



Week 10:  
Berkeley 3

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Preface

Hylas *versus*  
Philonous

Real Conflict?

Sensible Ideas  
Defended

Overview

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Objection 2

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## Week 10: Berkeley 3

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Southern University of Science and Technology  
SS149 (社会科学中心), Spring 2024

**Early Modern Western Philosophy (17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Centuries)**

近代西方哲学（十七-十八世纪）



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Quiz 10: In Berkeley's response to Objector 11's argument from design in the *Principles*, who is *supposed* to be the objector?

- ① John Locke (1632–1704)
- ② Edward Stillingfleet (1635–99)
- ③ William Molyneux (1656–98)
- ④ Samuel Clarke (1675–1729)

This is not related to your final grade, but intended to observe your understanding of the last class.



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- ④ **Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) (defending the 'clockwork of nature' already mechanistically designed by God. He was also Newton's spokesman against Leibniz. See also 'Objection 11'; Schliesser 2020; Clarke 1705, *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*)**

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[1] Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature and providence, that **the end of speculation be practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions**; yet those who are most addicted to speculative studies seem as generally of another mind. [...]

[2] Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise *scepticism and paradoxes*. It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing. Its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which they laugh at and despise.

– *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* [henceforce DHP], Preface (*Works* II, 167, emphasis added)



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[5] [... I]t has been my aim to introduce the **notions** I advance, into the mind, in the most easy and familiar manner; especially because they carry with them a great opposition to **the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind.**

[6] If the principles, which I here endeavour to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence are that *atheism and scepticism will be utterly destroyed*, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several **useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to practice**, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense.

– DHP, Preface (*Works* II, 168, emphasis added)

Berkeley's aim is PRAGMATIC (on the lecturer's view)

*Favouring* 'practice' or useful ways to 'our lives and actions' over useless speculations (i.e. *atheism* and *scepticism*), overcoming 'paradoxes' and returning to 'common sense'. See [Pearce 2017, 558](#).



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*Philonous*. Good morrow, Hylas. I did not expect to find you abroad so early.

*Hylas*. It is [...] something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 171, emphasis added)

## Philonous

'Lover of mind' (Greek: prefix φίλο- + νοûς), Berkeley's mouthpiece.

## Hylas

Its inspiration *perhaps* came from ὕλας in Greek mythology. Hylas, an *eromenos* of Heracles, was abducted or pulled into the water by *dryad* (wood) nymphs. Before Aristotle philosophized it, the original meanings of ὕλη (plural accusative case, ὕλας) were 'forest', 'woodland', 'firewood'. See '[Landscape with the Rape of Hylas](#)' (1832)



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## Philonous

‘Lover of mind’ (Greek: prefix φίλο- + νοûς), Berkeley’s mouthpiece.

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‘Matter’ (Greek: ὕλη). Its inspiration *perhaps* came from ὕλας in Greek mythology. Hylas, an *eromenos* of Heracles, was abducted or pulled into the water by *dryad* (wood) nymphs. Before Aristotle philosophized it, the original meanings of ὕλη (plural accusative case, ὕλας) were ‘forest’, ‘woodland’, ‘firewood’. See ‘Landscape with the Rape of Hylas’ (1832)





# 'Landscape with the Rape of Hylas' (1832) by Joseph Anton Koch (1768–1839)

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# 'The most extravagant opinion'

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*Hylas*. You were represented in **last night's conversation** as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world.

*Philonous*. That there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance', I am seriously persuaded [...]

*Hylas*. What! Can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as *matter*?

– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 172, emphasis added)

Hylas

I believe in matter!

Philonous

Oh dear, I don't.



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# Hylas's Objection about sensible things (objects)

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*Hylas.* [B]y **sensible things** I mean those only which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately, for they make no inferences. The *deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances*, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason. [...] Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. [...] **It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 174–175, emphasis added)

## Hylas's argument for sensible things

If sensible qualities (appearances perceived by sense) inhere in the objects (which occasion them), then sensible objects exist outside the mind.

Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.

Therefore, sensible objects do exist outside the mind. [MP]



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- 2 Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.
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– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 174–175, emphasis added)

## Hylas's argument for sensible things

- 1 If sensible qualities (appearances perceived by sense) inhere in the objects (which occasion them), then sensible objects exist outside the mind.
- 2 Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.
- 3 Therefore, sensible objects *do* exist outside the mind. [MP]



# Philonous's Reply about sensible things (objects)

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odat@tcd.ie

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Which premiss in Hylas's argument does Philonous attack?

## Hylas's argument *for* sensible things

- 1 If sensible qualities inhere in the objects, then sensible objects exist outside the mind.
- 2 Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.
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*Philonous.* **This point then is agreed between us, that *sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.* [...] Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many **sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities.** [...] How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance? [...] Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? [... S]ensible pain is nothing distinct from those **sensations or ideas**, in an intense degree.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 175–177, emphasis added)

## Hylas's argument *for* sensible things

- 1 If sensible qualities inhere in the objects, then sensible objects exist outside the mind.
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## Hylas's argument for sensible things

- 1 If sensible qualities inhere in the objects, then sensible objects exist outside the mind





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## Hylas's argument *for* sensible things [modus ponens]

- 1 ~~If sensible qualities inhere in the objects, then sensible objects exist outside the mind.~~
- 2 Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.
- 3 Therefore, sensible objects *do* exist outside the mind.

## Philonous's argument *for* sensible things [MT]

- ❑ If the inference of sensible qualities in the objects implies the existence of sensible objects outside the mind, then sensible things are not immediately perceived by sense.
- ❑ 'Sensible things' are 'immediately perceived by sense' (agreed between Hylas and Philonous; more precisely, they are nothing abstract/general, but particular ideas in the mind: i.e. *particulars*).
- ❑ Therefore, the inference of sensible qualities in the objects *cannot* imply the existence of sensible objects outside the mind.



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## Philonous's argument *for* sensible things [MT]

- 1 If the inherence of sensible qualities in the objects implies the existence of sensible objects outside the mind, then sensible things are not immediately perceived by sense.
- 2 'Sensible things' are 'immediately perceived by sense' (agreed between Hylas and Philonous; more precisely, they are nothing abstract/general, but particular ideas in the mind: i.e. **nominalism**).
- 3 Therefore, the inherence of sensible qualities in the objects *cannot* imply the existence of sensible objects outside the mind.



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- 1 ~~If sensible qualities inhere in the objects, then sensible objects exist outside the mind.~~
- 2 Sensible qualities inhere in the objects.
- 3 Therefore, sensible objects *do* exist outside the mind.

## N.B. Philonous's argument is **not** *reductio ad absurdum*

Because Philonous accepts the conclusion of his own argument (P2 is indeed accepted). **A *reductio* argument is simply that the person giving the argument does not accept the conclusion, and does not expect the opponent to accept it, either.** This only requires the rejection of one premiss of the opponent's argument, not necessarily all of the premisses. That is, Philonous's argument is **not *reduced* to an absurd conclusion** that no-one wishes to accept, but a conclusion that Philonous wants Hylas to endorse, too. However, due to the rejection of P1 above, Philonous *cannot* accept the conclusion of Hylas's argument.



# Philonous's (Berkeley's) Deference of Sensible Ideas

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- 5 **Philonous's (Berkeley's) Deference of Sensible Ideas**
- 6 Overview Argument of the *Three Dialogues*
- 7 Hylas's Objection 1: Intermediary Cause
- 8 Hylas's Objection 2: Instrument
- 9 Hylas's Objection 3: Occasion(alism)
- 10 Hylas's Objection 4: General Entity
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- 12 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# Berkeley's two simple arguments for **sensible ideas** (Rickless 2013, 5–6, 139–145)

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- ① Sensible objects are perceived by sense.
  - ② Anything that is perceived by sense is an idea.
  - ③ So, sensible objects are ideas.
- 
- ① Sensible objects are collections of sensible qualities.
  - ② All sensible qualities are ideas.
  - ③ So, sensible objects are collections of ideas.

Rickless (2013, 144):

[T]he main argument of DHP 1, which is designed to establish that the being of a sensible object consists in being perceived, is based on premises that explain Berkeley's acceptance of the two Simple Arguments in the early sections of PHK.





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# Defence of premisses 1 in the two arguments

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- 1 Sensible objects are perceived by sense.

## Second Simple Argument (implicit in *PHK* §1)

- 1 Sensible objects are collections of sensible qualities.

*Philonous*. In reading a book, what I **immediately** perceive are the letters, but **mediately**, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, etc. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, **there is no doubt**: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

*Hylas*. No certainly, it were absurd to think *God* or *Virtue* sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

*Philonous*. It seems then, that by 'sensible things' you mean those only **which can be perceived immediately by sense**.

*Hylas*. Right.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 174, emphasis added)



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## First Simple Argument (found in *PHK* §4)

- ② Anything that is perceived by sense is an idea.

## Second Simple Argument (implicit in *PHK* §1)

- ② All sensible qualities are ideas.

*Philonous*. It seems therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible.

*Hylas*. I grant it.

*Philonous*. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but **so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities**.

*Hylas*. Nothing else.

### What about ideas?

- *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 175, emphasis added)



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*Philonous*. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but **so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities**.

*Hylas*. Nothing else.

What about ideas?

- *DHP*, Dialogue 1 (*Works* II, 175, emphasis added)





# Defence of premisses 2 in the two arguments

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## First Simple Argument (found in *PHK* §4)

- ② Anything that is perceived by sense is an idea.

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*Philonous*. [Any quality has] **no existence without the mind**. (*W2*: 191)

Sensible qualities, be they secondary or primary, are mere ideas — ideas in the mind.



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# Berkeley's two simple arguments for **sensible ideas** in *DHP*, Dialogue 1

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- 1 Sensible objects are perceived by sense.
- 2 Anything that is perceived by sense is an idea.
- 3 So, sensible objects are ideas.

## Second Simple Argument (implicit in *PHK* §1)

- 1 Sensible objects are collections of sensible qualities.
- 2 All sensible qualities are ideas.
- 3 So, sensible objects are collections of ideas.



# Berkeley's two simple arguments for **sensible ideas** in *DHP*, Dialogue 1

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# Overview Argument of the *Three Dialogues*

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Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ So the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



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# Hylas's four conceptions of matter in Dialogue 2

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### ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]

Against this premiss that defuses the existence of matter, Hylas offers **four conceptions of matter** (see also Stoneham 2002, 43).

## Hylas's Four Conceptions of Matter (not yet an argument)

- ① Matter is the causal intermediary between God's will and our ideas. (Dialogue 2, *Works* 2, 215)
- ② It is the instrument of God's will. (218)
- ③ It is the occasion of our sensations. (220)
- ④ It is entity in general (as opposed to specific qualities). (222)



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# Hylas's Objection 1: Intermediary Cause

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# Hylas's Objection 1: Intermediary Cause

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*Hylas*. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But allowing that God is the supreme and universal cause of all things, yet may not there be still a third nature besides spirits and ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be matter?

## Hylas objects

Matter exists as an intermediary 'cause' between God's will (divine mind/spirit) and our ideas.

## Hylas's Argument 1 [modus ponens]

- ① Matter is (having 'a third nature besides spirits and ideas') causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas.
- ② If matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas, then matter exists.
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* exist.



# Hylas's Objection 1: Intermediary Cause

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*Hylas*. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But allowing that God is the supreme and universal cause of all things, yet may not there be still a third nature besides spirits and ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited **cause** of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be matter?

## Hylas objects

Matter exists as an intermediary 'cause' between God's will (divine mind/spirit) and our ideas.

### Hylas's Argument 1 [modus ponens]

- ① Matter is (having 'a third nature besides spirits and ideas') causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas.
- ② If matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas, then matter exists.
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* exist.



# Hylas's Objection 1: Intermediary Cause

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*Hylas.* I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of **a Deity** seems no less evident than it is surprising. But allowing that God is the supreme and universal cause of all things, yet may not there be still **a third nature besides spirits and ideas**? May we not admit a subordinate and limited **cause** of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be matter?

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*Philonous.* How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense, which is not perceived immediately. Therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. **The matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose, something that may be discovered by reason and not by sense.**

*Hylas.* You are in the right.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 215, emphasis added)



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## Hylas's Argument 1 [modus ponens]

- 1 Matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas.
- 2 If matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas, then matter exists.
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## Philonous's Argument 1 [modus tollens]

- 1 If matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas, then the material cause is 'perceived immediately' by sense.
- 2 The material cause is not perceived immediately by sense (n.b. the perception by sense does not need the discovery by reason).
- 3 Therefore, matter *cannot* be causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas.



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## Hylas's Argument 1 [modus ponens]

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## **Philonous's Argument 1 [modus tollens] rejecting Hylas's P1 (primarily, but actually both premisses)**

- 1 If matter is causally intermediary between God's will and our ideas, then the material cause is 'perceived immediately' by sense.
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# Hylas's Objection 2: Instrument

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*Hylas.* I give up the point entirely. But though matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an instrument subservient to the supreme agent in the production of our ideas? [...] When I tell you matter is an instrument, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true, I know not the particular kind of instrument; but however I have some notion of instrument in general, which I apply to it.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 217–218, emphasis added)

## Hylas objects

Matter exists as the 'instrument' of God's will.

### Hylas's Argument 2 [modus tollens]

- ① Matter is the ('general') instrument of God's will.
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*Philonous.* [...] We indeed, who are beings of **finite powers**, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument shows the agent to be limited by **rules of another's prescription**, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that **the supreme unlimited agent uses no tool or instrument at all. The will of an omnipotent spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means** which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely **in compliance with the laws of nature**, or those conditions prescribed to them by the first cause, who is himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.

*Hylas.* I will no longer maintain that matter is an instrument.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 219, emphasis added)





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## Hylas's Argument 2 [modus tollens]

- ① Matter is the ('general') instrument of God's will.
- ② If matter does not exist, then matter is not an instrument of God's will.
- ③ Therefore, matter *must* exist.

## **Philonous's Argument 2 [modus ponens]**

- ① If God uses no instrument ('means') to exert and execute his will, then matter is not the instrument of God's will.
- ② God uses no instrument to exert and execute his will.
- ③ Therefore, matter *is* not the instrument of God's will.



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## Hylas's Argument 2 [modus tollens]

- ① Matter is the ('general') instrument of God's will.

## **Philonous's Argument 2 [modus ponens] rejecting Hylas's P1**

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## Hylas's Argument 2 [modus tollens]

- 1 Matter is the ('general') instrument of God's will.

## Philonous's Argument 2 [modus ponens] rejecting Hylas's P1

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- ~~① Matter is the ('general') instrument of God's will.~~

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# Hylas's Objection 3: Occasion(alism)

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# Hylas's Objection 3: Occasion(alism)

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*Hylas.* [B]y *occasion* I mean an inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds. [...] When we see ideas produced in our minds after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 220, emphasis added)

## Hylas objects

Matter exists as an 'occasion' for God to excite ideas in our minds.

## Hylas's Argument 3 [modus ponens]

- 1 Matter is an 'occasion' for God to cause our sensations (or sensible 'ideas').
- 2 If matter is an occasion for God to cause our sensations, then matter exists.
- 3 Therefore, matter *does* exist.



# Hylas's Objection 3: Occasion(alism)

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*Hylas.* [B]y **occasion** I mean an inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds. [...] When we see ideas produced in our minds after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have **some fixed and regular occasions**, at the presence of which they are excited.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 220, emphasis added)

## Hylas objects

Matter exists as an 'occasion' for God to excite ideas in our minds.

### Hylas's Argument 3 [modus ponens]

- ① Matter is an 'occasion' for God to cause our sensations (or sensible 'ideas').
- ② If matter is an occasion for God to cause our sensations, then matter exists.
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* exist.



# Hylas's Objection 3: Occasion(alism)

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*Philonous.* [...] **I only ask whether** the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God [...] And lastly whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose, it **not being easy to conceive** how **the external and absolute existence of an unthinking substance**, distinct from its being perceived, can be **inferred from** my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him **the occasion of producing ideas in us.**

*Hylas.* I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of occasion seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

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## Hylas's Argument 3 [modus ponens]

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- 2 If matter is an occasion for God to cause our sensations, then matter exists.
- 3 Therefore, matter *does* exist.

## **Philonous's Argument 3 [modus tollens]**

- 1 If matter is an occasion for God to cause our sensations, then he produces 'ideas' in our minds on the occasion of unperceived matter ('unthinking substance').
- 2 God produces no idea in our minds on the occasion of unperceived matter. [**Sub-argument**]
- 3 Therefore, matter *cannot* be an occasion for God to cause our sensations. [Compare with Berkeley's response to Objection 12 in the *PHK*]



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## Hylas's Argument 3 [modus ponens]

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## Sub-argument for P2 [modus tollens]

[P2-1] If God produces any idea in our minds on the occasion of unperceived matter, then we 'conceive' of the 'external and absolute existence' of matter.

[P2-2] We do not conceive of the external and absolute existence of matter.

[P2-C] Therefore, God *must* produce *no* idea in our minds on the occasion of unperceived matter.

- 2 God produces no idea in our minds on the occasion of unperceived matter. [**Sub-argument**]
- 3 Therefore, matter *cannot* be an occasion for God to cause our sensations. [Compare with Berkeley's response to Objection 12 in the *PHK*]



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# Hylas's Objection 4: General Entity

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*Hylas*. [... I] understand by *matter* neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.

*Philonous*. It seems then you include, in your present notion of matter, nothing but the general abstract idea of *entity*.

*Hylas*. Nothing else, save only that I super-add to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 222, emphasis added)

## Hylas objects

Matter means something 'general'.

### Hylas's Argument 4 [modus tollens]

- ① There is 'a general abstract idea of *entity*' (which denies all 'particular' ideas).
- ② If (my latest conception of) matter means nothing, then there is no general abstract idea of entity.
- ③ Therefore, matter *must* mean something.



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*Hylas*. Nothing else, save only that I super-add to this **general** idea Matter is 'something entirely unknown' for Hylas, whereas **Philonous could assume that it is 'an unknown somewhat'** (*DHP* 3, 260) if there were 'a distinct idea of entity in general' (*DHP* 2, 222); **N.B. this argument does not defend the existence of matter itself**, after a series of Philonous's defeat of Hylas.

## Hylas's Argument 4 [modus tollens]

- ① There is 'a general abstract idea of *entity*' (which denies all 'particular' ideas).
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*Philonous.* Pray where do you suppose this unknown matter to exist?

*Hylas.* [...] **I know not where it exists**; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you; and you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about matter.

*Philonous.* [W]hat is there positive in your **abstracted notion of its existence**? [...] Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely **whether you can frame a distinct idea of entity in general**, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, **all particular things whatsoever**.

*Hylas.* Hold, let me think a little—I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance methought I had **some dilute and airy notion of pure entity in abstract**; but upon closer attention it has quite vanished out of sight.

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- 2 If (my latest conception of) matter means nothing, then there is no general abstract idea of entity.
- 3 Therefore, matter *must* mean something.

## Philonous's Argument 4 [modus ponens]

- 1 If only particular ideas ('whatsoever') exists in the mind without abstraction ('abstracted notion of its existence'), then there is no general abstract idea of entity.
- 2 Only particular ideas exists in the mind without abstraction (because except for 'all particular things', abstract general ideas cannot be perceived to exist: **nominalism and anti-abstractionism**).
- 3 Therefore, there *is* no general abstract idea of entity.



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- 1 There is 'a general abstract idea of entity'.

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- 1 There is 'a general abstract idea of entity'.

## Philonous's Argument 4 [modus ponens] rejecting Hylas's P1

- 1 If only particular ideas ('whatsoever') exists in the mind without abstraction ('abstracted notion of its existence'), then there is no general abstract idea of entity.
- 2 Only particular ideas exists in the mind without abstraction (because except for 'all particular things', abstract general ideas cannot be perceived to exist: **nominalism and anti-abstractionism**).
- 3 Therefore, there *is* no general abstract idea of entity.



# Philonous's Reply 4

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## ~~Hylas's Argument 4 [modus tollens]~~

- ~~① There is 'a general abstract idea of entity'~~

## Philonous's Argument 4 [modus ponens] rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① If only particular ideas ('whatsoever') exists in the mind without abstraction ('abstracted notion of its existence'), then there is no general abstract idea of entity.
- ② Only particular ideas exists in the mind without abstraction (because except for 'all particular things', abstract general ideas cannot be perceived to exist: **nominalism and anti-abstractionism**).
- ③ Therefore, there *is* no general abstract idea of entity.



# Summary of Dialogue 2

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# Summary of Dialogue 2 (4 Objections, etc.): 'matter comes to nothing'

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
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*Philonous.* Pray tell me if the case stands not thus. At first, from a belief of material substance you would have it that the **immediate** objects existed without the mind ; then that their **archetypes** ; then causes ; next instruments ; then occasions ; lastly, something in general , which being interpreted proves nothing. So **matter comes to nothing**. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

*Hylas.* Be that as it will, yet I still insist. . .

– *DHP*, Dialogue 2 (*Works* II, 222–223, emphasis added)



## Summary

*Philonous*. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus. At first, from a belief of material substance you would have it that the **immediate objects existed without the mind** [209; ‘distance’ unrepresented by visible ideas, also discussed in Dialogue 1, 201–203; *PHK* §§42–44 (Objection 3); *NTV*]; then that their **archetypes** ; then causes ; next instruments ; then occasions ; lastly, something in general , which being interpreted proves nothing. So **matter comes to nothing**. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

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## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the *Three Dialogues*.
  - Why did Berkeley/Philonous object to 'what philosophers call material substance' (*DHP*, Dialogue 1, ...)?
  - What makes the difference between our body (embodiment) and matter in general, when 'we are chained to a body' (Dialogue 3)?
  - For the book details and logical intricacy, review Stoneham 2002, Ch. 2 and its appendix.
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [next week]



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# Next Week 11: Berkeley 4

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Assignment 1: Read Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Dialogue 3, pp. 227–263 (*Works II*; Clarke 2008); *De motu* ('On Motion') §§1–72 (tr. Clarke 2008; Jesseph 1992).



Assignment 2: Read the 'Argument Advice' and 'Essay Questions' in PDF. And ask me or your assigned TA for anything unclear in the documents and slides.

- Keep active in the **WeCom/企业微信** group for this course, and pay attention to the **Blackboard** (SS149, Spring 2024), in which you can find all the basic info and recommended references.
- **Office hours** of the instructor (Center for Social Sciences, C111) and TAs (their offices) are Mondays 2-4pm, or any working time of appointment, by WeCom direct message or email.