

## Topic 4.3: Stablecoins

### The Bridge Between Crypto and Fiat

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### What You Will Learn in This Topic

By the end of this session, you will be able to:

1. **Classify** stablecoins by design type (fiat-backed, crypto-collateralized, algorithmic)
2. **Explain** the mechanisms that maintain price stability for each type
3. **Assess** de-peg risk factors and analyze historical de-peg events
4. **Understand** the Stablecoin Trilemma and its design implications
5. **Articulate** why stablecoins face heavy regulatory scrutiny

#### Hands-On Component

NB10: Analyze stablecoin price stability data—examine de-peg events and compare resilience across designs.


## The Volatility Problem:

- Bitcoin: 60%+ annual volatility (Example: If you bought \$100 of Bitcoin, it might be worth \$40-\$160 by year end)
- Unsuitable for everyday payments
- Merchant pricing becomes impossible
- DeFi needs stable base assets

## Prior Knowledge Required:

- Basic understanding of cryptocurrency
- DeFi primitives (T4.2)
- Smart contracts (T4.1)

*Quick check: If “DeFi primitives” is unfamiliar, briefly review T4.2 first.*



### Key Insight

Stablecoins bridge Traditional Finance (TradFi) and crypto by providing price predictability in a volatile ecosystem.

## On-Chain “Cash” for the Crypto Economy

### Without Stablecoins:

- Trading requires moving to fiat
- DeFi cannot price loans reliably
- Cross-border payments face friction
- No on-chain savings in stable value

### Market Size (2024):

- Total supply: \$170B+
- Daily volume: \$50B+
- Surpasses Visa in some metrics

### Use Cases:

- **Trading pairs** on exchanges
- **DeFi collateral** and lending
- **Remittances** (24/7, low fees)
- **Savings** in dollarized economies
- **Payroll** and B2B payments

### Why \$1 Peg?

USD is the global reserve currency. A dollar-pegged stablecoin inherits this network effect (“network effect” means more people use dollars, so dollar-based coins are more useful).

# What Are Stablecoins?

## Definition

**Stablecoins** are cryptocurrencies designed to maintain a stable value relative to a reference asset (typically USD).

## Core Challenge:


- How do you maintain \$1 value without a central bank?
- Three fundamentally different approaches exist
- Each involves different trust assumptions
- No perfect solution—only trade-offs



## The Central Question

How do you create “digital dollars” that maintain purchasing power without the Federal Reserve?

# Stablecoin Design Taxonomy




**Key Insight:** Each design trades off between decentralization, capital efficiency, and stability.

## Mechanism:

1. User sends \$1 to issuer
2. Issuer holds \$1 in reserves
3. Issuer mints 1 stablecoin
4. User can redeem anytime

## Examples:

- **USDT** (Tether): \$110B, largest — “Tether USD” token
- **USDC** (Circle): \$35B, regulated — “USD Coin” token
- **PYUSD** (PayPal): Newest entrant



## Peg Maintenance:

- Arbitrage keeps price at \$1 (arbitrage = buying low in one place and selling high in another until prices match)
- If price > \$1: mint and sell
- If price < \$1: buy and redeem

## What You Must Trust:

- Issuer holds stated reserves
- Reserves are liquid and accessible
- Issuer won't be hacked or defrauded
- Issuer will honor redemptions
- Banking partners remain stable

## USDT Reserve Composition:

- Cash & equivalents: 85%+
- Corporate bonds: small %
- Secured loans: small %
- Other investments: small %

*What could go wrong? Example: Tether faced controversy over whether reserves actually existed (2017-2021).*

## Centralization Risks

- Can freeze/blacklist addresses
- Regulatory seizure possible
- Single point of failure
- Opaque reserve reporting (USDT)

## USDC vs USDT:

- USDC: Monthly attestations, regulated
- USDT: Less transparent, offshore
- Both: Centralized freeze capability

## Key Trade-off


Fiat-backing provides strong stability but reintroduces the centralization that crypto was designed to avoid.

## How It Works:

1. User deposits \$150 ETH
2. Protocol mints 100 DAI
3. Collateral ratio: 150%
4. If ETH drops, liquidation (like a pawn shop loan — if your collateral loses value, they sell it to cover the loan)

## MakerDAO/DAI:

- DAI is the largest crypto-backed stablecoin
- Decentralized governance
- Multiple collateral types
- Stability fee (interest)
- Liquidation at 150%



## Why Over-Collateralization?

- Crypto collateral is volatile
- 150% provides safety buffer
- Liquidation protects the peg



## Liquidation Process:

1. Collateral ratio falls below threshold (e.g., 150%)
2. Anyone can trigger liquidation via smart contract
3. Collateral sold at discount (liquidation penalty: 13%)
4. Debt repaid, remainder returned to vault owner

## Liquidation Cascades: The Domino Effect

During market crashes, mass liquidations can cause collateral fire sales, pushing prices lower, triggering more liquidations—a dangerous feedback loop.

*Think of dominoes: When one person is forced to sell, prices drop, forcing more sales, creating a chain reaction.*

## Advantages:

- ✓ **Decentralized**—no single issuer
- ✓ **Transparent**—on-chain reserves
- ✓ **Censorship-resistant**
- ✓ **No counterparty risk**
- ✓ **Auditable in real-time**

## Example Protocols:

- DAI (MakerDAO)
- LUSD (Liquity)
- sUSD (Synthetix)

## Disadvantages:

- ✗ **Capital inefficient**—need \$150 for \$100
- ✗ **Liquidation risk** for users
- ✗ **Complex** for average users
- ✗ **Smart contract risk**
- ✗ **Scalability limited** by collateral

### Capital Efficiency

To mint \$1B in DAI requires \$1.5B+ in collateral locked up, making it less scalable than fiat-backed alternatives.

## Pure Algorithmic (Failed):

- No collateral backing
- Dual-token: stable + governance
- Expand supply when above peg
- Contract supply when below peg

## The Death Spiral:

1. Price drops below peg
2. Redemptions spike
3. Confidence collapses
4. Governance token crashes
5. System becomes insolvent


## Case Study: UST/LUNA (May 2022)

- Peak market cap: \$18B
- Collapsed in 72 hours
- \$60B total value destroyed
- Triggered crypto contagion

## Hybrid Models (Surviving):

- **FRAZ**: Partially collateralized
- Dynamic collateral ratio
- More resilient to de-peg

## Case Study: Terra/UST Collapse



**Key Lesson:** When the peg mechanism relies on a token whose value depends on confidence in the peg, you create a reflexive loop that can collapse catastrophically.

## Above Peg (\$1.02):

1. Arbitrageurs mint new stablecoins
2. Pay \$1 worth of governance token
3. Sell stablecoin for \$1.02
4. Profit: \$0.02 per coin
5. Increased supply pushes price down

This direction works well.

## Below Peg (\$0.98):

1. Arbitrageurs buy stablecoin at \$0.98
2. Redeem for \$1 worth of governance token
3. Sell governance token
4. **But who buys the governance token?**
5. **Selling pressure crashes it**

This direction is fragile.

## The Fundamental Problem

Algorithmic stability depends on *someone* absorbing losses during de-peg events. Without real collateral, this relies purely on confidence—which can evaporate instantly.


# Stablecoin Design Comparison

| Attribute          | Fiat-Backed         | Crypto-Collateral     | Algorithmic             |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Collateral         | Fiat in bank        | Crypto (150%+)        | None/Partial            |
| Centralization     | High                | Medium                | Low                     |
| Capital Efficiency | High (1:1)          | Low (over-collateral) | High (0 collateral)     |
| Scalability        | Limited by reserves | Limited by collateral | Theoretically unlimited |
| Peg Stability      | Strong              | Strong                | Weak                    |
| Regulatory Risk    | High                | Medium                | Low                     |
| Censorship Risk    | High                | Low                   | Very Low                |

## The Stablecoin Trilemma


You can optimize for two of three: **Decentralization, Stability, Capital Efficiency**

# The Stablecoin Trilemma



No stablecoin achieves all three. Design choices reflect priorities.

# De-Peg Events: Historical Analysis



## Key Lessons:

- Fiat-backed: Banking system dependencies (SVB, Silvergate)
- Algorithmic: Fundamental design flaws lead to death spirals
- All designs: Confidence is fragile and self-reinforcing

## March 2023 Crisis:

1. SVB bank run announced (Mar 9)
2. Circle disclosed \$3.3B in SVB
3. USDC fell to \$0.87 (Mar 11)
4. Fed backstop announced (Mar 12)
5. USDC recovered to \$1.00

## Key Numbers:

- Total USDC supply: \$43B
- SVB exposure: \$3.3B (7.7%)
- Maximum de-peg: 13%
- Recovery time: 48 hours

## Lessons Learned

- Fiat-backed ≠ risk-free
- Banking concentration is risky
- Government backstop saved USDC
- Decentralized alternatives gained attention

## Circle's Response:

- Diversified banking partners
- Increased T-bill holdings
- More frequent attestations


# Measuring Stablecoin Stability

## Key Metrics:

- **Mean deviation:** Average distance from \$1
- **Max deviation:** Worst-case de-peg
- **Time in band:** % of time within  $\pm 1\%$
- **Volatility:** Standard deviation of price
- **Recovery time:** Hours to return to peg

## Typical Performance:


- USDC:  $\pm 0.1\%$  (99% of time)
- DAI:  $\pm 0.5\%$  (95% of time)
- Algorithmic:  $\pm 2\%+$  (variable)



## Interpretation:

Tighter distribution = more stable peg

# Peg Maintenance: The Role of Arbitrage



**Key Insight:** Arbitrage only works if:

- Redemption is guaranteed (fiat-backed) or incentivized (algorithmic)
- Transaction costs are low enough to capture the spread
- Sufficient liquidity exists on both sides

## Why Stablecoins Are Essential to DeFi:

- **Base pair** for trading (ETH/USDC, BTC/DAI)
- **Collateral** for loans (borrow against stables)
- **Settlement** for derivatives contracts
- **Yield** generation without volatility exposure

## Legitimate Yield Sources:

- **Lending interest:** Borrowers pay to borrow
- **Trading fees:** DEX liquidity provision
- **Protocol incentives:** Governance tokens
- **RWA yield:** T-bills backing (4-5%)

## Typical DeFi Rates:

- Lending (Aave): 2-5% APY
- Liquidity provision: 5-15% APY
- T-bill backed: 4-5% APY

## Red Flags: Unsustainable Yield

- Anchor Protocol: 19.5% on UST
- “Too good to be true”
- Where does yield come from?
- **If you can't identify the source, you ARE the yield**

## Risk-Return Reality:

Higher yield = Higher risk

“Safe” stablecoin yield  $\approx$  T-bill rate

# What's Actually Backing Stablecoins?

| Asset Type           | USDC | USDT | Risk Level |
|----------------------|------|------|------------|
| Cash & Bank Deposits | 20%  | 10%  | Low        |
| US Treasury Bills    | 75%  | 80%  | Very Low   |
| Commercial Paper     | 0%   | 3%   | Medium     |
| Corporate Bonds      | 2%   | 3%   | Medium     |
| Secured Loans        | 0%   | 3%   | Higher     |
| Other Investments    | 3%   | 1%   | Variable   |

## Why Reserve Composition Matters:


- **Liquidity:** Can reserves be sold quickly during redemptions?
- **Credit risk:** Could reserve assets default?
- **Duration risk:** Are reserves affected by interest rate changes?
- **Transparency:** Are reserves independently verified?

## Post-SVB Shift

Major stablecoins have shifted toward T-bills (very liquid, very safe) after the banking crisis revealed concentration risk.

## Market Dominance (2024):

- USDT: \$110B (65%)
- USDC: \$35B (20%)
- DAI: \$5B (3%)
- Others: \$20B (12%)



## Geographic Patterns:

- **USDC**: US-regulated, institutional
- **USDT**: Offshore, emerging markets
- **Euro stablecoins**: Growing (EURC)
- **Regional**: XSGD (Singapore), etc.

## Growth Drivers:

- Cross-border payments
- DeFi activity
- Emerging market adoption

### Analyzing Peg Stability and De-Peg Events

In the Colab notebook (NB10), you will:

1. Compare stability metrics across stablecoin types
2. Simulate crypto-collateralized stablecoin behavior
3. Model liquidation cascades under stress conditions
4. Analyze the Terra/UST death spiral dynamics
5. Calculate stability scores for different designs

#### Access the Notebook

[day\\_04/notebooks/NB10\\_Stablecoin\\_Analysis.ipynb](#)

Or scan QR code / click link provided

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Time: 20-25 minutes for guided exploration

## Part 1: Stability Metrics

- Generate synthetic price data
- Calculate mean/max deviation
- Measure time within bands
- Compare across types

## Part 2: Collateral Simulation

- Build a DAI-like system
- Open vaults with collateral
- Simulate price decline
- Observe liquidations

## Part 3: Cascade Analysis

- Model liquidation cascades
- Vary market depth parameters
- Observe feedback effects

## Part 4: Death Spiral

- Simulate algorithmic collapse
- Understand reflexivity
- Identify warning signs

### Key Takeaway

Hands-on simulation reveals risks that theory alone cannot convey.

# Discussion: Which Stablecoin Should You Use?

## For Maximum Safety:

- USDC (fiat-backed, audited)
- Accept centralization risk
- Best for: Large holdings, institutions

## For Decentralization:

- DAI (crypto-collateralized)
- Accept capital inefficiency
- Best for: DeFi natives, censorship concerns

## For Higher Yield:

- Be extremely cautious
- Understand yield source
- Best for: Experienced users only

## Questions to Ask:

1. What backs the stablecoin?
2. Who can freeze my funds?
3. What happens if issuer fails?
4. How transparent are reserves?
5. What's the track record?

## Portfolio Approach

Many sophisticated users hold multiple stablecoins to diversify risk:

- 50% USDC (safety)
- 30% DAI (decentralization)
- 20% other (diversification)

# Discussion: Stablecoins as Systemic Risk?

## Why Regulators Worry:

- \$170B+ in circulation
- Critical DeFi infrastructure
- Bank-like without banking rules
- Potential money laundering
- Consumer protection gaps
- “Too big to fail” concerns

## Historical Parallels:

- Money market funds (2008)
- Bank runs (pre-FDIC)
- Currency crises

## Counterarguments:

- More transparent than banks
- Real-time reserve verification
- Market-based discipline
- Innovation benefits

## The Core Tension

Should stablecoins be regulated like banks?

- Yes: Same risks, same rules
- No: Different technology, different approach
- Hybrid: Risk-based regulation

## Why Regulators Care:

- Systemic risk (too big to fail?)
- Consumer protection
- Money laundering concerns
- Monetary policy implications
- Bank-like activities

## Regulatory Developments:

- EU: MiCA framework (2024)
- US: Congressional debate ongoing
- Singapore: Clear framework
- China: Banned

## Key Requirements Emerging

- 1:1 reserve backing
- Regular audits/attestations
- Redemption guarantees
- Segregated reserves
- Licensing requirements

## Impact on Market:

- USDC: Embracing regulation
- USDT: Offshore strategy
- DAI: Decentralization defense

## Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA):

- First comprehensive crypto regulation
- Effective 2024 for stablecoins
- Applies to all EU member states

## Key Stablecoin Requirements:

1. **Authorization:** Must be licensed
2. **Reserves:** 1:1 backing required
3. **Segregation:** Customer funds protected
4. **Redemption:** On-demand at par value
5. **Volume limits:** Caps on non-euro stablecoins

## Two Categories:

- **EMT:** E-money tokens (single fiat)
- **ART:** Asset-referenced tokens (baskets)

## Impact

- USDT delisted from some EU exchanges
- USDC becoming “compliant choice”
- Euro stablecoins emerging
- Algorithmic stablecoins effectively banned


### Key Takeaways from Topic 4.3

1. **Three design types** with different trade-offs  
Fiat-backed (stable, centralized), Crypto-collateralized (decentralized, inefficient), Algorithmic (efficient, risky)
2. **The Stablecoin Trilemma constrains design**  
Can only optimize two of: Decentralization, Stability, Capital Efficiency
3. **Peg mechanisms rely on arbitrage and trust**  
Without reliable redemption, pegs can break catastrophically
4. **Terra/UST proved algorithmic stability is fragile**  
Death spirals destroy value rapidly when confidence breaks
5. **Heavy regulatory scrutiny is coming**  
MiCA in EU, pending legislation in US, global coordination

#### The Big Idea

Stablecoins are the critical bridge between crypto and traditional finance, but each design involves fundamental trust trade-offs.

# Concept Map: Stablecoin Ecosystem



**Stablecoin** A cryptocurrency designed to maintain a stable value relative to a reference asset (typically \$1 USD).

**Peg** The target price a stablecoin aims to maintain, typically \$1.00.

**De-peg** When a stablecoin's market price deviates significantly from its target peg.

**Fiat-Backed Stablecoin** A stablecoin backed 1:1 by fiat currency reserves held by a centralized issuer (e.g., USDC, USDT).

**Collateralization Ratio** The ratio of collateral value to debt; crypto-backed stablecoins typically require 150%+ collateralization.

**Crypto-Collateralized Stablecoin** A stablecoin backed by over-collateralized cryptocurrency locked in smart contracts (e.g., DAI).

**Algorithmic Stablecoin** A stablecoin that maintains its peg through algorithmic supply adjustments rather than collateral backing.

**Liquidation** The forced sale of collateral when a vault's collateralization ratio falls below the minimum threshold.

**Death Spiral** A reflexive feedback loop where falling prices trigger mechanisms that cause further price declines.

**Stablecoin Trilemma** The impossibility of simultaneously achieving full decentralization, perfect stability, and high capital efficiency.

**Attestation** An independent accounting report verifying stablecoin reserves (less rigorous than a full audit).

## Misconception

“Stablecoins are stable”

“Fiat-backed means risk-free”

“Algorithmic = decentralized = good”

“Higher yield = better stablecoin”

## Reality

Stablecoins *target* stability but can de-peg, especially during market stress

Fiat-backed coins carry counterparty, banking, and regulatory risks (see SVB crisis)

Algorithmic designs have proven fragile; decentralization alone doesn't ensure stability

Unsustainable yield is often a warning sign of hidden risks (see Anchor/UST)

## Critical Thinking

Always ask: What backs this stablecoin? Who can freeze it? What happens in a crisis?

### Question

Which of the following is NOT a characteristic of fiat-backed stablecoins like USDC?

- A. 1:1 backing by USD or USD-equivalent reserves
- B. Centralized issuer that can freeze addresses
- C. Over-collateralization requirement of 150%+
- D. Regular attestation reports on reserve holdings

## Self-Assessment: Question 1

### Question

Which of the following is NOT a characteristic of fiat-backed stablecoins like USDC?

- A. 1:1 backing by USD or USD-equivalent reserves
- B. Centralized issuer that can freeze addresses
- C. Over-collateralization requirement of 150%+
- D. Regular attestation reports on reserve holdings

### Answer: C

**Explanation:** Fiat-backed stablecoins use 1:1 backing (100% collateralization), not over-collateralization. The 150%+ over-collateralization requirement is characteristic of *crypto-collateralized* stablecoins like DAI, which need extra buffer due to collateral volatility.

### Question 2 (from Quiz)

What is the Stablecoin Trilemma?

**Answer:** The impossibility of simultaneously achieving **decentralization**, **stability**, and **capital efficiency**. Every stablecoin design must compromise on at least one dimension.

### Question 3 (from Quiz)

Why did the Terra/UST algorithmic stablecoin collapse?

**Answer:** UST relied on a reflexive mint/burn mechanism with LUNA. When confidence broke, mass redemptions crashed LUNA's price, making it impossible to absorb UST selling pressure. This created a **death spiral**—a feedback loop where falling prices trigger mechanisms that cause further price declines.

**Key Lesson:** When the peg mechanism depends on confidence in the peg, the system is vulnerable to self-fulfilling collapse.

### Preview: Tokenization of Real-World Assets

In Topic 4.4, we'll explore:

- **Real-World Asset (RWA) tokenization**—putting stocks, bonds, real estate on-chain
- **Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)**—digital government money
- **Security tokens**—regulated digital securities
- **The convergence** of traditional and decentralized finance

#### Connection

Topic 4.3 covered stablecoins as the first bridge between TradFi and crypto.

Topic 4.4 extends this to tokenizing *all* real-world assets.

**Preparation:** Consider how stablecoin mechanisms might apply to tokenized assets.

# Resources for Further Learning

## Essential Reading:

- MakerDAO Documentation (DAI mechanics)
- Circle USDC Transparency Reports
- Terra Post-Mortem Analysis

## Online Resources:

- Course notebook: NB10\_Stablecoin\_Analysis.ipynb
- DeFiLlama Stablecoin Dashboard: <https://defillama.com/stablecoins>
- The Block: Stablecoin Reports


## Academic References:

- Klages-Mundt et al. "Stablecoins 2.0" (DeFi stability analysis)
- BIS Reports on Stablecoins and Financial Stability

## Course Materials

All slides and notebooks available on the course website.

## Questions & Discussion



Stablecoins: Bridge or Risk?

Contact: joerg.osterrieder@gmail.com

Next Topic: T4.4 — Tokenization and CBDCs