

‘If Foreign, then Cleaner’:

Individual Corruption Perceptions and Support for Free Trade in Developing Nations

Supplementary Information

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A. Summary statistics




Figure A1. Density plots of trade support (left) and corruption perceptions (right, vertical line indicates the median) based on pooled data from survey respondents in eighteen Latin American countries




Figure A2. Distributions of trade support (left) and corruption perceptions (right, vertical lines indicate medians), broken down by country




Figure A3. Correlational biplot indicating direction and degree of association between five input variables and their first two principal components

B. Full information about the main effect

Table B1. Models of support for free trade as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Free Trade			
	<i>Linear Regression</i>	<i>Ordered Logistic</i>	<i>Linear Regression</i>	<i>Ordered Logistic</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	0.025** (0.010)	0.076*** (0.029)		
Corruption perceptions (additive)			0.011** (0.004)	0.034*** (0.013)
Female	−0.061*** (0.013)	−0.196*** (0.040)	−0.061*** (0.013)	−0.196*** (0.040)
Age	−0.001*** (0.0004)	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.001*** (0.0004)	−0.004*** (0.001)
Education	0.061*** (0.008)	0.172*** (0.024)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.172*** (0.024)
Employed in a state company	−0.048* (0.025)	−0.149** (0.076)	−0.048* (0.025)	−0.149** (0.076)
Employed in a private company	−0.007 (0.020)	−0.030 (0.060)	−0.007 (0.020)	−0.030 (0.060)
Not employed	−0.032** (0.015)	−0.096** (0.046)	−0.032** (0.015)	−0.096** (0.046)
Wealth	0.005 (0.004)	0.019* (0.011)	0.005 (0.004)	0.019* (0.011)
Political ideology	0.017*** (0.002)	0.051*** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.051*** (0.007)
Not a citizen	0.124* (0.064)	0.413** (0.193)	0.124* (0.064)	0.413** (0.193)
Observations	10,975	10,975	10,975	10,975

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses

Table B2. Models of support for free trade as a function of separate indicators of corruption by different political elites or as a function of perceptions of national and local level corruption,¹ plus control covariates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Support for Free Trade					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
President	0.021 (0.014)					
Members of Congress		0.033** (0.014)				
Public employees			0.013 (0.014)			
Local government councilors				0.013 (0.014)		
Judges					0.025* (0.013)	
Both national and local level						0.035** (0.017)
Only national level corruption						0.065*** (0.021)
Only local level corruption						0.020 (0.019)
Female	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.062*** (0.013)	-0.062*** (0.013)
Age	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
Education	0.062*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.008)
Employed in a state company	-0.049* (0.025)	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.049* (0.025)	-0.049* (0.025)	-0.049* (0.025)
Employed in a private company	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.020)
Not employed	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.032** (0.015)
Wealth	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Political ideology	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)
Not a citizen	0.121* (0.064)	0.122* (0.064)	0.121* (0.064)	0.121* (0.064)	0.123* (0.064)	0.122* (0.064)
Observations	10,975	10,975	10,975	10,975	10,975	10,975

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses

¹ National level corruption: the individual perceives both the president and members of Congress as corrupt; local level corruption: the individual perceives local government councilors as corrupt.




Figure B1. Completely-unpooled country-specific effects of corruption perceptions on trade support (with 95% confidence intervals)

C. Full information about mediation effects

Table C1. Models of perceptions of the US, support for trade with the US, perceptions of international companies, and perceptions of imported product quality as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Perceptions of the US (1)	Support for Trade with the US (2)	Perceptions of International Companies (3)	Perceptions of Import Quality (4)
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	0.016** (0.007)	0.028** (0.012)	0.028** (0.014)	0.015 (0.011)
Female	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.016)	0.028 (0.019)	0.022 (0.015)
Age	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0005)
Education	0.013** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.008 (0.011)	0.061*** (0.009)
Employed in a state company	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.051* (0.031)	-0.075** (0.036)	0.080*** (0.029)
Employed in a private company	0.021 (0.014)	0.002 (0.025)	0.028 (0.029)	0.045* (0.024)
Not employed	0.010 (0.010)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.008 (0.018)
Wealth	0.001 (0.002)	0.012*** (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)
Political ideology	0.026*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Not a citizen	0.032 (0.043)	0.180** (0.077)	0.434*** (0.092)	-0.102 (0.074)
Observations	10,748	10,899	10,725	11,077

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses




Figure C1. Predicted values of mediators and support for trade with the US as a function of corruption perceptions (with 95% confidence envelopes)

Table C2. Models of support for free trade as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates, conditional on beliefs about progress of the home country

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Free Trade			
Belief about progress of home country	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Progressing	Standstill	In Decline	Pooled
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	−0.042* (0.025)	0.014 (0.014)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.025** (0.010)
Female	−0.062** (0.032)	−0.091*** (0.018)	−0.011 (0.025)	−0.061*** (0.013)
Age	−0.002** (0.001)	−0.001** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001*** (0.0004)
Education	0.034* (0.018)	0.064*** (0.011)	0.069*** (0.015)	0.061*** (0.008)
Employed in a state company	0.049 (0.058)	−0.077** (0.036)	−0.054 (0.046)	−0.048* (0.025)
Employed in a private company	0.001 (0.047)	−0.008 (0.028)	−0.021 (0.037)	−0.007 (0.020)
Not employed	−0.014 (0.037)	−0.033 (0.021)	−0.042 (0.029)	−0.032** (0.015)
Wealth	0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)
Political ideology	0.008 (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.002)
Not a citizen	0.146 (0.139)	0.078 (0.090)	0.222* (0.129)	0.124* (0.064)
Observations	2,016	5,424	3,389	10,975
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses				





Figure C2. Additional model-based causal mediation analysis results (with 95% confidence intervals)

D. Additional tests concerning alternative explanations

Table D1. Models of support for free trade as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates, conditional on beliefs about whether eradication of corruption is possible

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Support for Free Trade		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Is eradication of corruption possible?	Yes	No	Pooled
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	−0.001 (0.013)	0.061*** (0.016)	0.025** (0.010)
Female	−0.053*** (0.017)	−0.062*** (0.021)	−0.061*** (0.013)
Age	−0.001*** (0.001)	−0.002** (0.001)	−0.001*** (0.0004)
Education	0.039*** (0.010)	0.089*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.008)
Employed in a state company	−0.056* (0.032)	−0.030 (0.042)	−0.048* (0.025)
Employed in a private company	−0.058** (0.026)	0.062* (0.033)	−0.007 (0.020)
Not employed	−0.042** (0.020)	−0.007 (0.025)	−0.032** (0.015)
Wealth	0.003 (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)
Political ideology	0.014*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.002)
Not a citizen	0.213*** (0.078)	−0.063 (0.109)	0.124* (0.064)
Observations	6,089	4,637	10,975

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses

Table D2. Models of support for free trade as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates, with and without dissatisfaction variables added

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for Free Trade			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	0.025** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)
Dissatisfied w/ democracy		-0.028*** (0.008)		-0.013 (0.009)
Dissatisfied w/ economy			-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.039*** (0.010)
Female	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.058*** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.014)
Age	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.002*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
Education	0.061*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.008)	0.060*** (0.008)	0.059*** (0.008)
Employed in a state company	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.042* (0.026)	-0.049* (0.026)	-0.042 (0.026)
Employed in a private company	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.0001 (0.021)
Not employed	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.028* (0.016)	-0.030* (0.016)	-0.027* (0.016)
Wealth	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Political ideology	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)
Not a citizen	0.124* (0.064)	0.118* (0.065)	0.136** (0.065)	0.124* (0.066)
Observations	10,975	10,784	10,837	10,691

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses

Table D3. Models of support for free trade and support for international integration as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Support for Free Trade	Support for International Integration
	(1)	(2)
Corruption perceptions (PC1)	0.025** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.012)
Female	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.123*** (0.016)
Age	-0.001*** (0.0004)	0.001* (0.0005)
Education	0.061*** (0.008)	0.151*** (0.009)
Employed in a state company	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.002 (0.030)
Employed in a private company	-0.007 (0.020)	0.064*** (0.024)
Not employed	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.010 (0.018)
Wealth	0.005 (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)
Political ideology	0.017*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)
Not a citizen	0.124* (0.064)	-0.036 (0.075)
Observations	10,975	10,825

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses




Figure D1. Predicted values of support for international integration as a function of corruption perceptions (with 95% confidence envelopes)

E. Additional tests concerning external validity

Table E1. Models of support for free trade as a function of corruption perceptions and control covariates, conditional on IMF's classification of developing and developed economies

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Support for Free Trade		
	(1) Developing Economies	(2) Developed Economies	(3) Pooled
Corruption perceptions	0.044*** (0.006)	−0.057*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Female	−0.064*** (0.014)	−0.130*** (0.012)	−0.100*** (0.009)
Age	−0.002*** (0.0005)	−0.002*** (0.0003)	−0.002*** (0.0003)
Observations	13,848	13,969	27,817
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Country fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses			

Table E2. Model of country-specific corruption perception coefficients as a function of per capita GDP (log scale) and trade dependency

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Coefficients of Corruption Perceptions
Log(GDP per capita)	−0.039*** (0.009)
Trade-to-GDP ratio	−0.0004 (0.0003)
Observations	27
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses	