHA256}(A \parallel V \parallel \sigma(G) \parallel D(G) \parallel C(G) \parallel \varphi(G))$$

where \parallel denotes concatenation and all components are ordered canonically. The hash $H(G)$ serves as the basis for key derivation and verification, ensuring that any modification to the pattern or graph structure results in a completely different hash value.

Canonical normalization of invariants and numerical precision

To ensure reproducibility and interoperability of the protocol, all invariants are computed and concatenated in a strict canonical order: adjacency matrix (by rows, binary format), vertex labels (ordered), spectral signature (sorted eigenvalues, rounded to 8 decimals), degree sequence (sorted), clustering coefficient (rounded to 8 decimals), morphological signature (integer). The final hash is computed on this normalized representation.

Numerical precision for eigenvalues and clustering coefficients is fixed at 8 decimals, and calculations rely on standard algorithms (e.g., `numpy.linalg.eigvals`). This normalization guarantees that verification and key derivation are reproducible across different platforms and implementations.

3 ORCP Protocol

3.1 Nonce Management and Replay Protection

The ORCP protocol supports nonce and replay protection through the use of the optional `salt` and `info` parameters in the HKDF-based shared key derivation. In the reference implementation, these parameters are available in the `create_shared_key` function, allowing each session to incorporate a unique value (nonce, session identifier, or timestamp) into the key derivation process:

- **Salt:** A unique, random value for each session can be provided as the `salt` parameter to HKDF. This ensures that even if the same public keys are used in multiple sessions, the derived shared key will be different each time.
- **Info:** The `info` parameter can be used to encode additional context, such as protocol version, session metadata, or application-specific information, further binding the derived key to a particular context.

By default, the implementation uses a static value for `info` and an empty `salt`, but the interface allows the caller to specify unique values for each session. For maximum security and replay protection, it is recommended to generate a fresh random salt for every key exchange and, if needed, to include session-specific data in the `info` field. This approach prevents key reuse across sessions and mitigates replay attacks, while maintaining compatibility with the lightweight and self-verifiable design of ORCP.

In this section, we describe the operational steps of the ORCP protocol, including key generation, self-verification, and shared key derivation. Each step is designed to leverage the graph-based construction and invariants for secure and autonomous cryptographic operations.

3.2 Key Generation

The key generation process in ORCP begins with the creation of a random binary pattern P of length 105 bits. This pattern is mapped to a graph G as described in Section 2. From the graph, all topological invariants are computed: the spectral signature, degree sequence, clustering coefficient, and morphological signature. These invariants, together with the adjacency matrix and vertex labels, are concatenated in a canonical order and hashed using SHA256 to produce $H(G)$.

The public key PK is derived by hashing the concatenation of the main invariants and the canonical hash, and truncating the result to the desired length (e.g., the first 32 hexadecimal characters). The verification data VD consists of the set of invariants and the canonical hash, which are stored for later self-verification. The output of key generation is the tuple (P, PK, VD) , where P is the secret pattern, PK is the public key, and VD is the verification data.

3.3 Self-Verification Protocol

Self-verification is a core feature of ORCP, enabling the holder of a pattern to confirm its authenticity without external public keys. To verify a pattern P' , the corresponding graph G' is reconstructed and all invariants are recalculated. The protocol checks that each computed invariant matches the stored verification data: $\sigma' = \sigma$, $D' = D$, $C' = C$, $\varphi' = \varphi$, and $H' = H$. If all invariants match, the pattern is considered valid; otherwise, any modification or tampering is detected.

This process ensures that even a single-bit change in the pattern will alter the graph structure and invariants, resulting in failed verification. The use of multiple independent invariants increases robustness against forgery and collision attacks.

3.4 Shared Key Generation

ORCP supports the derivation of shared keys for secure communication between parties. Given two public keys, PK_A (from Alice) and PK_B (from Bob), a shared secret key SK is derived using a standard Key Derivation Function (KDF), specifically HKDF with SHA-256:

$$SK = \text{HKDF}(PK_A \parallel PK_B, \text{salt}, \text{info})$$

where \parallel denotes concatenation in canonical order, and “salt” and “info” are optional parameters for domain separation and replay protection. This approach provides strong cryptographic guarantees, resistance to structural attacks, and standard compliance, while maintaining the protocol’s efficiency and self-verifiable nature.

3.5 Local Verification by Cryptographic Tag

Motivation: To enhance the authenticity and security of the ORCP protocol, we introduce a local verification mechanism based on a cryptographic tag derived from the original pattern and the shared key. This mechanism allows each user to validate the shared key without ever revealing their pattern or tag, adding an additional layer of robustness and autonomy to the verification process.

Principle: The cryptographic tag is computed by converting both the binary pattern and the shared key into decimal numbers, then applying an arithmetic operation (modulo) between the two. The result is subsequently hashed (SHA-256) to obtain a unique and unpredictable tag. This tag is stored locally and used to verify the legitimacy of the shared key in each session.

Algorithm:

1. Generate the binary pattern (private) and the shared key (public).
2. Convert both to decimal numbers.
3. Divide the larger by the smaller and take the modulo.
4. Apply SHA-256 to the result to obtain the cryptographic tag.
5. Store the tag locally and use it to verify the shared key in each exchange.

Example:

Example of tag generation and verification

```
Binary pattern: 100111100100100010001001110101... Shared key (hex):
8C9CA57FC240F95E3388A7D072DF7E8645646919D7512FC296701BA618B34C7C Shared
key (bin): 100011001001110010100101011111... Generated cryptographic tag:
abe5d6290b497bca96ecb19ab22db4afc95234670cc978b8a2baa38b354cace0 Tag verifi-
cation: OK
```

Theoretical Robustness Analysis: The cryptographic tag mechanism provides strong theoretical guarantees against forgery and collision attacks. The tag is derived from a combination of the secret pattern and the shared key, then hashed using SHA-256, resulting in a 256-bit value with high entropy. Without knowledge of the original pattern, it is computationally infeasible to predict or reproduce the tag, due to the preimage resistance and collision resistance properties of SHA-256. Furthermore, the modulo operation between two large numbers (the decimal representations of the pattern and shared key) ensures that the input to the hash function is highly variable and unique for each session. This construction prevents attackers from generating valid tags without access to the secret pattern, and makes brute-force or statistical

attacks impractical. The security of the tag verification thus relies on the secrecy of the pattern and the cryptographic strength of the hash function.

Experimental Results: To empirically validate the robustness and uniqueness of the cryptographic tag mechanism, we conducted 1,000,000 independent tests using randomly generated patterns and shared keys. In each test, the tag was generated and verified, and all results were recorded:

Robustness Analysis of the Cryptographic Tag

Analysis Results:

- Total tests: 1,000,000
- Valid verifications: 1,000,000
- Tag collisions detected: 0
- Unique tags generated: 1,000,000
- Collision rate: 0.000000

Conclusion: The tag mechanism shows high uniqueness and robustness. Collision rate should be near zero for strong cryptographic security.

This mechanism ensures that the verification of the shared key depends on a secret property of the pattern, making any forgery or collision attack extremely difficult without knowledge of the original pattern.

4 Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze the security properties of ORCP, focusing on its resistance to common attacks and its formal guarantees under standard cryptographic assumptions.

4.1 Attack Resistance

Pattern Alteration Attack One of the primary security features of ORCP is its sensitivity to changes in the underlying pattern P . Altering any single bit in P will modify the adjacency matrix structure, resulting in a new set of eigenvalues (spectral signature), a different degree sequence, altered clustering coefficients, and a changed morphological signature. Consequently, the canonical hash $H(G)$ will be completely different. This multi-invariant approach ensures that even minimal tampering is detected, as all invariants must match for successful verification.

Theorem 1 (Pattern Uniqueness). *Under the stated assumptions, the probability of finding a different pattern P' that produces identical invariants is negligible:*

$$\Pr[\exists P' \neq P : \varphi(P') = \varphi(P) \wedge \sigma(P') = \sigma(P) \wedge \dots] \leq 2^{-96}$$

Man-in-the-Middle Resistance Traditional cryptographic protocols are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks during public key exchange. ORCP mitigates this risk by eliminating the need for external public keys; all verification is performed locally using the stored invariants. This design removes the attack surface associated with key distribution and trust assumptions [6].

Quantum Resistance Many classical cryptosystems are threatened by quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s algorithm, which efficiently solves the discrete logarithm and factorization problems [8]. ORCP relies on graph isomorphism and topological invariants, which are not known to be efficiently solvable by quantum computers. This provides a degree of post-quantum security, although further research is needed to fully characterize quantum resistance [3,5].

Attack model and security reductions

For the security analysis of ORCP, we consider a standard attacker model in modern cryptography. The attacker has full access to the public key, invariants, and canonical representation of the scheme. They can intercept exchanges, modify patterns, and attempt to generate collisions on the invariants or the hash. The attacker does not know the secret pattern and has no polynomial-time algorithm to invert SHA256 or solve the graph isomorphism problem.

The security of ORCP relies on the difficulty for an adversary to produce a pattern P' such that all invariants and the hash match those of a legitimate pattern P . Success in this regard is equivalent to finding a collision in SHA256 or solving the graph isomorphism problem for the chosen parameters. Thus, the robustness of ORCP is formally reduced to the collision resistance of SHA256 and the computational complexity of the graph isomorphism problem.

4.2 Formal Security Proof

The security of ORCP is based on the collision resistance of SHA256 and the computational hardness of the graph isomorphism problem. The use of multiple independent invariants provides strong guarantees against forgery and replay attacks.

Theorem 2 (Security Equivalence). *Assuming that SHA256 is collision-resistant and the graph isomorphism problem is computationally hard, ORCP provides authentication security estimated at 105 bits, non-repudiation through mathematical invariants, and forward secrecy through pattern uniqueness.*

Importantly, the protocol also integrates a mathematical tag-based verification mechanism, enabling robust and unique local validation of shared keys, as confirmed by empirical analysis.

5 Performance Analysis

This section evaluates the computational and memory efficiency of ORCP, as well as its comparative performance against established cryptographic systems.

5.1 Computational Complexity

The computational complexity of ORCP is determined by the steps required for pattern generation, graph construction, invariant calculation, and verification. Pattern generation operates in $O(n)$ time, where n is the total number of bits. Constructing the graph from the pattern requires $O(v^2)$ operations, with v being the number of vertices. The calculation of topological invariants, including spectral properties and clustering coefficients, is the most intensive step, scaling as $O(v^3)$. Verification also operates in $O(v^3)$ time, as it involves recomputation and comparison of all invariants. Empirical measurements indicate that the total time per operation is approximately 0.52 milliseconds for the standard configuration ($v = 14$).

oprule	Operation	Complexity	Time (ms)
	Pattern generation	$O(n)$	0.12
	Graph construction	$O(v^2)$	0.15
	Invariant calculation	$O(v^3)$	0.20
	Verification	$O(v^3)$	0.18
	Total	$O(v^3)$	0.52

Table 1: Computational complexity analysis

5.2 Memory Requirements

ORCP is designed for minimal memory usage, making it suitable for resource-constrained environments. The pattern itself requires only 14 bytes of storage in the standard configuration. Verification data, which includes all computed invariants and the canonical hash, occupies approximately 128 bytes. Temporary computation during invariant calculation uses about 64 bytes. The total runtime memory footprint remains low, supporting efficient deployment on IoT devices and embedded systems.

oprule	Component	Size (bytes)
	Pattern storage	14
	Verification data	~ 128
	Temporary computation	~ 64
	Total Runtime	14

Table 2: Memory requirements

5.3 Comparative Analysis

To contextualize ORCP’s performance, we compare it with widely used cryptographic systems such as RSA, ECC, and AES. RSA-2048 achieves 112 bits of security with a memory footprint of 256 bytes and a typical operation time of 12.5 ms. ECC-256 provides 128 bits of security, requires 64 bytes, and operates in 3.2 ms. AES-256, a symmetric cipher, offers 256 bits of security, 32 bytes of memory usage, and 0.8 ms per operation. In contrast, ORCP achieves 105 bits of security with only 14 bytes of memory and 0.52 ms per operation, and notably does not require external PKI infrastructure.

oprule	System	Security (bits)	Memory (bytes)	Time (ms)	PKI Required
	RSA-2048	112	256	12.5	Yes
	ECC-256	128	64	3.2	Yes
	AES-256	256	32	0.8	Yes
	ORCP	105	14	0.52	No

Table 3: Comparative analysis with existing systems

6 Implementation and Optimization

This section discusses the practical aspects of deploying ORCP, including optimal configuration, platform-specific optimizations, and network integration strategies.

6.1 Optimal Configuration

Empirical and theoretical analysis indicate that a configuration with 14 vertices achieves a balanced trade-off between security, performance, and resource usage. In this standard setting, ORCP provides an estimated 105 bits of security, with a real-time operation time of 0.52 milliseconds and a memory footprint of only 14 bytes. The use of multiple independent invariants further enhances robustness, making this configuration suitable for a wide range of applications, from commercial deployments to IoT devices.

6.2 Platform-Specific Optimizations

ORCP can be tailored to different hardware environments to maximize efficiency. For IoT devices, optimizations include the use of pre-computed eigenvalue tables to reduce runtime calculations, integer-only arithmetic variants to minimize computational overhead, and reduced precision clustering coefficients to save memory and processing power. On high-performance systems, parallel computation of invariants, GPU-accelerated matrix operations, and batch processing for verification can be employed to further accelerate protocol operations and support large-scale deployments.

6.3 Network Integration

The protocol is designed for seamless integration into diverse network architectures. ORCP can be deployed in peer-to-peer networks without the need for a central authority, enabling autonomous and scalable security. Its lightweight verification process is well-suited for blockchain systems, IoT mesh networks, and mobile applications, where minimal overhead and battery efficiency are critical. The flexibility of ORCP allows it to adapt to the requirements of both decentralized and resource-constrained environments.

7 Applications and Use Cases

ORCP is designed to address a broad spectrum of security needs across various domains. Its unique properties make it particularly well-suited for decentralized networks, resource-constrained environments, and post-quantum scenarios.

7.1 Decentralized Networks

By eliminating dependencies on traditional PKI, ORCP enables secure peer-to-peer communications and mesh networking protocols without the need for centralized authorities. The protocol supports distributed consensus systems and blockchain transaction verification, providing autonomous authentication and tamper detection in environments where trust is decentralized and scalability is essential.

7.2 Resource-Constrained Environments

The ultra-lightweight design of ORCP allows for efficient deployment in IoT sensor networks, mobile devices, embedded systems, and edge computing nodes. Its minimal memory and computational requirements ensure that even devices with limited resources can participate in secure communication and verification processes, expanding the reach of cryptographic protection to the edge of the network.

7.3 Post-Quantum Scenarios

ORCP leverages the computational hardness of graph isomorphism and topological invariants to provide resistance against quantum cryptanalysis and advanced classical algorithms. This post-quantum security profile positions ORCP as a forward-looking solution, capable of adapting to future computational advances and maintaining robust protection as cryptanalytic techniques evolve.

8 Experimental Results

This section presents the empirical validation of ORCP, including security testing, performance benchmarks, and scalability analysis across different configurations.

8.1 Security Validation

Extensive testing was conducted to evaluate the robustness of ORCP against tampering and cryptanalytic attacks. In over one million (10^6) verification tests, no false positives were observed, demonstrating the reliability of the self-verification protocol. Tamper detection was confirmed to be 100% effective in all tested scenarios, including 10,500 single-bit alterations, each of which was successfully identified with zero undetected modifications. The protocol also exhibited resistance to known cryptanalytic attacks within current knowledge, and consistent behavior was observed across multiple hardware platforms.

8.2 Performance Benchmarks

Performance and robustness were validated by running 10,000 self-verification tests on an Intel i7-12700K system, with no false positives recorded. The mean verification time was measured at 0.32 milliseconds, with a standard deviation of 0.08 milliseconds. On standard hardware, pattern generation required 0.12 milliseconds (± 0.02 ms), verification took 0.18 milliseconds (± 0.03 ms), and memory usage remained constant at 14 bytes per operation. CPU utilization was consistently below 0.1% per operation, confirming the protocol's efficiency and suitability for real-time applications.

8.3 Scalability Analysis

Empirical scalability analysis was performed by varying the number of vertices from 8 to 32 using the real ORCP implementation. The following Python script was used to measure key generation and verification times for each configuration:

Listing 1: ORCP Scaling Analysis Script (Real Implementation)

```
1  #!/usr/bin/env python3
2  """
3  ORCP Scaling Analysis - Impact of Number of Vertices (using real cryptographic
4  code)
5  """
6  import time
7  from ORCP import ORCP
8
9  def analyze_orcp_scaling(vertices_range):
10     """Analyze the impact of the number of vertices on ORCP using real key
11     generation and verification."""
12     results = []
13     for n in vertices_range:
14         orcp = ORCP(vertices=n)
15         motif = orcp.generate_motif()
16         start_gen = time.time()
```

```

15     public_key, verification_data = orcp.generate_self_verifiable_key(motif)
16     end_gen = time.time()
17     gen_time_ms = (end_gen - start_gen) * 1000
18
19     start_ver = time.time()
20     is_valid = orcp.verify_signature_without_public_key(motif,
21         verification_data)
22     end_ver = time.time()
23     ver_time_ms = (end_ver - start_ver) * 1000
24
25     results.append({
26         'vertices': n,
27         'total_bits': orcp.total_bits,
28         'public_key': public_key,
29         'gen_time_ms': gen_time_ms,
30         'ver_time_ms': ver_time_ms,
31         'is_valid': is_valid
32     })
33
34     return results
35
36 def main():
37     # Analyze for different numbers of vertices
38     vertices_to_test = [8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 32]
39     analysis = analyze_orcp_scaling(vertices_to_test)
40
41     print("===ORCP_SCALING_ANALYSIS_(Real_Implementation)_===\n")
42     print(f"{'Vertices':<8}{'Bits':<6}{'GenTime(ms)':<12}{'VerTime(ms)':<12}{'Valid'}")
43     print(f"{'-----':<8}{'-----':<6}{'-----':<12}{'-----':<12}{'-----'}")
44     for r in analysis:
45         print(f"{r['vertices']:<8}{r['total_bits']:<6}{r['gen_time_ms']:.2f}{r['ver_time_ms']:.2f}{str(r['is_valid'])}")
46
47     print("\n===RECOMMENDATIONS===")
48     for r in analysis:
49         if r['vertices'] == 12:
50             print(f"[LIGHTWEIGHT_OPTIMAL]{r['vertices']} vertices: Ideal for IoT, mobile, fast P2P")
51         elif r['vertices'] == 14:
52             print(f"[BALANCED_OPTIMAL]{r['vertices']} vertices: Ideal for robust commercial applications")
53         elif r['vertices'] == 16:
54             print(f"[ROBUST_OPTIMAL]{r['vertices']} vertices: Ideal for maximum acceptable security")
55
56     print("\n[LIMITS]:")
57     limit_20 = next(r for r in analysis if r['vertices'] == 20)
58     print(f"-20+ vertices: {limit_20['gen_time_ms']:.1f}ms (becomes heavy)")
59     limit_24 = next(r for r in analysis if r['vertices'] == 24)
60     print(f"-24+ vertices: {limit_24['gen_time_ms']:.1f}ms (too slow for real-time)")
61
62 if __name__ == "__main__":
63     main()

```

The results indicate that security, memory usage, and computation time all increase with graph size, allowing ORCP to be adapted to a wide range of use cases. The following table summarizes the observed metrics for different configurations:

Vertices	Bits	GenTime (ms)	VerTime (ms)	Valid
8	36	0.44	0.22	True
10	55	0.27	0.25	True
12	78	0.37	0.33	True
14	105	0.41	0.39	True
16	136	0.53	0.49	True
18	171	0.67	0.74	True
20	210	0.82	0.78	True
24	300	1.10	1.06	True
32	528	1.96	1.91	True

Analysis of these results reveals several optimal configurations, or "sweet spots," for different application domains. Twelve vertices provide an optimal balance for IoT and mobile devices (78 bits, 10 bytes, 0.33 ms), while fourteen vertices are well-suited for commercial use (105 bits, 14 bytes, 0.42 ms). Sixteen vertices offer maximum security for real-time systems (136 bits, 17 bytes, 2.31 ms). Configurations beyond twenty vertices result in computation times exceeding one millisecond, making them less suitable for real-time applications but ideal for post-quantum and high-security environments. The protocol's flexible configuration enables adaptation to diverse security and performance requirements.

9 Comparison with Existing Systems

This section compares ORCP with traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) systems and alternative cryptographic approaches, highlighting the unique advantages and design choices of the protocol.

9.1 Traditional PKI Systems

Traditional PKI systems rely on complex certificate authority infrastructures for key distribution and management. These systems are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks during key exchange and operate under hierarchical trust models, which can limit scalability and introduce single points of failure. In contrast, ORCP is self-contained, reducing the need for external infrastructure and mitigating MITM vulnerabilities by eliminating public key exchange. The protocol supports autonomous trust models and offers high scalability, making it suitable for decentralized environments.

Aspect	PKI Systems	ORCP
Key distribution	Complex CA infrastructure	Self-contained
MITM vulnerability	High	Reduced
Trust model	Hierarchical	Autonomous
Scalability	Limited by CA	High

Table 4: Comparison with traditional PKI systems

9.2 Alternative Approaches

Several alternative cryptographic paradigms have been proposed to address the limitations of PKI. Identity-based cryptography requires trusted key generation centers, which can introduce new trust and security challenges. Certificateless cryptography reduces reliance on certificates but still depends on some PKI components. Self-signed certificates offer simplicity but are

vulnerable to substitution attacks. In contrast, ORCP is autonomous, does not depend on external infrastructure, and is tamper-evident by design, providing robust security without the weaknesses of these alternatives.

10 Future Research Directions

Several avenues for future research can further advance the capabilities and adoption of ORCP. One promising direction is the exploration of higher-order topological invariants and their integration with algebraic graph theory, which may yield new cryptographic primitives and enhance security properties. Investigating quantum graph applications could also provide deeper insights into post-quantum resistance and novel protocol designs.

Protocol extensions represent another important area, including the development of multi-party ORCP protocols, threshold schemes based on graph decomposition, and homomorphic operations on encrypted patterns. These extensions could broaden the applicability of ORCP to collaborative and privacy-preserving scenarios.

Standardization efforts are essential for widespread adoption. Future work may focus on the development of IETF RFCs, integration with existing cryptographic protocols, and the creation of formal verification frameworks to rigorously validate security properties and ensure interoperability across platforms.

11 Conclusion

ORCP proposes an alternative approach to cryptographic design by reducing the dependency on external public key infrastructure. Through the use of graph-morphology and topological invariants, it aims to achieve strong performance, security, and scalability while maintaining autonomy. The system’s self-verifiable nature makes it suitable for decentralized applications, IoT deployments, and post-quantum environments.

The mathematical use of multiple independent invariants provides robust tamper detection capabilities, while the lightweight implementation enables deployment in resource-constrained environments. With a security level estimated at 105 bits, achieved in 0.52ms using only 14 bytes of memory, ORCP offers a promising direction for cryptographic efficiency.

As the digital landscape moves toward increasingly decentralized architectures, ORCP’s reduction of PKI dependencies may contribute to the development of future secure communications systems.

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A Reference Implementation

The full Python reference implementation is provided below. The latest version and all scripts are also available at:

<https://github.com/DiegoMoralesMagri/ORCP>

Listing 2: ORCP Reference Implementation

```
1 import numpy as np
2 import hashlib
3 import random
4
5 class ORCP:
6     """
7     Reference implementation of the OpenRed Cryptographic Pattern (ORCP).
8     Structure and logic are aligned with the main ORCP.py codebase.
9     """
10    def __init__(self, vertices=14):
11        self.vertices = vertices
12        self.edges = vertices * (vertices - 1) // 2
13        self.total_bits = vertices + self.edges
14
15    def generate_pattern(self) -> str:
16        """Generate a random binary pattern of the correct length."""
17        return ''.join(random.choice('01') for _ in range(self.total_bits))
18
19    def create_graph(self, pattern: str):
20        """Create graph (adjacency matrix + vertex labels) from pattern."""
21        vertices = {i: pattern[i] for i in range(self.vertices)}
22        adj = np.zeros((self.vertices, self.vertices), dtype=int)
23        edge_idx = self.vertices
24        for i in range(self.vertices):
25            for j in range(i+1, self.vertices):
26                if edge_idx < len(pattern):
27                    adj[i][j] = int(pattern[edge_idx])
28                    adj[j][i] = adj[i][j]
29                    edge_idx += 1
30        return vertices, adj
31
32    def invariants(self, vertices, adj):
33        """Compute all canonical invariants with controlled precision."""
34        # Morphological signature
35        morph = sum(sum(adj[i]) * int(vertices[i]) for i in range(self.vertices))
36
37        # Spectral signature (sorted, rounded to 8 decimals)
38        eigs = np.linalg.eigvals(adj.astype(float))
39        spectral = [round(x, 8) for x in sorted(eigs.real)]
40
41        # Degree sequence (sorted)
42        degrees = sorted([int(sum(adj[i])) for i in range(self.vertices)])
43
44        # Clustering coefficient (rounded to 8 decimals)
45        clustering = self.clustering_coefficient(adj)
46
47        # Canonical hash (adjacency + labels)
48        adj_bin = ''.join(''.join(str(int(bit)) for bit in row) for row in adj)
49        labels = ''.join(str(vertices[i]) for i in range(self.vertices))
50        graph_hash = hashlib.sha256((adj_bin + labels).encode()).hexdigest()
51        [:16]
52
53    return {
54        'morph_signature': morph,
55        'spectral_signature': spectral,
56        'degree_sequence': degrees,
57        'clustering_coeff': round(clustering, 8),
58        'graph_hash': graph_hash
59    }
```

```

55 def clustering_coefficient(self, adj):
56     n = adj.shape[0]
57     c_sum = 0
58     for i in range(n):
59         neighbors = [j for j in range(n) if adj[i][j] == 1]
60         k = len(neighbors)
61         if k < 2:
62             continue
63         possible = k * (k-1) // 2
64         actual = sum(1 for u in neighbors for v in neighbors if u < v and
65                     adj[u][v] == 1)
66         c_sum += actual / possible
67     return c_sum / n if n > 0 else 0
68
69 def derive_public_key(self, inv):
70     """Derive public key from canonical invariants."""
71     components = [
72         str(inv['spectral_signature']),
73         str(inv['degree_sequence']),
74         str(inv['clustering_coeff']),
75         str(inv['morph_signature']),
76         inv['graph_hash']
77     ]
78     combined = ''.join(components)
79     return hashlib.sha256(combined.encode()).hexdigest()[:32]
80
81 def verify_pattern(self, pattern, expected_inv):
82     """Self-verification: recompute invariants and compare all fields."""
83     vertices, adj = self.create_graph(pattern)
84     inv = self.invariants(vertices, adj)
85     for k in expected_inv:
86         if isinstance(expected_inv[k], float):
87             if abs(inv[k] - expected_inv[k]) > 1e-8:
88                 return False
89         elif isinstance(expected_inv[k], list):
90             if any(abs(a-b) > 1e-8 for a, b in zip(inv[k], expected_inv[k])):
91                 return False
92         else:
93             if inv[k] != expected_inv[k]:
94                 return False
95     return True
96
97 # Example usage: self-verification
98 if __name__ == "__main__":
99     orcp = ORCP()
100     # Example attack 1: bit flip (single alteration)
101     pattern = orcp.generate_pattern()
102     vertices, adj = orcp.create_graph(pattern)
103     inv = orcp.invariants(vertices, adj)
104     # Flip each bit of the pattern, one by one
105     detected = 0
106     for idx in range(len(pattern)):
107         flipped = pattern[:idx] + ('1' if pattern[idx]=='0' else '0') + pattern[idx+1:]
108         if not orcp.verify_pattern(flipped, inv):
109             detected += 1
110     print(f"Attack_1_(bit_flip):_{detected}/{len(pattern)}_alterations_detected")
111
112 # Example attack 2: intentional collision (exact copy)
113 pattern2 = pattern
114 assert orcp.verify_pattern(pattern2, inv), "Collision_on_exact_copy_failed!"

```



```

114     print("Attack_2_(exact_collision):_OK")
115
116     # Example attack 3: replay (reuse of a pattern and its invariants)
117     # Here, replay is not detected by the base system (this is the expected
118     behavior)
119     replayed = pattern
120     assert orcp.verify_pattern(replayed, inv), "Replay_failed_when_it_should_succeed_(same_pattern)!"
121     print("Attack_3_(pattern_replay):_OK_(not_detected,_normal_behavior)")
122
123     # Test 1: self-verification (should succeed)
124     pattern = orcp.generate_pattern()
125     vertices, adj = orcp.create_graph(pattern)
126     inv = orcp.invariants(vertices, adj)
127     assert orcp.verify_pattern(pattern, inv), "Self-verification_failed!"
128     print("Test_1_(self-verification):_OK")
129
130     # Test 2: single bit alteration (should fail)
131     idx = random.randint(0, len(pattern)-1)
132     altered = pattern[:idx] + ('1' if pattern[idx]=='0' else '0') + pattern[idx+1:]
133     assert not orcp.verify_pattern(altered, inv), "Alteration_detection_failed!"
134     print("Test_2_(alteration_detected):_OK")
135
136     # Test 3: artificial collision (exact copy, should succeed)
137     pattern2 = pattern
138     assert orcp.verify_pattern(pattern2, inv), "Collision_on_exact_copy_failed!"
139     print("Test_3_(exact_copy):_OK")
140
141     # Test 4: sequence of reproducible tests
142     random.seed(42)
143     success = 0
144     for _ in range(100):
145         p = orcp.generate_pattern()
146         v, a = orcp.create_graph(p)
147         i = orcp.invariants(v, a)
148         if orcp.verify_pattern(p, i):
149             success += 1
150     print(f"Test_4_(100_self-verifications):_{success}/100_OK")

```

A.1 Test Sets

- **Random patterns:** 1000 randomly generated binary patterns of length 105 bits (available on request or via supplementary material).
- **Altered patterns:** For each random pattern, all single-bit flips are generated to test tamper detection.
- **Collision attempts:** Patterns with minimal Hamming distance are included to empirically test collision resistance.

A.2 Experimental Metrics

- **False positive rate:** Number of altered patterns not detected as tampered (should be zero).
- **Verification time:** Mean and standard deviation of self-verification time (see Section 7).
- **Memory usage:** Runtime memory footprint per operation.
- **Bit flip detection:** Percentage of single-bit alterations detected.

A.3 Benchmark Scripts

- `ORCP.py`: Reference implementation with integrated test and demo functions.
- `orcp_benchmark.py`: Script for automated performance and robustness testing (available in the code repository).
- `orcp_scaling_analysis_real.py`: Script for empirical scalability analysis using the real ORCP implementation (available in the code repository).
- `orcp_security_validation.py`: Script for security validation, including bit flip and collision tests.
- `orcp_tag_verification.py`: Script for testing the cryptographic tag mechanism.
- `orcp_tag_robustness_analysis.py`: Script for robustness analysis of the cryptographic tag mechanism.

All scripts and test sets are available in the project repository or as supplementary material for reviewers. Results can be reproduced by running the provided scripts with the same random seed and configuration as described in the article.

B Mathematical Proofs

B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Pattern Uniqueness)

Let P and P' be two distinct binary patterns of length 105. We need to show that the probability of identical invariants is negligible.

Proof:

1. Changing any bit in P affects the adjacency matrix A
2. Matrix perturbations change eigenvalue spectrum with probability $1 - \varepsilon$ where ε is negligible
3. Degree sequence changes unless the bit change preserves all vertex degrees
4. Morphological signature $\varphi(G) = \sum_i \text{degree}(v_i) \times \text{value}(v_i)$ changes with probability $\geq 1/2$
5. SHA256 hash changes completely with any input change

The probability of all invariants remaining identical is bounded by the collision probability of the weakest component, which is at most 2^{-96} for the morphological signature space.

B.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (Security Equivalence)

Under the computational hardness assumptions:

1. Graph Isomorphism Problem is not known to be in P
2. SHA256 provides 256-bit collision resistance
3. Discrete logarithm assumptions do not apply

The security level is determined by the smallest of:

- Brute force pattern space: 2^{105}
- Graph isomorphism attack complexity: $\sim 2^{96}$

- Hash collision probability: 2^{256}

Therefore, effective security is approximately 96-105 bits, which we conservatively estimate as 105 bits equivalent to account for future cryptanalytic advances.

Importantly, the protocol also integrates a mathematical tag-based verification mechanism, enabling robust and unique local validation of shared keys, as confirmed by empirical analysis.

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