

## Lesson 16: Proof of Work

### Module 2: Blockchain Fundamentals

Digital Finance

# The Double-Spending Problem

## Digital Money Challenge:

- Digital files are copyable
- How to prevent spending same coin twice?
- Traditional solution: Central authority (bank)

## Decentralized Challenge:

- No central ledger
- Network latency
- Conflicting transactions
- Malicious actors

[charts/lesson\\_16/double\\_spending\\_scenario.pdf](charts/lesson_16/double_spending_scenario.pdf)

## Consensus Problem: Agreeing on Transaction Order

[charts/lesson\\_16/consensus\\_problem.pdf](#)

# Proof of Work: The Solution

## Core Idea:

- Make block creation expensive
- Require computational work
- Probability-based selection
- Longest chain wins

## Properties:

- Sybil resistance (one CPU = one vote)
- Objective chain selection rule
- Economic security
- No coordination needed

charts/lesson\_16/pow\_concept.pdf

## Hash Puzzle: Finding theNonce

**Mining Goal:** Find nonce such that block hash is below target

$$\text{SHA256(Block Header)} < \text{Target}$$

**Block Header Contains:**

- Previous block hash
- Merkle root (transaction summary)
- Timestamp
- Difficulty target
- **Nonce** (number to vary)


**Example:**

Target: 00000000000000000000f1a2b3c4d...

Hash attempt 1: 8a3f2e1d9c... (too high)

Hash attempt 2: 00000000000000000000a1b2c3d... (success!)

## Bitcoin Mining Process



### Steps:

- ① Collect transactions from mempool
- ② Build Merkle tree, create block header
- ③ Try different nonce values

# Difficulty Target: Controlling Block Time

## Target Representation:

$$\text{Target} = \text{coefficient} \times 2^{8(\text{exponent}-3)}$$

## Difficulty:


$$\text{Difficulty} = \frac{\text{Max Target}}{\text{Current Target}}$$

## Bitcoin:

- Target block time: 10 minutes
- Adjusts every 2016 blocks (2 weeks)
- Difficulty  $\propto$  total hashrate

[charts/lesson\\_16/difficulty\\_adjustment.pdf](charts/lesson_16/difficulty_adjustment.pdf)

## Difficulty Over Time: Bitcoin Example



### Observations:

- Exponential growth from 2009 to 2024

**Probability of Success per Hash:**

$$P(\text{success}) = \frac{\text{Target}}{2^{256}}$$

**Expected Number of Hashes:**

$$E[\text{hashes}] = \frac{2^{256}}{\text{Target}} = \text{Difficulty} \times 2^{32}$$

**Expected Time to Find Block:**

$$T = \frac{\text{Difficulty} \times 2^{32}}{\text{Hashrate}}$$

**Example:** Difficulty = 50 trillion, Hashrate = 100 TH/s

$$T = \frac{50 \times 10^{12} \times 2^{32}}{100 \times 10^{12}} \approx 2147 \text{ seconds} \approx 36 \text{ minutes}$$

## Mining Difficulty vs Hashrate

[charts/lesson\\_16/hashrate\\_vs\\_difficulty.pdf](charts/lesson_16/hashrate_vs_difficulty.pdf)

## Attack Scenario:

- Attacker controls >50% hashrate
- Can create longest chain
- Rewrite transaction history
- Double-spend attack

## Limitations:

- Cannot steal others' coins
- Cannot create coins from nothing
- Cannot change protocol rules

[charts/lesson\\_16/51\\_percent\\_attack.pdf](#)

## Confirmation Depth: Security Over Time

[charts/lesson\\_16/confirmation\\_depth.pdf](charts/lesson_16/confirmation_depth.pdf)

## Revenue:

- Block reward: 3.125 BTC (as of 2024, halves every 4 years)
- Transaction fees: Variable (0.1–2 BTC per block)

## Costs:

- Hardware (ASICs): \$3,000–\$15,000 per unit
- Electricity: 3–6 cents per kWh (industrial rates)
- Cooling, maintenance, facility

## Profitability Equation:

$$\text{Profit} = (\text{Block Reward} + \text{Fees}) \times \text{BTC Price} - \text{Electricity Cost}$$

**Break-even:** Electricity cost  $\approx$  40–60% of revenue at scale

[`charts/lesson\_16/mining\_hardware\_evolution.pdf`](#)


# Energy Consumption: The Elephant in the Room

## Bitcoin Network (2024):

- Total hashrate: ~600 EH/s
- Power consumption: ~150 TWh/year
- Comparable to Argentina or Netherlands

## Per Transaction:

- ~700 kWh per transaction
- vs Visa: ~0.001 kWh
- But: Bitcoin = settlement layer



[charts/lesson\\_16/mining\\_energy\\_sources.pdf](#)

## Criticisms:

- Massive carbon footprint
- E-waste from obsolete ASICs
- Inefficient compared to databases
- Competes with useful computing

## Counterarguments:

- Energy = security (makes attacks expensive)
- Incentivizes renewable buildout
- Banking system also energy-intensive
- Enables censorship-resistant money

**Trade-off:** Security vs energy efficiency (Proof of Stake addresses this)

`charts/lesson_16/mining_pool_distribution.pdf`

# Selfish Mining Attack

## Strategy:

- ① Miner finds block, keeps secret
- ② Continues mining on private chain
- ③ Reveals when ahead by 2+ blocks
- ④ Honest chain orphaned

## Result:

- Unfair revenue (more than hashrate share)
- Effective with >25% hashrate
- Wastes other miners' work

[charts/lesson\\_16/selfish\\_mining.pdf](charts/lesson_16/selfish_mining.pdf)

## Alternatives to Proof of Work

Mechanism	Selection	Pros	Cons
Proof of Work	Computational power	Proven security, decentralized	Energy intensive
Proof of Stake	Staked capital	Energy efficient	Rich get richer, slashing risk
Proof of Authority	Approved validators	Fast, low energy	Centralized, permissioned
Proof of Space	Disk storage	Lower energy than PoW	New, unproven security

**Note:** Ethereum switched from PoW to PoS in 2022 (The Merge)

- **Double-Spending Problem:** Solved by probabilistic consensus via PoW
- **Mining:** Find nonce making block hash < target (SHA256 puzzle)
- **Difficulty:** Auto-adjusts to maintain constant block time (10 min for Bitcoin)
- **Security:** 51% attack possible but expensive; confirmation depth increases safety
- **Economics:** Revenue (block reward + fees) vs costs (hardware + electricity)
- **Energy Debate:** ~150 TWh/year, trade-off between security and efficiency

**Next Lesson:** Proof of Stake – energy-efficient alternative consensus