# The March on Brasilia: An Interpretation of Bolsonarist Actions in Preparation for the January 8, 2023 Insurrection

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## Introduction

On January 8, 2023, demonstrators attacked and occupied government buildings in Brasília. The event was described by analysts and commentators as a coup act. Since the 2022 presidential elections, won by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro have refused to recognize election results, claiming that those were rigged. They camped in front of barracks[[2]](#footnote-3) and called on the armed forces to carry out a coup d'état. On January 8, part of the camped protesters went to the Legislative Chamber and Planalto Palace, the presidential headquarters in Brazil, and invaded these two buildings. They expected the army to support them. The coup never took place, the police reacted by arresting demonstrators and clearing the camps. This historical event can be interpreted in different ways. One of them is that it was not actually a coup attempt. It is a popular insurrection of the fascist type far-right.

In this chapter, I will seek to present an interpretation of the Bolsonarist movement as a fascist movement. To this end, I identify the January 8 insurrection as a *March on Brasilia*, which has parallels with the October 27, 1922 *March on Rome*. To do so, I start by presenting a brief analysis of Bolsonarism and the January 8 insurrection. I then discuss the format of agitation and propaganda of Bolsonarism, ending with a reflection on the organizational characteristics of Bolsonarism.

## Fascism and the March: Historical Parallels Between Fascism and Bolsonarism

The categorization of Bolsonarism as a type of fascism is nothing new, and can be supported by different approaches. The approach presented here allows us to reflect on the militant action by part of the mass involved in the January 8 insurrection. Starting with an interpretation about Bolsonarism as fascism, I then discuss the meanings of the March on Rome and follow with a reflection on the parallel between the March on Rome and the March on Brasilia.

The definition of what characterizes fascism is a subject of wide discussion in the fields of history and sociology. One of the possible definitions comes from Giorgi Dimitrov, responsible for elaborating the popular front policy (anti-fascist front), that defeated fascism during World War II. For Dimitrov, fascism was a class alliance formed by the most chauvinist sector of the *financial bourgeoisie*[[3]](#footnote-4) allied with political gangsterism.[[4]](#footnote-5) Using the concept of *class fraction*,[[5]](#footnote-6) it is possible to say that Bolsonarism brings together sectors of the commercial bourgeoisie, the financial bourgeoisie, the agrarian oligarchy, and war- and crime lords (the so-called Brazilian *militias[[6]](#footnote-7)*). Thus, it expresses the alliance between radical sectors of the financial bourgeoisie, the old land oligarchy, and political gangsterism.[[7]](#footnote-8)

Also from the point of view of aesthetics and political objectives, Bolsonarism has parallels with fascism. Fascism is an ideology that is structured in violence around a social mythology and establishing the State as a historical entity to be glorified.[[8]](#footnote-9) To garner political support, Bolsonarism, like fascism, carries out agitation based on myths and on the violation of the truth.[[9]](#footnote-10) In fascist ideologies, the leader of the movement is always treated as a creature that expresses more than his own humanity. He is no longer seen as a man, and is treated as an expression of the collective will of the movement. In Italy, Mussolini was *Il Duce*; in Germany, Hitler was the *Führer*; in Brazil, Bolsonaro has become *The Myth*. In all cases, the argument of defending the nation against the communist danger was one of the driving forces of agitation speeches to mobilize the masses.

Another feature in common between fascism and Bolsonarism is the distrust on institutions and on the current democracy itself. Both fascism and Bolsonarism were considered by its followers the true representatives of the silent majority. Any electoral result that did not give victory to these movements was considered a misrepresentation of the true will of the nation.

Mussolini, in his quest for power, sought to amplify the strength of his *Nation Fascist Party*. He also encouraged the formation of shock brigades consisting of his militants and supporters, the *squadristi*. In 1922, fascism was still only a minority in the country's legislature. But Mussolini and other leading members of the fascist movement were convinced that the conditions were right for a coup d'état. The plan involved setting up columns leaving different regions of Italy, taking strategic posts, until arriving in Rome.[[10]](#footnote-11) On October 24, in Naples, Mussolini addressed around sixty thousand blackshirts, a *squadristi* group, stating that the fascists ‘wanted to govern Italy’. Then he went to Milan, where he would await the outcome of the coup, ready to flee the country if it failed. He did not directly participate in the March, as a way to protect himself from accusations of conspiracy. Between March 24 and 28, the *squadristi* took strategic posts across Italy. Their success was more due to the inaction of the police rather than their own strength. In areas where resistance was encountered, there were delays. On October 28, only sixteen thousand fascists had arrived at the meeting points for the march. The forces were not enough for a confrontation in the capital. But confrontation wasn't necessary. On that day, King Victor Emmanuel III invited Mussolini to take the role as head of government. The next day, thirty thousand people marched in honor of Mussolini.

The absence of political leadership during the marches caused the number of adherents to drop along its way. The uprising led to a contradictory situation where the numbers indicate that the march wore out the mobilization capacity at the same time that it led to the feeling of strength of the fascists among the public. Afraid of a civil war, Victor Emmanuel III dismissed the possibility of establishing martial law, which would allow him to defeat the rebels. The March, therefore, was not a coup d'état, but the burning of forces that generated the necessary climate for power to be handed over to Mussolini. Even with the victory, the fascist force concentrated in Rome was inferior to the one Mussolini had mobilized four days before.

In Brazil, Bolsonaro did not address his supporters. However, during his presidential term (2019–2022), he attacked electronic voting machines. He stated that they were vulnerable to manipulation. He hinted that, if there were no changes to the electoral system there was a risk that the election might not be recognized as legitimate. Shortly after the election results were announced, protesters supporting Bolsonaro started blocking roads and camped in front of military barracks. They called for military intervention, imprisonment of federal judges, and annulment of the election. In other words, they asked the military to interrupt the democratic process and recognize Bolsonaro's permanence in the presidency. On December 12th, militants tried to invade the headquarters of the federal police, without success. On December 24, a protester was arrested, accused of trying to carry out a terrorist attack. Arrested, the demonstrator admitted to being part of a conspiracy conjured up in the camp located in front of the Army Headquarters. Further, he acknowledges having received the explosives to be installed and cause panic, opening the ground for military intervention.[[11]](#footnote-12)

Bolsonaro did not openly support the activities of the militants. Instead, he traveled to the USA on December 30th, 2022 after stating that he would not demobilize the encamped supporters, as he had not mobilized them himself. Documents arising from subsequent investigations reveal that between the elections and Bolsonaro’s trip, a draft for a coup d’état was produced, which was found in the house of Anderson Torres, former Minister of Justice and Public Security.[[12]](#footnote-13) A conversation was also discovered between Colonel Elcio Franco, one of Jair Bolsonaro’s trusted men, and former Major Ailton Barros, where they described how to mobilize 1,500 men for a coup.[[13]](#footnote-14) The entire strategy involved the army leading the coup, which would be supported by the population. However, the army's top leadership did not actively join the conspiracy.

As of January 4, 2023, Bolsonaro still maintained the title of *President of Brazil*  in his Twitter account description[[14]](#footnote-15). This was seen by the demonstrators as a sign that *The Myth* did not recognize the election, so he was just waiting for the right time to act. That day, material began circulating on social media and messaging apps calling for the ‘Green and Yellow Revolution’, to be launched on January 7. The objective was to close down the Congress. On January 6, protesters' violence against journalists escalated. When questioned, the militants claimed that the violence was directed against ‘those who encouraged the fraud’ of the elections. On social media posts, they promised more violence if the elections were not annulled. Between the night of January 7 and the first hours of the next day, the insurrection began. On the 8th, in the morning, Congress was invaded, followed by the Planalto Palace, and finally the Federal Supreme Court. For the first few hours, there was little resistance from the police, who appeared unprepared. But contrary to what the demonstrators expected, the army did not join the insurrection. In time, the government managed to regroup its forces, and took the offensive. The insurrection was dispersed, militants were arrested, and the camps were gradually dismantled.

The insurrection had emission centers, which advertised the date and organized the action through social networks. It had a place of concentration and preparation, which was the field in front of the Army Headquarters, in Brasilia. However, at the time of action, no prominent leadership came forward, and the march took place in a disorganized manner. Once inside the Planalto Palace, instead of organizing a center of action and power, the demonstrators began to plunder property. Deprived of strategic cadres[[15]](#footnote-16) to lead them, and with no one to deliver the coup for them, the demonstrators had no chance of seizing power.

The March on Brasilia, the ‘Green and Yellow Revolution’, failed. Not just because Bolsonaro was unable to seize power, as the March on Rome would have been too. It failed because the strategy was never to take power by marching. Just as Mussolini knew that his attempt at a show of force could cost him an arrest and was already prepared to flee Italy, the Bolsonarist leadership was worried about defeat and chose not to participate on the scheduled date. Thus, the failure of the March cannot be read only from a tactical perspective. This is a strategic defeat of Bolsonarism. For the plans to work, it would have been necessary for the country's military leadership to adhere to Bolsonaro and his dissatisfaction with the elections. There are different reasons why this adhesion did not occur. A possible interpretation is that Bolsonarism never delivered a clear political program pointing to a structural change that would be advantageous for that military leadership and give it protagonism. It has not been able to produce convincing propaganda to garner long-term political support from the army head.

## Aspects of Bolsonarist Agitation and Propaganda

One way to research a political dispute is by studying the agitation and propaganda of the movement we want to understand. This analysis departs from the conceptualization that Dimitrov and the communists of the anti-fascist front used, where agitation is understood as all political action that aims to mobilize the masses for short-term goals, be it a political demonstration or attraction to some organizational group. Propaganda indicates the development of a complex set of ideas that constitute a way of seeing the world that supports a long-term objective. That is, propaganda is the development of a theory and a political (or party) program that justifies a power strategy. I argue here that Bolsonarism is a political movement that has the capacity to agitate but has limitations in its propaganda policy. For this, we need to first reflect on the programmatic difference between Bolsonarism and classic fascism to then touch on the common characteristics between fascism and Bolsonarism in terms of agitation. Finally, it is necessary to discuss the use of social networks as a tool for agitation and organization.

One of the characteristics that distinguishes Nazism and Fascism from other types of dictatorships is that they are mass movements that are organized around an ideology with a certain degree of complexity. They have a political program, declared objectives, and a theory that seeks to justify the program and objectives. The Nazis had Hitler's Mein Kampf as their programmatic text. The fascists, on the other hand, until 1933, did not have a book where the doctrine of fascism was explicit. Instead, they depended on Mussolini's speeches, and, from 1928, on the ideas contained in his autobiography. But the doctrinal elements of fascism were already well known in 1922, when *Il Duce* addressed the Blackshirts in Naples.

Mussolini already preached that liberal democracy was flawed because it allowed governments to succeed by deceiving the people and betraying their homeland and that only strong leadership could express the real needs of a silent majority and national strength[[16]](#footnote-17). Thus, the fascist doctrine was characterized by elements such as: (a) defense of force as a legitimate political instrument and of the vote as an instrument of misrepresentation; (b) elevation of national myths above rational historical analysis; (c) establishment of the State as the most important historical actor, to the detriment of the individual or social classes; and (d) subordination of the economy to politics and morals. Later, this doctrine would be described as a rupture with the Enlightenment, with fascism being an anti-liberal and anti-communist ideology, which subordinates reason to the objectives of the State[[17]](#footnote-18). This doctrinal set was strong enough to attract the support of thinkers during the rise of fascism. Benedetto Croce, for example, supported Mussolini's March to Rome and would only break with fascism in 1924.

Historical situations are capable of transforming ideas and movements. Fascism did not exist only in its pure form. It has generated offspring ideologies that are also called fascism. Among these offspring is a type of ideology that can be called ‘occupation fascism’. These are movements or governments that adopt the fascist model of mobilization, have fascist ideological aspects, but which have, at the core of their functioning, the belief that the most important historical agent is a foreign country. These are movements such as the *French People's Party*, which acted as a collaborationist movement in Nazi-occupied France during World War II;[[18]](#footnote-19) the *Personalist Party of Vietnam*, that was pro-Western and pro-Catholicism during the Vietnam War,[[19]](#footnote-20) among others.

In the case of Bolsonarism, one of the possible interpretations is that Bolsonaro’s speeches express the line of thought of Olavo de Carvalho, considered the movement’s intelectual guide.[[20]](#footnote-21) Olavo influenced an important current of thought among the Brazilian far-right.[[21]](#footnote-22) Thus, it is fair to consider him the mind behind Bolsonarist propaganda. His thought is characterized by being anti-rational and anti-science, advocating a return late medieval Catholic values.[[22]](#footnote-23) Thus, he defends a Christian Brazilian society, strongly linked to Europe and the USA. This propaganda can explain Bolsonaro’s government strategy for international relations, for instance, which abandoned the principle of Brazilian protagonism and sought to align itself with Donald Trump and the international far-right. Therefore, what we have is a type of *occupation fascism*, in which the State’s protagonism is exerted not by the country itself, but by foreign states.

There is, in Bolsonarism, no principle of strengthening Brazil's economic and military power in the long run. Instead, the defense of the army and the State took on a tactical approach, being used as a flag of political agitation. The search for external force helps to understand why it was strategic for Bolsonaro to obtain support from other countries for his critique of the electronic ballot box. On July 18, 2022, the then president invited ambassadors to a meeting where he presented unfounded accusations that electronic voting machines were unreliable. It was about preparing the ground for a future attempt to invalidate the elections. This attempt failed, since there was a clear collective international position contrary to Bolsonaro's arguments. The US embassy, a country considered an important strategic ally in Bolsonarist and Olavist thinking, stated the following day that the electoral system in Brazil was safe.[[23]](#footnote-24)

One of the main differences between fascism and other far-right movements is that it is a mass movement. In other words, it uses organizational and mobilization tools to garner support from the masses. Here, term ‘agitation’ is used to describe this set of mobilization and insufflation tools. Although irrationalism was a key element in fascist propaganda, it reaches its purest form in agitation. Fascism's hate speech seeks to mobilize the deepest yearnings and place a chosen enemy as responsible for those yearnings being unable to be met. Thus, fascists present themselves as the movement that can free the people from those who oppress the desire of the masses.[[24]](#footnote-25)

Bolsonarism chose the ‘left’[[25]](#footnote-26) as its main target, be it in its general form, or in the form of voters of the Workers’ Party (PT) candidate. Still, given the institutional resistance it encountered, the Federal Supreme Court became the target of attacks. In its agitation pieces circulated on the internet, Bolsonarism sought to build a narrative in which Lula could bring the ‘PT dictatorship’ in case the election took place with fraud. To prevent this, it was necessary to fight, and even close, the STF. With the electoral defeat, this agitation gained strength. The population was called to strike, stop roads, and camp in front of barracks. The main slogan was: ‘the elections were rigged’. Added to it were the words: ‘Lula dictator’, ‘Army, intervene!’, and even ‘close the STF’. The army, in these agitation pieces, appeared as an extension both of the people’s will and of Bolsonaro. The real proposition behind this agitation, therefore, is that the army could empower Bolsonaro *The Myth* to govern and rid the country of those who stand in the way of the masses’ desires.

In the 1920s and 1930s, newspapers, flyers, and rallies were the tools of agitation. Bolsonarism, on the other hand, used social networks and messaging applications to carry out their communication, constituting a true virtual ecosystem. At the center of this ecosystem are the so-called ‘big groups’ of the Telegram app,[[26]](#footnote-27) and some regional Whatsapp groups. Members of these groups produce and make available agitation material, such as captioned images, cartoons, videos, or sensationalist texts. To validate the information, they refer to ultra-right websites. Audiovisual material is made available via YouTube or TikTok. This material is then forwarded to sectoral or thematic groups, and smaller groups, forming a semi-hierarchical communication network.[[27]](#footnote-28) Some of the material that is forwarded in groups is reproduced by members or administrators on social networks, usually first on Twitter. From there, it is reproduced on Facebook and Instagram and other channels. This assembled structure, although it relies on a certain spontaneity of the members to forward the material to other groups and people, does not completely differ from the structure of committees, cells, and mass fronts of the traditional fascist parties (Figure 1). It is a competent and dangerous adaptation, given its infinitely greater capacity for mobilization. Still, it does not demand formal commitment from those who become part of the political agitation machine, often without being fully aware of their actions.




Figure 1: Representation of Bolsonarist virtual agitation network. Image by the author.

Given the nature of messaging apps, monitoring to identify shared content is limited. Only members can view messages. Thus, it is not possible to carry out a broad search of the content, which gives this communication structure an almost clandestine aspect. One way to capture part of this propaganda is by looking at what emerges on open social media. Twitter, as it serves as an intermediary between message groups and other social networks, is where agitation content first appears in the public debate. Therefore, monitoring and analysing this network allows us to understand some aspects of Bolsonaro supporters’ agitation practices. One of the possible aspects to investigate is the hypothesis that the March on Brasilia was planned.

To test this hypotesis, a wide collection of tweets was conducted, including 162,494 posts on that social network, using some key terms,[[28]](#footnote-29) including two that were calls for insurrection: ‘Revolução Verde Amarelo’ (Green and Yellow Revolution), and the code word ‘Festa da Selma’ (Selma’s party). The analyzed posts originated from 89,580 different users, and were shared 679,342 times. More than half a million communicative connections[[29]](#footnote-30) were observed.

The terms ‘Green and Yellow Revolution’ and ‘Selma’s party’’[[30]](#footnote-31) are quite indicative of the preparation process that preceded the insurrection. From January 4, the term ‘Green Yellow Revolution’ began to circulate calling for the demonstration on January 7 with the aim of closing the congress. On January 5, the term ‘Selma’s party’ began to circulate, with the pre-party scheduled for Saturday January 7, and the actual party soon after.




Figure 2: Mentions of the term ‘festadaselma’ or ‘Selma’s party’ by the public on Twitter, from December 26, 2022 to January 10, 2023. Image by the author using data collected from Twitter.

Figure 2 shows the preparation before January 7, the mobilization during that day, and then the moment of the insurrection on January 8. During the preparation, it was said that ‘Selma’s party’ would be matched by other parties, like ‘Telma’s party’, in São Paulo, and ‘Velma’s party’, in Rio de Janeiro. But the main one was ‘Selma’s party’ in Brasilia where the caravans were supposed to go, trying to mobilize at least five thousand people. It was stated that the intention was to cause disorder to get the army to act and carry out the coup in Bolsonaro's name, according to tweets on January 5 and 6. The march did take place on that day and ‘The Green and Yellow Revolution’, also called ‘Selma’s party’, was held albeit with fewer participants than expected. The expected coup did not occur.

## Considerations on the Leadership and Militarism of the Bolsonarist Movement

Interpreting that January 8 was a March on Brasilia, modeled on the March on Rome, and that Bolsonarism is a movement with fascist aspects, requires recognizing that it is a movement that has an organizational structure and a chain of command, although it is not limited to them.

The argument advanced here is that Bolsonarism is a mass ideology, as is fascism. In the case of Bolsonarism, the mass was mobilized via messaging apps and social networks and can be divided into two types of members: the regular militants, who are active members of message groups, systematically sharing and spreading content; and the supporters, who receive and only share the content that they are most interested in. The mobilization of regular members is easier, since they made Bolsonarist political action the center of their way of life, and acted as Bolsonarism's tactical cadres. Mobilizing supporters, on the other hand, proved to be more difficult. Therefore, the mass mobilized for January 7 and onwards was smaller than expected. In practice, only part of the regular militants participated.

One factor to be noted is that Mussolini's fascism set up its shock groups (the *squadristi*). Bolsonarismo has never developed hierarchical shock groups. There was an effort by the Bolsonaro government to arm groups of gun collectors, sport shooters, and hunters (CACs in the Portuguese acronym), in the expectation that members of shooting clubs would form the shock groups. But CACs were never effectively organized into a command structure. Moreover, the criminal militias, to which the Bolsonaro family and some Bolsonaristas are accused of having a connection, were not politically mobilized to carry out the March.

According to Colonel Jorge Eduardo Naime, there were militants with guerrilla training in the insurrection on January 8.[[31]](#footnote-32) But these militants were not organized into commanded combat groups subordinate to strategic leadership. There was no military command structure. There was no objective for the insurrection to carry out a coup, since the means for that were not mobilized. The insurrection should serve to legitimize the action of the strategic leaders, to encourage the army to carry out the coup in the name of the movement. But there was no command structure that made it possible to articulate the two things: the insurrection and the subsequent coup.

These strategic leaderships can be divided into two groups: militant leadership and military leadership. The militant leadership was composed of civilian cadres, whether they were deputies, political advisers, and low-level military personnel. In practice, they are those who organize Bolsonarism as a movement. In addition to the Bolsonaro family, people like Anderson Torres, Colonel Elcio Franco, and Ailton Barros, were part of the first echelon of leadership, between December 2022 and January 2023. This leadership bet on the strategy for taking power by trying to co-opt the high command of the army so they would deliver the coup and hand over power to Bolsonaro. Therefore, they only acted in the sense of mobilizing the population to put pressure on the army, while attempting to conspire with the army’s high command. On the day of the uprising, this militant leadership chose to be absent, to try to preserve itself in case everything went wrong.

The military leadership would be composed of the high command of the army, with whom Bolsonaro had good dialogue during his government. Although they participated in the government, and showed sympathy for Bolsonaro's political style, there was no complete adherence to Bolsonarism. In practice, Bolsonarism considered that the Brazilian State was not the main agent in the international struggle for a Western World Order. Instead, Bolsonarism sought validation from foreign forces, including the US. When representatives of US diplomacy made it clear that they considered the Brazilian election to be legitimate, the Brazilian military leadership understood that the main force that could support them would not legitimize a coup in Brazil. Thus, the army high command had no interest in carrying out a coup, and would only do so under clear orders from Bolsonaro, while he was still in power. Bolsonaro, like Mussolini, feared defeat. Mussolini gave the order and prepared to flee. Bolsonaro fled without ever giving the order, only leaving it implied. With that, he prevented the direct involvement of the strategic leadership for the seizure of power, and sealed the fate of the March to Brasilia, which would only be an ultra-right insurrection, with no chance of victory. He condemned it to be known by the pejorative name *of Revolta dos Manés* (The Fool’s Revolt).

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1. Apoena Canuto Cosenza holds a PhD in Economic History from Universidade de São Paulo - USP, and is currently a member of the Mario Schenberg Institute. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The protesters camped in front of the army headquarters in Brasília and in front of different barracks throughout the country. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The term *financial bourgeoisie* comes from Hilferding in 1910, and was later used by Lenin in 1917. This is the group of businessmen who work in finance. Finance, for them, was the union between banking capital and industrial capital. That is, they are bankers, large shareholders, partners in economic conglomerates, among others. See Rudolf Hilferding *Das Finanzkapital, eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus*. Wiener Volksbuchandlung, 1910. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Dimitrov, Georgi. ‘The United Front Against Fascism and War: The fascist offensive and the tasks of the Communist International in the fight for the unity of the working class against fascism’. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1935. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. *Class fraction* is a grouping that although it forms part of a broader socioeconomic class has its own interests that can place it in a different political field from the rest of its class. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. At Brazil, the term Militia (*Milícias*) has become a synonym of organized crime that is ruled by crooked members of state repression forces, that takes control over a territory. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Apoena Canuto Cosenza and Igor Grabois, ‘Frações de Classe e Reservas Estratégicas: Um paradigma da aliança anti-fascista’. *Revista Mouro* 11 (14), 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile, *The Doctrine of Fascism*. Vallecchi, 1935. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
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12. Vinicius Sassine and Camila Mattoso, ‘PF encontra na casa de ex-ministro minuta para Bolsonaro mudar resultado da eleição’, *Folha de São Paulo*, 12 February 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. ‘Áudio revela coronel Elcio Franco em trama golpista’, *CNN Brasil*, 8 May 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Jair M. Bolsonaro, @jairbolsonaro, https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. We adopted as a category the concepts of ‘strategic cadres’ which are the general organizational and political leaders of the movement, and ‘tactical cadres’ which are the occasional organizational leaders of a given subgroup or given specific political action of a larger political movement. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. MUSSOLINI, “Speech at the Parlament, 3, January, 1925”, in MUSSOLINI, My Autobiography. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928. P. 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Benito Mussolini and E. Cope, *The doctrine of fascism*. Vallecchi, 1935. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
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19. Robert G. Scigliano, ‘Political parties in South Vietnam under the Republic’, *Pacific Affairs* 33.4 (1960): 327–346. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Claudio Reis, ‘O intelectual orgânico do bolsonarismo e o caso da pandemia’. *Revista Enfil* 12 (2020): 76–95. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Gilberto Calil, ‘Olavo de Carvalho e a ascensão da extrema-direita’,*Argumentum* 13.2 (2021): 64–81. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
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23. ‘Um dia após Bolsonaro atacar urnas, embaixada dos EUA diz que eleições no Brasil são 'modelo' para o mundo’, *Jornal* *G1*, 19 July 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Robert Lanning, ‘Irrationalism: The foundation of hate propaganda’, *Journal of Hate Studies.* 10, 2011, p. 49. See also, Robert Lanning, ‘The Masses and Pro-fascist Propaganda’. In: *‘The Masses and Pro-fascist Propaganda’. In the hotel abyss: an Hegelian-Marxist critique of Adorno.* Brill*,* 2014*,* pp.120–150. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. It is important to emphasize that what Bolsonarism calls the left is not exactly what political science would call the left. In fact, there is little methodological rigor in the classification of what is or is not left by Jair Bolsonaro's supporters. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Levy Teles, ‘Bolsonaristas operam supergrupos nas redes e cobram soltura de presos’, *Terra*, 21 February 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Nina Santos, Viktor Chagas and Juliana Marinho, ‘De onde vem a informação que circula em grupos bolsonaristas no WhatsApp’,*Intexto* 53 (2022): 123603–123603. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. The terms collected were ‘:Alexandre de Moraes’, ‘Bolsonaro Mito’, ‘Dia 7 manifestação’, ‘Fecha STF’, ‘Festa da Selma’, ‘Fraude Eleição’, ‘Intervenção Militar’, ‘Lula Ladrão’, ‘Nuremberg’, ‘Revolução Verde Amarelo’, ‘Viva Bolsonaro’. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. This term is used by Brazilian influencers to describe the amount of times an idea or a post generated some kind of registered engagement other than reactions such as ‘likes’. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. ‘Festa da Selma’ is a term that has a double reference. It is a reference to the city of Selma, in the state of Alabama in the United States, the scene of the massacre of a manifestation of the black movement known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. It is also a reference to the term ‘Selva’, used as a greeting by the Brazilian army. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Alan Rios. ‘Golpistas tinham técnica de guerrilha e eram financiados, diz coronel à CPI’. *Jornal Metrópole*, 16 March 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)