



Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

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Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

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Assignments

Week 9: Berkeley 2

Takaharu Oda, PhD (odat@tcd.ie)

Southern University of Science and Technology
SS149 (社会科学中心), Spring 2024

Early Modern Western Philosophy (17th-18th Centuries)

近代西方哲学（十七-十八世纪）



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- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
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A Quiz from the Last Week

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Assignments

Quiz 9: For George Berkeley, if 'matter' is not an idea, then what is it?

- ① Existing
- ② Sensitive
- ③ Passive
- ④ Nonexistent

This is not related to your final grade, but intended to observe your understanding of the last class.



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Quiz 9: For George Berkeley, if 'matter' is not an idea, then what is it?

- ① Existing
- ② Sensitive
- ③ Passive [matter is neither passive nor active, if it is not an idea]
- ④ **Nonexistent [matter can't exist if it is not an idea perceived by the mind]**

This is not related to your final grade, but intended to observe your understanding of the last class.



Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments

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Formulating and Analyzing Arguments

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Assignments

Two basic rules of inference, specifically, deduction

- 1 *Modus ponens*, 'mode that affirms': from 'if φ , then ψ ' (P1) and φ (P2), we can infer ψ (C)

$$\varphi \supset \psi, \varphi \vdash \psi$$

- 2 *Modus tollens*, 'mode that denies': from 'if φ , then ψ ' (P1) and *not- ψ* (P2), we can infer *not- φ* (C)

$$\varphi \supset \psi, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \varphi$$



'one person's *modus ponens* is another's *modus tollens*'
Consider this contrast between *twelve* objections and Berkeley's replies.



Formulating and Analyzing Arguments

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Consider this contrast between twelve objections and Berkeley's replies.



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Consider this contrast between *twelve* objections and Berkeley's replies.



Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality

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Objection 1 (*PHK* §§34–40)

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First then, it will be objected that [...] all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a **chimerical** scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional.

– Objector 1, *PHK* §34

Objector 1: Edward Stillingfleet (the collection in Marsh's Library)

A chimerical scheme of ideas takes place if we expunge the existence of matter. (See his *Vindication* 1697, 235: targeting Locke and Toland, Stillingfleet makes an argument against the reasoning of 'the Gentlemen' who 'have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World'; Pearce 2014, 434)



First then, it will be objected that [...] all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a **chimerical** [relating to an imaginary beast 'chimera' in Greek mythology, a lion with the head of a goat protruding from its back and a tail that is a snake's head, i.e. a mere product without confirmed existence in reality] scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional.

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Objection 1 (*PHK* §§34–40)

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Objector 1: Edward Stillingfleet

A chimerical scheme of ideas takes place if we expunge the existence of matter (corporeal substance).

Objector 1's Argument

- ① 'All things that exist, exist only in the mind' ('that is, they are purely notional', recall Berkeley's *esse est percipi* principle).
- ② If 'all that is real and substantial in nature' *is not* banished out of the world and 'a chimerical scheme of ideas' *does not* take place (the objector's belief), then all things that exist *do not* exist only in the mind (but also outside the mind).
- ③ Therefore, all that is real and substantial in nature *must* be banished out of the world, instead of which the chimerical scheme of ideas *must* take place. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]

$$\psi, \varphi \supset \neg\psi \vdash \neg\varphi$$

Which premiss(es) in the argument would Berkeley undermine?



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Berkeley's Response to Objector 1 (*PHK* §§34–40)

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Objector 1's Argument

- ② If 'all that is real and substantial in nature' *is not* banished out of the world and 'a chimerical scheme of ideas' *does not* take place, then all things that exist *do not* exist only in the mind. [$\varphi \supset \neg\psi$]

Berkeley's Argument 1, rejecting the above P2

- ① The perception of *everything* in our minds makes us distinguish 'realities and chimeras' (§34, [**sub-argument**]).
- ② If the perception of everything in our minds makes us distinguish realities and chimeras, then real things exist *only* in **the mind**.
- ③ Therefore, real things *do* exist only in the mind. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]

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- ① The perception of *everything* in our minds makes us distinguish 'realities and chimeras' (§34, [**sub-argument**]).

Sub-argument for P1 (modus ponens)

[P1-1] If the existence perceived by '**sense or reflexion**' (§35) and the imagination ('framing') are different, then the perception in our minds makes us distinguish realities and chimeras. [P1-2] The existence perceived by sense or reflexion and the imagination are different. [P1-C] Therefore, the perception in our minds makes us distinguish realities and chimeras.



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Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas

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Objection 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Assignments

Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining one's self burnt, and actually being so; this and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets.

– Objector 2, *PHK* §41

Objector 2: John Locke

There is a discrepancy between a thing and its idea. (See his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* §4.2.14: Locke's response to an objection: 'what I call being actually in the Fire, is nothing but a Dream [...]: I answer, [...] of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have [...] the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive.')



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– Objector 2, *PHK* §41

Objector 2: John Locke

There is a discrepancy between a thing and its idea. (See his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* §4.2.14: Locke's response to an objection: 'what I call being actually in the Fire, is nothing but a Dream [...]: I answer, [...] of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have [...] the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive.')



Objection 2 (*PHK* §41)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

Objector 2: John Locke

There is a discrepancy between a thing and its idea.

Objector 2's Argument

- ① If there is no 'great difference betwixt real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire' (i.e. between 'actually being so' and 'dreaming or imagining one's self burnt'), then real fire is the same as dreamed/imagined fire.
- ② Real fire is not the same as dreamed/imagined fire.
- ③ Therefore, there must be a great difference between real fire and the idea of fire. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Objection 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Objection 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Objection 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Assignments

Objector 2's Argument

- 1 If there is no 'great difference betwixt real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire', then real fire is the same as dreamed/imagined fire.

Berkeley's Argument 2, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If there is a distinction between two experiences amongst ideas (such as the idea of real fire and that of imaginary fire, as well as the idea of real pain and that of imaginary pain that the fire '**occasions**'), then real fire and imaginary fire are not identical to each other.
- 2 There is a distinction between two experiences amongst ideas (whence also between two ideas).
- 3 Therefore, real fire and imaginary fire *are not* identical to each other. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens, **n.b. not rejecting the conclusion itself but the above P1 to show Objector 2's argument unacceptable**]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Assignments

Objector 2's Argument

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Assignments

Objector 2's Argument

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- 3 Therefore, real fire and imaginary fire *are not* identical to each other. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens, **n.b. not rejecting the conclusion itself but the above P1 to show Objector 2's argument unacceptable**]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 2 (*PHK* §41)

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Assignments

Objector 2's Argument

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- ② There is a distinction between two experiences amongst ideas (whence also between two ideas).
- ③ Therefore, real fire and imaginary fire *are not* identical to each other. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens, **n.b. not rejecting the conclusion itself but the above P1 to show Objector 2's argument unacceptable**]



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Assignments

~~Objector 2's Argument~~

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- 3 Therefore, real fire and imaginary fire *are not* identical to each other. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens, **n.b. not rejecting the conclusion itself but the above P1 to show Objector 2's argument unacceptable**]



Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision**
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Assignments

Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind, it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles, should be as near to us as our own thoughts.

– Objector 3, *PHK* §42

Objector 3: a group of philosophers in the Cartesian tradition on optics, including Malebranche, Locke, and Molyneux

Distance is *just* perceived by sight. (See Atherton 1990, ch. 5 'Distance and the Issue of Heterogeneity'; Atherton 2019, for all the 12 objections)



Objection 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Objection 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Assignments

Objector 3: a group of philosophers in the Cartesian tradition on optics, including Malebranche, Locke, and Molyneux

Distance is *just* perceived by sight.

Objector 3's Argument

- ① If we *immediately* see things at 'a distance' off (or 'actually without'), then *distance* (or 'outness', §43) is represented by 'visible ideas' (§44).
- ② We *do* immediately see things at a distance off.
- ③ Therefore, distance *is* represented by visible ideas. [P1 and P2 by *modus ponens*]



Objection 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Assignments

Objector 3's Argument

- ② We *do* immediately see things at a distance off.

Berkeley's Argument 3, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we *immediately* see things at a distance, then *distance* is represented by visible ideas.
- ② Distance is *not* represented by visible ideas (because objects of sense, such as real fire, are *only* 'signified', 'suggested', or 'mark[ed] out', to our minds as their *mediate* vision, §§43–44).
- ③ Therefore, we *cannot immediately* see things at a distance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 3 (*PHK* §§42–44)

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Assignments

Objector 3's Argument

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Assignments

Objector 3's Argument

- ② We *do* immediately see things at a distance off.

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Objector 3's Argument

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Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation**
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
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- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
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- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
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- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows, things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived. The trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is some body by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created.

— Objector 4, *PHK* §45

Objector 4: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic philosophers

Things exist owing to God's continuous creation. (However, it is unclear that Berkeley totally discarded this scholastic doctrine of '**continual creation**', §46)



Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

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Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic philosophers

Things exist owing to God's continuous ('continual') creation.

Objector 4's Argument

- ① *Esse est percipi* (i.e. things—'objects of sense'—exist only when they are perceived, or everything ceases to exist whenever it is unperceived, whenever we are 'shutting' our 'eyes').
- ② If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (according to the scholastic 'continual creation' *subsisted* by the 'divine conservation', §46).
- ③ Therefore, things *are* every moment annihilated and created anew.
[P1 and P2 by *modus ponens*]



Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic philosophers

Things exist owing to God's continuous ('continual') creation.

Objector 4's Argument

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- 2 If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (according to the scholastic 'continual creation' *subsisted* by the 'divine conservation', §46).
- 3 Therefore, things are every moment annihilated and created anew.
[P1 and P2 by *modus ponens*]



Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic philosophers

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Objector 4's Argument

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- 3 Therefore, things are every moment annihilated and created anew.
[P1 and P2 by *modus ponens*]



Objection 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic philosophers

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Objector 4's Argument

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- 2 If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (according to the scholastic 'continual creation' *subsisted* by the 'divine conservation', §46).
- 3 Therefore, things are every moment annihilated and created anew.
[P1 and P2 by *modus ponens*]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4's Argument

- ② If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (scholastic 'continual creation', §46).

Berkeley's Argument 4, rejecting the above P2

- ① If the *esse est percipi* principle implies continual creation, then the said principle implies that created things ('objects of sense') do not exist outside *my* mind (or 'this or that particular mind', §48).
- ② The *esse est percipi* principle *does not* imply that created things do not exist outside *my* mind (but rather, implying that they 'have no existence' outside 'all minds whatsoever', especially the divine mind, *without intermittency* or 'intervals', §48 [**sub-argument**]).
- ③ Therefore, the *esse est percipi* principle *cannot* imply continual creation. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

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Assignments

Objector 4's Argument

- ② If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (scholastic 'continual creation', §46).

Berkeley's Argument 4, rejecting the above P2

- ① If the *esse est percipi* principle implies continual creation, then the said principle implies that created things ('objects of sense') do not exist outside *my* mind (or 'this or that particular mind', §48).
- ② The *esse est percipi* principle *does not* imply that created things do not exist outside *my* mind (but rather, implying that they 'have no existence' outside 'all minds whatsoever', especially the divine mind, *without intermittency* or 'intervals', §48 [**sub-argument**]).
- ③ Therefore, the *esse est percipi* principle *cannot* imply continual creation. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4's Argument

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- ① If the *esse est percipi* principle implies continual creation, then the said principle implies that created things ('objects of sense') do not exist outside *my* mind (or 'this or that particular mind', §48).
- ② The *esse est percipi* principle *does not* imply that created things do not exist outside *my* mind (but rather, implying that they 'have no existence' outside 'all minds whatsoever', especially the divine mind, *without intermittency* or 'intervals', §48 [**sub-argument**]).
- ③ Therefore, the *esse est percipi* principle *cannot* imply continual creation. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Assignments

Objector 4's Argument

- 2 If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (scholastic 'continual creation', §46).

Sub-argument for P2

However, Berkeley admits that **Objector 4 is 'not [...] reasonably charged'** because their scholastic doctrine of continual (or continuous) creation does not 'follow' from the unperceived existence of bodies, §48; rather, their doctrine is compatible with his (Durandus-like) view of the divine perception and (mere) conservation, on the lecturer's interpretation. The conservationist account is to view 'the world to be a machine like a clock, made and put in motion by God, but afterwards continuing to go of itself', such that God is merely conserving the created world, without immediate intervention after the creation. On the scholastic Durandus, see Berkeley's 1729 Letter to Samuel Johnson §3 (*Works* II); [Freddoso 1994](#); Oda 2018)



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Objector 4's Argument

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Berkeley's Argument 4, rejecting the above P2

- ① If the *esse est percipi* principle implies continual creation, then the said principle implies that created things ('objects of sense') do not exist outside *my* mind (or 'this or that particular mind', §48).
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- ③ Therefore, the *esse est percipi* principle *cannot* imply continual creation. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 4 (*PHK* §§45–48)

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Objection 12

Assignments

~~Objector 4's Argument~~

- ~~② If *esse est percipi*, then 'things are every moment annihilated and created anew' (scholastic 'continual creation', §40).~~

Berkeley's Argument 4, rejecting the above P2

- ① If the *esse est percipi* principle implies continual creation, then the said principle implies that created things ('objects of sense') do not exist outside *my* mind (or 'this or that particular mind', §48).
- ② The *esse est percipi* principle *does not* imply that created things do not exist outside *my* mind (but rather, implying that they 'have no existence' outside 'all minds whatsoever', especially the divine mind, *without intermittency* or 'intervals', §48 [**sub-argument**]).
- ③ Therefore, the *esse est percipi* principle *cannot* imply continual creation. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

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Objector 5

Objector 6

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Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication**
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Assignments

Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected, that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured, since extension is a mode or attribute, which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists.

– Objector 5, *PHK* §49

Objector 5: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic logicians

Modes or attributes are predicated of the subject 'mind'. (n.b. the predication simply means applying a predicate to a subject/substance in the proposition)



Objection 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Assignments

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Assignments

Objector 5: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic logicians

Modes or attributes are predicated of the subject 'mind'.

Objector 5's Argument

- ① A mode (or attribute, e.g.) 'extension' exists only in a substance (or 'subject', such as 'the mind').
- ② If the mode 'extension' exists in the substance, then 'extension' is truly *predicated of* the substance ('to speak with the Schools', concerning their theories of language different to Berkeley's).
- ③ Therefore, 'extension' is truly *predicated of* the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Objection 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Objector 5's Argument

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- 3 Therefore, 'extension' is truly *predicated of* the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Objector 5: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic logicians

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Assignments

Objector 5: a group of 'Schoolmen' or scholastic logicians

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Assignments

Objector 5's Argument

- 2 If the mode 'extension' exists in the substance, then 'extension' is truly *predicated of* the substance.

Berkeley's Argument 5, rejecting the above P2

- 1 If a mode 'extension' existing in a substance implies the mode being truly predicated of the substance, then everything is predicated of the substance 'mind' as subject.
- 2 *Not* everything is predicated of the substance 'mind' as subject ([sub-argument] because qualities, such as 'extension' and 'figure', *cannot be predicated of* the mind but they are merely 'termed' or said to be 'modes or accidents' of the **object** 'perceived', even though *some other things* can be predicated of the mind as **subject**; some 'perceiving, active being' is called or predicated of 'mind', 'spirit', 'soul' or 'my self', §§2, 89, etc.).
- 3 Therefore, the mode 'extension' existing in the substance *cannot* imply the mode being truly predicated of the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Argument 7

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Assignments

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- 3 Therefore, the mode 'extension' existing in the substance *cannot* imply the mode being truly predicated of the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Objector 5's Argument

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- 3 Therefore, the mode 'extension' existing in the substance *cannot* imply the mode being truly predicated of the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Assignments

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- 3 Therefore, the mode 'extension' existing in the substance *cannot* imply the mode being truly predicated of the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 5 (*PHK* §49)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Object 1

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Assignments

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- ③ Therefore, the mode 'extension' existing in the substance *cannot* imply the mode being truly predicated of the substance. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation**
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 6 (*PHK* §50)

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Assignments

Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these, and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature, do all proceed on the supposition that **corporeal substance or matter does really exist**.

— Objector 6, *PHK* §50

Objector 6: a group of materialist corpuscularians, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Boyle

We have the explanation by the existence of matter or corporeal substance, according to corpuscularianism (i.e. **mechanical hypothesis** that every material substance is composed of minute 'corpuscles').



Objection 6 (*PHK* §50)

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Assignments

Objector 6: a group of materialist corpuscularians, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Boyle

We have the explanation by the existence of matter or corporeal substance, according to corpuscularianism.

Objector 6's Argument

- ① 'A great many things' are 'explained by matter'.
- ② If a great many things are explained by matter, then 'corporeal substance or matter does really exist'.
- ③ Therefore, corporeal substance or matter *does* really exist. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Berkeley's Response to Objector 6 (*PHK* §50)

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Assignments

Objector 6's Argument

- 1 'A great many things' are 'explained by matter'.

Berkeley's Argument 6, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If a great many things are explained by matter, then matter is useful to explain natural 'phenomena' on their '**occasions**' (on the lecturer's view, implying 'occasional causes [...] which are in truth but signs', the 1729 Letter to Johnson §3, *Works* II).
- 2 Matter is *useless* to explain natural phenomena on their occasions (because unlike 'figures, motion, and other qualities', matter does not 'produce any idea' or 'operate on' the mind; the idea of matter has never explained anything [sub-argument]).
- 3 Therefore, a great many things *cannot* be explained by matter according to corpuscularianism. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens, even though Berkeley can be an '*immaterialist corpuscularian*', Garber 1982, 182]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 6 (*PHK* §50)

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- 1 'A great many things' are 'explained by matter'.

Berkeley's Argument 6, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If a great many things are explained by matter, then matter is useful to explain natural 'phenomena' on their '**occasions**' (on the lecturer's view, implying 'occasional causes [...] which are in truth but signs', the 1729 Letter to Johnson §3, *Works* II).
- 2 Matter is *useless* to explain natural phenomena on their occasions (because unlike 'figures, motion, and other qualities', matter does not 'produce any idea' or 'operate on' the mind; the idea of matter has never explained anything [sub-argument]).
- 3 Therefore, a great many things *cannot* be explained by matter according to corpuscularianism. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens, even though Berkeley can be an '*immaterialist corpuscularian*', Garber 1982, 182]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 6 (*PHK* §50)

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Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

~~Objector 6's Argument~~

- ~~① 'A great many things' are explained by matter.~~

Berkeley's Argument 6, rejecting the above P1

- ① If a great many things are explained by matter, then matter is useful to explain natural 'phenomena' on their '**occasions**' (on the lecturer's view, implying 'occasional causes [...] which are in truth but signs', the 1729 Letter to Johnson §3, *Works* II).
- ② Matter is *useless* to explain natural phenomena on their occasions (because unlike 'figures, motion, and other qualities', matter does not 'produce any idea' or 'operate on' the mind; the idea of matter has never explained anything [sub-argument]).
- ③ Therefore, a great many things *cannot* be explained by matter according to corpuscularianism. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens, even though Berkeley can be an '*immaterialist corpuscularian*', Garber 1982, 182]



Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech

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- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech**
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner?

– Objector 7, *PHK* §51

Objector 7: the vulgar who commonly talk about the existence of matter (n.b. ‘vulgar’ had no pejorative sense in Berkeley’s time)

It is absurd to attribute natural causes to the operation of minds, not to matter.



Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

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Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7: the vulgar who commonly talk about matter

It is absurd to attribute natural causes to the operation of minds, not to matter.

Objector 7's Argument

- ① If it is necessary to 'take away natural causes' and 'ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spirits' or minds, then it is not absurd (laughable) to say that 'a spirit heats' or cools, not that 'fire heats, or water cools'.
- ② It *is* absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.
- ③ Therefore, it *must be unnecessary* to take away natural causes and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of minds. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7: the vulgar who commonly talk about matter

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Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7: the vulgar who commonly talk about matter

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Objection 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7: the vulgar who commonly talk about matter

It is absurd to attribute natural causes to the operation of minds, not to matter.

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- ③ Therefore, it *must be unnecessary* to take away natural causes and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of minds. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7's Argument

- ② It *is* absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it *is* not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

'weakly'

In the sense that the vulgar keep talking in their manner, *no matter what* Berkeley philosophizes.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it *is* not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7's Argument

- ② It is absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it is not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 7 (*PHK* §§51–53)

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Assignments

Objector 7's Argument

- ② It is absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
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- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it is not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Assignments

Objector 7's Argument

- ② It is absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

Sub-argument for P2

Because talking about the mental activity is useful/meaningful, whereas talking about corporeal substances of fire or water, namely matter, is useless as it is 'not capable of producing any one effect in Nature', natural phenomenon, 'to no manner of purpose' (§53).

- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it is not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Assignments

Objector 7's Argument

- ② It is absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it is not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Assignments

~~Objector 7's Argument~~

- ~~② It is absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools, not that fire heats or water cools.~~

Berkeley's Argument 7, weakly rejecting the above P2

- ① 'We ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*' (§51, the quote is a scholastic definition about 'the common use of language', found in Thomas of Sutton, Agostino Nifo, et al., avoiding 'the abuse of words' that do not provoke us to act in a useful way, *PHK* Intro §§20–25).
- ② If we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar*, then it is *not absurd* to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool.
- ③ Therefore (even if the vulgar may keep speaking about matter, after all), it *is* not absurd to say that a spirit heats or cools and that fire does not heat or water does not cool. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
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- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent**
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Weekly Quiz

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Assignments

In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of matter or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?

– Objector 8, *PHK* §54

Objector 8: everyone who believes in matter

‘The whole world’ (i.e. everyone, fr. *tout le monde*) universally and concurrently assents to the proposition ‘matter exists’.



Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

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Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

Objector 8: everyone who believes in matter

Everyone universally and concurrently assents to the proposition 'matter exists'.

Objector 8's Argument

- ① Everyone universally and concurrently 'assents' to the proposition 'matter exists' (or 'the existence of external things').
- ② If everyone universally and concurrently does not assent to the proposition 'matter exists', then external material things exist.
- ③ Therefore, external material things *do* exist. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

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Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

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Objection 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

Objector 8: everyone who believes in matter

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

Objector 8's Argument

- ① Everyone universally and concurrently 'assents' to the proposition 'matter exists'.

Berkeley's Argument 8, rejecting both premises, but primarily the above P1

- ① If it is true that everyone universally and concurrently assents to the proposition 'matter exists', then it is possible to believe the proposition in question.
- ② It is *impossible* to believe the proposition in question ([sub-argument] because it 'involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it', if the proposition includes 'the existence of matter or things without the mind', §54).
- ③ Therefore, it must be false that everyone universally and concurrently assents to the proposition 'matter exists'. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Objector 8's Argument

- 1 Everyone universally and concurrently 'assents' to the proposition 'matter exists'.

Berkeley's Argument 8, rejecting both premises, but primarily the above P1

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Berkeley's Response to Objector 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

Objector 8's Argument

- 1 Everyone universally and concurrently 'assents' to the proposition 'matter exists'.

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- 3 Therefore, it must be false that everyone universally and concurrently assents to the proposition 'matter exists'. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 8 (*PHK* §§54–55)

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Assignments

Objector 8's Argument

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Assignments

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Berkeley's Argument 8, rejecting both premises, but primarily the above P1

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- ③ Therefore, it must be false that everyone universally and concurrently assents to the proposition 'matter exists'. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief

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Objector 5

Objector 6

Objector 7

Objector 8

Objector 9

Objector 10

Objector 11

Objector 12

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief**
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 9

[Ninthly] it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice [i.e. 'settled speculative opinion' (§54) or 'false opinion' (§55) to believe the nonsense of the proposition 'matter exists'], and account for its obtaining in the world. (clarification added)

- Objector 9, *PHK* §56



Objection 9

[Ninthly] it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice [i.e. 'settled speculative opinion' (§54) or 'false opinion' (§55) to believe the nonsense of the proposition 'matter exists'], and account for its obtaining in the world. (clarification added)

- Objector 9, *PHK* §56

Objector 9: a group of *bona fide* materialists, such as Hobbes

We believe in matter. (Actually, this objection resembles Objection 8)



Objection 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9: a group of *bona fide* materialists, such as Hobbes

We believe in matter.

Objector 9's Argument

- ① There is an explanation (or 'account') for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- ② If matter does not exist, then there is no explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- ③ Therefore, matter *must* exist. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens; **this argument was to be rebutted by the same argument that Berkeley posited in response to Objector 8**]



Objection 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9: a group of *bona fide* materialists, such as Hobbes

We believe in matter.

Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation (or 'account') for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 2 If matter does not exist, then there is no explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 3 Therefore, matter *must* exist. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens; **this argument was to be rebutted by the same argument that Berkeley posited in response to Objector 8**]



Objection 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9: a group of *bona fide* materialists, such as Hobbes

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Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation (or 'account') for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 2 If matter does not exist, then there is no explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 3 Therefore, matter *must* exist. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens; **this argument was to be rebutted by the same argument that Berkeley posited in response to Objector 8**]



Objection 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9: a group of *bona fide* materialists, such as Hobbes

We believe in matter.

Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation (or 'account') for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 2 If matter does not exist, then there is no explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.
- 3 Therefore, matter *must* exist. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens; **this argument was to be rebutted by the same argument that Berkeley posited in response to Objector 8**]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.

Berkeley's Argument 9, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If not everyone, be they vulgar or learned, believes (or 'assents to') the proposition 'matter exists', then it is unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter.
- 2 Not everyone believes the proposition 'matter exists' (because without the existence of matter, we are conscious that 'ideas of sense'—perceived objects—are always 'marked out' or signified to our minds, §57).
- 3 Therefore, it *is* unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

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Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9's Argument

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Berkeley's Argument 9, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If not everyone, be they vulgar or learned, believes (or 'assents to') the proposition 'matter exists', then it is unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter.
- 2 Not everyone believes the proposition 'matter exists' (because without the existence of matter, we are conscious that 'ideas of sense'—perceived objects—are always 'marked out' or signified to our minds, §57).
- 3 Therefore, it *is* unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.

Berkeley's Argument 9, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If not everyone, be they vulgar or learned, believes (or 'assents to') the proposition 'matter exists', then it is unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter.
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- 3 Therefore, it *is* unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument ?

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 9's Argument

- 1 There is an explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.

Berkeley's Argument 9, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If not everyone, be they vulgar or learned, believes (or 'assents to') the proposition 'matter exists', then it is unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter.
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- 3 Therefore, it *is* unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 9 (*PHK* §§56–57)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

~~Objector 9's Argument~~

- ~~1 There is an explanation for everyone's belief that matter exists.~~

Berkeley's Argument 9, rejecting the above P1

- 1 If not everyone, be they vulgar or learned, believes (or 'assents to') the proposition 'matter exists', then it is unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter.
- 2 Not everyone believes the proposition 'matter exists' (because without the existence of matter, we are conscious that 'ideas of sense'—perceived objects—are always 'marked out' or signified to our minds, §57).
- 3 Therefore, it *is* unnecessary to explain why everyone believes in matter. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science**
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 10 (*PHK* §§58–59)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers, as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons; but on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.

– Objector 10, *PHK* §58

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.



Objection 10 (*PHK* §§58–59)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers, as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons; but on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.

– Objector 10, *PHK* §58

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.



Objection 10 (*PHK* §§58–59)

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Weekly Quiz

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Objection 5

Objection 6

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Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.

Objector 10's Argument

- ① If 'the motion of the earth' is 'only an idea', then the moving earth *unperceived by sense* does not exist.
- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.
- ③ Therefore, the motion of the earth *cannot* be only an idea. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Objection 10

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.

Objector 10's Argument

- ① If 'the motion of the earth' is 'only an idea', then the moving earth *unperceived by sense* does not exist.
- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.
- ③ Therefore, the motion of the earth *cannot* be only an idea. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Objection 10 (*PHK* §§58–59)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

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Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.

Objector 10's Argument

- 1 If 'the motion of the earth' is 'only an idea', then the moving earth *unperceived by sense* does not exist.
- 2 The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.
- 3 Therefore, the motion of the earth *cannot* be only an idea. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Objection 10 (*PHK* §§58–59)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10: a group of astronomers, e.g. Kepler, Galileo, Newton
Immaterialism is inconsistent with certain *real* discoveries in science.

Objector 10's Argument

- 1 If 'the motion of the earth' is 'only an idea', then the moving earth *unperceived by sense* does not exist.
- 2 The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.
- 3 Therefore, the motion of the earth *cannot* be only an idea. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 10 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10's Argument

- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.

Berkeley's Argument 10, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth, then it is false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
- ② We indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth ([sub-argument] because, *even if we do not directly or immediately perceive* it ourselves, we can say 'sure and well-grounded predictions' about the ideas observed by astronomers as '**the knowledge of Nature**', §58).
- ③ Therefore, it *is* false that the moving earth exists unperceived. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 10 (*PHK* §§56–57)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10's Argument

- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.

Berkeley's Argument 10, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth, then it is false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
- ② We indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth ([sub-argument] because, *even if we do not directly or immediately perceive* it ourselves, we can say 'sure and well-grounded predictions' about the ideas observed by astronomers as '**the knowledge of Nature**', §58).
- ③ Therefore, it *is* false that the moving earth exists unperceived. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 10 (*PHK* §§56–57)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument ?

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10's Argument

- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.

Berkeley's Argument 10, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth, then it is false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
- ② We indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth ([sub-argument] because, *even if we do not directly or immediately perceive* it ourselves, we can say 'sure and well-grounded predictions' about the ideas observed by astronomers as '**the knowledge of Nature**', §58).
- ③ Therefore, it *is* false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
[P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 10 (*PHK* §§56–57)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument ?

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 10's Argument

- ② The moving earth unperceived by sense *does* exist.

Berkeley's Argument 10, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth, then it is false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
- ② We indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth ([sub-argument] because, *even if we do not directly or immediately perceive* it ourselves, we can say 'sure and well-grounded predictions' about the ideas observed by astronomers as '**the knowledge of Nature**', §58).
- ③ Therefore, it *is* false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
[P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 10 (*PHK* §§56–57)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

~~Objector 10's Argument~~

- ~~② The moving earth unperceived by sense does exist.~~

Berkeley's Argument 10, rejecting the above P2

- ① If we indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth, then it is false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
- ② We indirectly or mediately *perceive* the motion of the earth ([sub-argument] because, *even if we do not directly or immediately perceive* it ourselves, we can say 'sure and well-grounded predictions' about the ideas observed by astronomers as '**the knowledge of Nature**', §58).
- ③ Therefore, it *is* false that the moving earth exists unperceived.
[P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objector 1

Objector 2

Objector 3

Objector 4

Objector 5

Objector 6

Objector 7

Objector 8

Objector 9

Objector 10

Objector 11

Objector 12

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design**
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the admirable mechanism in the parts of animals [... T]hough an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed [...] it is **an intelligence** which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. [...] The like may be said of all **the clockwork of nature**, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope.

– Objector 11, *PHK* §60

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

The material mechanisms of nature that God designed are efficient causes as ideas. (See Schliesser 2020, 62–65: ‘Posidonian Argument’, i.e. argument from design, as Posidonius’ portable planetarium resembles the structure of the celestial globe)



Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

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– Objector 11, *PHK* §60

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

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Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

The material mechanisms of nature that God designed are efficient causes as ideas.

Objector 11's Argument

- 1 There is reason (or teleological 'purpose') for the complexity of the mechanisms (e.g. 'the clockwork of nature' and 'regularity') that God has designed (or 'an intelligence' has created).
- 2 If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes (because it is false that they 'being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them', §60).
- 3 Therefore, the mechanisms *are* genuine efficient causes. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument ?

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

The material mechanisms of nature that God designed are efficient causes as ideas.

Objector 11's Argument

- 1 There is reason (or teleological 'purpose') for the complexity of the mechanisms (e.g. 'the clockwork of nature' and 'regularity') that God has designed (or 'an intelligence' has created).
- 2 If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes (because it is false that they 'being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them', §60).
- 3 Therefore, the mechanisms *are* genuine efficient causes. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

The material mechanisms of nature that God designed are efficient causes as ideas.

Objector 11's Argument

- 1 There is reason (or teleological 'purpose') for the complexity of the mechanisms (e.g. 'the clockwork of nature' and 'regularity') that God has designed (or 'an intelligence' has created).
- 2 If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes (because it is false that they 'being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them', §60).
- 3 Therefore, the mechanisms *are* genuine efficient causes. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Objection 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument ?

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11: Samuel Clarke

The material mechanisms of nature that God designed are efficient causes as ideas.

Objector 11's Argument

- 1 There is reason (or teleological 'purpose') for the complexity of the mechanisms (e.g. 'the clockwork of nature' and 'regularity') that God has designed (or 'an intelligence' has created).
- 2 If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes (because it is false that they 'being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them', §60).
- 3 Therefore, the mechanisms *are* genuine efficient causes. [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
Berkeley 2

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

Objection 5

Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11's Argument

- ② If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes.

Berkeley's Argument 11, rejecting the above P2

- ① If it is rational to believe that God's design of complex mechanisms implies genuine efficient causes, then the connection of ideas imply the relation of cause and effect.
- ② 'The connexion of ideas *does not* imply the relation of cause and effect ('but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified', §65, because nothing is 'under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects', and [sub-argument] everything is about signs—the semiotic relation of things and the 'signs instituted by the Author of Nature', God, §66).
- ③ Therefore, it *must be irrational* to believe that God's design of complex mechanisms implies genuine efficient causes. [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



Berkeley's Response to Objector 11 (*PHK* §§60–66)

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

Objection 4

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Objection 6

Objection 7

Objection 8

Objection 9

Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 11's Argument

- ② If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes.

Berkeley's Argument 11, rejecting the above P2

- ① If it is rational to believe that God's design of complex mechanisms implies genuine efficient causes, then the connection of ideas imply the relation of cause and effect.
- ② 'The connexion of ideas *does not* imply the relation of cause and effect ('but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified', §65, because nothing is 'under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects', and [sub-argument] everything is about signs—the semiotic relation of things and the 'signs instituted by the Author of Nature', God, §66).
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Objection 10

Objection 11

Objection 12

Assignments

~~Objector 11's Argument~~

- ~~2 If there is reason for the complexity of the mechanisms that God has designed, then the mechanisms are genuine efficient causes.~~

Berkeley's Argument 11, rejecting the above P2

- 1 If it is rational to believe that God's design of complex mechanisms implies genuine efficient causes, then the connection of ideas imply the relation of cause and effect.
- 2 'The connexion of ideas *does not* imply the relation of cause and effect ('but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified', §65, because nothing is 'under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects', and [sub-argument] everything is about signs—the semiotic relation of things and the 'signs instituted by the Author of Nature', God, §66).
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Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objector 1

Objector 2

Objector 3

Objector 4

Objector 5

Objector 6

Objector 7

Objector 8

Objector 9

Objector 10

Objector 11

Objector 12

Assignments

- 1 Weekly Quiz
- 2 Review: Formulating and Analyzing Arguments
- 3 Arguments of Objector 1 and Berkeley about Reality
- 4 Arguments of Objector 2 and Berkeley about Ideas
- 5 Arguments of Objector 3 and Berkeley about Vision
- 6 Arguments of Objector 4 and Berkeley about Creation
- 7 Arguments of Objector 5 and Berkeley about Predication
- 8 Arguments of Objector 6 and Berkeley about Explanation
- 9 Arguments of Objector 7 and Berkeley about Speech
- 10 Arguments of Objector 8 and Berkeley about Assent
- 11 Arguments of Objector 9 and Berkeley about Belief
- 12 Arguments of Objector 10 and Berkeley about Science
- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism**
- 15 Assignments for the Next Lecture



Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72)

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

Objection 2

Objection 3

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Objection 6

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Objection 9

Objection 10

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Objection 12

Assignments

In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected, that though it be clear from what has been said, that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe matter; yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of ‘matter’ the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity, and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is **the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God** is pleased to excite ideas in us: it does not appear, but that matter taken in this sense may possibly exist.

– Objector 12, *PHK* §67

Objector 12: a group of occasionalists, esp. Nicolas Malebranche

Matter exists as an *occasion* on which God excites ideas in our minds; overall, **none of Berkeley’s arguments thus far undermine this conception of matter.**



Objection 12 (*PHK* §§67–72)

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Objection 12

Assignments

Objector 12: a group of occasionalists, esp. Nicolas Malebranche

Matter exists as an *occasion* on which God excites ideas in our minds.

Objector 12's Argument

- ① Matter ('an inert senseless substance') is an *occasion* for God to excite ideas in our minds.
- ② If matter is an *occasion* for God to excite ideas in our minds, then matter exists in some sense of the term 'occasion' (because the term may imply causation, or relation of 'the agent' or 'efficient cause' and 'effect', in which matter can be an *occasional* cause, if not the agent or efficient cause, §68).
- ③ Therefore, matter *does* exist in some sense of the term 'occasion' (implying occasionalism, on the lecturer's interpretation). [P1 and P2 by modus ponens]



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Berkeley's Argument 12, rejecting the above P2

- ① If matter is an occasion for God to excite ideas in our minds, then matter exists in some sense of the term 'occasion'.
- ② *Never* does matter exist in any sense of the term 'occasion' (because matter does not **cause**, or it 'neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived [...] by sense nor reflexion', §68).
- ③ Therefore, matter *cannot* be an *occasion* for God to excite ideas in our minds (denying occasionalism, which is 'a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition', §53, also in response to Objection 7). [P1 and P2 by modus tollens]



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Assignments for the Next Lecture

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- 13 Arguments of Objector 11 and Berkeley about Design
- 14 Arguments of Objector 12 and Berkeley about Occasionalism
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Further Considerations

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

Objection 1

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Objection 3

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Objection 12

Assignments

Essay Questions in Part II

- 1 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about occasional causes, compared with Malebranche's occasionalism. [last week and Objection 12]
- 2 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument against one of the twelve objections in the *Principles*.
 - ♣ For all the 12 objections, review Atherton 2020, ch. 5.
- 3 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument about embodiment in the *Three Dialogues*. [next week]
- 4 Critically evaluate Berkeley's argument for mechanical causes as distinguished from metaphysical ones in *De motu*.



Further Considerations

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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

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Next Week 10: Berkeley 3

Week 9:
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Weekly Quiz

Argument 7

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Objection 12

Assignments



Assignment 1: Read Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, Preface and Dialogue 1, pp. 167-207; Dialogue 2, pp. 208–226 (*Works II*; Clarke 2008, pp. 151ff).



Assignment 2: Read the 'Argument Advice' and 'Essay Questions' in PDF. And ask me or your assigned TA for anything unclear in the documents and slides.

- Keep active in the **WeCom/企业微信** group for this course, and pay attention to the **Blackboard** (SS149, Spring 2024), in which you can find all the basic info and recommended references.
- **Office hours** of the instructor (Center for Social Sciences, C111) and TAs (their offices) are Mondays 2-4pm, or any working time of appointment, by WeCom direct message or email.