

# Lesson 41: Market Microstructure and HFT

## Module 4: Traditional Digital Finance

Digital Finance Course

2025

- Understand market microstructure theory and empirical regularities
- Analyze bid-ask spreads and their components
- Examine market maker economics and inventory management
- Evaluate high-frequency trading strategies and market impact
- Assess flash crashes and systemic stability concerns

## Core Questions:

- How are prices formed in continuous trading?
- What determines bid-ask spreads?
- How does information get incorporated into prices?
- What is the role of market makers and liquidity providers?
- How do trading protocols affect efficiency?

## Key Concepts:

- **Price Discovery:** Aggregating dispersed information
- **Liquidity:** Ability to trade without price impact
- **Market Depth:** Volume available at various prices
- **Resilience:** Speed of price recovery after shocks

## Trading Costs Framework:

- **Explicit Costs:** Commissions, fees, taxes
- **Implicit Costs:** Spread, impact, opportunity
- **Total Cost:**  $TC = \text{Spread} + \text{Impact} + \text{Delay}$

## Market Quality Metrics:

- **Efficiency:** Prices reflect available information
- **Liquidity:** Low cost, high volume capacity
- **Transparency:** Order flow and trade visibility
- **Stability:** Resistance to manipulation and crashes
- **Fairness:** Equal access and opportunity

## Spread Definitions:

- **Quoted Spread:**  $S_Q = P_{ask} - P_{bid}$
- **Percent Spread:**  $S_{\%} = \frac{P_{ask} - P_{bid}}{P_{mid}} \times 100$
- **Effective Spread:**  $S_E = 2|P_{trade} - P_{mid}|$
- **Realized Spread:**  $S_R = 2(P_{trade} - P_{mid+5min}) \times D$

where  $D = +1$  for buyer-initiated,  $-1$  for seller-initiated

## Example:

- Bid: \$99.98, Ask: \$100.02
- Quoted spread: \$0.04 (4 cents)
- Percent spread: 0.04%
- Trade at \$100.01 (price improvement)
- Effective spread:  $2 \times (\$100.01 - \$100.00) = \$0.02$

## Spread Components (Stoll 1989):

- **Order Processing:** Fixed costs (40-50%)
- **Inventory Holding:** Risk aversion costs (10-20%)
- **Adverse Selection:** Informed trading (30-50%)

## Determinants of Spreads:

- **Volume:** Higher volume  $\rightarrow$  tighter spreads
- **Volatility:** Higher volatility  $\rightarrow$  wider spreads
- **Competition:** More market makers  $\rightarrow$  tighter
- **Tick Size:** Minimum increment constraint
- **Information Asymmetry:** More informed trading  $\rightarrow$  wider

*US large-cap spreads: 1-3 bps; small-cap: 10-50 bps (2024)*

## Glosten-Milgrom Model (1985):

- Sequential trade model with information asymmetry
- Informed traders know true value  $V$
- Uninformed traders are noise/liquidity traders
- Market maker sets bid-ask to break even
- Spread compensates for adverse selection

## Key Implications:

- Spread widens with more informed trading
- Price update after each trade (Bayesian learning)
- Bid-ask bounce causes negative autocorrelation
- Larger trades signal more information

## Kyle Model (1985):

- Batch auction with strategic informed trader
- Informed trader optimizes profit vs price impact
- Market depth (lambda):  $\lambda = \frac{dP}{dQ}$
- Price impact linear in order flow

## Kyle's Lambda:

$$\lambda = \frac{\sigma_v}{2\sigma_u}$$

where  $\sigma_v$  = value volatility,  $\sigma_u$  = noise trading volatility

## Empirical Evidence:

- Larger trades move prices more (concave impact)
- Block trades have 5-10x impact vs VWAP execution
- Price impact persists 30-60 minutes post-trade

## Market Maker Functions:

- Continuous two-sided quotes (bid and ask)
- Absorb temporary order imbalances
- Facilitate price discovery
- Reduce search costs for traders
- Profit from bid-ask spread capture

## Designated Market Makers (DMM):

- **NYSE:** DMM obligations for assigned stocks
- **Nasdaq:** Competitive market makers (no exclusivity)
- **Obligations:** Maintain fair and orderly markets
- **Benefits:** Informational advantages, rebates

## Profitability Sources:

- **Spread Capture:** Buy bid, sell ask
- **Maker Rebates:** 0.15-0.30 cents/share (US equities)
- **Order Flow Internalization:** Payment for order flow (PFOF)
- **Statistical Arbitrage:** Short-term mean reversion

## Risks:

- **Inventory Risk:** Directional exposure
- **Adverse Selection:** Losing to informed traders
- **Volatility Spikes:** Widening spreads, reduced depth
- **Technology Failures:** Latency, connectivity issues

*Top HFT market makers: Citadel Securities, Virtu, Jane Street, Jump Trading*

## Stoll (1978) Inventory Model:

- Market maker adjusts quotes based on inventory
- High long inventory  $\rightarrow$  lower ask, lower bid
- High short inventory  $\rightarrow$  higher bid, higher ask
- Inventory mean-reversion via asymmetric quotes

## Quote Adjustment:

$$P_{bid} = P_{mid} - \frac{S}{2} - \alpha \cdot I$$

$$P_{ask} = P_{mid} + \frac{S}{2} - \alpha \cdot I$$

where  $I$  = inventory position,  $\alpha$  = inventory aversion

## Example:

- Neutral: Bid \$99.98, Ask \$100.02
- Long 10k shares: Bid \$99.96, Ask \$100.00 (skewed to sell)

## Avellaneda-Stoikov Model (2008):

- Optimal market making with risk aversion
- Maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth
- Incorporates arrival rates and fill probabilities
- Dynamic spread and mid-price adjustments

## Optimal Quotes:

$$\delta_{bid}^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma}{\kappa} \right) + \frac{\gamma \sigma^2 (T - t)}{2} q$$

$$\delta_{ask}^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left( 1 + \frac{\gamma}{\kappa} \right) - \frac{\gamma \sigma^2 (T - t)}{2} q$$

where  $\gamma$  = risk aversion,  $\kappa$  = order arrival intensity,  $q$  = inventory

## Modern Enhancements:

- Machine learning for arrival rate prediction
- Multi-venue inventory optimization
- Reinforcement learning for quote placement

## PFOF Mechanics:

- Retail broker routes orders to wholesaler
- Wholesaler internalizes (does not send to exchange)
- Wholesaler pays broker 0.1-0.5 cents/share
- Retail order receives NBBO or better (price improvement)
- Wholesaler profits from spread capture + rebates

## Major Wholesalers (2024):

- Citadel Securities: 40-45% retail market share
- Virtu Financial: 25-30%
- Jane Street: 10-15%
- Two Sigma Securities: 5-10%

**Volume:** 40-45% of US equity volume is off-exchange (largely PFOF)

## Controversies:

- **Conflict of Interest:** Broker incentive vs best execution
- **Market Segmentation:** Uninformed (retail) vs informed (institutional)
- **Reduced Exchange Volume:** Less price discovery on lit markets
- **GameStop (2021):** PFOF scrutiny after meme stock frenzy

## Regulatory Responses:

- SEC considering PFOF ban (2022-2024 discussions)
- MiFID II (EU): PFOF banned for equities (2018)
- Enhanced Rule 606 disclosures (quarterly routing reports)
- Best execution analysis requirements

*Retail traders receive average 0.5-1 cent price improvement per share vs NBBO*



## HFT Defining Features:

- **Ultra-Low Latency:** Microsecond execution speeds
- **High Order-to-Trade Ratio:** 100:1 to 1000:1
- **High Daily Volume:** Millions of shares/contracts
- **Flat Overnight Positions:** Minimal directional risk
- **Co-Location:** Servers at exchange data centers
- **Direct Market Access:** Sponsored access or memberships

## Market Share:

- US equities: 50-55% of volume (down from 60-65% in 2010)
- Futures: 60-70% of volume
- FX: 20-30% of spot volume
- European equities: 30-40% of volume

## Technology Infrastructure:

- **Co-Location Costs:** \$10k-50k/month per exchange
- **Market Data Feeds:** Direct feeds vs consolidated (SIP)
- **FPGA Acceleration:** Hardware-based order processing
- **Microwave Networks:** Chicago-NYC in 4.1 milliseconds
- **Kernel Bypass:** User-space networking (10-100x faster)

## Latency Benchmarks:

- Matching engine: 10-50 microseconds
- Co-located order entry: 50-200 microseconds
- Cross-venue arbitrage window: 100-500 microseconds
- Human reaction time: 200,000 microseconds (200 ms)

## Market Making:

- Provide liquidity via limit orders
- Profit from spread capture + maker rebates
- Inventory risk management critical
- Accounts for 40-50% of HFT volume

## Statistical Arbitrage:

- Mean-reversion strategies (tick-level)
- Pairs trading at microsecond horizons
- Order book imbalance signals
- Typical hold time: seconds to minutes

## Latency Arbitrage:

- Exploit slow price updates across venues
- React to information faster than competitors
- Requires fastest infrastructure
- Controversial (“arms race” criticism)

## Event Arbitrage:

- News parsing and trading (microseconds)
- Economic data releases (e.g., NFP, FOMC)
- Earnings announcements
- Machine-readable news (MRN) feeds

## Order Anticipation:

- Detect large institutional orders
- Trade ahead of expected price impact
- Legal gray area (vs illegal front-running)
- Detects via order book patterns

## Index Arbitrage:

- ETF vs underlying basket discrepancies
- Futures vs cash basis trades
- Dividend arbitrage around ex-dates
- Holds positions minutes to hours

## Positive Contributions:

- **Tighter Spreads:** Increased competition narrows bid-ask
- **Increased Liquidity:** Higher quoted depth
- **Faster Price Discovery:** Information incorporated quicker
- **Lower Trading Costs:** Spreads down 50-70% since 2000
- **Cross-Market Integration:** Arbitrage keeps markets aligned

## Empirical Evidence (Brogaard et al., 2014):

- HFT trades align with permanent price changes
- Net provision of liquidity (market making)
- Faster incorporation of public information
- No evidence of systematic predatory behavior

## Criticisms and Concerns:

- **Adverse Selection:** Institutional orders picked off
- **Phantom Liquidity:** Quotes vanish in stress periods
- **Flash Crashes:** Amplify volatility (e.g., 2010)
- **Unfair Advantage:** Speed and co-location benefits
- **Socially Wasteful:** Arms race with low social value

## Market Stability Risks:

- Simultaneous withdrawal during stress
- Correlated algorithmic behavior
- Feedback loops and cascades
- Fragility due to speed dependencies

*"HFT is like GPS: improves efficiency but introduces new failure modes"* – SEC Commissioner (2014)

## Event Timeline:

- **14:32 ET:** Large mutual fund executes \$4.1B E-Mini sell program
- **14:41-14:45:** Dow drops 600 points in 5 minutes
- **14:45:** Markets recover 70% of losses in minutes
- **End of Day:** Dow closes down 348 points

## Trigger Mechanism:

- Aggressive VWAP algorithm floods market
- HFT firms initially absorb selling
- Hot potato: HFTs trade among themselves
- Liquidity withdrawal as inventory limits hit
- Prices collapse due to lack of buyers

## Key Findings (CFTC-SEC Report):

- E-Mini futures led equities down
- Cross-market arbitrage transmitted stress
- Stub quotes executed (e.g., Accenture to \$0.01)
- 20,000+ trades broken (clearly erroneous)
- HFT exacerbated but did not cause crash

## Regulatory Responses:

- **Limit Up-Limit Down (2012):** Single-stock circuit breakers
- **Clearly Erroneous Trades:** Standardized break criteria
- **Reg SCI (2015):** Systems compliance for critical infrastructure
- **Market-Wide Breakers:** 7%, 13%, 20% thresholds

### October 15, 2014 Treasury Flash Rally:

- 10-year yield drops 37 bps in 12 minutes
- Largest intraday move in decades
- No fundamental news trigger
- Joint Staff Report: HFT amplified volatility
- Highlighted fragility in Treasury market structure

### August 24, 2015 ETF Flash Crash:

- 1100+ trading halts in first 36 minutes
- 20% of ETFs trade 10%+ away from NAV
- LULD breakers overwhelmed by volume
- Exposing ETF market making fragility

### GBP Flash Crash (October 7, 2016):

- Sterling drops 9% vs USD in minutes (Asian hours)
- Thin liquidity + algorithmic selling spiral
- Recovered within 30 minutes
- Highlighted FX market vulnerabilities

### Common Patterns:

- Initial shock (fundamental or algorithmic)
- Liquidity provider withdrawal
- Cascading sell orders (stop losses, algos)
- Feedback loop amplification
- Recovery once human oversight intervenes

*VPIN (toxicity indicator) spiked to 0.98 before 2010 Flash Crash (normal  $\leq 0.5$ )*

## Circuit Breakers (US Equities):

- **LULD Bands:** 5-20% depending on tier and time
- **Tier 1:** S&P 500, Russell 1000 (5% bands)
- **Tier 2:** Other NMS stocks (10% bands)
- **Trading Halt:** 5-minute pause if limit breached
- **Market-Wide:** 7%, 13%, 20% S&P 500 declines

## Clearly Erroneous Trades:

- Numerical thresholds for breaking trades
- \$0-\$25 stocks: 10% from reference price
- \$25-\$50: 5%, Over \$50: 3%
- Must be reported within 30 minutes
- Exchange decision (not automatic)

## Kill Switch Requirements (MiFID II):

- Ability to cancel all orders in under 2 seconds
- Mandatory for algorithmic traders
- Pre-trade risk controls on parameters
- Post-trade monitoring and alerts

## Volatility Auctions:

- European markets use volatility interruptions
- 2-5 minute random auction when thresholds hit
- Allows human intervention and price discovery
- Less disruptive than hard halts

## Speed Bumps:

- IEX: 350-microsecond delay on all orders
- Prevents latency arbitrage strategies
- Controversial: reduces efficiency vs stability

## U-Shaped Volume Pattern:

- High volume at open (09:30-10:00 ET)
- Low volume midday (11:00-14:00)
- High volume at close (15:30-16:00)
- Opening 30 min: 15-20% of daily volume
- Closing 30 min: 20-25% of daily volume

## U-Shaped Volatility:

- Spreads widest at open (information asymmetry)
- Tightest spreads midday (steady state)
- Widening into close (position squaring)

## Bid-Ask Bounce:

- Trades alternate between bid and ask
- Induces negative autocorrelation in returns
- Roll (1984) model:  $\text{Spread} = 2\sqrt{-\text{Cov}(r_t, r_{t-1})}$
- Empirically: first-order autocorr = -0.05 to -0.15

## Price Impact Asymmetry:

- Buy orders have larger impact than sells
- More pronounced for small-cap stocks
- Attributed to short-sale constraints
- Temporary component decays exponentially

*Opening cross (NYSE, Nasdaq): 5-10% of daily volume in single batch auction*

## US Tick Size Evolution:

- Pre-2001: 1/16 dollar (\$0.0625)
- 2001: Decimalization to \$0.01
- Result: Spreads compressed 30-50%
- But: Depth per price level declined
- Trade-off: Tighter spreads vs lower depth

## Tick Size Pilot (2016-2018):

- SEC mandated \$0.05 tick for 1200 small-cap stocks
- Goal: Improve liquidity and market making economics
- Results: Wider spreads, lower volume, minimal IPO impact
- Pilot ended; no permanent changes adopted

## Optimal Tick Size Theory:

- Too small: Excessive queue jumping, minimal profit
- Too large: Constrained price discovery, wide spreads
- Optimal tick proportional to stock price
- Harris (1994): Tick-to-price ratio = 0.1-0.5%

## Empirical Regularities:

- Quotes cluster at round numbers
- Spreads often exactly 1 tick (minimum)
- 60-70% of stocks trade at 1-cent spread
- Sub-penny trading banned for most stocks (Reg NMS)

*European markets: varying tick sizes by price range (MiFID II tick size regime)*



## Microstructure Foundations:

- Bid-ask spreads compensate for order processing, inventory, and adverse selection
- Market makers provide liquidity and earn spread via inventory management
- Information asymmetry drives adverse selection costs
- PFOF internalizes retail flow (40-45% of US volume)

## High-Frequency Trading:

- 50-55% of US equity volume (microsecond speeds)
- Strategies: market making, stat arb, latency arb
- Tighter spreads but phantom liquidity concerns
- Regulatory focus on stability and fairness

## Flash Crashes and Stability:

- May 6, 2010: 600-point drop in 5 minutes
- Liquidity withdrawal amplifies shocks
- LULD circuit breakers now standard
- Kill switches and risk controls mandatory (MiFID II, Reg SCI)

## Market Quality:

- U-shaped volume and volatility patterns
- Decimalization tightened spreads (2001)
- Tick size pilot failed to improve small-cap liquidity
- Trade-off: efficiency vs stability in design