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From 1683 to 1685 Arnauld engaged in a controversy with Malebranche over the nature of ideas. While the occasion for the dispute was a disagreement over grace, the focus was the account of ideas given in Malebranche's *Search After Truth*. Arnauld published his *Des vraies et des fausses idées* in 1683, and this was followed by a response from Malebranche in 1684 and a response by Arnauld shortly afterward.[1] In his criticism of Malebranche, Arnauld claimed to be reacting not just for himself, but for Descartes as well, and so a look at the controversy and the reasons given for the conflicting claims will, I believe, help in understanding Descartes' own difficult remarks on ideas.

The controversy can be seen as stemming from an ambiguity Descartes explicitly acknowledged in the preface to the *Meditations* in discussing an objection to his causal proof for the existence of God:

> My reply is that there is an ambiguity here in the word 'idea'. 'Idea' can be taken materially, as an operation of the intellect, in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than me. Alternatively, it can be taken objectively, as the thing represented by that operation; and this thing, even if it is not regarded as existing outside the intellect, can still, in virtue of its essence, be more perfect than myself.[2]

and in the *Meditations* itself, when introducing that proof:

> In so far as the ideas are considered simply as modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion. But in so far as different ideas represent different things, it is clear they differ widely.[3]

From this it appears that Descartes held that ideas were modes of the mind which were also representatives of things. "Formally" or "taken materially" they are modes of the mind, but they are also representatives of souls, material objects, accidents, or God. This content is what they are "objectively." An idea of the sun formally is an accident of a thinking substance, but objectively it is the sun, "in so far as it occurs in the understanding."

The controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld was a dispute over whether there are two types of ideas, acts of awareness on the one hand and

representations which are the objects of these acts on the other, or just one, a mode of the mind which itself is an awareness of an object. Arnauld held that it is the awareness, or perception itself which does the representing, and the objects of perception are in general not ideas but material things, souls, accidents of these, or God. Malebranche held that the act of perception could not be representational, but that the immediate object of perception is, in the case of our perception of material objects at least, an entity which is representational. These representational entities he called ideas, and he held they were in God's mind.[4]

II

Malebranche began his discussion of ideas with the claim that we cannot perceive things that are not directly present to us:

> I think everyone agrees that we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves. We see the sun, the stars, and an infinity of objects external to us; and it is not likely that the soul should leave the body to stroll about the heavens, as it were, in order to behold all these objects. Thus it does not see them by themselves, and our mind's immediate object when it sees the sun, for example, is not the sun, but something that is intimately joined to our soul, and this is what I call an *idea* . . . by the word idea, I mean nothing other than the immediate object, or the object closest to the mind, when it perceives something.[5]

Malebranche went on to say that for a mind to perceive something, that thing must be actually present to the mind. External things are not present to the mind, but things in the soul are. So "our soul has no need of ideas in order to perceive these things."[6] One of the consequences of this view, according to Malebranche himself, is that "the sun that we see is not the one we look at [*regarder*], . . . [t]he soul can see only the sun to which it is immediately joined, only that sun like it that occupies no place."[7] The extension that we are aware of is also not the extension of the corporeal world or "created extension," but "intelligible extension."

On Malebranche's view, when I think of something, there is a modification of my mind (or act of awareness), but this doesn't represent anything. I am aware immediately not of an object, but of an idea or a representative entity distinct from the object and from my act of awareness. At least this is the case with awareness of material objects. Malebranche did not think I am aware of such a representative entity in the case of my awareness of my own soul, my own sensations, or God. But in the other cases it is a proxy for the object that I immediately perceive. Malebranche's view, as opposed to Arnauld's, leads to the picture of ideas as a veil between the

thinker and the world, although Malebranche himself did not see them this way, as he took these ideas to be the eternal exemplars in God's mind: they are not copies of objects; rather objects, if there are any, are copies of them.

Arnauld strongly disagreed with this view that between the mind and the object there is a third thing, the idea which is the object of our perception. He began his long argument against Malebranche with a set of definitions which include the following:

> 3. I take for the same thing the idea of an object and the perception of the object . . . .
> 4. I say an object is present to the mind when the mind perceives it and is acquainted with it . . . .
> 5. I say a thing is objectively in my mind when I conceive it. When I conceive the sun, a square, a sound, the sun, the square, this sound, are objectively in my mind, whether or not they exist outside my mind.
> 6. I said that I took the *perception* and the *idea* for the same thing. It is necessary nevertheless to note that this thing, while being one, has two relations: the one to the soul it modifies, the other to the thing perceived, in so far as it is objectively in the soul . . . .[8]

Ideas, then, are modes of the mind which themselves are representatives of objects. This identification of the idea with the perception suggests that the idea is a mental act, a perception of an object, not of an idea: "I find it very certain that when I see the earth, the sun, the stars, the people who are around me, these are not imaginary bodies or people that I see, but the works of God, and real people whom God created like me."[9]

Arnauld claimed there is an ambiguity in the word "present" in the phrase "our mind sees only those objects which are present to it," and argued that a thing was present to a mind when the mind was conceiving it. He thought Malebranche's demand for presence as an intimate union stemmed from two prejudices believed about bodily perception. The first is that for a person to see something, an object has to be in view, has to be physically present. Arnauld thought it was illegitimate to transfer this demand for physical presence to mental perception. The second prejudice is "that sometimes visible things are seen in mirrors or in the water, or in other things which represent them to us, and then it is believed, although by mistake, that it is not the things themselves which are seen, but their images."[10] Arnauld held that it is myself I see, by means of a mirror, not an image. Throughout *Des vraises et des fausses idées* there is a criticism of viewing mental representations along the line of pictures:

> When it is said that our ideas and our perceptions (I take these to be the same thing) represent to us things which we conceive and are their images, it is in a completely different sense than when one says that pictures represent their

> originals, and are images of them, or that written or spoken words are images of our thoughts; because concerning ideas this means that the things we conceive are *objectively* in our mind and our thought. This *way of being objectively in the mind* is so particular to the mind and to thought, as being what gives it its particular nature, that it would be in vain to look for anything similar in all that is not mind and thought.[11]

Arnauld argued that Malebranche's theory of ideas did not explain what it was supposed to, namely how we are aware of bodies and created extension. His major argument for this point went roughly as follows: The question is how I come to think of a body A. According to Malebranche I can do this only by means of something else, something which represents A and is intimately joined to my soul. The question Arnauld posed was whether there is a distinct perception of this representative entity, which he called B, or whether this one perception is a perception of both A and B. If it is of both, then both are intimately joined to the soul, contrary to what Malebranche said about bodies. But if it is not, then there must be two perceptions, one of B and one of A, such that the first causes the second. There must be this second perception, since it is A that I need to see (or be aware of). Thus either way I need a perception of A, and so A must be intimately joined to my soul, and the perception of B is superfluous.[12]

Arnauld's arguments make it clear that he rejected a representationalist theory of ideas if this is taken to mean that the objects of our perceptions are themselves ideas which are representations of other things which are not objects of perception.

His view looks like a species of direct realism, and at first glance does not look at all like Descartes' view, for it does not appear to allow for all the epistemological problems so central to the *Meditations*. Descartes suggested that what a person has before his mind directly are representatives of objects. One can examine these representatives directly and see what their features are, but one needs the argument for the existence of God to get beyond this to any knowledge of external things. If we are perceiving objects already, as on Arnauld's view, it is hard to see how this problem could arise.

In the *Search After Truth*, Malebranche brought up the problem of perceptual error. He argued that the objects of our awareness cannot be the material objects of the world, for they need not exist for us to have the perception.[13] Arnauld's position on this point, though, allowed for the Cartesian scepticism concerning the existence of the thing, while still making the material objects the objects of the ideas:

> I am assured that I am aware of bodies when I am able to doubt whether there are any that exist, because it is sufficient that I am aware of them as possible.

> And when I am aware of (*connaîtrais*) a body as existing, when it doesn't, I err; but it is no less true that this body is objectively in my mind, although it doesn't exist outside my mind.[14]

In this case what we perceive is a possible object, but this should not be confused with perceiving an idea. Arnauld here tied objective reality with possible existence, a move that can also be seen in Descartes. This connection has the advantage also of making Descartes' extension of the causal principle from formal reality to the objective reality of ideas more plausible. For if I have an idea of X, then X possibly exists, and we can therefore demand that this have a causal explanation, for Descartes thought that the merely possible also needed a cause.

It is important to note as well that Arnauld did say that our perceptions are themselves representations. Arnauld's remarks on this topic are a bit obscure, however, and they prompted A. O. Lovejoy to hold that the dispute between Arnauld and Malebranche was not about a *tertium quid* between the mind and the object, but about a *quartium quid* between the idea in the mind and the object.[15] That is, Lovejoy took the dispute to be not over a representationalist theory of ideas, but over the question of whether these representations are in the human mind or in God's. Lovejoy further agreed with Thomas Reid that the argument against Malebranche given above also applies to Arnauld's own view.[16] I think Lovejoy is mistaken about this, but what he noticed about Arnauld's view does show how it can be squared with Cartesian doctrines and how it could well be the view that Descartes himself held.

The major source of Lovejoy's claim is Chapter six of *Des vraies et des fausses idées*, where Arnauld talked about our perceptions of ideas. Arnauld started the discussion by stating there are two ways in which a perception can itself be the immediate object of a perception. The first is that every perception is reflexive, "because I cannot think without knowing that I am thinking; I am not acquainted with a square without knowing that I am acquainted with it; I can't see the sun, or to put things out of all doubt, I can't imagine seeing the sun, without knowing with certainty that I imagine seeing the sun, without knowing with certainty that I imagine seeing it."[17] The second is that one perception can be made of another. He then argued that this second way shows how to interpret the Augustinian position that we "see the properties of things in their ideas" and the Cartesian claim that "all that I see clearly to be contained within the idea of a thing can truly be affirmed of that thing."[18] Arnauld's view was that we can examine our own perceptions of, e.g., a triangle or extended substance and see what features are contained objectively within these perceptions. The original percep-

tions, though, are still perceptions of triangles, extentended substance, etc. and are *not* perceptions of ideas. From this it does not appear that Lovejoy's criticism of Arnauld is valid: Arnauld's criticism of Malebranche does not apply to Arnauld's view.

However, Lovejoy focused on another passage from Chapter six. In this passage, Arnauld attempted to explain how it is that awareness of ideas is immediate and awareness of external objects mediate:

> . . . since each perception is essentially representative of something and therefore is called *idea*, it cannot be essentially reflective on itself unless its immediate object is this *idea*, that is to say, *the objective reality* of the thing that my mind is said to apprehend: so that, if I think of the sun, the objective reality of the sun which is present to my mind is the immediate object of this perception, and the possible or existent sun is the mediate object.[19]

Lovejoy took this passage to show that Arnauld thought that all we have before our minds are "objective realities," and we never perceive the things themselves. If this is the case, his criticism of Arnauld would be valid.

Arnauld did wish to maintain that the perception-idea itself was directly before the mind, and what the idea is an idea of is indirectly present to the mind by way of the perception of it. There is a sense in which only our own mental states are directly present to our mind, and this is what Arnauld was attempting to get across. But this is not to deny that the sun itself is also present to the mind when it is conceived. He agreed with Descartes that there are two modes of existence, objective and formal. It is the objective *existence* of the sun in the idea that is before my mind, not the formal existence. Nevertheless, it is still true that my perception-idea is a perception of the sun and not of some proxy for the sun, and thus it is still not true that Arnauld's attack on Malebranche can be directed at his own view.

III

In his response to Arnauld, Malebranche did not really address the major arguments presented by Arnauld, except to say that he had never held we are unable to perceive bodies, but merely that we perceive them indirectly by directly perceiving ideas.[20] I think it is clear from his response that he did not see the full force of Arnauld's objection, but was more intent on criticizing Arnauld's own position. Here the approach to the theory of ideas was a little different from that in the *Search After Truth*. In that work, Malebranche argued for his ideas as the objects of perception from his claim that the mind has to be intimately joined to the object of awareness. While he repeated this passage from the *Search After Truth* in his response

to Arnauld, there he focused instead on Arnauld's claim that the modification of the soul itself is capable of representing things, the point that Malebranche correctly saw as the major difference between them.

In several places in his response to Arnauld, Malebranche claimed that Arnauld confused *connaître* and *sentir*. Malebranche's view was that the modality of the mind which Arnauld wished to serve as a representative of objects is more more capable of representing an object than a sensation is. This is clear from the list of "metaphysical truths" which Malebranche gave in his reply:

> I. That in order to sense, e.g., pain, it is not necessary to have a representative idea, and that the modality of the soul is sufficient; because it is certain that pain is a modality or modification of the soul;
>
> II. That to be aware of (*connaître*) numbers or geometrical figures, and their relations, an idea is necessary so that the soul can have a perception of it; since without ideas, the soul can have a perception of nothing distinct from itself, and the idea of a circle cannot be a modality of the soul;
>
> III. That in order to see a sensible object, the sun, a tree, a house, etc., two things are necessary, the modality of color, since Arnauld agrees that color is a modification of the soul, and the pure idea [of extension] . . .[21]

Here Malebranche has not given reasons for rejecting the position that a modification of the soul cannot represent anything distinct from the soul and that the idea of a circle cannot be a modification of the soul. When he did give these reasons, he showed just how far he was from the Cartesian notion of objective being: ". . . . every modality is just the thing itself in such and such a way. For example, circularity of a body is just the body itself shaped in such a way that the parts of its surface are equal distance from its center . . . thus, the modality of the soul cannot represent objects, but only its own way of being, that is, the perception it has of the object."[22] The demand here is that in order to represent an attribute of the object, the soul would itself have to have that attribute. Following this line Malebranche also found difficulty in a modification of the soul representing the infinite, or a triangle in general, or something that is distinct from the soul.[23] His reasons are simply that a modification of the soul is finite, must be particular, and cannot be distinct from the soul's substance. In all this Malebranche was simply refusing to allow the modalities of the soul any representational role. Ultimately the only reason he gave for this denial was that Arnauld's view violated St. Augustine's dictum that the mind is not a light unto itself.[24] Further on, he made this view explicit:[25] "All the works of God are subordinate [to God]: the aim of the mind is to see the truth. It is therefore necessary that this intelligible truth is not to be found in bodies, inferior substances, nor in *essentially representative modalities* (because the

soul is not its own light and reason, it sees only darkness, or confused sensations, when contemplating itself) . . . ."[26] Malebranche thus put the soul's powers in a very low position.

This point comes up again in his response to another of Arnauld's criticisms, which Malebranche claimed applied to Arnauld himself. Arnauld had claimed that a consequence of Malebranche's view is that when we look at a woman, we see God. Malebranche responded that on Arnauld's view, when we look at a woman, we see our own souls. Here is his reasoning:

> When a woman is seen, is it not the color of her face that makes her visible? and if there is no color, does one see her? According to Aranuld, the color is not in the woman, but is a modification of the soul. Therefore, according to his reasoning, no man has ever loved a woman; because one can only love what one sees, and one only sees color, or colored extension, which is only a modality of the soul.[27]

Arnauld's response to this is that the answer to the questions are "Yes" and "No" respectively only if one restricts "see" to vision, and in this sense the conclusion does not follow, for "Do not the blind love their wives, their children, their fathers, their mothers?"[28] Arnauld then made it quite clear that his notion of seeing is wider than immediate sense perception. In response to Malebranche's claim that one only sees color, Arnauld said "When one sees a column of white marble, one does not just see whiteness, one sees also a column of marble."[29]

In his rather long response to Malebranche's main charge, Arnauld reiterated his claim that our perceptions must be representatives of things. If I perceive a square, my perception is a perception of a square, and is in this sense a representative of the square (although it does not resemble the square). This is why it is a perception of a square rather than a circle. According to Malebranche, our souls are not capable of representing anything; all representation is in the mind of God. But then it is hard to see how a perception of a square, which Malebranche does think is a modification of the soul, can be a perception of a square, rather than a circle. Bringing in Malebranche's ideas in the mind of God won't help here, for it is the soul that has to have the perception of the square rather than the circle.

This part of the controversy is reminiscent of the controversy over divine illumination in the Middle Ages. Malebranche here can be seen as siding with those who took the extreme view that the only proper objects of knowledge are the uncreated exemplars in God. While Malebranche simply claimed that the soul could not represent anything other than itself, they argued that since the things in the world are changeable (and so cannot be

the source of something unchangeable, like knowledge) and the soul itself is changeable, what inheres in the soul is even more mutable and so certainly cannot be the source of knowledge. Such was, according to Duns Scotus, the opinion of Henry of Ghent.[30] Duns Scotus attacked this view as leading to scepticism: "If an object is continually changing we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light, for there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is . . . . Likewise, if the mutability of the exemplar in our soul makes certitude impossible, then it follows that nothing in the soul could prevent it from erring, for everything inhering in such a subject is also mutable—even the act of understanding itself. (It follows further that, inasmuch as the act of understanding is even more mutable than the soul in which it resides, it will never be true nor contain truth.)"[31]

While Scotus's Aristotelian position is quite different from Arnauld's Cartesian one, the basic point is the same. Scotus argued that if Henry's view of the mind as too weak and changeable to keep within it an eternal truth is correct, then we are forced to scepticism, because the mind will still be too weak, even with the help of the divine light. Arnauld argues that we are capable of thinking of things, indeed all thought is thought about something,[32] from this it follows that our minds must be capable of representing objects; indeed, all Arnauld means by an act of awareness representing an object is that the act is in some sense directed toward the object. If our minds were too weak to do this, as Malebranche suggested, it would follow that we cannot think about anything except our own minds, even if there are exemplars in God's mind.

IV

It is clear that Descartes did not hold Malebranche's view that our minds are incapable of containing representations at all, but it is less clear that he did not hold that the objects of our mental perceptions were themselves ideas rather than the objects themselves. Anthony Kenny held that evidence for this position can be found in Descartes' response to Caterus's objection to the demand that ideas need a cause for their objective reality. In his reply to Caterus Descartes said,

> Notice that he is referring to the thing itself as if it were located outside the intellect, and in this sense 'objective being in the intellect' is certainly an extraneous label; but I was speaking of the idea, which is never outside the intellect, and in this sense 'objective being' simply means being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there. . . . but if the question is about what the idea of the sun is, and we answer that it is the thing which is thought

> of, in so far as it has objective being in the intellect, no one will take this to be the sun itself with this extraneous label applied to it.[33]

It certainly looks from the end of this passage as though Descartes was making a distinction between the thing thought of, which has objective being in the intellect, and the actual object, the sun. This is why Kenny took this passage as evidence that Descartes thought that what we think of are not objects, but proxies for objects.[34]

Given Caterus's objection, it is clear that Descartes needed to distinguish the objective and formal modes of existence, and this is exactly what he is doing here. He wished to show that there is something about the idea, namely its content or objective reality, for which one may inquire after the cause. But this is not the same as asking for the cause of the thing, which Descartes would agree does not even have to exist. It can still be the case that the idea is an idea of the thing and not, as Kenny suggests, an idea of a proxy for the thing. In fact, in the rest of the passage, Descartes said that it is the sun itself, not a proxy for the sun, that exists in the intellect:

> 'Objective being in the intellect' will not here mean 'the determination of an act of the intellect by means of an object', but will signify the object's being in the intellect in the way in which its objects are normally there. By this I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect—not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect.[35]

From this passage it should be clear that Descartes, like Arnauld, held the view that our perceptions are in general of objects and not proxies for objects.

Recent works on Descartes' ideas have tended to interpret Descartes in a way similar to Arnauld.[36] But a challenge to this way of reading Descartes came from Martial Gueroult, who argued that there were three distinct definitions of ideas in Descartes' *Meditations*. The first, which he called the psychological account, is that of an idea as a mode of the mind. The second account, which he called the phenomenological account, is that "ideas are only those thoughts that represent to us a thing by means of a picture—in brief, that have, at least at first sight, a representative content."[37] The third account, which Gueroult called the metaphysical, is that ideas are only those representatives which have objective validity, or in Cartesian terms are clear and distinct. Gueroult pointed out that any mode of the mind counts as an idea on the first definition, and it is only as Descartes progressed through the *Meditations* that he arrived at the more sophisticated account of ideas which focuses on the idea not as a mode of the mind, but as a representative with objective validity. Gueroult called Arnauld a "weak

Cartesian" for focusing on the first definition, and he called Leibniz and Malebranche "great Cartesians" for focusing on the second and third definitions and for rejecting the first account.[38]

Gueroult sided with Malebranche in suggesting that the focus should not be on the idea as a mode of the mind, but on the content of the representations. Two points should be made. Arnauld did, in the course of his work, focus on the first account, but even in that account Descartes said that an "image in the corporeal imagination" can only be called an idea in so far as it "gives form to the mind itself,"[39] and Arnauld made it clear that the ideas (modes of the mind) that he is concerned with are just those that have representational content, that have objective reality. Arnauld demanded that these representatives should not be seen as distinct from the modes of the mind, and that they are representatives of things, not ideas. This move required that he see cognition as something quite different from bodily sensation. Malebranche, on the other hand, took sensation as the paradigm for all that the mind is capable of doing, and thus argued that cognition requires ideas in the mind of God.

The second point is that Malebranche's argument with Arnauld does not put him any closer to Descartes. His position on the power of the human mind is not at all within the spirit of Descartes, and it was on this basis that he rejected Arnauld's view of ideas. Furthermore, his view that the objects of our perceptions are ideas in God's mind and not the extended world led him to reject Descartes' argument for the existence of the material world. Our knowledge of this existence, he claimed, is based solely on the creation story in the book of Genesis.

Nevertheless, there is the question whether all modifications of the mind have objective reality. Certain things Arnauld said suggest that he held this to be the case. It is well known that Arnauld and Descartes disagreed in the Fourth Objection and Replies over the question of whether our idea of cold, for example, has objective reality. It may well be that this point remains a point of difference between these two, but I do not think it is as central as Gueroult made it, because I do not see that there is a conflict between maintaining on the one hand that an idea is a modification of the mind, and on the other that it is something that has objective reality.[40]

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NOTES

1. All citations from these last three will be from *Oeuvres Philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld* ed. by Jules Simon (Paris: Adolphe Delahays, 1843). This edition includes Malebranche's *Réponse* and Arnauld's *Défence*. All the translations are mine.
2. Descartes, *Meditations* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* vol. II, Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) (hereafter, C), p. 7 (AT VII, 8).
3. Ibid., pp. 27–28 (AT VII, 40).
4. Malebranche, *Search After Truth*, Thomas Lennon and John Olscamp, trans. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1980), p. 230.
5. Ibid., p. 217.
6. Ibid., p. 218.
7. Ibid. (Elucidations), p. 625.
8. Arnauld, *Des vraies et des fausses idées*, ch. V, p. 51.
9. Ibid., ch. V, p. 56.
10. Ibid., ch. IV, p. 40.
11. Ibid., ch. V, p. 52.
12. Ibid., ch. X, pp. 82–83.
13. Malebranche, *Search After Truth*, p. 217.
14. Ibid., ch. V, pp. 55–56.
15. A. O. Lovejoy, " 'Representative Ideas' in Malebranche and Arnauld," *Mind* 32, N. S., no. 28, p. 459.
16. Ibid., p. 458, and Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1785), p. 195.
17. Arnauld, *Des vraies et des fausses idées*, ch. VI, p. 58.
18. Ibid., ch. VI, p. 65.
19. Ibid., ch. VI, p. 59.
20. Malebranche, *Réponse*, p. 359.
21. Ibid., p. 313.
22. Ibid., p. 315.
23. Ibid., p. 315 for infinite, p. 319 for general.
24. Ibid., p. 323.
25. Ibid., p. 364.
26. Ibid., p. 364.
27. Ibid., p. 334.
28. Arnauld, *Défence*, p. 529.
29. Ibid., p. 530.
30. John Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, Allan Wolter, trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill, 1962), pp. 108–09.
31. Ibid., p. 111.
32. Arnauld, *Des vraies et des fausses idées*, ch. I, p. 33.
33. Descartes, C. II, p. 74 (AT VII, 102).
34. Anthony Kenny, *Descartes* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 116.
35. Descartes, C. II, p. 75 (AT VII, 102).
36. See for example Thomas M. Lennon, "The Inherence Pattern and Descartes' *Ideas*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 12, January 1974, Brian O'Neil,

Epistemological Direct Realism in Descartes' Philosophy (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), and John W. Yolton, *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

37. Martial Gueroult, *Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons*, vol. II, Roger Ariew, trans. (Minneapolis, MN: Univesity of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 253.

38. Ibid., p. 254.

39. Descartes, CII, p. 113 (AT VII, 161).

40. This work was inspired by an NEH Summer Seminar I attended in 1986, directed by Marjorie Grene. I wish to thank Professor Grene for drawing my attention to Arnauld's work on ideas and for making the material available to me.