



Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Week 11: Berkeley 4

Takaharu Oda, PhD (odat@tcd.ie)

Southern University of Science and Technology  
SS149 (社会科学中心), Spring 2024

**Early Modern Western Philosophy (17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Centuries)**

**近代西方哲学（十七-十八世纪）**



# Week 11: Berkeley 4

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



## 1 Weekly Quiz



# A Quiz from the Last Week

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Quiz 11: According to Hylas in the *Three Dialogues* (Dialogue 2), what is *not* matter?

- ① Nothing
- ② Occasion
- ③ Instrument
- ④ Cause

This is not related to your final grade, but intended to observe your understanding of the last class.



# A Quiz from the Last Week

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Quiz 11: According to Hylas in the *Three Dialogues* (Dialogue 2), what is *not* matter?

- ① Nothing [Objection 4: 'matter' (Greek: ὕλη) is something or some general entity for Hylas himself or matter itself]
- ② Occasion [Objection 3]
- ③ Instrument [Objection 2]
- ④ Cause [Objection 1]

This is not related to your final grade, but intended to observe your understanding of the last class.



# The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclution Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]





# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ **All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]**
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



# Overview as Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Stoneham, *Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues*, Ch. 2 (2002, 23): 'The first three steps [i.e. premisses] correspond very roughly with the presentation of the argument in three separate dialogues.'

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ① All sensible things (objects of perception) are ideas. [Dialogue 1]
- ② Some ideas have real existence. [Dialogue 2]
- ③ **All the (perceived) features of the physical world can be accounted for in terms of minds and ideas. [Dialogue 3]**
- ④ So, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion]



# Conclusion: the world consists of minds and ideas

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ③ All the perceived features of **the physical world** can be accounted for in terms of **minds and ideas**. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ Therefore, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*]



# Conclusion: the world consists of minds and ideas

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Berkeley's (Philonous's) Argument for Immaterialism

- ③ All the perceived features of **the physical world** can be accounted for in terms of **minds and ideas**. [Dialogue 3]
- ④ Therefore, the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas. [Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*]



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas.* After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas from without is evident; and it is no less evident, that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) **powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas**. And as these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is **some subject of them necessarily to be admitted, which I call matter, and you call spirit. This is all the difference.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3, (*Works* II, 239, emphasis added)

Hylas objects (see also Locke, *EHU* §2.8.8 on the 'power')

Matter has the power to cause our ideas.



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas*. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas from without is evident; and it is no less evident, that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) **powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas**. And as these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is **some subject of them necessarily to be admitted, which I call matter, and you call spirit. This is all the difference**.

- *DHP*, Dialogue 3, (*Works* II, 239, emphasis added)

Hylas objects (see also Locke, *EHU* §2.8.8 on the 'power')

Matter has the power to cause our ideas.





# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas*. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas from without is evident; and it is no less evident, that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) **powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas**. And as these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is **some subject of them necessarily to be admitted, which I call matter, and you call spirit. This is all the difference**.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3, (*Works* II, 239, emphasis added)

Hylas objects (see also Locke, *EHU* §2.8.8 on the 'power')

Matter has the power to cause our ideas.



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- ① Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.
- ② If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* have the power to bring about my ideas.  
[n.b. this is **not denying that the 'spirit' or mind has certain powers.**]



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- ① Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.
- ② If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* have the power to bring about my ideas. [n.b. this is **not denying that the 'spirit' or mind has certain powers.**]



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- 1 Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.
- 2 If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.
- 3 Therefore, matter *does* have the power to bring about my ideas.  
[n.b. this is **not denying that the 'spirit' or mind has certain powers.**]



# Hylas's Objection: matter has the power

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- 1 Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.
- 2 If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.
- 3 Therefore, matter *does* have the power to bring about my ideas. [n.b. this is **not denying that the 'spirit' or mind has certain powers.**]



# Philonous's Reply: a mind/spirit has the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Philonous.* [...] I assert as well as you that since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then **we differ as to the kind of this powerful being.** I will have it to be spirit, you matter or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third nature. Thus I prove it to be spirit. **From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because actions, volitions; and because there are volitions, there must be a will.** Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind; but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding. There is therefore an understanding. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. **The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a spirit.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3, (*Works* II, 240, emphasis added)



# Philonous's Reply: a mind/spirit has the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Philonous.* [...] I assert as well as you that since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then **we differ as to the kind of this powerful being.** I will have it to be spirit, you matter or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third nature. Thus I prove it to be spirit. **From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because actions, volitions; and because there are volitions, there must be a will.** Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind; but being **ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding.** There is therefore an understanding. But **will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit.** **The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a spirit.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3, (*Works* II, 240, emphasis added)



# Philonous's Reply: a mind/spirit has the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Question: which premiss(es) shall Philonous (Berkeley) undermine in Hylas's argument?

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- 1 Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.
- 2 If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.
- 3 Therefore, matter *does* have the power to bring about my ideas.





# Philonous's Reply: a mind/spirit has the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Question: which premiss(es) shall Philonous (Berkeley) undermine in Hylas's argument?

## Hylas's Argument [modus ponens]

- ① **Matter is the cause of my (Hylas's) sense perception.**
- ② If matter is the cause of my sense perception, then matter has the power to bring about my 'ideas'.

**Philonous must reject both premisses, but primarily P1 for the root cause of inference (implication).**



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception. [ $\varphi$ ]
- ② Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [*nemo dat quod non habet*], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236). [ $\psi$ ]
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself). [ $\psi \supset \neg\varphi$ ]
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself. [ $\neg\psi$ , modus tollens from P1 & P3]
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself. [ $\psi \wedge \neg\psi$ , the contradiction of P2 & P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, *ex contradictione quodlibet*]



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception.  $[\varphi]$
- ② Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [*nemo dat quod non habet*], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236).  $[\psi]$
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself).  $[\psi \supset \neg\varphi]$
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself.  $[\neg\psi, \text{modus tollens from P1 \& P3}]$
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself.  $[\psi \wedge \neg\psi, \text{the contradiction of P2 \& P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, ex contradictione quodlibet}]$



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception.  $[\varphi]$
- ② Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [**nemo dat quod non habet**], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236).  $[\psi]$
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself).  $[\psi \supset \neg\varphi]$
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself.  $[\neg\psi, \text{modus tollens from P1 \& P3}]$
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself.  $[\psi \wedge \neg\psi, \text{the contradiction of P2 \& P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, } \textit{ex contradictione quodlibet}]$



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception.  $[\varphi]$
- ② Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [**nemo dat quod non habet**], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236).  $[\psi]$
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself).  $[\psi \supset \neg\varphi]$
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself.  $[\neg\psi, \text{modus tollens from P1 \& P3}]$
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself.  $[\psi \wedge \neg\psi, \text{the contradiction of P2 \& P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, ex contradictione quodlibet}]$



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception.  $[\varphi]$
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself).  $[\psi \supset \neg\varphi]$
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself.  $[\neg\psi, \text{modus tollens from P1 \& P3}]$
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself.  $[\psi \wedge \neg\psi, \text{the contradiction of P2 \& P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, } ex\ contradictione\ quodlibet]$



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- ① (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception.  $[\varphi]$
- ② Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [**nemo dat quod non habet**], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236).  $[\psi]$
- ③ If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself).  $[\psi \supset \neg\varphi]$
- ④ Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself.  $[\neg\psi, \text{modus tollens from P1 \& P3}]$
- ⑤ Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself.  $[\psi \wedge \neg\psi, \text{the contradiction of P2 \& P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, ex contradictione quodlibet}]$



# Philonous's Reply: *reduction ad absurdum* (reduction to an absurdity)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Philonous's Argument, rejecting Hylas's P1

- 1 (Let us assume, as you say, that) matter is the cause of our sense perception. [ $\varphi$ ]
- 2 Whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself (i.e. whatever gives us ideas is a mind, given the scholastic 'old known axiom: *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*' [**nemo dat quod non habet**], n.b. omitted part in the third 1734 ed., *DHP* 3, 236). [ $\psi$ ]
- 3 If whatever causes ideas has ideas in itself, then matter is not the cause of our sense perception (because **matter does not have ideas** or it is not whatever causes ideas, nothing in itself). [ $\psi \supset \neg\varphi$ ]
- 4 Whatever causes ideas does not (or *cannot*) have ideas in itself. [ $\neg\psi$ , modus tollens from P1 & P3]
- 5 Therefore, whatever causes ideas both *has* and *does not have* ideas in itself. [ $\psi \wedge \neg\psi$ , the contradiction of P2 & P4, i.e. from the contradiction anything follows, *ex contradictione quodlibet*]

**Reductio ad absurdum: the assumption of P1 must be false.**





# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① A will effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in an understanding (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, the mind does have the powers of will and understanding.



# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① **A will** effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in **an understanding** (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, **the mind does have the powers of will and understanding**.



# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① **A will** effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in **an understanding** (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, **the mind does have the powers of will and understanding.**



# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① **A will** effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in **an understanding** (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, **the mind does have the powers of will and understanding.**



# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① **A will** effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in **an understanding** (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, the mind does have the powers of will and understanding.



# Philonous's Defence: a mind does have the powers

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Further reinforcement, but independent argument

### Philonous's Argument for the mental powers [modus ponens]

- ① **A will** effects ideas (in the sequence from the 'will', 'volitions', 'actions', to 'effects', *DHP* 3, 240; see also [Woozley 1985, 295](#)).
- ② If a will effects ideas, then a mind has the power of will.
- ③ Ideas exist in **an understanding** (because ideas of perceived things are 'the immediate objects of the understanding', *DHP* 3, 236).
- ④ If ideas exist in an understanding, then a mind has the power of understanding.
- ⑤ Therefore, **the mind does have the powers of will and understanding.**



### 3 Theories of Causation

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 **Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion**
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# Three Theories of Causation in Berkeley's Texts

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Three (Scholastic) Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion —between the divine and creaturely ('created'/human) actions

- ① **Occasionalism** – God is the sole active cause and creaturely minds are passive; matter is the occasion for God to cause (or excite ideas of) bodily motions in creatures [**even though Berkeley does not accept matter!**].
- ② **Concurrentism** – God and creaturely minds 'concur' to cause (ideas of) bodily motions in creatures; creaturely minds are secondary *active* causes subordinate to God.
- ③ **(Mere) Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.
  - Berkeley, Objection 3 (*DHP* 2); Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72); *DHP* 3, 260; 2, 217, 223, etc. See also Oda 2018, 71–73; Freddoso 1988; 1991; 1994; Stoneham 2018; Lee 2012; McDonough 2008; et al.





# Three Theories of Causation in Berkeley's Texts

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Three (Scholastic) Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion —between the divine and creaturely ('created'/human) actions

- ① **Occasionalism** – God is the sole active cause and creaturely minds are passive; matter is the occasion for God to cause (or excite ideas of) bodily motions in creatures [**even though Berkeley does not accept matter!**].
- ② **Concurrentism** – God and creaturely minds 'concur' to cause (ideas of) bodily motions in creatures; creaturely minds are secondary *active* causes subordinate to God.
- ③ **(Mere) Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.
  - Berkeley, Objection 3 (*DHP* 2); Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72); *DHP* 3, 260; 2, 217, 223, etc. See also Oda 2018, 71–73; Freddoso 1988; 1991; 1994; Stoneham 2018; Lee 2012; McDonough 2008; et al.



# Three Theories of Causation in Berkeley's Texts

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Three (Scholastic) Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion —between the divine and creaturely ('created'/human) actions

- ① **Occasionalism** – God is the sole active cause and creaturely minds are passive; matter is the occasion for God to cause (or excite ideas of) bodily motions in creatures [**even though Berkeley does not accept matter!**].
- ② **Concurrentism** – God and creaturely minds 'concur' to cause (ideas of) bodily motions in creatures; creaturely minds are secondary *active* causes subordinate to God.
- ③ **(Mere) Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.
  - Berkeley, Objection 3 (*DHP* 2); Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72); *DHP* 3, 260; 2, 217, 223, etc. See also Oda 2018, 71–73; Freddoso 1988; 1991; 1994; Stoneham 2018; Lee 2012; McDonough 2008; et al.



# Three Theories of Causation in Berkeley's Texts

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Three (Scholastic) Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion —between the divine and creaturely ('created'/human) actions

- ① **Occasionalism** – God is the sole active cause and creaturely minds are passive; matter is the occasion for God to cause (or excite ideas of) bodily motions in creatures [**even though Berkeley does not accept matter!**].
- ② **Concurrentism** – God and creaturely minds 'concur' to cause (ideas of) bodily motions in creatures; creaturely minds are secondary *active* causes subordinate to God.
- ③ **(Mere) Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.
  - Berkeley, Objection 3 (*DHP* 2); Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72); *DHP* 3, 260; 2, 217, 223, etc. See also Oda 2018, 71–73; Freddoso 1988; 1991; 1994; Stoneham 2018; Lee 2012; McDonough 2008; et al.



# Three Theories of Causation in Berkeley's Texts

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Three (Scholastic) Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion —between the divine and creaturely ('created'/human) actions

- ① **Occasionalism** – God is the sole active cause and creaturely minds are passive; matter is the occasion for God to cause (or excite ideas of) bodily motions in creatures [**even though Berkeley does not accept matter!**].
- ③ **(Mere) Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.
  - Berkeley, Objection 3 (*DHP* 2); Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72); *DHP* 3, 260; 2, 217, 223, etc. See also Oda 2018, 71–73; Freddoso 1988; 1991; 1994; Stoneham 2018; Lee 2012; McDonough 2008; et al.



# Two Possible Readings of the *DHP*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Occasionalism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-atheist**’ can be attracted by this reading.
- ② **Occasionalism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-atheist**’ can be attracted by this reading.
- ③ **Conservationism / Realism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-sceptic**’ can be attracted by this reading.

## Conservationism (‘causal-volitional theory of human action’)

‘If a volitional theory holds that the volition *causes* the bodily movement, then some scholars have denied that Berkeley holds a volitional theory, for they have denied that our volitions have any causal powers. Rather, God causes our bodily movements on the occasion of our volitions. This is **occasionalism about action**, and the **contrasting view that we do in fact cause our bodily movements can be called realism.**’

– Stoneham 2010, 498; see also Stoneham 2018, 42ff



# Two Possible Readings of the *DHP*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

① **Occasionalism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-atheist**’ can be attracted by this reading.

③ **Conservationism / Realism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-sceptic**’ can be attracted by this reading.

## Conservationism (‘causal-volitional theory of human action’)

‘If a volitional theory holds that the volition *causes* the bodily movement, then some scholars have denied that Berkeley holds a volitional theory, for they have denied that our volitions have any causal powers. Rather, God causes our bodily movements on the occasion of our volitions. This is **occasionalism about action**, and the **contrasting view that we do in fact cause our bodily movements can be called realism.**’

– [Stoneham 2010, 498](#); see also Stoneham 2018, 42ff



# Two Possible Readings of the *DHP*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 **Occasionalism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-atheist**’ can be attracted by this reading.
- 3 **Conservationism / Realism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-sceptic**’ can be attracted by this reading.

Conservationism (‘causal-volitional theory of human action’)

‘If a volitional theory holds that the volition *causes* the bodily movement, then some scholars have denied that Berkeley holds a volitional theory, for they have denied that our volitions have any causal powers. Rather, God causes our bodily movements on the occasion of our volitions. This is **occasionalism about action**, and the contrasting view that we do in fact cause our bodily movements can be called **realism**.’

– [Stoneham 2010, 498](#); see also Stoneham 2018, 42ff



# Two Possible Readings of the *DHP*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Occasionalism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-atheist**’ can be attracted by this reading.
- ③ **Conservationism / Realism** – ‘Berkeley the **anti-sceptic**’ can be attracted by this reading.

## Conservationism (‘causal-volitional theory of human action’)

‘If a volitional theory holds that the volition *causes* the bodily movement, then some scholars have denied that Berkeley holds a volitional theory, for they have denied that our volitions have any causal powers. Rather, God causes our bodily movements on the occasion of our volitions. This is **occasionalism about action**, and **the contrasting view that we do in fact cause our bodily movements can be called realism.**’

– [Stoneham 2010, 498](#); see also Stoneham 2018, 42ff





# Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'**
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture











◀ ◻ ▶ ◀ ◻ ▶ ◀ ≡ ▶ ◀ ≡ ▶ ≡ ↺ 🔍 ↻ 19/54



# Malebranchiste de bonne foi ?

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Berkeley was to be seen as a **Malebranchean occasionalist**

Right after his early publications (*PHK*, *Passive Obedience*, *DHP*), he was labelled a **Malebranchiste de bonne foi** (i.e. of good faith) in the French Jesuit academic journal, *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1713) (Oda 2018, 73–74).

[W]hatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have **not a like dependence on my will**. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is **not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no**, ... There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them.

– *PHK* §29, emphasis added, see also §§146ff

*Philonous*. I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not **sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God**; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes to suppose he is influenced, directed or put in mind when and what he is to act, **by any unthinking substance**.

– *DHP* 2, 220, emphasis added, etc.



# Malebranchiste de bonne foi ?

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Berkeley was to be seen as a Malebranchean occasionalist

Right after his early publications (*PHK*, *Passive Obedience*, *DHP*), he was labelled a **Malebranchiste de bonne foi** (i.e. of good faith) in the French Jesuit academic journal, *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1713) (Oda 2018, 73–74).

[W]hatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have **not a like dependence on my will**. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is **not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no**, ... There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them.

– *PHK* §29, emphasis added, see also §§146ff

*Philonous*. I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not **sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God**; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes to suppose he is influenced, directed or put in mind when and what he is to act, **by any unthinking substance**.

– *DHP* 2, 220, emphasis added, etc.





# Malebranchiste de bonne foi ?

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Berkeley was to be seen as a Malebranchean occasionalist

Right after his early publications (*PHK*, *Passive Obedience*, *DHP*), he was labelled a **Malebranchiste de bonne foi** (i.e. of good faith) in the French Jesuit academic journal, *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1713) (Oda 2018, 73–74).

[W]hatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have **not a like dependence on my will**. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is **not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no**, ... There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them.

– *PHK* §29, emphasis added, see also §§146ff

*Philonous*. I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not **sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God**; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes to suppose he is influenced, directed or put in mind when and what he is to act, **by any unthinking substance**.

– *DHP* 2, 220, emphasis added, etc.



# Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# 'We are chained to a body' (Dialogue 3)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ③ **Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.

*Philonous.* We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the Law of our Nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body: which sensible body rightly considered, is nothing but a complexión of such qualities or ideas, as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind: so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions, means no more than a correspondence in the order of Nature between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in his mind.

– DHP, Dialogue 3, 241, emphasis added



# 'We are chained to a body' (Dialogue 3)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ③ **Conservationism / Realism** – Creaturely minds always voluntarily and actively cause (ideas of) bodily motions in themselves; God is merely conserving their activity after creation.

*Philonous.* **We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions.** By **the Law of our Nature** we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body: which sensible body rightly considered, is nothing but a complexión of such qualities or ideas, as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind: so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions, means no more than a correspondence in **the order of Nature** between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But **God is a pure spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in his mind.**

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3, 241, emphasis added



# Conservationism in the other texts (not exhaustive)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. **Herein I differ from Malebranch.** (*Notebooks [Philosophical Commentaries]* §548; *Works* I, emphasis added)

Besides corporeal things there is the other class, viz. thinking things, and that there is in them the power of moving bodies we have learned by personal experience, since **our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our limbs**, whatever be the ultimate explanation of the fact. This is certain that bodies are moved at the will of the mind, and accordingly the mind can be called, correctly enough, **a principle of motion, a particular and subordinate principle** indeed, and one which itself depends on the first and universal principle. (*De motu* §25; *Works* IV, tr. Luce, emphasis added)

The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. [... I]n the government of the world **physical agents, improperly so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes**, or instruments, are necessary to assist, not the Governor, but the governed. [...] **In the human body the mind orders and moves the limbs.** (*Siris* §§160–61; *Works* V, emphasis added)



# Conservationism in the other texts (not exhaustive)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. **Herein I differ from Malebranch.** (*Notebooks [Philosophical Commentaries]* §548; *Works* I, emphasis added)

Besides corporeal things there is the other class, viz. thinking things, and that there is in them the power of moving bodies we have learned by personal experience, since **our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our limbs**, whatever be the ultimate explanation of the fact. This is certain that bodies are moved at the will of the mind, and accordingly the mind can be called, correctly enough, **a principle of motion, a particular and subordinate principle** indeed, and one which itself depends on the first and universal principle. (*De motu* §25; *Works* IV, tr. Luce, emphasis added)

The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. [...]n the government of the world **physical agents, improperly so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes**, or instruments, are necessary to assist, not the Governor, but the governed. [...] **In the human body the mind orders and moves the limbs.** (*Siris* §§160–61; *Works* V, emphasis added)



# Conservationism in the other texts (not exhaustive)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. **Herein I differ from Malebranch.** (*Notebooks [Philosophical Commentaries]* §548; *Works* I, emphasis added)

Besides corporeal things there is the other class, viz. thinking things, and that there is in them the power of moving bodies we have learned by personal experience, since **our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our limbs**, whatever be the ultimate explanation of the fact. This is certain that bodies are moved at the will of the mind, and accordingly the mind can be called, correctly enough, **a principle of motion, a particular and subordinate principle** indeed, and one which itself depends on the first and universal principle. (*De motu* §25; *Works* IV, tr. Luce, emphasis added)

The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. [...] In the government of the world **physical agents, improperly so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes**, or instruments, are necessary to assist, not the Governor, but the governed. [...] **In the human body the mind orders and moves the limbs.** (*Siris* §§160–61; *Works* V, emphasis added)



# Conservationism in the other texts (not exhaustive)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. **Herein I differ from Malebranch.** (*Notebooks [Philosophical Commentaries]* §548; *Works* I, emphasis added)

Besides corporeal things there is the other class, viz. thinking things, and that there is in them the power of moving bodies we have learned by personal experience, since **our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our limbs**, whatever be the ultimate explanation of the fact. This is certain that bodies are moved at the will of the mind, and accordingly the mind can be called, correctly enough, **a principle of motion, a particular and subordinate principle** indeed, and one which itself depends on the first and universal principle. (*De motu* §25; *Works* IV, tr. Luce, emphasis added)

The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. [... I]n the government of the world **physical agents, improperly so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes**, or instruments, are necessary to assist, not the Governor, but the governed. [...] **In the human body the mind orders and moves the limbs.** (*Siris* §§160–61; *Works* V, emphasis added)





# Question about human bodily motion and action

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Working Question

To what extent is Berkeley the **anti-atheist occasionalist**, on the one hand, and to what extent the **anti-sceptic conservationist (realist)**, on the other, about human embodiment?

*Philonous.* We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. [...]

– *DHP* 3, 241, emphasis added

Consider Berkeley's (Philonous's) argument for the mental powers (under the tab 'Minds and Ideas' earlier on) in contrast with the Occasionalist Objections (Objection 3 in *DHK* 2 and Objection 12 in *PHK* §§67ff, etc.).



# Question about human bodily motion and action

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Working Question

To what extent is Berkeley the **anti-atheist occasionalist**, on the one hand, and to what extent the **anti-sceptic conservationist (realist)**, on the other, about human embodiment?

*Philonous*. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. [...]

– *DHP* 3, 241, emphasis added

Consider Berkeley's (Philonous's) argument for the mental powers (under the tab 'Minds and Ideas' earlier on) in contrast with the Occasionalist Objections (Objection 3 in *DHK* 2 and Objection 12 in *PHK* §§67ff, etc.).



# Question about human bodily motion and action

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Working Question

To what extent is Berkeley the **anti-atheist occasionalist**, on the one hand, and to what extent the **anti-sceptic conservationist (realist)**, on the other, about human embodiment?

*Philonous*. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. [...]

– *DHP* 3, 241, emphasis added

Consider Berkeley's (Philonous's) argument for the mental powers (under the tab 'Minds and Ideas' earlier on) in contrast with the Occasionalist Objections (Objection 3 in *DHK* 2 and Objection 12 in *PHK* §§67ff, etc.).



# Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 **Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)**
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① All significant **words** stand for **Ideas**.
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] it **exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

***Notebooks* 378  
Argument**

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

***Notebooks* 378  
Argument**

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**

② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.

③ All ideas come from without or from within.

④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.

⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.

⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.

⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.

⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.

⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.

⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.

⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] it **exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

***Notebooks* 378  
Argument**

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments





# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If from within they are the operations of the mind & are called thoughts.
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever has in it an idea, tho[ugh] it be never so passive, tho[ugh] it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive[, by] 10.**

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① **All significant words stand for Ideas.**
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If **from within they are the operations of the mind** & are called thoughts. **[Conservationist/Realist volition and causation?]**
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ [T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas is call[e]d perception.
- ⑪ **Whatever has in it an idea, tho[ugh] it be never so passive, tho[ugh] it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive[, by] 10.**

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments





# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① All significant **words** stand for **Ideas**.
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If **from within they are the operations of the mind** & are called thoughts. [**Conservationist/Realist volition and causation?**]
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ **[T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas** is call[e]d perception. [**Occasionalist standpoint without conservationism?**]
- ⑪ Whatever has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] **it exert no manner of act** about it, **yet it must perceive**[, by] 10.



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

– *Notebooks* §378 (*Works* I), spelling corrected, emphasis added

- ① All significant **words** stand for **Ideas**.
- ② All knowle[d]ge [is] about our ideas.
- ③ All ideas come from without or from within.
- ④ If from without it must be by the senses & they are call[e]d sensations.
- ⑤ If **from within they are the operations of the mind** & are called thoughts. [**Conservationist/Realist volition and causation?**]
- ⑥ No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
- ⑦ No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
- ⑧ All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts, by 3.4.5.
- ⑨ None of our ideas can be in a thing w[hich] is both thoughtless & senseless[, by] 6.7.8.
- ⑩ **[T]he bare passive reception or having of ideas** is call[e]d perception. [**Occasionalist standpoint without conservationism?**]
- ⑪ **Whatever** has in it an idea, tho[ugh] **it be never so passive**, tho[ugh] it **exert no manner of act** about it, yet **it must perceive**[, by] 10.



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.

13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.

14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.

15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]

16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.

17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.

18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.

19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the *Treatise*' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.

13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.

14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.

15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]

16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.

17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.

18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.

19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
- 13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.
- 14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
- 15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]
- 16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.
- 17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.
- 18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.
- 19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
- 13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.
- 14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
- 15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]
- 16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.
- 17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.
- 18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.
- 19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These arguments must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [concerning the PHK].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.

13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.

14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.

15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.

**[Conclusion]**

16 **[Another demonstration of the above]** Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.

17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.

18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.

19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.

**[Conclusion]**

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the *Treatise*' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.

13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.

14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.

15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.

**[Conclusion]**

16 **[Another demonstration of the above]** Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.

17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.

18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.

19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.

**[Conclusion]**

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the *Treatise*' [*concerning the PHK*].





# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378  
Argument**

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
- 13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.
- 14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
- 15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]
- 16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.
- 17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.
- 18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.
- 19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These arguments must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
- 13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.
- 14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
- 15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]
- 16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.
- 17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.
- 18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.
- 19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These arguments must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [concerning the PHK].



# Berkeley's Argument in the *Notebooks* (1707–08)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

**Notebooks 378**  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 12 [A]ll ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
- 13 [T]hat thing w[hich] is like unto another thing must agree w[ith] it in one or more simple ideas.
- 14 [W]hatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
- 15 [N]othing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11. 14.  
[Conclusion]
- 16 [Another demonstration of the above] Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar[e]d.
- 17 Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking w[hat] they agree in & w[hat] they disagree in.
- 18 The mind can compare nothing but its' own ideas. 17.
- 19 Nothing like an idea can be in an u[n]perceiving thing. 11. 16. 18.  
[Conclusion]

*Notebooks* §378a: 'These **arguments** must be proposed shorter & more separate in the Treatise' [*concerning the PHK*].



# Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

**Gravitational  
Conclusion**

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues***
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# The very final conversation in Dialogue 3

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas.* [...] I see things **in their native forms**, and am no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute existence. [...] You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing **their philosophical scepticism**; but in the end your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

*Philonous.* You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose, its ascent as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of *gravitation*. Just so, the same principles which **at first view lead to scepticism**, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3 (*Works* II, 262–263, emphasis added)



# The very final conversation in Dialogue 3

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas.* [...] I see things **in their native forms**, and am no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute existence. [...] You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing **their philosophical scepticism**; but in the end your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

*Philonous.* You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose, its ascent as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of *gravitation*. Just so, the same principles which **at first view lead to scepticism**, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3 (*Works* II, 262–263, emphasis added)



# The very final conversation in Dialogue 3

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

*Hylas.* [...] I see things **in their native forms**, and am no longer in pain about their unknown natures or absolute existence. [...] You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing **their philosophical scepticism**; but in the end your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

*Philonous.* You see, Hylas, **the water of yonder fountain**, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose, its **ascent as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation**. Just so, the same principles which **at first view lead to scepticism**, pursued to a certain point, bring men **back to common sense**.

– *DHP*, Dialogue 3 (*Works* II, 262–263, emphasis added)



# Gravitationally—‘back to common sense’

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

**Gravitational  
Conclusion**

*DM* Intro


Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



- Berkeley's **pragmatic** project of philosophical speculation (thinking) or 'practice' useful for 'our lives and actions' (Preface to *DHP*).
- Overcoming 'paradoxes' of **atheism** and **scepticism** and returning to 'common sense'.
- See e.g. [Pearce 2017, 242](#); *DHP* 1, 172; 3, 234, for Berkeley's anti-sceptical defence of **commonsense**.
- 'Fountain at Versailles' (1911) by James Carroll Beckwith (1852–1917)





# Gravitationally—‘back to common sense’

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro


Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



- Berkeley's **pragmatic** project of philosophical speculation (thinking) or 'practice' useful for 'our lives and actions' (Preface to *DHP*).
- Overcoming 'paradoxes' of **atheism** and **scepticism** and returning to 'common sense'.
- See e.g. [Pearce 2017, 242](#); *DHP* 1, 172; 3, 234, for Berkeley's anti-sceptical defence of **commonsense**.
- '[Fountain at Versailles](#)' (1911) by James Carroll Beckwith (1852–1917)



# Gravitationally—‘back to common sense’

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks 378*  
Argument

**Gravitational  
Conclusion**

*DM Intro*


Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



- Berkeley's **pragmatic** project of philosophical speculation (thinking) or 'practice' useful for 'our lives and actions' (Preface to *DHP*).
- Overcoming 'paradoxes' of **atheism** and **scepticism** and returning to 'common sense'.
- See e.g. [Pearce 2017, 242](#); *DHP* 1, 172; 3, 234, for Berkeley's anti-sceptical defence of **commonsense**.
- '[Fountain at Versailles](#)' (1911) by James Carroll Beckwith (1852–1917)



# Gravitationally—‘back to common sense’

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

**Gravitational  
Conclusion**

*DM* Intro


Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



- Berkeley's **pragmatic** project of philosophical speculation (thinking) or 'practice' useful for 'our lives and actions' (Preface to *DHP*).
- Overcoming 'paradoxes' of **atheism** and **scepticism** and returning to 'common sense'.
- See e.g. [Pearce 2017, 242](#); *DHP* 1, 172; 3, 234, for Berkeley's anti-sceptical defence of **commonsense**.
- '[Fountain at Versailles](#)' (1911) by James Carroll Beckwith (1852–1917)



# Introduction to *De Motu*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

**DM Intro**

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu***
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



DM Intro

DE  
M O T U;  
SIVE DE  
Motus Principio & Natura,  
ET DE  
Causa Communicationis Motuum.



Diatriba primùm Typis mandata,  
L O N D I N I. A. D. M D C C X X I.

- **On the Motion, or on the Principle and Nature of Motion, and on the Cause of the Communication of Motions**
- A short treatise (72 paragraphs/sections), published *in Latin* in London in 1721 ([Jones 2021](#); the lecturer's PhD thesis 'A Pragmatic Bishop' 2022).
- The *DM* primarily critiques **Newtonian** mechanics & dynamics.
- Berkeley *might* have intended to apply for a prize competition of the Paris *Académie royale des sciences*. **[No record]**
- The first year of the award decided in November, 1720, 2000 £ awarded to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. **[Archival research in 2020, by the lecturer's 'high-level scientific grant France-Irlande']**



# DM: De motu sive de motus principio & natura, et de causa communicationis motuum (1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

DE  
M O T U;  
S I V E D E  
Motus Principio & Natura,  
E T D E  
Caufa Communicationis Motuum.



Diatriba primū Typis mandata,  
L O N D I N I. A. D. M D C C X X I.

- On the Motion, or on the Principle and Nature of Motion, and on the Cause of the Communication of Motions
- A short treatise (72 paragraphs/sections), published *in Latin* in London in 1721 ([Jones 2021](#); the lecturer's PhD thesis 'A Pragmatic Bishop' 2022).
- The *DM* primarily critiques **Newtonian** mechanics & dynamics.
- Berkeley *might* have intended to apply for a prize competition of the Paris *Académie royale des sciences*. **[No record]**
- The first year of the award decided in November, 1720, 2000 £ awarded to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. **[Archival research in 2020, by the lecturer's 'high-level scientific grant France-Irlande']**



# DM: De motu sive de motus principio & natura, et de causa communicationis motuum (1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

DE  
M O T U;  
S I V E D E  
Motus Principio & Natura,  
E T D E  
Cauſa Communicationis Motuum.



Diatriba primū Typis mandata,  
L O N D I N I. A. D. M D C C X X I.

- On the Motion, or on the Principle and Nature of Motion, and on the Cause of the Communication of Motions
- A short treatise (72 paragraphs/sections), published *in Latin* in London in 1721 ([Jones 2021](#); the lecturer's PhD thesis 'A Pragmatic Bishop' 2022).
- The *DM* primarily critiques **Newtonian** mechanics & dynamics.
- Berkeley *might* have intended to apply for a prize competition of the Paris *Académie royale des sciences*. **[No record]**
- The first year of the award decided in November, 1720, 2000 £ awarded to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. **[Archival research in 2020, by the lecturer's 'high-level scientific grant France-Irlande']**



# DM: De motu sive de motus principio & natura, et de causa communicationis motuum (1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

DE  
M O T U;  
S I V E D E  
Motus Principio & Natura,  
E T D E  
Causa Communicationis Motuum.



Diatriba primū Typis mandata,  
L O N D I N I. A. D. M D C C X X I.

- On the Motion, or on the Principle and Nature of Motion, and on the Cause of the Communication of Motions
- A short treatise (72 paragraphs/sections), published *in Latin* in London in 1721 ([Jones 2021](#); the lecturer's PhD thesis 'A Pragmatic Bishop' 2022).
- The *DM* primarily critiques **Newtonian** mechanics & dynamics.
- Berkeley *might* have intended to apply for a prize competition of the Paris *Académie royale des sciences*. **[No record]**
- The first year of the award decided in November, 1720, 2000 £ awarded to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. **[Archival research in 2020, by the lecturer's 'high-level scientific grant France-Irlande']**





# DM: De motu sive de motus principio & natura, et de causa communicationis motuum (1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

DE  
M O T U;  
S I V E D E  
Motus Principio & Natura,  
ET D E  
Causa Communicationis Motuum.



Diatriba primū Typis mandata,  
L O N D I N I. A. D. M D C C X X I.

- On the Motion, or on the Principle and Nature of Motion, and on the Cause of the Communication of Motions
- A short treatise (72 paragraphs/sections), published *in Latin* in London in 1721 ([Jones 2021](#); the lecturer's PhD thesis 'A Pragmatic Bishop' 2022).
- The *DM* primarily critiques **Newtonian** mechanics & dynamics.
- Berkeley *might* have intended to apply for a prize competition of the Paris *Académie royale des sciences*. **[No record]**
- The first year of the award decided in November, 1720, 2000 £ awarded to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz. **[Archival research in 2020, by the lecturer's 'high-level scientific grant France-Irlande']**



# Three Models of Causation (*De motu*, 1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions




Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Where C and E stand for a cause and its effect, respectively



- ① Model 1 (C1 implying E1) is metaphysical causation.
- ② Model 2 is mechanical causation from an empirical hypothesis (C2).
- ③ Model 3 is mechanical causation from a **mathematical hypothesis** (C3): 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus', etc., refer or **quasi-refer** to unobjectionable entities having **occult qualities**.



# Three Models of Causation (*De motu*, 1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions




Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Where C and E stand for a cause and its effect, respectively



- 1 Model 1 (C1 implying E1) is metaphysical causation.
- 2 Model 2 is mechanical causation from an empirical hypothesis (C2).
- 3 Model 3 is mechanical causation from a **mathematical hypothesis** (C3): 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus', etc., refer or **quasi-refer** to unobjectionable entities having **occult qualities**.



# Model 3: Tripartite Definition (*De motu*, 1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Definition of a pragmatist theory of causation

- ① Causal terms are indispensable in scientific *deliberation for their usefulness*; they cannot be eliminated. (**contra reductionism**)
- ② What a cause is is defined by *one's temporal deliberative practices*, independent of atemporal structure that theories hold. (**contra structuralism**)
- ③ Causal laws (theories and theorems formulated in causal terms) are *genuinely true, not fictitious*, when one can confirm and deduce them. (**contra instrumentalism**)

### My pragmatist reading

New reformulation in Berkeley scholarship, undermining the three alternative readings



# Berkeley's pragmatist theory of *mechanical* causation (*De motu*, 1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions


Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Pyramid model (six levels of objects)—M: Mechanical Causation



- ① Foundation of 'logicism', *not* 'formalism' (instrumentalism)
- ⑤ Ontological commitment to *causes* in the 'universe of discourse' (De Morgan 1846; Boole 1854; Peirce 1880; Quine 1948 'On What There Is', et al.)



# Berkeley's pragmatist theory of *mechanical* causation (*De motu*, 1721)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions


Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Pyramid model (six levels of objects)—M: Mechanical Causation



- ① Foundation of 'logicism', *not* 'formalism' (instrumentalism)
- ⑤ Ontological commitment to *causes* in the 'universe of discourse' (De Morgan 1846; Boole 1854; Peirce 1880; Quine 1948 'On What There Is', et al.)



# Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation before *DM*, for example

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Speculative and Experimental philosophy in early modern Europe

- Traditionally, **metaphysics, physics, and mathematics** were regarded as **speculative natural philosophy** in the early modern development (e.g. Francis Bacon; Berkeley, *PHK* §§101, 118, 131; *Notebooks* §406).
- Later on, **experimental natural philosophy** established **mechanics: the operative or practical nature of experiments** in relation to *magic*; mechanics was at times called 'mathematical magic' (Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 510).
- 'We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of Causes **Physical & Spirituall**' (*Notebooks* §855). In other words, **Metaphysical Causation and Mechanical Causation**.





# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation before *DM*, for example

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Speculative and Experimental philosophy in early modern Europe

- Traditionally, **metaphysics, physics, and mathematics** were regarded as **speculative natural philosophy** in the early modern development (e.g. Francis Bacon; Berkeley, *PHK* §§101, 118, 131; *Notebooks* §406).
- Later on, **experimental natural philosophy** established **mechanics**: the **operative or practical nature of experiments** in relation to *magic*; mechanics was at times called 'mathematical magic' (Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 510).
- 'We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of Causes **Physical & Spirituall**' (*Notebooks* §855). In other words, *metaphysical causation* and *mechanical causation*.



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation before *DM*, for example

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Speculative and Experimental philosophy in early modern Europe

- Traditionally, **metaphysics, physics, and mathematics** were regarded as **speculative natural philosophy** in the early modern development (e.g. Francis Bacon; Berkeley, *PHK* §§101, 118, 131; *Notebooks* §406).
- Later on, **experimental natural philosophy** established **mechanics**: the **operative or practical nature of experiments** in relation to *magic*; mechanics was at times called ‘mathematical magic’ (Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 510).
- ‘We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of Causes Physical & Spirituall’ (*Notebooks* §855). In other words,



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation before *DM*, for example

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Speculative and Experimental philosophy in early modern Europe

- Traditionally, **metaphysics, physics, and mathematics** were regarded as **speculative natural philosophy** in the early modern development (e.g. Francis Bacon; Berkeley, *PHK* §§101, 118, 131; *Notebooks* §406).
- Later on, **experimental natural philosophy** established **mechanics**: the **operative or practical nature of experiments** in relation to *magic*; mechanics was at times called ‘mathematical magic’ (Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 510).
- ‘We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of Causes **Physical & Spirituall**’ (*Notebooks* §855). In other words, **Mechanical/Physical and Metaphysical Causes**.



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation before *DM*, for example

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Speculative and Experimental philosophy in early modern Europe

- Traditionally, **metaphysics, physics, and mathematics** were regarded as **speculative natural philosophy** in the early modern development (e.g. Francis Bacon; Berkeley, *PHK* §§101, 118, 131; *Notebooks* §406).
- Later on, **experimental natural philosophy** established **mechanics**: the **operative or practical nature of experiments** in relation to *magic*; mechanics was at times called ‘mathematical magic’ (Anstey and Vanzo 2012, 510).
- ‘We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of Causes **Physical & Spirituall**’ (*Notebooks* §855). In other words, **Mechanical/Physical and Metaphysical Causes**.



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **Causation in experimental mechanics**, involving **mathematical (geometrical) deduction**, distinguished from metaphysical causation (involving theology).
- **'Geometrical reasoning'** (deduction with calculation) as one of the *three elements* that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. 'sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning' (*DM* §1).
- Causal terms **'mathematical hypotheses'** (e.g. gravity) and 'abstractions' (i.e. **not abstract ideas!**) **'mechanics and calculation'** (*DM* §18, see also §§17, 39, 66, 70).
- The adjective **'mechanical'** had the root sense of 'manual' or 'getting one's hands dirty' (Gabbey 2004, 12–13).



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **Causation in experimental mechanics**, involving **mathematical (gemometrical) deduction**, distinguished from metaphysical causation (involving theology).
- **'Geometrical reasoning'** (deduction with calculation) as one of the *three elements* that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. 'sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning' (*DM* §1).
- Causal terms **'mathematical hypotheses'** (e.g. gravity) and 'abstractions' (i.e. **not abstract ideas!**) **'mechanics and calculation'** (*DM* §18, see also §§17, 39, 66, 70).
- The adjective **'mechanical'** had the root sense of 'manual' or 'getting one's hands dirty' (Gabbey 2004, 12–13).



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **Causation in experimental mechanics**, involving **mathematical (geometrical) deduction**, distinguished from metaphysical causation (involving theology).
- **‘Geometrical reasoning’** (deduction with calculation) as one of the *three elements* that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. ‘sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning’ (*DM* §1).
- Causal terms **‘mathematical hypotheses’** (e.g. gravity) and ‘abstractions’ (i.e. **not abstract ideas!**) **‘mechanics and calculation’** (*DM* §18, see also §§17, 39, 66, 70).
- The adjective **‘mechanical’** had the root sense of ‘manual’ or ‘getting one’s hands dirty’ (Gabbey 2004, 12–13).



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **Causation in experimental mechanics**, involving **mathematical (geometrical) deduction**, distinguished from metaphysical causation (involving theology).
- **‘Geometrical reasoning’** (deduction with calculation) as one of the *three elements* that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. ‘sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning’ (*DM* §1).
- Causal terms **‘mathematical hypotheses’** (e.g. gravity) and ‘abstractions’ (i.e. **not abstract ideas!**) **‘mechanics and calculation’** (*DM* §18, see also §§17, 39, 66, 70).
- The adjective **‘mechanical’** had the root sense of ‘manual’ or ‘getting one’s hands dirty’ (Gabbey 2004, 12–13).





# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **Causation in experimental mechanics**, involving **mathematical (geometrical) deduction**, distinguished from metaphysical causation (involving theology).
- **‘Geometrical reasoning’** (deduction with calculation) as one of the *three elements* that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. ‘sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning’ (*DM* §1).
- Causal terms **‘mathematical hypotheses’** (e.g. gravity) and ‘abstractions’ (i.e. **not abstract ideas!**) **‘mechanics and calculation’** (*DM* §18, see also §§17, 39, 66, 70).
- The adjective **‘mechanical’** had the root sense of ‘manual’ or ‘getting one’s hands dirty’ (Gabbey 2004, 12–13).



# The Distinction between Mechanical and Metaphysical Causation in DM

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- **‘Geometrical reasoning’** (deduction with calculation) as one of the **three elements that the mechanist (physicist) coalesces, i.e. ‘sense, experiment, and geometrical reasoning’** (*DM* §1).



# Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation**
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# A broad framework of Berkeley's theory of mechanical causation in 3 elements

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

The mechanist's discourse in the 'mode of speaking' (*DM* §1), 'mechanical demonstrations' (*DM* §28), and 'mechanical practices' (*DM* §42) referring to **3 elements** (*DM* §§1, 4, 21, 36, 40, 71):

- ① **Element 1 – 'sense [sensus]'**, which distinguishes manifest and occult (unperceivable) qualities, the latter of which are referred to by abstract general terms (phrases) '**mathematical hypotheses**' (e.g. 'force', 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus').
- ② **Element 2 – 'experiment [experientia]'**, which proves '**mathematical hypotheses**' (causal terms) abstracted from effects (phenomena); 'proper experiment' fortifies the 'mind' in reasoning (*DM* §§25, 31).
- ③ **Element 3 – 'geometrical reasoning [ratiocinium geometricum]' or 'reason [ratio]'**, which frames '**mathematical hypotheses**' in law-propositions (sentences) by deduction for our needs and practices.



# A broad framework of Berkeley's theory of mechanical causation in 3 elements

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

The mechanist's discourse in the 'mode of speaking' (*DM* §1), 'mechanical demonstrations' (*DM* §28), and 'mechanical practices' (*DM* §42) referring to **3 elements** (*DM* §§1, 4, 21, 36, 40, 71):

- ① **Element 1 – 'sense [sensus]'**, which distinguishes manifest and **occult (unperceivable)** qualities, the latter of which are referred to by abstract general terms (phrases) '**mathematical hypotheses**' (e.g. 'force', 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus').
- ② **Element 2 – 'experiment [experientia]'**, which proves '**mathematical hypotheses**' (causal terms) abstracted from effects (phenomena); 'proper experiment' fortifies the 'mind' in reasoning (*DM* §§25, 31).
- ③ **Element 3 – 'geometrical reasoning [ratiocinium geometricum]' or 'reason [ratio]'**, which frames '**mathematical hypotheses**' in law-propositions (sentences) by deduction for our needs and practices.



# A broad framework of Berkeley's theory of mechanical causation in 3 elements

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

The mechanist's discourse in the 'mode of speaking' (*DM* §1), 'mechanical demonstrations' (*DM* §28), and 'mechanical practices' (*DM* §42) referring to **3 elements** (*DM* §§1, 4, 21, 36, 40, 71):

- ① **Element 1 – 'sense [sensus]'**, which distinguishes manifest and **occult (unperceivable)** qualities, the latter of which are referred to by abstract general terms (phrases) '**mathematical hypotheses**' (e.g. 'force', 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus').
- ② **Element 2 – 'experiment [experientia]'**, which proves '**mathematical hypotheses**' (causal terms) abstracted from effects (phenomena); 'proper experiment' fortifies the 'mind' in reasoning (*DM* §§25, 31).
- ③ **Element 3 – 'geometrical reasoning [ratiocinium geometricum]'** or '**reason [ratio]**', which frames '**mathematical hypotheses**' in law-propositions (sentences) by deduction for our needs and practices.



# A broad framework of Berkeley's theory of mechanical causation in 3 elements

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

The mechanist's discourse in the 'mode of speaking' (*DM* §1), 'mechanical demonstrations' (*DM* §28), and 'mechanical practices' (*DM* §42) referring to **3 elements** (*DM* §§1, 4, 21, 36, 40, 71):

- ① **Element 1 – 'sense [sensus]'**, which distinguishes manifest and **occult (unperceivable)** qualities, the latter of which are referred to by abstract general terms (phrases) '**mathematical hypotheses**' (e.g. 'force', 'gravity', 'attraction', 'impetus').
- ② **Element 2 – 'experiment [experientia]'**, which proves '**mathematical hypotheses**' (causal terms) abstracted from effects (phenomena); 'proper experiment' fortifies the 'mind' in reasoning (*DM* §§25, 31).
- ③ **Element 3 – 'geometrical reasoning [ratiocinium geometricum]'** or '**reason [ratio]**', which frames '**mathematical hypotheses**' in law-propositions (sentences) by deduction for our needs and practices.



# 'Geometrical reasoning' in 3 steps

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Step 3.1 – linguistic definition**, as *theorisation* by mathematical imagination or abstraction, i.e. the first *framing* of **causal terms** ('**mathematical hypotheses**') into law-propositions (*DM* §§33, 38, 39, 66, 67, etc.)
- ② **Step 3.2 – epistemic confirmation**, as *deliberation* by judging the **truth-values** (true/false) of theorised law-propositions in which causal terms occur (*DM* §§20, 28, 31, 38, 40, 67, etc.)
- ③ **Step 3.3 – pragmatic expression**, as *locution* of mechanical **causation** (law-propositions) for utility by mathematical deduction, followed by calculation (*DM* §§7, 28, 38, etc.)

## Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

The three-step framing of causal terms into causation, within the broad three-element framework of Berkeley's **discourse** for our **human** utility (on the lecturer's interpretation).





# 'Geometrical reasoning' in 3 steps

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Step 3.1 – linguistic definition**, as *theorisation* by mathematical imagination or abstraction, i.e. the first *framing* of **causal terms** ('**mathematical hypotheses**') into law-propositions (*DM* §§33, 38, 39, 66, 67, etc.)
- ② **Step 3.2 – epistemic confirmation**, as *deliberation* by judging the **truth-values** (true/false) of theorised law-propositions in which causal terms occur (*DM* §§20, 28, 31, 38, 40, 67, etc.)
- ③ **Step 3.3 – pragmatic expression**, as *locution* of mechanical **causation** (law-propositions) for utility by mathematical deduction, followed by calculation (*DM* §§7, 28, 38, etc.)

## Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

The three-step framing of causal terms into causation, within the broad three-element framework of Berkeley's **discourse** for our **human** utility (on the lecturer's interpretation).



# 'Geometrical reasoning' in 3 steps

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Step 3.1 – linguistic definition**, as *theorisation* by mathematical imagination or abstraction, i.e. the first *framing* of **causal terms** ('**mathematical hypotheses**') into law-propositions (*DM* §§33, 38, 39, 66, 67, etc.)
- ② **Step 3.2 – epistemic confirmation**, as *deliberation* by judging the **truth-values** (true/false) of theorised law-propositions in which causal terms occur (*DM* §§20, 28, 31, 38, 40, 67, etc.)
- ③ **Step 3.3 – pragmatic expression**, as *locution* of mechanical causation (law-propositions) for utility by mathematical deduction, followed by calculation (*DM* §§7, 28, 38, etc.)

## Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

The three-step framing of causal terms into causation, within the broad three-element framework of Berkeley's **discourse** for our **human** utility (on the lecturer's interpretation).



# 'Geometrical reasoning' in 3 steps

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Step 3.1 – linguistic definition**, as *theorisation* by mathematical imagination or abstraction, i.e. the first *framing* of **causal terms** ('**mathematical hypotheses**') into law-propositions (*DM* §§33, 38, 39, 66, 67, etc.)
- ② **Step 3.2 – epistemic confirmation**, as *deliberation* by judging the **truth-values** (true/false) of theorised law-propositions in which causal terms occur (*DM* §§20, 28, 31, 38, 40, 67, etc.)
- ③ **Step 3.3 – pragmatic expression**, as *locution* of mechanical **causation** (**law-propositions**) for utility by mathematical deduction, followed by calculation (*DM* §§7, 28, 38, etc.)

## Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

The three-step framing of causal terms into causation, within the broad three-element framework of Berkeley's **discourse** for our **human** utility (on the lecturer's interpretation).



# 'Geometrical reasoning' in 3 steps

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- ① **Step 3.1 – linguistic definition**, as *theorisation* by mathematical imagination or abstraction, i.e. the first *framing* of **causal terms** ('**mathematical hypotheses**') into law-propositions (*DM* §§33, 38, 39, 66, 67, etc.)
- ② **Step 3.2 – epistemic confirmation**, as *deliberation* by judging the **truth-values** (true/false) of theorised law-propositions in which causal terms occur (*DM* §§20, 28, 31, 38, 40, 67, etc.)
- ③ **Step 3.3 – pragmatic expression**, as *locution* of mechanical **causation** (**law-propositions**) for utility by mathematical deduction, followed by calculation (*DM* §§7, 28, 38, etc.)

## Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

The three-step framing of causal terms into causation, within the broad three-element framework of Berkeley's **discourse** for our **human** utility (on the lecturer's interpretation).



# Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation (i.e. causal terms and theories)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection


Assignments

**The human mind** delights in extending and expanding its knowledge. For this purpose general notions and propositions must be formed [step 3.1], in which particular propositions and knowledge are in some way contained, which are then, and only then, believed to be understood [step 3.2]. This is well known to **geometers**. In **mechanics** also notions are premised, i.e. definitions and first and general statements about motion [step 3.1], from which [through step 3.2] more remote and less general conclusions are later deduced by the mathematical method [step 3.3].

– Berkeley, *DM* §38, emphasis/clarification added


Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

Mechanistic, scientific discourse for utility. [Discursive Thinking]



**The human mind** delights in extending and expanding its knowledge. For this purpose general **notions and propositions must be formed [step 3.1]**, in which particular propositions and knowledge are in some way contained, which are then, and only then, **believed to be understood [step 3.2]**. This is well known to **geometers**. In **mechanics** also notions are premised, i.e. definitions and first and general statements about motion [step 3.1], from which [through step 3.2] more remote and less general conclusions are later deduced by the mathematical method [step 3.3].

- Berkeley, *DM* §38, emphasis/clarification added



**The human mind** delights in extending and expanding its knowledge. For this purpose general **notions and propositions must be formed [step 3.1]**, in which particular propositions and knowledge are in some way contained, which are then, and only then, **believed to be understood [step 3.2]**. This is well known to **geometers**. In **mechanics** also notions are premised, i.e. **definitions and first and general statements about motion [step 3.1]**, from which **[through step 3.2]** more remote and less general **conclusions are later deduced by the mathematical method [step 3.3]**.

- Berkeley, *DM* §38, emphasis/clarification added



# Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation (i.e. causal terms and theories)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

**The human mind** delights in extending and expanding its knowledge. For this purpose general **notions and propositions must be formed [step 3.1]**, in which particular propositions and knowledge are in some way contained, which are then, and only then, **believed to be understood [step 3.2]**. This is well known to **geometers**. In **mechanics** also notions are premised, i.e. **definitions and first and general statements about motion [step 3.1]**, from which **[through step 3.2]** more remote and less general **conclusions are later deduced by the mathematical method [step 3.3]**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §38, emphasis/clarification added

Berkeley's pragmatist theory of mechanical causation

Mechanistic, scientific **discourse** for utility. **[Discursive Thinking]**





# Berkeley's mechanistic approach to the 'motion'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

From what has been said it is clear that in **perceiving** the real nature of motion, it will be **exceedingly useful**,

- 1° to distinguish between **mathematical hypotheses** and the **nature of things [Element 1 sense]**;
- 2° to beware of **abstractions [Element 3 geometrical reasoning in the philosopher's discursive thinking ('mathematical abstractions', DM §40), not pure metaphysical thinking]**;
- 3° to consider motion as something **sensible**, or at least **imaginable**, and to be content with **relative measures [Element 2 experiment]**.

[...] And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.

– Berkeley, *DM* §66, emphasis/clarification added



# Berkeley's mechanistic approach to the 'motion'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

From what has been said it is clear that in **perceiving** the real nature of motion, it will be **exceedingly useful**,

- 1° to distinguish between **mathematical hypotheses** and the **nature of things [Element 1 sense]**;
- 2° to beware of **abstractions [Element 3 geometrical reasoning in the philosopher's discursive thinking ('mathematical abstractions', DM §40), not pure metaphysical thinking]**;
- 3° to consider motion as something **sensible**, or at least **imaginable**, and to be content with **relative measures [Element 2 experiment]**.

[...] And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.

– Berkeley, *DM* §66, emphasis/clarification added



# Berkeley's mechanistic approach to the 'motion'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

From what has been said it is clear that in **perceiving** the real nature of motion, it will be **exceedingly useful**,

- 1° to distinguish between **mathematical hypotheses** and the **nature of things [Element 1 sense]**;
- 2° to beware of **abstractions [Element 3 geometrical reasoning in the philosopher's discursive thinking ('mathematical abstractions', DM §40), not pure metaphysical thinking]**;
- 3° to consider motion as something **sensible**, or at least **imaginable**, and to be content with **relative measures [Element 2 experiment]**.

[...] And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.

– Berkeley, *DM* §66, emphasis/clarification added



# Berkeley's mechanistic approach to the 'motion'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

From what has been said it is clear that in **perceiving** the real nature of motion, it will be **exceedingly useful**,

- 1° to distinguish between **mathematical hypotheses** and the **nature of things** [Element 1 sense];
- 2° to beware of **abstractions** [Element 3 geometrical reasoning in the philosopher's discursive thinking ('mathematical abstractions', DM §40), not pure metaphysical thinking];
- 3° to consider motion as something **sensible**, or at least **imaginable**, and to be content with **relative measures** [Element 2 experiment].

[...] And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.

– Berkeley, *DM* §66, emphasis/clarification added



# Berkeley's mechanistic approach to the 'motion'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

From what has been said it is clear that in **perceiving** the real nature of motion, it will be **exceedingly useful**,

- 1° to distinguish between **mathematical hypotheses** and the **nature of things** [Element 1 sense];
- 2° to beware of **abstractions** [Element 3 geometrical reasoning in the philosopher's discursive thinking ('mathematical abstractions', DM §40), not pure metaphysical thinking];
- 3° to consider motion as something **sensible**, or at least **imaginable**, and to be content with **relative measures** [Element 2 experiment].

[...] And let these words suffice about the nature of motion.

– Berkeley, *DM* §66, emphasis/clarification added



# Metaphysical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation**
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture



# Any different kinds of 'causes' in the text of *DM*?

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

**The physicist** [in the sense of mathematical mechanist or ourselves] studies the series or successions of sensible things, noting by what laws they are connected, and in what order, what precedes as **cause**, and what follows as effect. And on this method we say that the body in motion is the **cause of motion** in the other, and impresses motion on it, draws it also or impels it. In this sense second **corporeal cause** ought to be understood, **no account** being taken of the **actual seat** of the forces or of the **active powers** or of the real cause in which they are.

— Berkeley, *DM* §71, emphasis/clarification added

## The 'real cause'

The last *cause* is a metaphysical one as the **foundation** for the laws/propositions of motion.



# Any different kinds of 'causes' in the text of *DM*?

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

**The physicist** [in the sense of mathematical mechanist or ourselves] studies the series or successions of sensible things, noting by what laws they are connected, and in what order, what precedes as **cause**, and what follows as effect. And on this method we say that the body in motion is the **cause of motion** in the other, and impresses motion on it, draws it also or impels it. In this sense second **corporeal cause** ought to be understood, **no account** being taken of the **actual seat** of the forces or of the **active powers** or of the **real cause** in which they are.

– Berkeley, *DM* §71, emphasis/clarification added

## The 'real cause'

The last *cause* is a metaphysical one as the **foundation** for the laws/propositions of motion.





# The limit of mechanical causation and something else or *higher*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

[I]t will be more convenient [...] to **distinguish** between the **sciences** [knowledges] as to **confine** each to its own bounds; thus the **natural philosopher** should concern themselves entirely with experiments, laws of motions, mechanical principles, and reasonings thence deduced; but if they shall advance views on other matters, let them refer them for **acceptance to some superior science**.

[I]f to each **science** its province were **allotted**, its limits **assigned**, and the principles and objects which belong to it accurately **distinguished**, then it will be possible to treat them with greater ease and clarity.

– Berkeley, *DM* §§42, 72, emphasis/clarification added

Two types of science/knowledge [*scientia*]

Mechanical causation differs from **metaphysical (superior)** causation.



# The limit of mechanical causation and something else or *higher*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

[I]t will be more convenient [...] to **distinguish** between the **sciences** [**knowledges**] as to **confine** each to its own bounds; thus the **natural philosopher** should concern himself entirely with experiments, laws of motions, mechanical principles, and reasonings thence deduced; but if they shall advance views on other matters, let them refer them for **acceptance to some superior science**.

[I]f to each **science** its province were **allotted**, its limits **assigned**, and the principles and objects which belong to it accurately **distinguished**, then it will be possible to treat them with greater ease and clarity.

– Berkeley, *DM* §§42, 72, emphasis/clarification added

Two types of science/knowledge [*scientia*]

Mechanical causation differs from **metaphysical (superior)** causation.



# The limit of mechanical causation and something else or *higher*

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

[I]t will be more convenient [...] to **distinguish** between the **sciences** [knowledges] as to **confine** each to its own bounds; thus the **natural philosopher** should concern himself entirely with experiments, laws of motions, mechanical principles, and reasonings thence deduced; but if they shall advance views on other matters, let them refer them for **acceptance to some superior science**.

[I]f to each **science** its province were **allotted**, its limits **assigned**, and the principles and objects which belong to it accurately **distinguished**, then it will be possible to treat them with greater ease and clarity.

– Berkeley, *DM* §§42, 72, emphasis/clarification added

Two types of science/knowledge [*scientia*]

Mechanical causation differs from **metaphysical (superior)** causation.



# Metaphysically 'truly active causes'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Only by meditation and reasoning can **truly active causes** be rescued from the surrounding darkness and be **to some extent known**. To deal with them is the business of **first philosophy or metaphysics**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §72, emphasis/clarification added

Possibly, there are not only the divine, but also the other active causes in Berkeley's metaphysics. See also *DM* §§3 ('animate beings', incl. human minds); 25, 30, 31, 32 (Anaxagorean *voûç*, incl. Cartesian 'mind'). But, consider the following: §§3, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.



# Metaphysically 'truly active causes'

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

Only by meditation and reasoning can **truly active causes** be rescued from the surrounding darkness and be **to some extent known**. To deal with them is the business of **first philosophy or metaphysics**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §72, emphasis/clarification added

## Why are the 'truly active causes' plural?

Possibly, there are not only the divine, but also the other active causes in Berkeley's metaphysics. See also *DM* §§3 ('**animate beings**', incl. human minds); 25, 30, 31, 32 (Anaxagorean *voûç*, incl. Cartesian 'mind'). **N.B. consider 'pure intellect' in §53 (DHP 1, 193–94; Alc 7.13 (Works III): 'the intellect towards truth').**



# Theological understanding of the *metaphysical* causes (despite human *animate* causes)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.


– Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

The 'supreme right' indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to 'God', see also *DM* §§32, 34 ('the wisdom, goodness, and power of God'), 54, 56.

## 3 definitions of divine causes in the metaphysical domain

- ① Divine cause is 'real' [*vera*].
- ② It is 'efficient'—God as 'creator' [*conditor*] (*DM* §34), **efficient cause or 'power'**.
- ③ It is 'conserving'—God as 'conservator' [*conservator*] (*DM* §34), **final cause or 'wisdom'**.



It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.

- Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

The 'supreme right' indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to 'God', see also *DM* §§32, 34 ('the wisdom, goodness, and power of God'), 54, 56.



# Theological understanding of the *metaphysical* causes (despite human *animate* causes)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

## The ‘supreme right’ indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to ‘God’, see also *DM* §§32, 34 (‘the wisdom, goodness, and power of God’), 54, 56.

## 3 definitions of divine causes in the metaphysical domain

- ① Divine cause is ‘real’ [*vera*].
- ② It is ‘efficient’—God as ‘creator’ [*conditor*] (*DM* §34), **efficient cause or ‘power’**.
- ③ It is ‘conserving’—God as ‘conservator’ [*conservator*] (*DM* §34), **final cause or ‘wisdom’**.





# Theological understanding of the *metaphysical* causes (despite human *animate* causes)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

## The ‘supreme right’ indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to ‘God’, see also *DM* §§32, 34 (‘the wisdom, goodness, and power of God’), 54, 56.

## 3 definitions of divine causes in the metaphysical domain

- 1 Divine cause is ‘real’ [*vera*].
- 2 It is ‘efficient’—God as ‘creator’ [*conditor*] (*DM* §34), **efficient cause or ‘power’**.
- 3 It is ‘conserving’—God as ‘conservator’ [*conservator*] (*DM* §34), **final cause or ‘wisdom’**.



# Theological understanding of the *metaphysical* causes (despite human *animate* causes)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

## The ‘supreme right’ indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to ‘God’, see also *DM* §§32, 34 (‘the wisdom, goodness, and power of God’), 54, 56.

## 3 definitions of divine causes in the metaphysical domain

- ① Divine cause is ‘real’ [*vera*].
- ② It is ‘efficient’—God as ‘creator’ [*conditor*] (*DM* §34), **efficient cause or ‘power’**.
- ③ It is ‘conserving’—God as ‘conservator’ [*conservator*] (*DM* §34), **final cause or ‘wisdom’**.



# Theological understanding of the *metaphysical* causes (despite human *animate* causes)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

It will be of great importance to consider what properly a principle is, and how that term is to be understood by philosophers. The **real [true], efficient, and conserving cause of all things by supreme right** is called their **fount and principle**.


– Berkeley, *DM* §36, emphasis/clarification added

## The ‘supreme right’ indicates the divine cause or God

For direct references to ‘God’, see also *DM* §§32, 34 (‘the wisdom, goodness, and power of God’), 54, 56.

## 3 definitions of divine causes in the metaphysical domain


- ① Divine cause is ‘real’ [*vera*].
- ② It is ‘efficient’—God as ‘creator’ [*conditor*] (*DM* §34), **efficient cause or ‘power’**.
- ③ It is ‘conserving’—God as ‘conservator’ [*conservator*] (*DM* §34), **final cause or ‘wisdom’**.



## Metaphysical Causation

— Leibniz, 'Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures' (1705; tr. Loemaker 1989, 588), emphasis added; See also his *Monadology* §79 (1714; 1989, 651), etc.

- William King, *Sermon* (1709; 1976, §IV), emphasis added




## Metaphysical Causation

These are like **two kingdoms**, one of **efficient** causes, the other of **final**, each of which separately suffices in detail to give a reason for the whole, as if the other did not exist. But neither is adequate without the other when we consider their origin, for they emanate from one source in which the **power which makes efficient causes**, and the **wisdom which rules final causes**, are found united.

— Leibniz, 'Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures' (1705; tr. Loemaker 1989, 588), emphasis added; See also his *Monadology* §79 (1714; 1989, 651), etc.

- William King, *Sermon* (1709; 1976, §IV), emphasis added




## Metaphysical Causation

These are like **two kingdoms**, one of **efficient** causes, the other of **final**, each of which separately suffices in detail to give a reason for the whole, as if the other did not exist. But neither is adequate without the other when we consider their origin, for they emanate from one source in which the **power which makes efficient causes**, and the **wisdom which rules final causes**, are found united.

— Leibniz, 'Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures' (1705; tr. Loemaker 1989, 588), emphasis added; See also his *Monadology* §79 (1714; 1989, 651), etc.

God who has thus concerted and settled Matters, must have **Wisdom**; and having ascrib'd to him **Wisdom**, because we see the effects and result of it in his Works.

- William King, *Sermon* (1709; 1976, §IV), emphasis added



## Metaphysical Causation

These are like **two kingdoms**, one of **efficient** causes, the other of **final**, each of which separately suffices in detail to give a reason for the whole, as if the other did not exist. But neither is adequate without the other when we consider their origin, for they emanate from one source in which the **power which makes efficient causes**, and the **wisdom which rules final causes**, are found united.

— Leibniz, 'Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures' (1705; tr. Loemaker 1989, 588), emphasis added; See also his *Monadology* §79 (1714; 1989, 651), etc.

God who has thus concerted and settled Matters, must have **Wisdom**; and having ascrib'd to him **Wisdom**, because we see the effects and result of it in his Works.

- William King, *Sermon* (1709; 1976, §IV), emphasis added

For Berkeley's references, see DM §§34–36; PHK §46; Siris §231 (Works V); the 1729 Correspondence §3 (Works II); etc.



# Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 The Physical World of Minds (Spirits) and Ideas
- 3 Three Theories of Causation about Bodily Motion
- 4 Occasionalist Embodiment: 'in whom we live and move'
- 5 Conservationist Embodiment: 'we are chained to a body'
- 6 Berkeley's Argument in Premiss-Conclusion Form (*PC* §378)
- 7 Gravitational Conclusion of the *Three Dialogues*
- 8 Introduction to *De Motu*
- 9 Scientific Distinctions in the *De Motu*
- 10 Mechanical Causation
- 11 Metaphysical Causation
- 12 Berkeley's Argument and his Opponents' Objection
- 13 Assignments for the Next Lecture





# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be judged as having said something [*dixisse*] rather than to have thought anything [*cogitâsse*]. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was adduced to explain.

- Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, *or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct*, are to be judged as having said something

The metaphysical doctrine of **Henry More** (1614–87)

**‘Spirit of Nature’** (ὕλη+ἀρχή ‘origin’), akin to Ralph Cudworth’s **‘Plastic Nature’**. Two of the Cambridge Platonists defended **abstract metaphysics about realist causation**—the **vitalistic** principles of created nature. Berkeley possibly adopted this reference from Leibniz’s criticism that More’s doctrine was ‘archaeus’ (too ancient or too unintelligible), albeit sympathetic to his contemporary (Christian-Kabbalistic) neo-Platonists.

– Hutton 2015, 149; Jesseph 1992, 81–82; Leibniz 1989, tr. Loemker, 441, etc. For **vitalism**, see Wolfe 2013; 2021, etc.



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation


Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having said something [*dixisse*] rather than to have thought anything [*cogitâsse*]. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was adduced to explain.

- Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)



### Argument and Objection

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitâsse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

- Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitasse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)

## Berkeley's Argument for Mechanical Causation

- ① Mechanical explanation expresses the cause and origin of motion, i.e. 'mathematical hypotheses' (causal terms).
- ② Whatever expresses 'mathematical hypotheses' is discursively thought by deliberation, not purely thought.
- ③ Therefore, mechanical explanation is discursively thought, not purely thought. [Universal Instantiation]



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitasse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)

## Berkeley's Argument for Mechanical Causation

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses the cause and origin of motion, i.e. 'mathematical hypotheses' (causal terms).
- 2 Whatever expresses 'mathematical hypotheses' is discursively thought by deliberation, not purely thought.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation is discursively thought, not purely thought. [Universal Instantiation]



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitasse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)

## Berkeley's Argument for Mechanical Causation

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses the cause and origin of motion, i.e. 'mathematical hypotheses' (causal terms).
- 2 Whatever expresses 'mathematical hypotheses' is discursively thought by deliberation, not purely thought.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation is discursively thought, not purely thought. [Universal Instantiation]



# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitasse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)

## Berkeley's Argument for Mechanical Causation

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses the cause and origin of motion, i.e. 'mathematical hypotheses' (causal terms).
- 2 Whatever expresses 'mathematical hypotheses' is discursively thought by deliberation, not purely thought.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation is discursively thought, not purely thought. [Universal Instantiation]

Question: which premiss(es) shall his opponents attack?





# Berkeley's Argument for (his pragmatist theory of) Mechanical Causation

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

All those who in explaining the **cause and origin of motion** make use of the **Hylarchic principle**, or the need of nature, or its appetite, or lastly of a natural instinct, are to be **judged** as having **said something [dixisse]** rather than to have **thought anything [cogitâsse]**. [...] For indeed all of these either say nothing particular and determinate, or if it were something, it would be as difficult to explain as that very thing which it was **adduced to explain**.

– Berkeley, *DM* §20, clarification added (see also §37)

## Berkeley's Argument for Mechanical Causation

- 1 **Mechanical explanation expresses the cause and origin of motion, i.e. 'mathematical hypotheses' (causal terms).**

Question: which premiss(es) shall his opponents attack?



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- ① Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- ② If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- ④ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- ⑤ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- ⑥ Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by '**pure intellect**', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

For Berkeley himself, however

The *purely intellectual* metaphysical world *cannot* imply the mechanical world in expressing causation. **[Independence Thesis]**

- ② If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- ④ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- ⑤ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- ⑥ Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

For Berkeley himself, however

The *purely intellectual* metaphysical world *cannot* imply the mechanical world in expressing causation. **[Independence Thesis]**

- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

For Berkeley himself, however

The *purely intellectual* metaphysical world *cannot* imply the mechanical world in expressing causation. **[Independence Thesis]**

- ② If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]

For the opponents

Mechanical causation *must* be **dependent on the metaphysical foundations of 'pure intellect'**, such as the 'Hylarchic principle', 'self-moving' causes, 'spirits', 'body beyond solid extension', and 'something else from which [...] forces might arise' (Borelli and Leibniz, *DM* §20; Jesseph 1992, 81–82). **[Dependence Thesis]**





# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- ① Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- ④ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- ⑤ Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- ⑥ Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by '**pure intellect**', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by '**pure intellect**', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- ~~1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi (\neg\neg\psi)$ , *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]~~
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by 'pure intellect', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]
- 6 Therefore, whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is *both* purely thought *and not* purely thought. [ $\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi$ , *contradictio*, P4,P5]

**Reductio ad absurdum: P1 must be false.**



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 1 Mechanical explanation expresses mathematical hypotheses. [ $\psi$  ( $\neg\neg\psi$ ), *suppositio*: P1 of Berkeley's Argument]
- 2 If whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought (by '**pure intellect**', *DM* §53; *DHP* 1, 193–94), then mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \supset \neg\psi$ ]
- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses. [ $\varphi \vee \neg\psi$ ]
- 4 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought. [ $\varphi$ , *disjunctive syllogism*, P1,P3]
- 5 Whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses *is not* (*cannot be*) purely thought. [ $\neg\varphi$ , *modus tollens*, P1,P2]

Question: Which premiss does Berkeley still resist and attack?



# Objection from Berkeley's Opponents (*DM* §20)

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

*Notebooks* 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

*DM* Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical causation does not express mathematical hypotheses.

$[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

Question: Which premiss does Berkeley still resist and attack?



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- ③ Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things', then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses.
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP]





# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things' ('such as our minds, their states, passions, powers, and such like', DM §53), then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses (**however, it is independent of any pure thought, DM §§71, 72, etc.**).
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP]



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things', then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses.
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP]



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things', then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses.
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP]



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection

- 3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things', then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses.
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP]



# Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## ~~The Cambridge Platonists, Borelli and Leibniz's *Reductio* Objection~~

- ~~3 Either whatever expresses mathematical hypotheses is purely thought or mechanical explanation **does not** express mathematical hypotheses.  $[\varphi \vee \neg\psi]$~~

## Berkeley's Reply to the Opponents, rejecting the above P3

- 1 If the 'pure intellect' is not concerned with mechanical (physical or extended) causes, but 'only with spiritual and unextended things', then mechanical explanation is not *dependent on* whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses.
- 2 The pure intellect is not concerned with mechanical causes, but only with spiritual and unextended things.
- 3 Therefore, mechanical explanation *is not* dependent on whatever is purely thought to express mathematical hypotheses. [MP: **the Opponents' Dependence Thesis is false**]



## Assignments



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.





# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]**
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]**
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- ① Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- ② Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- ③ **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]**
- ④ Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- 3 **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]**
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - ♣ For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Further Considerations

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments

## Essay Questions in Part II

- ① Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [Week 9, *PHK* Objection 12, and *DHP* Hylas's Objection 3]
- ② Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*. [Week 10]
- ③ **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the Three Dialogues. [Week 11 and this week]**
- ④ **Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*. [this week]**
  - What are 'causes' and 'hypotheses' in mechanics (physics) and metaphysics, respectively? Are they different?
  - How do they relate to the positions of Berkeley and other early modern philosophers?
  - ♣ For more background of the treatise, *De motu* ['On Motion'], review Jesseph 1992, introduction.



# Next Week 12: Hume

Week 11:  
Berkeley 4

odat@tcd.ie

Weekly Quiz

Minds and Ideas

3 Theories of  
Causation

Occasionalist  
Embodiment

Conservationist  
Embodiment

Notebooks 378  
Argument

Gravitational  
Conclusion

DM Intro

Distinctions

Mechanical  
Causation

Metaphysical  
Causation

Argument and  
Objection

Assignments



Assignment 1: Read David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (ed. Millican 2007), §§4–5, esp. §7 (pp. 60–78: 'Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion').



Assignment 2: Read the 'Argument Advice' and 'Essay Questions' in PDF. And ask me or your assigned TA for anything unclear in the documents and slides.

- Keep active in the **WeCom/企业微信** group for this course, and pay attention to the **Blackboard** (SS149, Spring 2024), in which you can find all the basic info and recommended references.
- **Office hours** of the instructor (Center for Social Sciences, C111) and TAs (their offices) are Mondays 2-4pm, or any working time of appointment, by WeCom direct message or email.