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*Pasternak*

30 October 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence****THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence****SUBJECT: Pasternak and the Nobel Prize - The "Literary Hungary"**

1. Pasternak's "rejection" of the Nobel Prize dramatizes again the hard lesson of Hungary, that the Soviet regime will brutally crush any direct challenge to its basic principles. In its eyes Pasternak had become a symbol and an instrument of counter-revolution and as such he could only be dealt with in drastic fashion comparable to the treatment of the Budapest insurgents.

2. Reactions of revulsion and shock cannot conceal from Free World consciousness the sense of its own impotence to further the cause of liberalization within the Bloc. Hopes that a "Renaissance of humanism" will in the near future undermine the monolith of Communism have been dashed. Any further attempt on our part to portray the personal ordeal of Pasternak as a triumph of freedom will only, as in the case of Hungary, heighten the tragic irony which informs it.

3. An objective judgment of Pasternak as a literary figure would probably acknowledge that he represents an extension of the pre-Bolshevik tradition of Russian literature in what may be called its current of "European decadence." The "cosmopolitanism" which enabled him to translate Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe and other European classics with such finesse was in its essence an "alien" inheritance, which even his political detachment could not make acceptable to the Communist regime. So long as his impact was contained within the Soviet Union, it could be tolerated; when it came to appear as a chosen vessel of Free World cold war, it had to be crushed. The earlier western emphasis on Dudintsev's Not by Bread Alone may also have exacerbated the Soviet reaction to what they inevitably regarded as a deliberate provocation.

4. It is quite possible that the Kremlin is pleased that this crisis arose in the way it did, pari passu with the award of the Nobel prize to the three Soviet physicists. It is thus provided with an almost ideal opportunity to demonstrate the difference between the two creations: one a triumph of Soviet science and a manifestation of the power

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of the Communist system, the other an aberration, a turning against the system, which will be held up as a solemn and effective warning against all literary deviators.

5. One lesson for the Free World is perhaps that it has been over-sanguine in its appraisal of the potential cultural liberalization or "thaw" in the Soviet Union and, a fortiori, in its satellites. The unwavering determination of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to push through to its ultimate goals is only intensified by incidents such as this, undeterred by considerations of "fair play" to its own citizens or of impact on Free World opinion. The falsity of the liberalization promises of the Chinese Communist rectification program had already indicated this basic truth.

6. Another and even more chilling lesson which we have only begun to face is that inner tensions, whether political, social, economic or cultural, must not be optimistically regarded as a source of weakness in the Communist system. In Communist eyes, indeed, they are the inner principle of its dynamic strength, the dialectical basis for the creative interaction of historical necessity and human will. The fact that Communists believe this to be true, does not, of course, automatically make it so. But it would be well for us to adopt as a background to policy the propositions that stresses and strains are not necessarily vulnerabilities and that actions predicated on the assumption that they are will probably be self-defeating.

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