## LOG:: 07 Objects Of Interest

Now objects perceive me.

Paul Klee

Paul Virillio relays this line from the painter Paul Klee. What Klee imagined has become the truth. We humans are no longer the subject who sees.[[1]](#footnote-1) Virillio’s *Vision Machine* was, at the time of its writing, somehow still speculative: a fiction of a machine that not only recognizes shapes and contours but can also interpret a complex visual environment, directly operated by a computer, automatically interpreting the meaning of change and events in the observed field.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Seeing has become a matter or ability of a material. Computer or machine vision is a massive research field in the sciences. Still, we need to understand non-human seeing technology's cultural aspects and impact. We realize that a shift is happening, and this shift relates to human perception. We are still determining if the change will be an expansion of our perception, a controlling force, and a power of capital to co-construct how we live and act in our world.

Photography is a simple example of the technological shift of a medium's meaning and use. Photography has seen two essential value shifts. The first is a value shift from the individual aesthetic of the artist as a photographer to the collaborative and social aesthetics of social media platform services or applications. The second value shift is using photographic images as a vast, combined data fabric to extract information, train chatbots, and re-deliver this cumulative information as a totally different package.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Our lives are saturated with photos. Our smartphones capture everything, from selfies to everyday scenes. Visuals dominate communication, and images are attached to almost every message. This constant capturing and sharing turns us into both consumers and creators of imagery.

The sheer volume of photos has become overwhelming. The rise of selfies exemplifies this. Manually sorting and organizing is no longer feasible. We are unable to extract information in the way Daguerre was, where the camera and the photograph—as well as the photographer—documented and witnessed a single fact. We need AI to step in. Machines excel at analyzing vast amounts of photos, identifying patterns, and highlighting key moments. AI is then not just a sorting tool, it's starting to shape our visual language. It learns our photography preferences and even suggests new styles. This automation is driven by powerful computing, vast datasets, and sophisticated algorithms. Individual desktop computers will likely become relics, replaced by cloud-based, mobile-centric technology generating a general aesthetic.

*Images* and *objects* are looking back at us. Instead of passively consuming visuals, we already interact with them in a dynamic way. Photos don’t just document our life; they actively influence it, perhaps even subconsciously. But, what kind of *images* or *objects* are looking at us? What is happening or has changed in our relation to *things*?

**Cinematographic Objects**

For years, different fields have debated the role of objects. However, film and media studies haven't fully explored how such work might contribute to understanding agency, both human and non-human. What if we saw cinema not just as a way to show things, but as a machine for learning about them? In this light, what can cinema tell us about objects and their relationship with humans and non-humans?

Films are full of objects, on different levels. There are the things we see on screen, the objects the film is about, and even the film itself as an object. Martin Heidegger might call these *Zeug*, or useful things.

Volker Pantenburg's book *Cinematographic Objects* delves into how film theory defines and categorizes objects. Different theorists have different ideas. Balazs is drawn to the surface qualities of objects, while Epstein focuses on their active power. Casetti argues that Epstein's work suggests objects can even *act* on viewers. Thomas Elsaesser analyzes the specific example of the carousel on screen. He proposes a new way to think about film, moving beyond the idea of the image simply capturing reality. Instead, he suggests *energy* is a better concept, as it applies to different film technologies and captures the various types of energy involved, from mechanical to digital.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Energy today is experienced as distributive, networked, nodal. As such, it is closer to information and code. Energy in cinema is the ability to convert mechanically generated movement into brain perception and body sensation (Deleuze and Kittler). The object carousel as a para-, proto-, and meta-cinematic object par excellence, points, in Elsaesser's reflection, to an idea of cinema that *finally can, and perhaps should, only exist in mind.*[[5]](#footnote-5)

Of course, this reflection on the cinematographic object is grounded in a form of cinema that is already inadequate, despite directors like Christopher Nolan and Hollywood capital proofs a nostalgia for celluloid. Cinematographic objects, in this form of reflection, or *Betrachtung*, as a theoretical approach, don't offer more to our understanding of what is happening in the further algorithmic automation of culture. Cinema in 2024 is a niche, a system inside a broader cultural system offering a specific form of formalized entertainment, while streaming and platforms dominate the daily.

**thing and medium**

A very different reflection on objects comes from a 1926 essay by Fritz Heider, “Ding und Medium*”*. Thanks to Niklas Luhmann and Dirk Baecker, this essay is available today.

Heider, a psychologist by training, was partial to Gestalt psychology, with which he eventually made a career in the US. In 1920, Heider received his doctorate with a thesis on causality under Alexius Meinong, a student of Franz Bretano who became known for his object theory. Later in the 1920s, in Munich, Heider worked with the psychologist Max Wertheimer, one of the founders of Gestalt psychology. From 1927 on, he worked with the psychologist William Stern, father of Günther Anders, in Hamburg and emigrated to the US in 1930. In “Ding und Medium”, Heider asks why our perception singles out an object. Causality would treat everything as equally probable, so everything could be described through cause and effect. However, observation makes clear that humans are not determined, fixed creatures constrained by cause and effect. We can create our forms of life through surprising new combinations of cause and effect.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Heider uses the example of a pencil and a lamp.

I can see this pencil here, for example. It is illuminated by the lamp. The pencil therefore causes the process on the retina. We can also go back even further to the lamp; one could also say that the light from the lamp causes the retinal process. Why do I see the pencil and not something here just in front of my eye or the lamp?[[7]](#footnote-7)

Heider attempts to ask about the causal processes that create an energetic connection between a thing and our perception without us noticing anything about the energy source, about the energy transfer process between the thing and our senses, much less about the calculation of this perception in our body and brain. We perceive without perceiving the perception to which we owe a perception.

Heider suggests treating objects and media as similar in their basic building blocks. These elements can be combined tightly or loosely. Letters, for instance, are loosely connected, while words are a tight combination of letters. This means letters act as the media that creates a word object. Words can be loosely connected to form sentences, and sentences can be combined to form texts.

This concept, later developed extensively by Niklas Luhmann, helps Heider escape a cause-and-effect trap. He argues that perception isn't caused by objects themselves but by the perceiver. Through our actions, we select and solidify specific things from the vast possibilities the media offers, essentially crystallizing them from the background. Heider even lays the groundwork here for a new understanding of how actions work.

The organism itself is a thing in the world. The object of cognition does not act directly on the sense organ but through some mediation. He asks whether a structure of the external world is decisive for cognition, and, if so, what is this like. The world might be seen as a network of causal processes. In terms of causation, all links in the chain of cause and effect are equal, but not in terms of perception. There is a unique link, namely our object of perception. Wave-mediated remote perception—for we will restrict ourselves to this for the time being (Heider)—structures the world into what is perceived, the objects of perception, and the mediation through which perception occurs. Most of the time, the objects of perception are the solid and semi-solid things in our environment, and mediation is the air-filled space, the medium that surrounds things. There are exceptions; for example, things like glass serve as mediators; we can see through glass. But we will ignore these exceptions for now and ask ourselves based on which properties the things and media play the roles of the object of knowledge and mediator. The medium and the stone are the substrates of the event; they remain in place, and the energy moves through and over these substrates and takes on different forms.

For Heider, the concept of energy is similar to the idea of information. Energy excites things in the medium of their perception.

Heider continues by identifying two types of events: internally conditioned events assigned to the substrate, and externally conditioned events assigned to the influence. The medium event is externally conditioned. What happens in the media depends on the form of the incoming energy; the specific nature of the medium is largely irrelevant to the form of the event. It is now necessary to distinguish between unified and multiple events. An exact depiction, imposition, or impression of a design is generally only possible if the thing is imposed by or through events or that onto which something is imposed consists of many independent parts. These imposed events form false units, possibly because they can be traced back to uniform causes. If the causes of the individual, independent shocks also had nothing to do with each other, then it would be extremely unlikely that order and regularity would arise.

Isn't everything in this world equally meaningful, grounded, and only referring to itself? How can there be something that points to something else? To point to something else, the sign must be closely associated with this other, with the thing being signified. The sign must point to something specific; it must not stand alone in the world; it must be linked to something else and clearly to something specific. We find these properties of association in the medium processes. All these medium processes that affect our sense organs and give us information about things are false units. These false units have the property of pointing to something else; they are incomprehensible if they are not related to the unified cause.

The diversity of signs could also have come about in another way. There could be a single sign for every word, for every concept: a sign that forms a unity in itself that is not composed of different independent parts. Image language is such a sign system. Most sign systems, however, use combinations to achieve multiplicity. Combining independent elements also prevails in flag signals or Morse code. The arrangement of units occurs not in space, as with letters, but in time. The arrangement of points must come entirely from the person who gives the signs; it must not arise in any way from the nature of the signs themselves. In other words, the signs must be independent of one another. If the combination is used in time, then the time position of one element must be independent of the time positions of the other elements.

We must ask ourselves how the environment is structured in relation to its vital importance and its immediate importance for the organism. Of the countless possible environmental factors, we only need to know a few to be fully oriented to them as concerns their potential relationships to our bodies. We only live in a particular sphere of this world; we have no relationship at all to much of what is around us and what is happening; it is not really for us. The unity of the chair is, therefore, objective. The chair has properties as a whole. Specific laws and relationships between these whole properties are, to a high degree, invariant compared to the determinations of the small particles. Being spherical is one such property. It can be realized in an infinite number of particle combinations. Each of these combinations has the further property of being rollable. A solid ball can be rolled, no matter what material it is made of. There is, therefore, a correlation between different whole properties across the small particles and their properties. For the sensory-physiological processes, these physical systems are of great importance; for the practical structure of the world that surrounds us and for the conditions of perception outside the organism, structures of the type of solid units are probably more important.

In our world, there are more gruesome and smaller units and parts of larger wholes. The organism now steps between these things and creates its world. The things become rich in relationships, almost all of which are not transparently geometric. One must be clear: not everything has meaning for us, and a great deal happens that does not even enter our world. And the media are indeed filled with units that are of a lower order, yet that are empty about our order. Both events, the coarse material and that of the small molecules, are therefore linked to static units. Only the coarse material is of importance to us. This connection between most things carrying out their vibrations and media carrying out imposed vibrations and the wave process is thus linked to the world in which we live through associations, which is of great importance. This becomes clear to us from the exceptions. There are opaque media and opaque things. Fog has no coarse material significance for us; one can move in it as if in *empty air*, but in it, the associations of light waves with things are disturbed. Another exception is glass. It cannot impose characteristic arrangements on the wave process; it lets the orders through and transmits them like a medium. But it is a coarse material unit; glass is a solid body. These exceptions have biological significance. Sailors and mountain climbers die in fog, and small birds perish if they have not adapted to these exceptions and hit window panes with their beaks.

**Multiplicity events**

In cinema, the wall is the medium. Display devices are not ordinary media that pass on the influence they receive. They have their own laws. Display devices make something different from what hits them, transposing this into changes that we can perceive with greater sensory precision. Because of these laws, a display device is no longer a perfect medium. It abstracts certain moments from the influence and transposes their changes. This transposition must, of course, take place according to stringent laws. That is, the changes in the pointer must be precisely assigned to the changes in the influence. This is a medium mediation law: the successive positions of the pointer are not linked by a law specific to the pointer but are determined by external factors. Suppose one creates it by excluding the influence of form (flat surface) and lighting (uniform lighting) through suitable changes to the surface. In that case, an image is created in the narrower sense of the word. A projection image is created if one excludes the influence of form and surface quality (a uniform white wall) through specific lighting. This trace must be such that it sends out extensions similar to the ones that form the trace. The extensions have thus been fixed, for this trace substrate becomes a solid body whose parts cannot be moved relative to one another, which asserts itself as a unity in the changes. It is a fixation of false units, a fixation of mediation. In cinematographic depiction, too, the sequence is broken down into a sequence following one another, and an event is preserved in a solid body.

Because something like perception apparatuses exists in the world structure, things generally have much more characteristic effects. They become real in a much more comprehensive sense, since new possibilities of effect are opened. How does a knife work, for example, in the usual super-elementary connections? It works as a whole, as a physical unit; it works through its weight and even its shape; the wedge shape of its blade means it can cut. But when does its shape as a whole ever have a uniform, characteristic effect on other bodies? One is tempted to say this only happens in the organism, which recognizes its shape.

This reconstruction of the core units from the offshoots is now the *synthesis of ideas and sensations*, the *production of the form*. The necessity of such a synthesis is thus entirely understandable with reference back to the structure of the external world. Every being wishing to perceive its environment through a medium would have to use such a synthesis. If we tried to construct an apparatus that reacts to external things through a medium in a meaningful way, we would also have to build this apparatus in such a way that it brings the multiplicity of effects emanating from the units back together into units. In this sense, the synthesis is conditioned by the external world. We will assume that its more specific laws cannot be derived entirely from the psyche.

The order that lies latent in the medium is made physically effective, and this is also the first step in the meaningful unification of the effects rushing through the medium. The lens is even more effective, in that it keeps out what comes from other units and collects the multiplicity from a unit. This is already the beginning of synthesis. But only the beginning. The lens does indeed restore the order of the light-emitting points. Still, how the points are grouped into units needs to be assigned. On the screen or in front of the retina, the points next to each other are of equal value and atomistic.

**General and special devices**

If the medium were not homogeneous and the rays did not spread out according to a general pattern, a device for unification as generally usable as the lens would be impossible. Constructing a device that reunites the rays emanating from a point is possible. This duality is of the utmost importance. Firstly, there is the event itself, but also its meaning. The rays *signify* the points from which they come in some way. And when they are reunited, they are reunited correctly and meaningfully. This is analogous to the relationship between the physical and the psychic. The physical is the carrier of the psychic. Two layers of functional connections are superimposed on one another. The offshoots must be reunited meaningfully into units, so the laws determine the type of unification according to which the offshoots are assigned to the big things. But of course, the physiological process of this unification also has laws that are different from what it means.

There is a second possibility of the connection between the two layers. The laws of the carriers of these events could correspond in their structure to the laws of the layer of meaning. An apparatus could react meaningfully to many different influences by virtue of the laws within it. A change in the multiplicity of offshoots, i.e., in the stimulus, would not result in something different in the central part, and this is not because a changed stimulus sets in motion another apparatus precisely tailored to it, but because the apparatus reacts differently. The laws of the connection between offshoots and core events require specific assignments for the return.

A single, adaptable apparatus connects everything; it reacts differently depending on the cause. And, yes, we can improve our ability to perceive things with things we make in workshops, with glasses, microscopes, and telescopes.

The more specific the assignment of offshoot combinations to the center, the less likely it is that there are physiological apparatuses that respond meaningfully to many stimuli. The type of mediation influences the image of the objects; we can even place mediation at the center of perception. The hand is the perfect direct mediation of action, and we can recognize its mediating properties. Thus, the organism is not as directly involved in the causal connection as a thing that is pushed and pushed again; instead, it lives between two false units of multiple mediations. It receives the multiplicity emitted by the unified thing with its senses, unites it somehow, and then acts back on the thing's events through an assortment. This peculiar causal connection makes new connections and relationships between things possible. In the individual, if you can see through something, you can run your hand through it without resistance. What is *something* to our eyes is also *something* in the larger sense. Waves can, therefore, mediate the knowledge of significant things. This relationship of mediation to what is mediated, which we found in the wave event, now applies generally to knowledge transfer.

•

I tried to condense Heider's essay but wanted to retain his originality. So, I feel it is needed to sum up:

Things are not things per se, and media are not media per se. Everything can also be a medium for another. A thing is perceptible in a medium that mediates this perception. Because the thing owes its existence to perception, which is only possible through the medium, no thing can be outside of a medium. Media are thus always something in between and move between other things.

Heider highlights the medial concept, including its effects, but simultaneously subjects it to an economy that banishes the potential threat of the medial to the form of the human being (Heider) or the system (Luhmann).[[8]](#footnote-8)

The ancient elements are media insofar as things appear in them. But the things are not substances, but *false units*, insofar as the *wave events* are configured in perception as objects. (Glass, for example, can be *seen* as a thing or, as a medium, can *let other things see*.) This is constructivism in its most radical and at the same time most anthropological variant.[[9]](#footnote-9)

You only hear the clock ticking because the air itself is not ticking.[[10]](#footnote-10)

We don’t perceive the transmission channel.

•

**DIGITAL OBJECTS**

What I call digital objects are simply objects on the Web, such as YouTube videos, Facebook profiles, Flickr images, and so forth, that are composed of data and formalized by schemes or ontologies that one can generalize as metadata. These objects pervade our everyday life online, and it is in fact very difficult for us to separate what is online and offline anymore, as indicated decades ago by the action of *jacking into cyberspace*.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Technological objects constantly evolve to match their time period, with digital objects currently changing at an especially rapid pace. Yuk Hui examines digital objects, which he defines as things that appear on screens or operate in computer programs. Data itself becomes materialized as objects. Hui’s work draws heavily from philosophers like Stiegler, Husserl, Simondon, and Heidegger. A key concept is Simondon's idea of *concretisation*—how technical objects tend toward an ideal (but unreachable) natural state that reflects their current era. Hui develops a method based on Bachelard's *orders of magnitude* to analyze digital objects from different perspectives. He argues that digital objects represent a new kind of materiality—not just binary code, but the material capacity to process data.

Digital objects exist as a distinct category of technical objects that differ fundamentally from physical objects. They are made up of data and metadata, structured through relations within digital systems. Digital objects are not simply virtual representations, but have their own mode of existence characterized by their relationality; they exist through networks of relations with other digital objects, users, and technical systems. These objects are inherently relational; their existence depends on complex webs of relations between data, protocols, interfaces, and infrastructures. Unlike physical objects, which have relative independence, digital objects cannot exist outside their relations. A key point is that digital objects differ from traditional technical objects in their temporality; they’re oriented toward the future, rather than serving as objects of cultural memory.

Digital technology has fundamentally altered our relationship with reality, time, and memory. This transformation operates on several levels. Regarding digital objects and reality, there's a complex interplay between two types of ontology: the technical (dealing with metadata and knowledge representation) and the existential (concerning our being-in-the-world). Digital objects exist through both discursive relations (technical/logical) and existential relations (our lived experience of them). This dual nature suggests we might be experiencing an *inauthentic* version of technical reality. Concerning time and memory, time itself has become quantifiable data—something that can be measured, controlled, and infinitely divided (albeit with delays). This transforms how we store and access memories through what Bernard Stiegler calls *tertiary retention*: our technological memory systems. Time no longer flows uniformly but exists in different rhythms, scales, and intensities. And regarding the human-technology relationship, we've become so intertwined with technology that humans are now *unthinkable* without their technical supplements. Technology shapes how we form and retain memories (both immediate and long-term). This relationship has a *pharmacological* nature - meaning technology acts as both a remedy and a potential poison.

Digital objects have introduced a new way of being, in which numbers are material entities subject to control, symbols are transformed through *de-symbolization*, and our very experience of time and memory is mediated through technical systems. This isn't just about using technology - it's about how technology has fundamentally reshaped our way of existing in the world. We are in a new phase of human evolution. Digital objects transform our thinking about materiality and our relationship with technology, producing new forms of social and cultural memory through their persistence and replicability.

As discussed, we perceive things through transparent media like air or light; think of how you see an object through air. The medium (air) and the thing (what you're looking at) are clearly separate. But digital objects (Hui) work differently. They're both the thing AND the medium at the same time. Think of a digital photo: it's an object you can look at, but it's also the means by which information is transmitted.

While traditional media need to be *formless* to carry information (like clear air letting you see things), digital objects have their own form while still carrying information. Copying, modifying, or deleting instantly define different ways of existing and being perceived.

With digital objects, several complex layers of mediation emerge. There’s the physical infrastructure layer: the hardware, processors, memory, and network cables that form the material basis for digital objects. Unlike natural media, these aren't *thing-free,* but are highly structured and engineered specifically for information transmission. Then, there's the software layer: the operating systems, protocols, and code that interpret and translate digital information. This represents a form of mediation that has no clear parallel in Heider's theory, as it's both a medium and a set of active processes. And, there's the interface layer: the screens, speakers, and input devices through which we actually interact with digital objects. Here we finally return to something closer to Heider's natural media (light from screens, sound waves from speakers), but these are already heavily processed and transformed.

These layers of mediation affect our perception of digital objects as *real* things. In Heider’s theory, direct perception through natural media helps establish the reality and permanence of physical objects. But digital objects are always accessed through this complex chain of technological mediation, which might suggest they should feel less *real* to us. Yet paradoxically, digital objects often feel quite real and present in our experience. Interestingly, while Heider's theory suggests that multiple layers of mediation should make objects feel more distant and less real, digital objects often achieve a kind of immediate presence in our experience despite (or perhaps because of) their complex mediation.

As digital objects transform our experience of the world, they also transform our interaction with it. The digital layers upon the physical, creating an invisible skin of mediation, a *formless* package. The complexity of hardware, software, interface and network melts into a thing, mediated and invisible. Our world, our minds perceive with and in technology. The smartphone as we know it now is just a state of in-betweenness.

•

Are we becoming strange to our world?




Fig. 8 ANT-OOO

Graham Harman: Basic principles of OOO

(1) All objects must be given equal attention, whether they be human, non-human, natural,

cultural, real or fictional.

(2) Objects are not identical with their properties, but have a tense relationship with those

properties, and this very tension is responsible for all of the change that occurs in the world.

(3) Objects come in just two kinds: real objects exist whether or not they currently affect anything

else, while sensual objects exist only in relation to some real object.

(4) Real objects cannot relate to one another directly, but only indirectly, by means of a sensual

object.

(5) The properties of objects also come in just two kinds: again, real and sensual.[[12]](#footnote-12)

ANT - relations or connections between things (material) and concepts (semiotic); Technology/

nature and social are together in a network of relational properties and acting potentials Actor-Networks are short term, have a short life, are constantly becoming and reborn, some relations have to be constantly repeated otherwise the network would dissolve, … in other words social relations are always changing and have therefore constantly be built ….

Deleuze and Guattari use an description of rhizomatics as a nomadic form of connections

constantly in flux, ever becoming and leading off in a chaos of directions, this is a practice.

Bruno Latour: *An actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of an*

*action.*

Graham Harman: *For Latour, we have nothing but our dealings with networks of objects; some may be nobler and others more base, but all are on the same ontological footing. Hence, for Latour there is no way to transcend the world, and it is no accident that the concept of nothingness plays no role whatsoever in his thinking.*

*If philosophy is to make any progress in the decades to come, it is vital that we consistently*

*oppose Heidegger and side with Latour: against the ontological/ontic distinction, against the theory/ practice distinction, against the blanket contempt for mass-produced objects, against the idea that knowledge means transcendence of the world, against nothingness, and in favor of endless*

*curiosity about all manner of specific beings.[[13]](#footnote-13)*

1. Jill Walker Rettberg, Now objects perceive me: Art that interrogates machine vision, University of Bergen 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Paul Virilio, The Vision Machine. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994: 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. On Malick, On visual web, a photo is worth more than a 1000 words, December 2014, http://om.co/2014/12/10/weaving-a-very-visual-web/, accessed 12 March 2025. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Volker Pantenburg, Cinematographic Objects: Things and Operations

   Berlin: August Verlag 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Pantenburg 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Fritz Heider. Ding und Medium, herausgegeben und mit einem Vorwort versehen von Dirk Bäcker Copyright © 2005 by Kulturverlag Kadmos Berlin. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Heider 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Rezensionsnotiz zu Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28.06.2005. https://www.perlentaucher.de/buch/fritz-heider/ding-und-medium.html, accessed 12 March 2025. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Stephan Günzel, About false units. Fritz Heider's essay "Thing and Medium" from 1926 in a new edition. https://literaturkritik.de/id/8265. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. C. Morgner, The Medium in the Sociology of Niklas Luhmann: From Children to Human Beings. Educ Theory, 73: 890-916. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12609. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Yuk Hui, What is a digital object? Metaphilosophy, vol. 43, no. 4, 2012, pp. 380–95. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24441843. Accessed 9 Jan. 2025. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Graham Harman, Object-oriented ontology: a new theory of everything, Pelican Books London 2018: 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Graham Harman, The importance of Bruno Latour, Cultural Studies Review. Vol.13 No 1 March 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)