


# Energy-Adaptive Monitoring for Resilient Smart Farms



## Motivation

- Lack of security-aware smart farm technologies under resource constraints
- Introducing serious food contamination when animal conditions are not properly monitored
- Potential high revenue loss of farmers due to the failure of protecting farms from attacks

**Research Goal:** Develop an uncertainty-aware MADRL-based monitoring system to achieve high monitoring quality under fluctuating energy, cyberattacks, and adversarial examples.

# Problem Statement

**Objective function:** Minimize monitoring error ( $\mathcal{ME}$ ) and system overload ( $\mathcal{OL}$ )

$$\arg \max_{P=\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_T\}} \sum_{t=1}^T f(g_t(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_t)), \quad s.t. \quad \forall t \in [1, T], p_t \in \mathcal{P},$$

$T$  : total monitoring step

$P$  : update policy

$p_t$  : monitoring action at time step  $t$

$\mathcal{P}$  : action space

$g_t$  : sensor network at time step  $t$

$f : g_t \mapsto -\mathcal{ME}(g_t) - \mathcal{OL}(g_t)$


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```

graph LR
    LBS{LBS} -- BLE --> HBS{HBS}
    HBS -- LoRa --> G1[Gateway]
    HBS -- LoRa --> G2[Gateway]
    G1 -- LoRa --> Server((Server))
    G2 -- LoRa --> Server
  
```

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# Attack Model



HBS: high battery sensors; LBS: low battery sensors; MIMA: man-in-the-middle attackers

- **Non-compliance to the protocol:**  $P_{NCA}$ 
  - Reject the data request
- **False data injection**
  - Inject from internal/external attacker:  $P_{IDA}/P_{EDA}$
- **Denial-of-Service (DoS):**  $P_{IDA}$ 
  - Send redundant data requests

# Uncertainty-Aware Animal Monitoring

## SL-based Formulation of a Multinomial Opinion

- A multinomial opinion  $X$ :  $\omega_X = (\mathbf{b}_X, u_X, \mathbf{a}_X)$

- $\sum_{x \in \mathbb{X}} \mathbf{b}_X(x) + u_X = 1$

$\mathbf{b}_X$ : belief mass distribution over  $\mathbb{X}$

$u_X$ : uncertainty mass representing vacuity of evidence

$\mathbf{a}_X$ : base rate distribution over  $\mathbb{X}$

- The dissonance  $\mathbf{b}_X^{\text{Diss}}$  of an opinion  $X$ :

$$\mathbf{b}_X^{\text{Diss}} = \sum_{x_i \in \mathbb{X}} \left( \frac{\mathbf{b}_X(x_i) \sum_{x_j \in \mathbb{X} \setminus x_i} \mathbf{b}_X(x_j) \text{Bal}(x_j, x_i)}{\sum_{x_j \in \mathbb{X} \setminus x_i} \mathbf{b}_X(x_j)} \right)$$

relative mass balance:

$$\text{Bal}(x_j, x_i) = 1 - \frac{|\mathbf{b}_X(x_j) - \mathbf{b}_X(x_i)|}{\mathbf{b}_X(x_j) + \mathbf{b}_X(x_i)}$$

# DRL-based Monitoring Update

## ■ States:

- Global critic state:

$$s_t^i = g_t(k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t)$$

- Local actor state:

$$s_t^i = g_t^i(k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t)$$

- $g_t/g_t^i$  is represented by the history action sequence

## ■ Actions:

- $n_t^i$ : the total number of LBS

- Action space:  $\mathbf{a}_t^i = \{0, \lfloor \frac{n_t^i}{2} \rfloor, n_t^i\}$

## ■ Rewards:

- $r_t^i = f(g_t(k_1, k_2, \dots, k_t))$  based on  $f(g_t) = -\mathcal{ME}(g_t) - \mathcal{OL}(g_t)$  where  $k_i$  is an action taken in step  $i$




Figure 3: The proposed Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning (MADRL) framework.

# Data Aggregation at LoRa Gateways

## Uncertainty (Vacuity) Maximization

- Move belief mass  $\mathbf{b}_X$  to uncertainty mass  $u_X$
- Update uncertainty based on recent data

$$\omega_X = (\mathbf{b}_X, u_X, \mathbf{a}_X) \longrightarrow \ddot{\omega}_X = (\ddot{\mathbf{b}}_X, \ddot{u}_X, \mathbf{a}_X)$$

$$\ddot{u}_X = \min_i \left[ \frac{\mathbf{P}_X(x_i)}{\mathbf{a}_X(x_i)} \right],$$

$$\ddot{\mathbf{b}}_X(x_i) = \mathbf{P}_X(x_i) - \mathbf{a}_X(x_i) \cdot \ddot{u}, \text{ for } x_i \in \mathbb{X}$$

Trigger condition:  $u_X < \rho$

# Experimental Setup

## Dataset: EmbediVet Devices (EVD)

Metric	Description
Serial	A unique animal identifier
Heart rate	Heart beats per min.
Average-temperature	Average body temperature in Celsius
Min-temperature	Minimum temperature in Celsius
Max-temperature	Maximum temperature in Celsius
Average-activity	Average activity recorded by the number of steps taken
Battery-level	Residual battery life
Timestamp	Date and time of transmission

## Environmental Setup

- Modeling sun's movement in a day
- Consensus agreement: Ensure the maximum number of requests executed in the consolidated priority list based on Hopcroft–Karp algorithm <sup>1</sup>
- Gateway locations: Cover the whole farm with the same coverage of each gateway

<sup>1</sup>Hopcroft et al., 1973




# Asymptotic Complexity Analysis

Scheme	Complexity
MADQN/MAPPO	$O(n_e \times t_{train})$
Greedy	$O(n_{action})$
Random	$O(1)$
Data Mitigation (DM)	$O(1)$

- MADQN/MAPPO incurs smaller cost than Greedy with large action space
- Random and DM are the most efficient algorithms among all while showing poor performance


# Performance Comparison ( $\mathcal{R}$ , $\mathcal{ME}$ , $\mathcal{OL}$ )



(a) Accum. reward ( $\mathcal{R}$ )    (b) Monitoring error ( $\mathcal{ME}$ )    (c) Overload ( $\mathcal{OL}$ )

- MAPPO-UM has a stationary decision process and achieves the best performance among all comparing schemes.
- DRL algorithms with uncertainty maximization (UM) outperform those without UM.
- The UM technique can update the uncertainty information from time to time, which reflects the sensor network status in a timely manner.

# Performance Comparison ( $\mathcal{BML}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{FR}$ )



(d) Batt. maintenance level ( $\mathcal{BML}$ )    (e) Uncertainty ( $\mathcal{U}$ )    (f) Freshness ( $\mathcal{FR}$ )

- MAPPO-UM achieves the best battery maintenance level ( $\mathcal{BML}$ ) compared to other schemes.
- Different schemes could have very different policies due to two conflict goals in our multi-objective function.
- The overall performance order of the considered schemes is:  $\text{MAPPO-UM} \geq \text{MADQN-UM} \approx \text{MAPPO-UM} \geq \text{MADQN-UM} \geq \text{Greedy} \geq \text{Random}$ .

# Sensitivity Analysis for Adversarial Attacks

$P_{ADV}$ \ Attack	<i>FGSM</i>	<i>MIM</i>	<i>PGD</i>	<i>BIM</i>
0.1	2	2	8	3
0.2	7	9	14	9
0.3	12	8	16	8
0.4	13	13	21	9

FGSM: Fast Gradient Sign Method

MIM: Momentum Iterative Method

PGD: Projected Gradient Descent


BIM: Basic Iterative Method

$P_{ADV}$ : Adversarial attack probability

- MAPPO-UM is evaluated with respect to accumulated reward.
- The results are shown in the relative performance decline *permillage* <sup>2</sup>.
- PGD is the strongest while BIM is the weakest.

<sup>2</sup>a rate or proportion per thousand

# Effect of Varying the Internal Attack Probability ( $P_{IDA}$ )




(a) Accumulated reward ( $\mathcal{R}$ ) (b) Monitoring error rate ( $\mathcal{ME}$ )

(c) Overload ( $\mathcal{OL}$ )

- The overall performance order with respect to the three metrics is:  
 $\text{MAPPO-UM} \geq \text{MAPPO-NUM} \geq \text{Greedy} \geq \text{MADQN-UM} \geq \text{MADQN-NUM} \geq \text{DM} \geq \text{Random}.$


# Effect of Varying the External Attack Probability

( $P_{EDA}$ )



- (a) Accumulated reward ( $\mathcal{R}$ )      (b) Monitoring error rate ( $\mathcal{ME}$ )      (c) Overload ( $\mathcal{OL}$ )
- The overall performance order with respect to the three metrics is:  
 $\text{MAPPO-UM} \geq \text{MAPPO-NUM} \geq \text{Greedy} \geq \text{MADQN-UM} \geq \text{MADQN-NUM} \geq \text{DM} \geq \text{Random}.$

# Effect of Varying the Attacker's Non-Compliance Probability ( $P_{NCA}$ )



(a) Accumulated reward ( $R$ )

(b) Monitoring error rate ( $ME$ )

(c) Overload ( $OL$ )

- The overall performance order with respect to the three metrics is:  
 $\text{MAPPO-UM} \geq \text{MAPPO-NUM} \geq \text{Greedy} \geq \text{MADQN-UM} \geq \text{MADQN-NUM} \geq \text{DM} \geq \text{Random}.$

# Key Contributions & Findings

Our proposed MAPPO-UM achieves:

- A strong resilience against attacks by achieving the best monitoring quality and minimum system overload.
- The best energy maintenance level by intelligently leveraging the uncertainty information.
- The enhanced monitoring quality and energy-adaptive operation with the uncertainty maximization (UM) technique using more recent evidence.
- Different optimal monitoring policies in different scenarios due to the different payoffs to monitoring updates.
- Strong robustness under harsh environments as demonstrated via extensive sensitivity analyses.